CONCEPT FOR INTEGRATION OF THE SECURITY MINISTRIES AND TRANSITION TO POLICE LEAD

Problem Statement: What is an acceptable concept for achieving integration of the security ministries IOT facilitate transitions between the Coalition Forces, Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi Police and eventually achieve Police primacy throughout Iraq.
Agenda

- Background
- Iraqi Army Lead vs. Provincial Iraqi Control (MNF-LFRAGO 05-383)
- Problem Set
- Facts/Assumptions/Constraints/Issues
- ISF Roles and Missions
- IPS COIN Vignette
- Key Definitions/Conditions
- Operational Framework
- C2 Relationships
- Coalition Re-intervention
- The Way Ahead
Background
Discussion:
- We have a solid concept for Iraqi Army Lead (IAL) pursuant to CPA Order 67 and UNSCR 1546/1637.
- Need a concept to transition from IAL to Police Lead.
- We are challenged to achieve Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) without an agreement from GOI on command relationships, metrics, and process.
- Ultimately, we must understand if GOI will pass authority for Police primacy to the Provincial level or retain all power at the National level to facilitate development of an enduring framework.
- This COA provides a framework for an “interim agreement” with GOI to transition Police lead to Provincial leadership supported by the National Government.

Election Timeline:

Planning Timeline:

PM APPROVES CONCEPT

MNF-I FRAGO ISSUED

MOU SIGNED BY PARTIES
Iraqi Army Lead

vs.

Provincial Iraqi Control

(MNF-I FRAGO 05-383)
# Iraqi Army Lead vs. Provincial Iraqi Control

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<td>• Coordination accomplished by Iraqi civil and military authorities</td>
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<td>• Coordination accomplished at local, provincial, and Ministerial levels</td>
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*MNF-I FRAGO 05-383*
Problem Set
What is the mechanism to transition from Iraqi Army Lead (Division-Brigade-Battalion) to Police Lead (Province-District-Station) and achieve integration between the Security Ministries?

If some level of counter-insurgency potentially exists for the next several years, the Iraqi Army must support the Iraqi Police.
When Does COIN Transition to IPS?

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Facilitators
Small Cells / Cannot Mass
Decentralized C2
Single Dimensional Atks
Limited Capabilities

Armed Groups
Significant Size / Able To Mass
Effective C2
Coordinated Complex Atks
Conventional Capabilities/Wps

CURRENT COIN TASKS PER OPORD 05-03 AND CPATT GUIDANCE

IRAQI ARMY
- CONDUCT SECURITY OPNS
- URBAN OPNS
- ATTACK
- CORDON & SEARCH
- CONVOY SECURITY
- FIXED SITE SECURITY
- ESTABLISH CHECKPTS
- PRESENCE PATROLS
- PROVIDE QRF
- REACT TO CIVIL DISTURBANCE

CMDO SPECIAL POLICE
- ALERT/MARSHAL/DEPLOY
- RAID
- CORDON & SEARCH
- FIXED SITE SECURITY
- RECONNAISSANCE

PO SPECIAL POLICE
- ALERT/MARSHAL/DEPLOY
- COIN OPERATIONS
- AREA SECURITY
- SITE SECURITY
- INTERIM POLICE FORCE

PROVINCIAL POLICE
- DEFEND POLICE STATION
- ESTABLISH TCPs
- REACT TO AMBUSH / IDF / IEDs
- DETAINEE OPS
- PERFORM LAW & ORDER OPS
- SUPPORT POLICE INTEL OPS

IPS SKILLS REQUIRED:
- RAID
- EMPLOY QRF
- INTEGRATE INTEL
Facts/Assumptions and Constraints/Issues
Facts/Assumptions/Constraints/Issues

**Facts:**

- MNF/MOI MOU (P3 and PTT); 5 Apr 05
- MNF/MOD MOU (MiTT) – 14 Apr 05
- MNF/MOD/MOI MOU (DBE- Syrian Border); 23 Dec 05
- MNF/MOD MOU (IAL); 23 Dec 05
- MNF/MOI MOU (P3 and PTT); 24 Jan 06
- MNF-I FRAGO 05-303 (Conditions for PIC); 18 Dec 05
- MNC-I OPORD 05-03 (Methodology for IAL and PTT); 22 Nov 05
- 75% of IA assessed at TRA Level 2 NLT July '06
- Relatively low levels of violence in 12 of 18 Provinces

**Assumptions:**

- Some form of counter-insurgency will exist for several years in Iraq
- New GOI will sustain previous MOU agreements between MNF-I and previous GOI
- GOI will agree to pass limited authority to Provincial leadership IOT achieve Police lead
- GOI will agree to some interim “supporting” command relationship by the IA to Provincial leadership IOT transition to Police lead
- IPS will be organized, trained, and resourced to lead limited COIN operations at the low end of the operational spectrum

**Constraints:**

- New GOI not seated
- Provincial Elections are TBD
- GOI enduring framework for Police primacy remains undetermined
- Constitutional authority at Provincial level is TBD

**Issues:**

- Kurdish Region
- Baghdad
ISF Roles and Missions
ISF Roles and Missions

CURRENT

IA
- Control by MNF-I; IA OPCON
- Transition to IAL for COIN
- Limited arrest/detention powers
- Limited ability to enforce rule of law
- Not integrated with MOI

SP/NATIONAL POLICE
- Control by MOI; limited TACON by MNF-I
- Full arrest/detention powers
- Insufficient force structure to assume lead for COIN in multiple Urban/Provincial areas
- Trained and capable of executing limited COIN
- Limited sustainment during deployment
- Not integrated with MOD

IPS
- Limited credibility
- No formal organizational structure
- No ability to lead in COIN
- No formal/enduring command authority
- Ability to enforce rule of law challenged by lack of policy/leaders/special skills
- Not integrated with MOD

ENDSTATE

IPS
- Control by Provincial/Local Authority
- Enforces rule of law
- Full arrest/detention powers
- First responder
- Integrated Intel with MOI
- Capable of leading limited COIN operations
- Approved formal organization with appropriate policy/leaders/special skills

SP/NATIONAL POLICE
- Control by National Command Authority
- Internal threats/emergencies
- Limited arrest/detention powers
- Either augments or supersedes Provincial IPS for special circumstances
- Shared Intel with MOD
- Employed in designated key cities

IA
- Control by National Command Authority
- External threats
- Limited arrest powers
- Integration with DBE
- Shared Intel with MOI
- Executes a Train/REDCON/Leave Cycle
Company Level COIN Tasks:
- Cordon and Search
- Attack
- Urban Operations
- Convoy Security
- Fixed Site Security
- Check Points/QRF
- Presence Patrols

Conditions on the Ground:
- Low level of attacks
- AIF unable to mass or coordinate multiple complex attacks
- IA Platoon can operate at Medium Risk
- IPS units at TRA Level 2; capable of transition for COIN
- Provincial HQs capable of C4ISR at PJCC

IPS Station COIN Tasks:
- Raid
- Employ QRF
- Check Points/TCPs
- Develop Targetable Intel
- Detention Operations
- C2
- Integrate SP or IA
Key Definitions/Conditions
PROVINCIAL LEAD IN URGENT SITUATION

Provincial Lead in Urgent Situation is a non-binding “interim agreement” between the Coalition and Government of Iraq (GOI) to transition the lead for fighting the counter-insurgency (COIN) to the Iraqi Police (IPS). It is the link to achieve transition from Iraqi Army Lead to Provincial Iraqi Control. Provincial Lead in Urgent Situations assumes some form of counter-insurgency will exist in Iraq for several more years. Ultimately, the IPS will require a limited capability to lead, execute and sustain COIN operations at the provincial level as the threat conditions are reduced by the Iraqi Army and the Coalition. The IPS cannot succeed without an integrated approach from all security forces and empowerment from the GOI. Lead in Urgent Situations are “jointly” imposed by the Prime Minister and MNF-I in designated areas within Iraq to provide a framework for transition to IPS lead and achieve integration and support from all national security forces. When GOI and MNF-I jointly agree the conditions are appropriate, the PM will evoke Lead in Urgent Situations and pass authority for lead of COIN from the Iraqi Army to Provincial leadership. The Iraqi Army and all ISF will support the Governor and Provincial Chief of Police IAW jointly agreed command relationships by GOI and MNF-I for a predetermined timeframe. This is an “interim” measure to allow MNF-I to increasingly transition the COIN from Coalition forces lead to Iraqi Army lead to Iraqi Police lead while the GOI continues its debate on a more defined constitutional framework.
CHECKS AND BALANCES

- An “interim” non-binding agreement between PM, MNF-I and Security Ministries

- Requires Prime Minister oversight and approval of framework MOU; allows the GOI to control the scope and type of tasks/support/command relationships the Iraqi Army and Special Police will provide to Provincial police on a Province-by-Province basis

- “Jointly” designated by MNF-I, USAMB and PM in those areas where conditions are appropriate; can be nullified by either party with appropriate notification

- Creates a distinguishable/visible mechanism to remove the Iraqi Army from lead for COIN and enforcing the rule of law at Provincial level (demonstrates democratic progress by GOI; signals our intent to further disengage; able to exploit the adjusted relationship for IO purposes)

- Each MSC shapes and defines the integration between ISF through implementation of a “subordinate MOU” between CF, Provincial leadership and ISF; endorsed by MOD and MOI for each Province

- Iraqi Army formally integrates no lower than Division Commander level to Provincial Governor if requested; IA Division Commanders retain the “right of refusal” for any mission profile deemed inappropriate; IA Division Commander must immediately notify next higher; IGFC/JHQ/MOD can override IA Division Commander as appropriate

- Special Police are employed at brigade/battalion level if requested by Provincial leadership and approved by MOI; if MOI refuses to support, Provincial leadership can petition the PM to override MOI

- Iraqi Army and/or Special Police can only be employed with consent of Provincial leadership; PM and/or MNF-I can override for special circumstances or CF re-intervention after sufficient notification to ALCON (MOD & MOI do not have authority to employ forces without being requested by Provincial leadership)

- MOI continues to support IPS with appropriate logistical and financial support as validated by the PM
## Key Definitions/Conditions (Transition to Iraqi Army Lead)

### IAL STAGE I
**OPERATE IN BATTLESPACE**
- MNF-I in lead
- Full partnership
- Coach, teach, mentor
- MNF-I conducting training, leading operations
- Full MiTT from BN to DIV
- MNF-I provides enablers to IA
- IA TACON to partnership unit
- CF tactical level QRF, close proximity, short response time

### IAL STAGE II
**ASSUME BATTLESPACE**
- IA in lead
- Evolving partnership
- MNF-I assisting with training and supporting operations
- Full MiTT from BN to DIV
- MNF-I provides some enablers to IA
- IA TACON to MNF-I or IA higher HQ
- IA reports to higher HQ
- CF tactical level QRF, area coverage, longer response time

### IAL STAGE III
**INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS**
- IA independent operations
- Peer Partnership
- Routine interaction, professional dialogue, joint training/combined operations
- MiTT at BDE and above (Liaison Mission)
- IA provides enablers
- IA TACON to MNF-I or IA higher HQ
- IA reports to higher HQ
- Progressively shift command to MOD, JHQ, and IGFC
- CF operational level QRF, area coverage, longer response time
Key Definitions/Conditions (Transition to Police Lead)

NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS
- CPA 67: UNSCR 1546/1637
- MNF-I OPCON of IA
- IA assumes lead for COIN
- SP limited TACON to MNF-I; restore domestic order; set conditions for IPS
- IPS gradually assumes lead for rule of law at local level
- Integration achieved at PJCC
- CF postured in tactical overwatch
- Priority for ISF COIN integration:
  - IA
  - SP
  - IPS

PROVINCIAL LEAD IN URGENT SITUATIONS
- Interim agreement
- Requested by provincial leadership; approved by PM
- COIN fight integrated at provincial level
- IPS assumes lead for COIN at designated Urban/Provincial levels
- SP enables IPS; supports provincial chief of police if requested
- IA secures national infrastructure; supports Provincial leadership IAW "joint" MOU for designated areas
- Integration achieved at PJCC
- CF postured in operational overwatch in designated areas
- Priority for ISF COIN integration:
  - IPS
  - SP
  - IA

"POSSIBLE" STEADY STATE
- TBD Constitutional framework
- Law and order enforced by provincial/local leadership
- IPS maintain lead for COIN at Provincial level
- Provincial leadership requests SP on case-by-case basis
- IA executes Train / REDCON/ Leave Cycle
- CF begin transition to strategic overwatch
- Priority for ISF COIN integration:
  - IPS
  - SP
  - IA
Key Definitions/Conditions (Coalition Forces Overwatch)

**TACTICAL OVERWATCH**
- Threat Assessment
- IA units Level 2
- IA BNs Level 2 (green in all categories except sustainment)
- IA still requires enablers
- MiTTs provide Joint Effects
- CF operate from local bases in MSC
- Increased ISR
- MSC authority to shape battle space or tactical intervention

**OPERATIONAL OVERWATCH**
- Threat Assessment
- IA units Level 2 (green in all categories except sustainment)
- IA BNs Level 1
- IA requires limited enablers only
- Modified MiTTs
- MiTTs provide Joint Effects when required
- CF operate from regional FOBs and/or Final Consolidation Bases
- Increased ISR/CAS
- MNF-I authority/GOI cooperation for intervention

**STRATEGIC OVERWATCH**
- Threat Assessment
- IA units Level 1
- IA no longer require enablers
- Functional National logistics system
- Sustainment MiTTs at DIV level
- No MiTTs at BDE/BN level
- OMC organization
- CF over horizon; power projection into Final Consolidation Bases when required

*Not Formally Published by either MNF-I or MNC-I*
Operational Framework
C2 Relationships
NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS

- LEAD FOR COIN TRANSITIONS FROM MNF-I TO IA
- IA TACON TO MNC-I AT APPROPRIATE ECHELON IAW MNF-I IAL MOU
- SP TACON TO MNC-I AT BRIGADE/BATTALION LEVEL IAW MNF-I P3 MOU
- DBE TACON TO IA IAW MNF-I DBE MOU
- SP SUPPORT IA AND/OR IPS PROVINCIAL/DISTRICT POLICE CHIEFS WHEN REQUESTED BY MOD OR DIRECTED BY MOI; IN EITHER CASE, MOI WILL COORDINATE EMPLOYMENT OF SP WITH MNF-I
- IPS SUPPORT IA WHEN IA UNITS ACHIEVE TRA LEVEL 2 IAW CONTROL MEASURES "JOINTLY" AGREED UPON IN AN MSC/IA DIV/PROV GOV MOU (ENDORSED BY MOD & MOI)
- PRIMARY LOCATION FOR INTEGRATION FOR ALL ISF IS PJCC; MNF-I FACILITATES/REPORTS COMPLIANCE WITH MOUs AS REQUIRED
- TRANSITION TEAMS CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT; CF POSTURED IN TACTICAL OVERWATCH AND CONTINUES PARTNERSHIP WITH ALL ISF INTEGRATED UNDER IA LEAD
PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY POWERS

- Lead for coin transitions from IA to provincial leadership
- IA TACON to MNC-I at appropriate echelon IAW IAL MOU
- SP TACON to MNC-I at brigade/battalion level IAW MNF-I P3 MOU
- SP at brigade and/or battalion level support provincial and/or district police chiefs when requested by provincial governor and approved by MOI; MNF-I relinquishes TACON of SP for duration of support
- IA DIV CDR supports provincial leadership when requested by provincial governor and approved by MOD. IA support to IPS initially coordinated at division level; support relationship passes to brigade or battalion level if "jointly" agreed upon in MSC/A DIV/PROV GOV MOU (endorsed by MOD & MOI)
- Primary location for integration for all ISF is PJCC; MNF-I facilitates/reports compliance with MOUs as required
- Transition teams begin to unplug at battalion/station level as ISF units demonstrate consistent TRA level 1; CF postured in operational overwatch and incrementally discontinues partnership of ISF in designated areas
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

- **COMMAND** - refers to command authority over subordinates units assigned, attached, designated, and/or OPCON.

- **TACON** – refers to command authority over designated formations or commands or military capabilities that is limited to detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within an operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of the force or tactical use of combat assets within the assigned mission or task.

- **ADCON** – refers to the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, discipline, and any other matters not included in the operational mission of the military formation.

- **SUPPORT** – refers to the unit/formation that aids, protects, compliments, or sustains another designated supported command for the purpose of achieving integration and unity of command under a single lead agency and/or commander IOT accomplish a specified mission or tasks.
Coalition Re-intervention
Coalition Re-intervention
(Tactical Overwatch Vignette)

SITUATION:
- Localized threat
- Major incident
- IPS Corruption/Incompetence
- IA leadership Failure

INTERVENTION and GRADUATED RESPONSE:
- Reinforce MiTTs
- Reinforce P3 Teams
- Employ Special Police to reestablish domestic order
- CF authority to IA battlespace and conduct COIN operations as required

Initial Situation
TRAF Level 2 IA forces have taken the lead and assumed battlespace in this notional AO.

Change in Situation
AIF defeats an IA BN and establishes enemy sanctuary. CF execute graduated response, occupies contested area, defeats AIF, restores domestic order.

Resulting Situation
Partnered Coalition unit assumes the lead in contested battlespace. Reinforces MiTT of designated IA units, facilitates introduction of Special Police, rebuilds ISF.
Coalition Re-intervention (Operational Overwatch Vignette)

**SITUATION:**
- Larger urban areas
- Continuous elevated threat
- Police collapse
- Key leader assassinations
- IA Army intimidation

**INTERVENTION and GRADUATED RESPONSE:**
- Reinforce with robust MiTTs
- Reinforce P3 teams with CF Units
- MOI graduated response
- GOI National Emergency powers
- CF Creates JOA and deploys for COIN

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**Initial Situation**
IAL or PIC in large area of the country, ISF operate at TRA Level 2 for sustainment and several IA units begin to achieve Level 1.

**Change in Situation**
An area of Iraq destabilizes, Iraqi Government requests assistance, JOA established, graduated response initiated, domestic order restored.

**Resulting Situation**
Coalition BCT reinforces IA units, supplements with robust MiTTs, reintroduces Special Police, rebuilds ISF. Graduated withdrawal as situation permits.
The Way Ahead

- Operational Law Review/Coordinated Staffing
- Decision Brief to GEN Casey
- Brief USAMB
- Negotiations with Current GOI
- Draft Interim Agreement
- VTC with MSC Commanders
- Publish MNF-I FRAGO
Back-up Slides