MNF-I 2006 Transition Planning

This briefing is classified SECRET
REL USA, AUS, GBR
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: 22 Dec 2015
Where Are We?

Positive Trends:

- Security forces progressing well. Insurgents have failed to disrupt political progress or ISF development.
- Operations to restore Iraq’s control to its border with Syria and clear the ERV have degraded the capability of AQI.
- A wedge is being driven between the T&FF and Rejectionist elements of the insurgency.
- Shia insurgency inactive.

Challenges:

- Growing indigenous element in AQI.
- Sectarianism, intimidation, and lack of capacity hamper Government development.
- Danger of ethno-sectarian division remains.
- Extra-governmental armed groups.
- Pressures of almost three years of Coalition presence.
What We Know

- UNSCR 1637 reaffirms mandate for MNF-I forces in Iraq
- Constitutionally Elected Government – 4 year term
- Constitution widely perceived as not yet acceptable to Sunni community
- Significant progress in Iraqi Security Force development
- Influence of extra-governmental armed groups challenging Government control
- While increasingly isolated, Al Qaeda in Iraq will still be a factor post-election
- Complexity of force reductions makes a rapid drawdown detrimental to achieving our endstate
- Projections of Iraqi readiness will change
What We Think

- The time between now and the Government forming will be turbulent
- Al Qa’eda will continue to consider Iraq their main effort
- Growing rift between T&FF and Rejectionists
- Insurgency will remain active through 2006, but greater Sunni inclusion in the political process will lead to a gradual reduction in violence
- Constitutional amendment and provincial elections will be politically divisive
- New Iraqi Government will increasingly exercise its sovereignty
- Increasing pressure to transition security responsibility and reduce forces and visibility
- Coalition nations will look to reduce their forces in Iraq; however, opportunities exist to increase commitments in new areas
- Authorities for MNF-I to execute its mission may change through 2006
Unknowns

- Outcome of the Elections and the representative nature of the new government
- The degree that Coalition Force presence in Iraq is a factor in the insurgency
- Impact of the Referendum and Election outcomes on the insurgency
- Impact of national reconciliation and amnesty programs
- The level of terrorist and insurgent violence below which political and economic development is not significantly affected
- Level of insurgency that the Iraqi Security Forces can contain and defeat
- Sunni engagement programs too new to judge effect on insurgency
- Impact of increased transition of battlespace to the Iraqi Army and Coalition Force transitions in the first six months of 2006
- Impact of increased 14b, 14d in the south
In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.
2006 Key Security Tasks

- Support transition of new Government, conduct of Provincial elections, and Constitutional Referendum

- Continue transition of counter-insurgency campaign to ISF

- Build police capacity to the point where they can begin assuming lead for internal security – Year of the Police

- Support ISF in securing Baghdad and 9 key cities

- Support ISF in securing borders

- Defeat AQI and begin neutralizing the Rejectionist insurgency

- Transfer detention operations to Iraqis, and implement detainee integration process
Potential Courses of Action

- COA 1 “Baseline” 10 + 1 BCTs by Oct 06
- COA 2 “Stretch” 8 + 1 BCTs by Dec 06
- COA 3 “Exploitation” 8 + 1 BCTs by Sep 06
Key Assumptions

- The insurgency will remain active, but will not expand beyond the current six provinces

- MNF-I presence is a factor in Sunni Rejectionist violence

- The political process, in combination with MNF-I reductions, will diminish the Sunni Rejectionist component of the insurgency

- Growth of ISF capability will remain on track

- Shi'a Rejectionist violence can be contained with local security efforts

- Coalition members will remain committed at close to current levels through 2006

- [1.4b, 1.4d] will attempt to influence Iraq, but remain deterred from direct action
Planning Factors

- MNF Brigade partnered with each Iraqi Army Div HQ until they reach TRA Level 1
- Maintain continuity between partnered MNF / IA units to the greatest extent possible
- Theater Security Brigade will be required through 2006
- Sustain the Coalition – requirement remains for three non-US Div HQs
- As brigades draw down, out of hide MTTs will be replaced when below 13 BCTs
- Consider non-standard BCT structures where practical
- Design plan to permit battalion-level off-ramps
- Fully identify what logistics support we must provide to ISF
- Full Transition Teams required unit ISF units meet TRA Level 1
- Maintain mix of forces; preference to heavier force capability
- Next decision points are March 2006 for next step and Call Forward Force
Off-Ramp Variables

- Threat conditions
- Capabilities of ISF
- Impact on partnerships
- Replacement of Transition Teams
- Ministry capability development
- Multiple subordinate RIPv3s to continuously realign the battlespace
- Base transfers, consolidation and/or closures
- Enabler adjustment to support Transition Teams and ISF
- Transfer of equipment sets/property accountability
- Realignment of area coverage for engineers, CSS, HSS, signal, aviation
### Potential Courses of Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC05</th>
<th>JAN06</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC06</th>
<th>JAN07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### COA 1 “Baseline”
- 05-07 Off Ramped units
- 1/10 MTN
- 2/28 ID

#### COA 2 “Stretch”
- 05-07 Off Ramped units
- 7 RCT
- 2/4 ID
- 3/4 ID

#### COA 3 “Exploitation”
- 06-08 Do Not Deploy Units
- 2/10 MTN
- 2/1 CD

**Acceleration Effects**
- Sourcing of Transition Teams, Partnerships, Double RIPs, PRTs and approved RFFs

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(b)(3), (b)(6) MNC-I C3 Force Gen, 18 December 2005

SECRET/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR/ORCON/20151214

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett
US Army/ODA/Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
**Capabilities Over Time (JAN 06)**

**Baseline Model**
- Total Transition: 35 US BNs by Mar 08

**Graph Details**
- MNF-I Assessment
- ISF Battalions
- US Battalions
- 32 x US BN Offramp
- 18 x US BN Offramp

**US Force Structure Opportunities (By US BCT)**
- 8th
- 6th
- 5th
- 4th
- 3rd
- 2nd
- 1st
- 10th

**ISF Division Capability Established (Minus Div Enablers)**
- 7th
- 9th

**Declassified on:** 201506
COA 1 "Baseline" - 10 + 1 BCT Set by Oct 06

- Conditions
- Risk
- Resources
COA 1 Projections IA Division/Brigade Partnership and MITT Requirements
(Based on DEC TRA data)

Risk:
- Threat: 32.7% of AIF attacks in this battlespace (168 attacks per week).
- Seams & Gaps: Abu Ghraib area; realign Victory Base security;
  Western Ninawa; Kirkuk regional engagement and Kirkuk-Bayji corridor;
  Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor;
  and North Ramadi Region.
- TRA: 33 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection JAN 07)
- Partnership: 5 Partnership Transitions.
  - Transition Teams: 15 x Add’l External Transition Teams required;
    252 x augmentees required NET August 06
  - Discussion: Slowest off-ramp COA; achieves a 1 x CF BCT partnership
    per 1 x IA DIV; lower amount of “turbulence” in the battlespace over time
    when compared to COA 3; provides decision space for assessments

Currently Owns Battlespace
Transition of Security Lead - COA 1: Base Plan

- MNF-I ASSESSMENT
- IRAQI CAPABILITY
- US SUPPORT LEVEL

△ = Decision Point
△ = Decision Made

- Deploy 3/101 AA on time
- Deploy DRB (-)
- Deploy 2/1 AD
- Deploy 1/1 ID
- Deploy 1/1 AD

- ~138,000
- ~139,500
- ~125-130,000
- ~110-115,000
- ~105-110,000
- ~95-105,000

17 Brigades
17 (+) Brigades
15 Brigades
13 Brigades
12 Brigades
10 Brigades

ELECTION WINDOW

US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Ilitzam Mushtarak – United Commitment

SPA Plans – 20 Dec 05

SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR
COA 2 “Stretch” - 8 + 1 BCT Set by Dec 06

- Conditions
- Risk
- Resources
COA-2 Projections IA Division/Brigade Partnership and MiTT Requirements
(Based on DEC TRA data)

Risk:
- Threat: 46% of AIF attacks in this battlespace (238 attacks per week).
- Seams & Gaps: Abu Ghraib area; realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Kirkuk regional engagement and Kirkuk-Bayji corridor; Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region; Diyala Provinces.
- TRA: 33 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection JAN 07)
- Partnership: 7 Partnership Transitions.
- Transition Teams: 25 x External Transition Teams; 252 x augmentees required in April 05
- Discussion: Conditions based; allows for the acceleration of off ramping US BCTs in Fall 06; does not achieve a 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV.

Partnership Realignments

Currently Owns Battlespace

DEC05 JAN06 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC06

Approved for Release
Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett
US Army Staff, Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

SECRET//REL-to-USA, AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//20151214
Transition of Security Lead - COA 2: Stretch Plan

MNF-I ASSESSMENT:
- ▲ = Decision Point
- ◆ = Decision Made

IRAQI CAPABILITY:

US SUPPORT LEVEL:

Potential Reductions:
- T 14th
- Corps Separates
- COSCOM
- HQ Consolidation

Deployment:
- Deploy 3/101 AA on time
- Deploy DRB (+)
- Deploy 2/1 AD
- Deploy 1/1 ID

Iraqi Capability:

ELECTION WINDOW:

US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF

US Forces:
- 17 Brigades
- 17 (+) Brigades
- 15 Brigades
- 13 Brigades
- 10 Brigades
- 8 Brigades

Potential Dates:
- ~138,000
- ~138,000 (+)
- ~130,000
- ~123,000
- ~106,000
- ~99,000
COA 3 “Exploitation”- 8 + 1 BCT Set by Sep 06

- Conditions
- Risk
- Resources
COA 3 Projections IA Division/Brigade Partnership and MITTs Requirements
(Based on DEC TRA data)

Risk:
- Threat: 46.8% of AIF attacks in this battlespace (238 attacks per week).
- Seams & Gaps: Abu Gharib area; realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Sadr City and Salman Park; Kirkuk regional engagement; Yusufiyah region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region.
- TRA: 33 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection to achieve level 2 is JAN 07)
- Partnership: 7 Partnership Transitions.
- Transition Teams: 25 x External Transition Teams; 252 x augmentees required in April 05
- Discussion: Quickest COA for off ramp: creates challenges upfront to resource External Transition Teams; does not achieve a 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV; creates significant “turbulence” in the battlespace; provides the least decision space for assessments
Transition of Security Lead - COA 3: Exploitation Plan

MNF-I ASSESSMENT
- IRAQI CAPABILITY
- US SUPPORT LEVEL

Potential Reductions
- T 1.4a
- Corps Separates
- COSCOM
- HQ Consolidation

Deploy 3/101 AA on time
Deploy DRB(•)
Deploy 2/1 AD
Deploy 1/1 ID

~138,000
~138,000(+)

17 Brigades
17 (+) Brigades

~130,000
~123,000

15 Brigades
13 Brigades

~111,000
~99,000
~99,000

10 Brigades
8 Brigades

US Forces

ELECTION WINDOW

AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 05 JAN 06 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN 06 JULY AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 06

US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF

Ilizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

SPA Plans – 20 Dec 05
Strategic Risks in 2006

- Drawing down too quickly could unhinge ISF progress and destabilize the security situation
- ISF fractures along sectarian lines; must work to build national forces
- ISF near-full capability, but violence remains >500 attacks/week
- Insurgency increases in size and effectiveness forcing reintroduction of Coalition Forces
- Intra-sectarian violence spreads
- Infiltration by militia members destabilizes ISF
- Failure to develop capacity in the key ministries
- New IG places operational constraints / requirements on MNF-I
- Troops lose confidence in ISF and strategy as forces draw down
- Casualties increase as forces draw down
Conditions Impacting Drawdown

- Sustain success in Mosul / Tal’Afar and western border
- Sustain success in western Euphrates River Valley and western border
- Deny terrorists safe havens
- Expand control of ISF in key areas / cities
- Iraqi Army and Police at TRA Level 2 and moving to Level 1
- Ministerial institutional capacity improves on schedule
- Violence not hindering political and economic development
- Sunni engagement and economic development must begin to influence insurgency
Way Ahead

Additional work required:
- Enabler reduction
- MTT requirements
- P3 / PRT support
- March 2006 decision point

On track to brief SecDef / Tank – 4 - 5 January 2006
Back Up
Most Dangerous Threat

Islamic Extremists

Defeat the AQI network

Transition Security Responsibility (Provinces and Urban Areas) to Iraqi Control

Keep Sunni involved in political process

Transition to enduring Counterterrorism capability

### ACTIONS

- Increase Iraqi border control
- Baghdad/Mosul Security Operations
- Euphrates River Valley

#### TRA 4-3-2

- MNF-I in lead
- Full partnership
- MNF-I conducting training, leading operations
- Full MiTT (BN to DIV)

#### TRA 2

- IA in lead, MNF-I in support
- Evolving partnership
- MNF-I assisting training, supporting operations
- Full MiTT (BN to DIV)

#### TRA 1

- IA independent operations
- Peer partnership
- Routine interaction, joint training
- MiTT at BDE and above (liaison mission)

### Tactical Overwatch

- IGFC
- JHO
- Divisional Logistics TRA1

### Operational Overwatch

- 5/10 DIV HQ (60%)
- 8/10 DIV HQ (80%)
- 27/36 BDE (75%)
- 31/36 BDE (80%)

### 2006

- MNF-I USEMB Joint Mission Statement (DEC05)
- 2006 MNF-I Campaign Action Plan (JAN05)

### 2007

- Campaign Assessment

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This document is approved for release.
Transition Readiness Assessment (Army)

An Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi forces to perform counterinsurgency missions:

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Command and Control
- Training
- Sustainment/Logistics
- Equipment
- Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Unit</th>
<th>Fully Capable</th>
<th>Capable with CF Support</th>
<th>Partially Capable</th>
<th>Unit Forming</th>
<th>Unit Not Formed / Not Reporting</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division HQs (10)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>0 (4)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigade HQs (36)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>11 (4)</td>
<td>20 (22)</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalions (112)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>42 (26)</td>
<td>51 (54)</td>
<td>4 (8)</td>
<td>14 (21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Units</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>55 (30)</td>
<td>77 (80)</td>
<td>6 (15)</td>
<td>19 (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraqi Army Status as of December 2005 (# Reported in June 05 Baseline)

SPA Plans – 20 Dec 05

Ilitzam Mushtarak – United Commitment

SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR
Current IA TRA level by DIV HQ/ BDE HQ/ BN

* Divisions and Brigades icons are the headquarters only- not the cumulative unit

2/3/1 TRA level was reduced from TRA level II to TRA level III, but maintained battlespace.
Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace
(based on DEC TRA data)

Currently Owns Battlespace

IA Division HQs

IA Brigades

*NOTE: 3/7, 2/9 and 3/9 in force generation, projected to assume battlespace in JAN 07
Transition Readiness Assessment (Police)

Ultimately an Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Training
- Leadership
- Station Effectiveness
- Force Protection
- Facilities / Infrastructure
- Equipment
- Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Unit</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Effective With Limitations</th>
<th>Considerable Limitations</th>
<th>Ineffective</th>
<th>Unit Not Formed/ Not Reporting</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial HQ (18)</td>
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<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
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<td>Special Police Brigades (8)</td>
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<td>1 (0)</td>
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<td>0 (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>13 (13)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
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# Reported in September 05 Baseline
90 Day (MAR 06) Projection
Iraqi Police Services
(based on DEC TRA data)