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C3 EFFECTS (SECURITY CELL) ICDC PERFORMANCE REPORT
AS OF 11 APRIL 2004

GENERAL COMMENT

1. ISF. The dramatic events of the past week have had significant impact on ISF. Where pressure has been put on areas where ICDC and IPS live and work (Fallujah, Najaf, Kabala, E Baghdad) they have cracked. The IAF also have cracked when asked to deploy against fellow Iraqis. Elsewhere, where the general security situation has deteriorated, but is spread evenly across the AO, ISF has generally performed well.

2. The ISF ORBAT for Op VIGILANT RESOLVE (Fallujah) called for 2 x local ICDC Bns, the 36th Bn, and 2 x IAF Bns. In the event, only the 36th has contributed significantly. Lately, C3 Effects have been planning options for an Iraqi led ISF peace force to secure the town following a ceasefire. No significant capability could be found to deliver this concept. A similar plan is being looked at for Op RESOLUTE SWORD (Kabala/Najaf) that foresees 1ID BCT securing the surrounding areas around these towns, but an ISF capability securing the holy cities themselves. Again, each COA has identified that it is not possible to mass ISF in any significant capability to do this.

Comment. The 2 main reasons why it proved impossible to move ICDC units were:

- Ethnic Boundaries. I asked MSCs to consult with their ICDC Bde and Bn Cdr's with a view to move some ICDC capability to support a peacekeeping effort (not warfighting) in either Najaf or Fallujah. SE Shia would not go to Najaf to intervene against Sadr (Shia against Shia was a red line) or to a Sunni area, particularly Fallujah. Similarly, Sunni units would not go to intervene in Fallujah, and also not go to a Shia religious heartland such as Najaf. Only the Kurdish ICDC bns would go if asked, and probably fight. This would, however come at a price.
- Local Area Force. The other key reason why ICDC would not travel away from their communities, was that they are entirely focused on protecting their own local area, and are not particularly interested in somebody else's problem.

DETAILED ICDC PERFORMANCE.

3. General. The events of the past week have resulted in a drop in overall ICDC numbers. Sizeable elements of ICDC soldiers within Baghdad, MND CS and 1 MEF have stayed at home, resigned, or declared a neutral stance. Currently, there are 32,110 ICDC (29 fully functioning bns) operating effectively by the end of this week – an overall decrease of 2,777 personnel and 6 bns from last week. Some readjustment of these numbers is expected once the situation stabilizes.

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4. Baghdad. Two complete ICDC battalions in Baghdad have not shown up to work for most of the week, with 1AD assessing that these two units are concerned to cross over from Zone 21 (Sadr City), which has been the focus for much of the recent fighting. 1AD is expecting these ICDC soldiers to return back to work once they consider it safe to do so. One platoon has declared itself pro-Sadr and resigned. 1AD has launched an IO campaign in order to get the remaining ICDC soldiers back to work. The 5 bns operating in the remainder of the city are performing well.

5. MND CS. MNDCS ICDC Bns had been recognised as being the weakest in terms of training, CERP investment and joint integration with CF. C3 Effects has been aware of this for about 6 weeks, and had been focusing resources, training instructors etc. Progress starting to be made. Pressure and intimidation from Mahdi's Army quickly reduced the resolve of most of these ICDC units. Currently, the 401st ICDC Battalion is at 200 personnel or 25% strength. The 402d (Al Hilla) ICDC Battalion Commander was wounded in an ambush and his unit is at 50% strength. The 403rd ICDC battalion in Al Kut has remained neutral during the recent fighting in the area between the Coalition Forces and Sadr Militia (SM). The 404th ICDC Battalion has three companies that are combat ready. The other three companies in An Najaf no longer exist. Reports indicate that the coys in An Najaf fought until they ran out of ammunition, then blended into the community. It remains to be seen whether these units will reconstitute.

6. Fallujah. In Fallujah, only a small percentage of both local ICDC bns (505 & 506) are functioning. Most of these ICDC soldiers live in Fallujah, are unable to get in or out, or are staying at home for fear of intimidation. 36th Bn is a different matter and are reported to be fighting superbly alongside their SOF mentors and 1 MEF Bns. Unfortunately the 36th bn comd was killed today.

Comment. The two ICDC bns were hardly likely to support the Coalition assaulting the very place where their families and friends lived. Also I understand that they felt totally neglected by the Coalition. They were never taken seriously. They felt ashamed by the fact that there they had not been given any equipment despite being promised for months and months. The resolve of the 36th Bn is worth noting for possible future ISF structural options. This unit is made up of 5 different parties, two of which are Kurd (PUK/KDP). The Kurds are excellent fighters which gives the spine to the unit, and the others tend to perform in order not to lose face. Critically, this structure does not tie the unit to any location, and therefore can be moved around the country without any difficulties.

7. Remaining ICDC Performance. All other ICDC bns working normally, and there has been particular praise for those in Mosul, Samarra, W Baghdad and MND SE. Given the increased security tempo they are certainly doing well,

Comment. There can be no doubt that a stock check is required once the current hostilities have eased. It is already apparent that ICDC does not travel well, and the idea of making them mobile in order to mass ISF forces anywhere on the map

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appears to be a non starter. They are fine when operating to secure their local areas, but measures need to be put in place to prevent them cracking when pressure is exerted on the community in which they live.

8. Reconstructing Broken Bns, and Improving the Rest. My initial thoughts are:

- Focus on getting high quality leadership in place first.
- Wait for the equipment to come (due over the next 6 weeks) - New recruits can start with pride with decent equipment.
- Invest in the ICDC infrastructure. The ICDC base at Junction City where these 2 x ICDC bn near Fallujah were based is incredibly dilapidated.
- MSCs will need to put considerably more investment in terms of training teams, NCO & officer development. They will need to mentor the development of the new bns by joint patrolling and mission planning from the outset. This was particularly lacking in the 1 MEF MSC (fault of 82 Abn not 1 MEF).
- Key success in other areas (MNDSE and 36th bn) is the concept of permanently embedded CF soldiers with ICDC units. Provides the spine to hold the thing together. Needs to be implemented in all ICDC bns.
- Look more carefully about recruiting demographics. Need to recruit from other villages and small towns to spread the recruiting base. Perhaps deliberately recruit from outside the local area - these soldiers could be barracked during the week and go home at weekends.

Comment. The lesson of this week is to remember what ICDC is and always will be - a local force to help police the local area. It will always reflect the people it recruits from. It is being built to cope successfully when we go to local control - a relatively benign environment. There are things we can now do to improve their capability and performance in this regard. However, I doubt that ICDC will ever withstand a situation when direct pressure is put on the very town they come from like what happened over the past week in Fallujah. When it comes to taking sides in such circumstances - US led Coalition or Sunni Iraqis, nobody should be surprised that they don't rush to support the former.

(Signed)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Ch C3 Effects (Security)

b 3, b 6

XO - File

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, April 11, 2004 1:57 AM
To: Sanchez, Ricardo LTG CJTF-4 VCORPS CDR
Cc: Weber, Joseph F. (O-8); Miller, Thomas G. MG CJTF-4 C3; East, Barbara MG CJTF-4 C2;
Sargeant, Stephen T. (O-7); Kimmitt, Mark T. (O-7); b 3, (b)(6)
b 3, b 6
Subject: Mtg with MOD (SECRET)

Classification: SECRET

Caveats: NONE

Sir,

Today you met with the new MOD Ali Allawi, for the first time. The meeting took place at your request, to follow up an idea the MOD pitched to the Ministerial Committee on National Security, about the possibility of recalling some 1000 to 1500 former, "non-tainted", Iraqi SOF. In the event, the MOD made a broader proposal to you, for the creation of a "National Task Force"; he is ready to move out, and you have agreed to partner with him in this effort. You will meet with him again at 1200 hours, Easter Sunday, to follow up.

According to the MOD, the NTF should include up to 10,000 troops. It should draw from existing Iraqi forces, like the ICDC 36th, the other "best" ICDC units; the ICTF; the Army. We should ID former General Officers to organize it; and we should recall old SOF units to help fill it. Of the 10,000, half would be based in Baghdad, and the other half would be provincially-based.

To support this, the MOD noted, we will need an Internal Security Act, which stresses the state of emergency, allows the internal use of forces, and includes provisions for detention for up to two months. The force would also need a governmental connection - perhaps to the MCNS. It could operate as a DIV of the Coalition "only with wide latitude".

You agreed with the MOD to move forward quickly to lay out the concept. You will meet at 1200 today. He will bring his designated deputy, who worked for him at the MOT. You agreed that we would handle resourcing the entity; and that we would work with CPA. You would shoot for 3-4,000, "fairly rapidly". The objective will be to send the organization to the Fallujah/ Ramadi area. The MOD agreed to bring a list of general officers and their resumes.

You noted that creating an Iraqi force with an Iraqi leader is the right idea. The G.O. leader will have to get out and talk to troops. You offered that the Minister can reach you any time; and that we would facilitate any visits he would like to make to troops in the regions.

Subsequently, the MOD provide four names:

MG Sami Zaghir Jamil
MG Abdul Hussein Dagher Jabar Al Ami
MG Sabah Ajil Dawood
MG Aboud Kandar Hashim Khayoun al Malki

Bottom line - the MOD, though completely understaffed and underresourced, is ready to try, and ready to drop everything to work with you on crafting a solution to the current challenges. This speaks well for him. Getting him out to the field - to see your troops as well as "his" own - is essential, since he lacks military experience; the good

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news is that he seems willing to learn.

VR, [b 3, b 6]

[b)(3), (b)(6)]

CJTF-14a Political Advisor
Baghdad

[b)(6)]

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

Approved for Release

4/11/2004

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Transition Teams

MNF-I

September Assessment

2005

This briefing is classified

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REL-MCFI

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: X1

BG John P. McLaren Jr.

10 September 2005

Transition Teams IAG

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Agenda

- Feedback from Transition Teams
- Observations
- Window of Partnership Opportunity
- Status of Transition Teams
- Way Ahead for 2006
- Questions

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Direct Feedback from Transition Teams

Things to Watch


- "Relationships are key ... It takes about 2-3 months to build solid trust and rapport."
 - TTs have had a measureable impact on Bn/Bde staff functions and procedures.
 - Transition Teams/partnership exposes the IA to a true value system and helps grow the organization.
 - Without the MiTT, detainee abuse and violence against the civilians is likely
 - If MiTTs left today ... there would be a major decline in growth and effectiveness of the IA.
 - IA Chain of Command remains an issue -- Some leaders are competent, some hold higher loyalties to tribe or sect. Solid leadership is everything.
- [REDACTED]
- CS/CSS development at Bn/Bde level not keeping pace with growth in CBT capability.
 - MOD's direct communication down to battalions and brigades remains a constant & significant problem.
 - The rank, quality, and experience of our Transition Team leaders is critical.

Questions

Visits

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
Observations



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Window of Partnership Opportunity



Maximize the US Partnership efforts as long as US Forces are available, in order to accelerate development of the Iraqi Army.

Transition Teams IAG

Itizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

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
Status of Transition Teams

	FIELDING	MANNING	TRAINING	EQUIPPING	
MITT			INT	INT	No Issues
BTT	10 of 12		EXT	EXT	Minor Issues Being Addressed,
SPTT	30				Moderate issues Waiting for Resolution
BDU					Significant Issues Impacting Mission
BSU					Critical Issues Not Addressed
MTR					
LOG					
ITT					

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Way Ahead for 2006

- Continue to embed transition teams from battalion to echelons above division; press our partnership efforts.
- Continue to use the TRA to calibrate and adjust priorities.
- Continue to utilize the Iraqi Assistance Group Headquarters in the execution of ADCON for Transition Teams.
- Adjust RFF 510 when needed to meet TT requirements.



Bottom Line: the Transition Team concept works and from where our Team Chiefs sit, they can see marked improvements within the IA.

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Questions

Transition Teams IAG

Ittizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

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Backup

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Questions asked to the Transition Teams

IA Unit

- What would happen to your IA unit if your TT left today? Partnership unit left?
- What is your assessment of your IA counterpart?
- Is there a functioning chain of command within your unit? Higher Echelons?
- What level of operations is your IA unit conducting operations?
- Is your IA unit performing staff functions? CS/CSS planning/support?
- What are the impacts of tribal, ethnic, religious factors on your IA unit?
- What impact has your team had on your IA unit?
- How are the title X functions/lack of affecting IA growth? Who is helping TTs develop these? Where are the policies coming from?
- Is the "Train, Fight Train" concept working? Is your unit having to Train, Fight, Reconstitute, Train?



Questions asked to the Transition Teams (Continued)

Transition Team Internal

- What is the IA reaction to your TT? Are you accepted? How long did it take you to establish a relationship with your IA counterpart? When did that relationship become effective/essential to your mission?
- Is the composition of the team correct? Grade? Functional Area? Equipment?
- Are there additional resources that would help your efforts?
- What is your most pressing unmet need?
- What is precluding your TT from moving forward?

Partnership Unit

- What is your relationship with the partnership unit? What is the relationship of the IA unit to partnership unit?
- What is the USPU input? (to much, to little) How much external support is needed for your TT? For your IA Unit?

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Fielding/Manning

- MiTTs: 111 MiTTs on hand of 111 IA units requiring a MiTT. By MAR 2006, 130 required MiTTs (42 Internal & 88 External MiTTs)(RFF 510 sources all 88 externally required MiTTs).
- BTTs: 10 BTTs on hand of 12 IA units requiring a BTT. Pending the proof of concept; RFF 510 will source an additional 15 BTTs by March 2006 bringing our total number of BTTs to 27 Teams.
- SPTTs: 30 SPTTs on hand of 38 Police units requiring a SPTT. RFF 510 sources the remaining 8 SPTTs 15 November 2005 LAD.
- BDU: 8 BDUs on hand of 8 BDUs required, RFF 510 continues to source these requirements with the new composition by location.



Fielding/Manning (Continued)

- BSUs: 9 BSUs, on hand of 9 BSUs required. RFF 510 continues to source these requirements.
- MTR TTs: 3 MTRs on hand for the three IA units (3rd, 6th & 8th IA Divisions) requiring an MTR TT. 4 additional MTRs required by September 2006. RFF 510 will source the total required.
- LOG TTs: 1 LOG Team is currently on hand to support the 9th IA Division. Three Log Teams are required by March 2006. RFF 510 sources the requirement externally.
- ITTs: 2 ITTs on hand of 2 ITTs required. RFF 510 continues to source the requirement externally.

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"How To" Training and Certification Program

Current Training Flow

<u>CONUS</u>	<u>KUWAIT</u>	<u>TAJI</u>	<u>VICTORY</u>
SERE (2hrs 55min) ISOPREP Cards (1 hr) SINGGARS AN/PRC-150 (3 hrs) PLGR ANCD	IED Crew Training Overview (1 hr) Blue Force Tracker (BFT) Familiarization (4 hrs)	ECPTCP (4 hrs) AN/PRC-150 (6 hrs) AN/PRC-117 E & R TNG (12-24hrs) Iridium* DAGR* MBITR*	HRC/EPA (4 hrs) Warlock Install (2hrs) Trng (1hr) BFT trng (4 hrs)

**Total Time: 48-60hrs
Total Classes: 27**

* Required Training.... Equipment currently becoming available

Force Protection will be implemented at Taji with a one hour class on Personal Protection and a two hour class on FP on an Iraqi FOB

Mushtarak - United Commitment

Evasion and Rescue (12-24hrs) (Theater)

- Evasion Planning
- Evasion/Survival Kit
- Link up Procedures
- Desert Navigation (Day/Night)

HRC/EPA Training (4hrs) (Theater)

- Current CSAR SPINS and PR TTP review HRC (45 min.)
- Evasion/PR skills for survival after being isolated (1 hr.)
- Teams to assist in your recovery (30 min.)
- ISOPREP & EPA Guidance/Training (1 hr.)
- Evasion Planning Assistance (45 min.)



PHOENIX ACADEMY IN-THEATER

- TRAINING REQUIREMENTS DERIVED FROM IAG GUIDANCE.
- CURRENTLY 10-DAY TRAINING CYCLE. 3 Day Model
- PRIMARILY CLASSROOM INSTRUCTION.
- RELY PRIMARILY ON MSC TT INSTRUCTORS.
- TRAINING ATTENDED BY IRAQI OFFICERS/NCOS FROM UNIT TTs WILL EMBEDD WITH. CANNOT BE REPLICATED IN CONUS.

TRAINING TASK EXAMPLES:

- EQUIP ISSUE (M1114, CS WPNS, NVGs)
- CS CL V BASIC LOAD ISSUE
- TT GOALS & OBJECTIVES
- IED TRAINING (CLASSIFIED) - IED TF
- MITT/BTT/SPTT SPECIFIC TRAINING
- FOO/PAY AGENT TRAINING
- MNF-I ROE TRAINING
- COUNTERPART TRAINING
- COMMO TRAIN-THE-TRAINER

- FALCON VIEW TRAINING
- INSURGENT TTP TRAINING
- IA INTEL SYSTEMS
- IA R&S TRAINING

WORK w/ INDIGENOUS FORCES (SOF)

- CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING
 - CS WEAPONS FAM FIRE (M240 & M2)
 - FOREIGN WEAPONS CLASS (AK, RPK, PK & RPG)
 - WORKING w/ LINGUIST PRACTICAL EXERCISE
 - ECP/TCP PRACTICAL EXERCISE
- w/ IRAQI SOLDIERS/OFFICERS FROM TADJI

CD [Signature]

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REL MCFI

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: X1

Transition Teams IAG

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Internal Equipping Issues

Items looked at:

Shoot = Cal. 50 MG, Mount MG, M240B MG

Move = PVS-14, M1114, Warlock Combo

Communicate = PSC-5 / 1117 TACSAT, Iridium Phone, 150 HF

BAGHDAD

Shoot = 62%

Move = 35%

Comm = 10%

Total = 36%

North Central

Shoot = 114%

Move = 27%

Comm = 27%

Total = 56%

Average for Baghdad and North Central = 46%

- This equipment is to be transferred to the IAG (P) Property Book
- If shortages are not filled by SBE/TPE than an ONS will be required

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IAG(P) Initial Observations

- Transition Teams that are larger and who have strong Partnership support do better, faster.
- MOD's direct communication down to battalion and brigade levels remains a problem. Transition Teams believe that their ability to foster a functional chain of command is usurped by this frequent distraction
- A standards based training system is key to the continued professional growth of the Iraqi Army. A common set of collective training standards must be established and upheld.
- The turnover rate caused by Iraqi soldier "walk aways" has significantly impacted the "Train-Fight-Train" model. After each period of combat operations, many units must reconstitute before they can re-train



IAG(P) Initial Observations (Continued)

- CS/CSS remains a challenge at all levels of the IA.
- MiTT teams are focusing much of their effort on improving CSS capabilities within their counterpart units; highly recommend building HSCs with soldiers from within their organizations
- A stable, capable and self sustaining Iraqi Army cannot be built without a strong, credible personnel and logistics structure.
- Title X functions need to provide a reliable pay system, a strong NCO Corps, a legal system needed to impose discipline, and a system for retaining soldiers in their formations.

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IAG(P) Red Lines and Issues

- Correct specialties remain a critical issue within the Transition Teams.
- Quality of personnel is crucial to future success; maturity and knowledge base remains a keystone for the teams when dealing with Senior Iraqi Officers.
- Rank structure floor must be maintained.
- Timely arrival of ONS equipment is key to continuous flow of externally sourced teams
- Theater Provided Equipment is critical for in-bound internal Transition Teams.
- Organizational structure/composition of the Transition Team will be addressed during the next assessment. June Assessment composite changes are not in place yet.
- Force Protection remains a critical level of operation. Working collaborative planning with theater PR hierarchy to field Tier 1 Systems prior to elections.



Training

- In-theater Transition Team training continues to prepare our externally sourced teams.
 - Will refine training requirements based on operational need and will synchronize training throughout the deployment pipeline.
 - Subject Matter Experts from fielded units and Iraqi officers and soldiers from tactical units enriches the training.
 - Have increased HRC and SERE training for Transition Teams. Training includes approx. 50+ hours of Personnel Recovery training. [REDACTED]
 - SOF instructors at Taji continue to coach Transition Teams. Focus is on mentoring, coaching and advising techniques best suited to working with their Iraqi counterparts [REDACTED]
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Equipping

- Fielding of initial ONS equipment almost complete.
- Based on the Qatar sourcing conference a second ONS was submitted to cover newly identified Transition Team requirements.
- Have transitioned several line items of the original 98th Divisions equipment to the 80th Division.
- Working with MNSTC-I to consolidate property into one Property Book for all Transition Teams.
- Working with CFLCC to establish an equipment shelf for key items.
- Fielding of Tier I Force Protection Systems.

In the short-term SBE/TPE remains our largest challenge.