


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CJTF-
CENTCOM
SECURITY
CONFERENCE



SYRIAN
DESERT

18 March 2004

briefing is classified

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
MCFI

multiple sources

CJTF-4 CENTCOM Seco

18 March 2004 **We will not falter – We will not fail**

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Iraqi Local Control / Jan 04-Apr 04

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506



TOTAL DIVs in Iraq: 5

3 x US Divisions + 3 BDEs

• BDEs: 12 x Ground, 2 x MP, 3 x AVN

2 X Coalition Divisions

Number in Iraq: ~ 120,000

• US Forces: ~95,000

• Coalition: ~25,000

Number in Kuwait: ~ 31,400

• US Forces: ~31,000


• Coalition: ~400

TOTAL: ~ 151,400

Iraqi Security Forces

FPS	38,000
ICDC	40,000
DBE	16,350
NIA	4 BNs
IPS	61,000
ICT	Training
INIS	Training

Mobile QRFs
protecting /
supporting civilian
led efforts



Iraqi Local Control



Revised CJTF-1.4a Mission Statement

Conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining non-compliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in the AO in order to create a secure environment in direct support of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Organize, train, and equip credible and capable Iraqi Security Forces in order to accelerate the transition of security from Coalition Forces to Iraqi Forces. Concurrently conduct stability operations to support the establishment of government, the restoration of essential services, and economic development in order to set the conditions for transfer of sovereignty and operations to designated follow on authorities.



What We Are Doing

- ✓ Assumed the Mission on 8 March
- ✓ Harnessing the power of the entire CJTF-1.4a Command
- ✓ Assumed OPCON of CMATT
- ✓ Formed the Office of Security Cooperation by leveraging CMATT
- ✓ Establishing Joint Coordination Centers to coordinate Coalition and Iraqi Security Force efforts
- ✓ Expanding the ICDC from 36 to 45 Battalions
- ✓ Established a Police Working Group between Mol and CJTF-1.4a
 - ✓ Accelerating Police Training for TIP and 8-Week Course
 - ✓ Preparing statement of works for police infrastructure improvements
 - ✓ Identifying equipment and resourcing gaps

Iraq Assessment by MSC

MNB-N: Turkey, Kurdish Separation, Extremists 1.4b, 1.4d
1.4b, 1.4d Foreign Fighters. Mosul will continue to be a terrorist safe haven. Requires ICDC & IPS

MNB-N

MND-NC

MND-NC: Extremists, Criminals, 1.4b, 1.4d
1.4b, 1.4d Sectarian and Ethnic violence. Illicit trans-border traffic will remain a concern. Requires ICDC, DBE, and IPS

MND-W: Attacks against border security posts & patrols will continue. Foreign fighters criminals, and Sunni rejectionists will remain the major concern. Requires DBE, ICDC & IPS

Ar Ramadi

MND-W

MND-B

MND-B: ISF becomes a greater target. Organized crime on the rise. Extremism and mass casualty attacks remain a concern. 1.4b, 1.4d in Iraqi Govt, and Sunni Arab Rejectionists will remain a concern. Requires IPS & ICDC

Al Anbar

MND-CS

MND-CS: Stable but tense, significant security & stability concerns regarding the rise of Shia Activism, SAR plus 1.4b, 1.4d and rising criminal activity throughout AOR. Requires ICDC, IPS & DBE

MND-SE: Sabotage of power lines and oil infrastructure primary concern. Terrorism on the rise. Significant 1.4b, 1.4d and large Shia militia presence remain a concern. Requires IPS & DBE

MND-SE

Overall Assessment: Current Security Transition Plan Matches Threat Assessment. Expect Increase in attacks as we approach turnover of Sovereignty especially against ISF, Iraqi political leadership and international enablers. FRE will re-emerge as Sunni Arab Rejectionists (SAR). Expect to see a rise in terrorism and sectarian & ethnic Violence fueled by extremism and conflicting power groups which could lead to wide spread violence throughout Iraq. 1.4b, 1.4d will continue to seek influence in Iraq

KUWAIT

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SYRIA

Tall Afar

Mosul

Ninawa



JORDAN

Legend

IAF DIV HQ



ICDC BDE HQ




CF Max Control



Local Control



Regional Control




When OIF-3 forces begin to flow (September 04), the majority of US-occupied AORs will not have transitioned to Local Control

As Samarra


MND (SE)

Security Transition Forecast January 05

Transition to
Local Control
will occur in
December 04 –
halfway through
the OIF-2/OIF-3
RIP/TOA



Initial ICDC Requirements





IAF Issues

■ Infrastructure – Garrison Construction

- Issue – Delay in release of Supplemental funding
- Required Action – CENTCOM to request release of \$256M of Supplemental funding
- Timeframe - Immediate
- Impact Statement
 - Day-by-Day slippage in the start of the training for Battalions 16-27
 - Delay in generation of operational capability
 - Wastage of RFF advisor support team capacity

■ Equipment – Battalion Sets

- Issue – Cancellation of Battalion Sets contract following protest
- Action – CENTCOM to request OSD direct the contracting Executive Agent (Army) to approve immediate resolution of contract cancellation
- Timeframe – Immediate (in order to deliver twenty battalion sets of equipment by 1 Aug 2004 i.e. only 134 days)
- Impact
 - Constrains commencement of training and precludes commencement of operations for 21 battalions.
 - Critical mission risk.

CFI /

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Joint Coordination Centers



More Building

1. JCCs located at the Provincial and Local level
2. Near-term capability based on telephone/radio communications
3. Long-term MOI Regional/Provincial and National Operations/Intel Centers

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IAF and ICDC Certification

- Two levels
 - Validation
 - Certification (held by CENTCOM)
- Validation – Required to enable a new trained battalion to commence operations under MSC control
- Certification – Required to enable a battalion that has demonstrated its capability and capacity on operations under MSC control to assume local command and control of a Tactical Area of Responsibility

Approved for Release

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Conclusions

- Delay in generating Iraqi capability undermines credibility, confidence, and consent of the Iraqi people – In July, we will no longer be an occupying power
- Funding and contracting processes drive Iraqi capability and capacity – delay increases operational risk and OIF force structure risk
- Justice, Communications, and Intelligence systems are key enablers – We need to carry out a risk assessment



Acquisition Recommendations

■ 30 days Funding Requirements (\$821M):

- DOS: Reallocate \$200M INL funds according to specialized training plan
- OSD: Immediately release IAF construction funds (\$256 M)
- CPA: Allocate \$365M DFI funds to (\$96M is previously unfunded, remainder is contract and operational risk mitigation):
 - Immediately accelerate mission critical IPS/DBE equipment (\$91 M)
 - Immediately acquire mission-critical ICDC equipment (\$40 M)
 - Offset mission-critical IAF battalion sets equipment (\$144 M)
 - Public Safety Training Equipment (\$50M)
 - Criminal Intelligence Database Network (\$40M)
- Contract: Direct Army for quick resolution of ICDC/IAF Battalion set contract
- Department of the Army: Provide immediate pre-award contracting support to the CPA-Contracting Activity for Past Performance Evaluations (PPE).
- Jordanian Academy: Resolve contract for permanent construction of Jordanian Academy with DOS



Recommendations

- ☐ CENTCOM work with Joint Staff and OSD to:
 - ☐ Address with DOS INL to:
 - ☐ Resolve the decision to reduce IPA from 1,000 to 500
 - ☐ Use funding released by reduction for Specialist Training (\$200M)
 - ☐ Accelerate the equipping of IPAs through DoS INL
 - ☐ Resolve contract for permanent construction of Jordanian Academy with DOS
 - ☐ Expedite Department of Army Decision on Contractual Way Ahead
 - ☐ IAF and ICDC Battalion Set
 - ☐ IPS/DBE Equipment
 - ☐ Release of the remainder of the IAF Infrastructure funds from DoD
- ☐ That the specified task to man, train, and equip the FPS be modified to monitor, assist, and advice

We will not falter – We will not fail