Iraq Update
4 January 2006

This briefing is classified
SECRET

Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: X1

4 January 2006

Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment
Completion of political process and recent operations have positioned us well for decisive action in 2006.

Appointment of a representative Iraqi government is key to success in 2006.

Political wrangling over constitutional amendment, federalism and provincial elections will dominate early tenure of new government.

Violence and intimidation will continue to be used to generate political effect.

Recent operations have disrupted Al Qaeda in Iraq; must continue to split them from Sunni population.

Impacts of election, security transition and coalition reductions will not be seen immediately. Expect reductions in insurgent violence to be gradual.

Perception of increased will continue to polarize Iraqi society.
2006 Challenges

- Forming government and building government capacity at national and provincial levels to meet basic needs of the population and establish rule of law.
- Sectarian tensions inhibiting government and security force development.
- Interference by and inability/unwillingness of to halt insurgent/foreign fighter support.
- Increased pressures of three years of coalition presence.
- Increased pressures for Iraqi freedom of action.
- Developing political element of insurgency will increase complexity of military operations.
- Balancing operations and troop reductions in a more complex environment.

Ilizam Mushtarak - United Commitment
2006 Key Security Tasks

- Defeat Al Qa’eda in Iraq and continue neutralizing Rejectionist insurgency to reduce levels of violence.

- Continue transition of counter-insurgency campaign to ISF.

- Build police capacity to the point where they can begin assuming lead for internal security – Year of the Police.

- Support transition of the new Security Ministries and conduct of Provincial elections and Constitutional Referendum.

- Support Iraqi government efforts to limit the influence of “militias”.

- Support ISF in securing borders.

- Support ISF in securing Baghdad and 9 key cities.

- Transfer detention operations to Iraqis and implement detainee integration process.
2006

Coalition Transitions

Government Formation

Campaign Assessment

Provincial Elections (T)

Constitutional Debate

Constitutional Referendum (T)

~ 75% of Army Brigades in Lead

~ 80% Army Divisions in Lead

~ 80% Special Police BDEs TRA 2

~ 60% Iraqi Police Service TRA 2

~ 50% Department of Border Enforcement TRA 2

Offramp Decision Point

Offramp Decision Point

Offramp Decision Point
Bad Things That Could Happen

- Shia government drives sectarian vice inclusive agenda.
- Sunni insurgents link with Al Qa’eda to hedge against Shia
  
  1.4b, 1.4d
- Government unable to establish control over armed groups.
- Security forces fracture along ethnic lines.
- Iraqi government demands greater control over coalition military operations and/or timetable for coalition withdrawal.
- Resources for economic development fail to materialize.
- Iraqi detainee situation deteriorates.
- Sectarian violence bubbles over into civil war.
- Coalition force reductions embolden terrorists and insurgents.
MNF-I FOBs in/near the 9 Key Cities

Mosul FOBs
- In: None
- In Vicinity:
  - Diamondback (Mosul Aflid)
  - Marez
  - Courage

Ar Ramadi FOBs
- In: None
- In Vicinity:
  - Combat Outpost
  - Snake Plt
  - Hurricane Point
  - Blue Diamond
  - Ar Ramadi

Fallujah FOBs
- In: None
- In Vicinity:
  - Baharia
  - Al Fallujah
  - Mercury

North Babil Area FOBs
- In: None
- In Vicinity:
  - Iskandariyah
  - Mahmudiyah
  - Kalsu

An Najaf FOBs
- In: None
- In Vicinity:
  - None

Kirkuk FOBs
- In: None
- In Vicinity:
  - Warrior

Samarra FOBs
- In:
  - PB Uvani
  - PB Razor
  - PB Olson
- In Vicinity:
  - None

Ba'qubah FOBs
- In: None
- In Vicinity:
  - Gabe
  - Warhorse

Baghdad FOBs
- In:
  - Falcon
  - Freedom I
  - Honor
  - Loyalty
  - Prosperity
  - Union III
- In Vicinity:
  - Rustamiyah
  - Hope *
  - Victory Base Camp

In: FOB inside built up area
In vicinity: FOB on outskirts of built up area

* FOB Honor transfers to IA on 31 Jan 06
** FOB Hope transfers to IA on 16 Feb 06
### MNF-I FOBs in/near the Remaining 21 Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sub Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tal Afar</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Sykes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayji FOBs</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Summerall</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tikrit FOBs</td>
<td>In Danger**</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Speicher Remagen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala FOBs</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Hillah FOBs</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charlie</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Samawah FOBs</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Camp Samawah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Smitty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Nasariyah FOBs</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Adder</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cedar</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mittica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irbil FOBs</td>
<td>In Ghost</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Zaytun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sulamaniyah FOBs</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Diwaniyah FOBs</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Echo</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kut FOBs</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah FOBs</td>
<td>In Basrah Palace</td>
<td>In Vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old State Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shatt Al Arab Hotel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Faw Peninsula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In:** FOB inside built up area  
**In vicinity:** FOB on outskirts of built up area  
*21 urban areas targeted for transfer as part of the transfer of urban areas  
**FOB Danger transfers to IA on 22 Nov.
Current IA TRA level by DIV HQ/ BDE HQ/ BN

* Divisions and Brigades icons are the headquarters only - not the cumulative unit

2/3/1 TRA level was reduced from TRA level II to TRA level III, but maintained battlespace.
## Sample POI Day 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>INSTRUCTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0830</td>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0830-0930</td>
<td>Fundamentals of an Insurgency</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0930-1200</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Doctrine</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1400</td>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1500</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1630</td>
<td>Leadership in Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Campaign Plan</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>CG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Corps, Division Cdr Guidance</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Corps Cdr / Div Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730-1830</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COIN CFE**

"The Insurgency Stops Here!"
# Sample POI Day 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>INSTRUCTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-1200</td>
<td>COIN Center of Gravity Analysis</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>(b)(3), (b)(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td>MNC-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1530</td>
<td>I/O Campaign w/ PE</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>(b)(3), (b)(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530-1630</td>
<td>Population Needs, Security, CMO</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>TF 1.4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1800</td>
<td>Detainee Ops</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1900</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COIN CFE**

"The Insurgency Stops Here!"
# Sample POI Day 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>INSTRUCTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0930</td>
<td>Exploitation, Technology, Interagency Intel</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>MNC-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0930-1130</td>
<td>G2X Local 1.4c</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130-1230</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td>(b)(3), (b)(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1230-1330</td>
<td>Targeting</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330-1430</td>
<td>Mission Planning / Parallel Planning</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430-1600</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>CJSOTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1900</td>
<td>Bde, Bn, and Co Lessons Learned Iraqi Perspective</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Bde Cdr, Bn + Co Cdr, Iraqi Mil/Pol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-UTC</td>
<td>Iraqi Semi-formal Dinner</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COIN CFE**

"The Insurgency Stops Here!"
# Sample POI Day 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>INSTRUCTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0930</td>
<td>Counter IED: Staff Planning and Analysis Considerations</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>CJTF 1.4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0930-1100</td>
<td>Intel Brief for PE</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Guest Briefer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1200</td>
<td>Debrief Asset for PE</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Small Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1800</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Planning PE</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Small Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1900</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COIN CFE**

"The Insurgency Stops Here!"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>INSTRUCTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0900</td>
<td>Debrief Asset for PE (exploitation)</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Small Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1130</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Planning PE (exploitation)</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Small Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130-1230</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1230-1530</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Planning PE (exploitation)</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Small Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530-1630</td>
<td>Student Presentations on How They Will Organize for</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>(b)(3), (b)(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Success in the COIN Fight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1730</td>
<td>Course AAR</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730-1800</td>
<td>Closing Remarks</td>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1900</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COIN CFE
"The Insurgency Stops Here!"
Weekly Summary
24-30 Dec 05

- Weekly Operations Total: **440/387**
  - 204/191 were Combined Operations with ISF
  - 103/108 were Independent ISF Operations
  - 133/88 were CF only Operations
  - 49.4% were Combined Operations
  - 27.9% were Independent ISF Operations
  - 22.7% were CF only Operations

- All Operations resulted in AIF:
  - Caches Found = **89/137**
  - IEDs Found & Cleared = **160/153**
  - AIF Detained = **454/275**
  - Bomb Makers Captured/Killed = 3 Captured; 2 Killed/2 Captured; 0 Killed
  - Foreign Fighters Captured/Killed = 7 Captured; 6 Killed/1 Captured; 8 Killed
  - HVIs Captured/Killed = 1 Captured; 0 Killed/0 Captured; 0 Killed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Average</th>
<th>Month Totals (Dec)</th>
<th>1 June to Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIF Detained</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>10,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF Killed</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED F/C</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>3,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cache</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>1,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF Det/Killed</td>
<td>42/39</td>
<td>22/27</td>
<td>291/272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Transition Readiness Assessment (Army)

An Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi forces to perform counterinsurgency missions.

- **Overall Readiness Assessment**
- **Personnel**
- **Command and Control**
- **Training**
- **Sustainment/Logistics**
- **Equipment**
- **Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Unit</th>
<th>Fully Capable</th>
<th>Capable with CF Support</th>
<th>Partially Capable</th>
<th>Unit Forming</th>
<th>Unit Not Formed / Not Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division HQs</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>0 (4)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade HQs</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>11 (4)</td>
<td>20 (22)</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>42 (26)</td>
<td>51 (54)</td>
<td>4 (8)</td>
<td>14 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(112)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Units</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>55 (30)</td>
<td>77 (80)</td>
<td>6 (15)</td>
<td>19 (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Iraqi Army Status as of December 2005 (# Reported in June 05 Baseline)**

**SPA Plans – 20 Dec 05**

**Ilizam Mushtarak – United Commitment**

**SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR**

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
Transition Readiness Assessment (Police)

Ultimately an Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Training
- Leadership
- Station Effectiveness
- Force Protection
- Facilities / Infrastructure
- Equipment
- Threat

| Iraqi Police Status as of December 2005 (# Reported in September 05 Baseline) |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Police Unit                   | Effective Level 1 | Effective With Limitations Level 2 | Considerable Limitations Level 3 | Ineffective Level 4 | Unit Not Formed/ Not Reporting |
| Rating                        |                  |                               |                               |                  |                                |
| Provincial HQ (18)            | 2 (2)            | 10 (10)                       | 5 (5)                         | 1 (1)            | 0 (0)                         |
| Special Police Brigades (8)   | 0 (0)            | 1 (0)                         | 7 (8)                         | 0 (0)            | 0 (0)                         |
| Total                         | 2 (2)            | 10 (10)                       | 13 (13)                       | 1 (1)            | 0 (0)                         |
Coalition Force Support to TRA Level II Units

Sustainment / Logistics:
- ISF Level II capability: Forecast and requisition supplies and support; conduct operator maintenance
- CF provide:
  - Coordinate and follow-up with MoD to establish life support contract
  - Fund life support contracts or provide services if contracts fail
  - Common supplies and fuel
  - Vehicle recovery and evacuation
  - Ground and air transport to augment moves
  - Emergency care to stabilize patients and transport to Iraqi health system
  - Training Support through Unit Partnership Program

Fire Support:
- ISF Level II capability: None required; No IA fire support systems (air or ground)
- CF provide: Access to Joint Fires

EOD:
- ISF Level II capability: None required
  - Bomb disposal companies forming (1 per division) - currently lack equipment and training
- CF provide: EOD clearance and investigative analysis of attack sites

Command and Control:
- ISF Level II capability: Capable of planning and executing counterinsurgency operations; able to send and receive reports and orders from higher/lower echelons
- CF provides:
  - augmented staff planning
  - Coalition Units provide command and control of select Iraqi Units (until IA Higher HQs achieves TRA 2)
Coalition Force Support to TRA Level II Units

Engineer:
- ISF Level II capability: None required
  - Engineer companies forming (1 per division) – currently lack equipment; no vertical or horizontal capability
- CF provide:
  - Construction assets in support of IA basecamp construction
  - Provide training support through unit partnership program
  - Military bridging to support IA river crossing operations
  - All route clearance and route maintenance operations

Communications:
- ISF Level II capability: Able to maintain external communications with higher
  - Signal companies not yet formed (1 per division)
  - IDN (internet capability) not developed
- CF provide: redundant communications capability.

ISR:
- Level II capability: None required
  - Scout platoons formed in all divisions; have fixed wing seeker aircraft (camera capability); MI companies are developing with UUVI (1 per division)
- CF provide: general intelligence support

Transition Teams:
- Coalition Units provide “out of hide” MiTTs
- Support to MiTTs: Must provide QRF, Joint Fires, medical, and logistics support to transition teams nation-wide
**Projected IA Brigades Assumption of TRA Level I**
(based on DEC TRA data)

Assumed: Best Case Conditions

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**Timeline:**

- **JAN 06**
- **FEB 06**
- **MAR 06**
- **APR 06**
- **MAY 06**
- **JUN 06**
- **JUL 06**
- **AUG 06**
- **SEP 06**
- **OCT 06**
- **NOV 06**
- **DEC 06**

- **JAN 07**
- **FEB 07**
- **MAR 07**
- **APR 07**
- **MAY 07**
- **JUN 07**
- **JUL 07**
- **AUG 07**
- **SEP 07**
- **OCT 07**
- **NOV 07**
- **DEC 07**

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BDEs in Al Anbar and Nineveh - 12 months added to the assumption of battlespace month.
BDEs in Baghdad, Salah Ad Din, Babil, and Diyala - 9 months added to the assumption of battlespace month.
BDEs in the remainder of Iraq - 8 months added to assumption of battlespace month.
Uncertain of Force Generation timeframe of 3/9 or if unit will be formed.
Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace (based on DEC TRA data)

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
06 - 08 Combat Formation Decision Points

Mar 06 Decision Point
- Repurpose two brigades

Mar 06 Decision Point
- Assess BDE PTDO and Theater Reserve requirement

OIF
- Jun 06 Decision Point
  - Repurpose one brigade

OIF
- Oct 06 Decision Point
  - Repurpose two brigades

29 Nov 05 Version
Ethnicity of Senior Staff

MOD Personnel (58)
- Shia (38)
- Sunni (15)
- Kurd (4)
- Turkoman (1)

IAF Senior Appointments (15)
- Shia (5)
- Sunni (5)
- Kurds (4)
- Turkoman (1)

Divisional Commands (11)
- Shia (4)
- Sunni (3)
- Kurds (3)
- Turkoman (1)

Brigade Commands (33)
- Shia (21)
- Sunni (5)
- Kurds (7)
Overall MOD/IAF Ethnicity

- Shia (68): 58%
- Sunni (28): 24%
- Kurd (18): 15%
- Turkoman (3): 3%
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES UPDATE
4 January 2006

"The only way to make a man trustworthy is to trust him." – Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 1945
- MNSTC-I Lines of Operation
- Force Generation
- Intangibles
- Professionalization of the Force
  - Logistics
  - Communications
  - Officers
- Year of the Police
- Ministry Development
- Issues
- Summary
MNSTC-I Lines of Operations

Build and Sustain MoI/MoD Institutional Capability

Generate Capable ISF

Develop Professional ISF

MNSTC-I Transition & Transformation

End State

Capable Security Ministries

Capable ISF

Changed Images

Transfer Security to Capable ISF
Force Generation: Iraqi Security Forces

Ministry of Interior Forces Trained and Equipped

118,152

Ministry of Defense Forces Trained & Equipped

105,803

223,955

77,525 Police (includes SWAT and Province ERUs)
9,512 Civil Intervention Force (PO Div)
9,713 Police Commandos
439 Emergency Response Unit
18,672 Border Enforcement
1,729 Highway Patrol
562 Dignitary Protection
92,165 Iraqi Army (Combat)
1,606 Special Operations
10,745 Combat Support, Service Support, & Training Units
489 Air Force
798 Navy

128 battalions in the fight, 53 battalions in the lead, 34 battalions own battlespace

SECRET
• COURAGE
• RESILIENCY
• LEADERSHIP
• ETHNIC DIVERSITY
• CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE MILITARY
• SECURITY MINISTRY RIVALRY

Professional Iraqi Security Forces achieved through standardized training, leader development, embedded transition teams, and partnering with Coalition units.
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE FORCE

Police
5 Police Academies
1 Officer College
1 Border & Customs Police Institute
2 Special Police Institute

Army
2 Basic Training Centers
1 Enlisted Specialty Skills Center
3 Junior Officer Academies
1 Joint (Intermediate) Staff College
1 National Defense University

Out-of-Country
International Police Training Center
NATO Schools (225 in CY05)

Transition Progress:
60% Iraqi Instructed

Newest Initiative: Center for Ethics and Leadership
Iraqi Army Transition Challenges

- Logistics
- Communications
- Officers
2006: “The Year of the Police”

- Build-out the “Objective Civil Security Force”
  ✓ 135,000 Police in 978 stations in 102 cities
  ✓ 28,000 Border Police
  ✓ 25,000 Special Police Commandos
  ✓ 6,000 Highway Patrol

- Establish 134 Police Transition Teams, 38 Special Police Transition Teams, 26 Border Transition Teams, and 4 Border Support Teams at Ports of Entry

- Transition Baghdad Police College from production of police to production of police officers (Leader Development)

- Establish by Summer 2006 a “Police Center for Ethics and Leadership”

- Evolve the Special Police Commandos to a “Gendarmerie-like” capability and disperse them geographically

- Develop and implement a maintenance concept for the Iraqi National Police
Development of the Security Ministries

- Developing both institutions from foot soldier and policeman to minister

- Focusing on 8 key systems necessary for the ministries to support the fight

- Building a professional, enduring civil service

- Measuring progress against action plans and milestones

Ministry of Interior currently capable but inefficient.
Ministry of Defense largely dependent on Coalition
• ARMED GROUPS
  ✓ MILITIAS
  ✓ FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICES (FPS)
  ✓ PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS (PSD)

• LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE SECURITY MINISTRIES

• FINANCIAL TRANSITION
  ✓ FOREIGN MILITARY FUND (FMF) BEGINNING FY08

• FINDING THE BALANCE
  - ABILITY TO ABSORB
  - AVOIDING DEPENDENCY
• Force Generation on track

• Ministry Action Plans in place

• Professionalization initiatives for Iraqi Security Forces are underway

• Plans in place for accelerating transition in logistics, communications, and leadership development
Combat Unit Transition Challenges

- Logistics
- Communications
- Officers/NCOs
Logistics Concept

National Supply Chain

Tadji
National Depot

4th Line Support = National Depot

RSU

3rd Line Support = Regional Support Units

Region

Military Trans

Civilian Contractor

XX

Region

2nd Line Support = Division Motor Transport Regiments (MTRs)

HSC

1st Line Support = Battalion HSCs
# Regional Support Units Force Generation Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taji RSU</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMTB RSU</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Habbaniyah RSU</td>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>FOC</td>
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<td>Al Kasik RSU</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al Numaniyah RSU</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*LOG TRA Level 1 Capacity*
**Motor Transport Regiments Accelerated Force Generation Schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<tr>
<td>9th Division</td>
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- **Accelerated Completion Date**: Green Star
- **Original Completion Date**: Red Star

**Motor Transport Regiments are key enablers of logistics support. They will be accelerated by 10 months.**
# Headquarters Support Companies Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>% Trained</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Div</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>MAR 06</td>
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<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Div</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>MAY 06</td>
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<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Div</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>APR 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Div</td>
<td>124%</td>
<td>JAN 06</td>
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<tr>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Div</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>MAR 06</td>
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<td>54%</td>
<td>MAR 06</td>
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<td>31%</td>
<td>MAY 06</td>
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<td>107%</td>
<td>JAN 06</td>
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<td>9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Div</td>
<td>137%</td>
<td>JAN 06</td>
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<tr>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Div</td>
<td>95%</td>
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All Headquarters Support Companies complete Military Occupation Specialty training at Iraq Army Service and Support Institute by May 2006
# Signal Company Force Generation Schedule

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</table>

*Completion Date*

Signal Companies are key enablers of communications support. They have been accelerated to match battlespace handover.
**Units report 4,758 of 7,203 officers = 66% of requirement; shortage is 2,445**

**Units report 22,230 of 37,174 NCOs = 60% of requirement; shortage is 14,944**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 05</th>
<th>Jan 06</th>
<th>Feb 06</th>
<th>Mar 06</th>
<th>Apr 06</th>
<th>May 06</th>
<th>Jun 06</th>
<th>Jul 06</th>
<th>Aug 06</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>224</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Officers</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>2,577</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>3,009</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NCOs</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>16,600</td>
<td>18,600</td>
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</table>

Officer Generation conducted at three 1-Year Military Academies (Sandhurst model) and four Former Officer Course locations.

NCO Generation completed through Squad Leader and Platoon Sergeant Courses taught at ten Division-level Regional Training Centers and one National Military Training Base.
Political Update – January 4, 2006

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Classified by Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad
E.O. 12958: reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
DECL: 10/3/2016

Political Update
Overview

Election Issues

• IECI Board expected to finish deciding on “red” complaints by January 3.

• IECI will announce preliminary results January 8 and final results around January 20 – after IMIE releases findings or press statement.

• IMIE team began arriving on January 1 – full team arrived January 3.

• Political parties (Sunni and Allawi) are hoping IMIE produces:
  • Assessment of over-aggressive Shia campaign
  • Assessment of any election fraud issues

• Political parties want this report as leverage against the Shi’a during the government formation negotiations. If IMIE reports negative findings (i.e. voter intimidation favoring the Shi’a Alliance), Sunni/Allawi parties can argue for more sought-after positions.
Preliminary Election Results

Latest Election Data

- Shi'a Alliance, 129
- Tawafuq, 43
- Iraqi National List, 25
- National Dialogue Front, 11
- Reconciliation & Liberation, 3
- Al-Rissaliyun, 2
- Others, 4

NOTES:

-- Shi'a Alliance & Kurdish Alliance = 182 seats (2 short of 2/3 majority) – could meet with support of al-Rissaliyun (Sadrists)

-- Kurdish Alliance and Sunni blocs and Allawi = 135 seats

OTHERS =
  - Mithal al-Aloosi – 1
  - Iraqi Turkomen Front – 1
  - El Ezediah Movement – 1
  - Al-Rafidain – 1

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
Post-Election Government Transition

Progress Towards Unity Government

- Talks are still preliminary because the results are still uncertified, and the Sunni Arab bloc and the Iraqi National List still publicly await the results of the IMIE observer visit.
- Talks could be protracted. Two roughly equal blocs appear to be coalescing, each with a claim to half the seats of the Council of Representatives.
- The Kurds, Sunnis and Allawi coalesce on one side, with the Shi’a alliance on the other.
- Kurdish leaders are playing a central role. SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakeem addressed the Kurdish Parliament December 27; PM Jafari visited Barzani and Talabani January 1; Sunni leaders met Barzani and Talabani January 2.
- The Sunni bloc and the Iraqi National List speak publicly about the need for a National Unity Government, but they want a government where ministry distribution is not dependent on election results. Instead, they want equal shares for each party, regardless of its performance at the ballot box. Shi’a Alliance leaders have publicly rejected this idea.
Post-Election Government Transition

Potential Prime Minister Candidates

FRONTRUNNERS

- Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari (Dawa) – candidacy opposed by many within the Shi’a Alliance, but has the advantages of incumbency.
- Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi (SCIRI) – running into turbulence within the Shi’a Alliance.

OTHER CANDIDATES

- Deputy TNA Speaker Hussein Shahrastani (Independent) – trying to secure support of Shi’a independents. Not seen as a serious contender.
- Nadim Jabiri (Fadhila) – a potential compromise candidate if deadlock continues between Jafari and Abdul Mehdi.
- Outside of 555?
USCENTCOM
"Long War Update"
for
President Bush
4 January 2006

The overall classification of this briefing is:
SECRET//NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED
CENTCOM Theater of War

Summary
US troops: 232,000
Coalition troops: 24,000
US combat aircraft: 1,406
US combatant ships: 30
In a year of many challenges we emerge in a better strategic position today than this time last year...

- Iraq stabilizing, new government emerging, security forces developing
- Afghanistan emerging as a real state
- Al Qaida weakened, popularity damaged, hurt militarily
- Saudi Arabia killing terrorists, stepping toward reform
- Pakistan bolstering efforts against extremists
- Syria pressuring extremists out of self-preservation
- Theater-wide intel sharing and cooperation greatly improving
- Our military forces winning every fight
2006: Opportunities and Dangers

Opportunities to...
- Shift counter-insurgency fight to regional forces
- Solidify counter-terrorist effort throughout the region
- Unravel Al Qaida and other associated extremist groups in the region
- Pressure toward moderate behavior
- Encourage further political reform

Dangers from...
- Al Qaida reinventing itself as popular anti-US resistance
- Shia-Sunni violence escalating throughout the theater
- Oil infrastructure targeted and damaged
- Key leaders falling to assassination
- Terrorists acquiring WMD
Our Tasks in 2006

- Main effort to Iraqi stability:
  
  Legitimate government + effective security forces + economic opportunity = stability

- Secondary effort to Afghan security: internationalize effort through NATO, build confidence in government

- Hit Al Qaida and its associated movements wherever we find them in virtual or physical battlespace

- Anticipate the next terrorist problem: Al Qaida in Africa; Shia terrorism from Hezbollah

- Increase efforts to help Saudi Arabia and Pakistan help themselves against extremists

- Keep strategic resources flowing to world economy...show naval and air strength, build regional confidence against
**Afghanistan Overview**

- Secure the political process
  - Seating of the National Assembly and Provincial Councils
  - Economic infrastructure
  - Subjugating warlords
- Implement ISAF transition
- Develop partner security forces
  - Sustain ANA progress
  - Shift focus to ANP
- Secure PAK border; deny safe havens
  - PAK mil ops in PAK
  - PAK-AFG-US-ISAF coordination
- Support counter-narcotics efforts

---

**Upcoming Milestones**
- CAN bde in RC-South, Feb 06
- RC-South to NATO, May-Jul 06
- RC-East to NATO, Fall 06

---

OEF transition to NATO-ISAF ongoing; Coalition support to ANSF development continues as the main effort
Sensor-to-Shooter Link
- Enemy move toward PAK after attack on Camp Tillman
- Target identified by Predator; down-linked to JTAC’s ROVER
- Target destroyed by MK-82 airburst delivered by A-10
- video
Joint Warfighting: AFG
Joint Warfighting: Counter-IED in IRQ

- Shadow UAV detects enemy emplacing IED in roadbed
- Target passed to F-16
- F-16 tracks enemy to new location and destroys
- video
Joint Warfighting: Counter-IED

OPERATION NAME:
IRAQI FREEDOM

AIRCRAFT TYPE:
F-16CG

DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS IAW THEATER DIRECTIVES

SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR
Joint Warfighting: Earthquake Relief

1000 US service-members from all services commanded by RDML LeFever have had a strategic impact with our most important regional partner.
AQSL in FATA increasingly isolated. Saudi CT continues pressuring Al Qaida on the peninsula. Foreign intelligence services pursuing Al Qaida Network. Zarqawi network in Iraq pressured but still capable.
AQAM: The Main Enemy, A Threat in All Realms

Media and Propaganda

Internet and Proselytizing

Recruitment and Education

WMD Research and Development

Safe Havens

Facilitators, Smugglers

Financiers and Front Companies

Ideologically Sympathetic NGOs

Sympathetic Members of Legitimate Govt's

Technical Expertise Weapons Suppliers

Human Capital Fighters and Leaders

Training Camps
2005: Effects on Al Qaida

- Physically isolated Al Qaida senior leadership
- Captured or killed key operatives and significant leaders
- Branded their ideology as violent and extremist, and reduced its potential appeal in the region
- Gained greater partner nation cooperation in fighting Al Qaida across the region
- Pressure on network has prevented attacks on US Homeland
AQAM under pressure: some indicators

- "Muslim publics are expressing less support for terrorism than in the past. Confidence in Osama bin Laden has declined markedly in some countries and fewer believe suicide bombings that target civilians are justified in the defense of Islam."
  
  – Pew Global Attitudes Project – Islamic Extremism (14 Jul 05)

- "Support for Osama Bin Laden has declined significantly (51% favorable in May 2005 to just 33% in November), while those who oppose him rose over the same period from 23% to 41%. 73% of Pakistanis surveyed in November 2005 now believe suicide terrorist attacks are never justified, up from 46% just last May."

  – Pakistan branch of ACNielsen poll for D.C.-based nonprofit Terror Free Tomorrow (Nov 05)

- "In a survey of more than 1,000 , more than 87% of the respondents said they now considered al Qaeda a terrorist organization..." compared with only 11% prior to the Amman suicide bombings.

  – Washington Post (4 Dec 05)

Need to expose the enemy for what he is.
But...

- Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Zarqawi still at large
- Still seeking WMD
- Still capable of global operations
- Extremist recruit pool still active and dangerous
- Associated movements are emerging
- New methods for moving people, money, materiel
- We still have not contested their virtual realm
- Must improve our own intel
What is Needed to Defeat AQAM

- Physical capability
  - Operational capability
  - Increased intel-surveillance-recon (ISR) systems: “unblinking eye”
  - Access
    - Partnership (staff-like access and detailing)
    - Partner nation relationships
- Authorities and approvals
  - Authorities do not equal approval to conduct CT operations
  - Simplify and accelerate approval process for operations
  - Delegate: must provide maximum flexibility to the mission commander
- Make GWOT a truly inter-agency fight
  - Unity of command
  - Entire inter-agency effort on a wartime footing
2006: What to Expect from Al Qaida

- Continual push to regain lost popularity
- Focus offensive planning efforts against the West
- Attack oil infrastructure and create economic havoc
- Attack US Homeland
- Continued pursuit of WMD capability
- Enhance media image
For the Long War Ahead We Must...

- Continue to help others help themselves against extremism
- Enable regional states to take the lead against local insurgencies
- Shift our balance from counter-insurgency lead to counter-terrorism lead
- Posture our forces to keep the counter-terrorist lead against Al Qaida and Associated Movements (AQAM)
- Improve our intelligence gathering and targeting methods, especially against WMD
- Evolve our coalition to more readily share the military burden
- Improve integration of international and interagency capabilities: military, political, economic and information
- Invest in human capital: linguists, regional specialists
- Show no weakness to
- Expose our enemy's ideology and designs
The Long War...

- 21st Century Warfare is more about will and perception than it is about territory and enemies killed.
- Intelligence and precise action are more important than maneuver and mass.
- Winning comes slowly and subtly but we are winning...everywhere.
- Regional states are fighting harder than ever...we must help them help themselves more than we must do it for them.
- We still have too many barriers to decisive action...we must streamline our warfighting efforts across our government.
Discussion
MNF-I UPDATE
5 January 2006

This briefing is classified
SECRET
REL USA, AUS, GBR
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: 25 Dec 2015

Ilitzam Mushtarak – United Commitment
Completion of political process and recent operations have positioned us well for decisive action in 2006.

Appointment of a representative Iraqi government is key to success in 2006.

Political wrangling over constitutional amendment, federalism and provincial elections will dominate early tenure of new government.

Violence and intimidation will continue to be used to generate political effect.

Recent operations have disrupted Al Qa’eda in Iraq; must continue to split them from Sunni population.

Impacts of election, security transition and coalition reductions will not be seen immediately. Expect reductions in insurgent violence to be gradual.

Perception of increased 1.4b will continue to polarize Iraqi society.
2006 Challenges

- Forming government and building government capacity at national and provincial levels to meet basic needs of the population and establish rule of law.

- Sectarian tensions inhibiting government and security force development.

- Increased pressures of three years of coalition presence.

- Increased pressures for Iraqi freedom of action.

- Developing political element of insurgency will increase complexity of military operations.

- Balancing operations and troop reductions in a more complex environment.
MNF-I Mission Statement

In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.
Counterinsurgency Lines of Operation

Effects:

- Capable Iraqi Security Forces
- Defeat terrorists and neutralize insurgents
- Legitimate Iraqi Government
- Functioning rule of law institutions established
- Basic needs met
- Wedge driven between the insurgents and the population of Iraq
- Changed images
- Security responsibility passed to capable Iraqi Security Forces

End-State:

Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects human rights and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists
2006 Key Security Tasks

- Defeat Al Qa’eda in Iraq and continue neutralizing Rejectionist insurgency to reduce levels of violence.

- Continue transition of counter-insurgency campaign to ISF.

- Build police capacity to the point where they can begin assuming lead for internal security – Year of the Police.

- Support transition of the new Security Ministries and conduct of Provincial elections and Constitutional Referendum.

- Support Iraqi government efforts to limit the influence of “militias”.

- Support ISF in securing borders.

- Support ISF in securing Baghdad and 9 key cities.

- Transfer detention operations to Iraqis and implement detainee integration process.
**Operational Concept**

**Counterinsurgency Imperatives**

- Deny Enemy Sanctuary
- Deny Freedom of Movement
- Deny External Support
- Isolate Insurgents from Population
- Protect the Population
- Build Effective Local Security Forces
- Integrate political, economic, and information effects
Transition Concept

1. Implement Partnerships
2. Iraqi Army Lead
3. Iraqi Security Self Reliance
4. Provincial Iraqi Control

Ilitzam Mushtarak - United Commitment
Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace (based on DEC TRA data)

15 + 1 BCT Set

Currently Owns Battlespace

IA Division HQs

IA Brigades

* NOTE: 3/7, 2/9 and 3/9 in force generation, projected to assume battlespace in JAN 07
Projection of Iraqi Army Assumption of Battlespace

- Owns Battlespace
  Dec 05
- Projected to own battlespace by Oct 06

SPA Plans – 25 Dec 05

SECRET//REL-USA//
APR 06 PROJECTION

12 Brigades
38 Battalions
All 258 Border Forts projected to be complete

APR06 Forces Projection

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<th>Region</th>
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Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV
Transition Planning

- COA 1 “Baseline” 10 + 1 BCTs by Oct 06
- COA 2 “Stretch” 8 + 1 BCTs by Dec 06
- COA 3 “Exploitation” 8 + 1 BCTs by Sep 06
Key Transition Assumptions

- The insurgency will remain active, but will not expand beyond the current six provinces.

- The political process can diminish the Sunni Rejectionist component of the insurgency.

- Growth of ISF capability will remain on track.

- Shi’a Rejectionist violence can be contained with local security efforts.

- Coalition members will remain committed at close to current levels through 2006.

- MNF-I presence is a factor in Sunni Rejectionist violence.
Transition Planning Factors

- MNF Brigade partnered with each Iraqi Army Div HQ until they reach TRA Level 1.
- Maintain continuity between partnered MNF / IA units to the greatest extent possible.
- Option remains for three non-US Div HQs.
- As drawdown progresses, must replace “out of hide” MiTTs when below 13 US BCTs.
- Transition Teams required until ISF units meet TRA Level 1.
- Consider non-standard BCT structures where practical.
- Design plan to permit battalion-level off-ramps.
- Fully identify what logistics support we must provide to ISF.
- Next decision points are March 2006 for next step and Call Forward Force.
Off-Ramp Variables

- Threat conditions
- Capabilities of ISF
- Impact on partnerships
- Replacement of Transition Teams
- Ministry capability development
- Almost continuous realignment of battlespace
- Base transfers, consolidation and/or closures
- Enabler adjustment to support Transition Teams and ISF
- Transfer of equipment sets/property accountability
- Realignment of area coverage for Enabling Forces
COAs Based Off MNF-I Commander Guidance

1. COA 1 "Baseline"
   - 05-07 Off Ramped units
   - 1/10 MTN
   - 2/28 ID
   - 2/101 ID
   - 4/4 ID

2. COA 2 "Stretch"
   - RCT 7
   - 2/4 ID
   - 3/4 ID

3. COA 3 "Exploitation"
   - 2/28 ID
   - 1/10 MTN
   - 2/101 ID
   - 1/101 ID
   - 2/4 ID
   - 4/4 ID
   - RCT 7

* Acceleration Effects Sourcing of MiTTs, RFFs, PRTs, Partnerships, and Double RIPs

(b)(3), (b)(6)
MNC-I C3 Force Gen, 25 December 2005
COA 1 "Baseline": 10 + 1 x BCT Set by Oct 06

Decision Points:
- DP 1: ~21 IA Bdes > TRA 2 (NLT May)
- DP 2: ~28 IA Bdes > TRA 2 (NLT Aug)
- DP 3: ~33 IA Bdes > TRA 2 (NLT Oct)

Additional Resources Required:
- 15 x Augmented External TTs; plus additional medics and JFOs (~450 Pax)
- Additional MP Capability to support expanded P3
- Joint Enablers (enhanced ISR Capabilities)

Risk: MODERATE
Course of Action 1

Conditions Impacting Drawdown

- Formation of a representative government by Spring '06.
- Political process begins to diminish violence to levels containable by ISF with coalition enabling support.
- Iraqi Army and Police development continues generally at projected levels.
  - ~ 90% IA Bdes TRA 2 NLT Oct 06
  - ~ 50% IPS TRA 2 NLT Oct 06
- Improved security in Baghdad and 9 Key Cities.
- Sustain success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and Border regions.
- Security Ministries improve and can sustain forces with coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to coalition reductions.
**Decision Points:**
- DP 3: ~36 IA Bdes TRA 2 (NLT Dec)

**Additional Resources Required:**
- An additional 10 x Enhanced External TTs; ~100 Pax
  (Cumulative Total = 25 x External TTs; ~550 Pax)

**Risk:** MODERATE TO HIGH
Course of Action 2

Conditions Impacting Drawdown

- Formation of a representative government by Spring '06.

- Political process begins to diminish violence to levels containable by ISF with coalition enabling support.

- Iraqi Army and Police development continues generally at projected levels.
  - 1 x IA Division TRA Level 1 in MND-N NLT Dec 06
  - 1 x IA Division TRA Level 1 in MND-B NLT Dec 06
  - All remaining IA Bdes TRA Level 2 NLT Dec 06
  - 60% or greater IPS TRA Level 2 NLT Dec 06

- Improved security in Baghdad and 9 Key Cities.

- Sustain success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and Border regions.

- Security Ministries improve and can sustain forces with coalition support.

- No expansion of US battlespace due to coalition reductions.
COA 3 "Exploitation": 8 + 1 x BCT Set by Sep 06

Decision Points:
- DP 1: ~24 IA Bdes ≥ TRA 2 (NLT Apr)
- DP 2: ~33 IA Bdes ≥ TRA 2 (NLT Jun)
- DP 3: ~36 IA Bdes ≥ TRA 2 (NLT Sep)

Additional Resources Required:
- 25 x Augmented External TTs; plus additional medics & JFOs (~550 Pax)
- Additional MP Capability to support expanded P3
- Joint Enablers (enhanced ISR Capabilities)

Risk: HIGH
Course of Action 3

Conditions Impacting Drawdown

- Formation of a representative government by Spring '06.
- Political process begins to diminish violence to levels containable by ISF with coalition enabling support.
- Iraqi Army and Police development continues generally at projected levels.
  - 1 x IA Division TRA Level 1 in MND-N NLT Sep 06
  - 1 x IA Division TRA Level 1 in MND-B NLT Sep 06
  - All remaining IA Bdes TRA Level 2 NLT Sep 06
  - 60% or greater IPS TRA Level 2 NLT Sep 06
- Improved security in Baghdad and 9 Key Cities.
- Sustain success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and Border regions.
- Security Ministries improve and can sustain forces with coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to coalition reductions.
Take Aways

- Offramps are conditions-based; they will change.
- Level of friction and complexity limits pace of drawdown.
- Effects time lag and transportation cycle compounds decision complexity.
- Sectarian issues still not resolved.
- Accomplished in politically turbulent context.
- Leader and enabler centric versus combat troops.
- Nature of fight is changing.
Transition of Security Lead Base Plan

MNF-I ASSESSMENT
IRAQI CAPABILITY
US SUPPORT LEVEL

~138,000
~139,500
~125-130,000
~110-115,000
~105-110,000
~95-105,000

17 Brigades
17 (+) Brigades
15 Brigades
13 Brigades
12 Brigades
10 Brigades

ELECTION WINDOW

US forces

Irakian Capability

US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF

SPA Plans – 25 Dec 05
Ilitazam Mushtarak – United Commitment

SECRET//REL-USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)
Bad Things That Could Happen

- Shia government drives sectarian vice inclusive agenda.
- Sunni insurgents link with Al Qa'eda to hedge against Shia.
- Government unable to establish control over armed groups.
- Security forces fracture along ethnic lines.
- Iraqi government demands greater control over coalition military operations and/or timetable for coalition withdrawal.
- Resources for economic development fail to materialize.
- Iraqi detainee situation deteriorates.
- Sectarian violence bubbles over into civil war.
- Coalition force reductions embolden terrorists and insurgents.
What Do We Need

- Support for Transition Teams to replace “out of hide” MiTTs.
- Support for expanded Police Partnership Program.
- Joint Enablers (to include enhanced ISR capabilities).
- Limited support to Provincial Reconstruction Team Program.
- Joint work on counterinsurgency and counter-IED techniques.
- Patience on reduction planning and decisions.

- Sustain the Coalition.
- Regional Engagement to halt support to terrorists and foreign fighters and increase support for Iraqi Government.
- Interagency and International support of Iraqi Government Development.
- Increased support for economic development initiatives.
Back Up
**STAGE I**
(Operating In Battelspace)

**TRA 4-3**
- Lead/Support:
  - MNF-I in lead, IA in support
- Partnership:
  - Full Partnership
  - Coach, teach, mentor
  - MNF-I conducting training, leading operations
- MiTTs:
  - Full MiTT from BN to DIV
- Enablers:
  - MNF-I provides enablers to IA
- C2:
  - IA TACON to partnership unit
  - IA reports through partnership unit
- QRF:
  - Tactical level, close proximity, short response time

---

**STAGE II**
(Assuming Battlespace)

**Tactical Overwatch**
- Lead/Support:
  - IA in lead, MNF-I in support
- Partnership:
  - Evolving Partnership
  - MNF-I assisting with training and supporting operations
- MiTTs:
  - Full MiTT from BN to DIV
- Enablers:
  - MNF-I provides some enablers to IA
-C2:
  - IA TACON to MNF-I or IA higher HQ
  - IA reports to higher HQ
- QRF:
  - Tactical level, area coverage, longer response time

---

**STAGE III**
(Independent Operations)

**TRA 1**
- Lead/Support:
  - IA independent operations
- Partnership:
  - Peer Partnership
  - Routine interaction, professional dialogue, joint training/combined operations
- MiTTs:
  - MiTT at BDE and Above (Liaison Mission)
- Enablers:
  - IA provides enablers
- C2:
  - IA TACON to MNF-I or IA higher HQ
  - Progressively shift command to MOD, JHQ & IGFC
- QRF:
  - Operational level, area coverage, longer response time

---

**Operational Overwatch**
Iraqi Security Forces Update

9 January 2006

Iraqi Security Forces ministries provide much of this data.

This brief is classified: SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCFI//20151212

Data as of: 9 January 2006  Version M 1.7
**Total all Iraqi MoD and MoI Security Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ministry of Defense Forces</strong></th>
<th><strong>Trained &amp; Equipped</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army **</td>
<td>~89,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Infrastructure Bns</td>
<td>~3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Forces</td>
<td>~10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations</td>
<td>~1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>~500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Navy</td>
<td>~800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Interior Forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>~80,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Highway Patrol</td>
<td>~1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement</td>
<td>~18,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order Division</td>
<td>~8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>~400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commandos</td>
<td>~9,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>~1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignitary Protection</td>
<td>~600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>~120,100****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~226,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes approximately 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry of Interior but employed by other ministries. Does not include other site protection services or militias.

**The Iraqi Army consist of the Regular Iraqi Army, former Iraqi National Guard, former Iraqi Intervention Force, and Mechanized Forces.

***Ministry of Defense Forces: Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel are not included in these numbers. Unauthorized absences are no longer impacting operations.

****Ministry of Interior Forces: Exact Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel numbers are unknown. However, embedded Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) and the Police Partnership Program (PPPs) are gaining better fidelity on MOI present for duty status. As a result, all known police AWOL and causalties have been dropped from the rolls and are not included in these numbers.

Note: Numbers in this report are estimates derived from reports provided by Iraqi Security Forces.
Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces


(2) Other Police includes: Highway Patrol, Civil Intervention Forces, Emergency Response Unit, Special Police Commandos and Dignitary Protection

**Note:** Additionally, 74,000 Iraqis in the Facilities Protection Service have been trained by Ministry of Interior but are employed by other ministries. It should be noted that many Embassies and private contractors also have security forces.

**Note:** Ministry of Interior Forces: Exact Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel numbers are unknown. However, embedded Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) and the Police Partnership Program (P3s) are gaining better fidelity on MOI present for duty status. As a result, all known police AWOL and casualties have been dropped from the rolls and are not included in these numbers.

**Note:** Ministry of Defense Forces: Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel are not included in these numbers.

*Data as of: 9 January 2006*
# Iraqi Security Forces MoD Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>CURRENT IRAQI AUTHORIZATIONS</th>
<th>IN TRAINING**</th>
<th>TRAINED &amp; EQUIPPED 1 MAR 06</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING &amp; EQUIPPING COMPLETED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRAQI ARMY* (COMBAT)</td>
<td>103,943 112 BNs</td>
<td>1,200 98 BNs</td>
<td>~89,800 98 BNs</td>
<td>106 BNs DEC '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE BATTALIONS</td>
<td>3,036 4 BNs</td>
<td>480 4 BNs</td>
<td>~3,400 4 BNs</td>
<td>4 BNs OCT '05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL OPS</td>
<td>1,585 2 BNs</td>
<td>96 2 BNs</td>
<td>~1,500 2 BNs</td>
<td>2 BNs JUN '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT SUPPORT, SERVICE SUPPORT, &amp; TRAINING UNITS</td>
<td>19,507 13 BNs</td>
<td>429 6 BNs</td>
<td>~10,800 6 BNs</td>
<td>8 BNs DEC '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>1,141 6 SQDNs</td>
<td>0 3 SQDNs</td>
<td>~500 3 SQDNs</td>
<td>TBD based on Aircraft procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>1,652 3 SQDNs</td>
<td>38 2 SQDNs</td>
<td>~800 2 SQDNs</td>
<td>TBD based on Patrol Boat procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>130,864 131 BNs 9 SQDNs</td>
<td>3,233 110 BNs 5 SQDNs</td>
<td>~106,800 120 BNs 5 SQDNs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Iraqi Army consist of the Regular Iraqi Army, Former Iraqi National Guard, Former Iraqi Intervention Force, and Mechanized Forces.

** Individual Level Training Only.

Data as of: 9 January 2006
## Estimated MoD Forces Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>Battalions Authorized by Iraqi Ministry of Defense</th>
<th>Unit Capability</th>
<th>Coalition and ISF Fighting Side by Side</th>
<th>Iraqi Lead with Coalition Support</th>
<th>Independent Iraqi Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army (Combat)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Infrastructure Battalions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special OPS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL (Combat Units)</strong></td>
<td>118</td>
<td>10 (BNS)</td>
<td>49 (BNS)</td>
<td>52 (BNS)</td>
<td>1 (BNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support, Service Support, &amp; Training Units</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force (Squadron)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy (Squadron)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL (Battalions and Squadrons)</strong></td>
<td>140</td>
<td>15 (BNS &amp; SQNS)</td>
<td>52 (BNS &amp; SQNS)</td>
<td>60 (BNS &amp; SQNS)</td>
<td>1 (BNS &amp; SQNS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level 1, 2 and 3 units are engaged in operations against the enemy.**

- **Capable.** A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- **Capable.** A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
- **Partially Capable.** A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.
- **Not capable.** A Level 4 unit is being formed at the institutional training base or is not yet capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Data as of: 9 January 2006

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
# Iraqi Security Forces MoI Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>CURRENT IRAQI AUTHORIZATIONS</th>
<th>IN TRAINING**</th>
<th>TRAINED &amp; EQUIPPED*</th>
<th>TRAINED &amp; EQUIPPED 1 MAR 06</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING &amp; EQUIPPING COMPLETED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLICE</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>5,860</td>
<td>~80,400</td>
<td>~85,200</td>
<td>FEB '07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHWAY PATROL</td>
<td>6,262</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>~1,700</td>
<td>~2,100</td>
<td>AUG '07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BORDER ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>28,360</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>~18,700</td>
<td>~19,800</td>
<td>MAY '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order Brigade</td>
<td>10,595 (12 BNs)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>~8,000</td>
<td>~9,500</td>
<td>MAY '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>1,170 (3 BNs)</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>~1,200</td>
<td>~1,200</td>
<td>DEC '05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>~400 (1 BN-Equiv)</td>
<td>~400</td>
<td>JUN '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS</td>
<td>11,891 (12 BNs)</td>
<td>2,790</td>
<td>~9,100</td>
<td>~9,900</td>
<td>DEC '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIGNITARY PROTECTION</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>7,866</td>
<td>~600</td>
<td>~500</td>
<td>MAY '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>194,522</td>
<td></td>
<td>~120,100</td>
<td>~128,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Reflects losses in Iraqi Police due to casualties, other losses and personnel decisions.

** Individual Level Training Only.

*Data as of: 9 January 2006*
# Estimated MoI Special Police Forces Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>BATTALIONS AUTHORIZED BY IRAQI Ministry of Interior</th>
<th>UNIT CAPABILITY*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Units being Formed LEVEL 4</td>
<td>Coalition and ISF Fighting Side by Side LEVEL 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order Battalions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Battalons</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commando BNS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Police, Highway Patrol and Border Enforcement are not reflected in the capabilities chart. For conventional police forces, these metrics do not apply.

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- **Capable.** A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
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- **Not capable.** A Level 4 unit is being formed and is not yet capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

*Data as of: 9 January 2006*
Iraqi Army Lead (IAL) in Battle Space*

Progress in Achieving IAL

Projection of IAL - Mar 06

- Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff -
- Declassified on: 201506

Iraqi Security Forces are projected to assume triple the battle space assumed in November. Most progress is expected to take place in the Southern regions of Iraq.

*Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) updates this slide monthly using Effects Synchronization Board (ESB) information (Next ESB is 14 Jan 06).

**Battle space where Iraqi Police units are in the lead and working closely with Iraqi Army units is depicted in blue.

Data as of: 17 December 2005

Approved for Release
Building Ministerial Capacity
**Defense and Interior Ministries Manning**

Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I)

- Manning and Expertise

  - Advisory Support Teams (AST) became Transition Teams (TT) 1 Jan 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required and On-Hand Manning</th>
<th>Interim Solution[^2]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MnSTC-I Assessed Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD-AST</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHQ-AST</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3 Mol[^4]</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>215</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Iraqi Defense Ministry Officials[^5]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>46 (79%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Iraqi Interior Ministry Officials[^5]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Senior Police Officers: 23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian: TBD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^1]: Information from MNSTC-I briefing to SecDef on 23 Dec 05.
[^2]: Working through CENTCOM / MNF-I to determine progress of filling requirement since 23 Dec 05 briefing.
[^3]: JMD is being examined for revisions to allow cross leveled personnel to return to previous duty.
[^4]: Police Partnership Program (P3): MNSTC-I partners with IRMO to develop and strengthen IPS at the strategic level.
[^5]: Iraqi Ministry Officials information reflects the equivalent of political appointees in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

Data as of: 9 January 2006
Building ISF Support Capacity

(This section is for SecDef use only and not releasable)
Building ISF Support Capacity

- **Headquarters and Service Companies (HSC)** – Provides tactical level Combat Service Support capabilities to maneuver units supporting counterinsurgency operations.
- **Motorized Transport Regiments (MRTs)** – Provides additional logistical transportation support as required.
- **Mechanized Logistic Battalions** – Provides additional logistic security to the Motorized Transport Regiments.
- **Garrison Support Units (GSUs)** – Provides Direct Support and General Support supply and maintenance to the HSCs supporting maneuver units through a national level maintenance contract.
- **Regional Support Units (RSUs)** – Provides General Support resupply to the GSUs.
- **Taji National Depot** – Provides national level resupply to maneuver units.

*Data as of: 9 January 2006*
### Estimated MoD Logistic Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED BY IRAQI MOD</th>
<th>Units being Formed LEVEL 4</th>
<th>Coalition and ISF Supporting Side by Side LEVEL 3</th>
<th>Iraqi Lead with Coalition Support LEVEL 2</th>
<th>Independent Support Operations LEVEL 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANIES (HSC)</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTORIZED TRANSPORT REGIMENTS (MRTs)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHANIZED LOGISTIC BATTALIONS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TACTICAL ASSETS</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (GSUs)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL SUPPORT UNITS (RSUs)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAJI NATIONAL DEPOT (TND) AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT COMMAND</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT HEADQUARTERS M4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL OPERATIONAL ASSETS</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD DIRECTOR GENERAL (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level 1, 2 and 3 units are engaged in support operations.**

- Fully Independent. A Level 1 unit is fully capable of providing logistic support without coalition support.
- In the Lead. A Level 2 unit is capable of providing logistic support with some Coalition support.
- Supporting Alongside. A Level 3 unit is capable of providing logistic support with significant Coalition support.
- Forming. A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of providing logistic support.

Data as of: 9 January 2006
### Iraqi Security Forces MoD Logistic Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>CURRENT IRAQI AUTHORIZATIONS</th>
<th>IN TRAINING</th>
<th>TRAINED &amp; EQUIPPED</th>
<th>TRAINED &amp; EQUIPPED 31 MAR 06</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING &amp; EQUIPPING COMPLETED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANIES (HSC)</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>JUN '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTORIZED TRANSPORT REGIMENTS (MRTs)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>~2,100 (3 MTRs)</td>
<td>~4,300 (6 MTRs)</td>
<td>DEC '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHANIZED LOGISTIC BATTALIONS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>JUL '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (GSUs)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SEP '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL SUPPORT UNITS (RSUs)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>~3,500 (4 RSUs)</td>
<td>~3,900 (4 RSUs)</td>
<td>SEP '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAJI NATIONAL DEPOT (TND) AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>FEB '07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT COMMAND</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>JUL '06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT HEADQUARTERS M4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>JUL '06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data as of: 9 January 2006
Strategy for Supporting Iraq

Future

Present

Support a legitimate Iraqi Government

8 Strategic Objectives for achieving success in Iraq

- Transition to Security Self-Reliance
- Defeat the Insurgents
- Neutralize Insurgency
- Compact for Democratic Government
- Provide Essential Services
- Strengthen Iraq’s capacity to forge a national compact
- Strengthen the rule of law
- Increase international support for Iraq
- Strengthen public understanding of the Insurgents

Insurgents

Iraqi People Who Are On the Fence

Support a legitimate Iraqi Government

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
Iraqi Army — Defend Iraq against external threats and, when directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security. Provides command and control for Strategic Infrastructure forces.


Strategic Infrastructure Battalions — Defend critical oil and electric strategic infrastructure.

Combat Support, Service Support and Training Units — Provide material and logistics to Iraqi Army.

Air Force — Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities.

Navy - Conduct security operations along the Iraqi coastline and in territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles.
Ministry of Interior Forces

- **Police** — Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security.
- **Highway Patrol** — Provide law enforcement, public safety, internal security, and convoy security along Iraq’s Highways.
- **Border Enforcement** — controls Iraq’s international borders. Responsible for patrolling borders, enforcing customs, and managing immigration.
- **Civil Intervention Force** — Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and counterinsurgency. Civil Intervention Forces are comprised of two separate units: a Public Order Brigade and the 8th Mechanized Brigade.
- **Emergency Response Unit** — Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.
- **Special Police Commando Battalions** — Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion.
- **Dignitary Protection** - Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.

Data as of: 9 January 2006
Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA)

- An Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi forces to perform counterinsurgency missions
- TRA assessment areas:
  - Overall Readiness Assessment
  - Personnel
  - Command and Control
  - Training
- Sustainment / Logistics
- Equipment
- Leadership

- As with all nations’ security forces, Iraqi units are at varying levels of readiness and experience
  - Some units currently are taking on insurgents and terrorists
  - Most units are planning and executing anti-terrorist operations with Coalition support or in conjunction with Coalition units

Note: For the most part, numbers in this report are estimates derived from reports provided by Iraqi Security Forces.
THIS WEEK:

- **33 Iraqi Students are training out of country**
  - AMEDD Basic x 1
  - Ranger x 5
  - NPS-SPECOPS Masters X 2
  - DLI (Air Command and Staff) X 3
  - Army War College X 1
  - Intermediate Level Education X 1
  - National War College X 1
  - National Defense University Counter Terrorism x 2
  - DLI (ILE) x 1
  - Marine Corps Command and Staff x 1
  - DLI (Armor) x 1
  - DLI (Quartermaster Basic Officer’s Course) x 2
  - DLI (Advance Aerospace Medical) x 1
  - DLI (Infantry Basic Officer’s Course) x 2
  - DLI (Ordnance) x 1
  - DLI (Aircraft Maintenance Officer) x 2
  - DLI (Air War College) x 1
  - DLI (Intel Officer Advanced) x 4
  - DLI (Engineer Officer Basic) x 1
Future Out of Country Training:

- 23 Future out of country training
  - Basic Intel 1 seat
  - Program on Terrorism & Sec Studies (PTSS) 1 seat
  - Infantry Career 1 seat
  - AMEDD CPT Career 2 seats
  - Navy Staff College 1 seat
  - Intel Officer Advanced 1 seat
  - C-130 Flight Engineer 1 seat
  - Army War College 2 seat
  - National Defense University Counter Terrorism 1 seat
  - Ranger 5 seats
  - Army CGCS 1 seat
  - AMEDD Basic 2 seat
  - Intel Crisis C2 2 seats
  - US Military Academy 1 seat
  - US Air Force Academy 1 seat
## Iraqi Security Forces Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
<th>NUMBER IN TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Regular Army</td>
<td>Basic &amp; Skill Training: 8-12 weeks</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Soldier Basic Training: 5 weeks</td>
<td>1,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IA Combat Organizational Training</td>
<td>1,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSS Organizational Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Special Ops Force</td>
<td>Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit Tactics)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commando Battalion</td>
<td>12-week Special Operator Course in Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Counter Terrorist Task Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Infrastructure Battalions</td>
<td>Basic Training: 4 weeks</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Varied by Specialty: 1.5 months</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Basic Training: 8 weeks followed by specialized training at Umm Qasr</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Police Service</td>
<td>Former Academy Graduates: 3 week TIP</td>
<td>7,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Recruits: 10 week Academy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order Brigade and Mechanized Police</td>
<td>6 Week and 8 Week Basic Training</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commandos</td>
<td>6-Week Academy Training</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>4 week Basic; 4 week Specialized Training</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>4-Week Academy and Specialized Training</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>3-Week Academy Training</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Dignity Protection</td>
<td>3-Week Initial Training; 2-3 Week Advanced Training</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow-on Mentoring by US Contractors and Navy Seals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>11,435</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data as of: 9 January 2006
# Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

Projected percentage of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces on hand over time*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Current Iraqi Authorized</th>
<th>9 JAN 06</th>
<th>31 MAR 06</th>
<th>30 JUN 06</th>
<th>30 SEP 06</th>
<th>31 DEC 06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army (Combat) **</td>
<td>103,943 112 BNs</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Infrastructure Battalions</td>
<td>3,036 4 BNs</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operation Forces</td>
<td>1,585 2 BNs</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support, Service Support, &amp; Training and Support Units</td>
<td>19,507 13 BNs</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,141 6 SQDNs</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,652 3 SQDNs</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These percentages do not reflect Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) capability.

** The Iraqi Army consist of the Regular Iraqi Army, former Iraqi National Guard, former Iraqi Intervention Force, and Mechanized Forces

Legend: 
- **85-100 % OF REQUIREMENT**
- **60-84 % OF REQUIREMENT**
- **59 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT**

Data as of: 9 January 2006
## Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

Projected percentage of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces on hand over time*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Current Iraqi Authorized</th>
<th>9 JAN 06</th>
<th>31 MAR 06</th>
<th>30 JUN 06</th>
<th>30 SEP 06</th>
<th>31 DEC 06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>6,262</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement</td>
<td>28,360</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Intervention Force: Public Order Brigades</td>
<td>10,595</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Intervention Force: Mechanized Police Brigades</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commando BNs</td>
<td>14,891</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignitary Protection</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>At 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These percentages do not reflect Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) capability.

**Legend:**
- Light Green: 85-100% of requirement
- Yellow: 60-84% of requirement
- Red: 59% or less of requirement

Data as of: 9 January 2006
MoD Combat Forces Capability

MONTHLY REPORTING^{2}(2)

- Capable. A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- Capable. A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
- Partially Capable. A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.

(1) Combat Forces include Iraqi Army only
(2) Embedded Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) refined their reporting procedures resulting in more accurate assessments

Data as of: 9 January 2006

Approved for Release
**MoI Special Police Forces Capability**

**MONTHLY REPORTING**

- **Capable.** A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- **Capable.** A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
- **Partially Capable.** A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.

(1) Combat Forces include Special Police Commandos, Mechanized Police Battalions, Public Order Battalions, and Emergency Response Unit

(2) The majority of the embedded Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) joined their Iraqi counterparts and provided more accurate reporting

Data as of: 9 January 2006

Approved for Release
**Significant Events Since Last Report**

**TRAIN:**
- POB 8 Public Order Training Academy at An Numinayah (24 Dec-9 Feb 06).
- Special Police Forces Company Grade Officer Training at Camp Solidarity 2 Jan-17 FEB 06; Special Police Forces NCO Training at Camp Solidarity 6 week course for 100 Students.
- Commando Basic Course at Camp Solidarity starts on 2 January, 6 week course for 279 students.

**EQUIP:**
- Issued to Ministry of Defense Forces:
  - 75 vehicles, 0 sets of body armor, 135 weapons, and 1,069,500 rounds of ammunition.
- Issued to Ministry of Interior Forces:
  - 55 vehicles, 740 sets of body armor, 7,405 weapons and 317,504 rounds of ammunition.

**BUILD:**
Contract Award:
- FOB Solidarity, Special Police Training Academy ($985K – ISFF); ECD is 1 Apr 06 (90 days).
- Commando Site #3, ($920K – QRF); ECD - 20 Feb 06.

Data as of: 9 January 2006
Significant Events Since Last Report

Project Starts:
- Renovations on the Zab Police Station, ($70k--IRRF).
- Renovations on the Ranya Police Stations, ($86k--IRRF). ECD is 08 Mar 06.
- Police Station Resol, ($360k--IRRF), in Al-Karma, Al-Anbar Province, on 12 Oct 05. ECD is 10 Jan 06 and is 67% complete.
- Demolition of Salman Pak Police Station, ($300k--ISFF). ECD is 23 Mar 06.
- Construction started on the Salman Pak Police Station, ($1M--ISFF). ECD is 28 Jun 06.
- Construction started on the Check Point #19 (Al Bauaitha), ($346k--IRRF). ECD 31 Jan 06 and is 45% complete.
- Construction began on IA 2/4/2 Bn Batufa Compound, ($626k--ISFF). ECD is 24 Jun 06.
- Construction began on IA 2/4/2 Bn Qadish Compound, ($795k--ISFF). ECD is 24 Jun 06.
- Construction started on the Southwest Fallujah Iraqi Police Station, ($2M--IRRF). ECD is 31 Mar 06.
- Renovations started on the Peramagroom Police Station, ($42k--IRRF).

Projects Completed:
- Complete Al Kadhimya Patrol/Al Taji Patrol Station, ($620k--IRRF),
- Zafarania POB, 3 BN/2 PO BDE ($979K – IRRF)
- Baladat POB, 3rd PO BDE HQ ($324K – QRF)
- Force Protection Along Rt. Irish, ($254K – QRF);
- Ali Al Gharbi Police Station construction is complete for a $300k in Najadiya, Maysan Province.
- Construction is complete (four months ahead of schedule) for a $300k Police Station Project in Al Amarah, Maysan Governorate.
- Upgrades completed on the Zakho Military Academy (ZMA), ($402k--ISFF).
**Significant Events Since Last Report**

**MENTOR/EMPLOY:**

- The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) continued Operation EID, Route Security with the 5th DIV assuming responsibility for the Khalis Road.
- 1 AR company for the 1st BN, 1st BDE, 9th DIV deployed to support Operation EID.
- Eighteen Iraqi Army Battalions, one Transportation Battalion, and two Police Commando Battalions are conducting operations in and around Mosul/Tal Afar.
- Twelve Iraqi Army Battalions, three Public Order Battalions, and one Police Commando Battalion are conducting operations in Ramadi/ Habbaniyah/ Fallujah corridor.
- Seventeen Iraqi Army Battalions, two Public Order Battalions, five Police Commando Battalions and elements of the 8th Police Mechanized Brigade are conducting operations in Baghdad.
- One battalion of Police Commandos, one Iraqi Army Battalion and Iraqi Police are conducting operations in Samarra.
- Three Iraqi Army Battalions and one Transportation Battalion are conducting operations in northern Wasit Province.
- One Iraqi Army Battalion and three Public Order Battalions are conducting operations in Salman Pak.
- Three Iraqi Army Battalions are conducting operations in Baqubah.
- Two Special Border Force Battalions are conducting operations in vicinity of the Al Waleed and Trebil border crossings. Border elements are supported by Department of Homeland Security Border Support Teams at 1.4b, 1.4d
- One Squadron is flying Infrastructure Reconnaissance and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance missions from Basrah and Kirkuk.