

Major Decisions – First 100 Days

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As of 10 JAN 06

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Link to CENTRIX online documents:

(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Expansion

1. ISSUE. Establishment, sustainment, and MNC-I support for Department of State-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).

2. LEAD. C9 Plans: (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background
 - May/June 2005 – Implementation of DoS-led Provincial Support Teams (PST) and establishment of Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees (PRDC) in 15 provinces
 - July 2005 – commitment of \$10M CERP to each of the eight PRDCs with MNF-I defined strategic cities
 - July 2005 – Initial MNF-I PST/PRDC assessments; determined program was failing and required increased commitment, established WG that ultimately led to decision to implement PRTs
 - November 2005 – Three "proof of principle" (PoP) PRTs established (Ninewa, Kirkuk, Babil provinces), all where Regional Embassy Offices exist
 - December 2005 – MNF-I/USMI assessment of PoP PRTs; MNC-I puts a Civil Affairs (CA) Company or equivalent in DS of each PoP PRT
- Higher HQ Guidance: pending January 15 assessment.
- Facts
 - PRTs are interagency governance capacity development teams, under Department of State (DoS) leadership. They are responsible for operational-level governance and economic lines of operation, and have significant MNC-I support. Keystone element is USAID's contracted Local Governance Program (LGP), with 3-5 expats and 15-25 third-country hires
 - Key PRT functions in provinces are supposed to revolve around capacity development, Rule of Law, economic development, and reconstruction
 - DoS wants to implement a total of 15 PRTs and one RRT (regional) for the Kurdish area; RROCs and SROCs will co-locate with PRTs
 - PRTs do not have a direct C2 relationship with MSCs, MNC-I, or MNF-I; they report directly to the National Coordination Team (NCT), which is a Chief of Mission (COM) agency (although it has a number of military members assigned to it); no MNC-I rep or LNO formally represented on NCT
 - NCT is responsible to Senior Executive Committee, chaired by IRMO director (Ambassador Speckhard)
 - Senior Executive Committee is responsible to Strategic Mission Council, which includes GEN Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad
- Assumptions
 - We anticipate 11 or 12 US PRTs, with the UK and other coalition partners taking the four SE provinces and ROK and/or Dutch taking the RRT.
 - As US forces off-ramp and FOBs consolidate, PRTs will delay FOB closures, with consequent increased security requirements impeding off-ramp plan.

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- Risk
 - Desynchronization of campaign plan if Gov/Econ LOOs no longer synchronized with security LOO.
 - Friction between PRT and MSC over priorities of effort and support could desynchronize tactical efforts across LOOs.
 - Overcommitment of CA forces to PRTs will leave BCTs without tactical CA support.
 - Issues and Challenges
 - Expansion: NCT wants to continue expansion at the rate of 3 per month, beginning late January. Initial expansion provinces are likely to be Najaf, Baghdad, and Salah ad Din. 101st would rather do Diwaniyah first, and UK may decide to contribute in January as well.
 - Assessment: NCT has developed two assessments: operational (really just status reporting) and functional (effects assessments). The December 30-day operational assessment was inadequate for GEN Casey; he directed a reassessment on 15 January, that better addresses real issues and decision points. First functional assessments are due in early January from PRTs.
 - Civil Affairs commitment: we want the latitude to give one CAT-A and a CAPT per PRT; NCT has been demanding a CA CO per; last guidance from GEN Casey was for a CA CO to the PoP PRTs.
 - Security commitment: NCT doesn't know what they will provide from DoS side, but ultimately wants the capacity to conduct three simultaneous movements, with site security. We estimate that would take at least one INF PLT per PRT. Issue is currently with GEN Casey for review.
 - Manpower Cost Analysis: MNC-I prepared a manpower review for the C3 to brief GEN Casey. Depending on size of CA commitment and number of US PRT provinces, numbers range from 544-1047 pax through July 06—and will rise following then as maneuver footprint consolidates away from FOBs that PRTs will be on.
 - Staffing: Currently a DOD/DoS MOU is in staffing, but is likely to take some time for concurrence; we anticipate uncertainty and ambiguity of support details during implementation as a result. MNF-I should issue an expansion FRAGO following the January assessment.
4. RECOMMENDATION/MNC-I POSITION.
- MNC-I commitments should be stated as task and purpose, so we can build tailored packages to support the PRTs.
 - Civil Affairs commitment should be for a CAT-A and CAPT minimum, not a CA CO.
 - Movement security will require an infantry platoon to conduct two simultaneous movements, with site security.
 - A detailed conditions check is necessary for each PRT prior to final implementation approval—particularly important for interagency commitments.
5. DECISION POINT. None for MNC-I. MNF-I/USMI decision point for expansion and MNF-I military commitments will come at or following 15 DEC assessment.

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1. **Issue:** Development of an MNC-I Kurdish Policy
2. **Lead:** C3 Plans with C3 ISF Support, POC (b)(3), (b)(6)
3. **Discussion:** CG MNC-I has recognized the requirement to have a comprehensive policy for Kurdish issues. This requirement has surfaced as the Kurdish influence has begun to assert itself with the completion of the national elections and will continue with the seating of the new Government of Iraq.
4. **Recommendation / Way Ahead:** C3 Plans with C3 ISF is tasked to formulate and recommend the MNC-I position on Kurdish issues for approval by the CG MNC-I.

Approved for Release

Baghdad Bypass Fact Sheet

1. Issue. MND-B identified the need to reduce the volume of coalition traffic in Baghdad to reduce CF presence and negative interactions with citizens. The problem traffic was identified as north-south logistics convoys that must travel through the urban areas to their final destination.

2. Lead (C7 Facilities, (b)(3), (b)(6)) C7 Facilities Operations Chief, (b)(6)
(b)(6)

3. Discussion

- **Background.** Currently, convoys travel on MSR Tampa north and south from northern Iraqi operating bases to Kuwait and back again. This route takes all convoys through urban areas of Baghdad. The enemy uses improvised explosive devices (IED) and vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs) to inflict Coalition casualties as well as loss of equipment and supplies on these routes. The urban environment also requires convoys to reduce traveling speed below the desired average of 45 MPH. This creates a greater susceptibility to attacks on convoys. Also, additional traffic backups the convoys cause in the city pose a safety problem for the populace.
- **HQ Guidance:** C7 received guidance from the Corps Chief of Staff to explore the possibility of creating a bypass route that will avoid urban areas as much as possible and provide the capability of greater convoy security. Analyzing the use of current supply routes in place was encouraged but C7 was not restricted to using only the current routes to develop feasible courses of action. C7 was also advised to work with GRD and the Iraqi Government in order to develop an Iraqi acceptable solution if possible.
- **Facts:** Current logistical routes used to get through/around Baghdad have the following mileage and traveling times: Center- 200KM; 4hrs travel time; no restrictions, Eastern- 296KM; 7-9 hrs travel time; 2 bridges restrict route to one-way movement, Western- 320KM; 6.5 hrs travel time; no restrictions. A bypass will require Military Construction (MILCON) appropriations to be completed. There are existing bypass plans and some work has been completed by the Iraqis for an expressway connecting northern and southern Baghdad called the Dora-Yusufyah Expressway.
- **Assumptions/Risks:** The use of existing routes can potentially reduce overall construction duration but not significantly reduce cost. The use of rural routes makes it easier to spot enemy activity but could limit communication and combat support to convoys. Any new construction will

be partially funded by Iraqi's. The route will be a two lane highway and will have civilian traffic using the roads at the same times as the convoys.

- **Issues and Challenges:** The Iraqi Ministry of Housing and Construction is working with the C7 to put together a mutually beneficial route, though at this time an outer ring route does not appear to be a high priority for their civilian traffic plan. Land acquisition for right of way poses a problem in that the time required to obtain the right of way could exceed the construction time. Existing routes will require regular maintenance and spot repairs after extended use.

4. Recommendations//MNC-I Position. C7 is currently working to develop feasible courses of actions (COA) to meet the requirement. Route surveys from the air, from imagery as well as ground are scheduled to gather data on the conditions of existing roads and bridges and to investigate the challenges of building new roads through private lands. Ongoing meetings with the Iraqi Government are being held to gather information on the feasibility and impact the bypass would create. The C7 will collect the results of the route surveys and in conjunction with the MNC-I staff rank order the COAs before presenting a recommended COA to the MNC-I CG. This recommendation once approved will be presented to the Force Commanding General on 15 January 2006.

5. Decision Point. Recommended course of action to MNC-I CG at 9 Jan 06 SPM.



Baghdad Bypass

Update Brief

MNC-I C7, JAN 06

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


Background - Way Ahead

Problem Statement: Create route outside of Baghdad that redirects north-south convoys outside of urban areas to reduce the presence of coalition forces in the city.

Background:

- MND-B Identified need to reduce Coalition Force traffic within the city of Baghdad
- Bypass studied by military (Baghdad 1-495 in 2004) and joint study Iraqi-Italian (Apr05)



Way Ahead

- Conduct aerial recon, route surveys, develop scopes of work, refine cost/time estimates
- Continue coordination's with Ministry of Construction and Housing/IRMO/GRD
- Rank order COAs and present to MNC-I CG at 9 Jan SPM
- Present recommended COA to GEN Casey NLT 15 Jan

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Iraqi Solutions

Dora-Yusifiyah Expressway Iraqi #1 priority for

expressways, passes straight through Baghdad

- Advantages: Iraqi support, shortest route, route already designed and partially constructed
- Disadvantages: Does not reduce CF presence in Baghdad, confines CF convoys to one route

Baghdad Ring 4 (Exterior Ring Road) Lesser Iraqi priority

- Advantages: Would reduce CF presence, several segments of route already built, closely matches Military COAs
- Disadvantages: Time to construct (Right of Way), threat


Inner Ring (Ring 3) Already constructed; repairs to 4 overpasses underway

Other

- Need to meet with Iraqi Ministry
- Engagement with SME who is willing to help
- Work with PCO/GRD for potential IRRF involvement




MSR Tampa



Iraqi Expressway (Planned/Actual)

Legend





MSC Feedback

MND-NC

- Use eastern route


MND-B

- Go east

COSCOM

- Stay center, threat is equal
- Eastern route will require additional CF resources, Possible CSC
- NW Bypass Supports LSAA to MNF-W logistic convoys and TND distribution in support of ISF
- No CF Presence and enablers ISO eastern route, will need more forces to secure both
- Eastern routes bridges are chokepoints


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
MSR Tampa



New Construction



Repair/Upgrade






COA 1 NW Bypass

- Cost: \$28M
 - Time: 24 months (minimum)
 - Asset: Contractor
 - Length New Const: 16 KM (\$26)
 - Length Repair/Upgrade: 8 KM (\$2M)
- ### Advantages
- Maximum use of highest MLC route
 - Close to Iraqi Ring 5 solution
 - Focused route security/clearance
 - Existing support along route
 - Lowest cost
 - Best bypass for LSAA to VBC and MNF-W convoys

Disadvantages

- Known threat area
- Time to completion

Legend




MSR Tampa



New Construction



Repair/Upgrade





COA 2 Modified Eastern Route

- Cost: \$79M
- Time: 10 months
- Asset: Contractor
- Length Repair/Upgrade: 200KM (\$79M)
- Estimated Maint Cost: \$134k-\$200k/month


Advantages

- Lower threat at start
- Shortest time to start and complete

Disadvantages

- Longer route over lower MLC road
- Splits route security/clearance assets
- Will require regular maintenance
- Convoys more susceptible to attack on this route
- Less CF presence and enablers on route

Legend




MSR Tampa



New Construction



Repair/Upgrade






COA 3 SE Bypass

- Cost: \$66M
 - Time: 24 months (minimum)
 - Asset: Contractor
 - Length Repair/Upgrade: 137 KM (\$39M)
 - Length New Construction: 24 KM (\$27M)
- ### Advantages
- Shortens Eastern Route by 60KM
 - SE segment closely matches Iraqi Ring 5
 - Less threat at start

Disadvantages

- Time to completion, could use MJB to mitigate
- Longer route over lower MLC road
- Less CF presence and enablers on route





COA 4 Dora-Youssifiyah/Inner Ring

- Cost: \$69M
- Time: 12-18 months
- Asset: Contractor

Advantages

- Design complete
- Right of Way established
- One interchange 85% complete; pilings driven on the second one (2 required)
- Provides flexibility (alternate routes)
- Iraqi's #1 priority for new highway construction
- Shortest, both in distance and time
- Allows traffic to flow through completely without stopping

Disadvantages

- Traffic is within city limits of Baghdad
- EFP threat along eastern portion

Legend



MSR Tampa



New Construction



Inner Ring



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BACK UP SLIDES

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Facts:

- Current routes and alternate routes used to get through/around Baghdad
 - Center- 200KM; 4hrs travel time; no restrictions
 - Eastern- 296KM; 7-9 hrs travel time; 2 bridges restrict movement
 - Western- 320KM; 6.5 hrs travel time; no restrictions
- Existing Iraqi plans for expressways in Baghdad includes the Dora-Yusufyah Expressway (\$60-90M) (#1 Priority)
- Resulting bypass will be a co-used by military and civilian traffic

Assumptions:

- Selected bypass project will be funded
- Any new construction will be funded in part by Iraqi's
- North-South Convoys will not be redirected to the eastern route until recon is complete and route is repaired
- Two-lane bypass route is suitable for logistic convoys
- Minimum 45 days to deploy additional active duty construction units after approval of RFF (75 days for USAR/ARNG)

Constraints:

- MILCON funding limits and timing
- Delayed decision from Government of Iraq until well after election
- Military construction engineer capabilities are limited in theater and throughout all services

Issues and Considerations:

- Existing routes will require regular maintenance and spot repairs after extended use
- Iraqi priority for expressways is the Dora-Yusufyah Expressway that passes straight through the center of Baghdad
- No SOFA for CF actions in ISF transferred AOs

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


Baghdad Bypass Threat Assessment

BLUF: COA 2 is marginally better- minimizes exposure to threat south of Baghdad. However expect attacks to continue as traffic increases on the Eastern Route due to the presence of T&FF & IZR.

Threat Conditions

- The majority of attacks against sustainment convoys are not effective
- Baghdad and its suburbs have the greatest concentrations of insurgent cells and attacks in ITO
- Routes that run through these areas will be attacked- IEDs, DF, IDF
- North of Baghdad, Eastern Route to LSAA runs through concentrations of IZR, SDM and T&FF cells



6 January 2006

SUBJECT: Ministerial Development

1. ISSUE. Provide background information on the development of ministerial capabilities within the security ministries – the Ministries of Defense and Interior

2. LEAD. MNSTC-I, (b)(3), (b)(6) – Special Assistant to CG, MNSTC-I

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background. On 1 October, 2005, MNSTC-I took over responsibility for the development of the ministerial capabilities within the security ministries from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) – a sub-element within the US Embassy that falls under State Department control. MNSTC-I is now responsible for developing the MoD from soldier to minister and the Mol from policemen to minister.
- MNSTC-I Lines of Operation.
 - Build and Sustain Mol/MoD Institutional Capability – End state: Legitimate Iraqi Government
 - Generate Capable ISF – End state: Capable ISF
 - Develop Professional ISF – End state: Changed images
 - MNSTC-I Transition and Transformation – End state: Transfer security to capable ISF
- Ministerial Transition Teams and Assessments.
 - The Ministerial transition teams (MoD-TT and Mol-TT) are a mix of civilian and military personnel.
 - Part of the role of the TTs is to develop a professional, enduring civil service.
 - Each of the TTs is focused on developing 17 systems required in a capable bureaucracy. Their primary focus is on 8 of the systems which are the minimal essential systems: executive support, develop intelligence, plans and policy, manage personnel, provide logistic support, communicate, budget and contracting, and inspector general.
 - MNSTC-I has develop a ministerial-level TRA process which it is now validating. These assessments measure progress against action plans and milestones for each ministerial system. The key aspect of this process are the one- and six-month action plans to overcome assessed issues/challenges and to stay on track to meet transition milestones.
- Issues and Challenges.
 - Transition period with yet to be determined new ministers.

SUBJECT: MOD Memorandum of Understanding for Iraqi Army Brigade Boundaries and Basing

1. ISSUE. Gaining Ministry of Defense signature on agreement with the MNC-I/IGFC approved Iraqi Army End State Brigade Boundaries and Basing Decisions

2. LEAD. C3 ISF- (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background. Iraqi Divisional boundaries have been identified and in effect since early 2005. As we are now seeing Iraqi Army Brigades begin to own battle space throughout the JOA, a need to clearly identify those brigade operational areas and the basing required to maintain a presence for those units within that operational area developed.
- Facts.
 - 5 December 2005, MNC-I CG decision on Iraqi Army Brigade Boundaries
 - 12 December 2005, MNC-I CG decision on Iraqi Army Basing
 - 6 January 2006, Operation Alaam Aljadeed- Movement of 3/5th IA Brigade to Diyala Province back brief to MNC-I CG
 - Mission planning for movement of 3/7th IA completing training in progress
- Assumptions.
 - Corps Partnership efforts will continue to augment C2 Functions of IGFC
 - Operation EID will continue, with follow on repositioning of 3/5th to Diyala
 - LTG Abdul Qadir will remain as CG despite new Iraqi Government
 - IGFC will not receive TACON of 8th Division until a minimum TRA 3 (TBD) capability is established
 - 3/7th IA Brigade deploys between 21 January and 10 February 2006, conducts relief in place of 1/1 IA Brigade
 - With election results not released, MOD will show reluctance in signing formal documents in the interim until a new government is formed
- Risk. 3/7th IA as new unit conducting operations in Al Qaim area of operations vice their training readiness
- Issues and Challenges.
 - Competing movements of 3/7th and 3/5th will challenge movement assets that support movement to end state boundaries
 - Coordination and modification of life support contracts through Iraqi Command Channels
 - MNSTC-I agreement on basing requirements MNC-I has presented
 - Funding for barracks and other infrastructure limited
 - IGFC can not resource Iraqi Army needs under current JHQ/MOD Constraints (no budget, O&M Funds, other resources) to improve Iraqi bases

4. RECOMMENDATION. Continue to press MOD for their approval of the Iraqi Army Brigade Boundaries and basing solution
5. DECISION POINT.
 - 15 February to re-look basing solutions if MNSTC-I funding can not support basing solutions

Approved for Release

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Information Paper

1. Issue: Stalled move of 4 IA Div battalions

2. Lead

- MNC-I DCG: MG Parker, MNCI-C3 ISF: (b)(3), (b)(6) MNC-I C3 Plans (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (V Corps)
- MND-N G3 (b)(3), (b)(6) VOIP (b)(6) ISF - (b)(3), (b)(6) VOIP (b)(6)
(b)(6)

3. Background (Map attached)

- o MND-N need for extra combat power in Salad ad Din. Wished for extra Bde. After negotiation facilitated by MG Parker with CG IGFC and CG 4 IA Div, agreed to move 2 BNs from 2/4 and 3/4 IA Bdes to reinforce 1/4 IA Bde.
- o Because of sensitivities of moving BNs from around Kirkuk, MND-N has changed the proposal at least 4 times to try and find a politically acceptable solution.
- o Current proposal is to move 4/2/4 from Kirkuk to Summerall and 1/3/4 from Suleymaniyah to McKenzie. Also 2/2/4 out of Kirkuk to K1.
- o CG MND-N discussed all COAs with GEN Babakir who disliked the idea of any movement in 4 IA Div, because of the political sensitivities surrounding Kirkuk, but agreed to support the above COA.
- o MG Parker engaged with the Prime Minister evening 9 January and he approved the MNC-I proposal for the battalion moves within IA. We will begin to coordinate with IGFC to make to the moves in January.

5. Discussion and Recommendation: Information only.

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10 January 2005

SUBJECT: Current Disposition and Future Development Plan of Iraqi Special Police Forces (ISPF)

1. ISSUE. Identify current ISPF locations and mission sets, as well as possible COAs for future development plan

2. LEAD. C3 Plans, ISF Section, (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background. ISPF units are currently deployed both inside the city of Baghdad and in several other provinces ISO COIN Operations. Furthermore, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I (CPATT), as part of the Joint Committee for Security Transition Process, are convening regularly IOT develop the future strategy for ISPF development and deployment in theater. MNC-I must establish a position on the future deployment options, mission sets, and C2 relationships IOT to influence the security/battlespace transition process
- Facts.
 - MNC-I has no formal C2 relationship with MOI forces.
 - ISPF units provide a national security capability to support public order.
 - ISPF units used to bridge the capability gap between military and civil authority, enabling MOI to take the lead or assist in the COIN fight.
 - Reinforce civil police with a capability that enables operational effectiveness beyond those of Provincial IPS in terms of lethality, survivability, operational adaptability, and operational reach.
 - The Prime Minister has given the responsibility for the security of Baghdad to the MOI.
 - Current ISPF locations:
 - 1 x PCDO Bde, 1 x POB Bn, and 1 x Mech Bn deployed in Ramadi
 - 1 x PCDO Bn deployed in Mosul
 - 2 x PCDO Bns deployed in Samarra
 - 33 x ISPF units (Bn or higher) deployed in Baghdad
 - PCDO Bde in Ramadi will re-deploy 2 x Bns and Bde HQs back to Baghdad O/A 13 Jan 06.
 - There are SPTTs leveraged against all current ISPF units.
- Assumptions.
 - ISPF will provide bridge to long-term civil stability and assist in COIN.
 - ISPF unit locations will remain unchanged for the next 60 days.
 - 3 x COAs: status quo; merge ISPF and deploy regionally; reduce ISPF and decentralize to Provinces.
- Risk. Future Deployments and mission sets of ISPF do not complement the overall security posture of other ISF/CF forces and security transition.
- Issues and Challenges.
 - Establishing a formal C2 relationship with deployed ISPF units.
 - De-conflicting future ISPF tactical operations.
 - MOI approval of future ISPF deployments ISO CF operations.

4. RECOMMENDATION. Develop MNC-I position (preferable COA) NLT 1 Mar 06.

5. DECISION POINT.

- COA Brief O/A 15 Feb 06
- Decision Brief O/A 1 Mar 06.

Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

NATO Training Mission-Iraq



IRAQI SECURITY FORCES UPDATE

4 January 2006

(b)(6)

“The only way to make a man trustworthy is to trust him.” – Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 1945



Agenda




- **MNSTC-I Lines of Operation**
- **Force Generation**
- **Professionalization of the Force**
- **Accelerating TRA in the Army**
 - Logistics
 - Communications
 - Officers
- **Year of the Police**
- **Ministry Development**
- **Illustrative 5-Year Modernization Plan**
- **Financial Transition**
- **Summary**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

MNSTC-I Lines of Operations



PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE FORCE

Police

- 5 Police Academies
- 1 Officer College
- 1 Border & Customs Police Institute
- 2 Special Police Institute

Army


- 2 Basic Training Centers
- 1 Enlisted Specialty Skills Center
- 3 Junior Officer Academies
- 1 Joint (Intermediate) Staff College
- 1 National Defense University

**Transition Progress:
60% Iraqi Instructed**

Out-of-Country

- Jordanian International Police Training Center
- NATO Schools (225 in CY05)

*Newest Initiative: Center for Ethics
and Leadership in January 2006*



Combat Unit Transition Challenges



- **Logistics**
- **Communications**
- **Officers**

Approved for Release



2006: "The Year of the Police"



- **Build-out the "Objective Civil Security Force"**
 - ✓ 135,000 Police in 978 stations in 102 cities
 - ✓ 28,000 Border Police
 - ✓ 25,000 Special Police Commandos
 - ✓ 6,000 Highway Patrol
- **Establish 134 Police Transition Teams, 38 Special Police Transition Teams, 26 Border Transition Teams, and 4 Border Support Teams at Ports of Entry**
- **Transition Baghdad Police College from production of police to production of police officers (Leader Development)**
- **Establish by Summer 2006 a "Police Center for Ethics and Leadership"**
- **Re-program \$800M of FY05 Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) to accelerate training and equipping**
- **Evolve the Special Police Commandos to a "Gendarmerie-like" capability and disperse them geographically**
- **Develop and implement a maintenance concept for the Iraqi National Police**



Development of the Security Ministries



- *Developing both institutions from foot soldier and policeman to minister*
- *Focusing on 8 key systems necessary for the ministries to support the fight*
- *Building a professional, enduring civil service*
- *Measuring progress against action plans and milestones*


*Ministry of Interior currently capable but inefficient.
Ministry of Defense currently incapable*



Summary



- ***Force Generation on track***
- ***Ministry Action Plans in place***
- ***Professionalization initiatives for Iraqi Security Forces are underway***
- ***Plans in place for accelerating transition in logistics, communications, and leadership development***



10 January 2006

SUBJECT: Force Structure Review ISO PLW

1. ISSUE. Assess potential CS and CSS reductions and savings as part of the Posturing for the Long War PLANORD

2. LEAD. C3 Force Generation: (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background. GEN Casey requested COA input from MNC-I for potential CS and CSS reductions as part of the planning effort ISO PLW; specifically, identifying CS/CSS assets dedicated to support non-US forces.
- Facts.
 - On 22 Dec 05, conducted a force structure review to assess potential savings gained by the offramping from a 15 BCT in Iraq and 1 CFF to an 8 BCT set and 1 PTDO BCT as part of the PLW CONOP. Conclusions and Observations were as follows:
 - Conclusion 1: While support structure offramps will be realized given the MNC-I Above the Line Force Offramp plan, we will not realize substantial gains due to the BCT Offramps (validated our conclusions from previous Force Structure Reviews).
 - Conclusion 2: There is little correlation between BCT Offramps and EAD / EAC CS / CSS support structure (validated our conclusions from previous Force Structure Reviews)
 - Observation 1: To reduce EAD / EAC CS / CSS force structure we must reduce supported 2-Star Commands.
 - Observation 2: To reduce EAD / EAC CS / CSS force structure we must transfer complete control and support to entire geographic regions / provinces (No support to: Coalition Forces, SOF, Transition Teams, ISF, Contractors, etc.).
 - Observation 3: To reduce EAD / EAC CS / CSS force structure we must build the ISF logistics capability.
 - Observation 4: To reduce EAD / EAC CS / CSS force structure we must realize the benefits of contracting initiatives such as Task Order 59 & 89.
 - Additional analysis is requested to specifically, determine the total CS/CSS US support invested in non-US formations.
- Assumptions used in the 22 Dec 05 review:
 - Support to ISF Forces: No change; assume steady state through 07-09.
 - Support to Coalition Partners: No change; assume steady state through 07-09.
 - Transition Teams: Assumed an 18% increase for the Transition Team support for force rotations 06-08 & 07-09 IOT account for pending Police Transition Team support.
 - PRTs: Assumed that the support increase associated with PRTs is negligible.
 - Task Order 59/89, & Contracting Initiatives: Did not incorporate this category into this analysis. MNF-I will add this variable separately through the R&S process.
 - EAD / EAC CS / CSS Lag Time: Planned for a 3 month lag time from

- BCT offramp to any potential support structure offramp associated with the BCT offramp (if applicable).
- Base Realignment: No change; Assumed that the gains realized by Base Realignment are negligible to the EAD / EAC CS / CSS support structure.
 - PAX Numbers: Assumed 100% of MTOE authorized for the inbound unit, or a like unit MTOE.
 - Transformation / Modularity: Incorporated Transformation / Modularity changes as appropriate, when appropriate. Each of the BOS / Functional Areas has their own, very different, timelines.
 - RFFs: Did not incorporate any RFFs that are still pending in the staffing process. Only incorporated, validated, and approved, sourced RFFs that are / will be an enduring requirement incorporated into the URFs & JOPES deliberate planning.
 - 07-09 BCT Set. That the initial 07-09 force set equals the 06-08 force set endstate. That we execute COA 1 "Baseline" AND COA 2 "Stretch" at some point during OIF 05-07 and OIF 06-08.
 - Total potential saving from current set (15 BCT + 1 CFF) to Feb 07 set (8 BCT + 1PTDO) was @32,000 personnel.
 - Issues and Challenges.
 - In general CS/CSS units operate on an area support basis in support of divisional areas and offramping of BCTs have little impact on the requirements to continue providing area support.
 - To generate substantial savings tough call will have to be made in terms of reducing division-level HQ, taking risk on some part of the country by reducing coalition operations and determining what support will be provided to non-US forces and what support will not be provided.
 - What are the implications of reducing current support to ISF and coalition partners?
 - GOI and MOD taking lead in supporting ISF.
 - Developing a viable metric for projecting IA dependency on CF logistics
4. RECOMMENDATION. Using the 22 Dec 05 force structure review as initial framework, revisit guidance and assumptions and conduct a new review to determine new and creative mitigation strategy that could enable CS/CSS assets to be offramped at a faster pace.
5. DECISION POINT.
- 16 Jan 06: Brief mission analysis and Way Ahead at the SPM.
 - Feb 06: Conduct new Force Structure Review

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Force Structure Review ISO PLW

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL-MGFI//X1~~



Issue: Force Structure Review ISO PLW

Lead: (b)(3), (b)(6) C3 Force Gen

Background:

- Conducted review on 22 Dec 05.
- While support structure offramps will be realized given the MNC-I Above the Line Force Offramp plan, we will not realize substantial gains due to the BCT Offramps (validated our conclusions from previous Force Structure Reviews). Saving @ 32,000 pax.
- There is little correlation between BCT Offramps and EAD / EAC CS / CSS support structure (validated our conclusions from previous Force Structure Reviews) and reconstruction.

Higher HQs Guidance:

- Revisit the CS/CSS enablers to ascertain further potential reductions as BCTs are offramped.

Discussion/Challenges:

- CS/CSS units operate on an area support basis; Offramping of BCTs have little impact on the requirements to continue providing area support.
- To generate substantial savings tough call will have to be made in terms of reducing division-level HQ, taking risk on some part of the country by reducing coalition operations and determining what support will be provided to non-US forces and what support will not be provided.
- What are the implications of reducing current support to ISF and coalition partners?
- Getting GOI and MOD taking lead in supporting ISF.
- Developing a viable metric for projecting IA dependency on US CS/CSS enablers.

Recommendations/MNC-I Position:

- Reassess Force structure review to validate conclusions and observations and generate new and creative mitigation strategy that will enable CS/CSS assets to be offramped at a faster pace.

MA Brief
SPM

OPG conducts
new Force
Structure Review

NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY

~~SECRET~~ - E L M G F I // X 1



Bottom Line Up Front (as of 22 DEC 05)

Note 1: PAX delta based on 100% MTOE Authorized and projected Transformation / Modularity MTOEs

	15 MNVR + 1 CF (Current) TO 8 MNVR + 1 PTDO (DEC 06)	8 MNVR + 1 PTDO (DEC 06) TO 8 MNVR + 1 PTDO (FEB 07)	15 MNVR + 1 CF (Current) TO 8 MNVR + 1 PTDO (FEB 07)
	OIF 05-07 to 06-08 PAX Delta	OIF 06-08 to 07-09 PAX Delta	OIF 05-07 to 07-09 PAX Delta
MANEUVER	Brigades: -26360 Transition Teams: 206 Aviation: -690 Convoy Security COs: 0 -26844	Brigades: 0 Transition Teams: 0 Aviation: -2952 Convoy Security COs: 0 -2952	Brigades: -26360 Transition Teams: 206 Aviation: -3642 Convoy Security COs: 0 -29796
COMBAT SUPPORT	Fire Support: -60 CBRN: 0 Engineers: -597 Military Intelligence: 0 Military Police: 0 Signal: -755 Combat Camera: 0 Information Operations: 0 Civil Affairs: 16 Psychological Operations: -96 Public Affairs: -63 -1555	Fire Support: -137 CBRN: 0 Engineers: -540 Military Intelligence: 0 Military Police: 0 Signal: -728 Combat Camera: 0 Information Operations: 0 Civil Affairs: -68 Psychological Operations: 0 Public Affairs: 0 -1473	Fire Support: -197 CBRN: 0 Engineers: -1137 Military Intelligence: 0 Military Police: 0 Signal: -1483 Combat Camera: 0 Information Operations: 0 Civil Affairs: -52 Psychological Operations: -96 Public Affairs: -63 -3028
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	Adjutant General: -249 Finance: -51 Corps Support: 637 Quartermaster: 139 Transportation: 0 Ordnance (Ammo & Maint): 112 Ordnance (EOD): 176 Medical Services: 25 789	Adjutant General: -69 Finance: 20 Corps Support: 0 Quartermaster: 0 Transportation: 0 Ordnance (Ammo & Maint): 0 Ordnance (EOD): 46 Medical Services: 0 -3	Adjutant General: -318 Finance: -31 Corps Support: 637 Quartermaster: 139 Transportation: 0 Ordnance (Ammo & Maint): 112 Ordnance (EOD): 222 Medical Services: 25 786
HEADQUARTERS	RAOCs: 0	RAOCs: 75	RAOCs: 75
TOTALS	-27,610	-4,353	-31,963

5 January 2005

SUBJECT: MNC-I JMD Review

1. ISSUE. Conduct review of MNC-I JMD, adhering to CG, MNF-I guidance regarding strength, structure, and mission requirements.

2. LEAD. CJ1.

3. DISCUSSION

- Background. MNC-I must continually assess Corps Headquarters personnel requirements. Annual changes to the JMD must be validated by CG, MNC-I and MNF-I, submitted to CENTCOM for review, and sourced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Higher HQ Guidance. CG, MNF-I will publish JMD Guidance outlining intent for validation of Iraq JMDs and personnel manning within the Headquarters.
- Assumption. Reduction in JMD positions will be directed to reduce footprint, transition to support role, and reduce service augmentation.
- Risk. Failure to properly document the Joint manning requirements hinders future mission accomplishment.
- Issues and Challenges
 - Reduction in JMD Billets - Zero Growth philosophy
 - No migration of Coalition / Civilian to U.S. Military
 - No growth in grade structure – Balance grade structure to attain logical distribution of responsibilities and span of control
 - MNC-I Mission change
 - New JMD billets do not meet immediate sourcing requirements

4. RECOMMENDATION. V Corps conduct a 90 day review of the MNC-I JMD capturing personnel requirements which produces a lean and agile staff capable of implementing and executing the MNC-I mission.

5. DECISION POINT

- 90 day assessment of MNC-I JMD
- Validation of MNC-I JMD

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



Issue: MNC-I JMD Review

Lead: CJ1

Background:

- Continually assess personnel requirements for MNC-I
- Annual submission of JMD changes to CENTCOM

Higher HQs Guidance

- CG, MNF-I publishes JMD Guidance outlining intent for validating Iraq JMDs

Discussion/Challenges

- Reduction in JMD Billets – Zero Growth philosophy
- No migration of Coalition / Civilian to U.S. Military
- No growth in grade structure
- MNC-I mission change
- Sourcing immediate requirements

Recommendations

- V Corps conduct 90 day review

JUN 06 (T) – MNC-I JMD validated by CG, MNC-I and CG, MNF-I

6-7 MAR (T) – CENTCOM J1 Conference

19 JAN 06 – MNC-I TOA (911 Billets)

(TBD) – IAs
report to MNC-I

TBD – Joint Staff EXORD

SEP 06 (T) – PSRB

JUL 06 (T) – CENTCOM
JMD review conference

SUBJECT: IRAQI ARMY FORWARD OPERATING BASE (FOB) IN A BOX

SUMMARY: COSCOM WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THREE BATTALION SIZED CONTINGENCY PACKS OF ACCOMODATION STORES FOR THE IA.

1. (U) **PURPOSE:** THIS FRAGO PROVIDES ADDITIONAL DIRECTION ON THE FOB IN A BOX CONCEPT AS DETAILED IN THE APPENDIX 8 OF ANNEX D (PARA 3.C.2.).

2. (U) **REFERENCES:** NONE

3. (U) **TASKS TO SUBORDINATES:**

3.A. (U) **COSCOM.**

3.A.1. ~~(S//REL)~~ COSCOM WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THREE BATTALION SIZED CONTINGENCY PACKS OF ACCOMODATION STORES FOR THE IA. COMMODITIES BY QUANTITY TO BE HELD WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ATTACHMENT. 30 KW GENERATOR SETS, PLYWOOD 4X4 AND 20 FOOT SHIPPING CONTAINERS WILL NO LONGER BE MAINTAINED AS PART OF THE FOB IN A BOX PACKAGE.

3.A.2. (U) ON ORDER, BE PREPARED TO SHIP AUTHORIZED QUANTITIES AS DIRECTED BY MNC-I C3.

3.B. (U) **MNC-I C3.**

3.B.1 (U) AS RELEASE AUTHORITY, ENSURE THESE CONTINGENCY PACKS ARE USED MOST EFFICIENTLY IN THE SUPPORT OF IA CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

3.C. (U) **MNC-I C4.**

3.C.1. (U) IN CONJUNCTION WITH MNC-I C3 ISF, DETERMINE A DISTRIBUTION PLAN FOR ALL CURRENT FOB IN A BOX HOLDINGS ABOVE THE THREE BATTALION SET BY 1 MAY 06.

3.C.2. (U) PROVIDE PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE CURRENT FOB IN THE BOX REQUIREMENTS WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING COALITION SUPPORT AS IRAQI CAPABILITIES INCREASE.

3.C.3. (U) DETERMINE WHEN FOB IN A BOX HOLDINGS CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO IRAQI SUPPORT COMMAND AS NATIONAL CONTINGENCY STOCKS AS APPLICABLE.

3.C.4. (U) ADVISE MNSTC-I OF ALL HOLDINGS BELOW 100% TO DETERMINE IF SHORTFALL ITEMS WILL BE PURCHASED TO BE HELD IN STOCK OR IF THE MOD HAS THE CAPABILITY TO PROCURE AS REQUIRED.

4. (U) **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:**

4.A. (U) AS THE PROCUREMENT CAPABILITY OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE MATURES, IT IS EXPECTED THAT CONTINGENCY HOLDINGS CAN BE REDUCED WITHOUT BACKFILL FOR CERTAIN ITEMS.

4.B. (U) C4 PLANS ACTION OFFICER AND POC FOR THIS ENTRY IS b 3, b 6

(b)(3), (b)(6) AT DSN b 6

CENTR:

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6)

28 December 2005

SUBJECT: 8th IA Division Assuming Battle Space

1. ISSUE. Concur with the certification and validation of 8th IA Division to assume battle space in MND-CS with C2 of its 2nd and 3rd Brigades

2. LEAD. C3 ISF-(b)(3), (b)(6)

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background. MND-CS has certified the 8th Division Headquarters and is in the process of executing the validation model to assume battle space with command and control of the 2/3rd Brigades of 8th IA Division.
- Facts.
 - 8th Division HQ is a TRA Level 2 unit since Oct
 - 2nd and 3rd Brigades of 8th IA are level 2
 - MND-B with Babil battle space rearrangement, will assume TACON of 1st and 4th Brigades of 8th Division
 - MND-CS will re-position units in the CS area of operations
- Assumptions.
 - MND-CS AO will remain benign
 - 8th Division leadership will remain, despite new Iraqi Government Seating
 - 8th Division may be Command and Controlled by IGFC once IGFC is TRA 3
 - 8th Division units remain well equipped
 - Basing remains adequate where units are currently positioned
- Risk. Political influence in a predominately Shia formation as the politics of seating a new government may impact effectiveness of 8th Division.
- Issues and Challenges.
 - Long Range Communications shortages
 - Officer manning shortages
- 8th Division will have split MITT teams with two different MSCs, 1st and 4th Brigades by MND-B, Division HQ, 3rd Brigade and part of 2nd with MND-CS MITT teams
- LNO requirements between MND-B and 8th Division

4. RECOMMENDATION. V Corps will need to make a decision by 29 January to concur with TOA of 8th Division Iraqi Army assuming lead for operations in MND-CS AO

5. DECISION POINT.

- January 06-
- 8th Division HQ assumes battle space and C2 of its 2nd and 3rd Brigades

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Information Paper

1. Issue: MNF-I/USEMB Campaign Plan

2. Lead

- MNF-I Strategy, Plans and Assessments (SPA): (b)(3), (b)(6)
- MNC-I C3 Plans: (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Background

- Current MNF-I Campaign Guidance
 - o MNF-I Campaign Plan, 05AUG04, OIF-Partnership: From Occupation to Constitutional Elections
 - o MNF-I Campaign Action Plan for 2005, 22APR05, Transition to Self-Reliance
- New Campaign Plan under development
 - o Joint Plan with USEMB
 - o Joint Mission Statement published 06DEC05
 - o Campaign Plan originally scheduled for publication late NOV05, continues to slip; do not expect publication until late JAN06 at the earliest
 - o MNF-I having difficulty influencing USEMB through the decision-making process
 - o Indicators suggest GEN Casey may withdraw from the joint campaign concept and publish separate campaign plan focused on Security, Strategic Communications and Transition lines of operation leaving Governance and Economics to the USEMB (Nothing firm to corroborate this data point other than point to point discussion with O6 Action Officers)
- MNC-I published OPORD 05-03, OPERATION TAREEQ AL-HURIAH "Path to Freedom," 20NOV05 and updated 30DEC05 based on parallel planning with MNF-I
- OPORD 05-03 brief to CG MNF-I, 07DEC05; GEN Casey commented OPORD was about right (LTG Vines assessed we hit at about 90% solution); GEN Casey postulated on changing mission for V Corps in 2006

4. Higher Headquarters Guidance

- Several FRAGOs and Strategy Information Papers published or planned to bridge gap
- SPA Strategy Information Paper, 13NOV05, Iraqi Army Lead, informs Phase II (Transition to Iraqi Army Lead) of MNC-I OPORD 05-03
- MNF-I FRAGO 05-383 (Assessment of Provinces and Select Urban Areas for the Assumption of Full Security Responsibility by Iraqi Civil Authorities), 04DEC05, informs Phase III (Transition to Provincial Iraqi Control) of MNC-I OPORD 05-03
- No guidance published for Phase IV (Iraqi Security Self-Reliance)

5. Discussion and Recommendation. Continue parallel planning with MNF-I SPA and update MNC-I OPORD 05-03 when appropriate.

6. Decision Point. No decision required.

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Pages 42 through 43 redacted for the following reasons:

Draft

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HQ, MNF-I
EMBASSY ANNEX, IRAQ
041115CDEC05
ROUTINE (GREEN)

(U) MNF-I FRAGO 05-383 [ASSESSMENT OF PROVINCES AND SELECT URBAN AREAS FOR THE ASSUMPTION OF FULL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY BY IRAQI CIVIL AUTHORITIES]

(U) SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS REQUIRED FOR THE IRAQI ASSUMPTION OF FULL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVINCES OR SELECT URBAN AREAS

(U) REFERENCES:

- A. (U) MNF-I Campaign Plan [Operation Iraqi Freedom - Partnership: From Occupation to Constitutional Elections, 5 AUG 04 (~~S//REL USA AND MCFI~~)]
- B. (U) 2005 MNF-I Campaign Action Plan [Transition to Self-Reliance, 22 APR 05 (~~S//REL USA AND MCFI~~)]
- C. (U) MNF-I Framework OPORD, 1 NOV 05 (~~S//REL USA AND MCFI~~)
- D. (U) Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibilities Report, 26 OCT 05 (~~S//REL USA, IRQ, AND MCFI~~)

(U) TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THIS ORDER: Charlie

1. (U) SITUATION. Change.

1.A. (~~S//REL~~) General. This FRAGO outlines the process required to assess provinces or select urban areas to determine if they have achieved the conditions necessary for Iraqi civil authorities to assume full security responsibility. The assessment process will be used to project when provinces and select urban areas will achieve the conditions necessary for the assumption of security responsibility. Transition will be conducted in a measured way to maintain momentum against the terrorists and foreign fighters and other insurgents during and after the assumption of full security responsibility by the appropriate Iraqi civil authorities.

1.B. (~~S//REL~~) Overview. Security partnerships and transition teams are enabling Iraq to progressively assume the lead for the counter-insurgency operations. As the threat decreases and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and governance capabilities improve, Iraqi civil authorities will assume full security responsibility for provinces or select urban areas (select urban areas are identified at para 3.D.1 below). The assumption of full security responsibility is conditions based and not timeline driven. The first step in this process is to define the conditions (Provincial and Urban conditions identified in Annex A). The next step is to assess which provinces have achieved the conditions to assume full security responsibility. For those provinces that do not meet the conditions, their provincial capital and, if applicable, select key urban areas (para 3D.1 below) should then be assessed with the urban area criteria to see if they meet the conditions to assume full security responsibility. This FRAGO assigns tasks to Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) staff elements and units for the assessment of Iraqi and MNF-I preparedness in order to allow Iraqi civil authorities to assume full security responsibility for provinces or select urban areas.

2. (U) MISSION. No Change.

3. (U) EXECUTION. Change.

3.A. (U) COMMANDER'S INTENT. No Change.

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~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

3.B. ~~(S//REL)~~ **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.** **Change.** MNF-I through its staff and subordinate units conduct assessments to determine if a province or select urban area(s) within a province has achieved or project when it will achieve the conditions necessary for the Iraqi civil authorities to assume full security responsibility.

3.B.1. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Assumption of Security Responsibilities.** As Iraqi civil authorities and institutions demonstrate increased capabilities coupled with a low threat level, they will progressively assume full security responsibility for either their entire province or a select urban area(s) (as defined para 3.D.1) within that province. The Multinational Division or Force (MND/F) commander remains responsible for security in his area of responsibility until the formal assumption of security responsibility occurs. Formal transition, approved by the MNF-I Commanding General (CG), will depend on capable Iraqi civil authorities accepting full responsibility for the day-to-day planning, direction, conduct, and sustainment of security operations within a province or urban area.

3.B.1.A. (U) Annex A lists the conditions for the assumption of full security responsibility for provinces and select urban areas.

3.B.1.B. ~~(S//REL)~~ CG MNF-I is the approving authority for the assessments for the Iraqi civil authorities to assume full security responsibility.

3.B.2. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Endstate.** The Provincial Governor (or civil leader of a select major urban area), through the use of his provincial police, effectively maintains security in the assigned area without the need for Iraqi Special Police, Iraqi Army (IA) or MNF-I intervention. Mechanisms enabling MNF-I forces' freedom of movement into the transferred area if warranted remain available to coalition forces.

3.C. (U) **TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS AND STAFF.** **Change.**

3.C.1. (U) **MNC-I.**

3.C.1.A. ~~(S//REL)~~ Re-posture forces, taking advantage of opportunities to move outside of urban areas where possible, IOT support the assumption of full security responsibility by Iraqi civil authorities.

3.C.1.B. ~~(S//REL)~~ Assess and report progress towards achieving the conditions required for the assumption of security responsibility for provinces or select urban areas. Assist the MNF-I assessment in a monthly forum (Effects Assessment and Synchronization Board [EASB]) to address the progress of provinces or select urban areas toward assuming full security responsibility (see Annex A).

3.C.1.C. ~~(S//REL)~~ Develop CONPLANS that address the potential failure of ISF or local governance after assumption of security responsibility within a province or select urban area.

3.C.1.D. (U) Assess the following conditions, based on indicators and metrics developed ICW MNF-I DCS-SPA:

3.C.1.D.1. (U) Provinces:

3.C.1.D.1.A. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Threat Assessment:** Assess the provincial terrorist / insurgent threat level including external border security (where applicable). Develop projections of future trends for terrorist / insurgent threat levels. Assess the cross-border threat (where applicable) to include infiltration and smuggling; assess whether or not the presence of armed groups materially changes the threat assessment in the above for the purpose of security transfer; and assess the threat to critical infrastructure and lines of communication.

3.C.1.D.1.B. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Governance:** Assess whether or not the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC), the Provincial Security Committee (PSC), and Joint Operations Room (including political and

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security authorities as outlined in the implementing arrangement) are operational and capable of coordinating and monitoring operations. Assess provincial systems in place for detention, trial and incarceration [until such time as the Provincial Reconstruction Team is established and capable of assuming the responsibility for assessing detention, trial and incarceration].

3.C.1.D.1.C. ~~(S//REL)~~ Iraqi Police Service: Assess if the IPS (at Transition Readiness Assessment [TRA] level 2) has the capacity to maintain domestic order in the existing security situation and is capable of preventing the resurgence of terrorism. Assess if IPS are capable of coordinating counter-insurgency operations with IA and Special Police, including intelligence sharing (by assessing the PJCC). Assess whether or not the Border Guards (where applicable) are able to interdict cross-border support to insurgents and terrorists with support from MNF-I; and assess if the Special Police (at TRA level 2) have the ability to coordinate and conduct counter-insurgency operations in the provinces.

3.C.1.D.1.D. ~~(S//REL)~~ Iraqi Army: Assess whether or not the IA (at TRA Level 2), in coordination with IPS, is capable of leading counter-insurgency operations in their sectors in the province IAW joint Iraqi-MNF-I plans and agreements; assess if the IA, in coordination with IPS, can contain the insurgency in the province with support from MNF-I, and have the ability to coordinate for MNF-I reaction forces if its unit capabilities are exceeded. Assess if coordination mechanisms are in place and evaluated to receive and respond to requests for assistance from the IPS; assess if the IA has the capability to coordinate the security of strategic infrastructure in the province; and assess IA Brigade level temporary detention capabilities operating under Iraqi control.

3.C.1.D.1.E. ~~(S//REL)~~ MNF-I Forces: Posture MNC-I forces in "overwatch" positions for tactical intervention in the event a security crisis exceeds ISF capabilities. Ensure civil construction security is coordinated through the PJCC.

3.C.1.D.2. (U) Urban Areas:

3.C.1.D.2.A. ~~(S//REL)~~ Threat Assessment: Assess the current terrorist / insurgent threat level; make projections of future trends for terrorist / insurgent threat level; and assess whether or not the presence of armed groups materially changes the threat assessment in the above for the purpose of security transfer.

3.C.1.D.2.B. ~~(S//REL)~~ Governance: Assess whether or not the PJCC, PSC, and Joint Operations Room (including political and security authorities as outlined in the implementing arrangement) are operational and capable of coordinating and monitoring operations. Assess provincial systems in place for detention, trial and incarceration [until such time as the Provincial Reconstruction Team is established and capable of assuming the responsibility for assessing detention, trial and incarceration].

3.C.1.D.2.C. ~~(S//REL)~~ Iraqi Police Service: Assess whether or not IPS (at TRA level 2) has the capacity to maintain domestic order in existing security situation and prevent resurgence of terrorism. Assess if the Special Police are able to respond to requests for support (by assessing the PJCC); and certify that IPS / Special police have the coordination mechanisms to request assistance from IA (by assessing the PJCC).

3.C.1.D.2.D. ~~(S//REL)~~ Iraqi Army: Assess if the IA forces are able to respond to requests for assistance from the urban area; assess if coordination mechanisms are in place and evaluated to receive and respond to requests for assistance from the PJCC; and assess if IA forces designated to respond to the urban area are capable of leading counter-insurgency operations with MNF-I support (TRA Level 2).

3.C.1.D.2.E. ~~(S//REL)~~ MNF-I Forces: Posture MNC-I forces in "overwatch" position for tactical intervention in the event a security crisis exceeds ISF capabilities.

3.C.1.E. ~~(S//REL)~~ Provide assessments to MNF-I IAW agreed upon assessment forum (EASB process).

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~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

3.C.1.F. (~~S//REL~~) Prior to 30 Apr 06, ensure all police stations are visited and assessed IAW Police TRA standards at least once by a Police Transition Team (PTT). If this is not possible, identify the stations that were not visited and the obstacles that prevented this.

3.C.1.G. (~~S//REL~~) Continue to monitor provinces and select urban areas following the assumption of full security responsibility. Monitor indicators or warnings that would indicate a deteriorating security situation that would necessitate MNF-I assistance (for as long as Military Transition Teams or other MNF-I presence remains within a province or select urban area). Provide monthly assessments of these conditions to MNF-I DCS SPA Assessments.

3.C.1.H. (~~S//REL~~) Assess the weapons turn-in program established by the Iraqi Government as part of the threat assessment IAW MNC-I-established metrics. Monitor and provide updates to MNF-I during EASB process.

3.C.2. (U) **MNSTC-I.** Assess the following conditions based on indicators and metrics developed ICW MNF-I DCS-SPA:

3.C.2.A. (U) Provinces:

3.C.2.A.1. (~~S//REL~~) **Iraqi Police Service:** Assess whether or not the IPS coordinate their counter-insurgency operations with IA and Special Police, including intelligence sharing; assess whether or not the Border Guards (where applicable) are able to interdict cross-border support to insurgents and terrorists with support from MNF-I; and assess if the Special Police (at TRA level 2) have the ability to coordinate and conduct counter-insurgency operations in the provinces.

3.C.2.A.2. (~~S//REL~~) **Governance:** Assess capabilities of MoD and MoI intelligence structures and capabilities to support provincial operations and forces.

3.C.2.B. (U) Urban Areas:

3.C.2.B.1. (~~S//REL~~) **Iraqi Police Service:** Assess if the Special Police are able to respond to requests for support and coordinate with MNC-I to certify that IPS / Special police have the coordination mechanisms to request assistance from IA.

3.C.2.B.2. (~~S//REL~~) **Governance:** Assess capabilities of MoD and MoI intelligence structures and capabilities to support provincial operations and forces.

3.C.2.C. (~~S//REL~~) Provide assessments to MNF-I IAW agreed upon assessment forum (EASB process).

3.C.2.D. (~~S//REL~~) Support MNC-I police station visits and assessments with Iraqi Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) and PTTs as necessary to complete the 30 Apr 06 requirement.

3.C.3. (U) **MNF-I Staff Sections.**

3.C.3.A. (U) **DCS INT.**

3.C.3.A.1. (~~S//REL~~) Review and comment as necessary, on MNC-I threat assessments of provincial and select urban area conditions in preparation for assumption of full security responsibilities. Be prepared to present comments at monthly EASBs if assessment differs from MNC-I assessment.

3.C.3.A.2. (~~S//REL~~) Coordinate with the National Intelligence Coordination Commission and National Joint Intelligence Analysis Center to review and validate urban area and provincial threat assessments.

3.C.3.B. (U) **DCS STRATOPS.**

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3.C.3.B.1. (~~S//REL~~) Monitor status of provinces, and those portions of provinces where Iraqi authorities have assumed security responsibility of an urban area, using STRATOPS LNOs in National Joint Operations Center (NJOC) who receive daily situation reports from PJCCs.

3.C.3.B.2. (~~S//REL~~) Assess the NJOC to ensure it maintains communication with appropriate entities and coordinates, facilitates, and de-conflicts operations IAW metrics developed ICW MNF-I DCS SPA.

3.C.3.C. (U) **DCS SPA.**

3.C.3.C.1. (U) SPA Assessments is responsible for the coordination and conduct of the EASB process.

3.C.3.C.2. (~~S//REL~~) Assess and report progress of provinces and select urban areas toward achieving the conditions required for the assumption of full security responsibility in a monthly forum (EASB process) in order to address the progress of Iraqi provinces and select urban areas.

3.C.3.C.3. (~~S//REL~~) Develop Force-level CONPLANS for failure of ISF or local governance after the assumption of security responsibility within an urban area or province.

3.C.3.C.4. (~~S//REL~~) Coordinate with DCS STRATEFF to develop contingency Information Operations plans for failure of the ISF or Iraqi authorities (STRATEFF lead).

3.C.3.D. (U) **DCS STRATEFF.**

3.C.3.D.1. (~~S//REL~~) Develop a communications plan to support the assumption of security responsibility by Iraqi civil authorities of a province or urban area on a case by case basis.

3.C.3.D.2. (~~S//REL~~) As lead, coordinate with DCS SPA to develop contingency Information Operations plans for failure of ISF or Iraqi authorities.

3.C.3.D.3. (~~S//REL~~) Assist the US Embassy in assessing the Provincial Governor for both provincial and urban area conditions for the assumption of full security responsibilities, as depicted in Annex A (attached), IAW metrics developed ICW MNF-I DCS SPA. Incorporate appropriate USEMB assessments as part of the overall assessment process.

3.C.3.D.3.A. (U) Provide assessments to MNF-I IAW agreed upon assessment forum (EASB).

3.C.3.D.4. (~~S//REL~~) Continue to monitor provinces and select urban areas following the assumption of full security responsibilities by Iraqi civil authorities through Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) assessment inputs to EASB process.

3.D. (U) **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. Change.**

3.D.1. (~~S//REL~~) The following are the initial urban areas (cities) selected for assessment towards the assumption of full security responsibility by Iraqi civil authorities: Al Amarah, Al Hillah, Al Kut, An Najaf, An Nasirah, Ar Ramadi, As Samawah, As Sulaymaniyah, Baghdad, Balad, Baqubah, Basrah, Dahuk, Diwaniyah, Fallujah, Irbil, Karbala, Kirkuk, Mosul, Samarra, and Tikrit. Others may be added at the direction of the MNF-I CG. Urban areas not listed will not be individually transferred, but will transfer responsibility as part of a province.

3.D.2. (U) All metrics and assessment indicators used in the process will be approved by and reported to MNF-I DCS-SPA.

3.D.3. (U) IA and IPS are assessed monthly through the TRA process.

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3.D.4. (U) The first assessment briefing will be scheduled for 14 Jan 06 (Effects Assessment and Synchronization Board) to follow the submission of the January assessments by 6 Jan 06.

3.D.5. (U) This FRAGO contains enduring guidance and will be included in future drafts of the MNF-I Framework OPORD.

3.D.6. (U) POC for this FRAGO is [b 3, b 6] SPA Plans, [b 6] CENTRIXS:

[b(3), (b)(6)] NIPR:

4. (U) **SERVICE SUPPORT.** No Change.

5. (U) **COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** No Change.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

CASEY
GEN

OFFICIAL:

MG BARGEWELL
DCS STRATOPS

ATTACHMENT:

Annex A: CONDITIONS FOR THE ASSUMPTION OF FULL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

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~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~



JOINT MISSION STATEMENT

Building Success: Completing the Transition



Updated 6 December 2005

(U) Our long-term goal is an Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists, and effective national, regional, and provincial institutions, capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people and creating conditions for rule of law and prosperity. Iraq's success will reduce the threat to our national security and international stability emanating from the region, and serve as a model of democratic development for Iraq's neighbors. At present, Iraq is going through a difficult transition. Over the next four years, all instruments of U.S. and Coalition power – political, military, and economic – will be integrated in a sustained joint effort to complete Iraq's transition and achieve our strategic objectives.

(U) Achieving these goals in partnership with Iraq will require:

- ~~(S//REL)~~ Breaking the back of the insurgency -- reducing the insurgency to levels that can be defeated by increasingly capable Iraqi Security Forces -- by securing the borders; denying safe havens throughout the country; disrupting human, financial and material support; and by integrating military operations, political engagement, information operations, economic development, and governance programs to provide persistent security to local populations in key areas;
- (U) Transitioning security responsibility to increasingly capable Iraqi security forces.
- (U) Building national and provincial institutions that can deliver essential services and administer justice without regard to sect or ethnic grouping;
- (U) Facilitating economic growth and private sector investment through sound fiscal and monetary policy, enabling policy reforms (including the elimination of subsidies) and developing a modern financial and banking system that would serve as the engine for broad-based economic expansion, and job creation for ordinary Iraqis;
- (U) Increasing regional and international support and engagement with Iraq, reversing Syria's unhelpful policies, containing and rolling back hostile 1.4b, 1.4d
- (U) Eliminating any chance for Iraq to be used as a base for the export of global terror; and

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~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

- (U) Engaging moderate and rejectionist Sunni Arabs to ensure their full participation in the political process, drawing the line at terrorists and former Regime criminals.

~~(S//REL)~~ Our goals for one year:

- An orderly and rapid transition to the new Government, and an increased capacity at the national and provincial level to provide essential services to its citizens;
- Active Sunni Arab involvement in the Council of Representatives;
- Delegitimize the insurgency through broad Sunni participation in the political process, including elections;
- A secure Baghdad with only sporadic incidents of terrorism;
- Secure national borders;
- Iraqis progressively assuming responsibility for their own security under our conditions-based approach;
- Credible Iraqi police forces beginning to assume the lead for internal security, matched by more capable institutions for the administration of impartial justice and the rule of law;
- Economic growth driven by sustained increases in oil export revenues through enhanced infrastructure security, policy reforms (including progressive elimination of subsidies), and private sector development;
- A strategic change in Syrian hostile behavior toward Iraq, continued support from regional neighbors, and containing and rolling back a hostile 1.4b, 1.4d
1.4b, 1.4d in Iraq; and
- A significant increase in political and economic support from the international community and regional neighbors.

~~(S//REL)~~ In two years:

- Local and national governments that hold their officials accountable, promote rule of law, and finance their security and essential services;
- Improved security throughout the country, with Iraqi security forces assuming nationwide responsibility and the Coalition in a supporting role;
- An established macroeconomic framework for sustained economic growth and an emerging private sector creating the necessary jobs and business activity to reduce unemployment and support broad-based economic growth;

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~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

- The international financial institutions provide the bulk of international economic assistance; with U.S. assistance transitioning to a more limited, supporting role; and
- Opposition to residual insurgent elements is the clear "norm" among the Sunni Arab population.

~~(S//REL)~~ In four years:

- Iraq's security forces containing crime and residual insurgent elements;
- Normal bilateral security relationships established with the United States and others, including NATO;
- Private-sector led growth, along with foreign and domestic direct investment producing broad-based economic growth;
- The government effectively providing for the essential needs of its citizens and effectively administering the rule of law; and
- Matured political institutions and processes ensuring broad support for moderate and cross-sectarian democratic forces in the next elections. Sunni Arab leaders play key role in moderate centrist politics.

Mission Objectives

(U) To achieve the above outcome, there are eight critical, interrelated mission objectives that require fully integrated political, military, and economic efforts in concert with the Iraqi Government and Coalition partners:

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgency – Establishing a representative Iraqi government demands continued success in reducing the impact of the insurgency. Integrated military operations to secure Iraq's borders and a multi-agency program of focused stabilization are key components in our counterinsurgency strategy. A wedge will be driven between the Iraqi population and the insurgents through counterinsurgency operations designed to provide persistent security to local populations in key areas through synchronized political engagement, information operations, intensive economic development, and programs to enhance governance. The focused stabilization program will center on nine strategically important cities, with Baghdad given priority in 2006 in order to underwrite success nationwide. At our endstate, the Coalition, the Iraqi Government, and its matured security institutions will have created the conditions for the defeat of the insurgency and isolation of al Qaida in Iraq. This will effectively deny them a safe haven for the global export of terrorism and reduce the insurgency to levels that can be defeated by an increasingly capable Iraqi Security Force.

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2. (U) Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance – The Coalition will continue to actively support the progression to Iraqi security self-reliance. Much has already been achieved, but more remains to be done, with particular emphasis on the ability of security ministries and institutions to control and sustain their forces. Our support will facilitate national and provincial governments in developing their capacity for control of security operations. Additionally, the Iraqi Army and MoI forces will mature into effective counterinsurgency fighting forces through continued partnership and transition team efforts. The police and Iraqi security forces institutional and support functions will be our focus in the near term in order to enable a progressive transition to civil control and self-sufficiency. These collective efforts will lead to a gradual reduction of coalition forces and produce Iraqi security forces that are capable of assuming primary responsibility for the security of the nation.
3. (U) Help Iraqis Forge a National Compact for Democratic Government – Help the Iraqis implement a constitution and transparent political process with adequate protection of minorities and power sharing mechanisms that constitute a national compact among Iraq's principal communities. Support the growth of civil society and moderate, centrist political forces to strengthen unity, democratic processes, and non-sectarian political institutions and cooperation, and the processes of a democratic government. Ensure that Sunni Arabs are fully integrated into democratic Iraq's political institutions and civil society.
4. ~~(S//REL)~~ Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services – The development of effective national and provincial governments capable of providing an expanding level of security and essential services to their citizens is fundamental to the development of democracy in Iraq and the success of other objectives. While the U.S. Government will have restored the essential services to pre-war levels and beyond, we now need to assist in building ministerial and provincial capacity to help meet growing demand for those services. This requires encouraging policy and fiscal reforms to reduce subsidies; assisting in enhancing systems for accountability and transparency; building capable, responsible, and representative Iraqi institutions; and restoring a professional civil service system.
5. (U) Help Iraq Strengthen its Economy – Developing broad-based economic growth in the private sector is critical to the success of building security and stability in Iraq. With the assistance of the international community and appropriate policy reforms, Iraq can do much to stimulate key industries, particularly the labor-intensive private sector, such as agriculture and small-scale private sector development. In addition to increased local and provincial private sector job creation efforts, the U.S. Government will continue to strongly support efforts for a free market economy, including reforms of Iraq's banking system and trade regulations, removal of obstacles to foreign private investment, and the pursuit of additional U.S. and foreign private investment. Through support for the restoration of security, we will help reduce and then reverse capital flight and emigration of talented Iraqis. We will encourage Iraq to establish sound IMF standby programs as the basis of future economic growth and stability.

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6. (S/REL) Help Iraq Strengthen the Rule of Law and Promote Civil Rights – 2006 must be the year of the police and the rule of law. The Iraqi Government's ability to protect its citizens and to evenhandedly enforce its laws will have a profound effect on developing the trust and support needed from its citizens to reject the insurgency and to stand up to coercion. Iraq, with the assistance of the Coalition, must take back its streets from both the insurgents and the criminals who are benefiting from the continuing disorder. It must also address the rampant corruption and human rights abuses that are destroying the trust and hope of the Iraqi people in their government. We will promote rule of law in Iraq through a comprehensive, integrated approach that strengthens the legal framework, judiciary, police, prisons, the legal profession, and citizens' access to justice, and begins the transition of detention operations to the Iraqi Government.

7. (U) Increase International Support for Iraq – The success of Iraq's transition to self-reliance also depends on strengthening the political, economic, and security support of Iraq's neighbors and the broader international community. We will assist Iraq in garnering broader regional and international support for the political process; enhancing economic assistance from nations and international financial institutions; sustaining the Coalition; and restricting the flow of people, money, and arms to the terrorists. By the end of 2006, we should witness significant progress in the engagement of regional governments and the international financial institutions in supporting the new constitutional government.

8. (U) Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of the Insurgents – Effective and accurate communication of our objectives to the Iraqi people, international community, and American people is essential to our mission. Iraqi citizens must acquire a personal stake in the success of their new democracy, which will require setting realistic expectations – under-promising and over-delivering. We must therefore increase the Iraqi Government's ability to conduct effective strategic communications. At the same time, we must integrate the capabilities of the U.S. Government, our Coalition partners, and the Iraqi Government. We have an overarching mandate to build a broad understanding across the globe and at home based on our clearly-stated mission objectives, while reducing the effectiveness of messages delivered by terrorists and those who oppose progress in Iraq, including 1.4b

Resources


(U) Currently, sufficient funds are not available to support all the above objectives. Although additional congressional funding will be sought to complete these critically important efforts to stabilize Iraq, we will actively pursue matching funding from the Iraqi budget, as well as continuing contributions from the international community. Additionally, the effectiveness of our efforts will be directly related to the quality of a fully-staffed U.S. Government team in Iraq. Consequently, a top priority will be to ensure that we fill key positions with the most qualified individuals in a timely manner.

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
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Conclusion

(U) The Coalition is entering the decisive phase of our involvement in Iraq. We have accomplished much: the elimination of a brutal dictator, the democratic election of an Iraqi government, the development of an Iraqi constitution, the restoration of Iraq's infrastructure beyond pre-war levels, and the establishment of an increasingly effective Iraqi Security Force that in time will be able to take over from Coalition Forces. The challenge for the U.S. Government and Coalition will be to make 2006 a turning point in assisting Iraq in isolating the extremists and drawing in former rejectionists through focused stabilization efforts and the development of a functioning and increasingly responsible Iraqi Government that will gain the trust and support of its citizens. This will require an integrated approach and significant continuing military, economic, and political support and assistance, but with conditions and standards that will help the new government succeed in its new responsibilities.



Zalmay Khalilzad
Ambassador
United States Embassy - Baghdad



George J. Casey, Jr.
General, USA
Commander,
Multi-National Forces - Iraq

~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

HQ, MNF-I
EMBASSY ANNEX, IRAQ
041115CNOV05
ROUTINE (GREEN)

(U) ANNEX A TO MNF-I FRAGO 05-383 (ASSESSMENT OF PROVINCES AND SELECT URBAN AREAS FOR THE ASSUMPTION OF FULL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY BY IRAQI CIVIL AUTHORITIES)

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ These conditions outline the standards that a select urban area or province must achieve before the Iraqi civil authorities may assume full security responsibility. Ultimately, the decision to transfer the security responsibilities for an urban area or a province rests with the Multinational Forces- Iraq (MNF-I) Commanding General (CG), the Iraqi Prime Minister, and US Ambassador to Iraq.
2. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Urban Areas.** The following outlines the minimum conditions for an urban area to be eligible for the Iraqi civil authorities to assume full security responsibility. Police capacity and governance are keys to success and these conditions guide reductions in MNF-I security presence. Urban areas identified for transition will be nominated by the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) CG and approved by the MNF-I CG.
 - 2.A. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Threat Assessment:**
 - a. Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense (MoD), MNF-I and National Intelligence Coordination Center (NICC) assess the terrorist/insurgent threat level as low.
 - b. Iraqi MoI, MoD, MNF-I and NICC project the terrorist / insurgent threat level as steady or on a downward trend.
 - c. Crime assessment from MoI (Iraqi Police Service [IPS]) does not materially change the threat assessment above.
 - d. Presence of armed groups does not materially change the threat assessment in "a" and "b" above for the purpose of security transfer as assessed by MoI, MoD, MNF-I and NICC.
 - e. Weapons turn in program established in the urban area for weapons not authorized by law as assessed by MoD, MoI and MNF-I.
 - 2.B. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Governance.**
 - a. The Governor, sitting as the coordinator of the Provincial Security Committee (PSC) (including political and security authorities as outlined in the implementing arrangement), in accordance with the authorities granted him by law, must be capable of overseeing security operations in the urban area as assessed by MoD, MoI, USEMB and MNF-I.
 - b. Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC), PSC and Joint Operations Room (including political and security authorities as outlined in the implementing arrangement) are operational and capable of coordinating and monitoring operations as assessed by MoD, MoI, USEMB and MNF-I.
 - c. Intelligence structures and capabilities of MoD and MoI are capable of supporting provincial operations and forces as assessed by MoD, MoI, and MNF-I.
 - d. Provincial systems in place for detention, trial and incarceration under Iraqi control IAW Iraq's Constitution, laws and its international obligations as assessed by MoI, Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Ministry of Human Resources (MoHR) and USEMB.
 - 2.C. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Iraqi Police Service.**
 - a. IPS (at Transition Readiness Assessment [TRA] level 2) has the capacity to maintain domestic order in existing security situation and prevent resurgence of terrorism as assessed by MNF-I and MoI.
 - b. Special Police are able to respond to requests for support as assessed by MNF-I and MoI.
 - c. MoI, MoD and MNF-I certify that Special police have the coordination mechanisms to request assistance from IA.

2.D. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Iraqi Army:**

- a. Iraqi Army (IA) forces are able to respond to requests for assistance from the urban area as assessed by MoD, MoI and MNF-I.
- b. Coordination mechanisms are in place and evaluated to receive and respond to requests for assistance from the PJCC as assessed by MoI, MoD and MNF-I.
- c. IA forces designated to respond to the city are capable of leading counterinsurgency operations with MNF-I support (TRA Level 2) as assessed by MoD and MNF-I.

2.E. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Multi-National Forces-Iraq.**

- a. MNF-I forces will maintain capability and posture to reinforce if ISF capabilities are exceeded.
- b. MNF-I forces retain freedom of movement, and capability to conduct counterterrorism operations.
- c. Provisions for implementing the conditions above will be developed in coordination with MoI, MoD and MNF-I.

3. (U) **Provincial Transition of Security Responsibility.**

3.A. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Definition:** The assumption of full security responsibility for a province by the appropriate civil authorities following the achievement of conditions as specified by the Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibilities. Following this transfer, the Provincial Governor has primary responsibility for security within the Province.

3.B. (U) **Conditions:** Evaluated on a province-by-province basis.

3.C. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Threat Assessment:**

- a. MoD, MoI, MNF-I and NICC assess the provincial terrorist/insurgent threat level including external border security (where applicable) as low.
- b. MoD, MoI, MNF-I and NICC project the terrorist/insurgent threat level as steady or on a downward trend.
- c. Threat from across the external border (where applicable) to include infiltration and smuggling is assessed by MoD, MoI, MNF-I and NICC as low.
- d. Crime assessment from MoI (IPS) does not materially change threat assessment as listed above.
- e. Presence of armed groups does not materially change the threat assessment in "a" and "b" above for the purpose of security transfer as assessed by MoD, MoI, MNF-I and NICC.
- f. Threat to critical infrastructure and lines of communication assessed as low by MoI, MoD, MNF-I and NICC.
- g. Weapons turn in program established in the province for weapons not authorized by law as assessed by MoD, MoI and MNF-I.

3.D. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Iraqi Governance.**

- a. The Governor, sitting as the coordinator of the PSC (including political and security authorities as outlined in the implementing arrangement), in accordance with the authorities granted him by law, must be capable of overseeing security operations in the province as assessed by MoD, MoI, USEMB and MNF-I.
- b. PJCC, PSC and Joint Operations Room (including political and security authorities as outlined in the implementing arrangement) are operational and capable of coordinating and monitoring operations as assessed by MoD, MoI, USEMB and MNF-I.
- c. Intelligence structures and capabilities of MoD and MoI are capable of supporting provincial operations and forces as assessed by MoD, MoI and MNF-I.
- d. Provincial systems in place for detention, trial and incarceration under Iraqi control IAW Iraq's Constitution, laws and its international obligations as assessed by MoI, MoJ, MoHR and USEMB.

3.E. (U) Iraqi Security Forces.

3.E.1. ~~(S//REL)~~ Iraqi Police Forces.

- a. IPS (TRA level 2) has the capacity to maintain domestic order in existing security situation and prevent resurgence of terrorism as assessed by MoI and MNF-I.
- b. IPS coordinate their counter-insurgency operations with IA and Special Police, including intelligence sharing as assessed by MoD, MoI and MNF-I.
- c. Border Guards (where applicable) able to interdict cross-border support to insurgents and terrorists with support from MNF-I forces as assessed by MoD, MoI and MNF-I.
- d. Special Police (TRA level 2) have the ability to coordinate and conduct counter-insurgency operations in the provinces as assessed by MoD, MoI and MNF-I.

3.E.2. ~~(S//REL)~~ Iraqi Army.

- a. In coordination with IPS, IA (at TRA Level 2) leads counter-insurgency operations in their sectors in the province IAW joint Iraqi-MNF-I plans and agreements as assessed by MoD and MNF-I.
- b. In coordination with IPS, IA contains the insurgency in the province with support from MNF-I forces, and have the ability to coordinate for MNF-I reaction forces if its unit capabilities are exceeded as assessed by MoD and MNF-I.
- c. Coordination mechanisms are in place and evaluated to receive and respond to requests for assistance from the IPS as assessed by MoD, MoI and MNF-I.
- d. Capability to coordinate the security of strategic infrastructure in the province exists as assessed by MoD and MNF-I.
- e. IA brigade-level temporary detention capability operates under Iraqi control IAW Iraq's Constitution, laws and its international obligations as assessed by MoD, MoJ, MoHR and MNF-I.

3.F. ~~(S//REL)~~ Multi-National Forces-Iraq.

- a. MNF-I forces will maintain capability and posture to reinforce if ISF capabilities are exceeded.
- b. Coordinate civil construction activities and facilitate/integrate Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) via PJCC.
- c. Provide support and force protection for MNF-I forces operating in the area.
- d. MNF-I forces retain freedom of movement, and capability to conduct counterterrorism operations.
- e. Provisions for implementing the above conditions will be developed in coordination with MoI, MoD and MNF-I.

3.G. ~~(S//REL)~~ Notes.

- a. All Iraqi Armed Force will be under the command of the Prime Minister, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces.
- b. MoD forces will remain under the command of the MoD and coordinate with the MoD representative in the respective PSC.
- c. Special Police Forces under the command of the MoI retain freedom of movement, and the capability to conduct counter-terrorism operations in coordination with the MoI representative in the respective PSC.
- d. In crisis situations, all Iraqi Police Forces, local and national, will be under the command of MoI.
- e. TRA is a joint readiness assessment conducted periodically to measure the capabilities of the ISF.

1. Issue: Mod to RFF for 15 x MiTTs (JUL RDD)

2. Lead (Office & POC): MNC-I Force Generation – (b)(3), (b)(6) IAG –
(b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Discussion: The course of actions (COAs) in Posture for the Long War (PLW) 2006 Off Ramp Plan identifies additional Transition Teams (TTs) required to fill the gap of curtailing US BCTs in 2006.

4. Background: MNF-I Cdr's directed COA, (COA 1 "Baseline and COA 2 "Stretch"), requires additional external TTs due to the curtailment of US BCTs in 2006. Under this COA, MNC-I would require 5 x additional TTs in the months of July, August and September. Ten Additional externally sourced Transition Teams are also required as MNC-I off ramps forces to 12 x BCTs or less; the additional 252 augmentee requirement was previously an internal MNC-I fill; however, as previously stated once US BCTs reach 12 x BCTs or less requires MNC-I can no longer provide these augmentees and External sourcing is required. For potential decision dates see attachment, "MOD Options for Transition Team Sourcing."

5. Higher HQ Guidance: Submit the entire RFF for all TTs and augmentees; if at a later date MNC-I does not anticipate filling the requirement then turn off the requirement and request the unit not deploy.

6. Facts: US Forces currently provide 54 x out-of-hide (OOH) Transition Teams; each BCT can provide up to 5 x OOH TTs; assuming a US Army Reserve/National Guard solution, externally sourced TTs require a 6 x month lead time IOT source/train/deploy; off ramp BCTs will depart ITO with internal TTs. MNC-I will still provide 23 MiTTs Internally.

7. Assumptions: COA 1 requires MNC-I to submit an MOD to the RFF for 15 x TTs to fill the gap due to curtailment of US BCTs; if conditions for COA 2 are achieved, it will require MNC-I to submit another MOD to the RFF for 10 x TTs to fill the gap due to curtailment of US BCT in NOV/DEC 06; CJCS will support request for additional external TTs; and a full Transition Team program is required until tactical units achieve Level I TRA.

8. Risk: If teams are not requested/sourced, a capability gap with exists on TTs.

9. Issues and Challenges: Timely sourcing to Transition Teams.

10. Recommendations / MNC-I Position: Based on MNF-I Cdr's PLW brief to SECDEF (o/a 5 JAN 06) and feedback, submit RFF NLT 1 FEB 06 IOT to source and deploy TTs ITO fill gap due to curtailment of US BCTs.

11. Decision Point: 1 FEB 06

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Issue: Mod to RFF for 15 x MiTTs

Lead:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Background:

- COAs for Posturing for the Long War (PLW) brief requires additional external Transition Teams (TTs).

- Additional externally sourced TTs required once MNC-I off ramps forces to 12 x BCTs or less (252 Augmentees)

Higher HQs Guidance


- Submit the entire RFF for all TTs and augmentees
- If MNC-I does not anticipate filling the requirement then turn off the requirement.

Discussion/Challenges

- Timely sourcing to Transition Teams.

Recommendations/MNC-I Position

- Based on MNF-I Cdr's PLW brief to and feedback from the SECDEF (o/a 5 JAN 06), submit RFF NLT 1 FEB 06 IOT to source and fill gaps due to the curtailment of US BCTs.



1. **Issue:** Designate CF Operational Reserve (OPRES)
2. **Lead:** C3 Plans, (b)(3), (b)(6)
3. **Discussion:** Keeping a dedicated OPRES in the JOA has thus far been judged a misuse of combat power for security and partnership requirements in this COIN fight. As such the designated operational reserve forces have been committed in battlespace with a prepared to deploy (PTDO) time condition. Currently, MNC-I has two elements designated as a Coalition Force OPRES. The MEU, although committed to MNF-W for full spectrum operations, has a 96 hour PTDO task to be employed ITO wide as an OPRES. Additionally, MND-B has the task per FRAGO 307, DTG 01 Oct 05, to identify 1 BN TF as an operational reserve on a 72 hour PTDO tether. MNC-I also has access to the National Strategic Reserve, the 82nd ABN DRB. Both forces were requested and employed in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to provide surge combat power ISO of security requirements for the Iraqi Constitutional Referendum vote and the Iraqi National Elections.
With the completion of the referendum, national elections, and Operation SAYAID in the western ERV, the surge forces are due to redeploy. The MEU has been extended for employment until 15 Feb 06. The DRF battalions are in the process of redeployment right now. And, with the expansion of MND-B battlespace and the upcoming RIP/TOA of 4 ID for 3 ID and the employment of an MND-B BN TF to MNF-W (Ramadi) the OPRES task to MND-B must be reassessed.
4. **Recommendation / Way Ahead:** NLT 05 Jan 06 rescind the OPRES task to MND-B, leaving the 22 MEU (SOC) as the CF OPRES on a 96 hour PTDO. MNC-I C3, Plans will conduct mission analysis as to whether or not MNC-I should designate an OPRES BN TF as a replacement for 22 MEU upon redeployment. 01 Feb 06 is the initial NLT Decision Point.

3 January 2006

SUBJECT: Ashura-Arbaeen

1. ISSUE. Provide information about the Shia holy festival of Ashura and the ceremony of Arbaeen and its potential implications for Coalition Forces.

2. LEAD. C3-PLANS

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background. Ashura marks the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, and is celebrated on the 10th day of the Islamic month of Muharram (9 Feb 06). It is a day of mourning as it commemorates the Battle of Karbala, during which Imam Hussein, his family and a small group of followers were killed. The Holy Day of Arbaeen is the 20th day of Safar, 20 Mar 06, and marks the end of 40 days of mourning for Imam Hussein and is the final ceremony of the Ashura festival. It is celebrated 40 days after Ashura, as the 40th day after the funeral of a person is an important day of mourning. Continuing in the same vein as the Ashura festivals, during Arbaeen ceremonies people will parade through the streets, re-enact Imam Hussein's death, slash their heads with ceremonial swords, and gather in and around the Imam Hussein and Hazrat Al-Abbas shrines.
- Facts.
 - The transfer of authority for Najaf and Karbala to the Iraqi government means that Iraqi Security Forces will be responsible for ensuring security of these cities during the 2006 Ashura festival.
 - In 2005, despite increased security measures by the Iraqi government, which included the closure of the Iraqi border for the duration of the Ashura festival (18-23 FEB 05), suicide bomb attacks against mosques in Baghdad spiked, with 13 suicide attacks reported between 18-19 FEB. The Zarqawi network and Ansar Al-Sunna were responsible for these attacks.
 - Iranian pilgrims, estimated at 300, 000, will enter through border checkpoints in MND-CS and MND-SE, with most people entering Iraq through the Shalamchek border crossing 1.4a and transiting Basrah, before heading north to Karbala.
 - Most people wishing to worship Ashura and Arbaeen in Karbala will begin their travel towards and into Iraq about one to two weeks from the start of Ashura festivities.
- Assumptions.
 - IG will endorse and enforce a policy of controlling transit of Iraq by pilgrims from surrounding countries and those visiting Najaf and Karbala from outside of Iraq. In 2005 it was estimated that

1,000,000 people participated with several hundred-thousand coming from Iran.

- The large-scale movement of Shia pilgrims traveling across Iraq will provide terrorist, insurgent, criminal and extremist groups a large civilian target to attack or exploit.
- Enemy may attempt to conduct spectacular attacks to incite sectarian violence and promote instability.
- Risk. Aware of the negative IO impact and sectarian backlash that would be generated if they were to launch attacks in the major Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, IZR and T&FF recognize that Ashura could provide an excellent opportunity for them to incite sectarian violence and undermine the newly elected government.
- Issues and Challenges.
 - CF prepared to provide support to ISF while remaining in overwatch.
 - CF maintaining appropriate distance from holy sites as they conduct daily operations as well as MSR/ASR congestion.
 - Media coverage.
 - Medical facilities capabilities to support the large influx of pilgrims.

4. RECOMMENDATION.

- Iraqi-led operation with CF in support.
- MND-B establish security plans around key cities of Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf.
- Conduct shaping operations – shift ISR coverage to key cities, redirect traffic, IO to highlight success of GOI.

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Issue: Ashura-Arba'een

Lead:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Background:

- Ashura marks anniversary of martyrdom of Imam Hussein; Ashura is celebrated 9 Feb 06 and Arba'een, occurring 40 days after, is celebrated on 20 Mar 06
- Estimated that 300, 000 Iranian pilgrims will enter through checkpoints in MND-CS- and SE—most people entering through the Shalamcheh border crossing near Basrah
- The transfer of authority for Najaf and Karbala to the Iraqi government means that Iraqi security forces will be responsible for security in those cities during the festival

Discussion/Challenges

- The large-scale movement pilgrims traveling across Iraq provides T&FF a large civilian target to attack or exploit and may offer an opportunity to incite sectarian violence and undermine the new government

Recommendations/MNC-I Position

- CF must be prepared to support ISF while remaining in overwatch
- MND-B establish security plans around key cities of Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf
- Conduct shaping operations—shift ISR coverage to key cities, redirect traffic, IO highlight success of GOI

1. Issue: Decision to Continue IOTF

2. Lead: IOTF, (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Discussion:

- Background: The IOTF was established in July 2005 to provide direct support to TF 1.4a during Operation Sayaid through DEC 05. MNF-I CG expanded the IOTF mission to include degrading the flow of foreign fighters and to counter propaganda. IOTF mission was extended and tied to Operation Dahir. IOTF conducts aggressive Information Operations focused against the AQ network IOT disrupt their offensive capability, deny them sanctuary in Iraq, and drive a wedge between AQ and the populace.
- Higher HQ Guidance: MNF-I CG extended the IOTF to 31 March 2006.
- Facts:
 - Manpower: MNF-I, MNC-I, MNF-W, TF 1.4a provide manpower
 - Contract:
 - a. Bell Pottinger (1 Oct 05-31 Mar 06)
 - b. \$42.3m total (funded / advocated by MNC-I ECOORD)
 - c. Based on current expenditure rate – funds will last until 1 May 06; contract modification to extend the contract to 30 Apr 06 will be completed 1 Jan 06
 - TF 1.4a supports the IOTF and wants the mission to continue
- Assumptions:
 - MNF-I CG will extend the mission requirement to 30 Sep 06
 - MNF-I, MNC-I, MNF-W, TF 1.4a will continue to provide manpower
 - MNC-I will remain Executive Agent
 - MNF-I will support a Super CARB for 1 May to 30 Sep 06
- Risk: Mission dissolution; loss of focus on AQ [AS] as a target; quick-fire counter-propaganda ability will be lost – propaganda is a significant tool for recruitment.
- Issues and Challenges:
 - Maintain AQ mission focus
 - New funding from 1 May 06 to 30 Sep 06
 - PSYOP approval authorities
- MNC-I Position: Remain as Executive Agent; provide personnel, resources and advocacy; maintain relationships with TF 1.4a, JIATF, and MNF-I.

4. Recommendations: Continue IOTF. IOTF will specifically target existing and emerging terrorist organizations in and affecting the ITO with speed and agility. This capability is imperative to "driving a wedge between the populace and terrorist organizations and to discredit the propaganda used to recruit new terrorist operatives.

5. Decision Point: 1 March 2006

IOTF Paper

The IOTF mission is to conduct aggressive Information Operations focused against the AQ network in order to disrupt their offensive capability, deny them sanctuary in Iraq, and drive a wedge between AQ and the populace. The IOTF provides the MNF-I Commander with an agency singularly focused on attacking AQ by utilizing all the pillars of Information Operations. The Effects Coordinator, MNC-I is the Executive Agent for the IOTF.

The IOTF uses a multi-media approach to deliver its anti-AQ message to the Iraqi populace. In executing its mission, the IOTF provides operational guidance to Bell-Pottinger, a civilian marketing firm, who produces and distributes all aspects of the IOTF information campaign. Bell-Pottinger also provides statistical analysis for product development and assessment, and media monitoring capabilities. The IOTF acts as the Contracting Officer's Representative for the \$43 million Bell-Pottinger contract that is currently due to expire in 31 March 2006. However, a modification to contract has been initiated through PARC to extend operations of Bell Pottinger to allow for expenditure of the contract dollars. Based on current expenditure rates, the current contract dollars will last to 1 May 2006.

The IOTF is currently led by a Military Intelligence LTC, Functional Area 30 (Information Operations qualified). She will be replaced in January 2006 by a Field Artillery LTC. Training and RIP have already begun for the replacement of the core IOTF personnel (30-day cycle). Personnel rotations for the remaining personnel are on schedule providing a staggered continuity of expertise. Resident on the team are two information operations officers – an MNF-W and TF 1.4a LNO. An RFF is in staffing for an Arabic/Middle Eastern FAO and a PSYOP Officer – two positions without identified replacements.

The IOTF manages an internet media monitoring cell (Cyber Cell) to quickly identify streams of propaganda – Arabic and English. The Cyber Cell combs Jihadist media, Arab media, and world media for relevant information that can be turned against AQ in the IOTF information campaign. The Cyber Cell is composed of one Soldier, two Airmen, and several contractors from MNF-I Strategic Communications.

The IOTF's greatest strength is its ability to direct a major information campaign, against a single target, in a relatively short amount of time. Due to the streamlined nature of the IOTF command structure, the organization can rapidly preempt AQs dissemination of information, or quickly react to AQ propaganda. Numerous website postings from AQI and AMZ over the past several months which show the growing frustration of AQSL over the way they are portrayed in the Iraqi medium validate the effectiveness of the IOTF information campaign. Dissolving the IOTF would cause the Force Commander to lose this singularly focused, quick-hitting tool. This would make refuting AQ's propaganda more difficult and could cause them to become more emboldened. With propaganda being a significant tool for recruitment, the impact will have operational significance.

28 December 2005

SUBJECT: IGFC HQs Future

1. ISSUE. Identify long-term Command & Control structures and future of the IGFC Headquarters as a viable Iraqi Army C2 Node

2. LEAD. C3 ISF- (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background. Since April 2005, manning of the IGFC has meet with limited results. IGFC remains at TRA 4 despite numerous forcing functions to establish as a functioning headquarters. Decision point in near term to fully understand Iraqi intentions for this C2 node
- Facts.
 - April 2005, IGFC opened at Camp Victory
 - August 2005, Granted ADCON of Iraqi Army Forces by General Babakir
 - October, IGFC receives its first tactical task as a forcing function to man the facility, the ASR Cheyenne Route Security mission- Op Eid
 - December 2005, IGFC still at TRA 4, manning has increased by about 15 officers since August.
- Assumptions.
 - Corps Partnership efforts will continue to augment C2 Functions of IGFC
 - External Sourced MITT team arrives in January 2006
 - Operation EID will continue, with follow on repositioning of 3/5th to Diyala
 - LTG Abdul Qadir will remain as CG despite new Iraqi Government
 - IGFC will not receive TACON of 8th Division until a minimum TRA 3 capability is established
 - IGFC will not obtain budget or fiscal responsibility from MOD
- Risk. Continued turmoil in C2 of Iraqi Army split by JHQ M-Staff and IGFC G-Staff in roles, responsibilities between title X and tactical duties.
- Issues and Challenges.
 - TRA levels do not meet projections primarily due to manning shortages
 - Continue to build life support area for IGFC, large contract expenditures with little gain
 - Loss of momentum in operations due to inadequate IGFC C2 structure
 - IGFC can not resource Iraqi Army needs
- US External MITT team for IGFC can be used to augment JHQ staff

4. RECOMMENDATION. V Corps will need to make a decision by 1 March on continuing support to IGFC as a viable C2 node

5. DECISION POINT.

- March 06-
- Shift all efforts for Iraqi Army C2 to JHQ

1. Issue: Establish IPS TRA Baseline by 1 Mar 06 in order that IPS Development Program implementation and IPS progress can be measured.
2. Lead: Sqn Ldr (b)(3), (b)(6)
3. Discussion:
 - Background: The objective of the IPS Development Program is to transition the leadee for security operations to the ISF by developing IPS capability to TRA Level 2 or above. To that end a 3-phase plan has been drawn up under which Police Transition Teams (PTT) are established within Provincial headquarters and defined District headquarters and stations. A conceptual outline of the IPS Development Strategy is Enclosed. Broadly, the role of the PTTs is to train and develop the IPS to achieve at least Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2. TRA Level 2 is the minimum standard required for transition to occur. PTTs are OPCON to MNC-I and TACON to the MSCs (limited to the execution of the PTT mission). The 49th MP Bde is the Executive agent for program delivery to the MSCs, who are the supported commander.
 - Phase 1 of the program commenced 1 Jan 06. It includes training and deployment of the PTTs that will be located at each of 14 Provincial headquarters and in 54 District headquarters within the 9+ Key Cities as well as 91 stations in Baghdad/Tagi. [Note: The 4 provinces within MND-SE are part of a separate, related program subject to the same TRA].
 - During the first 2 months of Phase 1, before 1 Mar 06, a TRA is to be concluded on each provincial and district headquarter.
 - This represents the first pan-battlespace evaluation of the IPS. It will allow the magnitude of the training task to be established, indicate where resources should be allocated and inform projections for battlespace transition. It will also set the baseline from which progress will be measured.
 - Higher HQ Guidance: 2006 has been coined the 'year of the police'. MNF-I articulated guidance through its FRAGO 383-05, which called for the assessment of the IPS.
 - Facts: PTTs, comprising MPs, IPLOs and translators, have been established and are being training and rolled out ICW Corps OPORD. IPS manning is approximate 123,000 of whom around 64,000 have been trained. The target trained strength is 135,000 by Feb 2007.
 - Assumptions: That the PTTs integrate into there respective unit swiftly and are able to conduct their assessment.
 - Risk: Delay to achieve visibility of extant IPS standard could impact on Force Generation and delay transition.
 - MNC-I Position: IPS development is central component for transition of COIN to IRZ. Corps is the supported commander for the IPS Development Program; the baseline TRA will inform future planning and resource allocation and should therefore be conducted as early as possible.
4. Recommendations: Maintain pressure to achieve baseline IPS TRA by 1 Mar 06.

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Issue: Establish IPS TRA Baseline by 1 Mar 06

Lead: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Background:

- IPS Development Program commenced 1 Jan 05
- PTT Roll out to 14 Provincial & 64 District HQs in 9+ Key Cities
- Provincial & District PTTs trained by 20 Jan, others by 5 Feb 06
- **Provincial and District Baseline TRA to be conducted by 1 Mar 06**
 - Allow future IPS Progress to be measured
 - Allow Program implementation to be reviewed
 - Reveal magnitude of training task
 - Indicate priorities for resource allocation
 - Inform projections for battlespace transition

Higher HQs Guidance


- MNC-I is lead for IPS Development Program.
- MNF-I directive issued under FRAGO 05-383

Discussion/Challenges

- Delay in issuing TRA Definitions could impact on Force Generation and hinder program as a whole with concomitant impact on transition time

Recommendations/MNC-I Position

- It is imperative to quickly gain visibility of IPS baseline position.
- Pressure should be maintained to ensure that this occurs by 1 Mar 06



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
DEVELOP CAPABLE IPS

"2006: The Year of the Police"

Characteristics:


- Focus at the Provincial Police HQs and 9+ Key Cities (districts/stations)
- Resource all 18 Provincial Police Headquarters at one PTT per HQs (1:1)
- Resource District Police Headquarters at one PTT per HQs (1:1)
- Resource Police Station PTT at one PTT per two stations (1:2)
- MND-SE continues SSR and resources PTT in four southern provinces
- MNC-I resources remaining 14 provinces; Requires 13 x MP companies
- Expansion beyond 9 (+) cities plan requires remissioning MP security units or RFF

Current PTT:	PTT req'd at Endstate:
Prov HQ = 9	Prov HQ = 14 + SE
Dist HQ = 15	Dist HQ = 54 + SE
Station = 32	Station = 176 + SE



Prioritized 9 (+) Cities **Requires 13 x MP Companies**

14 Provincial HQs	Ph. IIIA
54 District HQs	Ph. IIIA
176 Stations	
Baghdad/Taji	91
Tal Afar	4
Najaf	12
Mosul	22
Ramadi	3
Fallujah	9
N. Babil	8
Baqubah	11
Samarra	5
Kirkuk	11
Ph. IIIB	
MND-SE Sourced:	
4 Provincial HQs	
19 District HQs	
41 Stations	
Basra	19
Nasiriyah	5
Samawah	10
Amarah	7



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Police Transition Team Composition

Provincial Headquarters

Military	7
IPLO	5
Civilian	3
MP Squad	9
Total:	24

- Team Chief O4/31A
- Deputy IPLO
- Ops/Plans 31B50/IPLO
- Personnel 42L30/IPLO
- Logistics 92Y30
- IA /SP LNO O2/02A
- Criminal Intelligence 31B20/IPLO
- Communications 25U20
- Training IPLO
- Linguistic support Interpreters
- Security MP Squad

District Headquarters

Military	4
IPLO	3
Civilian	2
MP Squad	9
Total:	18

- Team Chief O3/31A
- Deputy IPLO
- Ops/Plans 31B40/IPLO
- Personnel 42L20
- Logistics 92Y20
- Criminal Intelligence IPLO
- Linguistic support Interpreters
- Security MP Squad

Police Station

Military	2
IPLO	2
Civilian	1
MP Squad	7
Total:	12

- Team Chief 31B30
- Deputy IPLO
- Personnel/IOG IPLO
- Criminal Intelligence 31B20
- Linguistic support Interpreter
- Security MP Squad

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
PTT Task List

- Train, coach and mentor the Police Chief and staff (develop leadership)
- Develop personnel accountability procedures (administration, pay, leave, etc.)
- Develop security protection measures
- Develop criminal intelligence direction, collection and analysis
- Plan and execute collective training programs
 - Iraqi criminal law
 - Criminal investigation and evidentiary procedures IAW Iraqi law
 - Community policing
 - IPS SOP
- Ensure all officers cycled through formal individual training (Police Academy)
- Plan and coordinate effective police operations
- Establish procedures for suspect and detainee handling
- Develop logistical support systems (maintenance, supply, accountability, etc.)
- Develop effective Internal Affairs investigative capabilities
- Plan and execute PAO and Community Relations programs

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
PTT and Partner Relationships



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
MP Forces Available




9 Available for PTT (JAN06)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFH~~

Sourcing for the 13 x MP Co for 9+ key cities plan



Abu transition to Cropper



Suse turn over to Iraqi Control

Abu Detainees start move

Suse transfer begins

28 December 2005

SUBJECT: Future OIF Headquarters Options

1. ISSUE. Identify long-term Command & Control structures currently under consideration for Iraqi and Coalition Forces in Iraq.

2. LEAD. C3 FUOPS, (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. DISCUSSION.

- Background. GEN Casey requested COA input from MNC-I for potential Future OIF HQ Structure. 6 Month COA is an MNC-I Cdr directed COA.
- Facts.
 - USCENTCOM concept for future posture is to move from large, fixed US force posture that occupies battlespace to one that relies on tactical QRF
 - MNC-I has established the criteria/process to handover battlespace to ISF
 - (MNF-I) Joint Committee for Transfer of Security Responsibility has established conditions for the transfer of security responsibilities for urban areas and provinces
 - USCENTCOM RFF 510 IAG requests 130 x MiTTs (to include 15-man IGFC MiTT), 8 x SPTTs, 2 x ITTs, 42 x BTTs to embed with and develop ISF for independent COIN ops in next 24 months
- Assumptions.
 - Partnership, not Combined, structure for relationship with IA
 - ISF will counter the insurgency effectively
 - Focus of CF will shift from COIN to training and security assistance
 - Coalition C2 posture can transition to long-term structure in 2006
 - 05-03 Campaign Timeline for transition of battlespace/off-ramp will be met
 - The number of PRTs will increase to 15
 - Iraqi reliance on CF logistic enablers will outlast reliance on CF operational enablers
 - CF will retain capacity to prosecute counter-terrorist operations within ITO
- Risk. Turmoil in CF C2 structure leading to loss of momentum in prosecuting operations and transition of battle space.
- Issues and Challenges.
 - TRA levels do not meet projections and delay MNSTC-I structure change
 - AIF trends do not improve as projected
 - Loss of momentum in operations due to changing CF C2 structure
 - Short timeline for COA 6 initiation with large amount simultaneous staff restructure/function realignment
 - What are the implications of establishing PRTs?
 - To what extent is the continued presence of CF a contributing factor?
 - What role will NATO and UN play in the future?
 - Developing a viable metric for projecting IA dependency on CF logistics

4. RECOMMENDATION. 6 Month COA

5. DECISION POINT.



- 6 Month COA: MAR 06 with implementation in JUN 06
- 1 Year/2 Year COAs: APR 06 with implementation in SEP/DEC 06 respectively



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6 MONTH COA
(TIME TO ESTABLISH
ENDSTATE HQ)

(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)


**Possible Timeline:**



3 - 2 Headquarters (Merge MNC-I into MNF-I)

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6 MONTH COA
(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)



DP1: When do we
combine MNC-I
with MNF-I?

- Rationalize MNF-I/MNC-I functions to eliminate redundancy
- End of present 4-star command tour
- IGFC status determined
- Minimum of 75% trainers are Iraqi
- 11 of 32 (33%) IA Bdes are TRA 2
- 6 of 18 (33%) IP Bdes are TRA 2
- MOI/MOD can sustain current provision of essential services (TRA 3)

Possible Timeline:

EXECUTE REALIGNMENT
OF MNC-I AND MNF-I



MNF-I

MNSTC-I

EXECUTE REALIGNMENT
OF MNC-I TO OMC

2006

J F M A M J J A S O N D

2007

J F M A M J J A S O N D

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF~~

SAVINGS



• R&S

• CIS

• JIOC

• STRATOPS

MSC

MNC-I C3 FUOPS




MNSTC-I Becomes An OMC


DP2: When do we realign
MNSTC-I to an OMC?

2

- No known AIF sanctuary in ITO
- AIF activity is contained
- CF in operational overwatch
- Partnership to be maintained at all levels
- There are no OOH MITTs in ITO
- ISF in the lead (TRA 2)
- CF enablers (log / commo / trans / engs) introduced at national level only (est. Jul 07)
- MOI/MOD at TRA 2



Possible Timeline:





~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI~~

1 YEAR COA
(TIME TO ESTABLISH
ENDSTATE HQ)



Current Coalition Headquarters

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF~~

1 YEAR COA

(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)

1
DP1: When do we change from 3 to 2 HQs?

2
DP2: When do we go to one 3-star HQs?

3
DP3: When do we create a TF and consolidate with S&A?

• MINISTERIAL CAPACITY
• POLICY & DIRECTION
• STRATEGIC INTERFACE



• CONDUCT COIN
• PROVIDE ENABLERS
• OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
• EMBASSY SUPPORT
• ARFOR
• PARTNER IA
• DEVELOP ISF



• DEVELOP IGFC
• LIAISE BTW IGFC/MNC-I
• MITT RSQI




• TRAIN & MENTOR IA
DOWN TO BN LEVEL



• MOD & MOI CAPACITY
• FORCE GENERATION
• ASST TO IJHQ
• TRAIN, EQUIP IA FORCES
• LIFE SPT INTEGRATION



• MENTOR SP/IP
• PARTNER SP




• TRAIN & MENTOR SPF
DOWN TO BN LEVEL



• SECURITY
• INTELLIGENCE

Possible Timeline:



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF~~

MNC-I C3 FUOPS

~~SECRET//REL to USA &... MCFI~~

(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)




- SECURITY
- INTELLIGENCE
- FORCE GENERATION
- DEVELOPING SUSTAINMENT

•CONDUCT COIN



DP2: When do go to one 3-star HQs?




- TT SUPPORT
- MENTOR IA/IP
- PARTNER IA
- DEVELOP ISF

- TRAIN & MENTOR ISF DOWN TO BDE LEVEL

THE REALIGNMENT

EXECUTE REALIGNMENT
OF IAG UNDER OMC. OFF
RAMP TF HQ

Possible Timeline:





Operational Headquarters Transitions to a Taskforce (Operational Overwatch)

DP3: When do we create a TF
and consolidate with S&A?

3

- Strategic threat assessment
- AIF activity is diminished
- Number of BCT?
- MITTs down to Div only
- Intelligence-sharing construct with ISF in-place
- Operational Overwatch
- Point for transition to strategic overwatch can be identified
- ISSR effective
- PIC established in all provinces without CF presence
- Cooperation and coordination btw Provinces and Ministries
- National Government able to sustain essential services

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF~~

1YEAR COA

(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)



- MINISTERIAL CAPACITY
- POLICY & DIRECTION
- STRATEGIC INTERFACE
- MOD & MOI CAPACITY
- ARFOR
- ASST TO IJHQ



- CONDUCT COIN
- INTELLIGENCE
- SUSTAINMENT
- FORCE GENERATION




- MITT SUPPORT
- MENTOR IA/IP
- PARTNER IA
- DEVELOP ISF




- OPERATIONAL OVERWATCH
- PROVIDE ENABLERS
- OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
- EMBASSY SUPPORT



- TRAIN & MENTOR ISF DOWN TO DIV LEVEL



Possible Timeline:



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF~~




Endstate Headquarters – Taskforce and S&A merge

DP1: When do
we change from 3
to 2 HQs?

DP2: When do go
to one 3-star
HQs?

DP3: When do
we create a TF
and consolidate
with S&A?



1YEAR COA
(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)




- INTELLIGENCE
- CONDUCT COIN
- FORCE GENERATION
- SUSTAINMENT ISF

EXECUTE REALIGNMENT
OF IAG UNDER OMC, OFF
RAMP TF HQ

EXECUTE REALIGNMENT
OF MNC-I AND MNSTC-I

Possible Timeline:



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF~~

MNC-I C3 FUOPS



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI~~

2 YEAR COA
(TIME TO ESTABLISH
ENDSTATE HQ)



Current Coalition Headquarters

DP1: When do we change from 3 to 2 HQs?

DP2: When do we create a stand-alone Security & Assistance Group?

DP3: When do we change from a Corps to a TF?

2 YEAR COA
(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)

• MINISTERIAL CAPACITY
• POLICY & DIRECTION
• STRATEGIC INTERFACE

ISF

• SECURITY
• INTELLIGENCE

• MOD & MOI CAPACITY
• FORCE GENERATION
• ASST TO IJHQ
• TRAIN, EQUIP IA FORCES
• LIFE SPT INTEGRATION

• MENTOR SP/IP
• PARTNER SP

MNSTC-I

CMA TT

CPATT

SPTT

• TRAIN & MENTOR SP
DOWN TO BN LEVEL

MNC-I

• CONDUCT COIN
• PROVIDE ENABLERS
• OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
• EMBASSY SUPPORT
• ARFOR
• PARTNER IA
• DEVELOP ISF


IAG

• DEVELOP IGFC
• LIAISON BTW IGFC/MNC-I
• MITT R&OI

MITT


• TRAIN & MENTOR IA
DOWN TO BN LEVEL

Possible Timeline:



~~SECRET//REL to USA a.i. MCFL~~

(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)



- TRAIN & MENTOR IA DOWN TO BN LEVEL
- TRAIN & MENTOR SPF DOWN TO BN LEVEL





IAG Becomes Stand-Alone Security & Assistance Group

DP2: When do we create a stand-alone Security & Assistance Group?



- No known AIF sanctuary in ITO
- AIF activity is diminished
- CF in tactical overwatch
- Establish adequate structure to enable effective C2 of enlarged organization
- Structure in-place to take on partnership work currently vested in Corps
- MITTs required down to Bde only (reduced bill)
- There are no OOH MITTs in ITO
- Determine Combat Support arrangements for MITT operations within reduced CF footprint
- ISF in the lead (TRA 2)
- CF enablers (log / commo / trans / engs) introduced at national level only (est. Jul 07)
- MOI/MOD at TRA 2

EXECUTE REALIGNMENT OF MNC-I AND MNC-I

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

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III CORPS (06-08)

III CORPS (06-08)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI~~


2 YEAR COA
(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)

- MINISTERIAL CAPACITY
- POLICY & DIRECTION
- STRATEGIC INTERFACE
- MOD & MOI CAPACITY
- ASST TO IJHQ





- SECURITY
- INTELLIGENCE
- FORCE GENERATION
- DEVELOPING SUSTAINMENT

CONDUCT COIN




- TACTICAL OVERWATCH
- PROVIDE ENABLERS
- OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
- EMBASSY SUPPORT
- ARFOR



- TT SUPPORT
- MENTOR IA/IP
- PARTNER IA
- DEVELOP ISF


TRAIN & MENTOR ISF DOWN TO BDE LEVEL

Possible Timeline:



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI~~

(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)





Endstate Headquarters – Taskforce and S&A merge


DP1: When do we
change from 3 to 2
HQs?



DP2: When do we
create a stand-alone
Security & Assistance
Group?



DP3: When do we
change from a Corps
to a TF?



2 YEAR COA


(TIME TO ESTABLISH ENDSTATE HQ)

ISF

- INTELLIGENCE
- CONDUCT COIN
- FORCE GENERATION
- SUSTAINMENT ISF

- MENTOR IA/IP
- SUSTAIN(LOG/MAINT EXPERIENCE)
- FORCE PROTECTION
- OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT
- EMBASSY SUPPORT (MND-B)
- OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
- PROVIDING ENABLERS

Possible Timeline:



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF~~

MNC-I C3 FUOPS

1. Issue: Redeploy 2/1 AD (-); PTDO status; Call Forward Force BDE TAC w / BN TF

2. Lead (Office & POC): MNC-I Force Generation – (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Discussion: 2/1 AD deployed to the ITO in Dec 05; decision was made to halt the BCT in Kuwait and designate the BCT as Theater Reserve, later called "Call Forward Force."

4. Background: The 2005 Off Ramp plan identified 2/1 AD as a potential candidate to off ramp and not deploy to the ITO. In OCT 2005, 2/1 AD deployed to Kuwait and became the Call Forward Force. The Call Forward Force was to act as the Theater Operational Reserve with Iraq being its primary area of focus. CENTCOM Message directed that the Call Forward Force would remain in Kuwait until 30 APR 2006. Following decision o/a 15 MAR 06, 2/1 AD would either redeploy to Europe in its entirety or leave a portion of the BCT within Kuwait.

5. Higher HQ Guidance: MNF-I Commander wants to make a decision o/a 15 MAR 06 to redeploy the majority of 2/1 AD to Europe, while leaving the BCT TAC and a Battalion in Kuwait. Units from 2/1 AD would deploy/redeploy quarterly and perform training exercises within Kuwait as required.

6. Facts: The contingency force is available for operations across the AOR; the force will deploy through 30 APR 06 as a minimum; 2/1 AD will be FOC NLT 19 JAN 06; MNF-I Commander will make a decision to redeploy main body and leave smaller force within Kuwait o/a 15 MAR 06.

7. Assumptions: MNF-I Commander will leave a BDE TAC and Maneuver Battalion in Kuwait; remaining portion of force will redeploy to Europe and assume PTDO; 2/1 ID is available for PTDO; as other US BCTs are "off ramped" and do not deploy and as a result are eligible for PTDO.

8. Risk: Negligible

9. Issues and Challenges: Maintain balance between PLW requirements and availability of a CFF.


10. Recommendations / MNC-I Position: Redeploy the entire force to Europe and identify another potential US BCT as PTDO.

11. Decision Point: 15 MAR 06

1. **Issue:** Curtail 2 BCT - 1/10 BCT (APR 06) and 2/28 BCT (MAY 06)
2. **Lead (Office & POC):** MNC-I Force Generation – (b)(3), (b)(6)
3. **Discussion:** Course of Action 1 "Baseline" of the MNF-I Commander's PLW 2006 Off Ramp plan indicates that MNF-I Cdr will make a decision in MAR 2006 to curtail 1/10 MTN (APR 06) and 2/28 IN (MAY 06).
4. **Background:** US Joint Staff PLANORD (1 DEC 05) directed the development of COAs to reduce US BCTs in Iraq in 2006; MNF-I developed 3 x COAs for the off ramping of US Forces. COA 1 "Baseline" (10+1 x BCT by OCT 06) consists of the curtailment of 5 x US BCTs by October 2006; COA 2 "Stretch" is essentially a sequel of COA 1 and based on conditions allows MNF-I to off ramp 2 additional US BCTs by December 2006 (8+1 x BCT Set by DEC 06). COA 3 "Exploitation" is an accelerated off ramp that begins in February 2006 and ends in September 2006 thus achieving a 8 + 1 x BCT by September 2006. MNC-I is currently pursuing COA 1 based on MNF-I Cdr's guidance. The first decision point occurs in March 2006, in which the MNF-I Commander will make his decision to curtail 1/10 MTN in April 2006 and 2/28 IN in May 2006.
5. **Higher HQ Guidance:** MNF-I Cdr's guidance is to make a decision in March 2006 to curtail 2 x US BCTs (1/10 MTN – April 2006 and 2/28 IN – May 2006), which takes US Forces in the ITO to a 13 + 1 x BCT set by May 2006.
6. **Facts:** JS approved OIF 06-08 Force Rotation is 13 x BCTs in Iraq + 1 x BCT for Call Forward and 1 x BCT in PTDO.
7. **Assumptions:** Insurgency will not grow in post-December election period; sectarian violence will not destabilize Iraq; AIF attacks will occur in same battlespace (ERV, TRV, Baghdad to Baqubah, Tal Afar to Mosul, and Bayji to Kirkuk); GOI will not be fully seated until late April 2006; US enablers are still required to support and sustain ISF; and Iraqi Army will remain on glide path for assumption of battlespace per the DEC TRA projections.
8. **Risk:** 95% of the AIF attacks occur in 6 provinces (Ninawa, Al Anbar, Baghdad, Salad ad Din, Diyala, and Al Tamim), as MNF-I off ramp forces, battlespace realignment will be required to address these uncovered areas.
9. **Issues and Challenges:** Balance PLW requirements with operational and security requirements.
10. **Recommendations / MNC-I Position:** TBD, based of MNF-I feedback from SECDEF and January TRA assessment.
11. **Decision Point:** 15 MAR 06



COAs Based Off MNF-I Commander Guidance



* Acceleration Effects Sourcing of MITTs, RFFs, PRTs, Partnerships, and Double RIPS

1. Issue: Counter IED IO Contract Renewal.

2. Lead: MNC-I IO, (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Discussion:

• Background: 1.4a approved \$17 million for MNC-I to support the counter-IED fight. The money was allocated for a 12 month IO program designed to disrupt popular support for IED makers and IED activity. The contract was written for 6 months with a 6 month renewal option. The first 6 month contract runs from 19 Sep 05 to 20 May 06 which includes a "no cost to the government" extension. The contract award decision needs to be made NLT 15 Mar 06 if a new contractor is required or NLT 15 Apr 06 if a currently approved contractor is chosen.

• Higher HQ Guidance: NA

• Facts:

- Three contractors are approved by Contracting to provide support to MNC-I IO (Lincoln Group, Bell-Pottinger, SyColeman). Any awards must go to one of these three unless there is a "compelling reason" to not use one of them. In the case of a compelling reason, a new contractor could submit a technical proposal and a bid.

- The attainment of the operation's objective and effects are the measures of success of the current contractor. MNC-I IO will have had 45-60 days to evaluate the current contractor, SYColeman, by 15 Mar 06.

• Assumptions:

- Allowing a new contractor to bid on the contract will probably require at least 30-45 days for the contractor to develop and submit a detailed technical proposal, for the government to review and approve the proposal and then to get the contract signed. The contractor will likely require an additional 30 days to stand up a planning and production team at MNC-I HQ. This option requires a renewal decision to be made NLT 15 March 06 in order to keep production flowing.

- Using one of the approved contractors would likely require some stand up time as they may have to hire additional employees, but it still should be significantly quicker than using a new contractor since they are familiar with our planning and approval processes. This option requires a renewal decision to be made NLT 15 Apr 06 in order to keep production flowing.

• Risk: Assessment data is required to evaluate the success of the current contractor. If sufficient data is not available by the reward deadlines, MNC-I may 1) renew the contract with an unsuccessful contractor or 2) lose a successful contractor.

• Issues and Challenges: Delaying the award decision will limit award options and create a production gap but a delay may be required in order to measure the success of the current contractor.

4. Recommendation: Conduct final assessment of SYColeman's execution and achievement of effects and objectives NLT 15 MAR 06.

5. Decision Point: Decision for a new contractor NLT 15 Mar 06.

1. Issue: Realignment of Theater Security (TSCE) (MAY06) (48 BCT & 1/34 RIP)

2. Lead (Office & POC): MNC-I Force Generation – (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Discussion: In May 06, 48 BCT RIP/TOAs with 1/34 UA and assumes TSEC within the ITO. 1/34 UA will provide convoy escorts for theater sustainment convoys and forces to support integrated defense of LSA Anaconda.

4. Background: In November 05, 48 BCT conducted a RIP/TOA with 56 BCT and assumed Theater Security (TSEC). In December 05, 48 BCT also conducted a RIP/TOA with 29 BCT forces at LSA Anaconda to include the tasks of supporting integrated defense of the LSA. As previously stated, 1/34 RIP/TOAs with 48 BCT in May 2006. MNC-I conducted an initial analysis IOT determine the feasibility and supportability of this RIP/TOA in May 2006. Based on the analysis, 1/34 UA can assume the TSEC to include the supporting integrated defense task at LSA Anaconda.

5. Higher HQ Guidance: Reduce the allocation of forces providing security in MNF-W.

6. Facts: 1/34 UA deploys to ITO with 3,740 PAX compared to 4,200 PAX of 48 BCT; however, in addition to the Theater Security Force, 14 Security Companies are URF'ed to support convoy operations; 48 BCT HQs is located at Tallil; 48 BCT TAC is located at LSA Anaconda; 48 BCT provides 653 PAX for security at LSA Anaconda; 3 COSCOM is located in LSA Anaconda.

7. Assumptions: Insurgency will not grow in post-December election period; sectarian violence will not destabilize Iraq; Iraqi DBE/Army will control borders; US surge operations in the West and Northwest will decline in Spring/Summer 2006; MND-N will continue reinforcing the integrated defense of LSA Anaconda; 1/34 retains 2 x Mech Co Teams and Engineer assets; fixed site security forces for Camp Taqqadum will not be allocated in Spring 06; manning and operation of radio relay points will decrease in Spring 06; US enablers are still required to support and sustain ISF; Iraqi Army will remain on glide path for assumption of battlespace per TRA projections, allowing the off ramp of US BCTs and the closing and/or transferring of bases within ITO.

8. Risk: As US BCTs off ramp in 2006, TSEC will remain critical in the safe delivery of supplies supporting US/ISF in Iraq; without TSEC, sustainment convoys will be subject to increased AIF attacks impacting adversely on the sustainment flow within the ITO.

9. Recommendations / MNC-I Position: Implement the TSEC plan as depicted in the attachments.

10. Decision Point: 1 APR 06



3740 pax projected for deployment





1/34 UA

Providing Theater Security

Task	48th BCT Assumes Theater Security 22 Nov 05	44th BCT Assumes Theater Security 6 May 06				
Task	Unit	PAX	Remarks	Unit	PAX	Remarks
Radio Relay Point Manning and Operation						
Theater Support Convoy (TSC) Escort						
* TSC Command and Control						
Convoy Support Center (CSC) Cedar fixed site security						
CSC Scania Fixed Site Security & Garrison Duties, Mayor Cell						
Camp Tagaddum Fixed Site Security						
Implied Task: Rte clearance (Scania to Mixing Bowl)						
Implied Task: RRP Maint /force protect, upgrades						
				</		

* NOTE: 48th BCT HQ locates in Tallil.

*** NOTE: 2 x CO Teams remain with 1/34 UA**

*** NOTE: Does not include the 14 URFed Convo Security Companies.

Detached from 48 BCT = 442

BASE

~~SECRET//REF TO USA and MACF//43304228~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI #13301228~~



1/34 UA

Providing Integrated Defense of LSAA

Task	*48 th Assumes Limited SECFOR Tasks 12 JAN 06	*1/34 BCT assumes Limited SECFOR Tasks 6 May 06				
	Unit	PAX	Remarks	Unit	PAX	Remarks
Operate ECP's	                                   					

1. Issue. Supplemental CERP Funding Review

2. Lead. MNC-I C7, Reconstruction Planner, (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

- Background. MNF-I requested \$753M CERP funding for FY06 – received \$350M. Requested \$378M supplemental.
- Higher HQ Guidance – MNF-I FRAGO 05-374, 29NOV05: CERP is our tool to enable commanders to make immediate and positive impacts within their AOR. Key tasks: Build Iraqi governmental capacity; complete last tactical mile projects; create conditions for economic development momentum.
- Facts.
 - Executed \$350M supplemental in FY05. (Notified: MAY 05; received funds JUL 05; obligated 100% by 30 SEP 05.)
 - MNC-I C7 is the Title X, CERP program manager.
 - MNC-I with C7 lead, develops effects based CERP allocation criteria and identifies Corps targets; gathers all unfunded projects from MSC'S then conducts a Joint Civil Military Engineer Board (JCMEB) to prioritize and fund projects.
- Assumptions.
 - MNC-I receives a \$378M CERP supplemental with an FY06 obligation requirement or an end of 1st QTR, FY 07 obligation requirement.
 - MNC-I continues to support other MNF-I commands CERP requests that nest with Corps effects.
- Risk. Low.
- Issues and Challenges
 - Inclusion of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams' requirements in the effects based allocation of CERP to insure even progression across all LOO'S. (MSC Commanders continue to work closely with PRT's to support - governance and economic development.)
 - Transparent and efficient obligation of \$378M in as little as 100 days.
- MNC-I Position. Decision authority for CERP remains with battle-space commanders and not with DoS, GRD, or other agencies.

4. Recommendation – Approve effects based criteria and JCMEB process to prioritize projects.

5. Decision Point – Estimate 15 April 06. Monitor congressional review of supplemental requests. Have prioritization methodology with ranked projects ready before the money arrives.

1. Issue. Decision to Continue / Cancel C-RAM Intercept RFF
2. Lead. MNC-I ECC, C-RAM Theater LNO (b)(3), (b)(6)
3. Discussion.
 - Background. On 8 SEP 04 MNC-I ONS 306-04 was approved for development and deployment of a Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) System
 - Higher HQ Guidance – Support C-RAM capabilities to provide additional Force Protection against Indirect Fire (IDF) threats.
 - Facts.
 - a. The current C-RAM effort and Intercept Battery is fully funded by DOD
 - b. The purpose of the Intercept capability is to protect Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVAs) or High Risk Targets (HRTs) from IDF.
 - c. One C-RAM Intercept Battery (-) is currently in Theater at LSA Anaconda and has operated with two Phalanx gun systems for five months. Four more Phalanx guns are due to arrive in JAN 06 to complete the 6-gun Intercept Battery.
 - d. The current Intercept capability (with only 2 Phalanx guns) consists of two 500 meter semi-circles with no IDF engagements occurring thus far to provide a valid assessment of the operational capability of Intercept. The planned addition of the four additional Phalanx in JAN 06 will very likely provide a valid operational assessment.
 - e. Because the Phalanx systems were quickly developed and fielded several technical challenges still require design improvements and upgrades. On 19 DEC 05 one Phalanx system fired 5x20mm without a manual fire permit given. Currently all Phalanx systems are undergoing evaluation for an immediate engineering design correction. This correction will be integrated into the systems quickly.
 - Assumptions. IDF Threat will remain. DOD funding will continue for C-RAM.
 - Risk. IDF Threat remains persistent with 9% of Coalition Casualties from IDF attacks over last 12 week period (1 OCT – 23 DEC 05).
 - Issues and Challenges.

Is the Intercept capability worth the manpower (battery +/- 100 personnel), cost (+/- \$8M per gun), and effort (technical challenges and no IDF engagements)?
 - MNC-I Position.
 - a. Assess Operational Capability of fully funded and manned 6-gun Intercept Battery at LSA Anaconda between 1 FEB – 1 MAY 06 (90 days) to determine if any further Intercept systems are warranted/justified.
 - b. Operational Assessment Criteria:
 - The Phalanx should intercept >50% of Threat IDF entering the Protected Zones.
 - The IDF threat remains at or above current levels warranting a continuation of the successfully demonstrated IDF intercept capability.
4. Recommendation. Assess 6-gun Intercept capability at LSAA from 1 FEB 06 – 1 MAY 06 and submit RFF for a second battery if capability worthwhile and IDF Threat continues.

5. Decision Point: 1 MAY 06 – RFF based on Assessment of Intercept Battery capability.

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COUNTER-ROCKET ARTILLERY MORTAR INTERCEPT BATTERY RFF



(b)(3), (b)(6)

**C-RAM Theater Coordinator
MNC-I ECC Al Faw, Baghdad**

**DSN:
VIOP:**

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**NIP
SIPR**

27 DEC 05

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C-RAM INTERCEPT RFF

BLUF: C-RAM Intercept (Phalanx) has the Potential Capability to Neutralize Inbound IDF in Priority Protected Zones (o/a 50%) to Prevent a High Casualty Single IDF Event or Protect other Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas or High Risk Targets.

Recommendation: Conduct 90 Day Assessment of 6 Gun Capability at LSAA from 1 FEB – 1 MAY 06 to Determine if Intercept Displays Successful Operational Capability in Theater.

Recommended Intercept In-Theater Assessment Criteria

1. Intercept Engagements Destroy > 50% of all IDF entering Protected Zones.
2. The IDF threat remains at or above current levels warranting a continuation of the successfully demonstrated IDF intercept capability.

Submit Intercept Battery RFF in May 06
if Assessment Demonstrates Successful Operational Capability
(Decision Point MAY 06)
LAD o/a 1 SEP 06.

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This is one of the Phalanx Systems at Anaconda



C-RAM Intercept Battery = 6 x Phalanx*

*Official name is Land Based Phalanx Weapon System (LBPWS)

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Pages 108 through 110 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4g

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C-RAM INTERCEPT RFF

BACK-UP SLIDES

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C-RAM IFOB Intercept Battery (92 Personnel)

EAD 1 AUG 06
LAD 1 SEP 06

IDF Intercept
92 Personnel
17 Vehicles
6 LBPWS
3 Sentinels

C-RAM IFOB
Intercept Battery
92 Personnel
5-2-85

BTRY HQs (9)
2-1-6

BC
1SG
XO
WO 140A
Supply x2
NBC
Medic
Admin

EOC (21)
3-0-18

AMDWS OP 1x3
FAAD 1x3
RCS 3x3 (9)
NCOIC 1x3
OIC 1 X 3

LBPWS Sections
(43)
0-1-42

Gun Sections 2 x 6 x 3 (36)
(Oper/Maint/Ammo/Guard)
Navy LBPWS Maintainers (7)

Sentinel Section
(12)
0-0-12

Sentinel Shelter OPs 4x3

Maintenance (7)
0-0-7

Maint NCOIC 1 x 63B30
Radar Mech 1 x 35M
Gen Mech 1 x 52D
Wheel Mech 1 x 63B
ULLS Clerk 1 x 92A
Fuel Handler 1 x 77F
Commo 1 x 31U

Key Equipment:

6 X LBPWS
1 x AMDWS
1 x FAAD
3 x RCS
3 x Sentinel
3 x Sentinel Shelters (HMMWV)
10 x HMMWV (or NTV substitute)
1 x LMTV
1 x Fueler
2 x HEMTT

S&W/LCMR
Section (9)
0-0-9

14J30 1x3 (3)
WAVES/LCMR/FAAD OP 1x3 (3)
LCMR Section 1x3 (3)
- NCOIC x 1
- 35D or 94M or 13R or other x 2

This element will be at FOB
already for next RFF set
Not part of RFF

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Fact Sheet: Abu Ghraib Closure Timeline

1. **Issue:** Transfer of Abu Ghraib to Government of Iraq

2. **Lead:** PMO - (b)(6)

3. Discussion

- **Background** Current closure date is 30 May 06. Two concurrent actions are pending/working: The turn-over of the real property (actions started) and the movement of detention operations (Est. start 15 Apr 06) to Camp Cropper.
- **Higher HQ Guidance** Close Abu Ghraib and return to Government of Iraq
- **Facts**
 - The real property transfer has already started
 - The original closure timeline has changed
 - FOB Abu G cannot close until the detainees are transferred
- **Assumptions**
 - Detainee transfer begins on or about 15 Apr 06 and will be completed NLT 30 Apr 06
 - A mass release of 3-6k detainees will occur in Mar 06
 - Current detainee rate of growth will remain constant
- **Risk** None
- **Issues and Challenges** Mass release/population increases
- **MNC-I Position** Continue to work to close FOB Abu Ghraib in a timely manner and to transfer detention operations to Camp Cropper

4. **Recommendations:** Continue to assist TF-1.4a to ensure a smooth transition of detention operations from Camps Redemption and Remembrance

5. **Decision Point:** On or about 8 Apr 06 determine status of Camp Cropper facilities to accept detainees