CAPITULATION, SURRENDER, CO-OPTION AND LOCAL CEASE FIRE OF IRAQI FORCES (U)

REFERENCES:


b. -(U) -Joint Pub 1-0, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 Feb 95

c. -(U) -Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes 1 and 2, 9 Oct 96

d. -(U) -USCENTCOM Regulation 10-3, 9 Jan 95, Organizations and Functions, Terms of Reference for Component Commanders

e. -(U) -USCENTCOM Regulation 525-1, Volume I, Operations Standing Operations Procedures, 1 Nov 97

f. -(U) -USCENTCOM Regulation 525-II, Volume I, Operations Standing Operations Procedures, 1 Nov 97

g. -(U) -Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 Oct 1907 (36 Stat. 2255 Treaty Series 539) (Suggested Sources: AFP 110-20, DA PAM 27-1)


i. -(U) -Geneva Conventions 12 AUG 49, For the Protection of War Victims


k. -(U) -Joint Pub 3-07.6, JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 15 August 2001

SECRE/OCON   REL USA CBR AUS

EXHIBITS:

1. (U) Approved Capitulation Agreement
2. (U) Approved Local Cease Fire Agreement
SECRET/ORCON — REL USA-GBR-AUS

1. —(U) Situation

   a. (U) General. This TAB addresses the capitulation, surrender, co-option and local cease fire of Iraqi forces.

   b. (U) Enemy.

   (1) —(U) Iraqi forces are regarded as extremely vulnerable to influence from sources external to the regime. Therefore, appeals to surrender, capitulate or agree to a local cease fire are expected to be widely accepted by Iraqi forces, in particular among Regular Army units. See USCENTCOM ANNEX C to CONPLAN.

   (2) —(U) See Annex B (Intelligence.) Iraqi forces are very familiar with the devastation inflicted upon them at the hands of the Coalition military during OPERATION DESERT STORM. Many see themselves as incapable of resisting Coalition forces. Iraqi forces are generally ill equipped and morale is low. Iraqi forces are positioned and focused upon domestic security. Those forces considered most loyal to the current regime are fully occupied near Baghdad, protecting the seat of political power, or in protecting sites critical to political, economic, or military power in Iraq.

   (3) —(U) Regular forces of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense forces and Reserves are considered most susceptible to appeals to capitulate. Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, and Intelligence and Security forces could be expected to resist.

   c. (U) Friendly. See Annex A (Task Organization.) Coalition forces should avoid being perceived as conquerors of the Iraqi people. Rather, the perception must be that Coalition forces are liberators. Any actions taken by Coalition forces that inflict unnecessary collateral damage or combatant and noncombatant casualties could serve to strengthen Iraqi resolve to resist. Therefore, all measures must be taken to garner favor and ensure mutual respect between the Iraqi people and Coalition forces. However, demonstrations of Coalition combat power will be necessary against those who do attempt to resist. Resistance by Iraqi forces must be handled swiftly by inflicting the maximum damage possible to ensure Coalition combat power remains unquestioned. This will ultimately minimize casualties on both sides while ensuring the security of Coalition forces and a quick end to hostilities.

   d. —(U) Other Government agencies may be critical in identifying capitulating units, confirming compliance with agreements, and establishing mechanisms to control and monitor capitulated units. To this end, the following interagency coordination processes, systems, and plans are provided:

   C-4-A-3
SECRET/ORCON — REL USA GBR AUS

(1) (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Interagency Support to USCENTCOM. (See USCENTCOM Annex V).

(2) (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Interagency coordination and requests for support will be conducted in accordance with NSPD 1. The Joint Staff J-5 serves as the military representative to the Interagency process.

(3) (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), located at HQs, USCENTCOM and at CP H-1, Camp As Saliyah, Qatar is comprised of representatives from USG agencies and departments, and is responsible for coordination of USG support to operations.

e. (U) Noncombatants. Many noncombatants, especially non-Sunni Muslim Iraqis and other minorities have been disenfranchised by the Iraqi regime. Support for Saddam’s regime by the general population is deemed low. They are tired of war, economic deprivation, and abuse meted by his regime. The current regime has inflicted extreme political and economic pressure, as well as terror to ensure compliance with their directives and policy. Some of the disenfranchised population may already be conducting organized resistance against the current regime. Others are passively waiting for an opportunity to resist. To the greatest extent possible these opposition forces and support groups will be identified and used to facilitate military operations.

(af.—(U) Legal Considerations. The following legal considerations apply when dealing with Iraqi forces that have capitulated or surrendered.

(1) (U) Capitulation. Capitulation is the surrender of a body of troops or a fortress or position pursuant to an agreement (exchange of promises) entered into between opposing commanders. Coalition commanders may enter into written capitulation agreements in accordance with the template agreement provided in Exhibit 1. Once terms of capitulation are settled between commanders the terms must be scrupulously honored IAW Hague Regulation, Article 35, and capitulation forces, like forces that have surrendered unconditionally, are entitled to the fundamental protections afforded prisoners of war. Failure to comply with the terms of a capitulation agreement may render violators liable for war crimes, reprisal or loss of their protected status. Capitulating forces are regarded as prisoners of war. Under special circumstances, such as the inability of the victor to guard, evacuate, maintain or sustain large numbers of prisoners of war, or to occupy the area while the enemy is present, immediate transfer to traditional prisoner of war camps may be delayed. Although it may be agreed that capitulated forces will not be maintained in traditional prisoner of war facilities, Commanders must continue to ensure fundamental protections are afforded to capitulated forces, to include ensuring their safety and well being. For example, a Coalition commander may not compel a capitulated force...
to disarm and remain in garrison while subjecting the capitulated force to attack from Coalition forces and opposition groups. To assist in fulfilling his obligations, the commander, at his discretion, may authorize forces to retain their individual weapons to protect themselves from opposition groups or the civilian population. A Coalition commander may also wish to segreage capitulated Intelligence and Security forces from Regular Army populations to ensure their safety.

(2) — (U) Prisoners of war. Forces or units that capitulate or surrender pursuant to agreed terms, or are so as a result of captured during combat operations, or unconditionally surrender become prisoners of war. Because prisoners of war may not forfeit their status, they may not switch sides or be used for military purposes after they have surrendered (they may not be co-opted). They may, however, be assigned certain administrative duties in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, such as camp administration, maintenance and other non-military activities such as public services and transportation. Although surrendered/capitulated forces may not be used to support hostilities, such forces may, prior to capitulating, entering into a local cease fire, or surrendering (becoming prisoners of war), independently become/join opposition groups or join a government in exile for the purpose of resisting the current Iraqi regime (i.e., they may be co-opted). Coalition forces normally search, silence, safeguard, segregate, and screen surrendered prisoners of war to the rear. However, in the case of capitulated forces, their forces will be handled in accordance with the capitulation agreement. The agreement may provide that certain personnel will be handled as prisoners of war, while others will be managed under the control of their respective unit as capitulated forces. Finally, members of a surrendered/capitulated unit may be repatriated or paroled in accordance with procedures TBD.

(3) — (U) Cease fire. A cease fire suspends military operations by mutual agreement of the Parties. Cease fires may be local or general. A local cease fire suspends military operations between specific units in a limited geographic area and may be agreed to by local commanders using Exhibit 2. During a cease fire, the Parties remain belligerents and may continue preparations for military operations. Use of enemy forces that have entered into a local cease fire agreement to undertake operational missions on behalf of U.S./Coalition forces is inconsistent with their continued status as belligerents. Enemy forces may not be used to undertake U.S. missions. Unless specifically agreed in the terms of the local cease fire agreement, the parties may resume military operations at any time after proper notice has been provided. Serious violations of a cease fire agreement terms by one party gives the other party the right to renounce the agreement and initiate hostilities. Although the terms of a cease fire agreement are negotiable, some terms may become so one-sided in favor of Coalition forces that they become, in fact, capitulation agreements...
resulting in the capitulated forces having the status of prisoners of war, with all the attendant obligations.

(34) ——(U) Co-option. For the purposes of this document, Co-opted Forces are those enemy forces that change allegiance to a government in waiting/exile or become/join an opposition group prior to capitulating, entering into a local cease fire, or surrendering (becoming prisoners of war). These forces can, for example, be individual deserters from an Iraqi unit who choose to join an opposition group, or a unit that has sworn allegiance to a government in waiting/exile. However, once a force has come under the power of Coalition forces they may not renounce their prisoner of war status and support Coalition military activities (i.e., they may not be co-opted).

(45) ——(U) Opposition groups. For the purposes of this document, Opposition Groups are forces that join the fight against the current Iraqi regime. These forces may be groups of insurgents or irregulars that are not recognized by the Iraqi national government or have sworn allegiance to a recognized government in waiting/exile.

eg. ——(U) Assumptions. (See basic plan and USCENTCOM Annex G).

(1) ——(G/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Regime oppression and a distrust for the Officer Corps will motivate Iraqi troops to support capitulation.

(2) ——(G/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Iraqi Intelligence and Security forces (25-70 personnel per HQ,) will be collocated with Iraqi Division and higher headquarters to ensure loyalty and compliance with regime orders.

(3) ——(G/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Poor subsistence, austere living conditions, outdated weapon systems, low morale, constant rotation of leaders, and paranoia of the regime will facilitate Iraqi capitulation/surrender.

(4) ——(G/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Assignment of Iraqi forces away from areas they are familiar with, and oppressive tactics against the indigenous population will deny Iraqi forces local support among the people.

(5) ——(G/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Iraqi leaders will be motivated to capitulate in the face of the imminent threat posed by Coalition forces, the threat from internal opposition groups, a reinforcing PSYOP campaign that stresses the inevitability of Coalition victory, and the potential for position in a post-Hussein Iraqi military.

(6) ——(G/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Given a chance, most units and personnel will turn away from the current Iraqi regime.
SECRET/ORCON — REL USA — GBR — AUS

(7) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Capitulation will immediately reduce Saddam's ability to fight a prolonged war.

2. — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Mission. USCENTCOM conducts kinetic and non-kinetic operations to influence the Iraqi military to capitulate to Coalition forces in order to facilitate maneuver by CFLCC forces and the removal of Saddam from power.

3. — (U) Execution.

a. — (U) Concept of Operations.

(1) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Commanders Intent. Iraqi military leaders and units will be offered an honorable and viable way to surrender, facilitating the momentum of Coalition operations. I want to avoid fighting the majority of the Iraqi RA and RGFC units and prevent the unnecessary targeting of Iraqi units that do not threaten Coalition operations. The IO campaign will focus on influencing the Iraqi forces to capitulate or enter into local cease fire agreements in order to initially minimize prisoner of war logistical and security requirements. SOF and OGA, will attempt to foster co-opted forces to control the Iraqi populace and maintain civil control within the ITO. I intend to preserve, as much as possible, the Iraqi military to maintain Iraqi internal stability and protect its borders during Phases III and IV.

(2) — (U) End State.

(a) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Threat to Coalition forces mitigated by reducing the number of opposing forces.

(b) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) A post-conflict Iraqi military is preserved.

(c) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Momentum of ground offensive is maintained.

(d) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) The threat to rear areas is reduced as Iraqi forces are by-passed, capitulated or enter into local cease fire agreements.

(e) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) The civil infrastructure and populations of the region are spared the effects of combat operations, maintained and controlled.

(f) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Operational fires are focused upon the opposing forces that present the greatest threat.

(g) — (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Compliant units remain intact and controlled for future country stabilization.
SECRET/ORCON — REL USA GBR AUS

(h) (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Non-compliant units loyal to Saddam regime are destroyed down to battalion level.

(i) (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Enemy Prisoners of War interned in POW camps are minimized.

(j) (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Iraqi combat efficiency is reduced degrading the potential for WMD or THM use.

b. (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Parts of the Operation. Surrender, capitulation, Local cease fire and co-option will be executed in 5 parts. Identification, instruction, confirmation, control, and monitoring.

1. (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Part I- Identification. An intense PSYOP program will be conducted using OGA and other government agencies, unconventional warfare, and all forms of IO dissemination resources to identify Iraqi forces and opposition groups vulnerable to surrender, capitulation, local and or co-option. The criteria for identifying potential Iraqi forces for contact are:

   a. (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Potential threat to Coalition forces, the strategic positioning of a unit, and the criticality to the defense of Iraq posed by a particular unit.

   b. (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Suspected loyalties of commanders and other key leaders.

   c. (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Perceived degree of loyalty of units to leaders.

   d. (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Unit's historical demonstration of support to central government directives.

   e. (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Iraq regime's capability to coerce unit to remain loyal/responsive to regime directives.

   f. (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Degree of logistical support, level of manning and equipping, unit receives from the Iraqi General Headquarters.

(2) (S/CC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Part II- Instructions. Messages to Iraqi forces will be clear, concise and unambiguous. The message to capitulate will require enemy forces to fully comply with the agreed terms or risk continued combat operations. Once forces amenable to capitulation have been identified a FLASH message will be transmitted using SALJUT report format to notify all headquarters regarding the units conveyed intent. Those Iraqi forces
SECRET/ORCON — REL USA GBR AUS

desiring/identified to surrender/capitulate will be instructed to do the following:

(a) Remain in place, marshall all vehicles in squares, in the open, side-by-side, in multiple rows, and no larger than battalion level. All gun barrels will be turned over the rear deck of the vehicle in a uniform direction. Mark units with white flags. Move personnel 1000 meters from the vehicles.

(b) No MANPAD systems will be visible from the air. All radars will be turned off.

(c) Towed artillery and ADA will be rigged for travel.

d) Aircraft and associated vehicles will be parked nose to nose in parking areas. Runways will not be blocked.

(e) Personnel will remain in uniform. Do not allow military personnel to depart the unit area, but require they remain in place until they receive further instructions. Follow subsequent instructions.

(3) The message to agree to a local cease fire will require enemy forces to fully comply with the agreed terms or risk continued combat operations. Once forces amenable to local cease fire have been identified, a FLASH message will be transmitted using SALUTE report format to notify all headquarters regarding the units conveyed intent. Those Iraqi forces desiring/identified to agree to a local cease fire will be instructed to do the following:

(a) Remain in place. All gun barrels will be turned in a non threatening position and all units will be marked with white flags.

(b) No MANPAD systems will be visible from the air. All radars will be turned off.

(c) Personnel will remain in uniform and will not depart the unit area.

(4) Part III- Confirmation. All forms of intelligence to include; air/ground ISR, tactical reconnaissance, radio and/or telephonic contact will be used to confirm Iraqi unit...
intent before they are engaged. As soon as tactically possible a face-
to-face meeting with Iraqi commander(s) will be coordinated.
Confirmation of compliance with surrender/capitulation or local cease
fire instructions will be a Priority Intelligence Requirement for all
US forces at all levels. Once a unit is confirmed as compliant with
initial instructions the following tasks must be accomplished:

(a) (S/SCI REL USA/GBR/AUS) A contact team will be
initiated by the component command in control of the unit’s location
to ensure the unit is surrendering or agreeing to a local cease fire
and to protect the unit from further destruction by Coalition combat
operations.

(b) (S/SCI REL USA/GBR/AUS) Restrictive fire control
measures will be initiated by the component command to protect the
unit from further destruction.

(5) (S/SCI REL USA/GBR/AUS) Part IV- Terms/Control.

Establishing terms of a local cease fire or control of surrendering/
capitulating forces will be the responsibility of the contacting
units. (If the contacting unit is a SOF element, the SOF element will
pass control of capitulated units to CFLCC at the earliest
opportunity.) The Coalition tactical commander’s representative(s)
will approach the Iraqi force. If capitulation, vice internment as a
prisoner of war is appropriate, a written agreement for the
capitulation of forces, equipment and/or positions will be presented
to the Iraqi commander. (Exhibit 1 to TAB A to App 4 to Annex C to
CENTCOM CONPLAN, approved capitulation agreement) If a local cease
fire, vice surrender/capitulation, a written agreement for the local
cease fire will be presented to the Iraqi Commander. (Exhibit 2 to TAB
A to App 4 to Annex C to CENTCOM CONPLAN approved local cease
fire agreement) Agreements will be in English and Arabic and contain the
terms for capitulation or local cease fire. Violation of these terms,
one entered into, could lead to renewed combat operations and/or
prosecution for war crimes. If Iraqi forces violate material terms
of the agreement, the Coalition tactical Commander may choose to
denounce the agreement and resume hostilities. Terms of the
capitulation or local cease fire agreement may be negotiated in
conformity with the approved agreements contained at Exhibits 1 and 2.
The model agreements authorize limited deviation from specific terms
of the agreement based upon the tactical situation at the time, to
include geographic location of the unit, the unit’s situation, the
status of other adjacent and higher headquarters, C3 issues,
logistical capabilities, Coalition objectives, Coalition forces’
capabilities and proximity to forces or entities hostile to the
capitulated unit. Further instructions regarding the retention of
weapons, munitions, chemical protective equipment, rations and water,
communications restrictions, the use of logistical support vehicles,
and expected activities and responsibilities of the capitulated force
should be addressed as required. Coalition force commanders are
prohibited from using capitulated/surrendered or enemy force under
local cease fire agreement for military purposes. Doing so creates
the appearance, if not fact, that enemy forces that would otherwise have been entitled to prisoner of war protection have been enticed to capitulate or enter into a local cease fire agreement in order that U.S. forces may avoid Geneva Convention obligations.

(56) Part V- Monitor. Once the Iraqi unit has agreed to capitulation or local cease fire terms, local commanders will determine an acceptable mechanism to continue to monitor the Iraqi unit for compliance with the terms and to fulfill the Commander's obligations under the capitulation/local cease fire agreement and applicable conventions. For example, in the case of capitulation, it may be necessary to protect leadership and Intelligence and Security forces from the remaining soldier population or the general population. It will generally be necessary to maintain a Coalition or GG force presence with the Iraqi capitulated forces. Capitulated Iraqi forces do not relinquish their rights as BFWs should they remain under the control of their own unit's chain of command as a capitulating force. Therefore, Coalition commanders must remain prepared to provide subsistence, and medical care within their capabilities should the unit be unable to sustain itself. Iraqi forces under a local cease fire agreement remain enemy forces and may reconstitute and plan for continued combat operations and, after appropriate notification, re-commence hostilities. Local Coalition commanders will be prepared to defeat/destroy any unit that does not comply with the terms of capitulation/local cease fire agreements. Once a capitulated unit has been positioned in its agreement, it will not be moved or employed without approval from COMCFLCC or CONCJOPSOC. Major troop movements of a force subject to the local cease fire may, by the terms of the agreement, constitute a serious breach allowing a return to hostilities.

Tasks

1. (a) Provide on call CAS to those units confirming or establishing control of forces capitulating, entering local cease fire agreements or being co-opted.

2. (b) Facilitate confirmation of unit compliance with stated instructions.

3. (c) Monitor capitulated units from the air.

4. (d) Support instruction process by providing necessary leaflet and communications support to the JPOTF.

5. (e) On order, to execute aerial resupply of capitulated and co-opted forces as required.
SECRET/QRCON — REL USA GBR AUS

- (a) (U) CFLCC
  - Provide C2 for the process of identification, agreements, confirmation, control and monitoring of all capitulated/surrendered forces and local cease fire forces in the ITO.

- (b) (U) — Execute the capitulation/local cease fire plan in the ITO.

- (c) (U) — Provide logistical support to sustain capitulated and co-opted forces as required.

- (d) (U) Develop prisoner of war screening criteria to assist CFSOCC forces in identifying individuals or High Value Personnel (HVP) who warrant further interrogation and/or incarceration under Coalition control.

- (e) (U) BPT to accept custody of selected RPW prisoners of war.

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- (a) (U) CFSOCC/JIACG
  - Conduct C2 and monitor co-opted forces within the ITO through UW/OG operations.

- (b) (U) — Execute the capitulation/local cease fire plan in the ITO.

- (c) (U) Conduct initial screening of capitulated forces for individuals who warrant further interrogation and/or internment under Coalition control.

- (d) (U) — Facilitate resupply of co-opted forces by CFLCC.

- (a) (U) CPOTF
  - Ensure units identified by CFLCC for capitulation/local cease fire or by CFSOCC and the JIATF for co-option, are instructed as to the desired measures to be taken.
  - Utilize Force of IO, JIATFPOC, CFLCC, JFSSOC, and JFACC, to this end.

  - (b) (U) — Develop procedures/plans to ensure that all targeted IZI/IR forces can be contacted.

  d. (U) — Coordinating Instructions

  (1) (U) Procedures for paroling capitulated or surrendered forces are TBD. However, it may be assumed that such forces will not be paroled unless they cannot be cared for by the monitoring unit, and
the force is no longer regarded as a viable threat to Coalition forces. Paroling of forces will be conducted strictly in conformity with applicable Geneva Conventions and guidance TBD.

(2) (U) Procedures for the repatriation of capitulated or surrendered forces TBD. However, it may be assumed that such forces will not be repatriated prior to cessation of hostilities unless they cannot be cared for by the monitoring unit, and the members are no longer regarded as a viable threat to Coalition forces. Repatriation of forces will be conducted strictly in conformity with applicable Geneva Conventions.

(3) (U) Commanders will ensure personnel deployed to the AOR receive appropriate training on the intent and procedures within this Tab, and the importance of respecting the persons and property of the local populace.

(4) (U) Commanders will establish measures to protect cultural property, with particular emphasis given to safeguarding religious shrines. All Targeting Boards must ensure that culturally sensitive targets are avoided.

(5) (U) Emergency relief efforts by Coalition forces include the provision of potable water, food, medical services, shelter, and sanitation. Emergency relief should be provided whenever deemed essential by the controlling or monitoring commander.

(6) (U) Component requirements for interagency support should be submitted to CENTCOM J3 for validation and submission to the JIACG.

(7) (U) Coalition commanders must balance risk to operations with the objective of preserving Iraqi units. This authority will be especially critical during initial compliance with capitulation/local cease fire instructions and while control is being established.

(8) (U) Priorities for CAS are first to units in contact and second to those confirming capitulation/local cease fire.

(9) (S/SCI REL USA-GBR-AUS) Coalition commanders may employ capitulated units to assist Coalition forces in performing non-combatant tasks as permitted by the Geneva Conventions, such as delivering humanitarian assistance supplies. However, tasks that place capitulated Iraqi forces directly in harm's way, such as demining, are not authorized.

(10) (S/SCI REL USA-GBR-AUS) Funding. Component commands or parent services will fund the cost of this operation and capture all incremental costs.

4. (U) Administration And Logistics
DECIMAL REL USA GBR AUS

1. (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Iraqi commanders of capitulated forces will be required to prepare a by-name roster of all forces under their command and sign a voucher as to their health and condition during the control part of capitulation operations. IOT facilitate coordination with the ICRC. Commanders of capitulated Iraqi forces will also be required to provide the rank and service number of members under his control.

b. (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) NGOs and NGOs should be provided access to capitulated Iraqi forces to vouch for their health and to facilitate logistical support.

c. (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Support to capitulated units should only be provided when their ability to support themselves from unit supplies and the local economy has been exhausted.

d. (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Capitulated units may be authorized to use organic transportation (general purpose vehicles) for the express purpose of carrying out tasks assigned by the Coalition commanders responsible for capitulated forces, or for their own life support and sustainment. Armored vehicles will not be used.

e. -(U) -Reports.

(1) (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) SALUTE Report. A FLASH message will be transmitted using SALUTE Report format to notify all headquarters regarding an Iraqi force’s conveyed intent to capitulate or enter into a local cease fire.

(2) (S/OC REL USA/GBR/AUS) Capitulation Report and Common Operating Picture. COMCFLCC will maintain a capitulation/local cease fire status report and Common Operating Picture listing the Iraqi units, locations, and status with regard to the part of capitulation entered into, and the method and forces by which the organization is being monitored. A remarks column shall be created for purposes of identifying essential issues related to the capitulated unit.

5. -(U) -Command, Control, and Communications

a. -(U) Command. See Annex J (Command Relationships). Command and control of surrendered/capitulated Iraqi forces rests with the component controlling the AO, JSOA, or ITO in which the Iraqi unit is located. C2 for Co-opting forces rests with COMCFSOCC. Responsibility for monitoring Iraqi forces subject to a local cease fire rests with the component controlling the AO, JSOA, or ITO in which the Iraqi unit is located.

b. -(U) Control. COMCFLCC retains control for all capitulation and surrender within the ITO.
SECRET/OGON - REL USA GBR AUS

GENERAL, U.S. Army
Commander

OFFICIAL:

COL, U.S. ARMY
Director of Operations