# MNC-I OPERATIONS ORDER 05-03 (U)

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1. (S//REL) Situation. This order supersedes OPORD 05-02, 01 April 2005, and 05-02 Update, 01 July 2005, and serves as the base guidance for Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) operations beginning 20 November 2005. As expected, conditions have changed over time and the course of operations. This order does not dictate significant course corrections from the previous operations order (OPORD) and Update. However, it incorporates emergent campaign planning at Multi-National Forces, Iraq and the United States Embassy, Baghdad (MNF-I/USEMB) and it reorganizes and restructures the content. The intent of this order is to provide necessary guidance to ensure MNC-I maintains operational and tactical momentum beyond the Iraqi National Elections and through the seating of the constitutionally elected Government of Iraq.

a. (S//REL) General. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) must be viewed in the context of the Global War on Terror and USCENTCOM’s role in this effort. Relevant guidance is contained in the March 2005 USCENTCOM PLANORD “Posturing for the Long War” and its counterpart the August 2005 PLANORD “Countering Al Qaida and Associated Movements.

   (1) (S//REL) Nature of the Coalition. The purpose of the 28 nation coalition is to establish an independent and democratic Iraq as a functioning member of the international community; a sovereign nation at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the Global War on Terror. Militarily, significant security progress has been made as evidenced by the success of the constitutional referendum vote. In other areas of national power, commensurate progress is required to further develop Iraq’s governmental capacity in order to create the conditions in which a free and independent Iraq is responsible for governance and security on behalf of the Iraqi People. MNC-I is OPCON to MNF-I and operates primarily in the security realm. However, security in this environment significantly impacts political and economic development and will have a comparable significant effect on coalition strategic communications efforts. Furthermore, as conditions and priorities dictate, MNC-I will directly support higher and adjacent units and agencies efforts to develop Iraq politically and economically.

   (2) (U) Environment of Conflict

      (a) (S//REL) We face a diverse and dynamic insurgency comprised of disparate terrorist and foreign fighter (T&FF) groups, Iraqi Rejectionists (IZR), Saddamists (SDM), and a large and growing organized criminal class that benefit from the continuing chaos. Distrust of the Iraqi government along with the corruption and infiltration by insurgents within the ISF are key dynamics sustaining the insurgency. A widespread opposition to the presence of Coalition Forces, coupled with a newly placed government, creates the conditions for support to the insurgency. Although the insurgent groups have diverse and divergent motives, they all share the desire to see Coalition Forces removed from Iraq. The insurgents continue to maintain the current level of attacks (400+ per week). Until a fully representative government is seated, rule of law enforced, and core concerns of the population are addressed, the insurgency will continue to pose a significant challenge to the overall security environment. Moreover, and in the short term, the nascent Iraqi political process has the potential to affect the security environment as political entities strive to secure as much control as possible during the post-election period.
(b) (S//REL) Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations are manpower and resource intensive. The critical element to Coalition COIN operations is continuous pressure on the enemy to allow time to build sufficient governmental and security capability. Recognizing the challenge of limited resources, we will take calculated tactical risks to achieve operational and strategic success. With the security success of the Iraqi constitutional referendum vote and the continuing efforts to deny enemy sanctuary within Iraq and disrupt support from without, the Coalition has the tactical and operational momentum. The current strategy to build ISF capability, particularly, Iraqi Army capability to conduct COIN independent of Coalition Forces, remains sound. With the development of capable ISF not only is the sufficient combat power to defeat the insurgency achieved, but also a clear signal is broadcast to the Iraqi people that the GOI is meeting its security responsibilities. Every day MNC-I improves the capability of ISF, and because of this, every day the Coalition and the Iraqi People are closer to victory.

(3) (U) Area of Concern

(a) (S//REL) Area of Interest. The Area of Interest is Iraq's neighboring countries and the broader Middle East, including both North Africa and the Horn of Africa, which generate and transmit T&FF into Iraq. The region contains allies and friends that support the mission (such as Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) as well as that present a threat to Coalition operations and the sovereignty and security of Iraq. Cross-border activities remain a challenge as continues to provide support for T&FF and SDM by providing sanctuary and facilitating the flow of money and manpower into the AO.

(b) (S//REL) Area of Operations. CG MNC-I is responsible for operations within the national borders of Iraq. The Area of Operations (AO) and force disposition is described in the figure below.

Figure 1 (S//REL) MNC-I Area of Operations before and after 05 January 2006
(U) Enemy Forces

(1) **Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF).** Terrorists and foreign fighters continue to be the greatest near term threat to security in Iraq. They continue to demonstrate the ability to coordinate and execute precision suicide attacks and create the perception of instability within Iraq. However, T&FF, Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), previous shift in targeting the Shi’a population in order to incite ethno-sectarian violence mobilized support against their efforts and affected their ability to maintain sanctuaries within Iraq among an already small Sunni extremist support base. CF operations focused on the Syrian border disrupted T&FF external support and resulted in a reassessment of the direction of external insurgent elements. While Zarqawi’s challenge is sustaining momentum, Ansar Al-Sunna (AAS) continues to expand its influence, particularly in the Ninewah Province and the Zaab Triangle where AAS remains uncontested by the GOI and stands to benefit in recruiting disaffected Iraqi extremists. T&FF will not assimilate into the political process but will continue suicide attacks to achieve catastrophic effects, such as mass casualties. Such attacks against CF and ISF are aimed at mobilizing extremists (beyond Iraq) and directly target the Coalition governments’ will to support the GOI. T&FF sanctuaries will remain close to the Syrian border while they will continue to operate in Al Qaim, Ramadi, Mosul, Samarra, Baqubah and Baghdad.

(2) **Saddamist (SDM).** Saddamists remain the facilitators for other groups. Their infiltration of local governments and security forces will ensure their influence over segments of the Sunni population. Intimidation and coercion of those who support the GOI at the local level remains their TTP. With access to organizational and financial resources, SDM will continue to facilitate the insurgency until such time they enter power. A weakness remains their association with Ba’athist ideology, which does not appeal to a wider Shi’a or Kurd population. Their area of influence will remain along the TRV and in Baghdad where they will target Coalition and ISF with IEDs along MSRs and attack GOI officials. SDM will continue to operate in Bayji, Tikrit, Mosul, Ramadi and Baghdad.

(3) **Iraqi Rejectionists (IZR).** Iraqi Rejectionists will be negatively affected by the elections process and the presence of a viable political outlet. Support to IZR Sunni has waned as their limited organization and message does little to mobilize the population. For IZR Sunni, the prospects are similar to SDM in their desire to support Sunni political advancement. Their use of violence will be further tempered by political progress. Groups like the 1920 BDE may moderate their violence in order to allow Sunni political leaders to advance their goals. IZR Shi’a leaders like Muqtada Al Sadr will continue to play to both ends by mobilizing militants privately, while publicly calling for restraint in order to portray an ineffective GOI and gain new constituents. IZR will continue to operate in Baghdad, Sunni Triangle, and in Southern Iraq.

(4) **Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA).** The most likely course of action between December 2005 and July 2006 is the maintenance of the status quo. Attacks will average 60-70 per day. These attacks will be concentrated in the Euphrates River Valley, the Tigris River Valley cities and Baghdad. Possible flashpoints of violence include the southern urban centers, intra-Shi’a violence, and south of the Kurdish Green line, as Kurds attempt to regain land lost during Saddam Hussein’s regime. The ISF will gain some capability, but will continue to require CF enablers to conduct COIN operations. The new GOI will be mired in political infighting, at the expense of administering the country. Most Iraqis will continue to
maintain faith in the ability of the GOI to eventually provide relief from economic privation and political violence.

(5) (S//REL) Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA). The most dangerous course of action is that the people quickly lose faith in the new GOI because it fails to provide the services that Iraqis expect: security, food, power, water and economic opportunity. This is likely to happen at the beginning of the summer after a long and bitter GOI formation period. Iraqis will turn to alternative support networks embedded within their ethnic and religious communities to solve their problems and ignore the Baghdad government. This will lead to an effective partition of Iraq. The Kurds will use their Peshmerga to fortify behind a line that includes Kirkuk and its oilfields. The Shi’a will pull back to Baghdad and points south leaving Sunni Arabs with Al Anbar, parts of Sal al Din and Nineveh.

(6) (S//REL) Conclusion. Although the insurgency appears willing to play a “waiting game” with the Coalition, the growing ability of Iraqis to develop security and civil institutions will challenge the insurgency’s staying power, particularly for T&FF. The only insurgents that appear to have a centralized command and control capability are the IZR Shi’a. While a compartmentalized cellular structure increases Sunni survivability, it weakens their ability to have operational and strategic effects on the Coalition endstate. Additionally, the population’s growing fatigue with violence and instability will continue to undermine T&FF support. The challenge to the Coalition is to demonstrate its commitment to the population’s security and reduce its presence as the ISF develops.

c. (S//REL) Friendly Forces. USCENTCOM and MNF-I/USEMB are the MNC-I higher headquarters. MNSTC-I, TF 4a and MNF-I SOF elements comprise the key adjacent units. Other friendly forces include the ISF, elements of the United Nations (UN), the Government of Iraq (GOI), and a range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). (Ref Annex A, Task Organization).

(1) (U) Higher Headquarters

(a) (U) US Central Command (USCENTCOM)

1. (S//REL) Coalition Mission. To integrate coalition partners at the strategic level in support of military operations.

2. (U) Commander’s Guidance (Key Tasks)

   a. (S//REL) Defeat Al Qaida and associated movements (AQAM).

      1) (S//REL) The main enemy.

      2) (S//REL) Military actions coupled with coalition, local counterterrorist (CT) activities are having an effect on the enemy.

      3) (S//REL) Attack Al Qaida and Associated Movements (AQAM) wherever we find them, in both the physical and virtual realms.
4) (S//REL) Theater intelligence and CT capabilities will focus on AQAM as their first priority.

   b (S//REL) Stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan to sustain political progress and promote self-reliance.

      1) (S//REL) Exploit the momentum resulting from successful elections.

      2) (S//REL) Focus on units and individuals trained, equipped, and capable of leading the COIN fight.

      3) (S//REL) Move forward with disarming, demobilizing and reintegration of militias.

   c (S//REL) Build loyal, well-trained, partner security forces capable of taking the lead in the fight against extremists.

      1) (S//REL) Some Gulf States remain vulnerable to extremism.

      2) (S//REL) Continue to build indigenous forces and capacity throughout the region.

      3) (S//REL) Create centers of excellence within the AOR.

   d (S//REL) Sustain the flow of oil by protecting key infrastructure and sea lines of communication (SLOC).

      1) (S//REL) Major terrorist strike against regional oil infrastructure remains a continuing threat.

      2) (S//REL) Theater forces will ensure free access and friendly national control over strategic points of navigation.

      3) (S//REL) Retain the capability to execute timely and effective consequence management.

   e (S//REL) Protect the Force against asymmetric threats with priority against IEDs and indirect fire.

      1) (S//REL) Remain alert to changing battlefield conditions while facing a thinking and adaptive enemy.

      2) (S//REL) Make the necessary force protection enhancements.

      3) (S//REL) Neutralize the effects of IEDs on friendly forces.
f (S//REL) Seize the strategic communications initiative—expose the enemy.

1) (S//REL) Win the perception battle.

2) (S//REL) Make obvious to all the true nature of the extremist enemy.

3) (S//REL) Expose the enemy for what he is: cowardly, desperate, and without a viable vision for the future.

g (S//REL) Reshape our strategic posture in the AOR for the Long War.

1) (S//REL) Smaller, more expeditionary US forces, enabling others to help themselves.

2) (S//REL) Transition the lead for security operations to capable partner states as much as and as early as possible.

3) (S//REL) US forces will shed battlespace and become more flexible and responsive.

(2) (U) MNF-I/USEMB

(S//REL) Joint Mission Statement (Draft). The USG, MNF-I and the international community, together with the Iraqi Government, will neutralize the insurgency, creating the conditions for Iraqi institutions to develop and transition to self-reliance, enabling a stable, democratic, increasingly prosperous and unified Iraq.

(a) (U) Joint Intent (Draft)

1) (S//REL) Purpose. Our long-term goal is an Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists, and effective national, regional, and provincial institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people and creating conditions for rule of law and prosperity. Iraq’s success will reduce the threat to our national security and international stability emanating from the region, and serve as a model of democratic development for Iraq’s neighbors. At present, Iraq is going through a difficult transition. Over the next four years, all instruments of U.S. and Coalition power – political, military, and economic – will be integrated in a sustained joint effort to complete Iraq’s transition and achieve our strategic objectives.

2) (U) Key Tasks

a) (S//REL) Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgency

b) (S//REL) Help Iraq build governmental capacity and provide essential services
c (S//REL) Help Iraq strengthen its economy

d (S//REL) Help Iraq strengthen the Rule of Law and promote civil rights

e (S//REL) Transition to Security Self-Reliance

f (S//REL) Help Iraqis forge a national compact for democratic government

g (S//REL) Strengthen public understanding of Coalition efforts and public isolation of the insurgents

h (S//REL) Increase International Support

3 (U) Endstate

a (U) One Year Endstate

1) (S//REL) An orderly and rapid transition to the new Government, and an increased capacity at the national and provincial level to provide essential services to its citizens.

2) Active Sunni Arab involvement in the Council of Representatives

3) (S//REL) Delegitimize the insurgency through broad Sunni participation in the political process, including elections

4) (S//REL) A secure Baghdad with only sporadic incidents of terrorism (S//REL) Secure national borders

5) (S//REL) Iraqis progressively assuming responsibility for their own security under our conditions-based approach

6) (S//REL) Credible Iraqi police forces beginning to assume the lead for internal security, matched by more capable institutions for the administration of impartial justice and the rule of law

7) (S//REL) Economic growth driven by sustained increases in oil export revenues through enhanced infrastructure security, policy reforms (including progressive elimination of subsidies), and private sector development

9) (S//REL) A significant increase in political and economic support from the international community and regional neighbors
(U) Two Year Endstate

1) (S//REL) Local and national governments that hold their officials accountable, promote the rule of law, and finance their security and essential service needs

2) (S//REL) Improved security throughout the country with Iraqi security forces assuming nationwide responsibility with the Coalition in a supporting role

3) (S//REL) An established macro-economic framework for sustained economic growth and an emerging private sector creating the necessary jobs and business activity to reduce unemployment and support broad-based economic improvement

4) (S//REL) The International Financial Institutions providing the bulk of international economic assistance with U.S. assistance transitioning to a more limited, supporting role

c (U) Four Year Endstate

1) (S//REL) Iraq’s security forces containing crime and residual insurgent elements

2) (S//REL) Normal bilateral security relationships with the United States and others, including NATO

3) (S//REL) Private sector led growth and foreign and domestic direct investment producing broad-based economic growth

4) (S//REL) The Government of Iraq effectively providing for the essential needs of its citizens and effectively administering the rule of law

5) (S//REL) Matured political institutions and processes ensuring broad support for moderate and cross-sectarian democratic forces in the next elections

(b) (S//REL) MNF-I/USEMB Concept. The U.S. Government and Coalition will make 2006 a turning point in assisting Iraq in isolating the extremists and drawing in former rejectionists through focused stabilization efforts and the development of a functioning and increasingly responsible Iraqi Government that will gain the trust and support of its citizens. This will require an integrated approach and significant continuing military and economic support and assistance, but with conditions and standards that will help the new government succeed in its new responsibilities. MNC-I conducts operations within and in support of the MNF-I/USEMB joint campaign plan and the operational framework described therein. MNF-I has implemented and will continue to pursue a phased strategy to transfer the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Campaign to the government of Iraq (GOI) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and ultimately set the conditions for Iraqi security self reliance. MNF-I/USEMB joint operational framework is built upon 5 lines of operation described in the figure below.
Figure 2 (S/REL) MNF-I/USEMB Lines of Operation

1. (U) MNF-I/USEMB Phases

a. (S/REL) Phase I: Implement Partnership. The first phase is complete. In this phase MNF-I established partnership between Iraqi and coalition units and embedded Transition Teams in designated ISF units to develop these units within their assigned areas of operations. Aggressive offensive counter-insurgency operations continue with ISF involvement steadily increasing.

b. (S/REL) Phase II: Transition to Iraqi Army Lead. This is the current phase of operations. In this phase Coalition Forces transition greater responsibility for security operations to the Iraqi Army by putting IA in the lead and establishing a tactical overwatch relationship with partnered forces in order to undertake their development. As Iraqi army units at all echelons develop under Coalition Force partnership efforts and are assessed against the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) process and the battlefield environment, IA units at TRA Level II assume their own battlespace. Command and control mechanisms will be emplaced to allow IA headquarters to C2 IA formations. As this transition occurs, Coalition Forces will establish operational overwatch by adapting mission profiles and posture to provide enabling and quick reaction support to ISF. As this phase progresses, the MNF-I/USEMB will continue to develop the sustainment and other enabler’s capacity from the ministerial level down to the battalion in order to create a viable force capable of fighting and winning the counter-insurgency fight.
c. (S//REL) Phase III: Transition to Provincial Iraqi Control. As Iraqi capacity continues to grow in the security sector, USEMB and MNF-I will assist provincial governments in building the governmental capacity to administer their provinces and to provide basic services to their constituencies so that they can support the conduct of counterinsurgency operations by Iraqi Security forces. This will set the conditions for the transition to the next phase. Given the evolving timeline for developing the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) and the transition of governments that will take place in early 2006, it is unlikely that this transition will occur before mid-2006. Capable security ministries are critical components in the development of an effective force. Priority is required to establish effective systems for pay, life support and distributing equipment down to battalion level.

d. (S//REL) Phase IV: Iraqi Security Self-Reliance. As Iraqi political progress achieves the goals set out in UNSCR 1546, UNSCR 1637 and letters annexed, the Multinational Force mandate in Iraq will end and the relationship between the MNF-I and the constitutionally-elected government will be reviewed. In this phase the security partnership between the Iraqi government and the Coalition will likely evolve to more of a typical security cooperation relationship, with Coalition Forces postured in strategic overwatch outside of Iraq with training, security cooperation and advisory presence remaining. The exact nature and relationship between the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces will be determined in close coordination with the Government of Iraq.

d. (U) Adjacent Units

1. (S//REL) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). MNSTC-I organizes, trains, and equips Iraqi Security Forces to field to MNC-I in order to support Iraq's ultimate goal of a unified, stable and democratic Iraq, which provides a representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and a growing market economy; and is able to defend itself and not pose a threat to the region.

   a. (U) Military

   1. (S//REL) Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). CMATT organizes, trains, and equips Iraqi Army forces. During operations, provides ongoing mentoring and advising to Iraqi leaders at all levels of command. Assists the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) leadership in developing accession sources and leadership programs across all services of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Endstate is the development of an Iraqi Armed Forces capable of planning and conducting unilateral operations in order to maintain security within Iraq and defend its sovereignty.

   2. (S//REL) Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team. The Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team mentors and assists the Iraqi Joint Headquarters (JHQ) in order to become capable of exercising effective national command and control of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF), contributing to the IAF capability development process and, in partnership with Coalition Forces, contributing to improving the internal security situation within Iraq.

2. (S//REL) Police. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) organizes, trains, and equips the Iraqi Police Forces and Department of Border Enforcement...
(DBE) forces and monitors, advises and certifies the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) forces in order to develop capable and credible Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

(2) (S//REL) TF In partnership with the GOI and other USG agencies, TF progressively transfers Theater Detention Operations to the GOI for the temporary detention of insurgents by training Iraqi government personnel and transferring facilities to the GOI consistent with international standards to promote Iraqi sovereignty while protecting the rights of all detainees.

(3) (S//REL) Gulf Region Division (GRD). Assists in the reconstruction of Iraq by providing engineering services to MNF-I and the GOI in order to rebuild critical infrastructure and provide essential services throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations.

e. (U) Assumptions

(1) (S//REL) The GOI and its associated ministries will develop the capacity to sustain forces in field in accordance with USEMB and MNF-I timelines.

(2) (S//REL) Seating and establishing the GOI will be turbulent as there are limited mechanisms to facilitate a transition. This may result in the inability of the GOI to fully function and ensure basic services and functions are met.

(3) (S//REL) The political process of integrating the Sunni minority into the GOI will be problematic. Discontent by the Sunni population stemming from the perception of slow progress may trigger discontent. Likewise, concessions could trigger Shi’a blowback, if perceived as unreasonable. All groups during the post-election period will be attempting to secure as much control as possible.

f. (U) Risk

(1) (S//REL) Although the ISF will continue to require substantial assistance, the political situation will drive towards a speedy handover of COIN responsibilities. Logistic, Mobility, and ISR capabilities are critical shortfalls and will undermine progress and development. Premature transfer of responsibilities would create security gaps that insurgents are eager to fill and would threaten the overall efficiencies of the emerging ISF capability.

(2) (S//REL) Uneven progress between LOOs could become particularly acute. For example, aggressive COIN accompanied by less substantial progress in governance and economic development could undermine achieving the strategic endstate of a democratic and functional government.

(3) (S//REL) The interaction between Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is a key element of our COIN campaign. The need for effective ISF and coordination among its elements is critical to defeating the insurgency. The risk of over-developing the MOD capacity at the expense of the MOI could manifest in the inability to transition responsibility for enforcing the rule of law to police primacy. This situation would set
the conditions for a potential return of another authoritarian military regime, which is unacceptable.

(4) (S//REL) Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1546 and 1637 (and the exchange of letters annexed to), the presence of Multi-National Force in Iraq is at the request of the Government of Iraq. Given mounting domestic pressure for Coalition Forces, seen by many Iraqis as an “occupying force,” to depart the country, and given a desire to exert more sovereign control over their country, the newly seated, constitutionally elected Government of Iraq may ask the Coalition to reduce forces faster or depart in whole sooner than desired. The risk is that Coalition Forces are asked to leave prior to setting the conditions that ensure the success of the Iraqi Security Forces. These conditions include defeating Al Qaida in Iraq and neutralizing the insurgency to a point that ISF can effectively maintain the security environment. Another consideration is that ISF, particularly the Iraqi Police Services, will not have been developed to ensure police primacy relative to the Iraqi Army thereby setting conditions for the potential return of another authoritarian military regime.

g. (S//REL) Legal Considerations. MNF-I derives its authority from UN Security Council Resolution 1546 dated 8 June 2004 in conjunction with the “Exchange of Letter” between the United States and Iraq and UNSCR 1637, dated 7 November 2005 and the annexed “Exchange of Letters” between the U.S. and Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 17 provides various protections which would normally be contained in a status of forces agreement until such time as a true bilateral agreement can be negotiated. UNSCR 1546 and 1637 grant the following authorities:

(1) (S//REL) A reaffirmation of the authorization for MNF-I under unified command.

(2) (S//REL) Grants MNF-I the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including preventing and deterring terrorism.

(3) (S//REL) The right for CF to detain Iraqi nationals based upon UNSCR 1546 and 1637 which grants MNF the ability to engage in the following: “… combat operations against members of these groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security.”
2. (S/REL) Mission. MNC-I builds capable Iraqi Security Forces and conducts counter-insurgency operations to neutralize\(^1\) the insurgency and to defeat Al Qaida in Iraq in order to transition the security lead to Iraqi Security Forces and the Government of Iraq.

3. (U) Execution

   a. (U) Commander’s Intent

      (1) (S/REL) Purpose. MNC-I continues operations to neutralize the insurgency, leadership and organizations, while developing the capacity for ISF to assume battlespace and conduct independent COIN operations. MNC-I must transfer battlespace to ISF accepting a moderate level of tactical risk while the Corps retains sufficient forces to allow ISF to mature. We must place emphasis on developing effective Iraqi Police Services (IPS) to assume the security lead in designated urban areas and to provide domestic law and order. MNC-I establishes the security environment to develop local economies, governance, and the rule of law. Finally, MNC-I must transition both battlespace and basing in a manner that postures CF in operational overwatch.

      (2) (U) Key Tasks

         (a) (S/REL) Transition battlespace and security lead to capable Iraqi Security Forces

         (b) (S/REL) Posture CF in overwatch to support ISF with required enablers and effects

         (c) (S/REL) Develop capable Iraqi Army forces, battalion through division, and the IGFC

         (d) (S/REL) Develop capable Iraqi Police Services at provincial, district and station level

         (e) (S/REL) Neutralize the insurgency (Saddamists and Iraqi Rejectionists)

         (f) (S/REL) Defeat Al Qaida in Iraq (Terrorists and Foreign Fighters)

         (g) (S/REL) Restore Iraqi control of the IZ border

         (h) (S/REL) Support MNF-I/USEMB efforts to develop provincial governance and economics

         (i) (S/REL) Support Iraqi administration and security of strategic infrastructure

\(^1\) Neutralize (JP 1-02): To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation.

MNC-I OPORD 05-03 Context: Neutralization is achieved when insurgent capability to conduct and sustain operations is degraded to the point the Iraqi Army (IA) can plan and conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in their own battlespace with coalition forces in overwatch providing required enablers. This assessment of the IA versus the threat is a commander’s subjective assessment and part of the battlespace handover process.
(j) (S//REL) Conduct information operations to drive a wedge between AIF and Iraqis

(k) (S//REL) Support Iraqi National Elections and the political process

(l) (S//REL) Engage Iraqi leaders, tribes and clerics

(3) (S//REL) End State

(a) (S//REL) ISF have assumed battlespace and are capable of effective COIN operations

(b) (S//REL) Iraq’s borders are under Iraqi control with ISF layered in-depth supported by CF enablers

(c) (S//REL) The insurgency is neutralized

(d) (S//REL) Al Qaida in Iraq is defeated

(e) (S//REL) Conditions are set for Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)

(f) (S//REL) Coalition Forces and bases are smaller and postured for overwatch

b. (U) Concept of the Operation

(1) (S//REL) General. To ensure simplicity and unity of effort, MNC-I adopts the phasing convention of the MNF-I/USEMB Joint Campaign Plan and conducts operations aligned with the higher headquarters’ lines of operation. Although MNC-I operational tasks fall primarily within the Security Line of Operation, all MNF-I/USEMB lines of operation are affected to some extent by MNC-I actions. Furthermore, MNC-I operations and allocation of forces within the MNC-I area of operations are characterized by the battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. MNC-I employs an effects-based methodology to achieve desired objectives and assess effectiveness of MNC-I operations.
(2) (S//REL) Domain of Responsibility. The responsibilities and focus of higher and lower headquarters necessarily and often overlap to provide unity of effort and synergy. The following chart outlines the responsibilities of MNC-I, its subordinates, and higher headquarters.

**Domain of Responsibility**

**CENTCOM**
- **Looking**: INTERNATIONALLY
- **Focused**: REGIONALLY
- **DEFEAT AL QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS**
- **ENGAGE REGIONAL ACTORS**
- **COALITION MAINTENANCE**
- **POSTURE FOR THE LONG WAR**

**MNF-I**
- **Looking**: REGIONALLY
- **Focused**: GOI AND INTERAGENCY
- **TRANSITION SECURITY LEAD TO GOI AND ISF**
- **NEUTRALIZE INSURGENCY**
- **DEFEAT AQI**
- **COALITION TRANSITION**
- **RESTORE IRAQI CONTROL OF THE IZ BORDER**
- **STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE**
- **MINISTERIAL CAPACITY**
- **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**
- **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION**
- **CONTRIBUTING COALITION NATIONS**

**MNC-I**
- **Looking**: GOI AND INTERAGENCY
- **Focused**: CORPS BATTLESPACE
- **DECISIVE**: TRANSITION BATTLESPACE TO CAPABLE ISF
- **SHAPING**: (ME) BUILD CAPABLE ISF
- **NEUTRALIZE INSURGENCY**
- **DEFEAT AQI**
- **RESTORE IRAQI CONTROL OF THE IZ BORDER**
- **STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE**
- **SUPPORT PROVINCIAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENT**
- **INTEGRATE SOF**
- **SUSTAINING**: BASE CLOSURE

**MSC**
- **Looking**: CORPS BATTLESPACE
- **Focused**: PROVINCIAL AND URBAN AREAS
- **DECISIVE**: TRANSITION BATTLESPACE TO CAPABLE ISF
- **SHAPING**: (ME) BUILD CAPABLE ISF TO CONDUCT INDEPENDENT COIN
- **NEUTRALIZE INSURGENCY**
- **DEFEAT AQI**
- **RESTORE IRAQI CONTROL OF THE IZ BORDER**
- **PROVINCIAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENT**
- **ENGAGE LEADERS, TRIBES, CLERICS**
- **SUSTAINING**: BASE CONSOLIDATION

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**Figure 3 (S//REL) Domain of Responsibility**

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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
(3) (S//REL) Operational Framework. The following chart describes the MNC-I Effects Objectives superimposed over the higher headquarters’ campaign plan lines of operations. It graphically depicts MNC-I objectives and desired effects nested with the MNF-I/USEMB phases.

![MNC-I Operational Framework Diagram]

Figure 4 (S//REL) MNC-I Effects Objectives

(4) (U) MNC-I Effects Objectives

(a) (S//REL) Effects Objective 1: Battle space transitioned. Defined as CF are postured in overwatch prepared to reenter ISF battlespace to intervene in a security crisis in support of CF transition teams or in the case of ISF mission failure. The enabling effects for this objective are:

1 (S//REL) Enabling Effect 1A: Coalition Tactical Overwatch established. Defined as CF are positioned outside of ISF battlespace in local bases postured to provide enablers and joint effects as required to support CF transition teams and ISF COIN operations.
(S//REL) Enabling Effect 1B: Assured CF mobility. Defined as AIF is unable to prevent CF movement along MSR/ASR or disrupt CF sustainment operations.

(S//REL) Enabling Effect 1C: Reduced basing footprint. Defined as the closure or transfer of bases to Iraqi control to reduce the coalition footprint in urban areas.

(S//REL) Enabling Effect 1D: Coalition Operational Overwatch established. Defined as CF are positioned outside of ISF battlespace in regional Contingency Operating Base (COB) postured to provide ISF sustainment and joint effects as required to support CF transition teams.

(S//REL) Enabling Effect 1E: Coalition Strategic Overwatch established. Defined as CF are postured over the horizon in four contingency operating bases (COB) or outside of Iraq prepared to project combat power if required.

(b) (S//REL) Effects Objective 2: ISF in the lead (Main Effort). Defined as a force, respected by the Iraqi people, that is properly organized, trained and equipped to lead COIN operations in assumed battlespace. The enabling effects for this objective are:

1. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 2A: IA battalions and brigades assume battlespace. Defined as IA battalions and brigades at TRA Level 2 or higher plan and conduct COIN operations in assumed battlespace.

2. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 2B: IA divisions assume battlespace. Defined as Iraqi Army divisions at TRA Level 2 or higher assume command and control of its subordinate units leading COIN operations in assumed battlespace.

3. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 2C: Capable Iraqi Police Services (IPS) provide domestic law and order in urban areas. Defined as IPS at TRA Level 2 or higher at the provincial, district and station level provide security and enforce domestic law and order in urban areas.

4. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 2D: ISF capable of independent COIN operations. Defined as ISF organized, trained and equipped to plan, direct, conduct and sustain security operations. A combined C2 structure is in place to execute national level COIN mission. A national logistics system is fully operational to sustain ISF. ISF are not dependent on CF to deal with insurgency.

(c) (S//REL) Effects Objective 3: Insurgency Neutralized, AQI Defeated. Defined as AIF incapable of interfering with CF and ISF operations and can no longer deny essential services, intimidate the Iraqi people or conduct sustained operations against the GOI and Iraqi people. Effect is achieved through intelligence-driven operations supported by Information Operations and engagement that isolate AIF from popular support and ultimately defeat it through direct action by ISF. AQI defeated is defined as the AQI organizations and cells are ineffective and unable to resource, plan and execute operations against CF, ISF and the Iraqi population. The enabling effects for this objective are:
1. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 3A: AIF Leadership disrupted. Defined as: T&FF leadership is incapable of coordinating and employing foreign fighters and can not effectively mass effects in space and time; SDM leadership is unable to receive financial support for operations; and IZR leadership is influenced to cooperate with GOI/CF by improvement in basic services, increased employment, and overall quality of life improvements.

2. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 3B: AIF organizations disrupted. Defined as T&FF organizations can not effectively facilitate and sustain the flow of foreign fighters from the borders to the Iraqi interior and urban areas; SDM organizations are unable to finance its operations; and IZR organizations are unable to illegally influence the political process.

3. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 3C: AIF denied sanctuary. Enemy sanctuary is denied if a commander assesses a coalition force platoon can operate in that area at moderate risk.

4. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 3D: Decreased AIF capability to sustain insurgency. Defined as; T&FF, SDM and IZR are unable to maintain their popular, political and financial support for their operations and are either destroyed or incorporated into the GOI political process.

5. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 3E: AQI defeated. Defined as AQI “… has permanently lost the physical means or will to fight.” (FM 1-02).

(d) (S//REL) Effects Objective 4: Iraqis control the borders. Defined as DBE forces backed by IA are able to interdict T&FF movement across the Iraqi border. The enabling effects for this objective are:

1. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 4A: DBE forces employed. Defined as DBE forces are trained, equipped, and deployed in border forts along the entire Iraqi border.

2. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 4B: IA postured in-depth to support DBE. Defined as an integrated, layered defense of the border with IA capable of responding to DBE forces’ requests for assistance.

3. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 4C: Roads leading to the interior are controlled by ISF. Vehicle Check Points (VCPs) are established on the roads that lead from the border to the major urban areas in central Iraq; AIF movement to the Iraqi interior is disrupted by VCP.

4. (S//REL) Enabling Effect 4D: Accommodation of tribal culture. Defined as GOI and local tribes reach consensus on what legitimate cross-border movement and trade is and is not. DBE forces accommodate historical tribal customs and tribes support the GOI and Iraqi laws.

(e) (S//REL) Effects Objective 5: Support Provincial and Local Governments. Defined as Iraqis are confident with Provincial and Local Governments’ ability to provide security, leadership, judicial enforcement, political and economic development to meet the needs of the people. The enabling effects for this objective are:
1. **Enabling Effect 5A**: IOC PRT Proof of Principle; On order expansion. Defined as MNC-I support allows MNF-I/USEMB to establish Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Proof of Principle that are fully responsible for operational-level engagement, coordination, reporting, and assessment of governance and economic development at the provincial level. On order, support expansion of PRTs to additional provinces.

2. **Enabling Effect 5B**: Increased primacy of Rule of Law. Defined as Iraqi institutions develop and maintain effective and accountable judicial processes.

3. **Enabling Effect 5C**: Capable provincial governments. Defined as legitimate and democratic provincial governments with a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promote increased security and rule of law, promote political and economic development, and provide provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

4. **Enabling Effect 5D**: Increased Iraqi economic self-reliance. Defined as Iraqi free-market economic and business infrastructure conditions result in sustained private sector business growth, decreased unemployment, and increased Iraqi exports.

(f) **Effects Objective 6**: Strategic infrastructure developed. Defined as strategic infrastructure plan is developed and infrastructure is operational, maintained and secured from AIF interdiction. The enabling effects for this objective are:

1. **Enabling Effect 6A**: Attacks on critical infrastructure disrupted. Defined as AIF and criminal attacks on critical infrastructure are disrupted.

2. **Enabling Effect 6B**: IGFC responsible for infrastructure security. Defined as the IGFC employs, commands and controls, and sustains infrastructure security forces.


(g) **Effects Objective 7**: Wedge Driven Between the AIF and the Iraqi People. Defined as the Iraqi people have sufficient confidence in the security and viability of their country, combined with the fact that the level of essential services, human rights and standards of living are improved, drives a wedge between the insurgent and terrorist groups and the Iraqi people leading to the vast majority being prepared to play a role in supporting and contributing to the country’s future. The enabling effects for this objective are:

1. **Enabling Effect 7A**: Iraqis support ISF. Defined as Iraqis are confident with ISF ability to provide a secure and relatively peaceful environment.
2  (S/REL) Enabling Effect 7B: AIF propaganda neutralized. Defined as AIF propaganda is ineffective at swaying Iraqi perceptions of and participation in the insurgency.

(h) (S/REL) Effects Objective 8: Iraqis supports the GOI. Defined as greater than 50% of the major ethnic and religious groups believe that their local, provincial and national governments are capable of making progress toward providing security, economic growth and essential services. The enabling effects for this objective are:

1  (S/REL) Enabling Effect 8A: Iraqis participate in the election process. Defined as Iraqis are aware of and freely choose to participate in Iraqi National and Provincial Elections.

2  (S/REL) Enabling Effect 8B: Iraqis participate in the constitutional process. Defined as Iraqis are aware of, and are free to participate in, the constitutional amendment referendum.

(5) (U) Phases of the Operation

(a) (U) General

1  (S/REL) Phasing Construct. The phasing construct for MNC-I OPORD 05-03 mirrors the MNF-I/USEMB Joint Campaign Plan. There are four phases to the order of which Phase I (Implement Partnership) is complete. Phase II (Transition to Iraqi Army Lead) is on-going. The remaining phases are Phase III (Transition to Provincial Iraqi Control) and Phase IV (Iraqi Security Self-Reliance). MNC-I OPORD 05-03 addresses the operations, objectives and desired effects for Phases II and III only. The concept for Phases IV is not yet developed at the higher headquarters. Phase II which is on-going will continue through 2006 and overlap with Phase III that is projected to begin in the first quarter of 2006 and continue well into 2007. Phase IV is a sequential phase unlikely to begin until Phase III is complete or nearly complete.

2  (S/REL) MNC-I Battlefield Organization. The MNC-I battlefield organization is described in each phase by defining the decisive operation, shaping operations, and sustaining operations. For Phase II and Phase III, the MNC-I decisive operation is Battlespace Transition. Described in detail in the following sections, Battlespace Transition is the process of ISF assuming full responsibility for the lead in security operations while Coalition Forces posture in varying degrees of overwatch to provide enablers as required. The MNC-I Main Effort is described for each phase as well as the priorities for Corps’ resource allocation. While the Main Effort will not likely change during a specific phase, the priority for MNC-I resources will shift based on the commander’s operational assessment, higher headquarters’ guidance, and the recommendations of the Corps’ Major Subordinate Commands (MSC).

(b) (U) Phase II: Transition to Iraqi Army Lead

1  (S/REL) General. This phase is on-going and is characterized by MNC-I efforts to transition battlespace and the responsibility for security lead to Iraqi Security Forces while Coalition Forces posture in overwatch to provide enabling support and joint effects as
required. The Phase II Main Effort across most of the MNC-I AO is to build capable Iraqi Army (IA) battalions, brigades and divisions through partnership and transition teams to allow IA units to assume full security responsibility for COIN operations in assumed battlespace. However, in MND-SE, portions of MND-B, and in the Kurdish Provinces (Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyyah), the Iraqi Police Services (IPS) are already in the security lead, so the focus in these areas is to support the IPS until IA units are capable to assume battlespace. The MNC-I decisive operation is to transition the Corps’ battlespace to capable ISF and gradually reduce coalition forces and basing commensurate with an increasingly capable ISF. The decisive operation directly supports the MNF-I/USEMB objective to transition the security lead to the Government of Iraq (GOI). MNC-I shaping operations in this phase create the conditions that allow the Corps to transition battlespace to ISF and support the higher headquarters’ efforts in governance and economics. Sustaining operations such as assured mobility and base closure and handover enable MNC-I to conduct continuous shaping operations. Phase II proceeds across the MNC-I AO at varying rates based on the security situation and the pace of IA force generation. The phase is subdivided into three stages the Major Subordinate Commands follow to develop Iraqi Army capability and transition battlespace. The phase ends when all IA units have assumed their endstate battlespace locations and lead independent COIN operations with CF postured in strategic overwatch.

2 (S//REL) Decisive Operation. The decisive operation for this phase requires MNC-I Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) to transition battlespace to capable IA units accepting a moderate level of tactical risk while the Corps retains sufficient forces to overwatch while they mature. The MNC-I Battlespace Transition Process (See Annex C) in Phase II proceeds along three stages that describe the conditions and increasing capability of IA units as well as the level of overwatch required of CF.

a (S//REL) Phase IIA: Operating in Battlespace—Iraqi Army in Support. In this stage, TRA Level 3 and Level 4 IA units conduct operations within their CF partner’s battlespace. The partnered IA unit coordinates all operations with its CF unit and the CF conducts all reporting to its MSC headquarters. The IA unit is under TACON of its partnered CF and does not own battlespace. The CF assigns and positions the IA unit, clears fires, adjusts unit boundaries and establishes control measures. In addition to planning and coordination, the IA unit is dependent on its coalition partner for logistics, intelligence, engineer support, transportation and joint fires. Embedded Military Transition Teams (MiTT) coordinate coalition enablers and joint effects. This stage ends when the Iraqi Army unit has completed its required transition training, is declared TRA Level 2, and the MSC Commander determines the unit is ready to assume its own battlespace.

b (S//REL) Phase IIB: Assumed Battlespace—Iraqi Army Lead. Phase IIB begins when the Iraqi Army unit assumes responsibility for its assigned battlespace. (See the Battlespace Assumption Model in Annex C.) The IA unit plans, coordinates and leads COIN operations in its battlespace. The Iraqi Army unit commander assumes full responsibility for the security of his battlespace and for the activities and actions of his forces within that space. The IA unit reports to a designated higher headquarters, initially to CF then to its higher IA headquarters when that headquarters is capable of assuming control. The IA unit is TACON to the higher headquarters to which it reports and retains its embedded MiTT. The higher headquarters assigns the IA unit tasks, positions it, and adjusts its boundaries. IA units’ embedded MiTT retain the responsibility to coordinate control measures with the higher
headquarters and clear all fires as well as continuing to coordinate sustainment and CF enablers like ISR and Joint Effects. Coalition Forces continue partnership at the battalion through division level to develop IA units to TRA Level 1. Coalition Forces initially operate from local bases within the MSC AO and are postured in Tactical Overwatch to provide sustainment, intelligence and joint effects for the IA unit as required and to prevent mission failure. The MSC Commander authorizes Coalition Forces to reenter the battlespace under the following conditions: to shape the battlespace; for tactical intervention during a crisis; to support transition teams (e.g. MiTT, PTT, BTT, etc.) with quick reaction forces (QRF) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC); and to prosecute CF high-value targets (HVT). This stage ends when the Iraqi Army unit is logistically able to sustain itself and its leadership is assessed as able to conduct independent operations. [Note: A fully functioning Iraqi national logistics system is not a prerequisite for IA battalions and brigades to achieve TRA Level 1, only that the unit is able to plan, requisition, receive, distribute and manage sustainment from a viable logistical source such as a higher IA unit, a contractor or coalition support.]

(S//REL) Phase IIC: Overwatch—Iraqi Army Independent Operations. Phase IIC begins when the Iraqi Army unit achieves TRA Level 1. In this stage, IA units lead COIN operations and are capable of planning, executing and sustaining independent operations in their own battlespace. IA units are green in all categories and no longer require CF enablers. A fully operational national logistics system is not required for a unit (battalion or brigade) to reach Level 1, only that it is capable of coordinating and receiving sustainment from a viable coalition, Iraqi Government, or contracted source. The IA unit reports independently to a designated higher headquarters which may still be a CF until its higher IA headquarters is capable of assuming control. The IA unit is TACON to the higher headquarters to which it reports. The IA unit positions and adjusts boundaries of subordinate units and also establishes control measures and clears fires. Partnership transforms during this stage as multiple IA units may partner with a single CF unit. The battalion-level MiTT pulls out, but remains at the brigade and division levels. Coalition Forces posture in Operational Overwatch from regional forward operating bases (FOB) to support remaining transition teams and prevent ISF mission failure. Over time as ISF become increasingly more capable, CF begin to posture in Strategic Overwatch from final consolidation bases within Iraq or over the horizon to project combat power if required. The concept and conditions for Strategic Overwatch and the roles of Transition Teams are under development and will be published at a later date. This stage ends and Phase II ends when the Iraqi Army is conducting independent operations nation-wide.

(S//REL) Shaping Operations. MNC-I shaping operations create and preserve the conditions that allow CF to transition battlespace to the ISF and for the GOI to assume full responsibility for security. The MNC-I Main Effort, Develop Capable ISF (in this phase the IA), is a shaping operation. Also, the MNC-I priority for resources shifts among the various shaping operations based on the MNC-I Commander’s operational assessment. Since it shifts regularly, the MNC-I priority for resources is conveyed weekly in the Operational Priorities Slide and verbally through the Battle Update Assessment (BUA) and the Commander’s Conference Call.

(S//REL) (MAIN EFFORT) Develop capable ISF to Conduct Independent COIN Operations. (See Appendix 1, Annex C). The MNC-I Main Effort is to develop capable ISF through partnership and transition teams with an emphasis on the Iraqi Army (IA) to support the MNC-I decisive operation. During Phase II, the primary focus is to develop IA battalions,
brigades and divisions to TRA Level 2 in order to transfer battlespace and the lead for COIN operations to IA units. MSC commanders determine the timeline for an IA unit to assume its own battlespace once it achieves TRA Level 2. In addition, during this phase MNC-I will begin a concentrated effort to develop Iraqi Police Services to set conditions for Phase III.

b (S//REL) Neutralize Insurgency and Defeat Al Qaida in Iraq. MNC-I conducts intelligence-driven offensive operations to neutralize the insurgency and defeat Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI). At this time AQI is assessed as the most dangerous component of the insurgency. Operations focus combat power, kinetic and non-kinetic, on the enemy to neutralize their capability to a level that allows battlespace transition to Iraqi Security Forces. The leadership of AQI must be killed or captured.

1) (S//REL) MSCs are directed to focus efforts within their battlespace on insurgent, to include AQI, sanctuary, leadership, and organizations. Enemy sanctuary will not be tolerated within the national boundaries of Iraq. Historically, the insurgency has sought to create sanctuary where Coalition Force presence is minimal and in locations where Coalition boundaries create an artificial seam that can be exploited for protection. Subordinate commands should be aware of these techniques and make every effort to prevent the formation of sanctuary. If sanctuary develops, subordinates are directed to take action to destroy it. Operations internal to an MSC’s AO, for the most part, will be left to the MSC to prosecute.

2) (S//REL) MNC-I sees two levels of operations to neutralize insurgent activity along MSC boundaries. Primarily, these operations will be MSC-coordinated limited boundary shifts and/or cross-boundary operations developed from coordinated tactical planning between MSCs. These intelligence-driven offensive operations are expected to occur on a regular basis throughout the MNC-I AO. Operations of this sort will require only limited MNC-I involvement; primarily publishing updated operational graphics and the necessary coordinating instructions to ensure mission accomplishment.

3) (S//REL) When conditions warrant, MNC-I may direct operations that focus on more significant operational and strategic insurgent activity. These larger scale operations could involve organizations and agencies outside of the Corps and may be synchronized and enabled by both MNC-I and higher. MNC-I, in accordance with operational priorities, will provide, integrate, and synchronize enablers and resources to facilitate maneuver. For example, MNC-I may realign or re-allocate forces, ISR assets, lethal and non-lethal effects, CS/CSS assets, and change command and support relationships of Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces in support of directed operations.

4) (S//REL) Regardless of the scale of the operation, integration of ISF and the GOI during all phases of planning and execution supported by a synchronized information operations effort are critical to success at all levels. Likewise, integration of non-lethal enablers will enhance the overall effect of isolating the insurgency from the population. These operations are part of the framework of operations that maintain constant pressure and permit no respite for the enemy.

c (S//REL) Restore Iraqi Control of the IZ Border. (See Appendix 3, Annex C). MNC-I develops capable DBE units through Border Transition Teams (BTT) and
partnership with CF while MNSTC-I continues to provide trained border police. MNC-I employs border forces to fully man the IZ border. The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) forces and IA units will integrate to coordinate operations and synchronize effects within their battle space. MSC will identify the echelon, location and method for tactical integration. DBE Regional Headquarters will integrate to coordinate operations and synchronize effects with IA Division Headquarters within their battle space. Official Ports of Entry (POE) will be fully operational with coordination and synchronization of all ministries involved. Finally, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and MOD integration will be completed as well as coordinated with other ministries responsible for POE functions. The end state is DBE and IA forces fully capable of exercising control over Iraq’s borders.

(S//REL) Strategic Infrastructure Security. MNC-I is developing a comprehensive approach to resolve infrastructure security challenges. The comprehensive approach also aims to improve situational awareness along with rapid and coordinated responses to all incidents involving critical infrastructure. To that end, MNC-I is developing procedures to facilitate coordination among the stakeholders, with a proof of concept in the Kirkuk to Bayji corridor (see Appendix 4, Annex C). Due to ongoing attacks on linear infrastructure, MNC-I continues full spectrum operations to disrupt suspected criminals/AIF IOT break-up the network of those involved in attacks.

1) (S//REL) Operations will focus on securing key infrastructure, developing the capability of the GOI to assume responsibility for assigned elements with infrastructure security functions, and identifying and disrupting criminal/AIF cells conducting the attacks. The strategic infrastructure of the Basrah to Al Faw export oil pipeline remains vital for future Iraqi economic development and remains the highest priority. However, due to instability, current operations will be conducted IAW the following priorities: 1) Kirkuk-Bayji pipelines and electrical lines including the Al Fathah Crossing, 2) Mussaib to Salman Pak electrical lines, 3) Bayji-Baghdad product pipelines and electrical lines, and 4) Baghdad electrical ring. The Government of Iraq (GOI) assigned responsibility for infrastructure protection to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The MOD is accountable but not fully capable due to insufficient organization, accountability, resources and authority.

2) (S//REL) Currently infrastructure security is the responsibility of each MSC. The infrastructure security situation is complicated by numerous security organizations working for the various ministries and is different in each AO. Each ministry has Facilities Protection Services (FPS) personnel who secure ministry buildings and key nodes. The Ministry of Electricity (MOE) forces consist of FPS and Electric Protection Security Services (EPSS). The Ministry of Oil (MOO) forces consist of Oil Protection Force (OPF), FPS, Tribal forces, and contractors (i.e. Parsons). The Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIB) are funded through the MOD and report through the IA BDE. The MSC has primary responsibility to assess security of key infrastructure and coordinate the physical security effort of the various forces in their AO IAW TAB C (Strategic Infrastructure Matrix). Where critical infrastructure is vulnerable or security efforts are insufficient, the MSC will assign IA units or Coalition Forces (CF) as required. ENDSTATE: The Joint Coordination Centers (JCC) and the Provincial Joint Coordination Centers (PJCC) are the hubs for emergency response at the local and provincial level. MSCs coordinate response to attacks/failures and repair activities through the JCCs and PJCCs and report IAW standing CCIRs.
e (S//REL) Support Provincial and Local Government. (See Annex G). MNC-I establishes the security environment that allows MNF-I/USEMB Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to assist provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased security, rule of law, to promote political and economic development, and to provide provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

f (S//REL) Support the Political Process. (See Appendix 12, Annex C). MNC-I establishes a security environment that allows the International Election Commission-Iraq (IECI) to conduct safe elections in order to establish a permanent GOI by conducting surge operations in key cities to neutralize AIF. These operations rely on actionable intelligence and aim to limit disruption to Iraqi populace prior to elections windows. These operations focus on known VBIED cells and are intended to neutralize as many as possible prior to the December General Elections. These operations are preceded and followed by political engagement operations. They are primarily MSC focused and require MNC-I to provide resources and enablers to set the conditions for elections. Election operations are synchronized across four lines of effort: security, logistics support, information operations, and command and control. The end state is the population fully supports the GOI by participating in the elections process.

4 (S//REL) Sustaining Operations. MNC-I sustaining operations enable the MNC-I shaping operations to create conditions to transition the battlespace and allow ISF to assume the lead for security operations.

a (S//REL) Assured Mobility and Distribution. (See Appendix 6, Annex D). Engineers provide assured mobility on Corps supply routes, construct and expand coalition bases, construct temporary MOD and MOI bases, and provide reinforcing prime power, topographic, design and reconstruction support. Assured mobility is achieved with route clearance operations to counter the IED threat and tactical bridging to support MSC and MNC-I operations. MNC-I achieves operational flexibility by weighting the main effort with GS engineer support, while simultaneously reinforcing supporting efforts across the AO. Risk is mitigated by using CF engineer construction forces to construct bases in less permissive areas and maximizing the use of contracted construction effort inside bases in permissive areas.

b (S//REL) Base Closure and Handover. (See Appendix 5, Annex C). The basing plan supports the MNF-I campaign plan. Based serve as power projection platforms throughout the ITO. The MNC-I basing plan is designed to support operational requirements of CF as they transition to operational overwatch and ISF as they assume battlespace. Base closure remains a conditions-based process focusing on: the ability of ISF to hold battlespace, the overall security of the AO, and money allotted to basing in support the MNF-I campaign plan. The priority for base transfers is to ISF then to the GOI (through the Ministry of Finance). The first priority is based on tactical and operational requirements of the ISF. The latter priority is based on returning symbols of national sovereignty to the GOI. The basing endstate is to establish Contingency Operating Bases (COBs) in each of the three cultural areas of Iraq (Sunni, Shia, and Kurd) and to consolidate the CF footprint into four COBs: Al Asad, Balad, Tallil, and Q-West.
Joint Fires and Effects. (See Appendix 8, Annex C). MNC-I employs lethal and non-lethal enablers to support MNC-I and MSC operational priorities along the four Lines of Operations in order to facilitate Coalition and Iraqi Security Force efforts to achieve the objective and enabling effects outlined in the Corps’ operational design. The synchronized application of all assets resident in the MNC-I task organization, made available through HHQ and contracting will shape the conditions for ISF to take the lead for COIN operations and facilitate the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). MNC-I Effects plans, coordinates and synchronizes its activities IAW established Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Work Groups enacted at the Corps level.

a (S//REL) Lethal fires focus on support to the Security Line of Operation. MNC-I prioritizes and coordinates available air (CAS, EW, ISR) and ground (GMLRS) fire support assets consistent with the threat, corps-level priorities and MSC requirements. Near-term focus areas include operations in the Western ERV, critical infrastructure security within the MND-NC AOR, and Rocket Man operations particularly IVO Baghdad and LSAA. Early identification and prompt submission of MSC requirements will help ensure available assets are postured to support MSC requests. However, MSC’s must recognize existing resource constraints, especially ISR, will preclude MNC-I’s ability to meet every identified requirement. To maximize effectiveness, MNC-I and its MSC’s employ evolving cross-cue techniques to take advantage of increasingly effective air and ground sensors (to include NTISR), to establish clear PID, monitor and track identified targets and exploit kinetic strike results through non-lethal means. MSC post attack exploitation (or mitigation) is perhaps the most vital component to ensure Corps’ success. Positioning, orientation and operational readiness of all available counterfire sensors, to include C-RAM, remain critical to our ability to protect the force and identified high value targets (IZ, BIAP, Balad). MNC-I continues to centrally analyze and manage these critical assets to assure MNF-I and MNC-I asset protection. Lastly, the measured provision of responsive Joint Fires ISO MNF-I Transition Teams, increasingly positioned throughout the battlespace, remains a moral imperative. MSC’s are responsible for assuring communications with and coordinating JFIRES ISO Transition Teams (MiTTs, BTTs, SPTTs, etc.) supporting partnered ISF elements in your AOR’s – regardless of whether or not those ISF elements have assumed battlespace.

b (S//REL) Non-lethal fires and enablers focus support to the MNF-I Commander’s priority themes of “AQ Out; Sunni’s In; ISF Increasingly in the Lead; and Bridging the Gap”. Efforts to support these themes directly contribute to the achievement of MNC-I’s objective and enabling effects. Near-term MNC-I priorities include restoration of Iraqi Border Control; Counter-IED; Iraqi National Election; and Driving the Wedge. Longer term, MNC-I focus expand to include Transitions (ITG to GOI; CF to ISF) and the projected Provincial Elections and Constitutional Amendment Referendum. MNC-I Public Affairs and Information Operations deliberate planning, production, coverage and dissemination efforts are prioritized to support these focus areas. The Information Operations Task Force (IOTF), by its charter, remains focused upon the degradation and marginalization of AQIZ/AMZ. MNC-I IO and PAO current operations elements (COMCAM, ENG and PAOs) continue to focus on exploiting or mitigating events (planned and unplanned) that occur within the ITO or AOI in order to further the achievement of MNC-I’s objective effects. To do so most effectively, MNC-I remains reliant upon the rapid and deliberate provision of images (still and video) and detailed accounts of these events from MSC battlespace owners to enable MNC-I Effects to bring those
stories to Iraqi, international and western audiences. Non-lethal support through MNC-I and MSC Civil Military Operations (CMO) and CMO Support remain vital to our ability to achieve our desired endstate. Lastly, a newly codified Engagement methodology within OPORD 05-03 provides a framework within which MNC-I and its MSC’s will coordinate, synchronize and execute engagement activities – with a near term focus of engaging the Sunni population to garner their support to the democratic process and drive the wedge between them and the AIF. The deliberate, detailed and routine documentation of engagement activities into the newly established Ghost Jewel database, must be the default for engagements at all echelons to enable all users to leverage otherwise unavailable details about prospective influence targets.

(c) (S//REL) A viable and routine assessments process remains the lynch pin to assuring MNC-I (and MSC) efforts are achieving their intended effect. MNC-I Effects established MOE / MOP and indicators will serve as the base line for the measurement and reporting of all activities that feed the Effects Assessment process. Routine assessment of MNC-I CONOPs and the Campaign Plan drive the prioritization, allocation and employment of Corps enablers and assure Corps and MSC efforts contribute to the MNF-I strategic objectives.

(c) (U) Phase III: Transition to Provincial Iraqi Control

1 (S//REL) General. Phase III overlaps with Phase II and is projected to begin early in 2006 as selected Iraqi provinces and urban areas begin to meet the conditions for transfer to Iraqi control. The Corps Decisive Operation remains to transition battlespace to capable Iraqi Security Forces, but the distinguishing characteristic is the focus on transitioning the security lead in the 18 provinces and designated urban areas to Iraqi Police Services (IPS). On order and based on the commander’s operational assessment of the threat and overall progress of ISF, the MNC-I Main Effort shifts to developing IPS capability. The phase is conditions-based and proceeds at varying rates across the MNC-I battlespace. It focuses on the MNF-I “9 Key Cities,” then expands as additional forces are available and security conditions permit. The Corps objective is to establish the security environment and develop capable ISF to meet the MNF-I Phase III conditions to transfer provinces and urban areas to Iraqi control. [See Tab B (Provincial and Key City Assessment Criteria) to Appendix 2 (Assessment Process) to Annex U (Synchronization Matrix)]. As ISF assumes full responsibility for security lead, Coalition Forces posture in overwatch to provide enablers and support for transition teams as required in accordance with the process described in Phase II. MNC-I shaping and sustaining operations continue unchanged from Phase II. Phase III ends when all 18 Iraqi provinces are transferred to Iraqi control.

2 (S//REL) Decisive Operation. (See Annex C). The decisive operation for Phase III is transitioning the lead for security operations to the ISF within each Iraqi province. The Main Effort is to develop capable IPS to TRA Level 2 or better in 9+ key cities through CF partnership and Police Transition Teams (PTT) at the Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters and Police Station level. The 9+ key cities plan refers to the higher headquarters “9 Key Cities” with the addition of Tal Afar and the four major cities in MND-SE. [Note: MND-SE internally resources PTT and conducts IPS development in the four southeastern provinces (Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Muthana) under the operational concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in order to meet the Corps Commander’s overall intent; the Corps resources PTT as appropriate for the remaining 14 provinces.] When able and conditions-based,
the Corps IPS development plan expands to include additional key cities to be determined later based on the commander’s operational assessment. To support IPS development during this phase, the Corps designates the 49th Military Police Brigade as the Executive Agent and the supporting commander for technical oversight of police-specific training. As the Executive Agent, the 49th MP Brigade organizes, equips, trains and provides technical oversight of PTT. In addition, the 49th MP Brigade Commander advises MSC commanders on IPS development within their AO. The 49th MP Brigade forms and trains PTT using the Corps template, and provides PTT and appropriate MP units under TACON to the MSC (the supported commanders) to develop IPS capability at the provincial level and below. MSC develop IPS through unit to unit partnership and by employing PTT within their AO. MSC integrate MOI and MOD forces at the tactical level within their AO to set the conditions for provincial and urban transfer. Finally, a key task that remains consistent throughout Phase III is for MSC to plan for and cycle all untrained Iraqi policemen on the official MOI Roll in the MSC AO through formal individual training at an appropriate police academy by February 2007. This requirement for formal individual training applies to police officers, detectives/investigators and policemen in the IPS, and supports the MNF-I/MOI objective to recruit, train and field 135,000 IPS servicemen and women in 2006. Phase III occurs in three stages:

a (S//REL) Phase IIIA: Implement Police Transition Teams. This stage begins after the 15 December 2005 Iraqi National Elections with the reorganization, training and allocation of Military Police forces and International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) to establish PTT. The MNC-I concept during January and February 2006 is to fully resource PTT in all 18 Provincial Police Headquarters and in all the District Police Headquarters of the following 9+ Key Cities: Baghdad/Taji, Baqubah, Fallujah, Kirkuk, Mosul, Najaf, North Babil, Ramadi, Samarra, and Tal Afar. Additional PTT if available during this stage are employed in the police stations of the 9+ cities. PTT at the Provincial Police Headquarters are fully resourced at a rate of one to one (1:1). For planning purposes, District Police Headquarters are resourced at a rate of one to one (1:1) and Police Stations at a rate of one to two (1:2). However, districts and stations may be resourced by MSC commanders based on their operational assessment not to exceed rates of (1:2) and (1:3) respectively. MSC commanders may commit additional forces, internally generated, in their AO to develop IPS in other cities and areas based on their operational assessment, but will keep the MNC-I Commander informed. [Note: MSC internally generated PTT remain OPCON to the MSC, but for standardization purposes receive core instruction and technical oversight from the 49th MP Brigade.] This stage ends when IPS at TRA Level 2 in the 18 Provincial Police Headquarters and the designated districts and stations of the 9+ Key Cities are in the security lead, capable of directing police operations, conducting law enforcement in the existing security environment, and preventing the resurgence of organized terrorism with support from the Special Police, Iraqi Army and Multinational Forces.

b (S//REL) Phase IIIB: Complete PTT Fielding in the 9+ Key Cities. This stage begins when additional Military Police forces become available to employ PTT in all the police stations of the 9+ key cities. This time frame is currently projected to be April 2006. This stage overlaps with the previous stage in that additional PTT are integrated into the 9+ key cities plan as they become available while the initial teams of Phase IIIA continue to develop their IPS. This stage ends for each additional police station when the IPS at TRA Level 2 are in the security lead, capable of directing police operations, conducting law enforcement in the existing security environment.
environment, and preventing the resurgence of organized terrorism with support from the Special Police, Iraqi Army and Multinational Forces.

**c**  (S//REL) Phase IIIC: Conditions-based Expansion of IPS Development. This is a conditions-based stage that begins when commanders assess they have created the security conditions that allow IPS development to expand to additional key cities or areas and when sufficient MP forces are available to remission from previous cities or to form additional PTT. The time frame for this expansion is projected to be no earlier than August to September 2006. As IPS become increasingly more capable across the Corps battlespace, Coalition Forces posture in overwatch in accordance with the concepts described in Phase II to provide enablers and prevent ISF mission failure. This stage and Phase III ends when IPS at TRA Level 2 in all 18 provincial police headquarters and the districts and stations of the designated key cities are in the security lead, capable of directing police operations, conducting law enforcement in the existing security environment, and preventing the resurgence of organized terrorism with support from the Special Police, Iraqi Army and Multinational Forces, thereby setting the Corps conditions for the higher headquarters to transfer provinces and urban areas to Iraqi control.

3  (U) Shaping Operations. No change.

4  (U) Sustaining Operations. No change.

5  (U) Joint Fires and Effects. No change.

6  (U) Information Operations. No change.

(d)  (U) Phase IV: Transition to National Iraqi Control.  TBP.

(e)  (U) Phase V: Transition to Iraqi Security Self Reliance.  TBP.

c.  (U) Tasks

(1)  (U) MNF–NW

   (a)  (S//REL) O/O support MND-NC consolidation of MND-N NLT 30 DEC 05.

   (b)  (S//REL) Employ Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) teams to assess infrastructure attacks as required.

(2)  (U) MND–B

   (a)  (S//REL) Assume responsibility for Babil, Najaf, and Karbala Provinces NLT 5 Jan 06.

   (b)  (S//REL) Continue operations to protect the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR).
(c) (S//REL) Assume security force tasks IAW MNC-I SECFOR Realignment Plan NLT 08 JAN 05. (See Appendix 13, Annex C).

(d) (S//REL) Provide Middle Ring Security for UNAMI operations in Baghdad until relieved.

(e) (S//REL) Employ Weapons Inspection Teams (WIT) to assess infrastructure attacks as required.

(3) (U) MNF–W

(a) (S//REL) Support MNC-I Tribal Engagement plan.

(b) (S//REL) Employ Desert Protectors. (See Appendix 1, Annex C).

(c) (S//REL) Continue Fallujah reconstruction.

(d) (S//REL) Support MND-B Babil consolidation.

(e) (S//REL) Employ WIT to assess infrastructure attacks as required.

(4) (U) MND–NC (O/O MND-N)

(a) (S//REL) Conduct Middle Ring Security NLT 01 DEC 05 for UNAMI Irbil Office until relieved.

(b) (S//REL) Support UNAMI Irbil convoys outside of MND-NE AO as required.

(c) (S//REL) Assume responsibility for consolidated MND-N NLT 30 DEC 05.

(d) (S//REL) Employ WIT to assess infrastructure attacks as required.

(5) (U) MND–CS

(a) (S//REL) Consolidate operations in Wasit and Qadisyah Provinces on or about 05 Jan 06.

(b) (S//REL) Support MND-B Consolidation of Babil Province.

(c) (S//REL) Promote coalition operations and coalition contributing nation participation within AO.

(6) (U) MND–SE

(a) (S//REL) Provide Middle Ring Security for UNAMI Operations in Basra.

(b) (S//REL) Facilitate Basrah oil facilities hardening and development projects.
(7) (U) MND-NE

(a) (S//REL) Provide Middle Ring Security NLT 01 DEC 05 for UNAMI Operations in Irbil and within MND-NE.

(b) (S//REL) Provide support and sustainment for follow-on coalition contributing nation force (e.g. Mongolia) conducting UNAMI Middle Ring Security Tasks in Irbil.

(8) (S//REL) CJISOTF. Conduct tribal engagement IAW MNC-I Effects targeting with emphasis on Sunni tribes in western Al Anbar Province.

(9) (U) 3rd COSCOM

(a) (S//REL) Partner with and provide Transition Teams to Motor Transportation Regiments as required.

(b) (S//REL) Support development (with MNF-I and MNSTC-I lead) of institutional logistics systems and national support capabilities, to include the development of the Taji National Depot.

(c) (S//REL) Provide CSS to Army forces located in the MNC-I AO.

(d) (S//REL) Provide reinforcing DS to maneuver units operating away from habitual support units.

(e) (S//REL) Provide common-item support and services as required IAW MOUs and Army Contract Service Agreements to other services, coalition partners, other US agencies, or the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI).

(f) (S//REL) Retain expeditionary life support and sustainment capability to support forces operating away from fixed sites.

(g) (S//REL) Provide movement support to MNC-I OPRES as required.

(h) (S//REL) Maintain container control.

(i) (S//REL) Provide aerial delivery of emergency common-item sustainment stocks (Class I, III, V, water) to support maneuver forces and transition teams in outlying areas as required.

(j) (S//REL) Submit CSS reports IAW Annex D, Appendix10.
d. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) Tasks Common to All

(a) (S//REL) Transition battlespace to TRA Level 2 ISF accepting moderate risk IAW MNC-I Battlespace Transition guidance (See Appendix 1, Annex C).

(b) (S//REL) Array CF in overwatch as required to sustain ISF with enablers and joint effects.

(c) (S//REL) Develop QRF and MEDEVAC contingency plans to reenter ISF battlespace in support of CF Transition Teams, PRTs, and PJCCs.

(d) (S//REL) Continue partnership to develop ISF units to TRA Level 2 IOT transition battlespace and security lead.

(e) (S//REL) Continue to embed and support Military Transition Teams (MiTT) and Border Transition Team (BTT), both out of hide and external, to continue development of ISF units. See Annex T and Appendices 1 and 2 and Tab A to Appendix 2.

(f) (S//REL) Establish Police Transition Teams (PTT) at provincial, district and station level IAW MNC-I Building Capable IPS “2006 Year of the Police” Plan (See Appendix 1, Annex C).

(g) (S//REL) Accept TACON of IPLOs/IPTs in support of IPS development IAW MNC-I Building Capable IPS “2006 Year of the Police” Plan (See Appendix 1, Annex C).

(h) (S//REL) BPT accept TACON of DBE elements through IA as required IOT establish Iraqi control of the Iraqi border (See Appendix 1, Annex C).

(i) (S//REL) Neutralize AIF to set the conditions to transition the lead for COIN operations and handover of battlespace to ISF (See Appendix 2, Annex C).

(j) (S//REL) Conduct operations to deny AIF sanctuary (See Appendix 2, Annex C).

(k) (S//REL) Conduct operations to restore and maintain Iraqi control of the Iraqi border NLT 30 Nov 05 (See Appendix 3, Annex C).

(l) (S//REL) Conduct IO to drive a wedge between the AIF and the Iraqi population (See Appendix 11, Annex C).

(m)(S//REL) Conduct IO to increase Iraqi support of the GOI (See Appendix 11, Annex C).

(n) (S//REL) Engage tribal leaders, religious leaders, and other local authorities to influence local populations (See Appendix 11, Annex C).
(o) (S//REL) Establish conditions and provide support to allow MNF-I PRTs to develop provincial governance and economies (See Appendix 1, Annex G).

(p) (S//REL) Establish conditions and BPT provide support to allow the IECI to conduct national elections and referendums (See Appendix 12, Annex C).

(q) (S//REL) Establish security conditions ISO provincial elections as required.

(r) (S//REL) Establish security conditions ISO religious and special events that draw large populations.

(s) (S//REL) Develop and execute deliberate plans to conduct base consolidation, closure, and handover IAW MNC-I Base Closure Guidance (See Appendix 5, Annex C).

(t) (S//REL) Provide adequate security to key infrastructure; minimize the effects of interdiction.

(u) (S//REL) Conduct operations to disrupt AIF and criminal networks attacking critical infrastructure.

(v) (S//REL) Provide security for infrastructure repair crews as required.

(w) (S//REL) Identify and engage key leaders IAW OPERATION GHOST JEWEL IOT advocate disruption of attacks on infrastructure.

(x) (S//REL) Perform reconnaissance and collection tasks as outlined in Tab B, Appendix 4, Annex C.

(y) (S//REL) Conduct information operations IAW Tab E, Appendix 4, Annex C.

(z) (S//REL) Update and submit strategic infrastructure matrix IAW Tab C, Appendix 4, Annex C NLT the 25th of each month.

(aa) (S//REL) Reinforce relationships with associated IA commanders IOT reinforce the importance of an efficient and effective infrastructure and their role in securing that infrastructure to counter the insurgency.

(bb) (S//REL) Report SIB readiness assessment, IAW Tab G, Appendix 4, Annex C, on the first of every month.

(cc) (S//REL) BPT provide direct support to ISF as required to prevent mission failure.

(dd) (S//REL) Provide distribution of emergency food and medical supplies for humanitarian relief missions as required.
(2) (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) (See Appendix 2, Annex C).

(3) (U) Definitions

(a) (S//REL) Neutralize the Insurgency. Neutralization is achieved when insurgent capability to conduct and sustain operations is degraded to the point the Iraqi Army (IA) can plan and conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in their own battlespace with coalition forces in overwatch providing required enablers. This assessment of the IA versus the threat is a commander’s subjective assessment and part of the battlespace handover process.

(b) (S//REL) AIF Sanctuary. Enemy sanctuary is defined in terms of the benefit to the enemy and the effect on coalition forces. It is an area where enemy forces have freedom of action to refit, plan, and direct operations. The enemy has established limited centralized C2; is capable of sustained activity; has some ability to mass; and partially controls the area. If enemy forces have created these conditions in an area and a coalition force platoon cannot operate in that area with moderate risk, then the enemy has created a sanctuary. The term “safe haven” will not be used as it is a joint doctrinal term used to define a protected area for non-combatants.

(c) (S//REL) Denied Sanctuary. Enemy sanctuary is denied if a commander assesses that the enemy benefits of sanctuary as defined above no longer exist and a coalition force platoon can operate in that area at moderate risk.

(d) (S//REL) Control of the Iraqi Border. The following five conditions define Iraqi control of the IZ border:

1. (S//REL) DBE forces deployed in border forts along the entire Iraqi border enforcing border laws and disrupting the cross-border transit of T&FF.

2. (S//REL) IA postured in-depth, integrated with DBE forces and prepared to respond to DBE requests for assistance.

3. (S//REL) Roads leading to the Iraqi interior are controlled with ISF using vehicle checkpoints to disrupt T&FF freedom of movement.

4. (S//REL) Accommodation with local tribes.

5. (S//REL) Official Ports of Entry (POE) are open and effectively enforce Iraqi border and immigration laws. (MNSTC-I has the lead for POE).

(e) (S//REL) CF Enablers. An enabler is a critical capability that must be present to allow an organization to accomplish or significantly ease the accomplishment of its assigned missions. Conditions determine the requirement for enablers; not all missions or forces require the same set. Military enablers typically include ISR, fires, aviation, air defense, engineer assets, military police, communications, administration and logistics.
(4) (S//REL) Rules of Engagement (ROE). The established ROE for all forces OPCON or TACON to MNC-I are found in Appendix 7 to Annex C.

4. (S//REL) (U) Administration and Logistics

   a. (S//REL) Logistics. (See Annex D). MNC-I develops sustainment plans, policies and procedures, and postures logistics assets across Iraq in order to support the development of Iraqi Security Forces, while retaining flexibility to support counterinsurgency operations. Key to success is gaining efficiencies in fixed site operations through contracts and LOGCAP support, while retaining expeditionary capability to support operations as required throughout Iraq without loss of momentum. Also critically important is development of concepts to support transition teams arrayed across Iraq while minimizing the logistics footprint. While tactical level logistical support remains a service responsibility, every effort should be made to maximize efficiencies gained through common item support.

   (1) (S//REL) Concept of Coalition Support. CFLCC provides EAC CSS, JRSOI, and Title X support to MNC-I through service channels. COSCOM provides general common item support to all services and Coalition Forces as required, IAW acquisition and cross servicing agreements (ACSA). COSCOM provides general support on an area basis from four key GS hubs: LSA Anaconda (main hub), Tallil (southern hub), Al Asad (Western hub), and Q-West (Northern hub). COSCOM provides DS to non-divisional Army units and is prepared to provide reinforcing DS to divisional units as required. FSSG provides DS/GS to MEF units in MNF-W area of operations. MARCENT coordinates Marine-specific supply throughout Iraq as required. Transition teams will be supported on an area basis, from the nearest MND or COSCOM CSS unit.

   (2) (S//REL) Support to Iraqi Security Forces. MNC-I develops IA logistics capability through partnership and doctrine development while providing direct support as required preventing mission failure. Development of institutional and higher-echelon logistics capability in the ISF is critical to Iraqi self-sufficiency. MNSTC-I and MNF-I are leading the development of the establishment of a Ministry of Defense institutional logistics system. COSCOM provides technical and managerial assistance to Base Support Units (BSUs) as they stand up to support Iraqi Divisions, as required, in accordance with Corps priorities. COSCOM initially provides partnership and C2 of Motor Transportation Regiments, and ensures distribution support to ISF as required. HSCs will gain significant capability and will require MSC partnering and mentoring as they assume support roles previously provided by MNC-I units. Ministry of Interior ISF (i.e., police and DBE) will receive support through MOI support systems, generally through local procurement and contracts. MNC-I transition teams supporting MOI units will assist the units in obtaining support through Iraqi channels. MNC-I logistics units will be postured to respond if national systems fail, and ISF units are unable to receive support through Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior channels.

   (3) (S//REL) Support to other US agencies. Coalition Forces and United Nations. MNC-I may be required to provide common item support, if available, to other US agencies or the United Nations, in accordance with applicable MOUs. Coalition support remains a national responsibility. MNC-I provides common item support and services IAW applicable ACSA.
MSCs will provide monthly reporting of support required to coalition partners, IAW Annex D, Appendix 10 (Reporting).

b. (U) Personnel. (See Annex E)

c. (U) Public Affairs. (See Annex F)

d. (U) Civil Affairs. (See Annex G)

e. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. (See Annex H)

f. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. (See Annex M)

g. (U) Medical Services. (See Annex Q)

5. (U) Command and Control

a. (S//REL) Command. The Commanding General of MNC-I exercises OPCON or TACON of designated forces as described in Figure 5 below. MNC-I is OPCON to MNF-I and is headquartered at Camp Victory.
Figure 5 (S//REL) MNC-I Organization

1. (S//REL) Command Relationships. (See Annex J). MNC-I will establish a partnering relationship at the Division, Brigade, and Battalion levels to advise and support Iraqi Army units at the appropriate echelon. MNC-I also establishes partnership with the Iraqi Police Services at the Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters and Police Station level to develop IPS capacity. Police Transition Teams (PTT) are TACON to the MSC to train, coach and mentor IPS. The IPLO assigned to PTT are TACON to the MSC through the PTT and ADCON to MNSTC-I (CPATT) for administration of all personnel matters with the IPLO contractor. Iraqi Army units will maintain an ADCON relationship through the Iraqi Army chain of command to the IGFC while establishing an OPCON or later on, a TACON relationship with their respective partnered coalition unit (per MOU between MNF-I and Iraqi MOD/MOI). The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) will coordinate Transition Team issues between MNC-I and MNSTC-I. The IAG executes ADCON of all U.S. externally sourced transition teams and future external RFF transition teams attached to MNC-I. The IAG will provide administrative support and coordinate sourcing, equipping, training, and policy development for Transition Teams. Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) and Border Transition Teams (BTTs) will be attached to a coalition partner at the Division, Brigade or Battalion level. They will provide partnered Iraqi Army and Border units training, coaching, mentoring, and access to coalition effects. Special...
Police Transition Teams (SPTT) are OPCON to MNSTC-1 (CPATT) but will be TACON to MNC-I during operations. These teams will provide training, coaching, mentoring and access to coalition effects to their respective Special Police units.

(2) (S//REL) Succession of Command. CG, MNC-I then the senior US MSC CG.

b. (S//REL) Control. (See ANNEX K). MNC-I will continue to conduct coalition coordination and command through CENTRIX. Communications support will now transition to cross domain solutions and the installation of FusionNet down to the BDE Level. The IAG will conduct administration and coordination of the transition teams over CENTRIXS / SIPR and NIPR data networks. Communication with the division level transition teams will be over Tactical Voice (MSE) Single Channel Secure Radio and CENTRIXS / SIPR / NIPR data networks. Communications from the division level teams to brigade teams will be Tactical Voice (MSE) and CENTRIX / NIPR data networks. Communications from brigade level teams to battalion teams and below will be Single Channel Secure Voice Communications (TACSAT / HF) and HF / Single Channel TACSAT (data).

Acknowledge:

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