Concept for OIF 2.5 Rotation (June - 1 August 2004)

As of 8 Jul 04
Concept for OIF 2.5 (+) Rotation (September-October 2004)

3/2 ID conducts Rotation with 1/25 ID
TOA O/A 21 OCT

2/2 ID conducts Rotation with 1/1 ID
TOA O/A 15 SEP

As of: 8 Jul 04
ASSSESSMENT OF THE INSURGENCY

Red Cell Assessment

02 Jul 04

MNF-I Red Cell

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The operational and tactical level leaders are adept at shaping realities and making decisions with a key understanding of the political environment. They are influenced by national interests and have minimal or none in the political environment. They act in a manner that strengthens national interests and further national action. The political environment affects the overall political landscape, shaping the political landscape and influencing political decisions. The political environment is dynamic, and political leaders must act in a manner that aligns with national interests. The political environment is complex, and political leaders must be aware of its impacts. The political environment is shaped by political leaders, and political leaders must be aware of its impacts.
The leadership will suspend activities and intervene if the counterintelligence and counterintelligence efforts are not successful. When under suspicion of pressure, the leadership assesses the threat to society's security, identifies national security threats, and they are present. Intelligence, including counterintelligence efforts, is necessary for the nation's security. Meanwhile, no security threats are encountered by the party. Therefore, party and internal security threats remain a serious concern. A strong security force is needed to counter these threats. The development of counterintelligence and counterterrorism efforts is crucial for the nation's security. Therefore, the party must continue to strengthen its own security forces.

Furthermore, the party must continue to strengthen its own security forces. The party must continue to develop a strong security force to ensure the nation's security. The party must continue to strengthen its own security forces.
The Knesset is not considered a clear-cut example of a multi-party system due to its historically cooperative nature. As such, it is not possible to clearly delineate the role of individual parties in the legislative process. All of the political parties have worked closely together, and the actions of one political party can significantly affect the actions of another. In this sense, the Knesset operates more like a federated system, where the parties cooperate to a large extent.

Successful coalition building is essential for effective political decision-making in the Knesset. Coalitions are formed based on common goals and interests, and their composition can change frequently. The process is often characterized by compromise and negotiation, with the goal of achieving a majority in the Knesset. The ability of parties to work together and find common ground is crucial for the functioning of the Knesset.

The Knesset also has the power to initiate legislation, vote on laws, and ultimately decide the fate of the government. This power is distributed among the parties, with each party having a say in the decision-making process. The Knesset is thus a complex and dynamic institution, with a unique role in the political landscape of Israel.
it occupies the Kurd’s political energies and undermines their engagement in Iraq’s broader political affairs. The Ba’athist may under estimate the extent of independence and desire in the Kurdish zone, but this is how they likely perceive this threat.

Lastly, the senior leaders of the Ba’athists/FRE are likely concerned about sustaining the sanctuary they have enjoyed primarily in the [14b]. The loss of this sanctuary would undermine their security placing them at risk, weaken their ability to coordinate and facilitate support to political groups and insurgents in Iraq, and place their finances at greater risk.

8. The Way Ahead. We expect to see the Ba’athists sustain military operations and capability while continuing to build a political base - overt and covert with increasing emphasis on setting conditions for political objectives. We will continue to get more visibility on operational leadership re-emerging to link political and military efforts. There will be some increased coalescing of mostly Sunni Arab, FRE, Shi’a militants and disparate individuals and groups fighting for political, family and tribal influence. Nonetheless, the Ba’athist/FRE face setbacks – PM Alawi, the IIG, UNSCR, NATO – these all add to legitimacy and credibility which, if it gains widespread acceptance will make their objectives that much harder to achieve. Moreover, the dependence on excellent OPSEC is also a weakness as it has made their planning harder, detracted from gaining the initiative and undermines agility.

The FRE and their SAR cohorts are well positioned to take advantage of the situation. The military campaign will continue to wear down the political resolve of the Coalition partners by continued attrition and a highly successful IO campaign whilst also attempting to discredit the new IIG and neutralize the Iraqi security forces. On the political front the undoubted political experience, financial resources, national coverage and organization, and their willingness to use illegal force allows the Ba’ath Party to look ahead to the forthcoming elections with some confidence.

With the likelihood that the plethora of immature Shi’a political parties will split the Shi’a vote coupled with the pragmatic attitude likely to be adopted by the Kurdish PUK/KDP duopoly, a Ba’athist political campaign based around the intimidation, subversion and coercion of Sunni political rivals by the SAR, a possible alliance with the PUK/KDP (using the Kurdish fears of a Shi’a theocracy plus a promise of a return to the regional autonomy they had in the last decade of Ba’athist rule) and the use of a number of ‘front’ parties (al-Islah, New Democrat, Iraqi Islamic Party, Hizb al-Awda etc) could see the reestablishment of a de-facto Ba’athist Coalition government or de-facto Ba’athist parties occupying pivotal positions after the next election.

On the military front, there will be concerted efforts to deny a permissive security environment required for political progress and international NGOs to operate (e.g. de-legitimize and strike at UN presence, elections, reconstruction). The insurgents will try to keep the Coalition off balance and reactive while demonstating the inability of the IIG to govern. They will leverage local and regional media while conducting occasional high profile attacks and probably an increase in targeted political assasinations. The intimidation, coercion and cooption of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition and IIG will likely accelerate over the next several months. We can expect the Ba’athist/FRE to continue to facilitate attacks by other groups (terrorists and Shi’a militants) and to try to build ties to some Jihadists/Salafists for short-term
The goal is simply to maintain a climate of insecurity and to discredit the II and Coalition. The long-term objective remains forcing out the Coalition out of Iraq; but the near-term US elections may change that. We plan to use the ongoing war to help us maintain the Republican coalition at the end of August. We have indications that a FRG backed surge of operations after the transfer of power and...
Local Control
Agenda

• Local Control – definition & criteria
• Security Transition
• Status by MND
  – MND-N
  – MND-NC
  – MND-Baghdad
  – MND-W
  – MND-CS
  – MND-SE
Definition of Iraqi Local Control

- Iraqi security forces are capable of maintaining a safe and secure environment and maintaining civil order on a day to day basis with limited coalition oversight in selected areas
  - Coalition forces conduct periodic checks of security forces
- Iraqi security forces are capable of acting as the first responders to routine security incidents such as criminal activity or minor civil disturbances
  - Coalition forces provide quick reaction forces to handle major incidents beyond the capability of Iraqi security forces
- Coalition forces positioned in bases outside of urban areas or on their periphery to minimize the disruption of normal commercial and social activity
What it is and is not

- Iraqi Local Control is:
  - The first step in a "crawl, walk, run" methodology of transitioning security responsibilities to Iraqis
  - A tangible demonstration to Iraqis that they are capable of and responsible for their own security
  - A demonstration of our pledge to return sovereignty
  - A means to minimize the disruption of normal civil and commercial activity in urban areas

- Iraqi Control is not:
  - An abandonment of Iraqis or their security forces
  - An abdication of our responsibility to provide a safe and secure environment
  - A discontinuation of offensive operations to defeat non-compliant forces
  - A restriction on operating in urban areas as needed to accomplish the mission
Transitioning to Iraqi Control

- Our criteria to transition to local control is both capabilities (IZ Security Forces) and conditions based (Threat in local area)

- Conditions are equally important as capabilities. We could find ourselves in a situation in which we have a minimally capable IZ Security Force, but the FRL is so strong in the area that we can not transition

Fundamental Equation

If (IZ Security = X) and (Incidents < Y), THEN (DP)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Iraqi Local Control</th>
<th>Iraqi Regional Control</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
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| • Iraqi security forces operating from small unit/station level  
  – Coalition provides oversight  
• Local Iraqi Quick Reaction Forces established  
• Iraqi security forces able to defend against terrorist operations  
  – Coalition provides operational & intel support  
• Coalition military basing outside of urban areas and daily security operations conducted by Iraqi security forces:  
• Coalition security focus shifts to reinforcing Iraqi Security capability  
• Threat conditions reduced to level that IZ security forces can cope with the majority of incidents at the local level | • Iraqi security organizations operating under civil control and capable of maintaining internal security  
• New Iraqi Army (NIA) develops capability to nationally plan, direct and execute defensive operations against external threats  
• Iraqi security forces capable of Counterterrorism operations  
  – Coalition provides operational and intelligence support  
• Coalition military forces:  
  – Reinforce Iraqi security organizations  
  – Assist in defeating external threats  
• Threat conditions reduced to level that IZ security forces can cope with the majority of incidents at the regional level | • Iraqi security forces and NIA responsible for:  
  – Internal security  
  – External security and threats  
• Iraq Intelligence Service fully functional  
• Coalition force posture:  
  – Focused on theater security  
  – Minimal presence in Iraq in accordance with National Security Agreements  
• Coalition forces can project air, naval, and ground capability to quickly reinforce the New Iraqi Army  
• Threat conditions reduced to level that IZ security forces can cope with the majority of incidents at the national level |
Transition Criteria – Capabilities Based (1 of 4)
(Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)

All Security Services

- Basic foundations of Iraq security organizations established:
  - Sufficient personnel recruited
  - Sufficient individual & organizational equipment on hand
  - Sufficient facilities
  - Training base/programs established
- Iraqis prepared to assume full responsibility for administration, planning, direction and conduct of operations at small unit/station/post level
- Coalition postured to hand over responsibility for operations at local level and to provide rapid reaction forces to reinforce Iraqis in crisis situations
- Coalition prepared to commence withdrawal to areas outside urban/municipal centers
Transition Criteria – Capabilities Based (2 of 4)  
(Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)

**Iraqi Police Service**

- An operating judicial system that can arraign, hold, and try criminals in a timely manner
- Local police stations manned with sufficient vehicles to run one shift, and police officers uniformed, armed, and equipped
- A functioning police headquarters at the local town or city level to coordinate all police activities in that municipality
- Local police can respond to the majority of required operations without coalition backup
Transition Criteria – Capabilities Based (3 of 4)  
(Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)

**Iraqi Civil Defense Corps**

- Personnel for battalions recruited
- ICDC units fully equipped
- ICDC personnel imbedded in coalition military units
  - Possess an initial capability of operating in unit elements
- Liaison and coordination established with local IPS
- ICDC Brigade C2 established
- Future of ICDC defined (policy)
  - Required for managing expectations among recruits
  - Defines the National approach toward the organization
  - Funding source identified through Phase IVb
Facilities Protection Service

- The Ministry of Interior has published its overarching policy guidelines for the Facility Protection Service. The Ministry’s have budgeted, and support the payroll of their respective FPS forces.

- Each site protected by FPS has a sufficient number of trained, armed, and uniformed personnel, with minimally adequate communications and facilities appropriate to that site, as defined by the responsible Ministry.

- The force reports to a higher C2 headquarters or authority as directed by the responsible ministry, and has reliable communications with an Iraqi supporting security force (ICDC, Police).
Transition Criteria – Conditions Based
(Current Stance to Iraqi Local Control)

- The Ministry of Interior (MOI) supports establishment of Iraqi Local Control in the designated area
- Local leaders support establishment of Iraqi Local Control in the designated area
- FRL activity and intimidation reduced to the level that Iraqi security forces can control the majority of incidents
- Criminal activity reduced to the level that Iraqi security forces can control the majority of incidents and enforce the rule of law
- Militias and other sub state actors remain compliant to the extent that Iraqi can maintain civil order
Geographical Areas Overview

- Three Governorates (Dahuk, Irbil, As Sulaymaniyah) are in effect under Iraqi Regional Control
- Area of Operations North, Center South, and South East are substantively under Iraqi Local Control
- Many rural and smaller urban areas in AO’s North Center and West are under Iraqi Local Control (no coalition forces in area with periodic patrols)
Iraqi Security Forces Overview

- NIA capability is not required for Iraqi Local or Regional Control
- FPS and BPS are in the TOA process and will be complete by March and June '04 though shortfalls will remain
- ICDC capabilities are projected to meet Iraqi Local Control criteria across the country in the March/April '04 timeframe
- IPS will not meet Iraqi Local Control criteria in most areas of the country until:
  - Equipment – JUL '04
  - Training – OCT '04
Data Collection

- Local Control Assessments from each MSC
- Campaign Plan Measures of Effectiveness includes Local Control Criteria
- C-3 Effects collects objective data on New Iraqi Security Forces