APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPERATION SAWAID (U)

(U) INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

1. *(S//REL)* **General Situation.** Foreign fighters are recruited for the full spectrum of insurgent activities. However, since 1 Nov 04, there has been a marked emphasis on recruiting foreign fighters for suicide operations. These suicide attacks constitute an insurgent/terrorist strategic weapon, as they receive wide media coverage, around which extremists create messages proclaiming both the success of the individual operations and of the Iraqi jihad. There is a facilitation network that begins in Damascus and moves FP across the Syrian Border at several points, primarily the Husaybah/Al Qaim area. The network currently moves approximately 100-125 foreign fighters per month into Iraq to conduct attacks against CF, the ISF, and the ITG utilizing multiple points along the Euphrates River from the Syrian Border to Rawah.

2. *(S//REL)* **AO SABER.** AO Saber is approximately 80km by 100km. It is bounded in the west by the Syrian Border and in the south by the Euphrates River. The major cities on the south side of the Euphrates from West to East are Husaybah, Karabilah, Al Qaim and Rawah, they are highlighted in green. On the north side of the Euphrates River there are 34 small towns and villages with an estimated population close to 45,000. The largest city on the north side of the river is Rawah with a population of 20,000.
3. **(S//REL) Current Situation.** The diagram below indicates the current intelligence available to this point to support operations west of Rawah and north of the Euphrates River. Highlighted in red are the road networks in the Area of Operations. There is an unimproved route running NE out of Karabilah (red dashed line), it is assessed that the mobility on this road is 20-35 mph with 4wd vehicles, while the multiple improved routes running north from Rawah can be travelled at 45-50 mph in sedans. There are currently 3 bridges that allow vehicular movement across the Euphrates, one in Karabilah, one east of Al Qaim, and one in Rawah. There is a second bridge in Karabilah that is limited to foot traffic and a second bridge to the east of Al Qaim, but it is unusable as of 15 June. In addition, there is 1 ferry site in Rawah, but it should be expected that boats will be used to move back and forth across the river throughout the AO. 

4. **(S//REL) Enemy Situation.** The enemy Situational Template was developed based on analysis of other sensitive reporting. Similar to the old Pony Express system, the FF are passed from one cell to another until they reach their final destination. In order to ensure the facilitators are protected and the area remains relatively secure, there are active cells that conduct intimidation and other offensive missions to enable the facilitators to complete their jobs. Members of the Facilitator Cells can also conduct offensive/defensive operations, however their primary mission is to prepare and process FF.
We assess the number of the AQIZ cells in Western Al Anbar can fluctuate based on the CF/ISIF operations in the area, but are currently between 35 and 40 (or between 200 and 400 enemy personnel).

**SITTEMP – Western Al Anbar**

a. **Karabilah.** Reporting indicates that insurgents utilize Karabilah as a staging and transfer area for both recruited insurgents and foreign fighters. Though the city is small, there appears to be a large number of AIF in the area, both due to smuggling as well as foreign fighters being driven across the border into Karabilah. Threat remains high for CF due to large presence of AIF. QJBR has the capability to use AA machine gun fire against CF aircraft. QJBR will most likely defend against any CF incursion.
b. **Al Qaim.** Reporting indicates AIF and QJBR remain active throughout the Al Qaim area. Operation Matador resulted in approximately 125 EKIA and 40 EWIA. This is less than the assessed insurgent strength in the area. It is likely that many escaped across the border to Syria are slowly infiltrating back into Al Qaim.

![Map of Al Qaim area]

**AL QAIM ENEMY SITUATION**

- **Al Qaim**
- **Irbil**
- **Husaybah**
- **Karkas**
- **Wasit**
- **Sadr**
- **Smuggles weapons & foreign fighters**
- **Al Qaim AAA Sites (ASCS)**
- **Al Qaim AAA Sites (SAS)**
- **Al Qaim Storage Site**
- **Al Qaim Training Site**
- **Hasakah Province Area of Influence**
- **Super Phosphate Plant**
- **Area of Intense Combat**
- **Irbil Air Base**
- **Camp Al Qaim**

**AL QA IN AF CELLS**

- **QJBR Cell**: 3
- **UI/I (IF Cell)**: 1
- **Ghadi Al-Hamza**: 1
- **Al Sibah Al-Qasr (Guards of Iraq)**: 1
- **Caveh Allah e Tanbshi**: 3
- **Abu Fars Cell**: 1
- **Former ASP J FASP**: 1
- **TOTAL AIF CELLS**: 11

**Hazardous Material:**

- **SVBIED**: 3
- **VBIED**: 1
- **IDF**: 1
- **SAF**: 1
- **SAFIRE**: 1
- **Land Mine**: 5
- **RPG**: 6
- **MORTAR**: 1

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**c. Rawah.** The city of Rawah is set across the Euphrates River from MSR Bronze. This allows only one avenue of approach from the south, giving ample warning of approaching Coalition Forces. The road network out of Rawah allows an escape to the west, north, or east. The Euphrates River also provides a withdrawal route. Despite the lack of attacks and intimidation within Rawah, late May reports indicated intimidation of the local security forces and the execution an Iraqi Brigadier General. Other reports indicate that insurgents actually control the city of Rawah. Within Rawah, the QJBR network within the city is highly compartmentalized to guard against compromises and foreign fighter movement through Rawah is facilitated by QJBR and a Saudi facilitator.

5. **(S//REL) MILCOA.** Expect CF/ISF operations in this area to initially cause confusion among enemy forces. As the pressure increases expect them to withdraw back across the Syrian Border, attempt to reposition south of the Euphrates, and ultimately look to find other points of entry (like Waleed to the South, and areas further to the North).

a. The most likely threats to COP Rawah will be from AIF mortars and SVBIEDs from enemy forces moving north from Rawah and other points along the Euphrates River.

b. The most likely threats to sustainment routes will be from SAF and an increased potential for IEDs and VBIEDs over time. There are numerous small villages along the routes
from Qwest and Sykes which could provide early warning to insurgents employing IEDs or intending to attack convoys.