Security Transition

Opportunities for Reductions and Off Ramps

FEEDBACK

(CORPS COMMENTS IN RED)
MNC-I FEEDBACK TO MNF-I OFF-RAMP STRATEGY

PLANNING:

• From this

MNF-I Template (Starting Point)
• Infrastructure Requirements
• Sustainment Capability
• ISF Independent COIN Capability

• To this

Common Understanding & Agreement of the Off Ramp Strategy

SECTION OF REDOR 2/11/2005 Sharaka wa Tafahum – Partnership and Understanding

Approved for Release
# 2005 Security Transition Strategy

## Strategy
- Build Iraqi Army capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations
- Progressively transition counterinsurgency responsibility to capable ISF — **Conditions-based**
- Adjust Coalition force posture and reduce presence
- Continue ISF development
- Improve Iraqi Government capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations (No Assessment Yet on Governmental Capacity)
- Transform nature of coalition

## Priorities
- **Operational Infrastructure (Basing, BSUs) & Sustainment**
- Intelligence
- Police
- Borders
- Army Brigade and Division Headquarters
- Command and Control capability
- MOD/MOI Institutional Capacity
- Integrated Iraqi counterinsurgency planning and execution
- Force Protection
- Continuous Force Transition
Opportunities

- Near term opportunities (late spring, early summer)
  - Coalition reductions
    - 14b
  - US reductions unlikely; would not impact MIT augmentation
- Mid to far term opportunities (mid summer to fall)
  - Generally promising
    - Continued reductions in need for sustained Coalition presence (Recommend stating: Continued need for transforming nature of Coalition presence from Expeditionary to Stability and Support of Reductions as available)
    - Opportunity to form IAG from division designated for OIF 05-07
    - Off ramp between 2-7 more brigades. (Recommend stating: Transition 3-4 Brigades or equivalents for use in other prioritized tasks list)
      1. Support ISF Sustainment Operations / LOC Security
      2. QRF,
      3. Election Support,
      4. Reconstruction,
      5. Additional Transition Teams and Training Assistance,
      6. Infrastructure Security,
      7. Redeploy
### Assumptions and Criteria

#### Assumptions
- ISF will require some Coalition logistics support through 2005.
- MNF-I can improve Iraqi military capabilities more rapidly in 2005.
- Iraqi Army can provide/enable the framework for ISF-wide operations (reassess date for operational Army HQ with Titan X or C2 capability).
- Iraqi Army progress in C2 and framework operations will exceed that of the Iraqi police in 2005.
- Iraqi Army brigade competence will require about 6 months of development after formation. Progress will not be uniform across between Brigades and Divisions. Critical path based on Logistics/Infrastructure.
- In less challenging areas, Coalition forces can reduce before Iraqi Army brigades fully demonstrate competence. There are NG Coalition (US) formations in these areas above Company level.
- In challenged areas, Coalition forces remain in place until Iraqi Army brigades fully demonstrate competence for several months.

#### Requirements
- Logistics Function & infrastructure, and Staff planning capability.
- Capable ISF units and headquarters.
- Competent intelligence systems.
- Police forces, and institutions capable of maintaining domestic Order.
- Reliable border and infrastructure security forces.
- Special striking forces.
- Iraqi leadership and organizations able to conduct independent counter-insurgency operations.
- National Iraqi organizations that can deploy, manage and support ISF-wide security operations.
- Wartime mentality & service ethos.
- MOI & MOD institutional capabilities.

#### Criteria
- Battalions – Manned and Equipped.
- Brigade Headquarters – Manned and Equipped.
- Brigade Capability – formation plus 6 months of development (Required at what manning level? If 90%, what is acceptable turn-over rate?).
- Force levels and Security Situation.
- High threat areas (historic troop to population ratio 25:1000).
  - Al Anbar, Nineveh, N Babil.
- Lower threat areas.
  - 15/1000 for Salah ad Din (Salah ad Din has greater attack rate than Al Anbar. Salah ad Din has higher population density and higher proportion of urban population. Currently should fall into same category as other with WMD risks).
  - 12/1000 for Baghdad. Baghdad has highest number of attacks per day of 23 provinces. If N. Saddam attack any numbers then we per capita 20 in top 5.
  - 10/1000 for all others.
- Regional Control—local to provincial military, police and civil coordination.
- National Control—local to national coordination, national government and ministerial C2 and direction.

**SEE MNF-I ESTIMATES FOR CONDITIONS REQUIRED WITHIN EACH PHASE (pages 38 - 45)**
Assumptions

- Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulaymaniayh will not be augmented by CF
- Maysan will only be augmented by British and this is unlikely
- Muthanna will be augmented by Australian Battalion, when 14b.1.4 contingent withdraws
- Irbil will not receive additional CF augmentation after 14b.1.4 commitment ends.
- The IPS in Ninewah will take at least 8 months to regain a proper policing capability
- The IPS in Al Anbar will take at least 12 months to regain a proper policing capability
- The IPS will not collapse completely in any other province but has potential to collapse in cities that lack Coalition or Iraqi Army support.
- The 14b.1.4d region not be reformed once the 800 withdraw
- The 14b.1.4d region will not be replaced by any other CF except for potential in Al Suwaid
- The UK and 14b.1.4d may draw down but will remain in theatre in the same AOs until at least Dec 05
- At least six months lead time for national level coordination would be required to allow UK or 14b.1.4d to be used out of MND-SE AO. Out of sector use would only be possible in other permissive environments.
- DBE will remain at least constant
- FPS will continue to increase in number but not necessarily in capability
Assumptions

- Iraqi Transitional Government will remain committed to MNF-I presence and the UNSCR 1546 process
- Insurgency will continue at roughly the present level throughout 2005 in Sunni areas; security situation across the country will not be uniform
- Properly resourced, trained, and supported, Iraqi Security Forces will be capable of conducting successful counterinsurgency operations
- Iraqi Security Force development will progress as programmed; performance will improve with the Transition Team concept but not in a uniform manner
- Integrated civil-military action and logistics sustainment will be required longer than coalition combat formations. CMO and logistic forces will continue to require Force Protection. Off ramp is predicated on force protection requirements
- Coalition partners will support new concepts and force posture adjustments, but within their current areas of responsibility. Greater opportunities will be available to new coalition partners as battlespace is transitioned to Iraqi Regional and national control.
- External support to insurgents will continue, but at reduced levels as Iraqi border forces become more capable
### Original Potential Off Ramp Opportunities

| MNB - NW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MND - NC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MND - NC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MND - NC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| MND - BAGHDAD 2/3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MND - BAGHDAD 4/3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MND - BAGHDAD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MND - BAGHDAD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OP RES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SECFOR | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| THEATER SEC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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Potential Off Ramp Opportunities

Early 2006 too early to off-ramp SGTs. This capability will not be likely until we get into National Control. This is due to the requirement to provide direct support and general support to the ISF. Support includes: CAD Logistics, Joint Fires & Effects, OIF Force Protection, Reconstruction, etc.

Issue: Decisions on MNF proposal to off-ramp are tied to phase & time line for conditions.
Discussion: 1) Where potential for transfer to ISF minimal the ISF exists; there are few to no US forces (e.g.,)
2) Transfers to regional command generally only contain options to ISF Ramp. This should include a number of options for the Commander. (SME/MDA)
Recommende Action: RAMP off-ramp at Battalion Level and below once.
Minimum conditions exist. Troop to task requirement indicate freed up forces should be able to reposition to regions that do not meet desired force levels
UP TO 15% REDUCTION ACROSS THEATER (CONDITIONS DEPENDENT)
SECOND OPTION: 172nd SBCT
MNF SLIDE: OUR CONCERN IS TO MITIGATE RISK DURING PERIOD OF GREATEST VULNERABILITY

ROLES DURING EACH PHASE BASED ON CAPABILITY AND DESIRED EFFECT FOR ISF TO FIGHT INDEPENDENT COIN OPERATIONS

- DECISIVE / SHAPING (PH I & II)
- SUPPORTING / SUPPORTED (BOTH CAPABLE OF DECISIVE OPERATIONS)
- FINAL ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP IN MUTUAL SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

DEALING WITH THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY

HOW TO MITIGATE RISK: EVENT DRIVEN, INTEL DEPENDENT (Iraqi face)

IF YOU DO EVERYTHING AT ONCE YOU DO NOTHING WELL AND FAIL. CAREFUL BALANCE
TROOP TO TASK ANALYSIS
BLUF: THIS SLIDE ILLUSTRATES CAPABILITY OVER TIME: ISF INCREASING, COALITION OFF RAMP

ACROSS THE TOP ARE THE WINDOWS WHERE WE WILL ACHIEVE PROVINCIAL CONTROL OF CATEGORY A – B – AND C PROVINCES.
ACROSS THE BOTTOM ARE KEY POLITICAL EVENTS THAT COULD SHAPE OUR DECISION CYCLE.

3 IIF BRIGADES AND THE 5 REGULAR ARMY BRIGADES THAT ARE SCHEDULED TO COME ON LINE BY MID JUN 2005. (DOES NOT SHOW MECH DIV – $850M FUNDING REQUIREMENT)

AND APPROX. 20 BRIGADES IN THE ING ARE ALSO SCHEDULED TO COME ON LINE BY JUN. THOUGH THEIR PRIMARY MISSION IS PROVINCIALY DEPENDENT AND FOCUSED AT SUPPORTING THE LOCAL IPS. (CONSTATATORY)

THE AGGREGATE OF IPS FORCES IS REFLECTED ON THE TOP. THIS LINE INCLUDES ALL TYPES OF MOI POLICE FORCES (DBE, FPS, SPF, ETC).

AS THESE FORCES INCREASE OVER TIME IT ALLOWS OUR COALITION FORCES TO BEGIN THEIR REDUCTION OVER TIME.

THE COALITION FORCES ARE INDICATED BY THE BLUE LINE. MNC-I WILL RAMP UP TO A TOTAL OF 25 COALITION BRIGADES BY THE ELECTIONS IN JANUARY.
THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO TURN OVER SEVEN PROVINCES (CAT A) BY JUN 2005 AND GAIN CREDIBILITY BY DOING SO.
THIS IS WHEN 9 RA BRIGADES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO CONDUCT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. (RFF PROCESS THROUGH MOD). THE ING CONSTABULARY ROLE CAN BEGIN TO CREATE A MORE SECURE ENVIRONMENT LOCALLY.

INITIAL DROP DUE TO WITHDRAWAL OF APPROX 2-3 BRIGADES FROM THE SECTORS, AND POTENTIALLY THE BEGINNING NOW THRU MARCH.


THE TRANSITION OF 7 PROVINCES FREEs UP FIVE BRIGADES TO EMPLOYMENT IN OTHER AREAS.

BUILD: THIS LAST LINE INDICATES THE CURRENT JCS SOURCING GUIDANCE. AS YOU CAN SEE IT IS A MUCH LESS AGGRESSIVE VIEW CONCERNING REDUCTION OF FORCES.
Evaluating Unit Capability

- Charts do not account for capability only projected numbers (personnel or Bdes).
- IOT accurately depict real capability the graphs must reflect a validation model based on assessment of a unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) performance by Iraqi and Coalition force Commanders.
- Validation Model Variables include:
  - LOGISTICS CAPABILITY
  - METL ASSESSMENT
  - USR TYPE ASSESSMENT
ISF VALIDATION MODEL: FOLLOWING MAT INTEGRATION AND PARTNERSHIP OPERATIONS

MNSCT-I LIMITED ROLE

GRADUAL INTEGRATION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP MECHANISM

SERIES OF GATES TO BE FULLY INDEPENDENT

GRADUAL INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (Coalition lead, ISF supporting, ISF supported)

TIED TO TRAINING CENTER REQUIREMENT

MNC COMMANDERS HAVE A LARGE ROLE

BY HAVING METHOD WE CAN THEN ASSESS RISK AND ADDRESS
APPROPRIATE MITIGATION
DIVISION METL

- COMMAND AND CONTROL FORCES WITHIN REGION
- PLAN AND COORDINATE FORCE EMPLOYMENT
- PLAN,COORDINATE & EXECUTE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
- INTEGRATE OPERATIONS WITH ARMY, POLICE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, AND OTHER IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AND COALITION FORCES (REGIONAL JOC)
- TRAIN THE FORCE
- CONOPS
- OPERATES IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COUNTERPART REGIONAL JOC
- OPERATES FROM FIXED BASE. DEPLOYS A FORWARD CP WHEN REQUIRED
BRIGADE METL

- Conduct Tactical Deployment and redeployment activities
- Conduct Tactical Movements
- Conduct Stability Operations
- Conduct Civil Military Operations
- Command and Control
  - C2 One or more battalions
  - Conduct MDMP (Troop Leading Procedures)
  - Conduct Personnel Accountability
  - Conduct Pay Functions
  - Execute Retention
  - Process Intelligence
  - Develop and Execute Training Plans
  - Sustain the Force
  - Maintain Communications
BATTALION METL

- Conduct Tactical Deployment and redeployment activities
- Conduct Tactical Movement
- Conduct Stability Operations (07-1-1270)
- Conduct Civil Military Operations (07-1-4060)
- Conduct Command and Control
- C2 One or More Companies (07-1-5027)
- Conduct MDMP (TLP)
- Conduct Recruiting, Pay, Personnel Functions (07-1-4008)
- Process Intelligence (07-1-2000)
- Develop & Execute Training Plans (07-1-4099)
- Sustain the Force
  - Track and coordinate Logistics/Equipment Support (07-1-4018)
  - Maintain Communications (07-1-5018)
# BSU Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIORITIZED RSU / BSE</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Kisik</td>
<td>Renovation Necessary</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habaniyah</td>
<td>Renovation Necessary</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Satisfactory Facilities</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIAP</td>
<td>Satisfactory Facilities</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>Renovation Necessary</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<td>KMTB</td>
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<td>Babil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Numaniyah</td>
<td>Renovation Necessary</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>Satisfactory Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Talil (COB)</td>
<td>Satisfactory Facilities</td>
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### ISF Development and Potential Security Handoff

#### MND-North Center (Corrected)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>ISF Equipment and Staff Training</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>No Staff, No Equipment, Temp HQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>No Staff, No Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>No Staff, No Equipment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
- Blue = ISF
- Green = MND-North
- Yellow = Partner
- Orange = Other

**Note:**
- Kirkuk: Partners 31 & 33 Bde
- Deny 1 Month Earlier

**Details:**
- 3rd BDE located in As Sulmarniah Province not Salah ad Din
- 40,000 ISF
- 42,000 MND-North
- 45,000 Partner

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**CF OVERVIEW:**
- ISF UNIT NATURES
- ISF UNIT FULLY CAPABLE
- CF LOCAL OVERWATCH
- ISF STRATEGY: CAPACITY FOR IRAQI CONTROL

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**Secretary of Defense:**
- Approved for Release

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**USCENTCOM Chief of Staff:**
- Approved for Release

**Declassified on:** 201506
### ISF Development and Potential Security Handoff MND-North Center (By Battalion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Companies Green</td>
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<tr>
<td>BN Staff needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>more training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Currently Partnered</td>
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<tr>
<td>with BN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pay and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>Pay and Budget</td>
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<td>System</td>
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<td>Logistics</td>
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</tbody>
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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
ISF Development and Potential Security Handoff
MND-North Center (By Battalion)

Pay and Budget System
Logistics

BN Staff is strong

2 Companies need training, BN Staff is strong

Pay and Budget System
Logistics

BN Staff needs more training
ISF Development and Potential Security Handoff
MND-North Center (By Battalion)

- Pay and Budget System
- Logistics

CF OPE, ISF UNIT MATURER, ISF UNIT FULLY CAPABLE, CF LOCAL OVERWATCH, ISF STRATEGIC CAPACITY FOR IRAQI CONTROL

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**IRAQI SECURITY FORCES**
**MND-Baghdad**

| 4/3 Partners Mutahaa, 1st 40th Bde |
| 2/3 Partners 41st Bde |
| Partners 6, 1st Mech Bde |

![MNF-I VERSION](image-url)
MNC-I REGIONAL CONTROL - SECURITY CONDITIONS

- ISF is capable of sustaining independent operations at BCT level
- Logistics and sustainment capable of supporting BCT operations at direct and organizational levels
- Basing established for all units at Bde level
- Staff functioning at BCT level
- S1 through S6 Staffs established
- ISF leads CDIN operations
- Sanctuaries for AIF reduced
- ISF provides custodial role ISO Police to ensure regional domestic order is maintained
- Intimidation campaign marginalized
- FPS/Oil protection services capable of providing minimal effects, ensuring minimal services
- Initial capability to conduct regional Intel operations
MNC-I GOVERNANCE CONDITIONS

- UNSCR 1546 process is on track
- ISF capable of safeguarding election process
- Iraqi participation is maintained
- Functioning local and regional detention and release system assures domestic order is maintained
- Local and regional governments assuming responsibilities
- Local and regional government administration able to survive party/leadership transitions
- OF assessment that local/regional governments are capable of providing basic services
MNC-I ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

- Opportunities exist for economic development
- Essential services continue to expand
- Domestic order maintained
- Economic benefits of production/distribution are realized
- OF assessment that economic infrastructure is capable of providing basic economic services
Iraqi people perceive basic services and needs being met by local and provincial government.

- Iraqi people perceive ISF are providing regional security
- Increased confidence and trust in ISF
- Legitimate government of Iraq is perceived as present and functioning although it may not yet be completely effective
- Iraqi people acknowledge that local, and regional governments exist
- OF understands Iraqi needs and perceptions and assess if they are being met
MNC-I NATIONAL CONTROL - SECURITY CONDITIONS

- Area BSU(s) and Regional BSU(s) developed sufficiently to support independent Division Operations
- MOD/MOI assume responsibility for ISF sustainment, G2, and Administrative and Logistics support to Joint Forces
- ISF conducts COIN operations and national defense
  - Sanctuaries for AIF eliminated
  - CF supplies fires effects as required
- ISF capability exceeds AIF with IOG freedom of action increased without reliance upon CF for direct support (in extremis)
- Rule of Law established with MOD/MOI/COJ in lead
- ISF provides constitutional role ISO IPS to ensure National domestic order
- Fully capable to conduct national intel operations
MNC-I GOVERNANCE CONDITIONS

- Essential bureaucratic structure and procedures capable of handling national down to local administration in place
- Functioning relationship between local through national agencies
- Ministries manage and coordinate essential services and basic needs
- CF assess that national government is capable of achieving desired effect
ANNEX ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

- ITG linkage to local/regional infrastructure development
- Begin establishment of national financial system
- Progression continues for economic development
  - Essential services continue to expand
  - Domestic order maintained
  - Economic benefits of production/distribution are realized
  - Alternatives are sought out to resolve problem areas
- CF assessment that economic infrastructure is capable of providing basic economic services
MINID COMMUNICATIONS CONDITIONS

- Iraqi people perceive basic services and needs being met by local, provincial, and national government
- National government is perceived as responsive to local emergencies
- Iraqi people perceive ISF providing national security and independently conducting COIN operations
  - Increased confidence and trust in ISF
- Legitimate government of Iraq is perceived as present and functioning and its effectiveness is improving
- Iraqi people acknowledge local, regional, and national governments exist
- CF understand Iraqi needs and perceptions and assess they are being met
No change in the disposition of Iraqi Army and IIF units.

FOR BACKGROUND INFO ONLY:

- **Current Status of Force Generation:** This is the current disposition of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Intervention Forces undergoing formation and training in accordance with the CMATT force generation plan.

- 1st IIF Bde (in green) remains at Tadji until completion of MOUT for its last Bn. Remainder of Bde moves to BAGHDAD IAW current deployment plan o/a 15 August.

- 3rd Bde (in blue) has completed basic training for 5th and 6th Bns. 7th Bn is scheduled to complete basic training 2 August. Operational employment planning is underway for the Brigade.

- All other Brigades (in Gray) are in the process of forming for training. They are all undergoing cadre integration (i.e. leader training). The first unit to receive troops for basic training will be 4th Bde in Al Kasik (week of 18 July to receive troops). Followed by 2d Bde in An Numaniyah around 1 August.

- Facilities and life support remain on track to execute the current force generation plan.
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- Facilities and life support remain on track to execute the current force generation plan.
# Regional Iraqi Control to Iraqi Self-Reliance

## Regional Iraqi Control (Mid 2005)
- Maintain local & provincial domestic order
- Assert territorial control through frameworks
- Conduct independent COIN operations with CP support only as needed
- Plan, direct, conduct, and sustain targeted/provincial level security operations
- Local provincial police, military, and civil and nonstate para-military, ad hoc groups (ISF dominance)

## National Iraqi Control (Early 2006)
- Continue to conduct unilateral and joint OCONUS operations
- Enable independent ISF COIN operations
- Position to deliver regional supporting effects to ISF
- Prepare to defeat external threats
- Partnering and assisting levels from and with ISF
- Separate Coalition/G2 structure
- Handover provincial security responsibility to ISF
- Small reductions in force posture, reduce/eliminate presence in cities

## Iraqi Self-Reliance (Mid-Late 2009)
- Maintain national domestic order
- Enforce rule of law
- Conduct independent COIN operations
- Assist ISF COIN operations
- Restored to deliver supporting effects to ISF when requested
- Assist ISF train and advise ISF
- Consolidate ISF into ISF/IG structure
- Progressively transition national security responsibility to ISF
- Significant reductions in force posture

### Coalition
- Maintain national COIN operations
- Restore to deliver supporting effects to ISF when requested
- Maintain national security without CP assistance
- Progressively transition national security responsibility to ISF
- Significant reductions in force posture

### ISF/IG
- Assist ISF COIN operations
- Restore to deliver supporting effects to ISF when requested
- Maintain national security responsibility to ISF & IS
- Progressively transition national security responsibility to ISF
- Significant reductions in force posture

### ISF/IG Coalition
- Assume strategic responsibility
- Handover national security responsibility to ISF & IS
- Restored to deliver supporting effects to ISF when requested
- Maintain national security without CP assistance
- Progressively transition national security responsibility to ISF
- Significant reductions in force posture

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**Under Development**

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Approved for Release: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
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MNF-I Enabling Effects for Regional Iraqi Control

- ISF capable of brigade/provincial level operations
  - All units capable of independent operations
- ISF controls territory across province through framework operations
  - Includes: intelligence collection, security presence, defense of bases/stations, and limited offensive action
- ISF capable of conducting independent COIN operations, with CF support as needed
  - Ability to concentrate and coordinate forces for intelligence-led offensive operations (cordon & search and kill/capture)
- CF capable of providing regional supporting effects to ISF and defeating external threats
  - Includes: kinetic/non-kinetic fires, logistics, transport, QRF, intelligence, communications, and liaison
- Local & provincial domestic order maintained
  - IPS conducting operations within local constraints
- Assistance teams and partnership with ISF will facilitate achieving effects
MNF-I Enabling Effects for National Iraqi Control

- ISF capable of division/national level operations (as appropriate)
- ISF capable of conducting independent COIN operations
  - Includes framework and offensive operations
- ISF capable of deterring external threats and preserving territorial integrity of Iraq, with CF support in extremis
  - Includes border security/policing
- CF capable of providing regional supporting effects to ISF when requested
  - Includes: kinetic/non-kinetic fires, intelligence, and liaison
- National domestic order maintained
- Rule of law established and enforced
- ISF no longer depend on CF to deal with the insurgency

Assistance teams and partnership with ISF will facilitate achieving effects
MNF-I Regional Iraqi Control Definition

Regional Iraqi Control, judged on a province by province basis, is defined as the conditions whereby local and provincial Iraqi security forces are sufficiently organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain security operations at the brigade/provincial level. Command and control structures are functioning, and Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions at the local/provincial level. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF are increased to a level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of anti-Iraqi forces.

Under Regional Iraqi Control, ISF can maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment, assert territorial control through framework operations, and conduct independent counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support only as needed. Coalition forces reduce unilateral operations, increase joint operations, are postured to deliver regional supporting effects to Iraqi security organizations, and are prepared to defeat external threats and preserve Iraq's territorial integrity.
MNF-I Required Tasks – Necessary Conditions for Regional Iraqi Control

- Organize, train, and equip local & provincial ISF
- ISF plan, direct, conduct, and sustain brigade/provincial level security operations (as appropriate)
  - Requires 6 months of partnership and assistance team support to deliver full brigade-level capability
- Develop local and provincial C2 structure (JCCs and PJCC)
- Local & provincial Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions
  - Formal supported/supporting relationships unlikely to exist
  - Solutions likely to vary by province based on pragmatic development of working relationships
- Increase ISF capabilities to level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of AIF
  - Combined ISF capability sufficient for operating area and threat level
MNF-I National Iraqi Control Definition

National Iraqi Control is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security forces are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations. Iraq's national, provincial, and local government organizations are effectively linked, with ministries that can deploy and support integrated and complementary security operations throughout the country. A combined Coalition-Iraqi command and control structure is in place to plan and execute national level counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF have increased to a level where they no longer depend on CF to deal with the insurgency.

Under National Iraqi Control, ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent counterinsurgency operations, preserve Iraq's territorial integrity, and deter threats to the national security of Iraq with Coalition support in extremis. Coalition forces assist Iraqi operations as needed, remain postured to deliver supporting effects to the ISF when requested, and progressively transition national security responsibilities to the Iraqis.
MNF-I Required Tasks – Necessary Conditions for National Iraqi Control

- Organize, train, and equip national ISF
  - Development of an Officer Corps within each service of the ISF
- ISF plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations (as appropriate)
  - With minimal CF direct support (logistics, transportation, comms etc.)
- National, provincial, and local government organizations effectively linked
- MOD/MOI direct, support, and sustain assigned ISF throughout Iraq
  - Formal national supported-supporting relationships unlikely to exist
- Develop combined Coalition & Iraqi C2 structure
  - National level counterinsurgency planning and execution capability
- Able to coordinate MOD, MOI, and Coalition force operations
- ISF and INIS collect, share, and exploit intelligence
- Security ministries supported by essential functions (judiciary, prisons, etc.)