Task Force Back Brief of MNC-I OPORD 05-02
Outline for Back Brief

- Opening Remarks
- Purpose
- Task Organization
- Intelligence Assessment
- Mission Statement
- Commanders Intent
- ISF and Transition Teams
- OSB
- ODA
- Implementation of P3
- Provincial Transition Concept
  - Basing Consolidation Concept
- Regional Reconstruction Operations Center
- Governance
- Communicating
- Rewards Program
- Working Concerns
- Discussion/Comments

MG Taluto

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Prepared by Task Force 1.4a - 3 Plans

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
Purpose

To conduct a back brief to the MNF-I and MNC-I Commanders regarding Task Force execution of MNC-I OPORD 05-02
IA Units: OPCON changes to TACON once capable of independent Ops
IA Units remain ADCON to MOD

Prepared by Task Force 1.4a G-3 Plans

24 APR 2005
Intelligence Assessment
AO Liberty Intelligence Facts

- Attacks are lower in AO LIBERTY since elections.
- Threat leadership is degraded due to recent HVI kill/capture Op's.
- Threat is comprised primarily of Former Regime Elements.
- Foreign fighters transit through AO LIBERTY in order to plan, stage, and conduct attacks elsewhere.
- Political violence is most prevalent in areas where Sunni & Shia or Kurd ethnic groups mix.
- MOI forces have had success in reducing attacks in Samarra.
- Those same MOI forces did not have as good success fighting well-trained and determined foreign fighters near Lake Tharthar.
- Threat financiers, enablers, and foreign fighters are more mobile than Iraqi's who occasionally engage CF solely for monetary gain or retribution (opportunists).
- Attacks cycles occur in two-week intervals.
AO Liberty Intelligence Assumptions

- Expect increased attacks against coalition forces
- Ethnic tensions will increase along Green Line
- Threat operations in urban areas will slowly reduce
- Threat sanctuaries in rural areas will increase
- Number of attacks (steady state) will continue at 10-15 per day
- Attacks will decrease in battle space assumed by ISF
- Threat attack effectiveness will increase
- Sunni’s will become less inclined to support threat activities

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NEVER FORGET!
Situation Template

- FRE: 800-900
- Jihadists: 900-1050
- Foreign Fighters: 75-100
- Criminal Element: 800-1000
- Totals: 2575-3050

- Jaysh Mohammed
- Jaysh Al Madhi
- Ansar Al Islam

- QJBR: Ansar Al Sunna

- Foreign Fighters
  - Mukafarin
  - FRE

- Attack Density:
  - 19 MAR 05 – 20 APR 05
  - 0 - 10: Lowest
  - 11 - 40
  - 41 - 62: Highest

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Complex Attack

30-Day Attack Trends

(S/MCFI) Attack trend up since 24 MAR when average was 11.0 per day
(S/MCFI) 13.42 attack average over last seven days; 13.26 over last 30 days
(S/MCFI) Attacks between 116 BCT and 3 BCT remaining equal
(S/MCFI) Trend of attacks against ISF dropped slightly to 17.34%

278 RCT
116 BCT 6%
22%
1 BCT
3 BCT 49%

30 Day Attacks By Target

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23 - 29 April 2005

42nd ID Collection Emphasis: Weekly As Of: 23 Apr 05

1. 2/78 Reg W3 BCT Seam
   HVI, AIF C2 & Logistics
   (PIR 1, 2) TUAV, Prophet
   UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR

2. Zaab Triangle (OP Big Apple)
   -8 Hrs, 2 Days a Week, 1200-2000
   -ADHOC Adwar Corps HVI #1
   Meeting 18 Apr 05, 1000-1400

3. Lake Thar Thar
   HVI, AIF C2 & Logistics
   (PIR 1, 2)
   JSTARS, UAV, EO/IR

4. Hamrin Mountains
   HVI, AIF C2 & Logistics,
   (PIR 1, 2, 3)
   JSTARS, UAV, EO/IR

5. Samarra
   OP Baton Rouge, OP Green Lantern, HVI,
   (PIR 1, 2, 3, 4) TUAV, Prophet
   UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR

6. Kirkuk
   HVI, Ethnic unrest
   (PIR 1, 4, 5) TUAV, Prophet
   UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR

7. IR/IZ Border
   IR/IZ Border, Logistics
   (PIR 2)

6. Kirkuk
   HVI, Ethnic unrest
   (PIR 1, 4, 5) TUAV, Prophet
   UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR

Prepared by Task Force Liberty

1. 2/78 RC 3 BCT Seam
   HVI, AIF C2 & Logistics
   (PIR 1, 2) TUAV, Prophet
   UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR

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   OP Baton Rouge, OP Green Lantern, HVI,
   (PIR 1, 2, 3, 4) TUAV, Prophet
   UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR

6. Kirkuk
   HVI, Ethnic unrest
   (PIR 1, 4, 5) TUAV, Prophet
   UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR

7. IR/IZ Border
   IR/IZ Border, Logistics
   (PIR 2)
EAD ROLL-UP MAR-APR 05

March 2005

Daily Average to Date: 5 hours

April 2005

Daily Average to Date: 2 hours

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Mission and Intent
Task Force Mission

TF CONDUCTS STABILITY OPERATIONS WHILE TRANSITIONING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO COMPETENT IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND MINISTRIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT THAT PERMITS IRAQ SELF RELIANCE.
Commander’s Intent

PURPOSE

WE MUST BUILD AND ENHANCE THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) CAPABILITY WHILE MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE INSURGENCY. AS THE ISF BECOME CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. WE WILL TRANSITION THE MAIN EFFORT FROM COALITION LEAD OPERATIONS TO ISF LEAD OPERATIONS TO NEUTRALIZE THE INSURGENCY. STABILITY OPERATIONS WILL BE SUSTAINED TO CONTINUE PROGRESS ALONG THE GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC AND COMMUNICATING LINES OF OPERATIONS.
Key Tasks

KEY TASKS (1 of 3)

- ISF competence attained thru thorough and positive mentorship and training by MiTT Teams, designed to reinforce success and eliminate failure.
- With the ISF, conduct deliberate operations – based on predictive intelligence – to mass combat power to kill or capture the enemy.
- Employ the ISF at every opportunity and --
  - Continue to develop provincial and local joint coordination centers
  - Continue to improve the organization and equipping of the ISF
  - Train, coach, and mentor the ISF on leader development and critical staff functions – operations, intelligence, communications, and training
  - Establish ISF sustainment systems; include maintenance, transportation, supply, and medical functions
  - Set the conditions for Iraqi control – battalions and brigades, capable of independent operations
Key Tasks

KEY TASKS (2 of 3)

- Continuously engage spheres of influence (SOI) at echelon with assigned themes and messages to deliver the division message to the Iraqi people.
- Conduct effects-based operations to synchronize lethal and non-lethal fires.
- Protect the force by securing and continuously improving the Division's FOBs and ISF key facilities with hardened sites and complex entry points with standoff to prevent suicide bombers and VBIEDs from breaching outer perimeters. Force protection enhanced by aggressive counter IED measures and training and reinforcement of safety measures and standards in all activities.
- Secure LOCs to ensure our freedom of maneuver thru thorough counter IED patrols, measures, and interdiction.
- Working in conjunction with and in support of the sovereign Iraqi government, improve basic services and the quality of life for the Iraqi people, rehabilitate essential infrastructure, and create jobs.

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24 APR 2005
Key Tasks

**KEY TASKS (3 of 3)**

- Protect critical Iraqi infrastructure from sabotage and destruction by applying ISR assets; leveraging JCCs, FPS, and the ISF; and conducting joint patrols.
- At all times, treat the Iraqi people with dignity and respect.
- Execute closure and turnover of Contingency Operating Sites (COS), Contingency Operating Locations (COL), and current Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to Iraqi government.
- Coordinate with IECI, other involved agencies, provincial and local governments and the ISF to ensure planning of support, logistics and security over watch for election periods.
- Execute non-lethal effects support to COIN operations, legitimize the GOI, and change the public image of the AIF, thus denying their ability to influence the people of Iraq.
- Engage key leaders in the Sunni Arab Community to bring them into the political fold and facilitate Sunni popular support for Iraqi government and the ISF.
Commander's Intent

END STATE

A SECURE ENVIRONMENT WITH IRAQI SECURITY FORCE'S CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, FUNCTIONING LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
Keys To Success In the AO

- Increase capability of Iraqi Security Forces as we keep pressure on AIF
  - Simultaneous application of partnership units and Military Transition Teams
  - Develop capable military and police leaders. Gain Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior commitment to stabilize Iraqi Security Forces
  - Train and equip an effective police force
  - Sustain support of the Iraqi people
  - Separate extremists from the Iraqi people
  - Establish partnership with provincial governments
  - Resource economic development
  - Effectively engage and involve local and provincial Sunni Leaders
ISF and Transition Teams
Page 24 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Oil Security Battalions
OSBs receive C2 from IA BDE HQs. BDE MiTTs are conduit between OSBs and CF.
OIL INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACKS and INCIDENTS

Since 14 Feb 05 there have been 6 incidents.

There have been numerous reported incidents on the oil pipelines in AO Liberty.

The majority of the reported incidents are: Burn off fires, Breaks in the lines not caused by attacks (Maintenance), criminal acts (stealing the oil out of the pipeline)

To Compare

JAN 05 5 Attacks
DEC 04 17 Attacks
NOV 04 23 Attacks.

Reported 18 Apr 05,
- 116 BCT reports pipeline Fire LD 6870 7980
- 2 of the 16" Temp line cut
- Oil was shut off, resulting in fire and oil flowing into the river
- Have not received NOC damage report or estimate on repair. Oil rerouted to another line.

Reported 19 Apr 05,
- 1 BCT reports oil fire at grid LD 78098852. Sent unit to investigate, NOT an Attack

Reported 21 Apr 05,
- (1) 116 BCT reports gas pipeline explosion at ME 09500 08300
- (2) 1 BCT reports pipeline fire near Bayji refinery at LD 68000 78000

Approved for Release
Special Forces Operations
In Support of IA Units
ODA OPERATIONS IN AO LIBERTY
(SINCE TOA: 14 FEB 05)

- 125 Operations
- 565 Detainees
- 13 AIF KIA
- 1 AIF WIA
ODA MiTT CONTRIBUTIONS

- Provided Cultural Awareness and FID classes
- Right/Left seat rides for IA TRNG
- Conducted combined ODA/MiTT & IA Operations
- Provided POI, translated classes, and training schedules
- Conducted foreign weapons familiarization
- Advised MiTT on force protection
- Coordinated with MiTT for logistics flow to IA units
- Continue training of IA SCOUT platoons
- Assisted with IA METL assessment
- Provided INTELL collection POI
- Facilitated introductions b/w MiTT and IA CDRs
THE POLICE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

- Draft FRAGO Directs a P3-P and P3-R
- **P3-P** Teams operate in a discrete manner within the Iraqi culture, with reduced presence and visibility while assisting the Iraqi police in performing their functional tasks by themselves

  - Salah Ad Din P3P – Operational 1 May 05
  - Kirkuk P3P – Operational NLT 15 May 05
  - Diyala P3P – Operational Now
  - Sulaymaniyyah – Not Required per Operational Assessment
  - Samarra P3R – Operational Now

**Samarra- P3-R**

- **P3-R** does require embedding – We have been embedded in Samarra since early Feb 05.
- 264 IPs in position at Samarra with 376 currently in training and 550 more scheduled for training by late May
- Total of 1,200 IPs trained and on the street in Samarra NLT 31 August on track for success
**Diyala P3-P Organization – 3 BCT**

- **TF CDR**
  - (b)(3), (b)(6)

- **TF XO**
  - (b)(3), (b)(6)

- **3 BCT LNO**
  - (b)(3), (b)(6)

- **ISF SPT CELL**

- **TF NCOIC**
  - (b)(3), (b)(6)

- **MIL SME**
  - (b)(3), (b)(6)

- **CIV SME**
  - SR IPLO

**Operations**

- **IPLO**
  - (b)(3), (b)(6)
  - Patrol Operations
  - QRF
  - Detainee Handling
  - Jail Operations
  - Communications
  - Reporting

**Training**

- **IPLO**
  - Training Management
  - International Schools
  - National Schools
  - Local Academy

**Pers/Log**

- **IPLO**
  - Police Admin
  - Personnel Acct
  - Pay Roll
  - Property Accountability
  - Maintenance
  - Contracting
  - CSS Planning

**Invest/Intel**

- **IPLO**
  - Targeting
  - Collection Planning
  - Criminal Investigation
  - Evidence Handling
  - Cooperation with IA

**Pjcc**

- **IPLO**
  - Inter-Agency Coop
  - 123 Tip Line
  - Emergency Response

It is not anticipated or expected that the P3-P team reside at the IPS Provincial HQ. It is not anticipated that the entire P3-P will be consumed 24/7 with their P3 tasks or duties.
P3P Way Ahead

Teach Concepts
Train Techniques

Collective and Leader
Training

Create Systems
And Standard Processes

ISF-led Security & Law
Enforcement Operations
In Diyala

Functional Patrol
Division

Established Detainee
Processing System

Integrate Legal Advisor
and Judicial Review

Organize Chain of Command

Develop Battle Rhythm

Stand up P3 Team

ENDSTATE:
Provincial Police Departments are established as a professional law enforcement organization that operate IAW Iraqi law, maintain public order, and enjoy the respect of the Iraqi people.
Basing Consolidation Concept
Regional Reconstruction Operations Center
Regional Reconstruction Operations Center

Provide coordinating facility to support the reconstruction effort within MND-NC (AO Liberty) AOR

- Facilitate and manage reconstruction effort and information
- Connect D/B contractors with ground level players (GRN/BCT/DG: PDTs)
- Integrate Infrastructure Process into MND-NC Information Operations
- Facilitate Security Coordination for D/Bs and contractors with AEGIS
- Facilitate among IRMO, PCO, Provincial DGs and Infrastructure DGs
- Coordinate information flow among NROC, Corps, DIV, RROC, & BCTs
- Gain information on local contractor network for BCTs using GRN
- Provide a central, convenient, accessible facility for reconstruction operations and information
Bayji Refinery
- Refinery Training Room
- QOL Projects; Clinic, Schools, Playground
- Computer and Telephone communication system 70% complete.
- Facilitate & Communicate More Effective Methods between DGs and IRMO Senior Advisors

Kirkuk Refinery
- Post Looting Clean-up Projects
- Refinery and Pipeline Repair Company Spare and Replacement Parts
- Road Paving in Refinery Areas

Oil Security
- Replacement Parts for Iraq Pipeline Air Patrol Aircraft
- Oil Infrastructure Working Groups - Coordinate Security
- Supply Oil Sector with Ambulances, Fire Trucks, MHE, Safety Equipment, Communications, Weapons & Ammunition
TF 1.4a  Power Sector Results

Power Infrastructure: Bayji, Dibbis, Mulla, Kirkuk, Shaheed Shazed

Facilitated DFI acid tank project & AC/DC couplings project
Developed CERP funded repair on Waste Water Treatment Plant
Developed CERP funded security wall around the housing area & clinics
Numerous QOL enhancements: Clinic, Schools & Playgrounds
Supply Power Sector with Ambulances, Fire Trucks, MHE, Safety Equipment.

Communications, Weapons & Ammunition
Provided Potable Water to both NRCC and Kirkuk Power Plant
Security Walls, towers, communications and weapons for plant security

All locations
Spare Parts for Power Generation equipment

Prepared by Task Force 1.4a  G-3 Plans

Approved for Release 24 APR 2005
TF 1.4a

Public Works Sector Results

Program Facilitation of:

Emergency Water and Sewer - Execute over $4.2 (1.2M) million in water & sewer Repair projects with FRAGO 620 funds.

Water Conservation Network Rehab – coordinate with PCO to maximize project participation in MND-NC and speed implementation of the projects.

PW-090 – Coordinate implementation and execution of PW-090 projects with the BCTs in each governorate.

PW-091 – Ensure that BCT coordinates with DGs to maximize capacity building efforts within their AOR and target PW-091 funds through Baghdad SOI engagements.

Establish O&M training for all Water, Sewer and Water Conservation Network programs. Ensure that the BCTs coordinate with the DGs, and contracting and expedite all project phases and maximize the $ allocated to the MND-NC AO.

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Transportation Sector Results

- Facilitate Al-Fat’ah Highway Bridge in Bayji Reconstruction
- As-Sharqat Highway Bridge Reconstruction
- Buhriz Bridge Construction
- Engage SOIs to Facilitate the Repair and Improvement of Al-Fat’ah Rail Bridge
- Following thru on the completion of Village Roads in Salah Al Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala
- Identify sources of Quality Gravel throughout the AOR
- Identify sources for quality Rail Road Ballast throughout the AOR
- Facilitated the renovation of 21 Passenger Rail Road Stations
- Secured from IRR Plans for the Bayji and Kirkuk Commercial RR Terminals

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TF BH&E Sector Results

Facilitating Meetings among DG of Education, Salah Ah Din Providence and Kirkuk Provinces, OTI, and BCTs to fill schools with school furnishing and equipment.

Facilitated Meetings with Director NOC Hospital, Kirkuk, to facilitate medical equipment purchases.

Facilitated meeting with Salah Ah Din DG Health on construction quality of a Oxygen Plant

Cleaning up previous 1ID DFI Health and Education projects
Governance and Communicating
Governance Transition Actions

- Provincial Councils
  - Kirkuk
    - Council is deadlocked
    - Article 58 issues
  - As Sulymaniyah
    - New Governor
  - Salah Ad Din
    - Governor reelected
    - Rejected Regional Govt.
  - Diyala
    - New Governor
- Local Governance
  - TF monitor City Councils
  - CERP project coordination
  - Basic services assistance
  - Security assistance

- Key Initiatives
  - Provincial involvement in CERP project planning
  - DG Coordination
  - BCTs monitor provincial governments
  - One-to-one SOI mentoring on governance issues.

- Friction Points
  - Kirkuk: Ethnic tensions
  - Local Intimidation
  - IPCC/IDPs
  - Electricity/water availability
COMMUNICATING

INFORMATION OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES:
1. INCREASE REPORTING OF AIF
2. INCREASE IRAQI POPULACE CONFIDENCE IN AND SUPPORT FOR ISF
3. SEPARATE AIF FROM THE POPULACE
4. INCREASE POPULACE SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
5. INCREASE POPULACE CONFIDENCE IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

INFORMATION OPERATIONS THEMES
1. TERRORISTS, FOREIGN FIGHTERS, FORMER REGIME ELEMENTS, AND CRIMINALS ARE HURTING THE GOOD PEOPLE OF IRAQ, THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AND COALITION FORCES. THEY ARE THE COMMON ENEMY.
2. THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES ARE STEADFAST AND RESOLUTE IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST THE ENEMY. THEY CONTINUE TO BE BETTER ARMED, BETTER TRAINED, AND BETTER EQUIPPED. THEY WILL NOT BACK DOWN FROM PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE TO LIVE FREE OF FEAR AND INTIMIDATION.
3. COALITION FORCES WORK IN PARTNERSHIP WITH LOCAL IRAQI BUSINESSES TO EXPAND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE.
4. COALITION FORCES WILL WORK WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES TO ENSURE THAT ACCESS TO WATER, ELECTRICITY, AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES CONTINUES TO IMPROVE IN NORTH-CENTRAL IRAQ. THIS ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES RELIES ON THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

SOI ENGAGEMENT AT ALL ECHELONS

BUILDING ISF MEDIA CAPABILITY

PSYOP PRODUCTS

MEDIA CAPABILITIES
KIRKUK MEDIA CENTER (IMN)
DIYALA MEDIA CENTER (IMN)
TIKRIT MEDIA CENTER
KURDSAT
TURKSAT
26 CF SUPPORTED NEWSPAPERS IN MND-NC

TARGETS
- IRAQI POPULACE: Sunni Arabs
- KEY LEADERS
  GOVERNORS
  MAYORS
  IMAMS / CLERICS
  PROVINCIAL COUNCILS
  POLICE CHIEFS
  WORKING GROUPS
- IRAQI MEDIA
- INTERNATIONAL MEDIA

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NEVER FORGET!
17 APRIL 2005

CITIZENS OF KHAN BANI SA’AD ORGANIZED A DEMONSTRATION TO PROTEST RECENT ACTS OF VIOLENCE.

17 APRIL 2005

KIRKUK POLICE “COPS SHOW” PUBLICIZES JCC PHONE NUMBERS AND REQUESTS INFORMATION ON FIVE UNSOLVED CRIMES.
Rewards Program
# Rewards for Information

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Micro</th>
<th>Small</th>
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<td>TOTAL (since 1 Feb 05)</td>
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*Trailblazer units will be issued Micro-rewards next week*

Additional funds should be available in July
Working Issues
Working Issues

- Who will be the custodians of FOB Danger and Dagger upon base closure?
- Will there be commercial COMS to support the 101st and the MiTTs?
- Can we add a U.S. BN to Caldwell as TF consolidates?
- What is the municipal JCC funding plan? Require assistance energizing the Iraqi governments funding of these successful programs.
- What is the structure of the Task Force? (# of BDEs)

Red indicates a time sensitive issue
Blue indicates an issue that will impact OIF 05-07 Sourcing
Working Issues

IA

- Where will the 4th IA HQ be located?
- Will a standardized policy for Iraqi work and leave schedule be forthcoming?
- Will MOD synchronize the MTOE difference between former ING and IA units (i.e. vehicles, radios, personnel)?
- What is the CMD relationship between 32nd BDE and the 5th IA?
- IA manning is Green, most units at or over strength; however, pay problems are common, is there a plan to address this issue?
- Awaiting MNF-I approval to streamline the release/disclosure of intelligence to the ISF?
Working Issues

**ISF cont.**

- IA equipping is Orange, there is a need for weapons, vehicles, radios and body armor, with regard to Iraqi logistics and sustainment:
  - What do we provide?
  - What do the BSUs provide?
  - Will the IA up-armor program expand?

- IA sustainment is Red. Guidance is limited. What is the plan for sourcing and what are the levels of Iraqi funding particularly with regard to maintenance?
Working Issues

OSB

- Majority of the 11th OSB AO is outside the 30th BDE sector. Request MOD consider moving the 11th OSB from C2 of the 30th IA BDE and under the C2 of a BDE in the vicinity of Baghdad.

- What is the basic equipping plan for things such as uniforms for the OSBs; lack of uniforms creates potential for Blue on Green incident?

- Is there a plan to issue identification and weapons cards to the OSBs?

- Is there a plan to address the adequacy of the oil line checkpoints?

- How will the OSBs communicate with other ISF units and CF?
Working Issues

OSB cont.

• Is there a plan to address the inadequacies of the meal contract for OSBs?

• How will OSBs be transported for patrols?

• ROE for OSBs is undefined.

• Is there a plan to develop an intermediate C2 node for the OSBs to interact with the IA BDE? (Span too wide for BDE to C2 all eight BNs)

• The 4th, 5th and 7th BNs of the 2nd IA DIV are in 4th IA DIV battle space, request they be placed under C2 of the 30th BDE, 4th IA DIV.
Working Issues

IPS

• What is the equipping plan for basic policing items such as vehicles, weapons, and body armor?
• With current school allocations it will be over eighteen months before the IPS are 100% trained.
• What is the plan for maintenance and replacement of items previously issued and what are the levels of Iraqi funding particularly with regard to maintenance?
DISCUSSION

G3 PLANS TEAM

“Row Well, and Live!”
BACKUP SLIDES
OPERATIONAL TIMELINE
 Threat Most Likely COA

Former Regime Elements and the cells that they enable and provide financing to conduct the majority of attacks in AO LIBERTY. Approximately half of these attacks will occur in Salah al Din Province. Approximately a quarter of all attacks will target Iraqi Security Forces. Average weekly attacks will remain around eighty attacks per week (steady state). Threat forces will conduct IED, indirect, direct fire, and complex attacks against Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces in order to harass, interdict and disrupt operations and cause as many casualties as possible. They will also seek membership in the Iraqi Security Forces in order to provide early warning to threat forces and gain information for future operational planning. Attacks against infrastructure will be conducted in order to cause or perpetuate general dissatisfaction with the local and national governments’ ability to improve fundamental services. Threat forces will continue attacks and acts of intimidation against Iraqi government officials in order to remove and influence officials working against threat forces. Rural areas along unit seams with low Coalition Force presence will increasingly be used by threat forces for sanctuaries from which operations are conducted.
Threat Most Dangerous COA

Former Regime Elements unify cells that they finance and enable in order to conduct synchronized operations against key infrastructure, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. These operations embolden other Anti-Iraqi Forces to intensify their operations resulting in widespread instability that overwhelms coalition forces, paralyzes the Iraqi government, and demoralizes Iraqi Security Forces. They concurrently leverage ethnic, religious and nationalist ties to gain increasing populace support and incite further violence.
Hamrin Mountain Overview

1.4c MULTIPLE SINGLE SOURCE REPORTING ON 1BCT HVT#6 AND QJBR MEMBERS

DIIR-3ID-258BCT-621-05-0042: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CONDUCTS TRAINING IN CAMPS WITHIN IRAQ AND

TD 14a 18355-05/ TD 14a/ 15108-05: SERIES OF CAVES LOCATED IN THE DRAWS OF THE NORTHWEST PORTION OF THE HAMRIN MOUNTAINS UTILIZED BY QJBR

TD 14a/ 20725-05: MOVEMENTS AND MEETING LOCATIONS OF ABU MUS'AB AL-ZARQAWI

1.4c 38S LD 9428513897, LD 84154/33775, MD 34778/28709 IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI ASSOCIATES AND LOCATIONS.

SPOT OBIZ-DET-K-071-05/ SPOT OBIZ-DET-K-071-05: LOCATION OF 1BCT HVT#3 AND PLANNED INSURGENT MTG. 38SMD2642832289

7 APR 05 JSTARS REPORT: REPORTED MILLING AREA

TF 14a N REPORT: POSSIBLE DIGGING/BURIAL SITE

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24 APR 2005
Current Situation:

- Less attacks since OP CITY MARKET
- AIF leadership fled to Hamrin Ridge
- MOI continuing operations
- AIF consolidating and reorganizing until again able to successfully attack CF/MOI/IA
Potential Samarra QJBR Links

HVI

FUTURE LEADERSHIP

MUSAB AL ZARQAWI
LEADER OF QJBR

FINANCIER/LEADER

SAMARRA/BALAD

(b)(6)

REGIONAL LEADER

SAMARRA

(b)(6)

CELL LEADER

SAMARRA

(b)(6)

CELL LEADER

SAMARRA

(b)(6)

CELL LEADER

SAMARRA
EAST THAR THAR ACTIVITY

SUSPICIOUS HOUSE WITH CARS
18 MARCH 2005

SAFEHOUSE
09 MARCH 2005

AIF MEETING PLACE - MOSQUE
09 MARCH 2005

2 MAR – 7 MAR JSTARS
Confirmed Milling Areas

FOREIGN FIGHTER ENGAGEMENT
23 MARCH 2005

MUTHANA CHEMICAL
COMPLEX

NEVER FORGET!
Concept of the Operation
Concept of the Operation (1of 3)

Iraqi Security Forces with embedded transition teams (ME) conduct counter insurgency operations to the extent of their capabilities. ISF is supported by CF in order to neutralize the AIF. Simultaneously TF mentors Iraqi forces at the Battalion level and above while maintaining partnering at the Company level in order to develop Iraqi Army (IA) capabilities. As the IA gain capability, battle space will be transitioned to Iraqi control. TF will continue to support MiTIs through logistics, F, fires, and medevac from contingency operating sites (COS) at FOBs Warrior, Speicher, Warhorse, and Anaconda. TF continues to provide oversight of the OSB, IPS and DBE as required in order to secure critical infrastructure, stabilize and secure urban areas, and control borders.
Concept of the Operation (2of 3)

As TF 1.4a transitions battle space to capable ISF, FOBs will be transferred to Iraqi control and TF 1.4a will be consolidated. The division FOB Relocation Iraqi Transition Team (FRITT) will assist units in the management of FOB transition. As Sulaymaniyah province will be transitioned on or about June 2005. Diyala province will transition on or about November 2005 as will Kirkuk (At Tameen) province. Salah ad Din will remain under coalition control until approximately June 2006. Coalition forces will reduce their footprint by transitioning battle space to Iraqi control and consolidating FOBs.

Prepared by Task Force 1.4a G-3 Plans

24 APR 2005
Concept of the Operation (3of 3)

TF 1.4a will continue to support the Iraqi transitional government by assisting the ISF in setting the conditions for a successful election. TF 1.4a will engage the Independent Election Commission of Iraq (IECI) and the ISF in AO Liberty to ensure they are prepared and equipped for all phases of the election process. MSCs must be prepared to assist if requested. Support may come in the form of assistance in planning for distribution of registration and ballot materials, site security planning, and appropriate life support. All MSCs must be prepared to act and initiate actions as required including those the IECI or ISF are unable to accomplish. Direct action will only be initiated after requested by the IECI in writing and approved or directed by higher. Maintaining support for the ISF and the Iraqi government will require TF 1.4a to work closely with the 101st ABN (AASLT) DIV during IOT maintain momentum and seamlessly transition the force.
## Key Operational Concepts by Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>ISF Capabilities</th>
<th>AIF Capabilities</th>
<th>Transition Teams</th>
<th>Basing</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>BN Level OPS</td>
<td>Key Cities Secured</td>
<td>Established and Operational</td>
<td>Turn Over Stone, Dibbis,</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Capable ISF in all Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Apr 05 - Jun 05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crazyhorse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>BDE Level OPS</td>
<td>Domestic Order in ISF</td>
<td>Fully Operational</td>
<td>Turn Over Omaha, Bernstein,</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>Capable ISF and GOI in B &amp; C Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jul 05 - Sep 05)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Controlled Provinces</td>
<td></td>
<td>Orion, Cobra, Barbarian,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>DIV Level COIN</td>
<td>Domestic Order Maintained</td>
<td>Fully Operational</td>
<td>Tinderbox, Dagger</td>
<td>Referendum &amp;</td>
<td>Capable ISF and GOI in C Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Oct 05 - Jan 06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>in CAT A &amp; B Provinces</td>
<td></td>
<td>Election Preparation</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV A</td>
<td>DIV Level Nat'l Sec Ops</td>
<td>AIF Neutralized</td>
<td>Reduce/ Tailor Transition</td>
<td>All but Anconda</td>
<td>Support Public</td>
<td>Functioning GOI Growing Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Feb 06 - Jun 06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Teams</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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24 Apr 2005
BN MiTTs

BN TM LDR
BN AST TM LDR
BN NCOIC
BN OPS NCO
BN S1
BN S4
BN COMMO
INTEL
FIRE SUP OFF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BN TM LDR
BN AST TM LDR
BN NCOIC
BN OPS NCO
BN S1
BDE S4
BN COMMO
BN MED
INTEL
FIRE SUP OFF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PSD: INTERNAL

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24 APR 2005
BDE MiTT

TM LDR
AST TM LDR
OPS OFFICER
NCOIC
S1
S1 NCO
S2 NCO
S4
S4 NCO
STAFF OFFICER
STAFF NCO

3 278

(b)(3), (b)(6)
BN MiTT

TM LDR
AST TM LDR
NCOIC
OPS NCO
TRNG NCO
S1 NCO
S4 NCO
COMMO NCO
MED NCO

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
278th BCT
MiTT SPT CELL

TM LDR
NCOIC
TNG NCO
S1 NCO
S4 NCO
COMMO NCO

X

(b)(3), (b)(6)
BCT MiTT TEAM SUPPORT

18 Personnel

1. BDE NCOIC: SSG CBT ARMS
   CREW: 5
   WEAPON: M240B
   RADIO: AN/VRC-92F

2. BDE S1 NCO: SGT 42A
   CREW: 4
   WEAPON: M249
   RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

3. BDE S4 NCO: SSG 92Y
   CREW: 4
   WEAPON: M249
   RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

4. COMM NCO: SSG 31U
   CREW: 5
   WEAPON: M240B
   RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

5. GUNNER: E1-E4 IMAT
   CREW: 5
   WEAPON: M240B
   RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

6. TM LDR: MAJ AV
   FSO: 2LT FSO
   CREW: 4
   WEAPON: M249
   RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

7. GUNNER: E1-4 IMAT
   CREW: 3
   WEAPON: M2
   RADIO: AN/VRC-92F

8. INTEL ANAL: SPC 96B
   CREW: 3
   WEAPON: M2
   RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

9. AST TM LDR: CPT IN
   S2 OFFICER: 1LT LIT
   FS CO: SSG FS CO
   MED NCO: SSG 91W
   CREW: 4
   WEAPON: M249
   RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

10. OPS OFF: CPT IN
    S5/EN: CPT ENG
    INTEL NCO: SSG 96B
    CONTRACTING: CO: SSG IMAT
    GUNNER: E1-4 IMAT
    CREW: 5
    WEAPON: M240B
    RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

PSD SEC

MTR SECTION (6 PAX)

1. TRUCK 1
   SGT PFC PFC

2. TRUCK 2
   SPC (P) PFC PFC

BCT ADDITIONS

TAC SAT
SAT PHONE
CLS
FBCB2
HF RADIO

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24 APR 2005
BN MiTT TEAM SUPPORT

14 Personnel

M1114
CREW: 5
WEAPON: M2
RADIO: AN/VRC-92F

AST TM LDR 03  CBT ARMS
BN OPS NCO  E6  CBT ARMS
BN S4 NCO  E5-6  92Y
BN S1 NCO  E5-6  42A (GUNNER)
DRY  E1-4  IMAT.

M1114
CREW: 4
WEAPON: PERSONNEL
RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

TM LDR 04  CBT ARMS
AST TM LDR 03  IMAT.
BN OPS NCO  E6  IMAT
COMMO NCO  E4-5  31U (DRIVER)

M1114
CREW: 5
WEAPON: M240
RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

BNCOIC  E7  CBT ARMS
FSO  O2  13A
FSO NCO  E5-6  13F
DRIVER  E1-4  IMAT
GUNNER  E1-4  IMAT

BCT ADDITIONS
TAC SAT
SAT PHONE
CLS
FBCB2
HF RADIO

PSD PLT
MTR SEC (8)

TRUCK 1
NAME  RANK

TRUCK 2
NAME  RANK

PSD ADDITIONAL DUTIES
TRAINING
SECURITY
REPORTING DURING OPS

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NEVER FORGET!
IA Support
IA Life Support Funding Flow

FINISH

6. Unit Receives Service/Items

START

1. Unit makes Requirements Packet
   - PR&C
   - Letter Of Justification
   - Scope of Work

START Packet to ISF Cell

2. ISF Cell Screens
   Packet to 42nd G-8

CONTROLLER

3. Controller Logs In Packet

MOD

4. MNC-I C8 Contacts MOD
   Packet to MOD

5. MOD Negotiates w/Contractor
   Contractor Delivers Service/Items

Vehicle Leases
Fuel Waste Removal

Subsistence Water Vehicle Maint
IA Non-Life Support Funding Flow

**Finish**
1. Unit makes requirements packet
   - PR&C
   - Letter of Justification
   - Scope of Work
2. Packet to ISF Cell
3. ISF Cell Screens
   - Packet to 42nd G-8
4. Comptroller logs in packet
5. Comptroller assigns fund cite
   - Packet to Contractor
6. Contractor awards contract
7. Unit receives service/items
   - Vendor is paid

**Start**

- Uniforms
- Buildings
- Construction
- Furniture
- Office Equipment

---

Prepared by Task Force

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OSB
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BN</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Area of Responsibility</th>
<th>Unit Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karkuk to Kabaz Oil Fields</td>
<td>Kabbaz Oil Fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wadi Al-Nafut to Haseeb Al-Arid village</td>
<td>Wadi Al-Nafut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Haseeb Al-Arid village to Al-Fat’ha bridge</td>
<td>Al-Fat’ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bayji to Tilool Al-Bayji</td>
<td>Bayji in Makool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Shirgat fork road to Al-Gayyara</td>
<td>Al-Shirgat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tilool Al-Bayji to Al-Hadar</td>
<td>Tilool Al-Bayji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al Gayara to Mosil old way</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al’Fat’ha bridge to Tikrit</td>
<td>Bayji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tikrit to Samarra Falluja fork road</td>
<td>HQ behind Remagen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Samarra-Falluja fork road</td>
<td>Al Ishaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Niba’ee area quarries to the bank of the Tigris</td>
<td>Mushahada Oil Refinery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OIL SECURITY BATTALIONS

(Dibis - Kirkuk)
1 OSB
- 1 x Patrol Co
- 3 x Static Co

(K1 - Safra)
2 OSB
- 1 x Patrol Co
- 3 x Static Co

(Safra - Bayji)
3 OSB
- 1 x Patrol Co
- 3 x Static Co

Equipment currently being issued:
- 750 x 3 BN AK-47s
- 12 x 3 BKC
- 2 x 3 RPKs
- 1000 x 3 Uniforms
- 1000 x 3 Boots
- 1000 x 3 Hats
- 1000 x 3 Long Underwear
- 120,000k AK rounds
- 7,000 BKC rounds
- 2,500 x 3 blankets
- 200 x 3 Cushions
- 500 x 3 Winter Coats

Current Issues:
- Unity of command at Bayji Bridge
- BN HQ not well established / force protection
- No identification cards as of yet
- No weapons cards
- Oil line checkpoints are not adequate
- Communication
- Inadequate meal contract
- Mobility for patrols
- Still allowing civilians near pipeline
- Need physical barriers around valves

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

Information on the Oil Pipeline BNs from S:\ [b](6) MOD:

a. BNs 1, 2, 3 are part of the 31st ING BDE, and their sector is from Kirkuk to Al Fatha. The bridge at Al Fatha is outside of their AO.
b. BNs 4, 5, 6, 7, 14 and 15’s sector is from the north of Bayji to Rabeeh. These BNs report to the 2nd ING Division HQ in Mosul for C2.
c. BNs 8, 9, 10, 11 sector is from Baghdad to Bayji. These BNs report to 30 ING BDE in Tikrit for C2.
d. BNs 12, 13 sector is from Baghdad to Anjanah. These BNs report to 32 ING BDE for C2.
e. BNs 16, 17 sector is from Baghdad to Karbala. These BNs are not formed yet, but will report to the Baghdad ING Division.
f. Currently there are 10 BNs on the ground. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Each BN has 44 officers and 1000 Soldiers authorized. BN 11 is authorized one extra rifle company for a total of 44/1200. None of these BNs are at full strength.
P3P / P3R Subjective Overview

Currently operating an Embedded Police Partnership Program, Reconstitution (P3-R) in Samarra 264 IPs in position with 376 in training and 550 scheduled for training in May. Total of 1,200 trained NLT August Phase I (P3-P) in Diyala 3 BCT took initiative and developed P3-P Team based off draft proposal. Team stood up 1APR in Diyala. Establishing a P3-P Team in Salah Al Din NLT 29APR Phase II (P3-P) Team in Kirkuk Province NLT 27MAY 116 BCT establishing program now requirements now As Sulaymaniyah is scheduled to be returned to Iraqi regional control on 1JUN. Due to As Sulaymaniyah’s stability it is determined that a P3-P is not required.
Salah Ad Din
P3-P Organization – 1 BCT

UNIT
- FORCE PRO
- QRF
- ESCORT
- SUSTAINMENT

TM CHIEF
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DEP TM CHIEF
(b)(6)

1 BCT LNO
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ISF SPT CELL

PERSONNEL
1 MIL
- Police Admin
- Personnel Acct
- Pay Roll

INVEST/INTEL
1 MIL
1 IPLO
- Targeting
- Collection Planning
- Criminal Investigation
- Evidence Handling
- Cooperation with IA

OPERATIONS
1 MIL OFF
1 MIL NCO
1 IPLO
- Patrol Operations
- QRF
- Detainee Handling
- Jail Operations
- Communications
- Reporting

TRAINING
1 MIL
1 IPLO
- Training Management
- International Schools
- National Schools
- Local Academy

LOGISTICS
1 MIL
- Property Accountability
- Maintenance
- Contracting
- CSS Planning
- Communications

It is not anticipated or expected that the P3-P team reside at the IPS Provincial HQ.
It is not anticipated that the entire P3-P will be consumed 24/7 with their P3 tasks or duties.
Organization – TF 3 BCT

TF CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)

TF XO
(b)(3), (b)(6)

3 BCT LNO
(b)(3), (b)(6)

TF NCOIC
(b)(3), (b)(6)

MIL SME
(b)(3), (b)(6)

CIV SME SR IPLO

PERS/LOG

INVEST/INTEL
(b)(3), (b)(6)

OPERATIONS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

TRAINING

IPLO

IPLO x 2

IPLO

-Targeting
-Collection Planning
-Criminal Investigation
-Evidence Handling
-Cooperation with IA

-Patrol Operations
-QRF
-Detainee Handling
-Jail Operations
-Communications
-Reporting

-Training Management
-International Schools
-National Schools
-Local Academy

-Inter-Agency Coop
-123 Tip Line
-Emergency Response

TF
18

3BCT
6

42ID
1

IPLO
4

TOTAL
29

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Support Following Battle Space Transition
Furthest distance for support is Stone – Army Air says from Warrior this takes approximately 45 minutes flight time. Max flight time one way without refuel is approximately 60min.
## MITTs COMMS AFTER BASE CONSOLIDATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOICE (V) or DATA (D)</th>
<th>CAPABILITY</th>
<th>STATUS OF CAPABILITY OR REQUIRED ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secure Voice</td>
<td>1. Iridium</td>
<td>1. Available from out of hide. PR&amp;C submitted 21MAR05 to fill shortages. At C6; pending C4 validation of MITT comms delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. JNN*</td>
<td>2. Available (Capability will be removed from BN &amp; BDE MiTTs upon commercialization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonsecure Voice</td>
<td>1. JNN*</td>
<td>1. Available (Capability will be removed from BN &amp; BDE MiTTs upon commercialization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Iraqi landline</td>
<td>2. Use existing infrastructure (limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Data</td>
<td>1. JNN*</td>
<td>1. Available (Capability will be removed from BN &amp; BDE MiTTs upon commercialization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonsecure Data</td>
<td>1. JNN*</td>
<td>1. Available (Capability will be removed from BN &amp; BDE MiTTs upon commercialization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Internet package</td>
<td>2a. Available at all IA units except Tuz. MiTTs have C6 permission to use capability (this is limited).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2b. PR&amp;C submitted 21MAR05 for independent capability. At C6; pending C4 validation of MiTT comms delta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Capability will be removed from BN & BDE MiTTs upon commercialization*
Regional Reconstruction Operations Center
OIL

Sector: Oil

411 CA Bn

Purpose: Primary facilitator of all Oil Sector Projects & improvements in Task Force AO

Method: Coordinates with SOIs at the Regional (NOC) level and at the individual Plants to determine requirements in the Oil Sector that will enhance or provide ancillary support to existing IRRF projects. Coordinates with IRMO and PCO Oil Sector to resolve issues in infrastructure and determines alternative funding sources. Uses Task Force CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by PCO.
POWER

Sector: Power 411 CABn

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Purpose: Primary facilitator of all Power sector projects & improvements in Task Force AO. Coordinates with SOIs at the local, regional and national levels.

Method: Coordinates with SOIs at the Regional (Northern Region) level and at the individual Plants to determine requirements in the Power Sector that will enhance or provide ancillary support to existing IRRF projects. Coordinates with IRMO and PCO Power Sector to resolve issues in infrastructure and determines alternative funding sources. Uses Task Force CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by PCO.
PUBLIC WORKS

Sector: Public Works 411 CA Bn

Purpose: Primary facilitator of all Water and Sewer projects & improvements in Task Force AO. Coordinates with SOIs at the BCT, regional and national levels.

Method: Coordinates with SOIs at the Provincial level with BCT representatives to determine Potable Water requirements. Coordinates with IRMO and PCO Water on Water and Sewer Programs, serves as a conduit of information to BCTs concerning these new programs. Assists BCTs in identifying Potable water and sewer requirements that meet the various programs criteria. Serves as the “Go Between” to resolve issues in Water and Sewer infrastructure and determines alternative funding sources. Uses Task Force CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by PCO.

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TRANSPORTATION

Sector: Transportation

411 CA Bn

Purpose: Primary facilitator of all Transportation sector projects (Rail, Critical Bridges & Roads) & Task Force AO.

Method: Coordinates with SOIs at the BCT, Provincial and National levels to resolve conflicts among the contractors, D/Bs, PCO, IRMO and occasionally local leadership. Uses Division assets to recon projects and ensure projects are within acceptable standards. Assists contractors in identifying sources of materials. Influences leaders at IRMO to push certain projects if no movement has occurred.
HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Sector: Buildings Health and Education Program Manager
En Bde 42d ID

Purpose: Primary construction manager / facilitator of all Buildings Health and Education Projects & Improvements in Task Force AO.

Method: Coordinates with SOIs at the BCT, Provincial, and Infrastructure Component to resolve conflicts among the Contractors and various customers. Works with OTI to fill Recently renovated schools with equipment and supplies. Uses Task Force CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by OTI/USAID. Coordinates with Infrastructure Component DGs to determine Clinic and Schools requirements on the Infrastructure LSAs. Coordinates with PCO to fund requirements. Uses 42d ID CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by PCO.
Governance Transition Concept

Iraq gained national sovereignty on 28 June 2004. As such, CF participation in local, provincial and national governance is limited to monitoring and reporting.

- Phase I & II – FOB consolidation – the monitoring and reporting of local governments will slowly decrease and ultimately end.

- Phase III – CF consolidates on Contingency Operating Locations (COL). The monitoring and reporting of governance will shift its primary focus to the Provincial Level.

- Phase IV – CF consolidates on Contingency Operating Bases (COB). The monitoring and reporting of governance will shift to regional governments and areas, i.e. the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) & Sunni heartland.

- Department of State (DOS) & PCO – Not all personnel will relocate. The Regional Embassy Offices (REO) are independent.
  - Tikrit – SET and PCO to Speicher.
  - Baquba – Phases I&II – SET, PCO, Engineers, CA at CMOC. Phase III – DP to move/close/remain in place.
  - Kirkuk – currently a Regional Embassy Office. Patriot Base will remain during Phases I-III. Phase IV is a decision point to move/close/remain in place.