

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, GBR, AUS~~



---

# **Decision Brief:** **June 2006 Force Structure Assessment**

**3 June 2006**

This briefing is classified

~~SECRET~~

~~REL USA, GBR, AUS~~

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: 3 Jun 2016

~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## Agenda

---

- Purpose / Problem Statement
  - Decisions to Date (SPA)
  - Impact of Previous Force Structure Decisions (SPA)
  - Situation: June – December 2006 (C2)
  - Force Structure Concept: Base COA (SPA)
  - Strategic Facts, Assumptions, and Planning Factors (SPA)
  - Required Conditions and What Has Changed (SPA)
  - Strategic Intent / Pros and Cons of Force Reductions (SPA)
  - Strategic Risks & Mitigation (SPA)
  - Courses of Action (MNC-I)
  - Tactical / Operational Risks & Mitigation (MNC-I)
  - Perception of Force Reductions on Key Audiences (STRATEFF)
  - Decisions / Way Ahead
-

~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## ***Purpose and Problem Statement***

---

### **Purpose:**

**Gain a decision on force restructuring opportunities in the period June through September 2006.**

### **Problem Statement:**

**How does a reduction of two to three combat brigades impact our ability to achieve our strategic endstate?**

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~




## MNF-I Decisions to Date

### Made:

- March 06: 2/28 ID BOGs out in June 06 (MNF-W)
- March 06: Do not curtail 1/10 Mtn (MND-B) in April 06
- April 06: Hold 2/1 ID in Germany; Backfill 2/28 ID with 1/1 AD(-)

### Pending:

- Whether to backfill 1/10 Mtn in August 06 (MND-B)
- Whether to backfill up to 2 additional BCTs in Sep 06 (Base Plan).
- Retain Theater Reserve in Kuwait past July 06 / way ahead for PTDO BCT



~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## *Impact of Previous Decisions*

---

- Although the first force restructuring was limited in scale and scope (2 BCTs), overall indicators are:
  - Demonstrated strategic commitment to conditions-based drawdown.
  - Created basis for engagement efforts with Sunni community in general.
  - Enhanced credibility of Sunni outreach in Western Euphrates River Valley; helped widen the gap between terrorists and the Iraqi people.
  - Attack levels against CF and ISF have remained generally consistent in the areas transitioned to the ISF.
  - The Iraqi Security Forces have stood firm – they have not faltered or failed in over a year.
  - Iraqi public confidence in ISF remains high; ~ 70%.

**Overall Assessment:** Have not seen measurable impact of first decision, ISF have held ground.

---



MNF-I DCSINT



## Threat Projection - 2006

- **T&FF groups retain capability to conduct mass casualty attacks and disrupt national stabilization. Divisions between AQI and AS are expanding. AQI attempting to incite civil war, provoking Shia with mass casualty attacks; AS is focused on anti-IG attacks which are deemed more legitimate to Iraqi population. Effectiveness of non-suicide attacks increasing as groups leverage military skills of former regime members. Wedge continues within T&FF groups and between terrorists and Sunni population**
- **Rejectionists continue to conduct majority of attacks and maintain a 'talk and fight' strategy; as IG gains traction, splintering of IZR-Sunni groups will result in realignment of personnel to T&FF and militias. Development of Sunni militia incorporating moderate Rejectionists, and potentially aligned with Sunni political groups, increasingly likely**
- **Shi'a militias are an increasingly significant component of the security landscape, especially in Baghdad. JAM is expanding and responding to AQI provocation and maintaining heightened levels of ethno-sectarian violence with kidnapping/death squads**

1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

***Bottom Line: The nature of conflict in Iraq is changing to a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists. Rising sectarian strife increasingly defines the pattern of violence. T&FF continue to lose Sunni support but retain capability to sustain high profile sectarian attacks. Rejectionists will match levels of violence to political developments as the government exerts its authority. JAM continues to impose itself in Baghdad, antagonizing Sunni groups and hardening sectarian tensions.***



MNF-I DCSINT

# Jun-Nov 06 Hotspot Assessment

MUSUL  
Musul remains a key  
strategic area for AQI & AS  
Potential for foreign fighters  
flow into Iraq remains

## AT TAMIM-KIRKUK

- Potential for contained sectarian violence over issue of Kirkuk towards end of 2006

## AL ANBAR

- T&FF intimidation of local Sunnis increases, hindering efforts to 'drive the wedge'
- Sunni population infiltrated by multiple insurgent groups; continued significant freedom of movement/action

## DIYALA

- Sunni-Shi'a split in population, growing AQI presence causing sectarian violence flare ups
- Increase in T&FF displaced from Al Anbar, Ninawa

## S. BAGHDAD/N. BABIL

- Latifiyah/Yusufiyah contested area for AQI
- Mixed population likely to experience sectarian tension/violence

## SOUTHERN PROVINCES

- Continued attacks on MNF by Shi'a militia
- Increased Shi'a on Shi'a violence as Sadr challenges SCIRI for influence in advance of provincial elections
- Militias, criminal and political parties' agendas increasingly intermixed
- Extensive infiltration of IPS by JAM/Badr

1.4b, 1.4d

## BAGHDAD

- Vast majority of sectarian violence will occur in Baghdad over next six months; JAM increasing influence
- Focal point for the Rejectionist fight against MNF, and T&FF efforts to spark self sustaining sectarian violence



MNF-I DCSINT

## **Threat Projection – MND B Late 2006**

- Baghdad province will continue as a focal point for AQI and insurgent attacks/activity and a flashpoint for sectarian tensions
- Attacks will only gradually diminish as Iraqi government struggles with providing security and essential services during its initial governance period
- Shi'a and Sunni Inter-ethnic relations will continue to be strained, fueled by ongoing reprisals
- AQI will make determined effort to intimidate population and discredit IG; concerted effort to stoke existing sectarian tensions through high-profile, mass casualty attacks
- Militias pursue sectarian agendas to increase influence, impose objectives; period leading to provincial elections will see increased attacks

1.4b, 1.4d

***Assessment: Key political/ethnic events will influence nature of conflict. T&FF efforts will focus on disrupting the new Iraqi government with AQI the most lethal threat. Militias will exploit security vacuums to control territory, increase influence. Intimidation and corruption will increase to maintain tacit support and political gains. Attacks will continue on infrastructure to deny essential services, discredit government.***



MNF-I DCSINT

## **Threat Projection - MND-N Late 2006**

- **AQI seeks to instigate sectarian division in Diyala Province by capitalizing on religious, ethnic, and tribal differences**
- **AQI will continue an intimidation campaign against civilians through mass casualty attacks and assassinations, most likely in Baqubah**
- **Shi'a militias increasingly active in Baqubah and will conduct reprisal attacks against Sunnis**

1.4b, 1.4d

- **AQI and Rejectionists present the main threat to CF and ISF, primarily through IEDs and IDF**

***Assessment: AQI will work to foment sectarian tensions in the area to discredit the IG and ISF through periodic mass casualty attacks at large Shi'a gatherings. Southwest Diyala will remain the primary area for sectarian strife between Sunni and Shi'a, while Ninevah Province will continue to be a primary route of T&FF into Iraq. Expect continued attacks against oil pipelines in Salah ad Din and Tamin to prevent economic recovery.***



MNF-I DCSINT

## Potential Strategic Derailing Events

- Catastrophic attack on iconic religious symbol, particularly against shrines in Najaf / Karbala, sparks uncontrollable ethno-sectarian violence; beyond ISF capability
- Conflict between AQI and JAM over territory in Baghdad develops into large-scale, open conflict
- Ethno-sectarian violence increases in ferocity and expands in Diyala Province
- AQI demonstrates chemical/biological capability with mass casualty attack
- AQSL establishes leadership enclave in  focus on Iraq
- Sadr-directed mass mobilization of JAM; closes southern LOCs
- Government officials closely implicated in Shi'a militia atrocity

• *Govt stagnation or failure*


~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



# 2006 MNF-I Force Restructuring Concept: Base Case


HQ elements at FOC:

- MoD
- JHQ
- IGFC



Projections for Dec 06:

- Provincial Iraqi Control
- Iraqi Army Lead
- MNF-I Lead



~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## Strategic Facts

---

- Unity Government seated in May 06.
    - MoD and Mol Ministers not yet named.
  - Sectarian violence and militias have emerged as critical factors in Iraq, and pose a threat to the stability of Iraq, along with AQI/T&FF, Sunni-based insurgency.
  - CENTCOM Theater Reserve established in Kuwait (HBCT).
    - Three Bn task forces from the Theater Reserve are deployed into Iraq (2 – Ramadi; 1 – Baghdad).
    - 11th MEU postured in Kuwait to support reconstitution of the Theater Reserve.
  - Army Pre-positioned Stock 5 (APS 5) is set in Kuwait to support PTDO HBCT.
  - Strong progress in development of Iraqi Security Forces; over 265,000 now trained and equipped.
    - 3 divisions, ~20 brigades, and ~70 Iraq Army battalions are projected to be in the lead by the end of June 06.
    - Continued professional performance by Iraqi Security Forces
    - Police performance improving; loyalty remains questionable in some places.
-

~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## ***MNF-I Planning Assumptions (1 of 2)***

---

- The GoI will continue to support the Coalition mission in Iraq through 2007.
  - The fundamental conflict in Iraq is between and among its ethnic and sectarian groups over the distribution of political and economic power.
  - Real and potential conflict over Iraqi societal values and political philosophy lie beneath the surface and are likely to arise in the course of this conflict.
  - International Militant Radical Islamic movements will continue to generate fighters and resources for operations in Iraq at current levels through 2006.
  - The Sunni insurgency will not expand and political inclusion will diminish the rejectionist component over time.
  - Shia rejectionist violence can be contained with existing security efforts.
  - Until the GoI develops the political impetus and a viable structure for reintegration, militia presence will be an enduring aspect of the security situation in Iraq.
  - Growth of ISF capability will remain on track; Coalition Forces will not have to reassume lead from Iraqi Army units that have assumed the lead.
-

~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## MNF-I Planning Assumptions (2 of 2)

- Half 9
- MNSTC-I will complete ISF force generation by end 2006/early 2007.
  - 15 of 18 provinces are projected to achieve PIC by the end of 2006 (all except Baghdad, al Anbar and Ninewa; 18 May 06 projections).
  - MNF-I forces will begin to posture to operational oversight within provinces that have achieved PIC (as conditions allow).
  - Coalition nations will continue political support for mission in Iraq, but steadily reduce troop contributions; there will not be a precipitate pullout of major headquarters (MND-NE, CS, and SE HQ will remain through 2007).
  - MNF-I base consolidation process will be executed as planned, reducing MNF-I bases to 50 or less by end of 2006 (plus 3 Convoy Support Centers).
  - The KRG governed areas will remain stable and not make provocative moves to gain control of Kirkuk as long as MNF-I maintains presence in Iraq.

1.4b, 1.4d

- No major combat operations will occur in the region through 2007.

~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## ***MNF-I Planning Factors***

- MNF-I brigade partnered with each IA division headquarters until they reach TRA1; where PIC achieved, transition to MNF-I Brigade partnered with two IA Div HQs (TRA 2) where practical.
- Maintain continuity between partnered MNF-I/IA units to greatest extent possible.
- Theater Security brigade required through 2006.
- Option remains for 3 non-US Division HQs; develop parallel plans to either maintain 3 US Div HQs or reduce to 2 US Div HQs in 2007.
- Transition Teams required at least until ISF units achieve TRA 1; on case-by-case basis, recommend where TTs may be withdrawn earlier without significant impact on ISF. TTs from units removed from the force structure will be externally sourced.
- Leverage ISF gains, progress towards PIC; plan to permit battalion-level off ramps.
- Consider nonstandard BCT structures where practical; especially where PIC achieved.
- Re-examine CENTAF/MEF fixed-wing CAS redundancy.
- Identify what logistics support we must provide to ISF; structure enabler support as in Strategic Planning Directive for supporting the ISF and Transition Teams.
- Adjust CS/CSS mission sets as necessary to match Operational Overwatch tasks.

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



## **Conditions Impacting Drawdown**

*From Jan 06 Tank Briefing*

- Formation of a representative Iraqi Government by Spring 2006.
- Political process and Sunni engagement diminishes violence to level that ISF can contain (with Coalition support).
- AQI marginalized, retaining limited ability for large-scale attacks.
- Threat of sectarian / militia-led violence remains low.
- Iraqi Army / Police development continues near projected levels; ISF assuming battlespace are consistently able to hold it.
  - ~ 90-percent of IA Bdes achieve TRA level 2 or better NLT Oct 06.
  - ~ 50-percent of IPS achieve TRA level 2 or better NLT Oct 06.
- Iraqis assume greater responsibility for Baghdad; improved security in other 9 key cities.
- Sustain success in the Mosul area, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and border regions.
- Security ministries improve and can sustain forces with Coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to coalition reductions.
- Off-ramp tempo can be sustained; positive impact in affected areas empirically determined within 30 – 60 days after BCTs depart.

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



## Review of Original Conditions

- Formation of a representative Iraqi Government by Spring 2006.
  - Protracted formation **delayed governance, economy, and security improvements**; undercut some gains in Sunni inclusion; hurt international standing
- Political process and Sunni engagement diminishes violence to level that the ISF can contain (with coalition support) in affected areas.
  - Some initial impact, but **engagement undercut** by political maneuvering and Sunni perception of the (internal) 1.4b
- AQI marginalized, retaining only a limited ability for large-scale attacks, and facilitation networks disrupted.
  - AQI's strategic direction and cohesion degraded, but **AQI continues efforts to ignite ethno-sectarian violence through mass casualty attacks** against Shi'a civilians/shrines; coopt of some hardline Rejectionists provides degree of resiliency
- Threat of sectarian / militia-led violence remains low.
  - Fundamental nature of the conflict revealed as struggle between and among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups over distribution of political and economic power. The **sectarian/militia threat continues to exploit Gov't weakness; militias are growing threat** and exhibit intent to fill perceived local security vacuums.
- Security ministries improve and can sustain forces with coalition support.
  - Uncertainties over final leadership has affected implementation of long term plans, **slowed development of key manning and sustainment functions.**

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



## ***What do we hope to accomplish by force reductions?***

- Build on the continued success of the ISF and reinforce the message that the ISF is taking charge of security responsibilities in Iraq.
- Help build momentum behind the new Iraqi Government.
- Send signal to the new Iraqi Government that the transition is underway and that they are ultimately responsible for Iraq's destiny.
- Reduce Iraqi dependency on Coalition forces.
- Send the signal that Coalition forces mean what they say: Coalition forces will depart when the Iraqis are capable.
- Help drive a wedge between insurgent groups.
- Undercut those calling for a Coalition withdrawal timeline.
- Lower visibility of Coalition Forces in Iraq.
- Provide a positive measure of success for Coalition Capitals.

***Not reducing our forces now can be interpreted that we are not winning***

~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## Pros and Cons of Force Reduction

### PROs:

- Demonstrates measurable progress and confidence in ISF development
- Demonstrates confidence in a capable Iraqi Government that can sustain transition
- Allows the Iraqi government to assume a greater role in improving security
- Reduces perceptions of enduring Coalition presence and occupation
- Postures Coalition forces for supporting role as provinces transition to PIC
- Provides positive message to Coalition governments and their public – **helps sustain the Strategic Center of Gravity**

### CONs:

- Some reduction in Coalition Force operational capability and flexibility
  - May reduce ability to make new Gov't security initiatives decisive (exploit opportunities to defeat AQI, impair hardline Rejectionists, etc)
  - Reduces ability to respond to strategic surprise
- May have negative impact on ISF progress in certain areas
- AQI/T&FF may perceive force reductions as weakness of will; may in turn provide AQI/T&FF Info Ops opportunity and sustain T&FF will
- Potential secondary effect to Coalition partners (non-US nations may want to follow with similar reduction)

~~SECRET//REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



## **Strategic Risk**

---

- 3 x BCT reduction stretches US forces during a period of significant volatility and uncertainty – Moderate/High; mitigate to Moderate
  - Negative perception within key audiences of US motivation for force reductions adds friction to our effort in Iraq - Moderate/High; mitigate to Moderate
  - Insurgents gain Info Ops win that sustains their will to continue the fight - Moderate; mitigate to Moderate/Low
  - Not reducing forces in the short term creates the perception that the Coalition is failing to make progress - Moderate/High; mitigate to Moderate/Low
-

Page 21 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
1.4a, 1.4g

Approved for Release

UNCLASSIFIED



# **Force Restructuring Decision Brief**

Approved for Release

As of: 31 May 06

ACTO:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET// REL to AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//~~



# Operational Conditions

## Since the last Decision Briefing in April...

### Threat Conditions.

- Increased threat of Sectarian Violence (murders & executions) in Baghdad & other key areas
- AQIZ attempting to capitalize on sectarian violence (SVBIEDs, IEDs, S-Vests)
- Continued assassinations and intimidation of leaders and locals in Ramadi
- JAM continues to stockpile weapons and posture to assure dominant role

1.4b, 1.4d

### Operational Conditions.

- Seating GOI delayed has resulted in 4-6 month delay setting conditions for force restructuring
- Operation Scales of Justice in Baghdad will transition to Operation Forward Together
- Progress of ISF generally remains on track but logistics & ministerial capacity continue to lag
- Only 6x Additional Battalions to MND-B (2-6 IN, 1-33 RSTA, 3-1/5 IA, 3x NP)
- Operations in Ramadi ongoing through Aug 06
- Stemming corruption and restoring essential services continue to be significant challenges that degrade public confidence in GOI
- GOI slow to enact Disarm, Demobilize, and Reintegrate Initiative
- Securing Linear Oil and Electrical Infrastructure w/ IA and SIBs
- MND-CS and MND-SE experiencing JAM intimidation causing inaction from ISF

① C3: Biggest Fear - River will become Green Line in Baghdad

② Less concerned about Ramadi - Cordon already impacting - will positively impact all of Anbar

③ Less concerned about Diyala - tribal

Needs a lookbill for 4/10/06

Look at how things are now!

Where are we bring insurgency down? while bringing ISF up?

Can we lessen sect violence more rapidly w/ additional forces

~~SECRET// REL to AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//~~

Thinks the fight will be in Latifiya and Amman



# Operational Expectations

## Since December 2005

### Projected for Oct 06

### Reality Jun 06

- Projected 5x IA Divisions & 22x IA Brigades Assumed Battlespace by Jun 06
- Government formed and Ministries staffed NLT Apr 06
- Threat of Sectarian Violence remains low
- Sectarian violence will not destabilize Iraq.
- MNF-I will reduce basing to less than 50 bases by Dec 06

- 3x IA Divs & 20x IA Bdes Iraqi Army Lead
- IPM selected 22 Apr & COR still not set
- Sectarian Violence Threat high in key areas
- Sectarian violence caused IPM and GOI to pull all NP units into Baghdad for security
- MNF-I on track to have approximately 52 bases open by Dec 06

1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

- Downward trend in unemployment
- National Government shows steady progress in improving essential services
- Rule of law institutions show significant progress
- Detainee operations transitioned to GOI
- MOD and MOI are TRA 1 by Dec 06 able develop, coordinate, & implement national policy without coalition support

- Little improvements in employment
- Essential services showing little improvement w/o CF support and funding
- ROL lagging significantly and intensifying problem with JAM and other militias.

1.4g

*not for that reason*

- MOD & MOI progressing but 7 IA and several provinces will still be under MNF-I tactical control in Jan 07



~~SECRET// REL to AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//~~



## Recommendation

- **Do Not Backfill 1/10 MTN – BOG 11 Aug**
- **Keep 2/1 ID PTDO & Deploy as Theater Reserve ~Sep 06**
- **COA 2: Do Not Backfill - 3/101 AA – BOG 19 Sep 06**
- **COA 2: Backfill 2/101 (BOG 20 Sep) & 4/101 AA**

Approved for Release

~~SECRET// REL to AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//~~

# Theater Reserve Discussion

and

# 1-10 MTN Backfill

Approved for Release




~~SECRET// REL to AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//~~

## Background and Timeline

**Problem Statement:** Do we flow 2/1 ID to backfill 1/10 MTN to mitigate risk of uncertain threat situation?

### **Background:**

- CENTCOM 10 + 1 PLANORD Guidance on Posturing for Long War
- 2/1 ID expected to be designated PTDO 12 Jun 06 (96 Hours – 15 Days)
- Abu Gharib Timeline Shifting (Late Jul 06 – Early Aug 06) *OPT (ops) to look at notes here.*
- Operation Scales of Justice Mar until Jun 06
- Off Ramping Potential based on ISF (IA, IP, NP) Capabilities
- Other factors relating to the decision:
  - Threat Environment
  - Operational Conditions
  - Risk (Operational - Tactical)



~~SECRET// REL to AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//~~

~~SECRET//REL to AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//~~

# Analysis



## **Facts**

1. 1/10 BOG 11 Aug 06                      2/1 AD BOG 16 Nov 06
2. 2/1 ID DP - 15 Jun for STRAT Air - APS 5 usage
2. 28/36 IA BDEs TRA 2 Assumed Battlespace by Aug 06
3. Total Attacks in Abu Gharib area remain constant between 45-60 per week since Feb 06
4. Effective Attacks range between 10-20 per week
5. If Designated PTDO, 96 Hr BCT HQs + Initial TF and 15 Day Later for BCT (-) flow
6. 2/1 ID - 114% personnel strength but stop loss will be lifted while on PTDO
7. TPE from 2/28 IN has been reassigned to fill PTTS and shortages in 1/1 AD but 1/10 MTN is intact

## **Assumptions**

1. OPN Scales of Justice becomes Operation *Forward Together* through Sep 06
2. Sectarian Violence will continue to be a threat in Baghdad and other key areas
3. Prisoner transfer Abu Ghraib to Cropper complete NET 1 AUG
4. Operations in Ramadi will continue into mid Sep 06
5. GOI will implement Weapons Control program within ~ next 60 days
6. GOI will be slow to disband militias and address sectarian issues
7. Provincial elections after Jan 07
8. Threat conditions and operations in Al Anbar require 3x CF BCTs through Oct 06

## **Constraints**

1. Lengthened post TOA Retrograde to meet BOG w/ TPE transfer
2. 100 Day Base Closure Model

## **Issues**

1. Equipment and Personnel space inside MND-B footprint
2. TPE/CREW if 2/1 ID employed



~~SECRET//REL to AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//~~

~~SECRET//REL to MCF//~~



# Baghdad Threat Assessment

30 Day Event Report APR-May



90 Day Attack Densities



Approved for Release


Unreadable Text

~~SECRET//REL to MCFW~~



# West Baghdad Threat Assessment


30 Day Event Report APR-May



- Incidents 10 Apr - 10 May**
- IED
  - IED F/C
  - EFP
  - VBIED
  - VBIED F/C
  - SVBIED
  - SAF
  - RPG
  - SAFIRE/SAM
  - GRENADE
  - IDF
  - COMPLEX ATTK
  - Murder
  - Cache F/C
  - Demonstration

- Attacks**
- 0-9
  - 10-19
  - 20 +
  - 50 +

90 Day Attack Densities



Unreadable Text

~~SECRET//REL to MCF//~~



# MND-B Offramp Opportunities

## (1 May TRA Data)

	FEB 06	MAR 06	APR 06	MAY 06	JUN 06	JUL06	AUG 06	SEP 06	OCT 06	NOV 06	DEC 06		
<b>MND-B</b>	3/20	6/20	8/20	8/20	10/20	10/20	12/20	14/20	16/20	16/20	17/20		
<b>BDES</b>					X 2  9 N. Bag		X 4  8 Karbala	X 4  6 S. Bag					
<b>DIV</b>						XX 9 							
<b>NP</b>						X 1  1		X 1 	X 8  2	X 5  2 X 3  1		X 7  2	
<b>District IP</b>	0/3			2/3									
<b>Stations</b>													
Abu Gharib				2/4			4/4						
Al Mansour				0/4				1/4	3/4				
Kadimiyah				3/5			4/5						

 = partnered with 1/10

 9 not formed

As  
TRAZ

<u>Externally Sourced MITTs</u>		
	BN	BDE
1/10 MTN	7	2

X  
6  2

X  
2  1

JAN 07 TRA 2

13-10

(BFRAMP decision)



# Decisions / Way Ahead

- Decisions:
  - Whether to backfill 1/10 Mtn in August 06, MND-B.
  - Whether to backfill one BCT in MND-N in September 06.
  - Whether to backfill one BCT in MND-B in September 06.
  - Retain Theater Reserve in Kuwait past July 06
  - Determine way ahead for PTDO BCT (to be briefed separately)
- Way Ahead:
  - Brief CENTCOM Cdr / SecDef
  - Brief Iraqi Gov't Leaders
  - Set announcement date (to be briefed separately)

Approved for Release

- replacing US BCTS with IA BDES

and IP BDES ... all based on PIC and IRA, but on IRA way ...