Command Planning Group

22 MAR 2004

"Linking the Long Range Plan To the Current Fight"

The overall classification of this briefing is SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI//X1
Page 2 redacted for the following reason:
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1.4b, 1.4d
**Sadr Update**

**Political Activity**
- Sadr campaigning for tribal leaders support in Najaf; willing to pay monthly salaries
- Sadr losing support in Sadr City
- Hawza clerics fear reprisals if they object to Sadr's Koran interpretations
- Political organizations in Basra want governor of Basra removed
- Basra OMS believes IPS sent to Najaf to assassinate Sistani and arrest Sadr

**Military Activity**
- Three units from Mahdi's Army have been recruited for suicide operations
- Member of Sadr's organization reportedly going to collect ~400 suicide vests
- Weapons moved from the Mahdi's Army training facility in Twairij to the Ammara Bin Yasser Mosque (T)
- There are between 2000-3000 armed members of Mahdi's Army; many more that are not armed (T)

**Outlook**
- Will continue to build power base around growing population of Shiite poor, combining prestige of Sadr family name with power and authority of his illegal Shari'a court and prison and armed Mahdi army supporters
- Will continue his quest for power and influence
- Long-range vision is ill-defined; poised to seize initiative created by civil unrest to foment revolution in Iraq
Kongra Gel (PKK/KGK)

Background
- 3500-4000 armed fighters and most key leaders in NIZ
- On again off again cease fires with GOT
- Still reeling from 1999 capture of Abdullah Ocalan
- Large influential Diaspora in Europe

Operational Trends
- Continued internal struggles for power and direction of the movement
- Indications of fighter morale deteriorating
- Hardliners considering increased militancy to offset harmful effects of inaction
- Party Congress in early April to decide direction
- Elements within KGK appear to be expanding relations with KDP
- Makhmur a microcosm of overall KGK problems

Vulnerabilities
- Coalescing of regional powers against KGK, at least rhetorically
- Internal problems make IO an effective tool to push current fissures
- PUK remains opposed to KGK presence
- Key leaders continue to feel relatively unimpeded in NIZ which may be degrading their security consciousness
- Apo imprisonment makes KGK C2 problematic and susceptible

Effects of Coalition Activity
- CPA pronouncements against KGK further isolating the group
- IGC lack of declaration against KGK has opposite effect to above
- Increasing interface with Turkey and EUCOM providing better sources of intelligence

Outlook
- KGK Spring Offensive may occur, uncertain due to rivalries and fluid decision making process
- April Party Congress unlikely to settle differences but instead solidify fissures
- KGK will continue to expand political infrastructure in NIZ
Iraqi Insurgency

Operational Trends
- Coalescing of disparate individuals and groups
- Evolving C2
- Increased Sunni extremist involvement
- Infiltration/corruption of police forces; increased vocal support to the resistance
- Increase attacks on soft targets
- Some fighters reaching their culminating point; request pardons

Vulnerabilities
- Resources diminishing; reliance on key facilitators for funding
- No recognizable unifying leadership, spokesman or party; no central focus
- Limited freedom of movement of key leaders
- Dependence on tribal/religious ties

Effects of Coalition Activity
- Emergence of secondary personalities assuming control of cells following capture of key personnel
- Key leaders remain underground
- Anti-coalition forces adjusting TTP's to counter CF countermeasures
- Criminals taking advantage of the situation
- Cell structure is fluid, particularly in the west and southern regions
- FRE staging/base moving to rural areas

Outlook
- Formation of legitimate and semi-legitimate political parties
- Develop theme of protect Sunni interests, anti-West
- Will attempt to evolve organization/ C2 focused on security/political fronts
- Exploit ties to extremists, FFs and tribal and religious figures for funding and resources
- Continue attacks focused on CF and pro-Coalition "collaborators"
- Keep Coalition off balance and reactive; demonstrate inability of GC to govern; leverage regional media
- Continue to demonstrate the ability to adapt and adjust to changes in the operational environment
Current Threat: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Network

Status
- Recent publicity of Zarqawi could strengthen credibility and reputation
- 2 Mar Ashura attacks match Zarqawi MO, intent
- Recent VBIED attacks fit a pattern that matches Zarqawi letter
- Seeks to incite Sunni-Shia sectarian violence
- Likely collaborating with al-Qaida operatives

Intelligence Gaps
- Location of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and senior associates
- Details of planned operations
- Sources of funding, established travel routes of new recruits, and training

Most Likely Targets
- Shia mosques, leaders, gatherings
- US/Coalition forces
- Iraqi Military and Police
- Kurdish leaders, interests

Vulnerabilities
- Financiers/facilitators outside of Iraq
- Cell leaders in IZ
- Rivalry / distrust among members
- Foreign extremists viewed as "outsider"

Outlook
- "Zero Hour" has arrived; expect additional near-term attacks
- Multiple, large-scale, simultaneous attacks
- Continue to absorb AI and other Salafist elements
- Operatives with specific expertise present
Emerging Threat: al-Qaida

Status
- Providing money and recruits
- Some anti-Coalition attacks assessed to be AQ supported
- Elements of Ansar al-Islam and other Salafist groups maybe turning to AQ for leadership, expertise
- May already be present, collaborating with Zarqawi

Intelligence Gaps
- Location of senior operatives / leadership
- AQ cells prepping/operating in Iraq with little or no footprint
- Details of planned operations
- AQ logistical pipeline into Iraq, sources of funding, established travel routes of new recruits, and training program
- Relationship with other extremist elements in Iraq

Outlook
- Results of Madrid bombing may embolden AQ to attack other Coalition partners
- Senior operatives present
- Multiple, large-scale, simultaneous attacks
- AQ elements will cooperate with Al affiliates where their interests overlap

Most Likely Targets
- Coalition facilities/personnel
- CPA and Iraqi entities/personalities promoting stability (e.g. Iraqi police)
- UN or other int’l organizations
- Targets of opportunity – major events

Vulnerabilities
- Leadership, financiers, and facilitators outside of Iraq
- Rivalry/distrust among members (IO)
- Reliance on communications (Intel)
Ansar al-Islam

Status
- Group losing credibility, influence, and funding but still viable
- Mosul remains an active hub for AI/AS activity
- Numerous threat streams targeting Kurdish New Year ceremonies (21 March); PUK aware, canceling official celebrations
- Traditional AI groups in north and FRE based groups IVO Baghdad using umbrella name of AS

Vulnerabilities
- Lack of consistent funding sources; assessed funding distribution problem (JIATF)
- Composite structure of group lends it to internal divisiveness (IO)
- Primarily operating in Kurdish area (Leverage Kurd relations)
- Reliance on communications (Intel)
- Recent arrests

Intelligence Gaps
- Specific cell locations
- Timing of threatened attacks
- C2 Status
- Leadership movements and locations
- Level of operational collusion with AQ/ Zarqawi

Outlook
- Remain a threat; possible pressure to conduct attacks to maintain relevancy
- CF capture of a significant blow to Al Mosul-cell operations
Foreign Fighter Facilitation

WHO ARE THEY?
- International Mujahadin:
  - combat experienced terrorists & fighters
- Foreign-sourced fighters:
  - experienced recruits trained to perform specific functions

OPERATIONAL TRENDS
- Concentration in urban areas in order to hide among the local population
- Use of rural areas as safe havens and staging areas during their travel into the country
- Indications of facilitators increasing their attempts to exploit remote areas of the borders.
- Continuing to seek safer routes in which to enter Iraq

EFFECTS OF COALITION ACTIVITY
- Movement of fighters into Iraq hindered by lack of safe areas
- Forced to hide among local population; rely on falsified documents
- Movement of ratlines to more remote and unprotected areas of the border

OUTLOOK
- Will continue to be recruited for existing terrorist networks
- Lack of success will dissuade donors and experienced operatives; focus on high-visibility attacks
- Continue attempts to import experienced fighters and trainers
- Continued use of smugglers and known smuggling routes to enter the country

VULNERABILITIES
- Limited expertise – often dependent on recruits with limited training
- Reliance on comms
- Reliance on few, key facilitators / ops planners
- Foreigners
- Network habits / routines
FLASHPOINTS

- Arbaeen
- Ethnic resettlement in Kirkuk/Khanaqin/Jalula (Spring Harvest)
- OP STUART
- FRE-Shia/Shia-FRE attacks
- Fuel/power/employment shortages
- Shia civil unrest (Sistani, political involvement/ Sadr)
- KADEK
- MEK

SAUDI ARABIA

SYRIA

KUWAIT
### "Civil War" Indicators

#### Political
- Political disputes and process increasingly polarized and unresolvable
- Increasing use of flags, posters and other symbols of ethnic or religious groups
- Inflammatory rhetoric from clerics, politicians and other leaders aimed at other religious or ethnic groups
- Mass departure of foreign NGOs
- Large influx of Kurd refugees due to crackdown in neighboring states
- Emergence of charismatic, radical religious/political leaders
- Increased political influence by neighboring states over ethnic group or region

#### Military
- Militias acquiring or seeking more resources e.g. weapons, ammunition, medical
- More people seeking to join militias
- Increased military training by militias
- Establishment of covert C2 structures
- Increase in interethnic violence; assassinations, random acts of violence, intimidation
- Isolated cases ethnic cleansing
- Increased use of militia checkpoints at ethnic "seams"
- Seeking covert military assistance from outside country

#### Economic
- Blockades, boycotts or embargo of goods from one group or region
- Refusing transit of goods through an area
- Illegal charges for transit of goods through an area
- Regional trade agreements/financial assistance from outside country

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*SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI*

*Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff Declassified on: 201506*
Campaign Plan (Security Line of Operation)

04 SEp | OCT | NOV | DEC | 05 JAN | FEB

Security Transition

Military Transition & Reintegration

3 DIV 9 BDE 16 BNs

3 DIV 9 BDE 27 BNs

Further Development of IAF

ICDC