

OPLAN IPB


MNC-I C2 Plans

15 MAR 05

Area of Responsibility



Area of Interest



Current State of the Insurgency

Insurgency is not growing or spreading

Remains Concentrated in 5 provinces

Very little support in Kurd or Shia dominated areas

Intimidation critical to sustaining insurgency in Sunni areas

Former Regime Elements

Reevaluating Strategy Following Failure to Delay, Prevent, or
Discredit Elections

Retain Ability to Support Current Level of Attacks

Islamic Extremists and Terrorists


Operations disrupted but remain a significant threat

Potential to expand reach through partnerships at the tactical level


INSURGENTS' OBJECTIVES / ENDSTATES

- **FRE: Expel Coalition and Destabilize** Iraqi Government and ISF // Seek to return Iraq to Ba'athist control and prevent Shia/Kurdish dominated government from assuming power.
- **Terrorists: Expel Coalition and Destabilize** Iraqi Government and ISF // Removal of Western Influence from Iraq; Establish Radical Religious Government.
- **SAR: Expel Coalition and Destabilize** Iraq Government and ISF // Re-establish their position of power in Iraqi society.
- **Shia Extremists: Expel Coalition and Destabilize** Iraq Government and ISF // Establish a Shia controlled Islamic Fundamentalist Government.
- **Anti-Coalition Tribal Groups: Expel Coalition and Destabilize** Iraqi Government and ISF // Maintain influence and increase power.
- **Organized Crime: Profit or revenge** // Make money.
- **External Influence / Facilitators: Undermine US - Coalition (Western) Influence** // Influence Political Outcome in Iraq.


XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS PROVINCIAL AND KEY CITY THREAT ASSESSMENT





XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS PROVINCIAL AND KEY CITY ASSESSMENT




STRATEGIC TEMPLATE




Density of Attacks
26 FEB to 4 MAR 05
All Attacks*



Number of Attacks by City



1 Year Environment



INSURGENT OBJECTIVES

Discredit ITG/IZ legal system

Disrupt drafting of new IZ Constitution

Discredit ITG and Coalition Forces

Prevent distribution of Constitution to IZ People

INSURGENT TARGETS

MNF

ISF / Transition Tms

Prosecutors, Witnesses and Judges

Infrast

TNA

TNA/Distro Centers

METHOD

IO

Intimidation

Assassinate / Kidnap

Subversion / Infiltration

IED / VBIED / SBIED

Small Arms / IDF

Demonstrations

KEY TERRAIN

Baghdad

Mosul

Greater Baghdad (N. Babil, Abu G, Salman Pak)

Euphrates River Basin (F, R, H, HA)

Tigris River Basin (Samarra, Zaab)

Baqubah, Kirkuk

CONTINGENCIES:

MAS/LTs:

Thawra, Najaf / Karbala, Amarah, Kut

Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Samawah


Kurdish Region:

Kirkuk, Hawijah, Mosul


~~SECK~~ AMZ / Sunni vs Shia

Najaf / Karbala, N. Babil, Baqubah

1 Year Environment



1 Year Environment



METHOD

IO
Intimidation
Assassinate / Kidnap
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~~SECRET~~ AMZ / Sunni vs Shia

Najaf / Karbala, N. Babil, Baqubah

INTENT ON DISRUPTING THE POLITICAL
PROCESS THROUGH VIOLENT MEANS;
LOSS OF LEGITIMACY MAY LEAD TO A
SPLIT BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANT TO
CONTINUE THE INSURGENCY AND THOSE
WHO WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN
THE POLITICAL PROCESS

AMZ / TERRORISTS

DESTROY THE CURRENT
POLITICAL SYSTEM AND
INTIMIDATE OR KILL
THOSE INVOLVED WITH
THE COALITION OR TNA

SAR

INTENT ON INFLUENCING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS; ELEMENTS
WILL USE BOTH VIOLENT
AND NON-VIOLENT
METHODS TO ACHIEVE
RESULTS

TRIBES

INTENT ON MAINTAINING /
INCREASING POWER AND
INFLUENCE THROUGH THE
POLITICAL PROCESS;
HOWEVER, WILL SUPPORT
INSURGENCY BY CONTINUING
TO TRANSPORT WEAPONS,
AMMUNITION, AND MONEY
FOR PROFIT

CRIMINALS

INTENT ON MAKING MONEY
AND UNDERMINING THE ISF
REGARDLESS OF THE
POLITICAL SITUATION,
NETWORKS SUPPORT
INSURGENT ENDS BY
PROVIDING NECESSARY
SUPPLIES THROUGH
SMUGGLING AND OTHER
ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES

EXTERNAL ACTORS

SUPPORTING
INSURGENTS BY
PROVIDING
SANCTUARY,
SUPPLIES, AND
SUPPORT


INSURGENT ELEMENTS AND STAKEHOLDERS

SHIA

INTENT ON SOLIDIFYING POLITICAL GAINS THROUGH CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS; SOME EXTREMIST ELEMENTS MAY VOICE DISCONTENT THROUGH VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND ISOLATED INCIDENTS

KURD

INTENT ON SUPPORTING THE POLITICAL
PROCESS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN
AUTONOMOUS RULE IN NORTHERN IRAQ



ENEMY MLCOA

DISPOSITION

INSURGENTS CONTINUE TO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS FROM MOSUL IN THE NORTH TO RAMADI IN THE WEST, IN THE GREATER BAGHDAD AREA, AND THE NORTHERN PORTION OF BABIL PROVINCE


METHOD

EXPECT INCREASED POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS ATTEMPTS AS THE NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TARGETS EXPANDS DUE TO THE TNA SEATING; INTIMIDATION EFFORTS AGAINST ISF AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE WILL ALSO INCREASE; AND IED/VBIED/IDF WILL CONTINUE ALONG MSR/ASRs AND IN URBAN AREAS

MLCOA

THE FRE, ELEMENTS OF THE SAR, AND AMZ, THE MAIN EFFORT, CONDUCT IED, VBIED, IDF, AND SUICIDE ATTACKS AGAINST COALITION FORCES, THE ISF, AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, DISRUPT THE RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT, LIMIT ISF AND COALITION CONTROL, AND INTIMIDATE THE IRAQI PEOPLE. IN ADDITION, ENEMY FORCES WILL TARGET CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO DENY REVENUE GENERATION AND BASIC NEEDS AND TO DISCREDIT THE GOVERNMENT. TRIBAL LEADERS, CRIMINAL ELEMENTS, AND EXTERNAL ACTORS, THE SUPPORTING EFFORT, WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS TO SUSTAIN THE INSURGENCY. OTHER SUPPORTING EFFORTS INCLUDE: HIGH PROFILE ATTACKS AND INTIMIDATION EFFORTS ALONG THE PERIPHERY TO DIVERT MNC-I RESOURCES AWAY FROM THE GREATER BAGHDAD AREA AND INCREASE FREEDOM OF MANEUVER FOR THE MAIN EFFORT. KIDNAPPING AND CRIME ARE ALSO LIKELY TO RISE AS THE MNF CONTINUES TO CAPTURE KEY FINANCIERS OF THE INSURGENCY


ENEMY MDCOA



MDCOA

A MORE UNIFIED INSURGENT FRONT CONDUCTS A COORDINATED AND SUSTAINED IED/VBIED/IDF/SUICIDE CAMPAIGN FROM MOSUL IN THE NORTH TO AL QAIM IN THE WEST AS WELL AS THE GREATER BAGHDAD AREA IN ORDER TO OVEREXTEND/ATTRIT COALITION FORCES AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN UNDERDEVELOPED ISF. IN ADDITION, ENEMY FORCES CONDUCT STRATEGIC ATTACKS ON INFRASTRUCTURE, ASSASSINATE KEY GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP, AND ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE REGIONAL SUPPORT, COALITION WILL TO FIGHT AND WORLD OPINION. TRIBAL LEADERS, CRIMINAL ELEMENTS, AND EXTERNAL ACTORS, THE SUPPORTING EFFORT, WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS TO SUSTAIN THE INSURGENCY.

Insurgent Movement – Operational Perspective What's Next?



- “Squirt” Theory – When you push, the enemy will squirt away from that area and reestablish itself in another safe area.
- Puddle – When you lift your foot, the water rushes back.

- Coalition must continue to disrupt insurgents by maintaining constant pressure; this will
 - Wear down the insurgents
 - Increase ITG Credibility and Capability
 - Increase ISF Credibility and Capability
 - Allow Coalition Off Ramp Strategy to Succeed

Assessment of the Insurgency

- Insurgents will **seek to regain the momentum lost to due to the elections**. Attacks against Coalition, ISF, and infrastructure will likely increase IOT to deny the ISF and ITG the ability to establish a reasonably safe and secure environment.
- Insurgents will attempt to **sustain the insurgency by soliciting support** from poorly educated, unemployed males and capitalizing on Sunni feelings of disenfranchisement created as a result of the government failing to live up to perceived expectations (i.e. lack of essential services, no improvement in the security situation and high unemployment).
- Insurgents will likely **pursue a dual-track strategy**; increasing political means to infiltrate and influence new government while continuing to fuel the insurgency. In addition they will look for opportunities to place insurgent loyalists into key military and security positions.
- Insurgents **DO NOT have a set timeline**: they are in the fight for the long-term, they believe that the Coalition will commit to this effort for no more than 5 years. By maintaining a campaign of terror and intimidation the insurgents hope to take over a weakened government following Coalition disengagement.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO PIR

1. Who is coordinating, directing, and facilitating attacks against MNC-I, the Iraqi Government, critical infrastructure, and the Iraqi people? Where are they located?

Identify/Locate leaders of insurgent organizations

Identify structure of insurgent organizations

Identify communication methods of insurgent organizations

Identify finance networks of insurgent organizations

Identify smuggling networks

Identify criminal networks

Identify rocket and mortar cells

Identify weapons caches

Identify safe houses

Identify ratlines being used by insurgents and criminals to infiltrate into Iraq

Identify coordinated attacks above the local level

2. Where and when will the insurgents direct and facilitate attacks against MNC-I, the Iraqi Government, critical infrastructure, and the Iraqi people?

Identify routes are being used by insurgents to move within Iraq

Identify locations where insurgents are attempting to increase control of government and ISF

Identify locations where insurgents are receiving support from Iraqi people

Identify locations where Iraqi Government and Coalition Forces are losing support of Iraqi people

Identify insurgents reconnaissance TTP

Identify insurgents surveillance TTP

Identify VBIED/IED TTP

Identify WMD threat to Iraqi Government, Coalition Forces, and the Iraqi people

Identify CNA threat to Iraqi Government and Coalition Forces

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO PIR

3. How will the insurgents maintain freedom of action IOT conduct and facilitate operations?

Identify insurgent leaders, organizational structure, communications networks, and financial networks and **key enablers** in the Western Corridor, Mosul, **Zaab Triangle**, Tikrit, Samarra, Baqubah, Salman Pak, Baghdad, and N. Babil province
Identify/Locate potential safe havens and sanctuaries
Identify insurgent infiltration of ISF, local/provincial/national government
Identify/Report willingness of Tribal Leaders to work with ITG and Coalition Forces
Identify/Report willingness of Local Leaders to work with ITG and Coalition Forces
Identify insurgent threat to Coalition Forces and the Iraqi people along MSRs and ASRs
Identify insurgent threat to Key Infrastructure
Identify movement routes and corridors between provinces
Identify tribes and criminal elements that support insurgent movement and logistical requirements
Locate weapons caches

4. How will the insurgents use the informational environment to influence the Iraqi Government, Coalition Forces, and the Iraqi population?

Identify insurgents efforts and capabilities to influence the local, regional, and International Media
Identify insurgents efforts and capabilities to conduct CNA
Identify the locations of demonstrations
Identify anti-Iraqi Government and Coalition speeches, sermons, and mosques
Identify personnel responsible for planning and directing Information Operations
Identify any change in popular support of the Iraqi Government

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO PIR

5. Where, when, and by what method will the insurgents attempt to disrupt the Iraqi Constitutional Development Process?

- Identify the locations of demonstrations
- Identify anti-Iraqi Government and Coalition speeches and sermons
- Identify threats to elected officials
- Identify insurgents efforts to intimidate the ISF and local population
- Identify any change in popular support for the Iraqi Government
- Identify/Monitor changes in Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni participation and support of the political process
- Identify/Monitor Fault Line issues
- Identify changes to insurgent TTP

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO PIR

6. In which key cities / provinces do the insurgents pose a significant threat to the transition of authority to Iraqi Regional control?

Identify insurgents efforts to increase their strength in specific cities
Identify insurgents efforts to increase their strength in specific provinces
Identify insurgents efforts to intimidate the ISF and local population
Identify any increase/decrease in popular support of the local/provincial government
Identify any increase/decrease in effectiveness of ISF
Identify/Locate potential safe havens and sanctuaries
Identify insurgent threat to Coalition Forces and the Iraqi people along MSRs and ASRs
Identify insurgent threat to Key Infrastructure
Identify/Monitor complications between Provincial/Local Leaders and ISF
Identify threats to US and TCN Contractors

7. Who and where are the key technicians and facilitators that are building and resourcing IEDs and VBIEDs?

Identify/Locate IED/VBIED making facilities
Identify/Locate IED/VBIED makers
Identify current and emerging IED/VBIED TTP
Identify current and emerging IED/VBIED devices
Identify/Locate insurgent and former regime weapon caches
Identify/Locate financiers