Page 1 redacted for the following reason:

Defer to TRANSCOM/ Air Mobility Command
MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. David Gompert, Director, Office of National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Fallujah Assessment

1. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on your proposed, updated Fallujah strategy. We understand that Ambassador Bremer likely will also use this document as a guide during his discussion of the Fallujah issue with Prime Minister Allawi.

Overall, we agree with the broad direction articulated in the paper, but we do also have some comments that we would like to see to addressed.

a. As we consider redefining our goals for Fallujah, our view is that this will require a definite policy decision first and is not something we can do lightly. If that decision is taken, we will need to take care that, publicly, this is not perceived as either a coalition defeat or concession. To do otherwise would risk not only a public relations backlash, but also put coalition forces at a potentially dangerous disadvantage. While our currently stated objectives may not seem feasible right now, we cannot be seen as lowering our expectations too far. On this same point, we should take care not to convey a minimalist approach as we talk to the IIG about their goals for Fallujah.

b. Regarding the Fallujah Brigade, it should be understood clearly by all parties, including the Iraqis, that we cannot exacerbate the security void in the city. Thus, if it is decided to “cut our losses” regarding the Brigade, this should be done as part a process that hands off security responsibility to more capable Iraqi security forces. We believe it will take some time before the Iraqi police or ICDC will be capable of assuming this role. At the same time, we do not want to put coalition forces unnecessarily back into the local security mix. Thus, for better or worse, we will have to work with the Brigade for some time to come. As such, we will need to determine how to fund the Brigade after current provisions expire. This should also be discussed with Prime Minister Allawi.

c. On how we can “protect” Iraq from Fallujah, we will need to take care that we do not and are not perceived as restricting essential services or contributing in any way to a humanitarian crisis in the city. Thus, on this point and the other aspects of any revised strategy, strategic communications and information operations will be critical. An orderly, comprehensive, fully-coordinated transition of this issue to Iraqi responsibility will be essential.

d. To reinforce what we believe you heard from the Marines on the ground earlier this week, any attempt to tighten to cordon around Fallujah too much will require a
SUBJECT: Fallujah Assessment

significant amount of combat power with a high probability of resumed combat operations between coalition forces and the factions on the ground. We would appreciate it if this point was made stronger and more clearly in the text.

e. While we work to test the Fallujah Brigade's intentions and capabilities, we must also stay the course in terms of engagement with leaders who hold the promise of influencing positively Fallujah's future. Key to the ultimate outcome in Fallujah may well be finding and supporting leaders there — religious, tribal, political, and military — who have a vision for a Fallujah fully-integrated into a new, democratic Iraq. One of the key messages you heard during your visit this week is that the citizens of Al Anbar do not believe they have a face or voice in the new IIG — a perception that carries over from the IGC. As such, it may be particularly important that the National Conference and, before it, the Preparatory Committee, make a special effort to be inclusive of Al Anbar.

f. We look forward to continuing our participation in this critical work, including our combined efforts on the ground in support of the CPA and MEF there.

2. Thank you again for the chance to comment.

3. POC for this is [b 3, b 6] MNF-I SPM, Chief of Staff, DSN (b 3)

[Signature]

STEPHEN T. SARGEANT
Major General (sel), USAF
DCS, Strategic Pol-Mil

SECRET/REL MCFI
What are the facts on the ground?

- The city is largely lawless. Multiple groups of hardened fighters hostile to the Coalition and to free Iraq are vying for position and intimidating the citizens.
- The Fallujah Brigade has done little or nothing to regain control of the city. Its aims, and those of town leaders, appear to be to accommodate the bad actors, get money and stall until 6/30.
- Brigade leadership is in disarray. Unless Latif is dedicated, new command is needed.
- Only one Marine battalion is now tied down by Fallujah. This is enabling improved military and civil affairs efforts elsewhere in Al Anbar – an advantage of the current approach.
- We are now talking to Janabi, and we are about to test the commitment and ability of the Fallujah Brigade to begin regaining control of the city.
- Our initiatives to use sheikhs have not borne fruit, perhaps because preempted by the Brigade.
- The population is nearly at pre-crisis level (250,000). Movement of people and goods out of the city is largely unrestricted. Life goes on.

What is our strategic assessment?

- Short of a major offensive by the Marines, the only instrument at hand to regain control of the city -- the Fallujah Brigade -- appears to be ineffective and/or unwilling.
- No regular Iraqi armed force will be available to retake Fallujah for several months -- if then.
- Even if the Fallujah Brigade were to begin making progress, achievement of our original aims -- gathering heavy weapons, foreign fighters, killers -- is remote.
- The situation in the rest of Al Anbar is unchanged. The Marines are guardedly optimistic.
- The greatest near-term peril is of heightened terrorism and urban fighting in Baghdad itself up to and after 6/30, fed in part by the symbol of and elements from Fallujah. There is a danger that the "Fallujah phenomena" could spread unless it is seen to fail.

Should we redefine our goals?

- Obtaining heavy weapons, foreign fighters, Saddamist killers -- not feasible
- Regaining control of the city -- may not be feasible
- Protecting the rest of Iraq, Baghdad, and the political process from Fallujah, physically and politically -- feasible and essential

What is the minimum essential goal?

- Barring clear and early progress by the Fallujah Brigade and Janabi toward regaining control of the city, our aim should be to protect Iraq by isolating Fallujah and trapping as many enemies as we can.
- In time, Iraq’s enemies in Fallujah could splinter and turn on each other, opening the way to our goals of regaining control and perhaps bagging some terrorists, killers and heavy weapons.

What should become of the Fallujah Brigade?

- If the Brigade proves useful in regaining control, elements from it may be integrated into IAF
- If it fails, it must be dissolved carefully and over time, with elements integrated into IAF
- In any case, it is better for now to keep the Brigade as a buffer than to discard or disband it.

How do we proceed operationally?

- How do we try to regain control of the city?
  - Test the Fallujah Brigade and Janabi. If they fail, shift toward isolation strategy.
  - Conduct military strikes only against special targets, e.g., Zarqawi
  - Revisit the sheikhs, who may be more inclined to help as the city deteriorates.
- If and as it is clear that we cannot regain control of the city, how can we protect Iraq?
  - Restrict movement in and out of the city to the extent possible -- without tying up too many of our forces or exposing them to constant threat. (A tight seal is too risky and costly.)
  - Publicize the effects of lawlessness and Mujahadín misrule in Fallujah
(U) MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSISTANCE TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH THE IRAQI FORCES]

(U) THIS FRAGO HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY MG MOLAN, DCS STRATOPS, MNF-I.

(U) SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR ASSISTANCE TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH THE IRAQI FORCES.

(U) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED ALL PARAGRAPHS ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO IRQ//XI, X4

(U) ATTACHMENTS: NIL

(U) REFERENCES:

A. (U) UNSCR 1546

B. (U) MNF-I CAMPAIGN ACTION PLAN: 2005 WAY AHEAD (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI) [TO FOLLOW]

C. (U) MNF-I FRAGO 484 [CONVOY SECURITY PROTECTION MEASURES]

D. (U) MNSTC-I MASTER LIST OF IRAQI FORCES DATED 14 FEB 05.

E. (U) MNF-I COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE VERSION 2.5 DATED 29 JAN 05. (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI) [TO FOLLOW]

F. (U) MNF-I RFF 438 DMS TO CENTCOM 091836Z JAN 05.

G. (U) MNF-I RFF 450 DMS TO CENTCOM 311052Z JAN 05.

(U) MAPS: [NO CHANGE]

(U) TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THIS ORDER: CHARLIE

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: [NO CHANGE]

1. (U) Situation. [CHANGE]

1.A. (U) Enemy forces.

1.A.1. FRE insurgency has become better organized over the past year and is waging a protracted campaign of intimidation in predominately Sunni areas to unhinge political, economic, and security force development.

1.A.2. We should plan that the insurgency will continue at roughly the present level throughout 2005 in those areas; and that the security situation across the country will not be uniform.
1.A.3. It is anticipated that external support to insurgents will continue, but at reduced levels as Iraqi border forces become more capable and we take more action in the border.

1.A.4. Attacks against the ISF reflect an increased realization by insurgent groups that the greatest threat to them is competent ISF.

1.A.5. In the near term, it is not expected that Iraq will face a conventional threat from outside its borders.

1.B. (U) Friendly Forces.

1.B.1. (U) Iraqi government.

1.B.1.A. Iraq's capability to manage the security situation will improve with the establishment of a ministerial lead to direct the counterinsurgency effort.

1.B.1.C. It is expected that the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) will remain committed to MNF-I presence and the UNSCR 1546 process.

1.B.1.D. It is expected that there will be some post-election turbulence in the Iraqi government that will offset the pace of operations.

1.B.2. (U) Iraqi security forces.

1.B.2.A. Iraqi security forces are progressing at varying rates but most still lack the capacity to conduct and sustain independent counterinsurgency operations. The key elements that need to be addressed are: leadership; establishing properly manned, trained and capable headquarters; reversing absenteeism and instilling a warrior ethos committed to service to the nation. We need to build on the momentum of the election performance of the ISF.

1.B.2.B. Efforts to develop capable Iraqi national intelligence organizations as a key element in counterinsurgency are at an early stage. The development of police and military intelligence remains a key focus for the MNF-I.

2. (U) Mission [CHANGE] In partnership with the ITG, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and ISF by developing Iraqi security forces and ITG security ministries while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.

3. (U) Execution [CHANGE]

3.A. Commander's Intent

3.A.1. Purpose. To develop Iraqi Security Forces’ capability to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations and to progressively transition the responsibility for the counterinsurgency to competent Iraqi Security Forces and Ministries.

Establish partnerships with Iraqi Security Forces down to battalion level.
Embed Assistance Teams in Military, Special Police, and Border Police units.
Conduct a Police Assistance Team proof of principle and work with the Ministry of Interior on ways to further develop police capability.
Continue to assist development of institutional capacity in the Ministries of Defense and Interior to conduct and support successful counterinsurgency operations.
Build intelligence capability in the Ministries of Defense and Interior and all Iraqi units to support counterinsurgency operations.
Use Special Forces in area support role and to train Iraqi Special Operations Forces.
Use a train-operate-train approach to develop Iraqi units.
Progressively transition the counterinsurgency mission to capable Iraqi Security Forces with embedded Assistance Teams.

3.A.3. Endstate. Iraqi Security Forces, capable of conducting independent counterinsurgency operations, have accepted responsibility for conducting counter-insurgency campaign at the local, regional, and national levels; Coalition forces moved to a supporting role, posture adjusted and visibility reduced.

3.B. Concept of Operations.

Concept. MNF-I will progressively shift the Coalition focus from fighting the insurgency to building Iraqi capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations. Effective immediately, MNF-I begins shifting its main effort to developing this capability in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in order to transition the counterinsurgency campaign to the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and ISF. 1 April 2005, is the date which MNF-I will have initial operational capability for the assistance team mission with a goal of 1 June 2005 having full operational capability.

Coalition division-level commanders will be responsible for assisting the development of all Iraqi Security Forces in their sector, to include Army (including former National Guard) units, Police, Border Police, Infrastructure Protection units and Facilities Protection Service units. To do this, we will take a three-pronged approach:

- Establish partnerships with Iraqi units down to battalion level.
- Embed Assistance Teams with Iraqi Military, Special Police and Border units to provide the Iraqi commander broad advisory support and direct access to coalition effects—artillery, rotary and fixed-wing air, MEDEVAC, intelligence, and logistics.
- Modify the nature and approach of Coalition operations over time, to move Coalition force to a supporting role, reduce the Coalition's visibility and posture.

This operation is MNF-I's main effort, and as such, partnership activities and Assistance Teams will have the priority for resources, including personnel and equipment. Implementing the assistance mission will occur in four phases:
Phase 1. Establish partnerships / "Out-of-hide" Assistance Team implementation. On receipt of this order, all embedded training and support or existing liaison teams, including those teams already taken "out of hide" from Corps units, and MNSTC-I-provided ASTs, will be designated as Military Assistance Teams (MATs); all will be attached to MNC-I. MNC-I will also establish partnerships between Coalition units and all Iraqi Army (including National Guard) and Border Police units down to battalion. Partner units will build habitual relationships, provide Iraqis with additional training and support, enable the Iraqi units to develop in-depth knowledge of the particular area in which they train and operate, and provide training and support for Assistance Teams. Partnerships will be firmly established not later than 01 March 2005, and all out-of-hide Assistance Teams will be in place not later than 1 April. In addition, an Iraqi Assistance Group (Provisional) (IAG(P)) will be established, initially under MNC-I’s command, to coordinate RSOF of Assistance Teams which includes marryNG them up with their equipment, and to provide technical support for them. Personnel to man the IAG(P) will be taken out of hide initially, and then replaced with personnel arriving in phase II via RF. Also in this phase, a proof of principle for Police Assistance Teams (PATs) begins in selected police stations in Baghdad, Mosul, Samarra, and Fallujah. Results will inform further actions to develop and support capable local police forces. Finally, Special Forces will provide area support to the Assistance Teams and will continue to provide dedicated support to Iraqi Special Operations Forces. Initial operational capability of the assistance team mission is 1 April 2005 (IOC 1 April 2005).

Phase 2. Augmentation. Partnerships will continue. From about 1 April through 1 June, augmentation teams will arrive to provide the rest of the MATs, all required Special Police Assistance Teams (SPATs), all required Border Assistance Teams (BATs), and all required personnel to fully man the IAG(P). Intelligence Assistance Teams (IATs), taken out of hide, will be embedded in the Ministries of Interior and Defense, to assist them in developing intelligence capability to support counterinsurgency operations. As conditions permit, Coalition forces will begin modifying the approach and nature of their operations, for example conducting fewer unilateral patrols and reducing visible presence in Iraqi cities. All Assistance Teams will be fully operational by 01 Jun 05 (FOC 1 June 2005).

Phase 3. Assessment and adjustment. In June, MNF-I will conduct a formal assessment of the Partnership and Assistance Team efforts, and will make adjustments as necessary. During this phase, it is anticipated that at least some Iraqi units will achieve the capacity necessary to hand off to them security responsibilities for their particular sectors. These conditions could, in turn, allow some limited adjustment of Coalition force posture (generally at battalion task force level). Assistance Teams will remain embedded with Iraqi units even after they have demonstrated capability to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations and have accepted full handover.

Phase 4. Full implementation of Iraqi Assistance Group. In December 2005 /January 2006, the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) will replace the IAG(P). The intent is to maximize stable relationships and to minimize transitions and turbulence. These new Assistance Teams will have been organized, formed, and trained prior to deploying to Iraq, and they will fall in on the previous Assistance Teams’ equipment. With the establishment of the IAG, unit-based Assistance Teams will no longer be required, which will allow further withdrawals of Coalition forces. While partnerships will continue, they will
progressively decrease in number and importance as more Iraqi Army units demonstrate capacity and assume responsibility for their sectors. Embedded Assistance Teams will continue to train and operate with Iraqi units, and MNSTC-I will continue to organize, train, and equip new Iraqi units, and to develop institutions and infrastructure.

3.C. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units and Staff. [CHANGE]

3.C.1. (U) MNSTC-I. [CHANGE]

3.C.1.A. Provide police assistance teams (PATs) (concept to be developed by MNSTC-I) to implement a 'proof of principle' trial in Baghdad, Mosul, Samarra and Fallujah as agreed with the MOI; the trial is not to include the Iraqi Highway Patrol (IHP). The military element of the PAT team will teach military skills to the IPS to enable them and their IPIO support to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. Training on specific police tasks will be conducted by IPIOs, and MSC-generated police expertise. Further details including function, mission, key tasks and composition at Annex A.

3.C.1.B. Provide military assistance teams (MATs) to all formed Iraqi Army divisions, brigades and battalions; formed units are those which have completed MNSTC-I training and include those being reconstituted. Continue to provide current levels of support, and thereafter MATs, to all formed ING divisions, brigades and battalions; formed units are those approved by MNF-I which have completed MSC run training and includes those being reconstituted. The MAT will provide the training and assistance as well as access to coalition effects; it will be supported by its partner unit which will provide additional FP, ORF and training support as required. Immediate assistance is to be provided as resources allow; by 01 Apr 05 all Iraqi military forces, as defined in 3.C.1.B are to be supported. The exception is in MND-NW and MND-CS where MATs will be embedded as resources allow but the MATs will not be fully implemented until those forces requested by RRF arrive. Further details including function, mission, key tasks and composition at Annex B.

3.C.1.C. When resourced by the RRF process provide border assistance teams (BATs), in accordance with CG's priorities.

3.C.1.D. BPT incorporate IAF into operations and support Iraqi units with coalition effects, including fires, intelligence, MEDEVAC and transportation.

3.C.1.E. Ensure the assistance teams are supported by appropriate FP, ORF, C2 and Logistics.

3.C.1.F. Ensure the existing ASTs and ODA with the Iraqi army are integrated in future plans.

3.C.1.G. All CJSOTF-AP assets less those dedicated to Tier 1 protection and I2SOF training are to be used to enable the assistance team concept. CJSOTF-AP teams will be used in an area support role to provide training and support to the assistance teams and ISF.

3.C.1.I. BPT on completion of the 120 day 'proof of principle' trial, subject to MOI / MNF-I agreement, to expand the PATs in accordance with CG MNF-I's priorities. If agreed this expansion would need to be resourced by the RRF process; these RRFs will not be submitted unless MOI agree to such an expansion.
3.C.1.J. Working in partnership with the Iraqi JHQ BPT assume OPCON of trained Iraqi units IOT develop their capability for independent operations and thereby relieve CP units of security responsibility for specific areas.

3.C.1.K. Develop, on an area basis, a supporting relationship to TF-14α accredited units of the MOD-infrastructure, MOD, MOP and MPT protection forces, especially those near critical infrastructure. This does not require a formal MAT but is to provide reassurance and sustainment training, as well as in extremis support.

3.C.1.L. Identify training requirements for Iraqi forces which are beyond the capability of MAT and partnership units to provide; coordinate with MNSTC-I to see how these training gaps can be addressed.

3.C.1.M. Identify lessons learned by all forces currently conducting operational training for ISF, in order to refine the initial training requirements and the refresher training required by the assistance teams. Additional training, including requests for training organization and branch MTTs, should be coordinated through STRATOPS.

3.C.1.N. Identify capability and equipment shortfalls (ie JTACs and linguists) required to implement Assistance Teams and Partnership NLT 1 March 05.

3.C.1.O. Prior to the full establishment of the IAG(P) BPT to support the RSOI of the assistance teams requested.

3.C.1.P. Assist establishment of IAG(P) from assets already in place.

3.C.1.Q. Identify Iraqi soldiers who speak English in order to develop a "KATUSA-like" program for the Iraqi Army.

3.C.1.R. Develop, in conjunction with DOS, DCS SPA, MNSTC-I and DCS INTELLIGENCE the metrics for measuring success in the development of the ISF, the institutions, the transition to Iraqi control and assessment of the state of the insurgency.

3.C.2. (U) MNSTC-I [CHANGE]

3.C.2.A. Continue to organize, train, equip, base, and assist ISF units with increasing emphasis on combat support and service support units.

3.C.2.B. BPT release elements of assigned AST personnel to be OPCON to MNC-I in support of MAT concept.

3.C.2.C. BPT to form, train and command SPATs to support the MOI police commandos, mechanized and public order units.

3.C.2.D. Continue to assist Iraqi ministries to improve administrative procedures including personnel, pay, military disciplinary process, supply and infrastructure IOT improve retention and effectiveness.

3.C.2.E. In coordination with DOS, assist in the development of a plan for the expansion of MOD and MOI institutional and intelligence capacity.
3.C.2.F. Continue to develop regeneration capability to reconstitute ISF units; assist the Iraqi MOD in allocating trained recruits as replacements to units in combat thereby ensuring maintenance of operational effectiveness.

3.C.2.G. Request additional IPLO, or similar, support for all police, special police and border forces.

3.C.2.H. In coordination with MOI and MOD develop a sustained training plan for units after they have completed initial training. Coordinate with MNC-I to schedule unit participation.

3.C.2.I. In conjunction with MNF-I and other agencies develop a concept for MNF-I support to the IPS if FAT support is not authorized after the "proof of principle" trial.

3.C.2.K. Ensure that, within resources, the BSUs are supported in order to facilitate the proper support requirements for the ISF.

3.C.2.L. Develop a common operational doctrine, applicable to all Iraqi forces, thereby enabling inter-operability. This is to form the basis of assistance training provided by all CF.

3.C.2.M. Develop the PAT proof of principle concept for implementation by MNC-I PAT teams.

3.C.2.P. Assist establishment of IAG(P) from assets already in place.

3.C.3. (U) Tasks to Staff. [CHANGE]

3.C.3.A. (U) DCS INTELLIGENCE. [CHANGE]

3.C.3.A.1. In concert with coalition partners and other agencies develop and implement integrated Iraqi intelligence organization to support intelligence-led counterinsurgency operations. The model needs to:

3.C.3.A.1.A. Incorporate MOD and MOD units from the lowest level (station/sub-unit) to that point where it is fused for action. At MOD it will be supported by intelligence assistance teams (IATs) implemented under DCS Intelligence direction.


3.C.3.A.2. Task Force Counter Intelligence Coordinating Authority (TFCICA). Enhance vetting procedures for Iraqi forces to reduce the chances of infiltration thereby promoting a more secure environment for Iraqi forces and their embedded coalition partners.

3.C.3.A.3. Develop a framework to allow intelligence sharing between CF and ISF.

3.C.3.B. (U) DCS STRATOPS. [CHANGE]

3.C.3.B.1. Coordinate and synchronize the changes in reporting and other requirements, resulting from the change in command relationships, with all other activities across the MNF-I.
3. C.3.B.2. Coordinate additional training support requested by MNC-I for the assistance teams.

3. C.3.B.3. Convene an OPT to coordinate the provision of an acceptable degree of JTAC capability, balancing MNC-I requirements with the CJFACC ability to provide.

3. C.3.C. (U) DCS SPA. [CHANGE]

3. C.3.C.1. Through the joint planning group, develop Iraqi joint planning capability.

3. C.3.C.3. Monitor and shape CENTCOM strategy, and planning guidance and efforts to complement this revised Iraq theater strategy and plan.

3. C.3.C.4. Assume the MNF-I lead for a joint planning group with the MOD and MOI to agree to partnership linkages, how these can link to Iraqi military districts and develop Memoranda of Understanding on command and control relationships between the MNF-I and Iraqi MOI and MOD.

3. C.3.C.5. Assume responsibility for conducting the Division Commanders conference to discuss the Assistance Team concept plan.

3. C.3.C.6. Develop and obtain the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that lays down which ISF forces MNF-I will support with assistance teams with the MOI and MOD.


3. C.3.D. (U) DCS PME. [CHANGE]

3. C.3.D.1. Identify and propose, in conjunction with the US Embassy, political-diplomatic steps to complement adjustments in this military strategy.

3. C.3.D.2. Monitor the strategic Iraqi military and diplomatic environment, in conjunction with US Embassy, MNF-I coalition operations, and ITG ministries, to provide MNF-I and US Embassy with visibility of other military and security assistance and training programs. The intent is to ensure unity of effort among all support arrangements to ISF.


3. C.3.E. DCS R69. [CHANGE]

3. C.3.E.1. In conjunction with MNSTC-I and PCO assist the MOD and MOI in assuming budgeting, programming, and funding responsibility for life support, base support, logistics, and reconstitution cost incurred by MOD and MOI forces, insofar as permitted by MOD or MOI budget allocations from the Iraqi government, as well as working to standardize Iraqi logistics procedures and policies.

3.C.3.E.3. In conjunction with MNSTC-I, develop Iraqi combat service and combat service support organizational structure sufficient to support the Iraqi combat formations.

3.C.3.F. DCS CIS. [CHANGE]

3.C.3.F.1. Design and support the necessary communications equipment within the MOI and MOD at national, provincial and local levels.


3.C.3.G. DCS STRATCOM. [CHANGE]

3.C.3.G.1. Develop a strategic communications plan to exploit the increases in Iraqi independence. BPT counter any assertion that the embedding of forces undermines Iraqi sovereignty.


3.C.3.H. Coalition Operations. [CHANGE] Monitor the strategic coalition environment, in conjunction with POF, to provide MNF-I with visibility of other military and security assistance and training programs, between the Iraqi government and coalition partners, and thereby promote that such Iraqi/coalition engagements contribute, with unity of effort, toward the desired endstate.


3.D.1 ACCE. ACCE will coordinate with CENTAF to provide a concept of adequate terminal guidance for embedded teams and MNC-I units. The ACCE is to coordinate for CENTAF to provide a brief to CG MNF-I MCT 01 Mar 05.

3.E. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

3.E.1. Priorities. The following are the priorities for assistance team support:

3.E.1.A. (U) Priorities for IPS.

3.E.1.A.1. Develop a PAT 'proof of principle' and obtain MOI concept approval (MNSTC-I) trial to be established in Baghdad, Mosul, Samarra and Fallujah.

3.E.1.A.2. Subject to MOI approval of the 'proof of principle' trial PAT teams may be established throughout the country.

3. E.2. National Policies, Caveats and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Each country's personnel continue to be bound by ROE which are produced in line with their national policy; it is unlikely there will be special ROE for this task but this is dependent on National Policy. All Assistance Team personnel will conduct operations in compliance with their existing ROE and National Law and the law of armed conflict; the latter includes an obligation to report any violations. It is essential that any National Caveat that may apply to Assistance Teams permit them to remain in place with Iraqi Forces while they conduct counterinsurgency operations.

3. E.3. Force Protection. Reference C remains in force. The purpose of the measures contained therein are to protect the force. The stipulations on vehicle numbers can be interpreted to include ISF vehicles if an assistance team is operating as part of a formed ISF unit.


3. E.4.A. Requests for Forces (RFF). The following RFF have been submitted or will be submitted by 30 Jan 05 to the US:

3. E.4.A.1. Personnel to support SPATs for the police commando, police mechanized and police public order forces. See Reference F.

3. E.4.A.2. Personnel to support divisional, brigade and battalion MATs, including CS and CSS brigades and battalions; BATs and IATs. See Reference G.


3. E.4.B. Additional RFF. The following additional RFFs may be required:

3. E.4.B.1. After MNF-I analysis of lessons learned and subsequent refinement of training requirements for the assistance teams and support to the ISF additional specialist trainers may be needed. Additional training requirements may be met by Mobile Training Teams or other means; where possible integrating support and experience from across the coalition.

3. E.4.B.2. Forces to support PATs if after the proof of principle PATs remain in existence in the trial areas and / or are introduced elsewhere.

3. E.4.B.3. Additional RFF may be required if the Iraqi forces expand beyond the levels currently envisaged in Reference D.

3. E.4.C. Linguists and Interpreters. Each team will require 4 linguists or interpreters. The MOD and MOI will be approached to provide some of these, particularly for use on operations; others will be needed to be hired through contracts. Approximately 1300 are needed; these will need to be appropriately cleared. MNF-I will develop a "KATUSA-like" program using Iraqi soldiers who speak English to assist assistance teams and joint operations to be discussed at the Commanders conference.

3. E.4.D. Training and Operational Standards. MNSTC-I and MNF-I will jointly develop, in conjunction with the Iraqis, Training and Operational standards. MNSTC-I will focus on institutional training and readiness
matters; MNC-I will lead on operational matters. The areas, already identified, that need to be developed are:

3.4.1. Common operational doctrine (developed by MNSTC-I), applicable to all Iraqi forces, thereby enabling inter-operability. This is to form the basis of assistance training provided by all CF.

3.4.2. Common training standards for the initial training courses, and other courses. These will be applicable to all elements of the Iraqi army, including the ING, and establish the benchmarks for all members of ISF thereby ensuring operational commanders are aware of the standards met in training.

3.4.3. A system to assess Iraqi units' operational effectiveness.

3.4.4. A system that ensures all Iraqi forces are trained and adhere to the Laws of Land Warfare.

3.4.5. A system that ensures all Iraqi forces are trained and adhere to correct Detainee Operations.

3.4.6. Master List of Forces. MNF-I SPA, with MNC-I and MNSTC-I has agreed to the master list at Reference D of known existing or authorized Iraqi MODI and MOD units. These are the only units that will be supported; any future units will only be supported with MNF-I’s agreement.

3.4.7. Coordination of Support to Iraqi Forces.

3.4.1. Until further directed, MATs advising and training Regular Army and IIF units will continue to report to and coordinate with MNSTC-I on issues related to equipment, personnel, leadership, and sustainment pertaining to their associated Iraqi unit to enable effective coordination, through MNSTC-I, with JHQ and MOD.

3.4.2. Until further directed, MATs advising and training ING units will continue to report to and coordinate with MNC-I on issues related to equipment, personnel, leadership, and sustainment pertaining to their associated Iraqi unit to enable effective coordination, through MNSTC-I, with JHQ and MOD.

3.4.3. A follow-on FRAGO will direct a single reporting and coordination channel for these issues once capacity to coordinate these issues within a single organization is established.

3.6. Basing. Basing issues resulting from this FRAGO will be addressed by MNC-I and MNSTC-I via the ongoing Basing Plan led by DCS SPA. MNC-I will conduct an assessment of basing as part of the TOA process.

4. (U) Service Support [CHANGE]

4.1. Logistic support matrix. The logistic support system for the ISF is not yet fully established; the matrix at Annex B [this has yet to be agreed upon and will be issued as an amendment to the FRAGO] indicates how support is to be provided. ISF units are ADCON to their own JHQ, although some support is provided through MNSTC-I. The intent is to ensure the ISF develop their own logistic support, essential for independent operations, and do not become dependent on CF. Key to this will be the development of the ISF base
support units (BSU) and logistic units; RFPs have been submitted to support these. However, it is vital that ISF operational capability is developed; it is not the commander’s intent that this development is impeded by logistical constraints.

4.A.2. Police stations. Logistic support will not be provided by MNC-I to police stations where PATs are aligned but MSC are required to provide all support required for the PATs including their FP.

4.A.3. Equipment. The major items of equipment considered necessary for mission success for the MATs and PATs are listed in annex A.

4.A.4. Financial support (to include OMA requirements for MNC-I and MNSTC-I) [this has yet to be agreed and will be issued as an amendment to the FRAGO]

5. (U) Command and Signal [CHANGE]

5.A. (U) Coalition Forces.

5.A.1. Formation of Iraqi Assistance Group (Provisional) (IAG(P)). RFPs have been submitted to form the IAG(P). This HQ will initially operate under MNC-I command and provide general support to MNSTC-I as outlined below. Its principal tasks will be:

5.A.1.A. Lead planning effort of implementing assistance team activities.

5.A.1.B. ROO of assistance teams.

5.A.1.C. Through MNSTC-I, communicate assistance team issues to ministries.


5.A.2.A. All Assistance Teams will be under the command of Coalition Commanders; they will operate in direct support of Iraqi commanders. The description of command relationships contained within this paragraph uses US terms, comparable terms retaining the intent need to be substituted for other national forces.

5.A.2.B. Existing teams. MAT, BAT and PAT teams drawn from existing MNC-I will retain their original command relationships with their parent units. CJSOFT AF ODA remain under operational control of CFSOCC, under tactical control of MNC-I and in support of the MSC rs. Former ASTs will be attached to MNC-I. Units are authorized to use phased approach to accomplish attachment.

5.A.2.C. New Assistance Teams. There will be an Assistance Team chain of command:

5.A.2.C.1. Battalion Military and Border Assistance Teams (MATs and BATs) will be attached to MNC-I.

5.A.2.C.2. Special Police Assistance Teams (SPATs) will be OPCON to MNSTC-I; Battalion SPATS OPCON to Brigade SPATs, who in turn are OPCON to Division SPATs. Upon commitment of their supported Iraqi unit, the SPATs will be put under TACON to MNC-I. The MNC-I Commander may assign TACON of a SPAT to a
subordinate unit if the tactical situation dictates. MNSTC-I will retain ADCON in these cases.

5.A.2.D. MNC-I generated assistance teams. MNC-I generated assistance teams will remain assigned to their parent unit. It is likely that they will then be attached under tactical control of a unit of their own nation in new operational areas; national caveats will apply. The assistance team will support the Iraqi forces; it will not command Iraqi forces nor will it be under Iraqi command.

5.A.2.E. PATs are under tactical control of MNC-I but IPLOs will continue to receive their technical direction from CPATT.

5.B. (U) Iraqi forces.

5.B.1. Iraqi forces will be under administrative control through their chain of command to their JHQ, within the evolving capacity of the ISF, and if attached to MNC-I for operations, under tactical control at the appropriate level of command. The forces that are training will be under administrative control of their JHQ and under tactical control of the force, Iraqi or MSC, in whose area they are located.

5.B.2. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The command and control relationships described reflect US doctrine and are unlikely to be easily understood by the Iraqi forces. A MOU will be drawn up between the Iraqi MOD, MOI, and MNF-I to ensure a clear understanding of the command commitment made by both sides.

5.C. (U) Partnership.

5.C.1. MNF-I will establish partnerships between Iraqi and coalition force units down to battalion level with all Iraqi security force units, including reconstituting units. MNF-I partnerships will also include border security forces and military forces within subordinate unit areas of operations. MNF-I will provide an area support relationship with all other Iraqi security forces. Partnership, at the campaign level addresses "the relationship between the force, the Iraqi authorities, and the US and coalition missions." At the unit level, partnership between coalition and Iraqi units is best captured in the Arabic Alizam Mushtarak, or united commitment. This term describes the obligation between brothers or members of the same tribe. The same is true for the coalition. This is a cooperative relationship that will change over time as ISF capacity matures. Partnership requires coalition forces to serve as organizational and individual role models, and includes a habitual training and operational relationship between coalition and Iraqi units. Initially the ISF will be 'Supporting' CF operations but this relationship will change over time as ISF become more able to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations and as Iraqi C2 organizations and support and policy institutions mature. At this stage the ISF will have transitioned from 'Supporting' CF to being 'Supported' by the CF. The coalition partner unit will assist the embedded team to ensure training assistance is given at company level. While Iraqi divisions and MOD will retain ADCON of ISF units, and MOI retains full command of special police. Partnership responsibilities also require the coalition to provide essential logistics and life support that will decrease over time, and support to assistance teams embedded in, or aligned with, ISF units within the coalition unit area of operations.
5.C.2. The Iraqi MOD, MOI and MNF-I will need to agree, in detail, to the proposed partnership linkages. The intention is to achieve this by a joint planning group to address:

5.C.2.A. The partnership linkages MNF-I proposes.

5.C.2.B. How these partnerships can link to Iraqi military districts thereby easing the transition to Iraqi control.

5.C.2.C. Agreement between the Iraqi Forces and MNF-I on the command and control relationships as well as guidance on what can be expected, by both sides from the partnership arrangements and Assistance Teams.

| (b)(3), (b)(6) |

ACKNOWLEDGE

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OFFICIAL:

MG MOLAN
DCS STRAT OPS

ANNEXES:

A. MATS, PATS, SPATS, BATS SPECIFICS
B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT MATRIX. [TO BE PUBLISHED]
ANNEX A (MATS, PATS, SPATS, BATS SPECIFICS) TO MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I MAT, PAT, BAT, AND SPAT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]

A. Assistance teams. MNF-I will develop and integrate military, special police, border force and police assistance teams that will embed with the Iraqi forces, assist their development to independent counterinsurgency capability, monitor and develop Iraqi leaders, foster the warrior spirit and ethos of service to the nation, and provide access to coalition effects and support.

A.1. (U) MAT Functions, Mission, Composition, and Key Tasks.

A.1.A. MAT Functions: Provides Iraqi commanders broad advisory support and direct access to coalition effects—artillery, rotary and fixed-wing air, intelligence, and logistics.

A.1.A.1. MAT Mission: Provide advisory support and direct access to coalition effects to enhance the ability of Iraqi army units from battalion headquarters to division headquarters to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations.

A.1.A.2. MAT Composition: Division team: COL/LTC plus 9; Brigade team: LTC/MAJ plus 9; Battalion team: MAJ/CFP plus 9. MSC commanders may choose to augment the team with additional members as the security situation and mission requirements dictate.

A.1.A.3. (U) MAT Key Tasks:

A.1.A.3.A. Improve planning, coordination and execution. At division level, focus on enhancing the ability of the commander and staff to plan and coordinate with the national security infrastructure, integrate military operations with police and provincial requirements, and provide direction, support and administration to subordinate units. At brigade and battalion level, focus on enhancing the ability of the commander and staff to plan and coordinate operations, and supervise and support their execution by subordinate units.

A.1.A.3.B. Provide assistance to the Iraqi commander, including acting as a role model, as that commander develops the leadership and professional knowledge of his subordinates and staffs. Essential to success is revitalizing a wartime and service ethos.

A.1.A.3.C. Advise and assist the ISF unit commander and staff with training, planning, and decision-making. Essential to success here is assisting in the management of a train-operate-train cycle that corresponds with the coalition partner unit to maximize the opportunity to develop capacity for independent counterinsurgency operations.

A.1.A.3.D. Assist the ISF with planning and coordinating for coalition support and effects. Serve as the conduit for integration of coalition force effects. Integrate coalition intelligence into ISF operations and push ISF developed intelligence into the coalition system.
Annex A (MATS, PATs, SPATs, BATs specifics) to MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I MAT, PAT, BAT, and SPAT Implementation Plan]

A.1.A.3.E. Provide 'ground truth' assessment of current ability of the ISF unit and leadership and future capability and potential of those units and leaders.

A.1.A.3.F. Act as a liaison between coalition and ISF partnership units.

A.1.A.4. Equipment: In addition to personal equipment each team will require the following major items of equipment: 3 x M1114, communications (ICOM, JTACS, MCI, IRIIDIUM phone) blue force tracker.

A.1.B. (u) PAT Functions, Mission, and Composition.

A.1.B.1. PAT Functions: Aligned team that provides Iraqi police broad advisory support, training, and direct access to coalition support. Special police assistance teams, for special police units, are modeled on MATs. During the 'Proof of Principle' the team will not be embedded with the IPS 24/7 but will provide what MNC-I agrees with local Iraqi commanders is appropriate support; this will be reviewed during the assessment.

A.1.B.2. PAT Mission: Provide advisory support and direct access to coalition efforts to enhance the ability of Iraqi police to conduct policing operations in a counterinsurgency environment.

A.1.B.3. PAT Composition. SSG to MAJ (depending on station size); 2-4 coalition soldiers; civilian police expert (4-6 per team, total). The Team Commander is to be a Military Policeman. MSC commanders may choose to augment the team with additional members as the security situation and mission requirements dictate.

A.1.B.4. (U) PAT Key Tasks:

A.1.B.4.A. PAT Military Tasks. Execution of military tasks enables police operations in a counterinsurgency environment and includes:
- Provide assistance to the Iraqi commander in developing the leadership of his subordinates.
- Develop force protection and combat skills critical to operations in a counterinsurgency environment.
- Advise and assist police in intelligence planning that enables force protection, the conduct of police operations, and integrate into the coalition network intelligence developed at the station.
- Communications

A.1.B.4.B. PAT Police Tasks. International police liaison officers are responsible for execution of police specific tasks and police-improving skills including:
- Patrolling
- Administration
- Dispatch / communications
- Investigation / crime scene

A-2
Annex A (MATs, PATs, SPATs, BATs specifics) to MNF-I FRAGO 667 (MNF-I MAT, PAT, BAT, and SPAT Implementation Plan)

- Logistics / armory
- Command and control

A.1.B.4.C. PAT Equipment: in addition to personal equipment each team will require the following major items of equipment: Hardened civilian vehicles, communications (ICOM, JTACS, MCI, IRIDIUM phone) blue force tracker.


A.1.C.1. Special Police Assistance Team: Special PAT (SPAT) is based on a MAT and has 8: MAJ/CAPT (Bn) to COL/LTC (Div); 6 Coalition soldiers; either a civilian police expert, military policeman or soldier (normally reservist) with a police background.

A.1.C.2. Border Assistance Team: Border Assistance Team (BAT) is based on a MAT and has 10: MAJ/CAPT (Bn) to COL/LTC (Div); 9 Coalition soldiers.

A.1.D. [U] Intelligence Assistance Teams


A.1.D.1.A. MOD IAT Functions: Improves the ability of the MOD Directorate General of Intelligence and Security and the Joint Headquarters J2 to support COIN operations by recommending internal modifications as well as by facilitating their integration with Coalition intelligence structures and by encouraging the development of a closer relationship with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS).

A.1.D.1.B. MOD IAT Mission: The MOD IAT advises and trains MOD intelligence personnel on the intelligence process with a focus on the integration of existing structure, the development of policy and programs to support that structure, and the identification of associated training needs in order to enhance the capability of MOD intelligence to support COIN operations in the near term and to meet Iraq’s security needs into the future.

A.1.D.1.C. MOD IAT Composition: MOD IAT has 7 personnel: 1 x COL (O-6); 1 x MAJ (O-5); 2 x CPT (O-3); and 2 x SPC (E-7) at MOD HQ, and an element at the Joint Headquarters J2 consisting of 1 x MAJ (O-4) and 1 x SSG (E-6).

A.1.D.1.D. MOD IAT Key Tasks:


Annex A (MATs, PATs, SPATs, BATs specifics) to MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I MAT, PAT, BAT, and SPAT Implementation Plan]


A.1.D.2.D.4. Develop MOD intelligence leaders and organizations that are capable of supporting independent COIN operations.


A.1.D.1.D.7. Advise and train intelligence personnel at the MOD and the Joint HQ J2 with regard to basic intelligence staff skills appropriate for their missions, such as collection management, report data-basing, COIN analysis, intelligence estimates, maintaining a situation map, intelligence update briefings, periodic intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), intelligence dissemination, counterintelligence and force protection.


A.1.D.2.A. MOI IAT Functions: Supports development of an MOI intelligence capability to conduct independent COIN operations. Assist MOI in developing actionable intelligence to defeat the insurgency and maintain domestic order. Assist in integrating MOI intelligence with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), and Coalition forces.

A.1.D.2.B. MOI IAT Mission: The MOI IAT advises and trains MOD intelligence personnel on the intelligence process with a focus on the integration of existing structure, the development of policy and programs to support that structure, and the identification of associated training needs in order to enhance the capability of MOI intelligence to support the MOI as the lead ministry in Iraq's fight against the current insurgency, and to meet Iraq's internal security needs into the future. The MOI IAT facilitates exchange and fusion between Iraqi intelligence agencies, ISF and coalition forces.

A.1.D.2.C. MOI IAT Composition: MOI IAT has 10 personnel: 1 x COL (O-6); 1 x LTC (O-5); 1 x CPT (O-3); 1 x CW2; 5 x SFC (E-7) and 1 x SSG (E-6). Recommend that the additional expertise for the IAT be drawn from International Police Liaison Officer (IFLO) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel.

A.1.D.2.D. MOI IAT Key Tasks:
Annex A (MATs, PATs, SPATs, BATs specifics) to MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I MAT, PAT, BAT, and SPAT Implementation Plan]


A.1.D.2.D.2. Develop MOI intelligence leaders and organizations that are capable of supporting independent COIN operations.

A.1.D.2.D.3. Assist in the integration of intelligence support to the National Coordination Center at MOI.

A.1.D.2.D.4. Assist in developing an intelligence capability for subordinate MOI elements such as Department of Border Enforcement and Special Police Units in order to meet their specific and unique intelligence requirements.

A.1.D.2.D.5. Assist in developing and implementing intelligence policy with a focus on ensuring the appropriate oversight on the use of intelligence and protection of classified information.


A.1.E.4.C. Equipment: in addition to personal equipment each team will require the following major items of equipment: Hardened civilian vehicles, communications (ICOM, JTACS, MOI, IRIDIUM phone) blue force tracker.
(U) MOD 1 TO MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH IRAQI FORCES (TRANSITION TEAMS)]

(U) THIS FRAGO HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY BG PALMER, DIR STRATOPS, MNF-I.

(U) SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE NAME CHANGE FROM ASSISTANCE TEAMS TO TRANSITION TEAMS.

(U) REFERENCES: [CHANGE]

A. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL/) MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSISTANCE TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH IRAQI FORCES] DATED: 151810CFEB05

B. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL/) E-MAIL FROM SPA WITH EXCERPT OF A SVCT BETWEEN CG MNF-I AND SECDEF ON 17 FEB 05.

(U) MAPS: [NO CHANGE]

(U) TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THIS ORDER: CHARLIE

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: [NO CHANGE]

1. (U) SITUATION. [CHANGE]

1.A. (U) ON 17 FEB 05 THE SECDEF DIRECTED ALL ASSISTANCE TEAMS BE REFERRED TO AS TRANSITION TEAMS. THE FOLLOWING TEAMS WILL BE REFERRED TO AS FOLLOWS:

1.A.1. (U) MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEAMS (MAT) WILL BE REFERRED TO AS MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS (MIT).

1.A.2. (U) POLICE ASSISTANCE TEAMS (PAT) WILL BE REFERRED TO AS POLICE TRANSITION TEAMS (PTT).

1.A.3. (U) SPECIAL POLICE ASSISTANCE TEAMS (SPAT) WILL BE REFERRED TO AS SPECIAL POLICE TRANSITION TEAMS (SPT).

1.A.4. (U) BORDER ASSISTANCE TEAMS (BAT) WILL BE REFERRED TO AS BORDER TRANSITION TEAMS (BIT).

1.A.5. (U) INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE TEAMS (IAT) WILL BE REFERRED TO AS INTELLIGENCE TRANSITION TEAMS (ITT).

1.B. (U) STAFF DISCUSSION AND ADDITIONAL INPUT HAVE GENERATED CHANGES TO MNF-I FRAGO 667 LISTED IN TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS.

1.C. (U) LOGISTIC SUPPORT MATRIX LISTED IN THE ORIGINAL ORDER IS ATTACHED TO THIS FRAGO.
2. (U) MISSION. [NO CHANGE]

3. (U) EXECUTION. [NO CHANGE]

3.A. (U) COMMANDER'S INTENT. [NO CHANGE]

3.B. (U) PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS FRAGO IS TO MAKE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES TO THE NAME OF THE ASSISTANCE TEAM MISSION AND TO CHANGE SOME TASKS FROM THE ORIGINAL ORDER.

3.C. (U) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. [NO CHANGE]

3.C. (U) TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS AND STAFF. [CHANGE]

3.C.1. (U) MNC-I.


3.C.2. (U) DCS SPA.


3.C.3. (U) DCS PME.


3.C.4. (U) DCS STRATOPS.


3.D. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. [NO CHANGE]

4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT. [CHANGE]
4. A. (U) THE ISF GENERAL CONCEPT OF SUPPORT FOR TRANSITION TEAM IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX IS ATTACHED TO THIS FRAGO.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. [CHANGE]

   (b)(3), (b)(6)

ACKNOWLEDGE

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OFFICIAL:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DCS STRAT OPS

ATTACHMENTS:
ISF CONCEPT OF SUPPORT FOR TRANSITION TEAM IMPLEMENTATION
MOD 4 TO MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNFI IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH IRAQI FORCES (POLICE TRANSITION TEAM (PTT) CHANGE)]

SUBJECT: CHANGE POLICE TRANSITION TEAM (PTT) CONCEPT TO THE POLICE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM (P3) CONCEPT.

REFERENCES: [CHANGE]


B. (U) MOD 1 TO MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNFI IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH IRAQI FORCES (TRANSITION TEAM)] DATED: 272120CFEB05.

C. (U) MOD 2 TO MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNFI IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH IRAQI FORCES (FOC DATE CHANGE)] DATED: 131015CMAR05.

D. (U) MNF-I FRAMEWORK OPORD [OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND PARTNERSHIP: FROM INITIAL TO CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTIONS] DATED 22 MAR 05.

E. (U) MNF-I CAMPAIGN ACTION PLAN: 2005 WAY AHEAD (DRAFT).

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THIS ORDER: DELTA

TASK ORGANIZATION: [NO CHANGE]

1. (U) SITUATION. [CHANGE]

1.A. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MGFI/) THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS) IS CRITICAL TO THE ATTAINMENT OF IRAQI CIVIL ORDER AND SUCCESS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT IRAQ. DUE TO THE ON-GOING SECURITY SITUATION, COALITION FORCE (CF) EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THE IPS WITH INTERNATIONAL POLICE LIAISON OFFICERS (IPLOS) HAS PRODUCED MIXED RESULTS.

1.B. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MGFI/) A CRITICAL FACTOR IN DEVELOPING AN INITIAL IPS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY IS THE ABILITY TO OPERATE FROM SECURE FACILITIES EMPLOYING ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES.

1.C. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MGFI/) TOWARD THAT END, THE IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR (MOI) AGREED EARLIER THIS YEAR TO ALLOW A POLICE TRANSITION TEAM (PTT) PROOF OF PRINCIPLE TO BE CONDUCTED IN 4 CITIES: BAGHDAD, MOSUL, FALLUJAH, AND SAMARRA. THREE OF THESE CITIES (MOSUL, SAMARRA, AND FALLUJAH) DO NOT CURRENTLY HAVE A VIABLE POLICE FORCE. ADDITIONALLY, THE MOI WAS RELUCTANT TO EXPAND THE PTT CONCEPT BEYOND THE FOUR ORIGINAL CITIES.

1.D. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MGFI/) IN MID-FEBRUARY 05, MNSTC-I BRIEFED THE MOI ON P3 WHICH WAS DEVELOPED IN CONCERT WITH MNC-I. P3 BUILDS CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY WITHIN THE MOI/IPS FROM THE TOP DOWN IN ORDER TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE, ACCEPTABLE POLICING SERVICES TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE. THE MOI APPROVED THE CONCEPT AND DESIRES TO IMPLEMENT THE P3 VICE THE PTT PROGRAM.
2. (U) MISSION. [NO CHANGE]

3. (U) EXECUTION. [NO CHANGE]

3.A. (U) COMMANDER'S INTENT. [CHANGE]

3.A.1. (U) PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS FRAGO IS TO MODIFY THE ORIGINAL ORDER (REF A), REPLACING THE PTT PROGRAM WITH P3. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER, PTT IS REPLACED BY THE P3 CONCEPT.

3.A.2. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL/) P3 PROGRAM INTENT. THE INTENT OF P3 IS TO DEVELOP CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY WITHIN THE MOI AND IPS IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE IPS TO EFFECTIVELY OPERATE IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT.

3.A.2.A. KEY POLICING CAPABILITIES. P3 TEAMS ASSIST IN DEVELOPING:
- POLICY AND LIAISON
- OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION
- HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND PAY
- LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE
- FINANCE AND CONTRACTS
- COIN
- INTELLIGENCE
- COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
- TRAINING

3.A.3. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL/) ENDSTATE. THE ENDSTATE OF P3 IS THE MOI AS AN EFFECTIVE INSTITUTION CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN DIRECTING, SUPPORTING, AND SUSTAINING ASSIGNED IPS FORCES. THE MOI FUNCTIONS EFFECTIVELY AND MANAGES ITS SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS ENABLING IRAQI PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS TO BE EFFECTIVE AND CAPABLE OF OPERATING IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT. LASTLY, THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICES MAINTAIN DOMESTIC ORDER AND DENY TERRORISTS A SAFE HAVEN WITHIN IRAQ.


3.C. (U) TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS AND STAFF. [CHANGE]

SECRET//REL to USA and MCFL//
3.C.1. (U) MNF-I. [CHANGE]

3.C.1.A. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) PROVIDE P3-P TEAMS FOCUSED ON THE PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS. KEY TASKS, FUNCTIONS, MISSION, DESIRED EFFECTS, AND COMPOSITION OF P3-P TEAMS ARE LISTED IN THE ATTACHMENT.

3.C.1.B. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) PROVIDE P3-R TEAMS TO ASSIST THE IPS IN THE RECONSTITUTION AND REBUILDING OF THE IRAQI LOCAL POLICE FORCE IN: MOSUL, FALLUJAH, SAMARRA, AND AREAS OF BAGHDAD AS THE IPS GENERATES POLICE FORCES IN THESE CITIES.

3.C.1.C. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) PROVIDE ALL SUPPORT REQUIRED TO MAN, SUSTAIN, AND PROTECT P3-P/R TEAMS.

3.C.1.D. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) IN CONJUNCTION WITH MNSTC-I, DEVELOP MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS TO ASSESS IRAQI PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS AND THEIR CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT.

3.C.1.E. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) ENSURE P3-P TEAMS HAVE ACCESS TO THREE (3) CAT I LOCAL NATIONAL LINGUISTS FOR INTERPRETATION AND TRANSLATION DUTIES.

3.C.2. (U) MNSTC-I. [CHANGE]

3.C.2.A. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) DEVELOP, MAN AND EQUIP THE P3-MOI TEAM.

3.C.2.B. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) DEVELOP, MAN AND EQUIP THE P3-IHP MOI TEAM.

3.C.2.C. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) AS FORCES ARE GENERATED FOR THE IRAQI RIVER POLICE, DEVELOP, MAN AND EQUIP A P3-RP TEAM.

3.C.2.D. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) PROVIDE IPLOS TO BE OPCON TO P3-P TEAMS AND THE P3-MOI TEAM TO FACILITATE THE POLICE TRAINING TASKS LISTED IN THE ATTACHMENT.

3.C.2.E. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) PROVIDE BASING FOR THE P3-MOI TEAM VICINITY FOR SHIELD.

3.C.2.F. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) DEVELOP MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS TO ASSESS IRAQI MOI AND PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS ALONG WITH THEIR CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT.

3.C.2.G. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) ENSURE P3-MOI AND P3-IHP TEAMS HAVE ACCESS TO THREE (3) CAT I LOCAL NATIONAL LINGUISTS FOR INTERPRETATION AND TRANSLATION DUTIES.

3.C.3. (U) DCS INTELLIGENCE. [CHANGE]

3.C.3.A. (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI/) MNF-I DCS INTELLIGENCE HAS THE INTELLIGENCE LEAD AT MOI HEADQUARTERS. WORKING IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH IRMO AND THE P3-MOI, ASSIST THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP IN DEVELOPING A FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY WITHIN THE MOI.

3.C.4. (U) DCS CIS. [CHANGE]

3.C.4.A. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) IN CONJUNCTION WITH P3, PROVIDE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND OVERSIGHT OF PJCC COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND EMBEDMENT.

3.C.5. (U) DCS SPA. [CHANGE]

3.C.5.A. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) IN CONJUNCTION WITH MNSTC-I, DEVELOP MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS TO ASSESS IRAQI MOI AND PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS CAPABILITIES TO INCLUDE ABILITY TO OPERATE IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT.

3.D. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. [CHANGE]

3.D.1. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (FOC) DATE FOR P3 TEAMS IS 01 JUL 05.

3.D.2. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) MNF-I WILL ASSESS P3 TEAMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH TIMELINE IN REF A SO THAT ADJUSTMENTS CAN BE MADE AS NECESSARY.

3.D.3. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) P3 TEAMS WILL ADHERE TO ALL ROE PRODUCED IN LINE WITH THEIR COUNTRY'S NATIONAL POLICY. P3 TEAMS WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR EXISTING ROE, NATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, AND ANY NATIONAL CAVEAT THAT APPLIES.

3.D.4. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) MNSTC-I CHATT REMAINS THE SINGLE SOURCE OF ADVICE FOR POLICING MATTERS.

4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT. [CHANGE]

4.A. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) P3 TEAM LOGISTIC SUPPORT. LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE P3-P AND P3-R TEAMS IS PROVIDED BY THE HOSTING MSC. LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE P3-MOI TEAM, P3-IHP TEAM, AND P3-RP TEAM IS PROVIDED BY MNSTC-I.

4.B. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) IRAQI POLICE STATIONS. LOGISTIC SUPPORT WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY MNF-I TO POLICE STATIONS WHERE P3 TEAMS ARE ALIGNED. MSC'S MAY BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE CLASS IV MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF THE FORCE PROTECTION/STATION HARDENING EFFORTS CONDUCTED IN COORDINATION WITH THE IPS PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF AND THE P3 TEAM.

4.C. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI////) P3 TEAM EQUIPMENT. THE MAJOR ITEMS OF MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY P3 TEAMS ARE LISTED IN THE ATTACHMENT.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. [CHANGE]
5.A. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

5.A.1. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL//) P3-P/R TEAMS WILL BE UNDER COMMAND OF COALITION COMMANDERS AND OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF THE PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEFS.

5.A.2. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL//) P3-P/R TEAMS DRAWN FROM MNC-I WILL REMAIN OPCON TO MNC-I. DIRECT COORDINATION AND LIAISON WILL BE CONDUCTED BETWEEN P3-P, AND P3-MOI TEAMS IN SUPPORT OF THE P3 CONCEPT.

5.A.3. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL//) THE P3-MOI (MILITARY ELEMENT) TEAM REMAINS ASSIGNED TO MNSTC-I.

5.A.4. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL//) IFLOS ARE OPCON TO THE P3-P TEAMS AND TACON TO CPATT FOR TECHNICAL CONTROL.

5.A.5. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFL//) IPS FORCES ARE NOT OPCON TO ANY CF UNITS. THE P3 PROGRAM IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE IRAQIS WITH ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING STRUCTURES WITHIN THE IPS SYSTEM, NOT EXERT C2 OVER ANY OF THEIR FORCES.

5.B. (U) SIGNAL.

ACKNOWLEDGE

CASEY
GEN

OFFICIAL:

MG BARGERWILL
DCS STRAT OFS

ATTACHMENT:
P3 SPECIFICS

SECRET//REL to USA and MCFL//
ATTACHMENT (P3 SPECIFICS) TO MOD XXC TO MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH IRAQI FORCES (POLICE TRANSITION TEAM (PTT) CHANGE)].

A.1. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI//) P3 MISSION. P3 DEVELOPS CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY IN THE MOI AND IPS THROUGH ADVISORY SUPPORT, TRAINING, AND ACCESS TO COALITION QRFT TO ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF THE MOI TO LEAD AND MANAGE POLICING OPERATIONS IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT.

A.2. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI//) P3 TEAM FUNCTIONS. P3 ALIGNED TEAMS PROVIDE IRAQI POLICE BROAD ADVISORY SUPPORT AND TRAINING. THE P3 TEAM WILL NOT BE EMBEDDED OR BRIEFCED WITHIN THE IPS 24/7, BUT WILL PROVIDE WHAT MNC-I AGREES WITH THE IRAQI PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF IS APPROPRIATE SUPPORT; THIS SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT WILL BE REVIEWED DURING THE ASSESSMENT. THE KEY TO BUILDING CAPABILITY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE IPS IS SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTISE DISCREETLY WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP WITH IRAQI COUNTERPARTS, BACKED UP BY QRFT. THE TIME REQUIRED FOR EACH P3 TEAM MEMBER TO BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN P3 AND WORKING IN THE IRAQI POLICE HEADQUARTERS WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE P3 TEAM CHIEF.

A.3. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI//) P3 KEY TASKS. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS OUTLINE THE P3'S TASKS.

- ASSIST THE MOI AND PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF IN DEVELOPING THE LEADERSHIP OF THE POLICE FORCE.
- ASSIST THE PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF IN DEVELOPING ADEQUATE ENHANCED SECURITY PROTECTION MEASURES.
- ASSIST THE MOI/IPS TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM TO INCLUDE: PAY, POLICY, AND CONTRACTS.
- ASSIST THE MOI/IPS IN DEVELOPING A LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM TO INCLUDE: MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY, AND PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY.
- ASSIST THE MOI IN ENHANCING THE IRAQI C4I SYSTEMS BY FACILITATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSCS.
- FACILITATE THE IRAQI'S EFFORT TO RECONSTITUTE IPS IN: MOSUL, FALLUJA, SAMARRA, AND AREAS OF BAGHDAD.
- ASSIST THE PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN ESTABLISHING, PLANNING, AND EXECUTING TRAINING PROGRAMS.
- ASSIST THE PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN DEVELOPING AN INTERNAL/EXTERNAL INFORMATION CAPABILITY GUIDED BY IRMO-MOI PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

A.4. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI//) EFFECTS. THE P3 PROGRAM DESIRED EFFECTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- IPS PAY SYSTEM FUNCTIONING, EFFECTIVE, AND EFFICIENT.
- IRAQI PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT (TO INCLUDE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION) ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM ESTABLISHED AND OPERATING.
ATTACHMENT (P3 SPECIFICS) TO MOD XX C TO MNF-I FRAGO 667 [MNF-I IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH IRAQI FORCES (POLICE TRANSITION TEAM (PTT) CHANGE)].

EFFECTS (CONT)

- VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM ESTABLISHED AND FUNCTIONING.

- TRAINING PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED AND FUNCTIONING AT PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS.

- TRAINED COMMAND INFORMATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL AT PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS.

- INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED AND INTEGRATED WITH MOI INTELLIGENCE AND THE IRAQI MAJOR CRIMES UNIT ARCHITECTURE.

- WHERE APPROPRIATE, FACILITY HARDENING, ENHANCED SECURITY PROCEDURES, DETENTION CAPABILITY AND OTHER NECESSARY RECONSTRUCTION IDENTIFIED OR UNDERWAY.

- INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, AND CONNECTIVITY TO PJCC ESTABLISHED.

- EFFECTIVE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM INCLUDING: RECRUITING, PROMOTIONS, RETENTION, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES.

- A MOI DEVELOPED, FUNCTIONING, AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM TO SUSTAIN LIFE SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYABLE POLICE FORCES.

- POLICE ABLE TO OPERATE IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT.

- MOI UNITS ABLE TO PLAN AND DEVELOP POLICY AT THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVEL, AND CONDUCT EFFECTIVE POLICING ACTIONS.

A.5. (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI) P3 TEAM COMPOSITION. P3-MOI CONSISTS OF MNSTC-I AND IRMO PERSONNEL. THE P3-MOI MILITARY ELEMENT WILL BE LED BY A COL (O6) WITH OFFICERS OF APPROPRIATE RANK AND EXPERIENCE TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION AS DIRECTED BY MNSTC-I IN COLLABORATION WITH IRMO-MOI. THE P3-P TEAM CONSISTS OF MNC-I PERSONNEL AND IPLOS. A P3-P TEAM CONSISTS OF A TEAM LEADER IN THE GRADE OF LTC/COL, PROVIDING EXPERIENCE, CREDIBILITY AND AUTHORITY. IF THE LTC/COL LACKS A POLICING BACKGROUND, HIS DEPUTY/SENIOR POLICE ADVISOR IS TO BE A MILITARY POLICEMAN, IPLO, OR RESERVIST WITH APPROPRIATE COMMAND POLICE BACKGROUND. THE BALANCE OF THE TEAM CONSISTS OF A ONE OR TWO MAN OPERATIONS CELL, SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS; (APPROXIMATELY 5-7) IN THE AREAS OF POLICY MAKING, OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/FINANCE, LOGISTICS, COIN, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND TRAINING. P3-P TEAMS ALSO INCLUDE IPLOS AND INTERPRETERS / TRANSLATORS. MSC COMMANDERS MAY CHOOSE TO AUGMENT THE TEAM WITH ADDITIONAL MEMBERS (E.G. ADDITIONAL IPLOS) AS THE SECURITY SITUATION AND MISSION REQUIREMENTS DICTATE.

A.6. P3 EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EQUIPMENT EACH TEAM WILL REQUIRE: HARDENED VEHICLES/MILITARY OR CIVILIAN AS APPROPRIATE, COMMUNICATIONS (ICOM, MCI, IRIDIUM PHONE) AND BLUE FORCE TRACKER.