Iraq Update
21 April 2006

This briefing is classified
SECRET
REL USA, AUS, GBR
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: 20 Apr 2016

Ilitizam Mushtarak – United Commitment
SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR
Situation

- Sectarianism will remain part of the strategic landscape and will complicate the accomplishment of our strategic objectives over the next several years.
- "Tit for Tat" sectarian violence will continue; AQIZ will continue to work to foment sectarian violence.
- Population movements have slowed, but will continue on a small scale.
- Pressures of government formation, ongoing sectarian violence, lagging basic needs, and weak economic development will make it harder for the new government to generate momentum.
- The Sunni population is currently participating in the political process and may be recalculating their alternatives, with respect to the insurgency.
- Army development on track; police development progressing, but police loyalty questionable in some areas.
- Signals from Sadr mixed; improving capability for rapid action.
- New government will likely exercise their sovereignty more; will press for "Way Ahead" on coalition presence and detainees.

SD SVTC 21 April 2006
Iraq Security Force
Assumption of Lead

April 2006

Iraqi Army

52 Battalions (2/14/52)
National Police

10 Battalions (0/1/10)

Apr 06 TRA Data

Division HQs

Brigade HQs

MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB

2006 2007

Itizam Mushtarak – United Commitment
Provincial Iraqi Control: April Assessment and Projections

April Assessment

Provincial Iraqi Control Projections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUN 06</td>
<td>Al Muthanna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 06</td>
<td>Maysan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG 06</td>
<td>Dhi Qar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 06</td>
<td>An Najaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 06</td>
<td>Dahuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 06</td>
<td>Diyala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 06</td>
<td>Irbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 06</td>
<td>Karbala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 06</td>
<td>Al Qadisiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 06</td>
<td>Babil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 06</td>
<td>Salah Ad Din</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV 06</td>
<td>Wasit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC 06</td>
<td>At Tamim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 07</td>
<td>Al Basrah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 07</td>
<td>Ninawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 07</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR 07</td>
<td>Al Anbar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is the first full assessment on progress towards Provincial Iraqi Control; the assessment process is maturing and projections will change in the future.

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Approved for Release
Issue #1: Short Term Presence

Government Program Point 5: “To work to safeguard the sovereignty of Iraq... realize the internal requisites according to an objective timetable so that Iraqi forces assume the security tasks completely and end the mission of MNF-I.”

- Expect pressure to show some plan for the withdrawal of MNF-I
- Should be prepared to talk short term plans (through 2007) in the first few months of the government

Key Points
- Use ISF development timelines and conditions-based approach to show “Way Ahead” without a fixed timetable
- Discuss the authorities MNF-I will continue to require
  - “SOFA-like” protections
  - Article 98 agreement
  - Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
- Consider “state to state” agreement for conflict termination
Issue #2: Detainees

Government Program Point 31: “Form a governmental committee to follow up detainee cases . . . activate the judicial procedures . . . encouraging the Iraqi and international organizations to follow up detainee files, visiting the detainee centers, and meeting the detainees without impediments”

- Expect pressure to show some plan for the handover of detainees to the Iraqis
- Should be prepared to talk short-term plans (through 2007) in first few months of new government
- Key Points:
  - Release program tied to government reconciliation initiatives
    - Current standing process to release low-risk detainees (20%)
    - Can accept some risk on medium risk detainees (35%); High Risk Detainees (45%) held for reconciliation agreement
  - Ongoing issues include: Iraqi legal authorities to hold security detainees, MEK, and refoulement agreements
  - Also expect to get pressed to conform to Iraqi Constitutional requirements for arrest and detention

SD SVTC 21 April 2006

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Issue #3: Long Term Presence

- Useful to begin discussing programs that signal appropriate long term relationships between USG and GOI
  - Security guarantees
  - FMF funding
- Don’t expect Iraqi interest initially in the long term
- Basing and long term presence discussions should follow in time
Issue # 4  Force Structure Update

Jan 06 Concept - US BCTs: 15 14 13 12 11 10

1 "Baseline" Course of Action

05-07 Off Ramped units

Current Conditions - US BCTs: 15 14 13 12 11 10

Holding forces in Sadr

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Way Ahead

- USG needs to prepare itself to address key policy issues with new Iraqi government shortly after their entry into office.

- While progress of Iraqi Security Forces remains on track, delay in government formation, on-going sectarian violence, and threat posed by Shi'a-based militias increases the period of uncertainty and risk.

- MNF-I planning to go from 15 to 14 US combat brigades in Iraq by Jun 06 (potentially to 13 US combat brigades by Aug 06), but conditions are causing restructuring plan to shift to the right.

- Will involve accepting MODERATE risk in Ninewa Province.

- Too early to decide on next force structure steps until we see nature of new GoI and determine full impact of sectarian violence / militia threat.
Key Transition Assumptions

- The insurgency will remain active, but will not expand beyond the current six provinces.

- The political process can diminish the Sunni Rejectionist component of the insurgency.

- Growth of ISF capability will remain on track.

- Shi’a Rejectionist violence can be contained with local security efforts.

- Coalition members will remain committed at close to current levels through 2006.

  - Iraq, but remain deterred from direct action.

- MNF-I presence is a factor in Sunni Rejectionist violence.
Conditions
(5 Jan 06 Tank Briefing)

- Political process and Sunni engagement diminishes violence to level that the ISF can contain (with Coalition support) in affected areas.
- Threat of sectarian / militia-led violence remains low.
- Iraqi Army / Police development continues near projected levels; ISF assuming battlespace are consistently able to hold it.
- Iraqis assume greater security responsibility for Baghdad; improved security in the other 9 key cities.
- Sustained success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and border regions.
- Security ministries continue to improve and can sustain forces with Coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to Coalition reductions.
Iraqi Security Forces Update

26 April 2006
Bottom Line Up Front

- Force generation, ministry development, and professionalization on track
- Areas of notable progress
  - Financial transition in MoD
  - Logistics concept in MoD
  - Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs)
  - Evolution of the National Police
- Areas of notable lack of progress
  - Inability of MoD to obligate capital expenditure budget
  - Inability of MoI to obligate infrastructure budget
MNSTC-I Lines of Operations

- Build and Sustain MoI/MoD Institutional Capability
- Generate Capable ISF
- Develop Professional ISF
- MNSTC-I Transition & Transformation
Build and Sustain MoD Institutional Capability
Build and Sustain Institutional Capability

Notable Progress in the Ministry of Defense

- **MoD Financial Transition**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MNSTC-I Funded Life Support Cost</th>
<th>MoD Funded Life Support Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06 March 2006</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2006</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **NCO Promotions**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Promotions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06 March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Command and Control**
  ✓ Iraqi Joint Forces Command Operations Center fully operational
  ✓ Iraqi Ground Forces Command Operations Center begins operations—May 06
  ✓ National Command and Control Exercise—May 06
Notable Progress in the Ministry of Defense

• Logistics Concept
  ✓ Approved by Minister
  ✓ 7 of 9 Motor Transport Regiments formed or forming
  ✓ 5 of 5 Regional Support Units formed
  ✓ Repair parts to battalion unit level by June

• Communications
  ✓ 7 of 16 Iraqi Defense Network (IDN) nodes installed for data transfer
  ✓ Long-range communications to battalion level by June

• Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs)
  ✓ 17 battalions formed
  ✓ 9 completed training
  ✓ 8 in training
  ✓ 85% equipped by June
Notable Lack of Progress in the Ministry of Defense

- Inability of MoD to Obligate Capital Expenditures Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds Available (Millions)</th>
<th>Funds Programmed (Millions)</th>
<th>Funds Committed (Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06 March 2006</td>
<td>$868</td>
<td>$370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2006</td>
<td>$868</td>
<td>$370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently working to get GoI to request establishment of an FMS Master Case with USG for capital expenditures ($500M)
Build and Sustain MoI Institutional Capability
Build and Sustain Institutional Capability

Notable Progress in the Ministry of Interior

- **Approval of the Strategic Framework**
  - Provides Strategic Vision
  - Assigns responsibility and delegates authority
  - Establishes effective business practices

- **Evolution of the National Police**
  - Combined Public Order and Commando Brigades
  - 1,142 Sunni integrated in April
  - Building public confidence

- **Implementation of e-Ministry network**
  - Improves accountability
  - Increases efficiency of processes
Build and Sustain Institutional Capability

Notable Lack of Progress in the Ministry of Interior

- **Inability of Mol to Commit Infrastructure Budget**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Funds Available (Millions)</th>
<th>Funds Committed (Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06 March 2006</td>
<td>$26</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2006</td>
<td>$26</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently working with Mol Planning Directorate and Ministry of Construction to commit funds against 11 projects
Generate Capable ISF
### Notable Progress in Force Generation

**Force Generation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ministry of Defense Forces</th>
<th>Ministry of Interior Forces</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06 March 2006</td>
<td>112,900</td>
<td>127,700</td>
<td>240,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2006</td>
<td>115,100</td>
<td>134,900</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Growth: 2,200 / 7,200 = 9,400

**Battlespace Transition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Army Battalions</th>
<th>Police Battalions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06 March 2006</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2006</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Growth: 9

**Border Transition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Border Police</th>
<th>Border Forts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06 March 2006</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2006</td>
<td>20,800</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Growth: 800 / 36
Generate Capable ISF

Notable Lack of Progress in Force Generation

- Difficulty recruiting IPS and IA in Al Anbar
  - High illiteracy rate
  - Intimidation

Currently working on an in-service education program with both security ministries
Develop Professional ISF

Notable Progress in the Ministry of Defense

- **Professional Education System**
  - ✓ Since 06 March 2006 graduated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Military Academy at Rustamiyah</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahko Military Academy</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualchalon Military Academy</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recalled Officer Training</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recalled NCO Training</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Graduates</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,269</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Center for Leadership and Ethics established at Ar Rustamiyah—March 06**
Notable Lack of Progress in the Ministry of Defense

- Lack of military justice system (UCMJ)
- Lack of functioning retirement policy

- Draft UCMJ awaiting approval by CoR
- Retirement law passed 27 January 2006 but not implemented
Notable Progress in the Ministry of Interior

• Professional Education System
  ✓ Since 06 March 2006 graduated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JIPTC</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad Police College</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Tactical Leader Course</td>
<td>2,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Graduates</td>
<td>3,601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notable Lack of Progress in the Ministry of Interior

• Lack of Police Disciplinary Code

• Lack of functioning retirement policy

✓ Draft Police Disciplinary Code awaiting approval by CoR
✓ Retirement law passed 27 January 2006, but not implemented
Issues

• Extra-Governmental Armed Groups
  ✓ Militias
  ✓ Facilities Protection Service
  ✓ Protective Service Detachments

• ISF Health Care
Iraqi Security Forces Update

26 April 2006
### Generation of Key Army Enablers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- **1st Division**
- **2nd Division**
- **3rd Division**
- **4th Division**
- **5th Division**
- **6th Division**
- **7th Division**
- **8th Division**
- **9th Division**
- **10th Division**

#### Key Illustrations:
- **Logistics**
- **Leaders**
- **Communications**

**Legend:**
- Logistics = Motor Transport Regiments Formed
- Leaders = Officer Generation at TRA Level 1
- Communications = Signal Companies Formed

**Note:**
- ⭐ = TRA Level 1 Capacity
- No MTR
Secretary of Defense
26 April 2006
Security

ENDURING HOT SPOTS
Baghdad
Mosul
Ramadi
Falujah

OPERATIONS SCALES OF JUSTICE
- 8 additional Battalions
- 1,100 Joint/Combined Patrols on a daily basis
- Concentrating on 5 Districts
- Accelerated Police Development

OPERATIONS IN RAMADI
- Insert Iraqi Police (+2157 policemen by July
- 11 police stations
- Set conditions for provincial governance
- 3 x Iraqi Army Brigade, 2 x Coalition Force Brigade (-)
- Integrated CMO (governance and economic)
- 13 Major CERP Projects ($31 million)

Iraqi Police Services - Police Transition Teams fielded by August 2006
9 +1 Key Cities - Police Transition Teams in 9 Key Cities + Baghdad
Iraqi Army Lead - Currently 2 of 10 Divisions; 14 of 36 Brigades; and
52 of 112 Battalions
National Police - Currently 2 of 9 Brigades; 9 of 27 Battalions at TRA 2
Border Enforcement - 100% force generated
AQIZ CAMPAIGN OF MURDER AND INTIMIDATION

PLANNED OPERATIONS IN RAMADI
- MNF-W (I MEF)
- 3 x Iraqi Army Brigade, 2 x Coalition Force Brigade (-)
- Integrated CMO (governance and economic)

MONTHLY EFFECTIVE ATTACKS IN RAMADI
1 Nov 04 - 21 Apr 06

SET CONDITIONS FOR
- Insert Iraqi Police Presence – 2,157 police by July
- 11 police stations, Development for Iraq Funds used
- Set conditions for provincial governance
- 13 Major CERP Projects ($31 million)
Economic Development

Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP)

- Provides targeted effects at the tactical level
- Immediate results for local populace
- $1.5 Billion since OIF I

New 40” Crude Oil Pipeline
- Kirkuk - Bayji

Micro-Finance Institutions
- Source of loans
- Create and improve micro-businesses

Micro-Finance Institutions planned in
Samarra, Irbil, Ramadi, Diwaniyah, Kut, Basrah

Focused Stabilization

August 2006

MNC-I Iraqi Economic Initiative
- Supports US Government initiatives
- Nested with MNF-I Focused Stabilization
- Improve job opportunities
- Leverages resources and inter-agency coordination towards key cities

MNC-I Iraqi Economic Initiative
Economic Consultant
Contract Awarded

Crop Spraying Initiative
- Will result in improved harvest quality, volume, and internal food production
- Creates job opportunities and improves economic conditions

Hateen Bus/Tractor Factory
- SOE Initiative

Approved for Release
• Parsons was contracted to construct and equip 141 Primary Healthcare Clinics (PHC) – Budgeted for $240M
• None of the PHCs are complete
• Parsons contract for PHCs is being terminated for the convenience of the government
• GRD will complete construction and equipping of 19 of the 141 PHCs with remaining funds
• MNC-I will provide CERP funds to complete remaining 122 unfinished PHCs – Cost for completion is $50M
Iraqi Security Forces Transition
January 2007 Projection

Iraqi Army Lead (IAL)

Iraqi Police Lead

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalions IAL</th>
<th>101</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigades IAL</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions IAL</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV

Provinces TRA 2 or better | 17 |
Key Cities TRA 2 or better | 9 |
Communicating

- Representative Government
- Sense of Nation
- Hope and Normalcy
- Support Economic Reforms
- Terrorists Defeated
- Meet Basic Needs of the People
- Capable ISF
  - Blue shirts in the street
  - Sound Army Institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TV Spots Played</th>
<th>Radio Broadcasts</th>
<th>Opinion Editorials Printed</th>
<th>Posters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12,577</td>
<td>14,599</td>
<td>9,941</td>
<td>245,868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Weekly IED Trends
3 July 2004 – 21 April 2006

- IEDs Rendered Safe
- IEDs Detonated
- 4 Week Moving Average

Number of IEDs

Sovereignty  Election  Pre-Constitution  Ref-Election  Gov Transition

29 Jun – 26 Nov 04  27 Nov 04 – 11 Feb 05  12 Feb – 28 Aug 05  29 Aug 05 – 10 Feb 06  11 Feb 06 – Present

Source: MNC-I FusionNet 22 Apr 06
Counter IED Measures of Effectiveness

Over 35,000 total IED events in 36 months

- Increase in Found/Cleared IEDs from 34% (Jun/Oct 05) to 44% (Nov 05/Feb 06)
  - Enhanced awareness
  - Experience
  - Training
  - Synchronization of assets
  - C-IED Fusion Cells
  - Improved information sharing
  - Refocusing C-IED training

Effectiveness of IED attacks decreased from 20% to 18% since Nov 05
(7% against CF, 5% against ISF, 6% against Civ)
- Armor additions
- CREW employment
- Blue TTP improvements
- Identification of enemy TTP

Consistency of IED events dictates the system and not the device must be targeted
Key Take-Aways

- The Iraqi Army is tactically sound, but is a fragile organization.
- Iraqi Ministerial capacity is the key to our success.
- Our focus in the next 9 months is the MOI – Year of the Police.
- IEDs continue to be the greatest threat to coalition forces.
  - New Counter-RCIED Electronic Warfare equipment fielding and integration is challenging.
  - Counter-RCIED Electronic Warfare equipment must be fully tested prior to delivery and fielding in the theater of operations.
- ISR coverage and availability must remain constant.
Back Up Slides
Page 51 redacted for the following reason:
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1.4a, 1.4g, (b)(6)
IED Activity
180 Day Look

6114 Exploded
4612 Found

CF KIA 213
CF WIA 1451
ISF KIA 357
ISF WIA 1407
CIV KIA 1093
CIV WIA 2815

As of 25 APR 06
MNC-I Support to Governance

- Provide personnel for Ministry Assistance Teams to develop capacity of Iraqi ministries and enhance coordination.

- Provide personnel and equipment for PRTs to develop governance capacity at the provincial and local levels.

- Provide aerial spraying for Date Palms and Wheat to strengthen agricultural economy and enhance credibility of Government by delivering on a promise broken last year.

- Assist GOI (IECI) in the planning for provincial election support to preserve the legitimacy and momentum of Government of Iraq.

- Develop improvement programs focused on restoring essential services and future disposition of state-owned enterprises to enhance credibility of Government of Iraq.

- Support Government of Iraq in reestablishing Rule of Law (courts, judges and prisons) to improve security.
Iraqi Police Transition
April 2006 – January 2007

Apr 06

Jan 07

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level I</td>
<td>Provinces TRA 2 or better: 7</td>
<td>Provinces TRA 2 or better: 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level II</td>
<td>Key Cities TRA 2 or better: 1</td>
<td>Key Cities TRA 2 or better: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level IV</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Approved for Release
Iraqi Army Transition
April 2006 – January 2007

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apr 06</th>
<th>Jan 07</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 52 battalions IAL
- 14 brigade IAL
- 2 division IAL
IED Attack Threat Boxes

Target Areas of Interest (TAls)

TAI 1: CP 59A
- Route Clearance
- 3CC Convoy Movement
- FMV
- T/TH/S: C-IED CAS
- EA-6B

MND-B Tactical Operations: T: Defeat AIF, P: Prevent any AIF actions against CF

TAI 2: Sword Vernon Junction
- Route Clearance
- 3CC Convoy Movement
- FMV
- T/TH/S: C-IED CAS
- EA-6B

MND-B Tactical Operations: T: Defeat AIF, P: Prevent any AIF actions against CF

TAI 3: Jackson Tampa Junction
- Route Clearance
- 3CC Convoy Movement
- FMV
- T/TH/S: C-IED CAS

MND-B Tactical Operations: T: Defeat AIF, P: Prevent any AIF actions against CF

THREAT BOX #1 – MSR TAMPA CP 59A
THREAT BOX #2 – ASR SWORD/VERNON
THREAT BOX #3 – ASR JACKSON/TAMPA
DETENTION OPERATIONS UPDATE

27 April 2006
BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT

• TRANSITION PROGRESSING BUT OBSTACLES REMAIN

• IRAQI CORRECTIONS SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY TOO IMMATURE TO EFFECTIVELY RUN US FACILITIES AT APPROPRIATE STANDARD

• CHANGES IMPLEMENTED OVER LAST 4 MONTHS HAVE IMPROVED DETENTION, REVIEW, AND RELEASE PROCEDURES
POPULATION SUMMARY

14,711 IN THEATER FACILITIES

SHIA 6.5% (966)

OTHER 1.8% (242)

SUNNI 91.7 (13,503)
TRANSITION TIMELINE

2006

AMJJAASONDJFMAMJASOND

TRANSITION EVENTS

FT SUSE TRANSITION
TRAIN IRAQI GUARDS/STAFF
US TRANSITION TEAM

CAMP BUCCA TRANSITION
TRAIN IRAQI GUARDS/STAFF
US TRANSITION TEAM AND US BN

CAMP CROPPER TRANSITION
CONSTRUCTION COMPLETE
TRAIN IRAQI GUARDS/STAFF
US TRANSITION TEAM

ABU GHRAIB CLOSURE
ABU CLOSED

JUVENILE TRANSFER TO IRAQI CUSTODY
TRANSFER COMPLETE

COMPOUND EXPANSION (BUCCA)
COMPOUNDS 15 & 16 COMPLETE

DUE PROCESS

COURT CASE THROUGHPUT
COMPLETE EXISTING CASES
MEET 6-MONTH STANDARD

RELEASE REVIEW BOARD THROUGHPUT
COMPLETE BACKLOG
MEET 90-120 DAY STANDARD FOR REVIEWS

- TRANSITION POINT IN PROGRAM
- EVENT

Itizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
TRANSITION TAKEAWAY

- IRAQI ABILITY TO MANAGE BUCCA WITHOUT US ASSISTANCE IS QUESTIONABLE


- US DETAINEE TRANSITION TEAM TIME IN ALL THREE CAMPS WILL EXCEED THE ORIGINAL 6-MONTH PROJECTION

- THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL LIKELY PRESS US TO CONFORM TO IRAQI CONSITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
JOINT DETAINEE COMMITTEE

• ESTABLISHED BY CPA MEMORANDUM 3

• REVIEWS ALL INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AFTER 30 JUNE 2004

• APPROVED BY PRIME MINISTER AND CG, MNF-I

• RESULTS TO DATE:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FEBRUARY SESSION</th>
<th>MARCH SESSION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REVIEWED - 104</td>
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<td>RELEASED - 5</td>
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PROCEDURAL CHANGES

- ESTABLISHED A LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH RISK SCREEN AND SEQUENCED LOW RISK FILES THROUGH REVIEW BOARD

- INITIATED AN EXPEDITED RELEASE PROGRAM TO RELEASE BENIGN DETAINEEs IN FIRST 30 DAYS

- INCREASED NUMBER OF RELEASES FROM 650 TO 1100 PER MONTH AVERAGE ... FOCUSING ON LOW RISK FILES

- INCREASED REVIEW BOARDS FROM 2 TO 4 PER WEEK

- INCREASE NUMBER OF COURT INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS FROM 10 TO 50 PER WEEK IN MAR – AVERAGING 100 PER WEEK IN APR

- WRITTEN NOTIFICATION PROVIDED TO DETAINEEs

- ESTABLISHED COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE COMPOUNDS

- ESTABLISHED REINTEGRATION PROGRAM (NEWS, SPEAKERS, CLASSES, SPONSORS)
"FORMING A FORMAL COMMISSION ... RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ALL DETAINES INCLUDING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF INNOCENT PEOPLE, SENDING THEM TO COURTS WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THEIR DETENTION, ENCOURAGING ALL IRAQI AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO VISIT DETENTION FACILITIES AND MEET THE DETAINES.... ""
GOVERNMENT FORMATION RELEASE

• RELEASE 2000-3000 LOW RISK DETAINEES

• CONDUCT IN LATE MAY/EARLY JUNE
DETERMINATION STRATEGIC ISSUES

- IRAQI LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD SECURITY DETAINES AND TRANSFER TO IRAQI CONTROL

- DECISION TO PASS PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE HIGH VALUE CRIMINALS (HVCS) TO THE IRAQIS

- HOW TO ADDRESS NON-REFOULEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

- RESOLUTION OF MEK/PMOI AT ASHRAF
GUIDANCE
BACKUP SLIDES
CRITERIA FOR TRANSFER

- IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO HOLD SECURITY DETAINEES

- FACILITIES ARE UNDER THE DIRECTION/SUPERVISION OF THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (MOJ)

- GOI HAS DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THE OPERATION OF EACH FACILITY (ADEQUATE FUNDING, LOGISTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, DETAINEE MEDICAL CARE, EXTERNAL DEFENSE, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, HUMAN TREATMENT, FEEDING, ...)

- WE HAVE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE NON-REFOULEMENT REQUIREMENT
ABU GHRAIB CLOSURE

CONDITIONS:

• CAMP CROPPER CONSTRUCTION COMPLETE (APR 06)
• FIRST CAMP BUCCA EXPANSION COMPOUND COMPLETE (MID-JUNE 06)

KEY MILESTONES:

• 30 DAYS TO COMPLETE DETAINEE AND JIDC TRANSFER
• 15 DAYS TO COMPLETE TRANSFER OF ABU GHRAIB TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (MOJ)

PROJECTED 15 JULY 06 = CLOSURE AND TRANSFER OF ABU GHRAIB
RELEASE STRATEGY CONCEPT

KEY SUPPORTING TASKS...

- ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE CRRB/REINTIGRATION/RELEASE BATTLE RHYTHM THAT:
  - ESTABLISHES THE CRRB DOCKET 21 DAYS PRIOR TO CRRB
  - PROVIDES UNITS/C2 NOTIFICATION 18 DAYS BEFORE CRRB
  - PROVIDES THE UNIT/DPM FINAL RELEASE LISTS BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION 14 DAYS BEFORE RELEASE
  - MOVES DETAINES TO ABU ON SCHEDULE

- TRANSITION FROM THE GUARANTOR TO SPONSOR IN APR

- CONDUCT FIRST CRRB REVIEW WITHIN 90 DAYS OF DETENTION FOR ALL DETAINES AND IDENTIFY LIMITED EVIDENCE/LOW RISK CASES FOR POTENTIAL RELEASE

- EXECUTE AN EXPEDITED RELEASE REVIEW AT THE MAGISTRATE CELL AT ABU

- RESPOND TO SPECIAL RELEASES IN A TIMELY MANNER

- RELEASE CCCI DISMISSALS AND ACQUITTALS IN A TIMELY MANNER

- EFFECTIVELY TRACK AQIZ DETAINES TO ENSURE THEY ARE NOT ACCIDENTALLY RELEASED