THE BATTLEFIELD
Approximate 2nd BCT AO within Al Anbar is in BLUE.
Rural/Suburban Terrain

Approximate of 2nd BCT AO within Al Anbar is in BLUE
POPULATION DENSITY

CITIES IN BCT AO (2005)

Baghdad 5,605,000
Mosul 1,740,000
Al Basrah 1,338,000
Arbil 840,000
Kirkuk 729,000
As Sulaymaniyah 643,000
An Najaf 563,000
Karbala' 550,000
An Nasiriyah 535,000
Al Hillah 525,000
Ar Ramadi 445,800
Khalidiyah 16,500
Habbiniyah 1,000
Al Taash 5,000

Approved for Release by: MG Michael X. Garrett
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
**AO TOPEKA GEOGRAPHY**

**Battle Space:**
- Waterways define mobility
- Flat/Gentle-Slope Irrigated Farmland
- Elevated Roads and Causeways
- **Micro-Compartment:** Berms, Ditches, Hedges, Palm Orchards, & Sprawl between towns
CLIMATOLOGY

- **Summer Months (April - October)**
  - Hot, Dry, Cloudless
  - Temperatures in Excess of 100F
  - Strong Winds
    - Sharqi, Shamal

- **Winter Months (November-March)**
  - Precipitation at Highest Levels

- **Weather Impacts**
  - Personnel: Dehydration, Sun and Wind Burns
  - Equipment: Excessive Wear, Overheating

---

**Baghdad Temperature: Mean Daily Maximum / Minimum (°F)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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<td>MAX °F</td>
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<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIN °F</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>69</td>
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</table>
WEATHER / SHAMALS

- Sudden sand storms may reduce visibility to less than 5 meters very quickly.
- Not as severe near urban areas.
- In the open desert they can force march speeds to a crawl.
- The use of ballistic goggles/Wiley-X protective sunglasses, and face scarves will mitigate the effects to personnel.
- Environmental contaminants in blowing sand frequently cause minor eye, and respiratory infections.
- Daily service is required for systems with air quality standards (rotary wing aircraft, laptops, ECUs, etc.).
TRIBES IN RAMADI AND SURROUNDING AREA

There are approximately 27 tribes in the Al Ramadi area. 70% of the sheiks follow the family Albu-Ali Sulayman. The Dulaymi Tribe of Al Anbar is comprised of 3.5 - 4 million people. There are many “subtribes” under the Dulaymi Tribe. The leaders of the Dulaymi tribe are Sheiks Amr Abd Al-Jabar Ali Sulayman and Majid Abd Alrazag Ali Sulayman. Of the many tribes in AO Topeka and Ar Ramadi the two that maintain the most influence are the Kharbiles (Khalifawis) and the Sulaymans (Assaf). They both claim leadership of the Dulaymi confederation and compete for coalition contracts as well as putting their own tribal members in key government positions so they can maintain influence of Al Anbar Province. Albu Alwan tribe is the predominate tribe in Ar Ramadi proper.

Tribal Key: (ALL Claim Pro-CF)
Actively Hostile (Kharbit)
Neutral/Hostile Elements
Neutral/Cooperative
Actively Pro-CF
Unknown
Tribal Friction Point
THE THREAT
PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF ANBAR INSURGENCY

International

National/Regional

Local

MUHANNAD AL-DULAYMI

AQ Bin Ladin

AMZ

QJBR/JTJ

SAJ/HARUN

AI/AS

JM/MA

GB

AHMED TOMAH GRP

DAHAM

KRTAN GRP

20th BN

NU’AMAN BN

AL AMIR GRP

NS

Bakr
TANZIM QAIDAT AL JIHAD BILAD AL RAFIDAYAN (QJBR/JTJ)

Overview

• This Group is led by AMZ. They have links to [b)(6)] and possibly to the Harun group. They are responsible for the killings of 12 ING in Ramadi, the bombing of the AG center in Ramadi, and the IED attack near the Imam Shaykh Musad Shrine in Khalidiyah. There are approximately 25 members in Khalidiyah.

Purpose

To undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and to force the withdraw of CF from Iraq, in order to instill an Islamic extremist government. Main focus is to direct the resistance to CF, attack CF, recruit new individuals for their cause, arm their group and other AIF groups and training of members of AIF groups.

Assessment

• This group is well connected and well financed. They are extremely dangerous and will not hesitate to kill civilians in order to score an IO victory. In the past they have dressed as IP and driven IP vehicles in order to kidnap people. It is very possible that nearly all the insurgent groups in Ar Ramadi will take some form of direction from the group.

Key Members

• Abu Mu’sab Al-Zarqawi (Emir of Iraq)
TANZIM QAIDAT AL JIHAD BILAD AL RAFIDAYAN (QJBR/JTJ)

Abu Musab Al Zargawi

Detained

Ulyan

Approved for Release
SARAYA AL JIHAD GROUP - ABU HARUN GROUP

Overview
The Abu Harun group appears to maintain control of several insurgent cells in Ramadi and the surrounding area. The group has connections throughout the I MEF AO and contacts in Baghdad and surrounding countries. This group has conducted attacks against MNF and IIG facilities. The network exercises effective OPSEC with multiple code words and use of communication assets. The group appears to be made up of local Iraqis and FF. This group is believed to be responsible for the 21 November 2004 execution of the ING soldiers and the 17 November 2004 attacks on the Government center in Ramadi. There are about 70 members in Ar Ramadi.

Purpose
The purpose for the attacks is to attempt to create mass casualties for CF, in an effort to force CF from the city.

Assessment
The group is believed to have a structured leadership cell with a support network comprised of local and foreign fighters. The cells operate out of several safe houses in Ramadi and the outlying areas of Jazerah and Tam’mim. Their sphere of influence stretches from Fallujah to Rutbah. They are believed to receive financial support from several legitimate businesses in the Ramadi area. They were likely responsible for the recent (S)VBIEDs and will continue to attack in that way.

Members

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 

(b)(6)
SARAYA AL JIHAD GROUP - ABU HARUN GROUP
Overview

- This Group is led by ____ (b)(6) ___. Their goal is to create an atmosphere of fear and instability in the Ar Ramadi area. In the past they have conducted IED, SAF, and IDF attacks against CF. Total numbers in the group are unknown. Conducts kidnapping and extortion for money. Has ties to local mosques in Ar Ramadi and receives support from the local populace. Member of the Committee of Islamic Scholars (aka the Shura Council).

Purpose

- ____ (b)(6) ___. Attempts to influence the IPs and INGs through attacks and intimidation. He hopes fear and instability will create resentment towards the new government.

Assessment

- As a member of the Shura Council, ____ (b)(6) ___. Connections are widespread. He also has ties to the 20th Revolutionary Battalion, Nu’amann Battalion, and others. ____ (b)(6) ____ will continue to attack CF as long as he receives support from the populace. Once this sentiment turns, and his safe haven disappears, he will be forced to change his methods or leave.
Overview
The [b](b)(6) formerly operated primarily in the tribal areas surrounding Fallujah. The Brigade is associated with the Jaysh Mohammed and likely receives limited guidance, direction, and support from that umbrella organization. Members in the Abu Bakr Brigade are primarily of former high-ranking military officers and Senior Ba’ath party members. Currently, group members are involved in IDF attacks on MNF. There is probably one “house” operating in the Mila’ab District of Ramadi. Their focus is the smuggling of Foreign Fighters in the area.

Purpose
The overall intent of JM elements is to set the stage for an eventual return to power by radical Sunni elements.

Assessment
This group presents a serious, long-term threat to stability in Iraq. The Brigade’s immediate goal is to destabilize and delegitimize the IIG and disrupt the upcoming election. Involvement in smuggling and IDF attacks in Fallujah as well as aboard Camp Habbaniyah and Camp Taqaddam poses a substantial threat to the MNF.

Associated Groups
1. Abdul Aziz al Mukrin
2. Abu Majid AKA The Amir

[b](b)(6)
Associated Groups

1. Abdul Aziz al Mukrin
2. Abu Majid AKA The Amir

Jaysh Mohammed

Battalions of the 1920th Revolution

Green Battalion

(b)(6)
INSURGENT GROUPS IN AR-RAMADI
INSURGENT GROUPS IN AL-TAASH

Answer: Approved for Release
CURRENT SITUATION

Insurgents continue to adapt techniques and tactics (locals are adopting extremist tactics)

- Emergence of VBIED (targeting ISF), re-emergence of Sniper fire (Ramadi/Tammin), and a shifting of POO sites. Attacks against ISF along with IO to discredit and neutralize ISF.

- After two weeks of ECPs in the city, insurgents attacked an ECP with a SVBIED. This tactic symbolizes the maturity of the insurgency in AO TOPEKA with the ability to patiently observe a target, gather resources/fighters, formulate a plan, and attack in a short amount of time.

- Infiltrate government and IPs and ISF

Internal conflict within the insurgency

- There are members of national level insurgencies, specifically Jaysh Mohammed, Ansar al Islam, and Ansar Al-Sunna conducting meetings in and around Baghdad to redefine the direction of the insurgency in Iraq.

- Most of the contention in the insurgent groups stem from two main topics;
  
  o The successful results of the elections require a reaction from the insurgents, either participation in the new government (older insurgents) or continued violence (newer radicals).

  o Disagreement between local insurgents and transitory extremist groups over having Iraqi police taking control of security in Ar Ramadi (AMZ put out a message calling infidels, probably because they are backing the return of the local police).
INSURGENCY COA

- Sustain IED, SAF and indirect fire attacks against CF to inflict casualties, attack ITG
- Sustain IO campaign painting CF as “violent occupiers”, portray ECPs as an oppressive unilateral action by CF without support of ITG and portray proposed weekend shift as a CF attempt to convert Arabs into Jews and Christians
- Sustain intimidation campaign (kidnappings/assassinations) of government officials, contractors, and coalition supporters to incite fear
- Attack newly deployed and formed ISF/IAF to portray their weakness, illegitimacy and inability to secure the local population. By forcing IAF/ISF to retreat and melt away, CF is pushed back to the forefront and easier to target
- Recon and target municipal buildings Police Stations, Mayors Office, government offices, CF bases and outposts
- Attempt to regain population support by offering to help with security (local police force) and municipal services, infiltrate local government and ISF for intelligence and political gain
- Utilize mass casualty producing weapons (SVBIED, suicide bombers) to intimidate population and portray CF illegitimacy

ASSESSMENT: Post Al-Fajr, there have been shifts in insurgent AO, strategy and allegiance. Although insurgent groups initially formed allegiances (locals and external extremists) after the elections were conducted successfully a rift emerged between local and external extremist groups. Locally, another fracture was created between the old and young. In-fighting will continue to establish the pecking order post election. Insurgents will again step up their intimidation campaign on the public and new government officials. External extremists will continue high casualty producing attacks on ITG/CF/ISF.
ASSESSMENT:

There is a peak of activity during the November time frame, possibly due to the activity experienced during Ramadan. Activity, while not quite reaching the pre-Ramadan numbers, has begun to level off. This trend seems to be continuing into the month of February, which has only slightly decreased. IEDs have steadily declined since TOA, though their accuracy has on average increased, and the insurgents are continuing to implement new tactics in our AO, such as the AT mines seen this month.

TOTALS 1827
SAF 641
IDF 555
IED 587
VBIED 32
SNIPER 12

AVERAGES:
SAF: per month 91.57
IED: per month 83.86
IDF: per month 79.29
ASSESSMENT:

SAF was the highest percentage of attacks due to the spike during Ramadan. IED attacks have been constant since TOA. The IED attacks are primarily along MSR Michigan between CP 295 and 297, but are also used for protection during egress from IDF. IDF POO locations have recently emerged south of the Milab district targeting the AG College and Combat Outpost; however, majority of the IDF since TOA were in the within the city targeting the Gov’t center.

TOTALS 635

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SAF</th>
<th>IDF</th>
<th>IED</th>
<th>VBIED</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>10</td>
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AVERAGES:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SAF:</th>
<th>IED:</th>
<th>IDF:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>per month</td>
<td>per month</td>
<td>per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.71</td>
<td>34.43</td>
<td>8.57</td>
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</table>
30 DAYS PRIOR ASSESSMENT: Prior to the implementation of ECPs, insurgents had freedom of movement for ingress/egress and multiple cache locations. Insurgents used mosques and infrastructure for caches and safe havens. IED attacks were along MSRs and ASRs and targets of opportunity. Within the city, insurgents would set up ambushes and complex attacks.

INCIDENT TOTALS: 100  IED ATT: 33  IED FND: 9  SAF: 43  POO: 5  SNIPER: 0  CACHE: 10
30 DAYS AFTER ECP ASSESSMENT:
Overall activity has decreased since the implementation of the ECPs on 20 Feb 05. The presence of the ECPs has restricted AIF movement of arms and explosives along the road ways. AIF may have changed to utilizing water ways to transport munitions and explosives. The last two weeks have seen a slight increase in the percentage of attacks occurring outside the city of Ar Ramadi.

INCIDENT TOTALS: 75  
IED ATT: 25  
IED FND: 9  
SAF: 31  
POO: 6  
SNIPER: 0  
CACHE: 4
TAMIM MONTHLY ACTIVITY

ASSESSMENT:

IEDs have consistently remained the main choice of attack. Majority of the attack have been along MSR Michigan. Over the past two months IEDs have decreased; however, have been more effective. Recently there is an emerging IDF cell south of Tamim possibly from Al Tash. Only 2 percent of the attacks is from snipers, but is a reoccurring threat.

TOTALS 126
SAF 26
IDF 18
IED 76
VBIED 3
SNIPER 3

AVERAGES:
SAF: per month 3.71
IED: per month 10.86
IDF: per month 2.57
30 DAYS PRIOR ASSESSMENT: Attacks prior to the ECPs consisted primarily of IEDs. Limited CF presence in Tamim allowed insurgents freedom of movement and safe haven. The increase of patrols provided insurgents targets of opportunity. The majority of IED attacks occurred along MSR Michigan and around the residential streets of the Tamim district. Insurgents used the residential area to over watch patrols, thus allowing them the ability to set up and command detonate IEDs.

INCIDENT TOTALS: 29  IED ATT: 17  IED FND: 6  SAF: 4  POO: 1  SNIPER: 0  CACHE: 1
TAMIM 30 DAYS OF ACTIVITY AFTER EMPLOYMENT OF ECPS

30 DAYS AFTER ECP ASSESSMENT:
Overall there has been a reduction of attacks in the Tamim/5 kilo districts. There was an identified shift in attacks after the emplacement of ECPs in Ramadi from IEDs to IDF. Reduction of attacks may have been from the emplacement of ECPs and increase patrols from 1-9. This limited the insurgents ability to egress to Ramadi and forces them to employ IDF attacks further south. Recent reporting indicates a possible increase of AMZ insurgent network in AL Tassh. Infiltration routes from Al Tassh may emerge as a main supply route as ECP operations continue limiting their ability to resupply from Ramadi.

INCIDENT TOTALS: 26   IED ATT: 9   IED FND: 4   SAF: 2   POO: 6   SNIPER: 1   CACHE: 4
MTI entered into this milling area at 0830. Activity continued until early afternoon. The MTI entered from MSR Michigan.

Detected these milling areas between 0745-0800, activity continued in these areas until about until 1000.

Between 1000-1100, MTI were detected leaving milling areas heading into Tameem along these routes.
(S) 30 Day Activity IVO Ta’meeem and 5 Kilo

(U) NAI 1

(U) Dates of Activity: 15 Feb - 16 Mar 05
(U) Center Point IVO
(S) Activity of Interest in Ta’meem and 5 Kilo

(S) This activity has been linked to

(b)(6) 

associate who was detained on 5 Nov 05 in Ramadi 1.4c

1.4c This activity is primarily associated with

(b)(6) who is normally active in the Baghdad/Abu Ghurayb area.

(S) was active on 10-11 Mar 05.

1.4a
Page 40 redacted for the following reason:
............................
1.4c, (b)(6)
**ASSESSMENT:**

Historically Jazeera is the primary location for IDF attacks. Recently due to ECP and CF operations, IDF attacks have decreased. IED attacks in Jazeera are located along MSR Mobile, but it has been identified that IEDs are also used for evading CF after IDF attacks. SAF and VBIEDs have been target of opportunity on CF convoys and egress from operations. Some reporting also indicated Jazeera is used for insurgent training and safehaven.

**TOTALS 159**

- SAF: 27
- IDF: 68
- IED: 61
- VBIED: 3
- SNIPER: 00

**AVERAGES:**

- SAF: per month 3.86
- IED: per month 8.71
- IDF: per month 9.71
30 DAYS PRIOR ASSESSMENT:
Primarily attacks in Jazzera consist of IDF. IDF POO locations were along the river near Sufia due to freedom of movement across the river. IED and SAF were targets of opportunity along MSR and ASR.

Jazzera is normally referred to as a safehaven and direct contact is low.

INCIDENT TOTALS: 22
IED ATT: 7
IED FND: 3
SAF: 3
POO: 8
SNIPER: 0
CACHE: 1
30 DAYS AFTER ECP ASSESSMENT:
Since the ECP emplacement attacks in Jazeera have increased; however, the attacks have shifted away from the city. IDF remains the majority of attacks with an increase of SAF. Reporting indicates Jazeera is a safe haven for senior insurgent members.

INCIDENT TOTALS: 28  IED ATT: 6  IED FND: 4  SAF: 6  POO: 9  SNIPER: 0  CACHE: 3
VBIED/SVBIED ATTACKS AO TOPEKA
NOV 2004

NOTE: BORDERLINE OF 2 BCT/RCT-1
ASSESSMENT: There was only one VBIED attack prior to the emplacement of ECPs. Since the emplacement of the ECPs there have been 6 attempted S/VBIEDs attacks. The majority of the attacks have been against stationary CF positions, such as the newly placed ECPs and BN OPs. In addition, the attacks came from outside the cities. Reporting has also indicated insurgents are targeting ECPs and ISF forces to include the attacks in the Habbaniyah area. Historic collection efforts indicated Ramadi is the center of a vehicle smuggling ring and VBIEDs are possibly constructed in the Tamim and Jazeera areas. Insurgent VBIED tactics are effective and we expect them to continue to used VBIED attacks on stationary positions and ISF.
HISTORICAL TTP’S FOR S/VBIEDS IN AO TOPEKA SINCE TOA

Historical Perspective:
• S/VBIEDs were rarely used in AO Topeka before TOA.
• Foreign fighters are flooding into the AO, and bringing with them the new tactics and hardcore techniques involving a high risk martyrdom mentality.
• ACF groups view S/VBIEDs as one of the most potent weapons in their respective arsenals, providing them with an effective means to threaten Coalition patrols/convoy, intimidate Iraqi civilians and security personnel, and wage an aggressive IO campaign.
• 33 S/VBIEDS have exploded with in our AO since TOA.

Class 5 Perspective:
• The use of Claymore devices in conjunction with S/VBIED main charges IOT increase fragmentation effects.
• The addition of explosively formed penetrators to S/VBIEDs to introduce an armor penetration capability, especially against IFVs.
• The development of a S/VBIED focused-blast charge in an attempt to threaten heavily armored vehicles using a charge composed of at least 100 to 200 kg of bulk explosives.
• A new trigger consisting of a push-button switch mounted behind the front bumper of the vehicle. When the front bumper of the vehicle struck an obstacle, the push-button switch would be depressed, closing the circuit and initiating the explosives in the S/VBIED.

Cover and Concealment
• AIF have changed they way they hide their explosives within the S/VBIED. This makes it harder for detection by CF ECP’s. Plastic explosives sewn in the seats.

Driver’s Attitude:
Prior reporting shows that the driver of the S/VBIED normally was nervous, had a blank stare, was unresponsive, and was grinning. He was like this because he was unsure if CF would find the explosives and consequently roll him up. Recently, these attributes have changed since the AIF has been trained in hiding the explosive charge better. The driver has the assurance and confidence that if he is stopped by CF that they will not find anything and he will go through this checkpoint and accomplish his mission.
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<td>RPG</td>
<td>803 x RNDS / 306 x LAUNCHERS</td>
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1-9’s CACHE DISCOVERED NORTH OF MOBILE IN WATER WELLS
INTEL SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION

2/5
HET 2
3 x DRAGON EYE
1 x ASAS
MRS
RVT

PROPHET HAMMER
506th INF
THT 171(+)
6 x RAVENS
1 x ASAS
*RVT

BDE HQ
PROPHET HAMMER
TROJAN D-LITE
DRT
1 x SAVAGE
UAV FWD
THT 170 / 172
REMBASS
CGS/GCS/RVT/MRS
6 x ASAS
1-9 INF BN
6 x RAVENS
1 x ASAS
THT 632
44th ENG
6 x RAVENS
1 x ASAS

503rd INF
HET 6 (2 pax)
THT 631
6 x RAVENS
2 x ASAS
RVT
1 x SAVAGE

UAV LAR SITE
2 x Shadow 200s
1 x GCS and L&R

* Shipped to US for repair
INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES

• Interpreters
• Teams
• Communications
  – Dissemination of UAV feed, imagery Access
  – Communication real time with remote sensitive collectors
• Data Mining search capability
• National or regional identity database for citizens of the province and the nation
Pages 60 through 61 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(6)