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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

MNF-I 2006 Transition Planning

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DECL ON: 22 Dec 2015



Where Are We?

■ Positive Trends:

- Security forces progressing well. Insurgents have failed to disrupt political progress or ISF development
- Operations to restore Iraq's control to its border with Syria and clear the ERV have degraded the capability of AQI
- A wedge is being driven between the T&FF and Rejectionist elements of the insurgency
- Shia insurgency inactive
- Confidence in the Iraqi institutions – Iraqi Army, Police, and Government – to improve life in Iraq remains strong among non-Sunni elements of society

■ Challenges:

- Growing indigenous element in AQI
- Sectarianism, intimidation, and lack of capacity hamper Government development
- Danger of ethno-sectarian division remains
- Extra-governmental armed groups
- Pressures of almost three years of Coalition presence



What We Know

- UNSCR 1637 reaffirms mandate for MNF-I forces in Iraq
- Constitutionally Elected Government – 4 year term
- Constitution widely perceived as not yet acceptable to Sunni community
- Significant progress in Iraqi Security Force development
- Influence of extra-governmental armed groups challenging Government control
- While increasingly isolated, Al Qa'eda in Iraq will still be a factor post-election
- Complexity of force reductions makes a rapid drawdown detrimental to achieving our endstate
- Projections of Iraqi readiness will change



What We Think

- The time between now and the Government forming will be turbulent
- Al Qa'eda will continue to consider Iraq their main effort
- Growing rift between T&FF and Rejectionists
- Insurgency will remain active through 2006, but greater Sunni inclusion in the political process will lead to a gradual reduction in violence
- Constitutional amendment and provincial elections will be politically divisive
- New Iraqi Government will increasingly exercise its sovereignty
- Increasing pressure to transition security responsibility and reduce forces and visibility
- Coalition nations will look to reduce their forces in Iraq; however, opportunities exist to increase commitments in new areas
- Authorities for MNF-I to execute its mission may change through 2006



Unknowns

- Outcome of the Elections and the representative nature of the new government
- The degree that Coalition Force presence in Iraq is a factor in the insurgency
- Impact of the Referendum and Election outcomes on the insurgency
- Impact of national reconciliation and amnesty programs
- The level of terrorist and insurgent violence below which political and economic development is not significantly affected
- Level of insurgency that the Iraqi Security Forces can contain and defeat
- Sunni engagement programs too new to judge effect on insurgency
- Impact of increased transition of battlespace to the Iraqi Army and Coalition Force transitions in the first six months of 2006
- Impact of increased 1.4b, 1.4d in the south



MNF-I Mission Statement

In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.



2006 Key Security Tasks

- Support transition of new Government, conduct of Provincial elections, and Constitutional Referendum
- Continue transition of counter-insurgency campaign to ISF
- Build police capacity to the point where they can begin assuming lead for internal security – Year of the Police
- Support ISF in securing Baghdad and 9 key cities
- Support ISF in securing borders
- Defeat AQI and begin neutralizing the Rejectionist insurgency
- Transfer detention operations to Iraqis, and implement detainee integration process



Potential Courses of Action

- COA 1 "Baseline" 10 + 1 BCTs by Oct 06
- COA 2 "Stretch" 8 + 1 BCTs by Dec 06
- COA 3 "Exploitation" 8 + 1 BCTs by Sep 06



Key Assumptions

- The insurgency will remain active, but will not expand beyond the current six provinces
- MNF-I presence is a factor in Sunni Rejectionist violence
- The political process, in combination with MNF-I reductions, will diminish the Sunni Rejectionist component of the insurgency
- Growth of ISF capability will remain on track
- Shi'a Rejectionist violence can be contained with local security efforts
- Coalition members will remain committed at close to current levels through 2006
- 1.4b, 1.4d will attempt to influence Iraq, but remain deterred from direct action



Planning Factors

- MNF Brigade partnered with each Iraqi Army Div HQ until they reach TRA Level 1
- Maintain continuity between partnered MNF / IA units to the greatest extent possible
- Theater Security Brigade will be required through 2006
- Sustain the Coalition – requirement remains for three non-US Div HQs
- As brigades draw down, out of hide MTTs will be replaced when below 13 BCTs
- Consider non-standard BCT structures where practical
- Design plan to permit battalion-level off-ramps
- Fully identify what logistics support we must provide to ISF
- Full Transition Teams required until ISF units meet TRA Level 1
- Maintain mix of forces; preference to heavier force capability
- Next decision points are March 2006 for next step and Call Forward Force




Off-Ramp Variables


- Threat conditions
- Capabilities of ISF
- Impact on partnerships
- Replacement of Transition Teams
- Ministry capability development
- Multiple subordinate RIPs to continuously realign the battlespace
- Base transfers, consolidation and/or closures
- Enabler adjustment to support Transition Teams and ISF
- Transfer of equipment sets/property accountability
- Realignment of area coverage for engineers, CSS, HSS, signal, aviation



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Potential Courses of Action







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27





COA 1 "Baseline"- 10 + 1 BCT Set by Oct 06



- Conditions
- Risk
- Resources

Curtail Apr 06	Curtail May 06	Curtail Jul 06	Curtail Aug 06	Curtail Oct 06
1/10 MTN	2/28 ID	2/101 AA	4/4 ID	RCT 7

DP

Aug 06



COA 1 Projections IA Division/Brigade Partnership and MITT Requirements (Based on DEC TRA data)

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Partnership
Realignment

MITT
Requirement



Currently
Owns
Battlespace

Risk:


- **Threat:** 32.7% of AIF attacks in this battlespace (168 attacks per week).
- **Seams & Gaps:** Abu Ghraib area; realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Kirkuk regional engagement and Kirkuk-Bayji corridor; Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region.
- **TRA:** 33 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection JAN 07)
- **Partnership:** 5 Partnership Transitions.
- **Transition Teams:** 15 x Add'l External Transition Teams required; 252 x augmentees required NET August 06
- **Discussion:** Slowest off-ramp COA; achieves a 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV; lower amount of "turbulence" in the battlespace over time when compared to COA 3; provides decision space for assessments

★
Projected
15 + 1 BCT Set

★
Projected
13 + 1 BCT Set


★
Consolidation
of MND-C

★
Projected
10 + 1 BCT Set



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

Transition of Security Lead - COA 1: Base Plan



US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF



COA 2 "Stretch"- 8 + 1 BCT Set by Dec 06



- Conditions
- Risk
- Resources

Curtail Apr 06	Curtail May 06	Curtail Jul 06	Curtail Aug 06	Curtail Oct 06
1/10 MTN	2/28 ID	2/101 AA	4/4 ID	RCT 7

DP

Aug 06



COA 2 Projections IA Division/Brigade Partnership and MITT Requirements (Based on DEC TRA data)

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USOIC/CDM Chief of Staff
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Partnership
Realignment


MITT
Requirement



Currently
Owns
Battlespace

Risk:


- **Threat:** 46% of AIF attacks in this battlespace (238 attacks per week).
- **Seams & Gaps:** Abu Ghraib area; realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Kirkuk regional engagement and Kirkuk-Bayji corridor; Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region; Diyala Provinces.
- **TRA:** 33 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection JAN 07)
- **Partnership:** 7 Partnership Transitions.
- **Transition Teams:** 25 x External Transition Teams; 252 x augmentees required in April 05
- **Discussion:** Conditions based; allows for the acceleration of off ramping US BCTs in Fall 06; does not achieve a 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV.





Transition of Security Lead - COA 2: Stretch Plan



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US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF



COA 3 "Exploitation"- 8 + 1 BCT Set by Sep 06



- Conditions
- Risk
- Resources

Curtail Apr 06	Curtail May 06	Curtail Jul 06	Curtail Aug 06	Curtail Oct 06
1/10 MTN	2/28 ID	2/101 AA	4/4 ID	RCT 7

DP

Aug 06




COA 3 Projections IA Division Brigade Partnership and MITT Requirements (Based on DEC TRA data)

Partnerships
Realignments

MITTs
Requirements

Risk:


- **Threat:** 46.8% of AIF attacks in this battlespace (238 attacks per week).
- **Seams & Gaps:** Abu Gharib area; realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Sadr City and Salman Park; Kirkuk regional engagement; Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region.
- **TRA:** 33 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection to achieve level 2 is JAN 07)
- **Partnership:** 7 Partnership Transitions.
- **Transition Teams:** 25 x External Transition Teams; 252 x augmentees required in April 05
- **Discussion:** Quickest COA for off ramp; creates challenges upfront to resource External Transition Teams; does not achieve a 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV; creates significant "turbulence" in the battlespace; provides the least decision space for assessments





Transition of Security Lead - COA 3: Exploitation Plan

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US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF



Strategic Risks in 2006

- Drawing down too quickly could unhinge ISF progress and destabilize the security situation
- ISF fractures along sectarian lines; must work to build national forces
- ISF near-full capability, but violence remains >500 attacks/week
- Insurgency increases in size and effectiveness forcing reintroduction of Coalition Forces
- Intra-sectarian violence spreads
- Infiltration by militia members destabilizes ISF
- Failure to develop capacity in the key ministries
- New IG places operational constraints / requirements on MNF-I
- Troops lose confidence in ISF and strategy as forces draw down
- Casualties increase as forces draw down

1.4b, 1.4d



Conditions Impacting Drawdown

- Sustain success in Mosul / Tal'Afar and western border
- Sustain success in western Euphrates River Valley and western border
- Deny terrorists safe havens
- Expand control of ISF in key areas / cities
- Iraqi Army and Police at TRA Level 2 and moving to Level 1
- Ministerial institutional capacity improves on schedule
- Violence not hindering political and economic development
- Sunni engagement and economic development must begin to influence insurgency



Way Ahead

Additional work required:


- Enabler reduction
- MTT requirements
- P3 / PRT support
- March 2006 decision point


**On track to brief SecDef / Tank – 4 - 5 January
2006**




Back Up

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
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Icons
based on
final IA
Brigade
locations

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OCT 06 Projection of IA Owned Battlespace (based on DEC 05 TRA data)



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Transition Readiness Assessment (Army)

An Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi forces to perform counterinsurgency missions

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Command and Control
- Training
- Sustainment/Logistics
- Equipment
- Leadership

Iraqi Army Status as of December 2005 (# Reported in June 05 Baseline)					
Army Unit Rating	Fully Capable Level 1	Capable with CF Support Level 2	Partially Capable Level 3	Unit Forming Level 4	Unit Not Formed / Not Reporting
Division HQs (10)	0 (0)	2 (0)	6 (4)	0 (4)	2 (2)
Brigade HQs (36)	0 (0)	11 (4)	20 (22)	2 (3)	3 (6)
Battalions (112)	1 (1)	42 (26)	51 (54)	4 (8)	14 (21)
Total Units	1 (1)	55 (30)	77 (80)	6 (15)	19 (29)



Current IA TRA level by DIV HQ/ BDE HQ/ BN

* Divisions and Brigades icons are the headquarters only- not the cumulative unit



2/3/1 TRA level was reduced from TRA level II to TRA level III, but maintained battlespace.






★
Projected
15 + 1 BCT Set

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Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace (based on DEC TRA data)

Currently Owns Battlespace

XX	6
X	3
X	3
X	1
X	2



* NOTE: 3/7, 2/9 and 3/9 in force generation, projected to assume battlespace in JAN 07



Transition Readiness Assessment (Police)

Ultimately an Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Training
- Leadership
- Station Effectiveness
- Force Protection
- Facilities / Infrastructure
- Equipment
- Threat


Iraqi Police Status as of December 2005 (# Reported in September 05 Baseline)					
Police Unit Rating	Effective Level 1	Effective With Limitations Level 2	Considerable Limitations Level 3	Ineffective Level 4	Unit Not Formed/ Not Reporting
Provincial HQ (18)	2 (2)	10 (10)	5 (5)	1 (1)	0 (0)
Special Police Brigades (8)	0 (0)	1 (0)	7 (8)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Total	2 (2)	10 (10)	13 (13)	1 (1)	0 (0)

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
90 Day (MAR 06) Projection Iraqi Police Services (based on DEC TRA data)

Province	90 Day Projection
Dahuk	Orange
Arbil	Yellow
Sulaymaniyah	Green
Maysan	Yellow
Dhi Qar	Yellow
Al Basrah	Yellow
Muthanna'	Yellow
At Tamin	Green
Diyala	Yellow
Wasit	Yellow
Babil	Yellow
Karbala	Green
Qadisiyah	Yellow
An Najaf	Green
Ninewa	Orange
Salah Ad Din	Orange
Baghdad	Green
Al Anbar	Red



CMDO



Public Order



1st MECH
 BDE



Icons
based on
final IA
Brigade
locations

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JUN 06 Projection of
IA and IPS in The Lead
(based on DEC TRA data)

