OPLAN

IPB

MNC-I C2 Plans

15 MAR 05
Area of Responsibility
Current State of the Insurgency

Insurgency is not growing or spreading
- Remains Concentrated in 5 provinces
- Very little support in Kurd or Shia dominated areas
- Intimidation critical to sustaining insurgency in Sunni areas

Former Regime Elements
- Reevaluating Strategy Following Failure to Delay, Prevent, or Discredit Elections
- Retain Ability to Support Current Level of Attacks

Islamic Extremists and Terrorists
- Operations disrupted but remain a significant threat
- Potential to expand reach through partnerships at the tactical level
INSURGENTS’ OBJECTIVES / ENDSTATES

- **FRE:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraqi Government and ISF // Seek to return Iraq to Ba’athist control and prevent Shia/Kurdish dominated government from assuming power.

- **Terrorists:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraqi Government and ISF // Removal of Western Influence from Iraq; Establish Radical Religious Government.

- **SAR:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraq Government and ISF // Re-establish their position of power in Iraqi society.

- **Shia Extremists:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraq Government and ISF // Establish a Shia controlled Islamic Fundamentalist Government.

- **Anti-Coalition Tribal Groups:** Expel Coalition and Destabilize Iraqi Government and ISF // Maintain influence and increase power.

- **Organized Crime:** Profit or revenge // Make money.

- **External Influence / Facilitators:** Undermine US - Coalition (Western) Influence // Influence Political Outcome in Iraq.
XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS
PROVINCIAL AND KEY CITY
THREAT ASSESSMENT

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, and MCRP//20150404
For display only to IRQ
Density of Attacks
26 FEB to 4 MAR 05
All Attacks*

Number of Attacks by City

Mosul  Baghdad  Ramadi  Alkandariyah  Almamudiyah  Baqubah  Balad  Abu Ghurayb  Samarra  Fallujah  Hawija  Baiji  Taji  Al Qaim

[Map showing density of attacks with colors indicating least dense to most dense]
# 1 Year Environment

## August
- Battle of Najaf Anniversary 5 AUG
- ITG Drafting
- Constitution
- Former Regime Members Trial
- Draft IZ Constitution Due 15 AUG
- WTC Anniversary
- Distribution of IZ Constitution

## September

## Insurgent Objectives
- Discredit ITG/IZ legal system
- Disrupt drafting of new IZ Constitution
- Discredit ITG and Coalition Forces
- Prevent distribution of Constitution to IZ People

## Insurgent Targets
- MNF
- ISF / Transition Tms
- Prosecutors, Witnesses and Judges
- Infrast
- TNA

## Method
- IO
- Intimidation
- Assassinate / Kidnap
- Subversion / Infiltration
- IED / VBIED / SBIED
- Small Arms / IDF
- Demonstrations

## Key Terrain
- Baghdad
- Mosul
- Greater Baghdad (N. Babil, Abu G, Salman Pak)
- Euphrates River Basin (F, R, H, HA)
- Tigris River Basin (Samarra, Zaab)
- Baqubah, Kirkuk

## Contingencies:
- MAS/LTs:
  - Thawra, Najaf / Karbala, Amarah, Kut
  - Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Samawah
- Kurdish Region:
  - Kirkuk, Hawijah, Mosul
- AMZ / Sunni vs Shia:
  - Najaf / Karbala, N. Babil, Baqubah
**1 Year Environment**

**OCTOBER**
- Distribution of IZ Constitution
- Constitutional Referendum
- Former Regime Members Trial

**NOVEMBER**
- Ramadan
- 2nd Battle of Fallujah Anniversary 08 NOV

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**INSURGENT OBJECTIVES**
- Discredit ITG/IZ legal system
- P'vnt Constitution distro/
- Discredit/Disrupt
- Referendum Vote
- Discredit ITG and Coalition Forces
- Discredit Elections

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**INSURGENT TARGETS**
- MNF
- ISF / Transition Tms
- Prosecutors, Witnesses and Judges
- Infrast
- TNA/Distro Centers
- IG Candidates / IZ Voters
- Polling Centers

**METHOD**
- IO
- Intimidation
- Assassinate / Kidnap
- Subversion / Infiltration
- IED / VBIED / SBIED
- Small Arms / IDF
- Demonstrations

**KEY TERRAIN**
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**CONTINGENCIES:**
**MAS/LTs:**
- Thawra, Najaf / Karbala, Amarah, Kut
- Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Samawah

**Kurdish Region:**
- Kirkuk, Hawijah, Mosul

**AMZ / Sunni vs Shia**
- Najaf / Karbala, N. Babil, Baqubah
1 Year Environment

DECEMBER

Anniversary of Hussein Capture 13 DEC

Elections 15 DEC

Former Regime Members Trial

JANUARY

IZ Gov TOA 31DEC

Hajj

INSURGENT OBJECTIVES

Discredit ITG/IZ legal system
Discredit Elections
Discredit ITG and Coalition Forces
Disrupt TOA
Discredit IZ Government

INSURGENT TARGETS

MNF
ISF / Transition Tms
Prosecutors, Witnesses and Judges
Infrastr
IG Candidates/ IZ Voters
Polling Places

Elected IG Officials

METHOD
IQ
Intimidation
Assassinate / Kidnap
Subversion / Infiltration
IED / VBIED / SBIED
Small Arms / IDF
Demonstrations

KEY TERRAIN
Baghdad
Mosul
Greater Baghdad (N. Babil, Abu G, Salman Pak)
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CONTINGENCIES:
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Diwaniyah, Nasiriya, Basrah, Samawah

Kurdish Region:
Kirkuk, Hawija, Mosul

AMZ / Sunni vs Shia
Najaf / Karbala, N. Babil, Baqubah
FRP

INTENT ON DISRUPTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS THROUGH VIOLENT MEANS; LOSS OF LEGITIMACY MAY LEAD TO A SPLIT BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANT TO CONTINUE THE INSURGENCY AND THOSE WHO WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

AMZ / TERRORISTS

DESTROY THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM AND INTIMIDATE OR KILL THOSE INVOLVED WITH THE COALITION OR TNA.

SAR

INTENT ON INFLUENCING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS; ELEMENTS WILL USE BOTH VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT METHODS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS.

Tribes

INTENT ON MAINTAINING / INCREASING POWER AND INFLUENCE THROUGH THE POLITICAL PROCESS; HOWEVER, WILL SUPPORT INSURGENCY BY CONTINUING TO TRANSPORT WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND MONEY FOR PROFIT.

Criminals

INTENT ON MAKING MONEY AND UNDERMINING THE ISF REGARDLESS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION, NETWORKS SUPPORT INSURGENT ENDS BY PROVIDING NECESSARY SUPPLIES THROUGH SMUGGLING AND OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.

Insurgent Elements and Stakeholders

Shia

INTENT ON SOLIDIFYING POLITICAL GAINS THROUGH CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS; SOME EXTREMIST ELEMENTS MAY VOICE DISCONTENT THROUGH VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND ISOLATED INCIDENTS.

Kurd

INTENT ON SUPPORTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AUTONOMOUS RULE IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

External Actors

Supporting insurgents by providing sanctuary, supplies, and support.
ENEMY MLCOA

DISPOSITION

INSURGENTS CONTINUE TO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS FROM MOSUL IN THE NORTH TO RAMADI IN THE WEST, IN THE GREATER BAGHDAD AREA, AND THE NORTHERN PORTION OF BABIL PROVINCE.

METHOD

EXPECT INCREASED POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS ATTEMPTS AS THE NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TARGETS EXPANDS DUE TO THE TNA SEATING; INTIMIDATION EFFORTS AGAINST ISF AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE WILL ALSO INCREASE; AND IED/VBIED/IDF WILL CONTINUE ALONG MSR's/ASR's AND IN URBAN AREAS.

MLCOA

MDCOA

A MORE UNIFIED INSURGENT FRONT CONDUCTS A COORDINATED AND SUSTAINED IED/VBIED/IDF/SUICIDE CAMPAIGN FROM MOSUL IN THE NORTH TO AL QAIM IN THE WEST AS WELL AS THE GREATER BAGHDAD AREA IN ORDER TO OVEREXTEND/ATTRIT COALITION FORCES AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN UNDERDEVELOPED ISF. IN ADDITION, ENEMY FORCES CONDUCT STRATEGIC ATTACKS ON INFRASTRUCTURE, ASSASSINATE KEY GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP, AND ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE REGIONAL SUPPORT, COALITION WILL TO FIGHT AND WORLD OPINION. TRIBAL LEADERS, CRIMINAL ELEMENTS, AND EXTERNAL ACTORS, THE SUPPORTING EFFORT, WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS TO SUSTAIN THE INSURGENCY.
Insurgent Movement – Operational Perspective
What’s Next?

- “Squirt” Theory – When you push, the enemy will squirt away from that area and reestablish itself in another safe area.
- Puddle – When you lift your foot, the water rushes back.

Coalition must continue to disrupt insurgents by maintaining constant pressure; this will
- Wear down the insurgents
- Increase ITG Credibility and Capability
- Increase ISF Credibility and Capability
- Allow Coalition Off Ramp Strategy to Succeed
Assessment of the Insurgency

- Insurgents will seek to regain the momentum lost to due to the elections. Attacks against Coalition, ISF, and infrastructure will likely increase IOT to deny the ISF and ITG the ability to establish a reasonably safe and secure environment.

- Insurgents will attempt to sustain the insurgency by soliciting support from poorly educated, unemployed males and capitalizing on Sunni feelings of disenfranchisement created as a result of the government failing to live up to perceived expectations (i.e. lack of essential services, no improvement in the security situation and high unemployment).

- Insurgents will likely pursue a dual-track strategy; increasing political means to infiltrate and influence new government while continuing to fuel the insurgency. In addition they will look for opportunities to place insurgent loyalists into key military and security positions.

- Insurgents DO NOT have a set timeline: they are in the fight for the long-term, they believe that the Coalition will commit to this effort for no more than 5 years. By maintaining a campaign of terror and intimidation the insurgents hope to take over a weakened government following Coalition disengagement.
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO PIR

1. Who is coordinating, directing, and facilitating attacks against MNC-I, the Iraqi Government, critical infrastructure, and the Iraqi people? Where are they located?
   Identify/Locate leaders of insurgent organizations
   Identify structure of insurgent organizations
   Identify communication methods of insurgent organizations
   Identify finance networks of insurgent organizations
   Identify smuggling networks
   Identify criminal networks
   Identify rocket and mortar cells
   Identify weapons caches
   Identify safe houses
   Identify ratlines being used by insurgents and criminals to infiltrate into Iraq
   Identify coordinated attacks above the local level

2. Where and when will the insurgents direct and facilitate attacks against MNC-I, the Iraqi Government, critical infrastructure, and the Iraqi people?
   Identify routes are being used by insurgents to move within Iraq
   Identify locations where insurgents are attempting to increase control of government and ISF
   Identify locations where insurgents are receiving support from Iraqi people
   Identify locations where Iraqi Government and Coalition Forces are losing support of Iraqi people
   Identify insurgents reconnaissance TTP
   Identify insurgents surveillance TTP
   Identify VBIED/IED TTP
   Identify WMD threat to Iraqi Government, Coalition Forces, and the Iraqi people
   Identify CNA threat to Iraqi Government and Coalition Forces
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO PIR

3. **How will the insurgents maintain freedom of action IOT conduct and facilitate operations?**
   Identify insurgent leaders, organizational structure, communications networks, and financial networks and key enablers in the Western Corridor, Mosul, Zaab Triangle, Tikrit, Samarra, Baqubah, Salman Pak, Baghdad, and N. Babil province
   Identify/Locate potential safe havens and sanctuaries
   Identify insurgent infiltration of ISF, local/provincial/national government
   Identify/Report willingness of Tribal Leaders to work with ITG and Coalition Forces
   Identify/Report willingness of Local Leaders to work with ITG and Coalition Forces
   Identify insurgent threat to Coalition Forces and the Iraqi people along MSR’s and ASR’s
   Identify insurgent threat to Key Infrastructure
   Identify movement routes and corridors between provinces
   Identify tribes and criminal elements that support insurgent movement and logistical requirements
   Locate weapons caches

4. **How will the insurgents use the informational environment to influence the Iraqi Government, Coalition Forces, and the Iraqi population?**
   Identify insurgents efforts and capabilities to influence the local, regional, and International Media
   Identify insurgents efforts and capabilities to conduct CNA
   Identify the locations of demonstrations
   Identify anti-Iraqi Government and Coalition speeches, sermons, and mosques
   Identify personnel responsible for planning and directing Information Operations
   Identify any change in popular support of the Iraqi Government
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO PIR

5. **Where, when, and by what method will the insurgents attempt to disrupt the Iraqi Constitutional Development Process?**
   - Identify the locations of demonstrations
   - Identify anti-Iraqi Government and Coalition speeches and sermons
   - Identify threats to elected officials
   - Identify insurgents efforts to intimidate the ISF and local population
   - Identify any change in popular support for the Iraqi Government
   - Identify/Monitor changes in Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni participation and support of the political process
   - Identify/Monitor Fault Line issues
   - Identify changes to insurgent TTP
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO PIR

6. In which key cities / provinces do the insurgents pose a significant threat to the transition of authority to Iraqi Regional control?
   - Identify insurgents efforts to increase their strength in specific cities
   - Identify insurgents efforts to increase their strength in specific provinces
   - Identify insurgents efforts to intimidate the ISF and local population
   - Identify any increase/decrease in popular support of the local/provincial government
   - Identify any increase/decrease in effectiveness of ISF
   - Identify/Locate potential safe havens and sanctuaries
   - Identify insurgent threat to Coalition Forces and the Iraqi people along MSRs and ASRs
   - Identify insurgent threat to Key Infrastructure
   - Identify/Monitor complications between Provincial/Local Leaders and ISF
   - Identify threats to US and TCN Contractors

7. Who and where are the key technicians and facilitators that are building and resourcing IEDs and VBIEDs?
   - Identify/Locate IED/VBIED making facilities
   - Identify/Locate IED/VBIED makers
   - Identify current and emerging IED/VBIED TTP
   - Identify current and emerging IED/VBIED devices
   - Identify/Locate insurgent and former regime weapon caches
   - Identify/Locate financiers