2006 Strategic Outlook

13 December 2005

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2006 Strategic Outlook
(13 December 2005)
To provide an estimate of the strategic environment in Iraq in 2006 and address the key strategic questions that will affect MNF-I's modus operandi
The Post-Election Environment

- Permanent Iraqi Government operating in the absence of a driving political timeline
- Full Iraqi Government will likely not be seated and functioning until mid-April; may effect Iraqi buy-in necessary to facilitate transition
- New IG will increasingly exercise its sovereignty and attempt to influence military operations
- Authorities for MNF-I to execute its mission will not change through 2006 (end of UNSCR 1637 mandate)
- The insurgency: effectiveness and cohesion of various elements degrade over time; but no immediate, dramatic change in geographic scope or level of attacks in early 2006
- Increased Iraqi, U.S., and international pressure for MNF-I to reduce forces and visibility
- Limited international and private investment in 2006 due to real and perceived security risks and lack of effective legal framework for investment; IRRF efforts wind down
- Constitutional amendment referendum and provincial elections offer opportunities to keep Sunnis in the political process and achieve the desired national compact; may also create uncertainty

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Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment
Our Number One Strategic Decision

- **The constant:** we will defeat terrorist and foreign fighters through counterterrorist operations
- **The variable:** what must we do to the rejectionist component of the insurgency?

**Option one:**
- The rejectionist component of the insurgency can be assimilated into the political process
- Current level of violence is motivated by "resistance to the occupation"
- Then ... MNF-I will diminish the level of violence by reducing forces and operational visibility while continuing to transition security responsibility to capable ISF

**Option two:**
- The rejectionist component of the insurgency is pursuing a dual track strategy to change the political process
- Current level of violence is motivated by desire to effect political outcome
- Then ... if MNF-I reduces forces and operational visibility, rejectionists will redirect even greater percentage of total attacks against ISF and the government

Our desired strategic effect is to reduce the level of violence to a point that can be contained by the ISF
Seven questions that will shape our modus operandi

1. How do we demonstrate strategic success?
   - Transition security responsibility and off-ramp of coalition forces (the centerpiece for the 2006 Campaign Plan)

2. Should we broaden our mission in Iraq to consider it a decisive element in the Global War on Terror?
   - Our mandate is for maintenance of security and stability for political transition
   - Defeating AQIZ and transitioning security responsibility to a representative government is the most effective path to regional stability
   - Winning the GWOT is not primarily a military solution
   - May shift focus to CT after Iraqi Security Self-Reliance

3. Do we have to succeed in Anbar to be decisive in Iraq?
   - No, if ... success equals neutralizing the insurgency (as long as the ISF can sustain secure borders, contain the insurgency and denying terrorist safe haven)
   - Yes, if ... success equals defeating AQI
Seven questions that will shape our modus operandi

4. What should the long-term security relationship look like?
   - Transition of strategic and operational headquarters to smaller organizations but more integrated with Iraqi headquarters
   - Office of Security Cooperation: enduring CT capability; mil-to-mil exchange, JSETs, joint-exercises

5. What do we want the MND Commanders to accomplish in the strategic cities?
   - Transition all to Provincial Iraqi Control by the end of 2006
   - Multi-disciplinary approach in each that helps the Iraqis to secure the physical environment, improves access to basic services and win popular support for the government

6. How can we keep Sunnis in the political process?
   - Constitutional amendment referendum
   - Provincial elections
   - Sunni engagement: national reconciliation and potential amnesty

7. What is the priority for strategic resources?
   - Reinforce success; maintain momentum in transition of security responsibility
Transition to Iraqi Security Self-Reliance

LIBERATION/ OCCUPATION

CLASSIC COIN STRATEGY

CAMPAIGN PLAN (AUG 2004)
In partnership with the Iraqi Government, MNF-I conducts full spectrum counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists, and organizes, trains and equips Iraqi security forces in order to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process on schedule

MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

COIN+TRANSITION STRATEGY

CAMPAIGN ACTION PLAN (APR 2005)
In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development

PARTNERSHIP . . .

Decisive Elections Strategic Directive

. . . SELF-RELIANCE

JOINT TRANSITION STRATEGY

JOINT CAMPAIGN PLAN (JAN 2006)
MNF-I and the USEMB, in partnership with the Iraqi Government, neutralize the insurgency to a level that facilitates the transition of the counterinsurgency campaign to the IG and capable ISF and supports an effective, responsible, representative government to enable Iraq's transition to democracy and self-reliance

Elections Jan 2005
Elections Dec 2005

Establishing the Foundation
Building Capacity
Transitioning to Security Self-Reliance

28 June 2004

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Ilitzam Mushtarik - United Commitment

Security Self-Reliance

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Proposed Mission

Mission:
Who: MNF-I and the USEMB, in partnership with the Iraqi Government
What (Essential Tasks):
neutralize the insurgency to a level that facilitates the ....
transition of the counterinsurgency campaign to the IG and capable ISF
and supports an effective, responsible representative government
Why (Purpose): to enable Iraq’s transition to democracy and self-reliance

MNF-I and the USEMB, in partnership with the Iraqi Government, neutralize the insurgency to a level that facilitates the transition of the counterinsurgency campaign to the IG and capable ISF and supports an effective, responsible, representative government to enable Iraq’s transition to democracy and self-reliance
Proposed Intent

Purpose: Enable Iraq's transition to self-reliance and democracy

Key Tasks:
- Build capable ISF
- Defeat T&FF
- Neutralize the insurgency to a level within ISF capability
- Transition security lead to capable ISF
- Stabilize Iraq's strategic cities
- Support political and economic development at the national and provincial levels

Endstate:
- The insurgency is diminished to a level which allows continued political growth and economic development
- The ISF and key ministries achieve security self-reliance
- The Coalition is transformed to a normal security relationship with the IG
## Risk in 2006

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<th>Risk</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
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| ISF reaches near-full capacity but violence remain >500 attacks/ week | - Closely assess off-ramp plan and BPT extend into 2007  
- Extend military/ police transition teams beyond TRA1                  |
| Loss of momentum during the ITG to IG transition                    | - Enable the formation of the new government through the execution of prepared transition plan (First 100 Days)  
- Continue to disrupt the enemy’s tempo                                 |
| Sharpening the Sunni-Shia divide by the nature of the security transition timeline | - Transition mixed ethnic province to PIC early  
- Identify, monitor and counter indicators of increasing sectarian violence |
| Coalition fatigue                                                    | - Work through CENTCOM, and in conjunction with the USEMB, to develop and communicate a strategy to sustain current Coalition support and develop unique opportunities for new donor nations |
| Lack of international financial support for reconstruction           | - Secure pledges for international donations early in 2006 to exploit momentum from elections and seating of new IG  
- Offset loss with debt relief (sanctioned by UNWB/IMF), fiscal reform and increased Iraqi placement for reconstruction (primarily through increased oil revenue) |
| New IG places unreasonable constraints/ requirements on MNF-I operations/ authorities | - Continue partnership and engagement of key political leadership through joint committee processes to shape an environment conducive to CF operations |
| Tolerance for MNF-I presence rapidly dissipates after the election among the neutral segment of Iraq’s population | - Identify quick win city/provincial transitions early in 2006  
- Exploit transition with integrated IO                                   |
| Intra-sectarian violence                                            | - Identify and monitor increased tensions and the potential for violence between Sadr and SCIRI/ Badr factions  
- Work in conjunction with IG to develop a coordinated response plan to contain such disturbances |