CFLCC MISSION ANALYSIS/COA DEVELOPMENT BRIEF
NORTH IRAQ OPERATIONS

6 APR 03
ENEMY ML COA: RA/RGI/SRG/RDS
Defend Approaches into and IVO Tikrit, Kirkuk, and Mosul

CONTROL:
- RA Forces continue to retain control of LOCs and key nodes/infrastructure IVO Tikrit and Mosul (Shape Conditions).
- RDS maintain military population control IVO Kirkuk and Mosul (Shape Conditions).

DETER:
- RA Forces remain dispersed IVO Mosul and Kirkuk and LOCs leading into these cities in North (Shape Conditions).
- 1st Inf RA Units defend along LOCs to Kirkuk (Shape Conditions).

ATRIT:
- SRG Bde defend IVO Tikrit and NEB IVO Kirkuk (Shape Conditions).

ASYMMETRIC THREAT:
- RDS Attacks on LOCs: Destruction of key oil nodes IVO Kirkuk: IED/VBIED

POPULATION:
- Pro-regime IVO Tikrit; Neutral to Coalition further North

ENEMY ATTRITION/STANCEN:
- RA Forces (INF) – 30-50%
- SRG Bde – 50%
*Based on assumption that shaping in north becomes a priority

VULNERABILITIES:
- Mobility; Exposure to Desolation/ Captigration, C2, and Logistics

ASSESSMENT:
- Projected enemy maneuver/disposition will not create conditions to prevent execution of this operation.
CFC Guidance

- Submit detailed Commander’s estimate for accomplishing assigned tasks in North Iraq w/out 4ID entering through Turkey NLT 071200Z APR 03
- Consider 3 courses of action.
- COA 1-Employ existing forces into North Iraq from South in response to emerging threats.
- COA 2-Employ forces into North Iraq from South based on current force flow projections.
- COA 3-Employ EUCOM forces via Airlift.
- All previous tasks remain the same.
- Include Comparative analysis of COAs to include projected Deployment/Employment Timelines.
- As Campaign unfolds in the South, requirement to Fix, Protect Critical Infrastructure, and separate Turkish and Kurdish forces increase in importance.
Facts

- Center of gravity for operation Iraqi Freedom is Baghdad
- IO operations in the North are ongoing
- Fires are ongoing against Iraqi forces in the North (Lethal Shaping)
- Kurds have conducted limited movement forward
- APOD at Bashur is operational
- Regime Military and Non Military currently control Oil fields and Urban areas in Northern Iraq
- 21st TSC supports North to South
- Bridging assets available to support South to North
- DC flow has had minimal impact on movements
Assumptions

- Following forces are available: SETAF, TF 14th, 173d AB, 26 MEU, 82d ABN DRB, 21 TSC (for COA 3)
- Diplomatic measures will discourage Turks from increasing their presence in N Iraq
- EUCOM/21st TSC will support forces in North until Ground LOC is established
- 2 Day Travel per Bde of 4 ID South to North (Kuwait to vic Baghdad via HET)
- GOT will allow resupply over flight rights and HA overland
- Utilize Emergency HA out of Germany
- Northern Oil Fields are rigged for destruction
- Kurds want to secure the Kirkuk Oil Fields
- Utilize CA brigade for echelons above division operations (Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center) in the North
Key Tasks

- Control Tikrit IOT Deny Regime Alternate Refuge Location
- Secure Key North Oil Nodes within Zone IOT Prevent Kurdish Control of Oil Resources
- Defeat Enemy Forces in Zone IOT Complete Regime Removal
- Secure Ground LOC IOT Facilitate Operations in the North
- BPT Control Mosul IOT Deter Turkish Adventurism
CFLCC Specified Tasks (1 of 2)

- Develop and Submit COA 1 - Employ existing forces into Northern Iraq from the south in response to emerging threats. (Current CFLCC FRAGO 93 addresses I MEF forces moving North of Baghdad)
- Develop and Submit COA 2 - Employ forces into Northern Iraq from the South based on current force flow projections (4th ID/other Options)
- Develop and Submit COA 3 - Employ EUCOM forces into Northern Iraq via airlift (SETAF option)
- Develop and Submit to CDRUSCENTCOM detailed concept of operations and supporting analysis for:
  - Air or Land Employment
  - Detailed Timeline
  - Airlift Requirements
  - Movement Plan
  - Concept of Support and Employment
CFLCC Specified Tasks (2 of 2)

- Plan for sustainment of EUCOM (Northern Forces) forces by Airlift only until GLOC est. from South
- On order receive OPCON of EUCOM forces
- Recommend Battlespace Apportionment
- On order Conduct L/U with North forces and est. Ground LOC from the South
- Plan for integration of North forces for PH IV operations
- Plan to provide CFLCC LNO team to EUCOM HQ
- Coordinate with EUCOM and supporting components for Identification of Key tasks to be accomplished for ea COA
- Develop Timeline for Key Actions to occur in support of ea COA
- Coordinate with EUCOM and Submit request for forces ISO COA 3 to CCJ3-PP HQ (Forces initially work for CFSOCC in their JSOA – CFSOCC does the RFF)
- Plan to assume logistical/personnel support of CEC forces in Northern Iraq once a secure GLOC is established from Kuwait to Northern Iraq
Implied Tasks

- Provide support to oil contractors in Northern Oil Fields
- Establish Northern LSA
- Assume control of EPW Collection Point/Holding Area
- Conduct LOC Security
- Establish HACC in North
Key Task Timeline

- RSOI Complete
- Control Tikrit IOT Deny Regime Alternate Refuge Location
- Secure Key North Oil Nodes within Zone IOT
- Prevent Kurdish Control of Oil Resources
- Defeat PAK Enemy Forces in Zone IOT
- Complete Regime Removal
- Secure Ground LOC IOT Facilitate Operations in the North
- BPT Control Mosul IOT Deter Turkish Adventurism

* 3-79 AR & 1-44 IN attached to V Corps
COAs
COA 1: Employ existing forces into Northern Iraq from the South in response to emerging threats

OPTION 1: 101AAST
OPTION 2: 82nd ABD(-)

- Attack to secure key oil infrastructure in Kirkuk IOT prevent Kurdish control of oil resources
- O/G, secure Tikrit IOT deny Regime alternate refuge location
- BFT attack to secure Mosul IOT deter Turkish adventurism
- Secure ground LOC IOT facilitate operations in the North
- Link up with 173d ABN BDE
- Assume OPCON of 173rd BDE
- BFT destroy enemy east of Kirkuk
- I MEF and other V Corps elements continue to isolate and conduct operations in Baghdad.
COA 1 Options

Employ existing forces into Northern Iraq from the South in response to emerging threats

- Likely choice is a heavy/light task-organized element
- Options:
  - 82nd ABD(-) with current force-structure in Iraq
  - 101st AASLT(-) Div C2 node, flag officer, 1 BDE with attack aviation capability
- In both cases, these Div level command and control elements would accept OPCON of 173rd once they are vic Kirkuk
- CFLCC will establish land LOC from South as soon as feasible
- Element will continue close coordination with JSOTF-N
- Sustainment from EUCOM is critical until land LOC is in place and secure
COA 2: Employ forces into Northern Iraq from the South based on current force flow projections

OPTION 1: 4th ID
OPTION 2: S3CR

- Attack to secure key oil infrastructure in Kirkuk IOT prevent Kurdish control of oil resources.
- Q/Q, secure Tikrit IOT deny Regime alternate refuge location
- BPT attack to secure Mosul IOT deter Turkish adventurism
- Secure ground LOC IOT facilitate operations in the North
- Link up with 173d ABN BDE
- Assume OPCON of 173rd BDE
- BPT destroy enemy east of Kirkuk
- I MEF and other V Corps elements continue to isolate and conduct operations in Baghdad.
COA 2 Options

Employ forces into Northern Iraq from the South based on current force flow projections

- Likely choice is a heavy/light task-organized element
- Options:
  - 4th ID task organized dependant upon the Baghdad fight and other tasks/conditions within CFLCC
  - 101st AASLT(-) Div C2 node, flag officer, 1 BDE with attack aviation capability
- In both cases, these Div level command and control elements would accept OPCON of 173rd once they are vic Kirkuk
- CFLCC will establish land LOC from South as soon as feasible
- Element will continue close coordination with JSOTF-N
- Sustainment from EUCOM is critical until land LOC is in place and secure
COA 3: Employ EUCOM forces into Northern Iraq via airlift

DIRECTED OPTION: SETAF

SETAF, with 173d ABN BDE, DRB 82d ABN, TF 1-44AR(HRC/MRC)(-), and 26 MEU

- Attack to secure key oil infrastructure in Kirkuk IOT prevent Kurdish control of oil resources
- O/G, secure Tikrit IOT deny Regime alternate refuge location
- BPT attack to secure Mosul IOT deter Turkish adventurism
- Secure ground LOC IOT facilitate operations in the North
- Link up with 173d ABN BDE
- Assume OPCON of 173d BDE
- BPT destroy enemy east of Kirkuk
- I MEF and other V Corps elements continue to isolate and conduct operations in Baghdad.
COA 3 Options
Employ EUCOM forces into Northern Iraq via airlift

- SETAF conducts operations with 173rd ABN, 26 MEU and TF [14a](1.4)
- EUCOM provides support via air/ground
- CFLCC establishes ground LOC from South to Link-up with this forces when feasible
- Subsequent command and control relationships established based on conditions (Phase III or Phase IV)
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<tr>
<th>COA 1</th>
<th>Employ existing forces into Northern Iraq from the South in response to emerging threats 101ST ABN ROK ABN</th>
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</table>
| Key Task Timeline | D+ 21  
D+ 22 |
| Logistics Considerations | Supportable  
No RSOI  
Low reliance on GLOC  
Air Resupply |
| Air Lift Demands | AASLT  
Intra-theater  
(04C-130) |
| Phase IV Adjustments | Requires adjustments to set Phase IV  
Takes CBT  
PWR from Baghdad |
| Impact on Baghdad Fight | V Corps Controls  
OCPON |
| Command & Control | |

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<tr>
<th>COA 2</th>
<th>Employ forces into Northern Iraq from the South based on current force flow projections 4ID 3 ACR</th>
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| Key Task Timeline | D+30  
D+57 |
| Logistics Considerations | Supportable  
LOG intensive  
GLOC dependant  
New LSA |
| Air Lift Demands | No Air Lift Required  
HET (2 Days to Baghdad per 866) |
| Phase IV Adjustments | Supports Phase IV Operations  
Minimal impact |
| Impact on Baghdad Fight | V Corps Controls  
OCPON |
| Command & Control | |

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<th>COA 3</th>
<th>Employ EUCOM forces into Northern Iraq via airlift</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Task Timeline</td>
<td>D+30</td>
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</table>
| Logistics Considerations | Supportable by EUCOM  
Air Resupply |
| Air Lift Demands | Requires inter-theater assets  
Provides additional force |
| Phase IV Adjustments | No impact |
| Impact on Baghdad Fight | EUCOM is in DS  
OCPON to CFLCC |
| Command & Control | |
Issues

- How much/how long can we expect EUCOM logistical support for forces in the North?
- COA 3: X-band satellite connectivity only supportable at expense of current CFLCC bandwidth (V Corps, I MEF and CFLCC lose bandwidth)
Required Support from CENTCOM

- Coordination with EUCOM for logistical support (ground and air sustainment)
- Priority of airlift as required to support operations in the North
- Coordination with EUCOM for MEU availability
- Coordination with EUCOM for SETAF employment (COA 3)
- Coordinate with EUCOM for Request for Forces (COA 3)
Concept of Support

• COA 1 and 2: Theater LSA Adder continues operations and 377th TSC task organizes to shorten V Corps LOC’s. 377th establishes a convoy support center vic Ad Diwaniyah to support MSR Tampa and ASR Jackson. V Corps secures OBJ Redskins and begins establishing LSA Copperhead. 377th prepares to conduct RIP with V Corps and assumes operation of LSA Copperhead. V Corps echelons internal logistics forward and eventually closes LSA Bushmaster. Reduction of V Corps LOC’s will allow for sustainment of operations North of Baghdad. 173rd continues to receive support through EUCOM. After link-up with 173rd, EUCOM continues to support via ground and air means.

• COA 3: Current CFLCC theater log structure continues to develop and transition as stated above. SETAF is sustained through air LOC from EUCOM. After link-up with ground forces from the South, EUCOM continues to support via ground and air means.