


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
Concept for OIF 2.5 (+) Rotation (September-October 2004)

3/2 ID conducts Rotation
with 1/25 ID
TOA O/A 21 OCT




2/2 ID conducts
Rotation with
1/1 ID
TOA O/A 15 SEP


24 MEU



11 MEU



O/A 1 OCT



MND-CS



MND-SE

From Kuwait

As of: 9 Jul 04

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OIF 2

AD

OIF 3

MNF-I AS OF 01 JUL 05

MNB-NW	3 BDE/2 ID BOG 14 NOV		15 SEP 04		1 BDE/25 ID	MNB-NW
MND-NC	2 BDE/25 ID BOG 10 JAN 05 30 eSB BOG 21 FEB 05 2 BDE/1 ID BOG 9 FEB 05 3 BDE/1 ID BOG 11 FEB 05	   	5 Dec 04 26 Nov 04 7 JAN 05 15 JAN 05	   	116 BCT IDAHO 278 BCT TENNESSEE 1 BDE/3 ID 3 BDE/3 ID	MND-NC  DIV TOA O/A 27 JAN 05
MNF-W	1 BDE/1 ID BOG 8 SEP 04 1 RCT BOG 1 MAR 05 7 RCT BOG 10 MAR 05	  	15 AUG 04 24 JAN 05 15 FEB 05	  	2 BDE/2 ID 8 RCT 5 RCT	MNF-W  O/A 1 FEB 05
NORTH BABIL	2 BDE 1AD 		7 JUL 04 24	15 JAN 05 	155 BCT MISSISSIPPI	NORTH BABIL 
MND BAGHDAD	2 BDE/1 CD BOG 12 JAN 05 1 BDE/1 CD BOG 12 MAR 05 3 BDE/1 CD BOG 17 MAR 05 39 eSB BOG 22 MAR 05	   	18 OCT 04 2 FEB 05 7 FEB 05 24 JAN 05	   	256 BCT LOUISIANA 2nd BDE/3 ID 3rd BDE/1 AD 4th BDE/3 ID	MND BAGHDAD  DIV TOA O/A 23 JAN
RESERVE	1 BDE 1AD		26 JUN 04		2 BDE/10 ID	RESERVE
MND-CS SECFOR	2 LCR 		12 JUL 04	11	2 Apr 05	3 ACR
	81 eSB BOG 22 MAR 05		15 FEB 05		29 BCT	
THEATER SECURITY BDE	197 FAB BOG 20 MAR 05		3 FEB 05		56 BDE / 36 ID	THEATER SECURITY BDE



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MNF-I Red Cell

Red Cell Assessment

02 Jul 04

ASSESSMENT OF THE INSURGENCY

1. The Insurgencies. Coalition Forces are faced by a number of disparate groups whom although **having incompatible ultimate objectives, they all share a common intermediate goal of forcing the Coalition to leave.** The groups share TTP and no one modus operandi can be attributed to one particular group (e.g. Suicide VBIEDs are not the sole prerogative of Zarqawi), likewise they will combine for joint operations against the common enemy (e.g. Shi'a militants traveled from Najaf to Fallujah to assist the Sunni during the fighting in the town in April). These groups can be divided into three main blocks:

a. The Islamist extremists fighting for an Islamic transnational caliphate (e.g. Zarqawi, Ansar al-Islam – total combined strength estimated <1000). Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam associated terrorists pose a great short term threat because if successful in assassinating PM Allawi and other key IIG figures in the next 30-60 days, that could keep the IIG from gaining traction and establishing itself as a legitimate and independent government. They remain intent on assassinating IIG members and other "apostates" while maintaining the ability to conduct spectacular attacks that have significant IO impacts in Iraq, regionally and internationally. Zarqawi is a "free radical" in the system and the extremists' narrow, nihilistic political agenda has no mass appeal. Up to seventy percent of the Tawid and Jihad Groups associated with Zarqawi consist of Iraqi Sunnis (mostly Kurds from AJ) indicating a sufficient internal pipeline enabling facilitation and operations.

b. The ethnic, sectarian and tribal militants fighting for representation, influence, power and self-preservation (e.g. Jaish al-Mahdi, 15th Sha'aban – total combined strength estimated 2,000 to 4,000)

c. The Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR) which coalesced around the Former Regime Elements (FRE), is endeavoring to return Iraq to a de facto Ba'athist (and therefore Sunni dominated) state (SAR militant groups include Jaish Muhammed, Hizb al-Awda – total combined strength 8,000-12,000). The Ba'athists draw on former security and intelligence services (e.g. Ba'athist Militia, Fedayeen Saddam, IIS, DGS, SSO, Presidential Security, Special Republic Guard) and former military to form the backbone of the resistance. Within the SAR, the Ba'athists are extensively using Islamic symbolism to motivate the call to arms and leverage the mosques for C2, logistics and finances to sustain the insurgency.

Within the Sunni Arab community, in particular, there are a lesser number of true Iraqi Islamic jihadists (Salafists, Sufists, Wahabists, Moslem Brotherhood etc.) who pose a threat to the IIG and are, for the most part, outside of the control of the FRE/Ba'athists.

2. The SAR/FRE. It is this last group, the SAR, which are the greatest danger and most consistent and persistent threat to the IIG/Coalition and is the subject of this memo. Coupled with the FRE providing the strategic level "guidance and facilitation" and technical and tactical expertise at the operational level, **the SAR is able to draw strength from the tens of thousands**

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of professional military and security service personnel who were disenfranchised by the de-Ba'athification policies and demobilization of the Iraqi armed forces last year. Adding to this large recruiting pool are the unemployed, the criminals, but also those young 'patriotic' Iraqis who feel it is their duty to resist the foreign invaders.

The Ba'athist/FRE and Sunni Arabs remember that the primary Iraqi institutions were dominated by Sunnis; and they equate de-Ba'athification with de-Sunnification. They are searching for political relevance and leadership to protect their interests and have no overt equivalent to well-established Kurd political parties nor Shia religious institutions. Although other areas of the country see improvements, the Sunni Arabs see relative economic deprivation and have the perception that living standards have fallen. Moreover, the highest unemployment rates in the country are found in Sunni Arab areas. They have unmet expectations and perceive discrimination in employment and feel that other opportunities are denied them. They also remain angry about Coalition military actions; foster anti-Western beliefs, are a hot bed of xenophobia and tend to identify nationalist principles with Sunni interests while resisting foreign "occupation".

The Ba'athists/FRE and Sunni Arabs continue to tap into political and economic sources of discontent and resentment. Importantly, and surprisingly to Western observers, they have the conviction that Iraq's Sunni represent a majority of the population but fear that the emerging government will be dominated by Shi'a, used by Shia for revenge, and under the influence of Tehran. The see the political process as illegitimate and unrepresentative while maintaining residual distrust of IIG as simply a derivative of the inept and corrupt IGC; political stooges for foreign powers.

3. Ba'athist Support. Further support to the SAR comes from the FRE's ability to utilize the Ba'ath Party's institutionalized networks and cellular structure, which encompassed the whole of Arab Iraq. After 34 years of Ba'ath rule, all aspects of Iraqi society were tainted by the ubiquitous presence of the Ba'athists. The professional classes of Iraq, the senior bureaucrats and technocrats that are required to run a modern state and the military professionals, were required to be Ba'ath party members. However their membership was not only due to the all-pervasive nature of the Ba'athist regime; the appeal of the former Ba'athist message (not to be confused with the Saddamist) should not be underestimated. **The basic Ba'athist ideology of Arab nationalism, mixed economy socialism, secular government with Islamic values coupled with strong leadership, resonates with the Iraqi population.**

4. FRE Leadership. The Sunni Arab Resistance relies on five pillars of support to organize, maintain and lead the insurgency and these are: 1) The Ba'ath Party structure, including the Military Bureau; 2) Former Iraqi security and intelligence services; 3) The former Ba'athist managed Society of Islamic Scientists that has evolved into the Muslim Ulema Council (MUC); 4) the Iraqi Islamic Party; and lastly 5) the tribal basis of society which provides a recruitment base and support structure. These five pillars of support leverage tribal, religious, criminal, and peer networks to facilitate and operate the insurgency. A strategic level of FRE "guidance and facilitation" had been suspected but was first conclusively proved by the DOCEX following the detention of Saddam Hussein in Dec 03, which disclosed the re-emergence of the Military Bureau in May 03. The subsequent detention of approximately 60% of the then identified Military Bureau senior leadership led some to believe that the FRE leadership had been neutered, but

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recent sensitive reporting from [1.4b] has revealed the existence of a more mature and effective Ba'ath leadership. We believe the FRE dominate the insurgency and now have an effective political leadership directing and coordinating their activities from [1.4b] the Gulf States and inside Iraq. [1.4b] is by far the most important FRE refuge. They are focused primarily on rebuilding and organizing the Ba'ath Party in Iraq and associated front organizations, and organizing, financing and giving broad guidance to the insurgency. The military arm is led more from within Iraq, leveraging their associations - tribe, mosque and peer groups - to manage a decentralized and OPSEC focused military effort. This dual tracked policy and the role of leadership, enables the FRE to use violence as an effective tool to support their political objectives.

We assess the Ba'athist leadership is providing more "Guidance and Facilitation" than "Command and Control", with a leadership by committee - a very loose "Board of Directors". We have detected some competing power groups in this big tent of Ba'athist opposition but we do not know if it is more of a 'ruse de guerre' or more like a confederation. There is no single leader but there is leadership. The leadership is organizing, financing, assigning, re-contacting, directing and planning for the Ba'ath and associated organizations/ fronts to participate in the political process while manipulating tribes, religious leaders and existing political structures. They are focusing their efforts on the 15 non-Kurdish Provinces and believe that they are active and reasonably strong in Al Anbar, Ninewa, Salah a Din, Diyala and al Tammim.

The Ba'athist leadership is receiving regional popular support coupled with at least tacit support from elements within the [1.4b] and [1.4b] governments. [1.4b] based leadership includes former Ba'ath exiled by Saddam cooperating with FRE senior leadership, primarily Iraqi Ba'ath Party and intelligence services who are coordinating and financing activity in Iraq. The leadership in [1.4b] is facilitating wider financial aspects to include IIS front companies. Some efforts are directed at establishing the political organizations while establishing links with friendly political, religious and labor entities among others in Iraq. Former senior Ba'ath leaders and support staff (financiers, coordinators, and operators) are directing Ba'ath operations from [1.4b] in conjunction with the previously exiled Iraqi Ba'ath leadership in [1.4b] They are based in [1.4b] with at least the tacit approval of Damascus, with at some 150 key cadre facilitating planning and political activities. Ba'athists assess that their strategy, tactics and coordination are getting stronger although they continue to primarily operate "underground". They are not constrained by national borders and have trans-national facilitation for this national insurgency. The leadership remains acutely aware of OPSEC, while depending on an extensive use of tribal, family, peer group and financial ties to coordinate and operate both in Iraq and [1.4b] The operational and tactical level leaders are adept at using religion/mosques; and links to religious extremists and terrorists -- a "sup with the devil".

5. Some Objectives and Enablers. The FRE are seeking the removal of the US/Coalition from Iraq, an "end to occupation," and ascendance of Sunni Arab power, influence and authority. In order to achieve their aims we assess that some imperatives of the FRE are:

- Isolate US from the Coalition partners; undermine US national will.
- Separate the IIG from people; undermine credibility and popular support for IIG.
- Isolate Coalition/IIG from international and NGO support.

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- Create fear, instability and insecurity to rupture relations between Coalition and Iraqi people and rob Coalition/IIG of popular support and create a climate of intolerance.
- Undermine, delay, and/or stall the 'Iraqification' of security services and constitutional progress because this is the biggest threat to SAR.
- Destabilize the Iraqi base of operations for Coalition in Baghdad and Shi'a/Southern Iraq.
- Ensure new Iraqi government lacks legitimacy and is inherently weak "Weimar"-like.

To achieve these aims the SAR/FRE can leverage enablers such as the divided international community, unsupportive/uncertain/uncommitted international organizations, NGOs that require a permissive environment, sympathetic Arab media and European press, and the US Presidential campaign & divided US public opinion. Meanwhile the fact that the Iraqi public remains divided, fearful, distrustful and uncertain about the future can be exploited. Finally, the FRE can utilize their traditional base of support among Sunni Arabs (mil, econ, popular support) and the emergence of popular support for Sunni Arab issues due to their sense of marginalization and victimization.

6. Twin-Track Approach. There is increasing evidence of a military and political campaign; a twin track approach the FRE leadership have adopted to ensure that their objectives are met. **The military actions are designed to set the conditions for political success.**

a. Military Campaign. Operations against the Coalition have been maintained and steadily increased since December, with some collaboration with terrorist and Shi'a resistance groups. They have been able to retain the initiative and continue attrition of Coalition forces, with the objectives of undermining US popular support and fracturing the Coalition by attacking weaker Coalition partners. Operations directed at collaborators are designed to intimidate, coerce and subvert Iraqi security forces and administration to undermine support for the IIG and weaken institutions. **The military campaign has not just survived but in some ways flourished despite the Coalition.** SAR's TTPs have proved resilient and adaptable to the Coalition's best efforts, continuing to inflict steady attrition on Coalition Forces whilst increasing their efforts against the Iraqi security forces, organs of state and vital infrastructure. The concerted efforts of the Saddam regime before OIF to establish thousands of covert ammunition caches throughout the country coupled with the huge amounts of money (estimated from the many hundreds of millions to billions) secreted away by the regime plus the relatively low cost of the insurgency (e.g \$35 for one RPG round, \$3 for a hand grenade) ensures that the military campaign is sustainable for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the insurgents retain excellent freedom of movement, possess local knowledge, blend in to the environment and operate in a population that is at least non-hostile if not supportive in some areas. Freedom of movement is enhanced where Iraqi security services are subverted and/or ineffective and where Coalition elements are intimidated. Lastly, there remains a large recruiting pool of former Ba'athists, security services, foreign fighters, unemployed and disenfranchised Iraqis.

b. Political Campaign. The Baath Party at both a regional and national level continues to develop a coherent political leadership and reenergized organization. A significant part of the FRE/Ba'athist effort is focused on political operations as they build new party entities, community groups and front organizations. **A key principle remains maintaining and building organizational viability built upon entrenched Ba'ath party networks, party and tribal interconnections, using mosques for C2, IO, logistics and recruiting networks.** Meanwhile they are penetrating, infiltrating and subverting other political and civic organizations and the emerging security services. When under suspicion or pressure, the leadership reacts cautiously and minimizes exposure. The leadership will suspend activities and instruct cells to

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await further instructions and maintain capability. They are building around the core of the old Ba'athist organization but using new names and fronts. Regionally former Ba'athists have taken political control of the town governments (and in some cases local police forces) in Samarra and Ramadi. At Governorate level an example of the Ba'athist approach is the attempt by local Ba'athist in Al Anbar Governorate to engineer the removal of the present Governor of Al Anbar and arrange for his replacement by a Ba'athist nominee. At the national level, early Jun 03 reporting indicated that senior Ba'athist leaders, predominantly resident in Syria, have recently discussed the state of the party in Iraq and their desire to hold a party political convention in the next three months. They have reason to neither expose the political leadership now nor announce a political platform since the anti-occupation themes unify the insurgency and remain the focus.

7. Weaknesses and Fears. The Ba'athists primary political concern is preventing a new, effective (non-Ba'athist Iraqi government) from filling the political vacuum when Saddam fell. The insurgents and the Ba'ath fear stability and economic success bringing essential services and employment, competent and uncorrupted Iraqi police and security forces, and success at engaging tribal leaders. **The Ba'ath cannot allow significant Sunni acceptance and participation in the IIG and must try to maintain a fractionalized Sunni population and keep in check or eliminate other Sunni political leadership.** The concern over Sunni splinters is because any Sunni leader who participated in the former regime who is willing to participate in the IIG is a threat. In part, the FRL power and influence is based on disenfranchised Sunni.

Similarly, the Ba'ath fear Shi'a unification and any potentially unifying Shi'a leader is seen as a threat. Nonetheless, they do not see SCIRI/BADR and possibly Sadr as real threats at this time, as they are potentially dividing forces among the Shi'a and SCIRI/BADR are perceived as too closely aligned with [1.4b] At present, Sadr is a divisive force among the Shi'a and keep the Coalition overly focused south, but he is a long-term threat due to his pedigree, strong nationalist and Shi'a impulses at odds with the Ba'ath. Shi'a leaders pursuing a policy of de-Ba'athification are a threat and must be confronted as will any key former Shi'a Ba'athist who take a leading role in the IIG. Some IIG members will be targeted to cause a sense of insecurity and create increased instability and political turmoil. Restrictions on freedom of movement and effective police/security forces and intelligence capability must be prevented, co-opted or coerced.

Successful Coalition political engagement with tribal, religious and local leaders, or former Ba'athists is a significant threat. Improved security bringing a permissive environment allowing Int'l Organizations/NGOs an active role in rebuilding effort and facilitating economic success and recovery must be avoided. The non-permissive environment will hinder international/regional participation and an effective UN role in IIG process and election processes. All of the political objectives have been reflected, amply, by the actions of the military campaign. Religious extremists (Salafrists/Wahhabists) and other terrorist groups are to be manipulated and used as troops in the insurgency, but they also pose a long-term threat that must be dealt with at some point.

The Kurds are not considered a near-term threat as they have historically cooperated with the regime when strongly pressed. Former Iraqi governments have traditionally handled the Kurds by dividing Kurdish political leaders, buying them off, and directly employing force to suppress separatist movements. The Ba'athists are comfortable with a Kurdish semi-autonomous zone, as

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it occupies the Kurd's political energies and undermines their engagement in Iraq's broader political affairs. The Ba'athist may under estimate the extent of independence and desire in the Kurdish zone, but this is how they likely perceive this threat.

Lastly, the senior leaders of the Ba'athists/FRE are likely concerned about sustaining the sanctuary they have enjoyed primarily in 1.4b The loss of this sanctuary would undermine their security placing them at risk, weaken their ability to coordinate and facilitate support to political groups and insurgents in Iraq, and place their finances at greater risk.

8. The Way Ahead. We expect to see the Ba'athists sustain military operations and capability while continuing to build a political base -- overt and covert with increasing emphasis on setting conditions for political objectives. We will continue to get more visibility on operational leadership re-emerging to link political and military efforts. There will be some increased coalescing of mostly Sunni Arab, FRE, Shi'a militants and disparate individuals and groups fighting for political, family and tribal influence. Nonetheless, the Ba'athist/FRE face setbacks -- PM Alawi, the IIG, UNSCR, NATO -- these all add to legitimacy and credibility which, if it gains widespread acceptance will make their objectives that much harder to achieve. Moreover, the dependence on excellent OPSEC is also a weakness as it has made their planning harder, detracted from gaining the initiative and undermines agility.

The FRE and their SAR cohorts are well positioned to take advantage of the situation. The military campaign will continue to wear down the political resolve of the Coalition partners by continued attrition and a highly successful IO campaign whilst also attempting to discredit the new IIG and neutralize the Iraqi security forces. On the political front the undoubted political experience, financial resources, national coverage and organization, and their willingness to use illegal force allows the Ba'ath Party to look ahead to the forthcoming elections with some confidence.

With the likelihood that the plethora of immature Shi'a political parties will split the Shi'a vote coupled with the pragmatic attitude likely to be adopted by the Kurdish PUK/KDP duopoly, a Ba'athist political campaign based around the intimidation, subversion and coercion of Sunni political rivals by the SAR, a possible alliance with the PUK/KDP (using the Kurdish fears of a Shi'a theocracy plus a promise of a return to the regional autonomy they had in the last decade of Ba'athist rule) and the use of a number of 'front' parties (al-Islah, New Democrat, Iraqi Islamic Party, Hizb al-Awda etc) could see the reestablishment of a de-facto Ba'athist Coalition government or de-facto Ba'athist parties occupying pivotal positions after the next election.

On the military front, there will be concerted efforts to deny a permissive security environment required for political progress and international NGOs to operate (e.g. de-legitimize and strike at UN presence, elections, reconstruction). The insurgents will try to keep the Coalition off balance and reactive while demonstrating the inability of the IIG to govern. They will leverage local and regional media while conducting occasional high profile attacks and probably an increase in targeted political assassinations. The intimidation, coercion and coercion of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition and IIG will likely accelerate over the next several months. We can expect the Ba'athist/FRE to continue to facilitate attacks by other groups (terrorists and Shi'a militants) and to try to build ties to some Jihadists/Salafists for short-term

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
gains. We have indications of a FRE backed surge of operations after the transfer of power, and as US elections draw near; perhaps timed near the Republican convention at the end of August. The long-term objective remains forcing out the Coalition out of Iraq; but the near-term goal is simply to maintain a climate of insecurity and to discredit the IIG and Coalition.

The FRE/Ba'athists continue to be underestimated by some, but they are resilient, adaptable and determined; they view the insurgency with a long-term perspective, which is not tied to a specific timetable. Absent Ba'athist reconciliation, the FRE driven insurgency will sustain operations while continuing its dual tracked political-military approach. The FRE/Ba'athists, if not co-opted, have demonstrated the staying power, financial and military capability, degree of organization and most importantly, tacit popular support which could allow them to continue the insurgency indefinitely at a high enough level to actually overthrow or subvert a weak government.

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Local Control

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
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Agenda

- 
- **Local Control – definition & criteria**
 - **Security Transition**
 - **Status by MND**
 - **MND-N**
 - **MND-NC**
 - **MND-Baghdad**
 - **MND-W**
 - **MND-CS**
 - **MND-SE**

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Definition of Iraqi Local Control



- Iraqi security forces are capable of maintaining a safe and secure environment and maintaining civil order on a day to day basis with limited coalition oversight in selected areas
 - Coalition forces conduct periodic checks of security forces
- Iraqi security forces are capable of acting as the first responders to routine security incidents such as criminal activity or minor civil disturbances
 - Coalition forces provide quick reaction forces to handle major incidents beyond the capability of Iraqi security forces
- Coalition forces positioned in bases outside of urban areas or on their periphery to minimize the disruption of normal commercial and social activity

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What it is and is not



- **Iraqi Local Control is:**

- The first step in a “crawl, walk, run” methodology of transitioning security responsibilities to Iraqis
- A tangible demonstration to Iraqis that they are capable of and responsible for their own security
- A demonstration of our pledge to return sovereignty
- A means to minimize the disruption of normal civil and commercial activity in urban areas

- **Iraqi Control is not:**


- An abandonment of Iraqis or their security forces
- An abdication of our responsibility to provide a safe and secure environment
- A discontinuation of offensive operations to defeat non-compliant forces
- A restriction on operating in urban areas as needed to accomplish the mission

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Transitioning to Iraqi Control

- Our criteria to transition to local control is both capabilities (IZ Security Forces) and conditions based (Threat in local area)
- Conditions are equally important as capabilities. We could find ourselves in a situation in which we have a minimally capable IZ Security Force, but the FRL is so strong in the area that we can not transition



Fundamental
Equation

If (IZ security = X) and (Incidents < Y) THEN (DP)

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Broad Security Transition Criteria

Transfer Responsibility to Other Authorities



Iraqi Local Control	Iraqi Regional Control	Strategic Overwatch
•Iraqi security forces operating from small unit/station level –Coalition provides oversight •Local Iraqi Quick Reaction Forces established •Iraqi security forces able to defend against terrorist operations –Coalition provides operational & intel support •Coalition military basing outside of urban areas and daily security operations conducted by Iraqi security forces: •Coalition security focus shifts to reinforcing Iraqi Security capability •Threat conditions reduced to level that IZ security forces can cope with the majority of incidents at the local level	•Iraqi security organizations operating under civil control and capable of maintaining internal security •New Iraqi Army (NIA) develops capability to nationally plan, direct and execute defensive operations against external threats •Iraqi security forces capable of Counterterrorism operations –Coalition provides operational and intelligence support •Coalition military forces: –Reinforce Iraqi security organizations –Assist in defeating external threats •Threat conditions reduced to level that IZ security forces can cope with the majority of incidents at the regional level	•Iraqi security forces and NIA responsible for: –Internal security –External security and threats •Iraq Intelligence Service fully functional •Coalition force posture: –Focused on theater security –Minimal presence in Iraq in accordance with National Security Agreements •Coalition forces can project air, naval, and ground capability to quickly reinforce the New Iraqi Army •Threat conditions reduced to level that IZ security forces can cope with the majority of incidents at the national level

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Transition Criteria – Capabilities Based (1 of 4) (Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)



All Security Services

- Basic foundations of Iraq security organizations established:
 - Sufficient personnel recruited
 - Sufficient individual & organizational equipment on hand
 - Sufficient facilities
 - Training base/programs established
- Iraqis prepared to assume full responsibility for administration, planning, direction and conduct of operations at small unit/station/post level
- Coalition postured to hand over responsibility for operations at local level and to provide rapid reaction forces to reinforce Iraqis in crisis situations
- Coalition prepared to commence withdrawal to areas outside urban/municipal centers

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Transition Criteria – Capabilities Based (2 of 4) (Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)



Iraqi Police Service

- An operating judicial system that can arraign, hold, and try criminals in a timely manner
- Local police stations manned with sufficient vehicles to run one shift, and police officers uniformed, armed, and equipped
- A functioning police headquarters at the local town or city level to coordinate all police activities in that municipality
- Local police can respond to the majority of required operations without coalition backup

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Transition Criteria – Capabilities Based (3 of 4) (Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)



Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

- Personnel for battalions recruited
- ICDC units fully equipped
- ICDC personnel imbedded in coalition military units
 - Possess an initial capability of operating in unit elements
- Liaison and coordination established with local IPS
- ICDC Brigade C2 established
- Future of ICDC defined (policy)
 - Required for managing expectations among recruits
 - Defines the National approach toward the organization
 - Funding source identified through Phase IVb

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Transition Criteria – Capabilities Based (4 of 4) **(Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)**



Facilities Protection Service

- The Ministry of Interior has published its overarching policy guidelines for the Facility Protection Service. The Ministry's have budgeted, and support the payroll of their respective FPS forces
- Each site protected by FPS has a sufficient number of trained, armed, and uniformed personnel, with minimally adequate communications and facilities appropriate to that site, as defined by the responsible Ministry
- The force reports to a higher C2 headquarters or authority as directed by the responsible ministry, and has reliable communications with an Iraqi supporting security force (ICDC, Police)

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Transition Criteria – Conditions Based (Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)



- **The Ministry of Interior (MOI) supports establishment of Iraqi Local Control in the designated area**
- **Local leaders supports establishment of Iraqi Local Control in the designated area**
- **FRL activity and intimidation reduced to the level that Iraqi security forces can control the majority of incidents**
- **Criminal activity reduced to the level that Iraqi security forces can control the majority of incidents and enforce the rule of law**
- **Militias and other sub state actors remain compliant to the extent that Iraqi can maintain civil order**

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Geographical Areas Overview



- **Three Governorates (Dahuk, Irbil, As Sulaymaniyah) are in effect under Iraqi Regional Control**
- **Area of Operations North, Center South, and South East are substantively under Iraqi Local Control**
- **Many rural and smaller urban areas in AO's North Center and West are under Iraqi Local Control (no coalition forces in area with periodic patrols)**

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Iraqi Security Forces Overview



- **NIA capability is not required for Iraqi Local or Regional Control**
- **FPS and BPS are in the TOA process and will be complete by March and June '04 though shortfalls will remain**
- **ICDC capabilities are projected to meet Iraqi Local Control criteria across the country in the March/April '04 timeframe**
- **IPS will not meet Iraqi Local Control criteria in most areas of the country until:**
 - **Equipment – JUL '04**
 - **Training – OCT '04**

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Data Collection



- Local Control Assessments from each MSC
- Campaign Plan Measures of Effectiveness includes Local Control Criteria
- C-3 Effects collects objective data on New Iraqi Security Forces

Approved for Release


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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201606

Legend

	CF Max Control
	Local Control
	Regional Control



Security Transition Status
FEB 04