Multi-National Force - Iraq
Combined Intelligence Operations Center

CIOC SPECIAL ANALYSIS PAPER

30 April 2006

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The Changing Nature of the Fight in Iraq

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Summary: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the conflict in Iraq and determine whether the struggle is evolving into a new type of conflict – particularly, whether the month of April represented the beginning of a new type of conflict. The paper examines the overall nature of the struggle, distinguishes its different stages and analyzes trends data for the last nine months. The paper draws on previous intelligence assessments, open source, counter-insurgency (COIN) metrics, sensitive and special reporting.

Key Judgments

- (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Sunnis who are not participating in the political process will be increasingly attracted to extremists groups, such as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). This includes members of the former regime, who bring technical expertise and military experience – improving AQI’s capabilities to conduct complex attacks.

- (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Attacks in Iraq are increasingly focused in the eastern Euphrates River Valley, Baghdad, and western Diyala Province.

- (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The increasing involvement of rejectionist elements with AQI and other terrorist groups may be a contributing factor to increasing lethality and professionalism of attacks against Multi-National Forces (MNF), Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Iraqi Government (IG), and civilians.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Radicalization of Sunni Rejectionists Opposing Political Transition and MNF-I Presence: Large segments of the Sunni insurgency are still resisting engagement in the political process. Some rejectionist elements which maintain close operational connections to AQI may be increasingly cooperating in AQI-led attacks. The divergence in the Sunni community has also likely led to a consolidation of military expertise, as ex-members of the Saddam-era Iraqi Army – particularly specialists in specific weapon-types and special forces – migrate towards AQI, bringing their skills with them. AQI’s high degree of control over Ramadi serves to attract an increasing number of members of the former regime, deepening cooperation between AQI and other insurgents and further promoting the operational capability of AQI. In addition, in areas with a significant rejectionist population, cooperation between extreme elements may be increasing, impacting the overall number and professionalism of attacks, particularly complex attacks. With the assistance of members of the former regime, AQI will increasingly utilize paramilitary tactics in pursuit of its objectives to expel the Coalition, undermine the Iraqi government, and establish a caliphate from which to spread the jihad.
(S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) General Attack Trends: Attacks in Iraq are increasingly focused in the eastern Euphrates River Valley, Baghdad, and western Diyala Province since January. (See Figure 1: Density of Attacks 14-20 Jan 06; Figure 2: Attacks 15-21 Apr 06) Increasing attacks in this area may be a reflection of increased counter-terrorism activities, previous operations, and a reduction in terrorists’ freedom of movement in other parts of the country. It also may reflect a strategic decision by terrorist and rejectionist groups to focus their efforts on Central Iraq.

Establishing a relative safe haven in the areas surrounding Baghdad would allow terrorists and rejectionists to plan and stage operations in Baghdad, with the ultimate goal of creating such chaos in Baghdad that normal governance is impossible. Terrorist groups and rejectionist groups share the objective to expel the coalition and undermine the Iraqi government — conducting attacks in Baghdad further both goals. Cooperation between terrorists and members of the former regime based on common goals may partially account for the increased attack density in Baghdad.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Increased lethality and professionalism: The increasing involvement of rejectionist elements with AQI and other terrorist groups may be contributing to increased lethality and professionalism of attacks against MNF, ISF, IG, and civilians. In addition, other factors, including sectarian violence and security measures, are impacting the attack levels and patterns. Terrorists and rejectionists primarily utilize four categories of attacks — Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Small Arms Fire (SAF), Indirect Fire (IDF), and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED). Terrorist groups, particularly AQI and Ansar al-
Sunna, also utilize suicide attacks. (See Figure 3: Total CF, ISF, CIV Casualties by Weapon Type and Appendix 1: Effectiveness of Attacks by Weapons Type)

- (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) *Improvised Explosive Devices*: IEDs are the weapons used in the highest quantity and cause the most casualties. Total casualities are most affected by large shifts in total civilian casualities while ISF and CF casualities remain consistent. (See Appendix 1: Effectiveness of Attacks by Weapons Type)

- (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) *Small Arms Fire*: Increased SAF since February 06 likely reflects the sectarian violence in the aftermath of the 22 February Golden Mosque bombings, with attack rates reaching the highest point since October 05. The effectiveness of SAF against CF remains low. Trends are showing a two month cycle where it appears terrorist and insurgents alternate their choice of ISF or civilians as their primary target. (See Appendix 1: Effectiveness of Attacks by Weapons Type)

- (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) *Indirect Fire*: IDF attacks and IDF-inflicted casualties have been increasing since January 06. Although civilians continue to bear the major portion of the casualties, they have been decreasing since February 06 with CF and ISF casualties increasing slightly over the same period. The increased casualty rate for IDF suggests an improved operator skill, and could indicate the growing involvement of former regime military specialists and rejectionists in sectarian violence. Alternatively, more accurate IDF could be used by AQI and AQI affiliates in places where they are able to practice and train, thereby increasing the lethality of the attacks. (See Appendix 1: Effectiveness of Attacks by Weapons Type)

- (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) *VBIEDs*: While VBIED casualties had been increasing since the easing of security measure following the December 05 elections, the total number of casualties has been dropping since mid-March. This may reflect current increased security measures or an increased focus on other tactics by the perpetrators. VBIED effectiveness has remained steady and low against CF. VBIED attacks against ISF are slightly more effective than against CF, but have declined to levels near CF. VBIED effectiveness against civilians
is high with civilians accounting for almost all VBIED causalities. (See Appendix 1: Effectiveness of Attacks by Weapons Type)

- **(S/REL TO USA, MCI) Suicide Attacks:** Suicide attacks, including Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) and Suicide Vests (SVEST), are a hallmark of terrorist groups, not rejectionist groups. Trends data does not suggest a terrorist group "spring offensive" utilizing suicide attacks similar to spring 2005. While April 06 suicide attack levels are slightly higher than the previous five months, they are consistent with the typical level of 30 to 40 suicide attacks per month.

- **(S/REL USA, AUS, GBR) Ramadi Case Study:** Ramadi-based AQI is a highly effective and organized network of independent AQI affiliated cells and criminal gangs taking direction from a few local leaders. AQI-associated operatives have been able to orchestrate complex attacks against important targets in the city. This trend is likely the result of AQI's freedom of movement to plan and execute attacks at a time and place of their choosing. In addition, there may be a temporary surge of cooperation in Ramadi between AQI and rejectionist elements, since, as recent reporting indicates, local insurgents choose to cooperate with AQI in anticipation of imminent MNF-I operations in the city. The perception of an imminent MNF operation may provide a unifying factor in Ramadi, and temporarily counter previous indications of a split or a wedge within the Sunni population between AQI and other groups in the city.

- **(S/REL USA, AUS, GBR) At any one time, MNF-W assesses Ramadi-based AQI capable of massing over 150 fighters and support personnel for attacks in the city and its surrounding areas. In addition, AQI has the ability to mass in groups of 30 fighters for a sustained engagement. The ability of AQI to plan, train, and move freely in Ramadi allows AQI to conduct increasingly, coordinated complex attacks. Complex attacks in Ramadi have steadily increased since January, and, since 9 April, there have been 11 complex attacks in Ramadi, primarily against MNF/ISF, including two complex attacks against the government center. (See Figure 4: Complex Attacks in Ramadi)

*Figure 4: Complex Attacks in Ramadi*

- **(S/REL TO USA, MCI) The Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) claimed the 17 April 2006 complex attack against the Government Center in Ramadi. The attackers utilized SVBIED, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), SAF and IDF against the Government Center, including firing from multiple positions. 15 CF were wounded, and 25 insurgents were killed.**
(S//REL TO USA, MCIF) On 19 April 06, terrorists conducted a complex, coordinated attack with SAF from multiple firing positions and an attempted RPG against the perimeter of Camp Blue Diamond for approximately 40 minutes. No coalition forces were wounded in the attack.

(S//REL TO USA, MCIF) On 25 March 06, terrorists conducted a coordinated attack against the Government Center with SAF from multiple firing positions for approximately 2 hours. No coalition forces were wounded or killed in the attack, though 11 terrorists were killed.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Western Diyala Case Study:
Terrorist activity in Diyala demonstrates cooperation between groups, particularly AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and AQI-affiliates. In addition, reporting since January 2006 indicates increased cooperation between terrorist groups and rejectors comprised of former Baathists and members of the New Ba'ath Party. While increasing Sunni alienation with the political process may have driven some of the rejectors to work with AQI, trends data suggests the increase may be partially attributable to increased sectarian tensions following the 22 February Golden Mosque attack. Rejectors' association with AQI may serve to explain recent increasingly complex attacks in the province. (See Figure 5: Complex Attacks in Diyala Province)

(S//REL TO USA, MCIF) The MSC claimed a 28 March 06 complex attack involving a SVBIED, SAF and IDF against an Iraqi Police station in Iskandariyah; a further IED was employed, possibly to target responders. Approximately 15 unidentified insurgents attempted to capture a nearby bridge using IDF, RPG and machine guns half an hour prior to the attack on the IP station; this attack was possibly intended to prevent responding support reaching the station.

(S//REL TO USA, MCIF) The MSC previously claimed a 21 March 06 large-scale complex attack involving SAF, IDF and RPG fire on an IP station in Muqdadiyah. Units responding to the initial attack were targeted by a VBIDE and multiple IEDs; two helicopters were also engaged by accurate ground fire and forced to withdraw. The attack resulted in significant IP casualties and the release of approximately 30 detainees.

(S//REL TO USA, MCIF) Conclusion: The conflict in Iraq is entering a new stage. The Sunni community is split between those who wish to continue to resist the political
transition—who are increasingly attracted to extremist groups, such as AQI; and those
who are willing to engage with the political process. Other factors, including increasing
sectarian tensions in the aftermath of the 22 February Golden Mosque bombing, have
likely increased radicalization of fringe elements of the Sunni rejectionists. The increased
cooporation or possible inclusion of these elements in AQI and other terrorist groups could
be reflected in increased complexity and lethality of attacks, particularly complex attacks.
While this trend appears to be only in nascent stages, continued radicalization as
rejectionists' goals and expectations are not met may improve AQI's capabilities and help
it increasingly utilize paramilitary tactics in its pursuit of its strategic objectives to expel
the Coalition, undermine and destroy the Iraqi government, and establish a caliphate from
which to spread the jihad.

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Appendix 1: Effectiveness of Attacks by Weapons Type

**Total CF, ISF, CIV Casualties by Weapon Type**
1 Sep 05 – 28 Apr 06

- Total IED
- Total IDF
- Total SAF
- Total VBIED
- Total SVEST

**IED Attack Effectiveness**
1 Sep 05 – 28 Apr 06

- IED Attacks
- Sum of Civ Cas
- Sum of CF Cas
- Sum of ISF Cas
- Total CF/ISF/CIV

DATA SOURCE: FUSION NET
Although it will be some time before we can determine the full impact of the elimination of Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi and the appointment of the new Iraqi Ministers of Defense and Interior, the Intelligence Community assesses that Zarqawi's death is a significant setback for Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and the completion of the Iraqi Cabinet provides a starting point for reforming and reinvigorating Iraqi security organs.

- The death of Zarqawi rendered a strong blow to AQI. He provided the strategic vision for the group and his successors may not be as committed to sustaining over the long term efforts to exacerbate Iraq's ethno-sectarian divisions by attacking Shia targets. However, these subordinates probably will be able to direct attacks that are already in the pipeline, and these attacks may increase in the near term as the organization attempts to demonstrate its resilience in the face of Zarqawi's demise.

- The appointment of new security ministers is an important step toward the government beginning to assert control over the deteriorating security situation. The ministers face an uphill struggle overcoming public skepticism over the government's ability to handle security issues in a non-sectarian, transparent manner—particularly among Sunni Arabs. They will need to quickly sort out roles and responsibilities, formulate a national security strategy, and prove that they can assert government control at the local levels. The nomination of Abdel Qader Jassim—a Sunni Arab and a former general—to the Minister of Defense post could help to ease Sunni perceptions that the country's Shia and Kurd-dominated military lacked a leadership that could check predatory, ethno-sectarian-driven practices. (S/NF)

The Iraq conflict is increasingly an ethno-sectarian struggle for political power and the right to define Iraq's future national identity intertwined with a religious and nationalist resistance to foreign occupation. This internally generated conflict is exploited by transnational terrorists who are having increasing success in recruiting and sustaining themselves within Iraq.

- Violence between Iraqis is not limited to conflicts between sects and ethnic groups, but also occurs within them. The Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish communities all have substantial divisions that have—or could—result in armed conflict. Southern Iraq, for example, although quieter than the center could easily devolve into greater levels of violence between Shia militias.

- This struggle to define "Iraqi identity" and work out its subordinate power relationships is of central importance to Iraqis and armed conflict between
them will almost certainly persist as we draw down our military presence. In other words, **some of the violence is about us, but the need to sort out what post-Saddam Iraq looks like is the real driver.**

We have seen important changes in the Sunni Arab insurgency reflecting these themes. Detainees and intelligence from other sources tell us that an increasing number of insurgents are taking up the mantle of defending Sunnis against what they perceive to be predatory Shia security forces and A Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) is not only fighting to oust the Coalition, but sees casting itself as a "defender of the Sunnis" as a way to put down deeper roots in the country.

- Fears of sectarian violence and local security concerns appear to be powerful motivators for the Sunni population not to take a strong stand against AQI acts of terrorism. Many Sunni insurgent groups disagreed with Zarqawi's methods and message, but efforts to coalesce meaningful resistance to AQI on the ground faltered in the past few months, particularly after the Anbar People's Committee—the most promising initiative—collapsed in January.

- Some of our intelligence also indicates that some local Sunni villagers are working for AQI not because they find the message appealing, but because they feel that AQI can protect them against Shia militias and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

- Likewise, many Shia view the Jaysh al-Mahdi and other Shia militias as protectors of Shia security and interests against threats from AQI and other Sunni elements. (S//NF)

**Insurgent violence has escalated in recent months to some of the highest levels ever.** In tandem with it, we see rising societal violence between Iraqis primarily in the form of more murders and kidnappings. The increases in attacks probably result from a combination of growing insurgent capacity in some areas—particularly Diyala and Anbar—sectarian fears, frustration with the slow formation of the central government, weather, anger at the lack of services, and growing violence from Shia militants against the Coalition and Sunnis.

- In Sunni perceptions, Shia-led security forces—and particularly the police—are instruments of a central government unwilling to curb them and not yet clearly willing to share meaningful political power. Increased violence also reflects the efforts of Shia militias to punish and retaliate for Sunni transgressions and expel Sunnis from Shia populated areas. It also reflects AQI's growing strength and exploitation of weakened central institutions.

- The increasing violence—particularly in Sunni Arab areas—has occurred despite increased participation by Sunni leaders in the central government.
This disconnect reflects the reality that national level Sunni parties have as yet been unable to build local bases of support that help to drain away grassroots backers of the insurgency. (S/NF)

Attacks in Baghdad against the security forces have risen sharply, a development we think is rooted in their increasing role in patrolling the city, as well as in sectarian killings.

- Similar increases in attacks were noted in Diyala and Al Anbar. We think these increases were due at least in part to growing insurgent capacity. We see some evidence that AQI strengthened in Al-Anbar in recent months—particularly Ramadi. We have also seen reporting that it played a major role in a series of attacks in Diyala at the end of April involving a total of close to 800 insurgents; we have not seen comparable attacks since mid-2004.

- Several Shia-dominated provinces have shown steady increases in violence toward the Coalition since February, although province-wide attacks remain relatively low. We see growing signs that Shia militias and their constituents—who have chafed at Coalition raids against their leaders, perceived US meddling in Iraqi politics, allegations of prisoner abuse, and the lack of improvement in basic services—have conducted attacks against Coalition forces, sometimes with explosives provided by [14]. (S/NF)

Erosion of security in Iraq has hindered the development of strong national institutions by creating alternative power centers and by making compromise by national sectarian leaders more difficult. Although the ISF have made real progress—particularly the Iraqi Army—perceptions of poor local security, lack of faith in the government, and concerns of sectarian bias in the security forces have prompted many Iraqis to bypass official security institutions—particularly in the mixed provinces—and rely instead on their own confessional groups for protection against sectarian attacks. Sunni and Shia communities increasingly are taking security into their own hands by mobilizing local neighborhood watch groups and in a growing number of cases ejecting minority residents to create sectarian sanctuaries.

- Local leaders—including an increasing number of Sunnis—in four provinces have told our military commanders and intelligence officers that if the Coalition left prematurely, they fear a large-scale civil war would occur in its wake.

- Even some insurgent leaders expressed a willingness to negotiate with US officials this spring on the condition that Coalition forces would protect Sunnis from Shia militias or Ministry of Interior forces.
Coalition forces may come to play a much different role than in 2003 and 2004 in this environment; one that looks more like peace enforcement than counterinsurgency. (S/NF)

Predominately Sunni countries are making some attempts to counterbalance. Five governments—Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—and Turkey have opened relations in the last five months with a broad range of Iraqi groups. This self-named “Committee of Six” focuses its relations on a mix of Iraqi groups, following a pattern established in the runup to Iraq’s elections in late 2005. Currently, the Committee is seeking to broker a coalition of parties within the Iraqi legislature that can stymie legislation and efforts to amend the constitution. (S/NF)

14b has increased efforts to broaden its influence in Iraq. Most of our information since January indicates that the Government has focused on engaging influential Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and strengthening ties to Sunnis. As of last month, Damascus appears to be working with Shia and Sunnis to promote an Iraqi Government that would work to prevent the disintegration of the country along sectarian lines and to hasten the departure of Coalition forces. Reports of varying reliability indicate is stopping some
insurgents from crossing its borders into Iraq but is allowing others to operate.
(S/NF)

Finally, Turkey is pressing the Coalition, Baghdad, and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to take military action against the Kurdistan People's Congress (KGK, formerly PKK) camps in northern Iraq. The Turkish military has moved aggressively to counter infiltration of KGK militants from northern Iraq, but Ankara probably will not undertake more than hot-pursuit or harassment operations into Iraq without at least tacit approval from Washington, Baghdad, and/or Iraqi Kurdish leaders in order to preserve relations with Washington and the EU.
(S/NF)
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Muqtada al Sadr and JAM: the Next Six Months

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Purpose. To assess the challenge that Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) and Muqtada al Sadr represent to Iraq and the Coalition over the next six months.

(U) Assumptions:

1. (S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Sadr exercises broad strategic control over JAM, but delegates operational and tactical control to key lieutenants.

2. (S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Sadr will continue to use JAM to enhance his profile in Iraq and influence over the Iraqi Government.

3. (S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Unless constrained, co-opted or redirected, JAM's influence will grow and will increasingly challenge Iraqi Government authority.

4. (S/REL TO USA, MCFI) JAM is a significant presence throughout large parts of the Iraqi Government and Security Forces.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Scope. This paper defines Sadr and JAM's objectives, level of control and shadow government, relationship with external actors, courses of action, vulnerabilities and opportunities to exploit those vulnerabilities, and presents worst-case scenarios and significant associated risks.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Background. Sadr is primarily an opportunist, interested in enhancing his own power. He exploits his family's religious heritage, nationalist and Islamist credentials. His commitment to Islamism is, however, genuine and he believes in greater clerical involvement in political affairs. Sadr will need to build a profile independent of his family's reputation. While he uses JAM to increase his stature, he will also need to build links to senior clerics to advance his clerical career and continue to build a reputation as a spiritual as well as political authority. Confrontations with senior clerics in Najaf have damaged his standing with senior religious leaders. Sadr has a group of close advisers but does not seem to have any senior leader acting as a patron.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) His political career has been defined by brinkmanship followed by compromise. For instance, confrontations in April and August 2004 and August 2005 brought short-term negative effects; but ultimately increased his national profile and popularity with his constituency - poor uneducated urban Shi'a.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Sadr's long term intentions, goals and objectives. Sadr's ultimate goal is a united, centralized Shi'a-dominated Islamic state - suggesting his outreach to Sunnis has been largely politically expedient. It is likely that he does not wish to play an official political role, but intends to manipulate the political system from outside, aspiring to become a source of emulation. He is still exploring options and probably lacks a clearly defined plan to achieve his long term goals, taking opportunities
as and when they arise. He intends to re-establish Najaf at the heart of the Shi'a world. This will involve competition with [148] and will limit his ability to draw support from 1.46 in the long term. He is aware of the limits of his poor, urban constituency and will attempt to expand his appeal to a broader cross-section of the Shi'a community.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Sadr's near to mid-term, intentions, goals and objectives. Sadr will aim to continue to be a key political power broker in the formation of the next government. He will attempt to control the UIA with the aim of exercising a significant influence in the government. Sadr likely sees the supporters of Dawa and Fadilah – who are broadly part of the Sadrist trend – as natural allies in his effort to reduce the influence of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Badr Organization. It is probable he will seek to expand links with Dawa and Fadilah, with the aim of bringing them back into a broadly-based Sadrist movement under his leadership. He will seek to control the service ministries in the next government, and expand his influence within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) He will continue to maintain an anti-Coalition stance as a means of defining himself as the leading nationalist figure in the Shi'a community. However, he is unlikely to call publicly for anti-Coalition violence.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Sadr will continue to work toward increasing his control over JAM, improving its religious credentials, military training, command and control and discipline. He will further seek to legitimize JAM as an official or semi-official security force protecting Shi'a communities, particularly in Sunni-majority areas.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Sadr is keeping his options open, pursuing politics backed by threats and a better controlled and more capable JAM, but ready to move to violence the moment he feels it is to his advantage. Sadr will aim to maintain the ability of elements of JAM to launch limited attacks against CF unattributable to him.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The Extent of JAM's Control and Shadow-Government institutions in Baghdad and the south. In Baghdad, JAM and OMS effectively control Sadr City with an extensive network of social services, Sharia courts, religious police and effective control over Iraqi Police Service (IPS). JAM maintains an openly armed presence, and an extensive intelligence network. Moreover, JAM takes credit for MNF-I and GOI reconstruction projects, social welfare, and delivery of essential services.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Outside Sadr City, JAM is expanding its influence into the rest of eastern Baghdad through an armed presence and intimidation. In western Baghdad, JAM has used Shi'a enclaves in Sunni-majority areas as bridgeheads to establish a presence by providing security to these communities.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) In southern Iraq, JAM does not have the same level of control as it does in Baghdad. JAM faces greater internal organizational challenges and competition from other Shi'a organizations, especially SCIRI/Badr. Although they have not been able to monopolize the provision of social welfare, they have been able to
extensively infiltrate lower echelons of the IPS. Sadr is increasing JAM's influence in Najaf, but we assess this is constrained by the Hawza and SCIRI and Badr's presence.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Sadr has used ministries controlled by his supporters, specifically Health and Transportation, to advance his agenda under the cover of government organizations. Sadr's association with these ministries has increased his public profile due to their provision of essential services and social welfare programs.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Provincial governance is associated by most Iraqis with the provision of essential services, and Sadr has used the position of his followers in provincial governments to extend his influence.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Regardless of the differing levels of control that JAM exercises nationwide, it maintains the ability to mobilize rapidly and escalate attacks against MNF across large parts of Baghdad, central and southern Iraq.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) While Sadr is willing to accept assistance from external actors such as 14b, he maintains distance and resists direction. His relationships with external actors are primarily designed to enhance his position within Iraq.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Sadr and JAM's likely COA over the next three to six months. There are five policy areas that Sadr will have to address. In likely order of priority these are:
Sadr and JAM/OMS' role in the political process, and the position of Jafa'ari. Sadr's prime consideration will be the maintenance of a central role in Iraqi politics. He will seek to ensure that Jafa'ari retains the prime ministership and that OMS candidates are appointed to key service ministries. Sadr will strongly oppose regional federalism and Kurdish control of Kirkuk.

In the event that Jafa'ari does not remain Prime Minister this will be seen by Sadr and JAM as a defeat. The Sadrist reaction will depend upon how Jafa'ari is removed. Jafa'ari's replacement by a SCIRI/Badr figure would provoke a more extreme Sadrist reaction. If, however, his replacement is more amenable to the Sadrists and other concessions are made (for example, an increase in Sadrist representation in the ministries) the reaction will be moderated. Jafa'ari's removal would further delay the formation of the government, leading to a period of uncertainty and instability. During this period, political posturing by Sadists is likely, but it is unlikely that the Sadists would permanently walk out of the Council of Representatives (COR).

Accompanying this political posturing, public demonstrations organized by Sadrist groups, particularly in Sadr City, east Baghdad and perhaps in southern Iraq, are likely. The largest demonstrations would take place in Baghdad, but would be unlikely to exceed 15,000. In the south, demonstrations would likely number in the low thousands at best. Likewise, an increase in JAM attacks on CF and ISF is likely. However, an orchestrated large-scale offensive by JAM in Baghdad and MND-SE is unlikely. There is the possibility that these events could escalate outside of the control of Sadr and JAM's senior lieutenants, and result in widespread violence between JAM members and ISF/CF.

If Jafa'ari survives as PM he will require continued support from Sadr, complicating MNF-I/GOI anti-militia programs. Whilst Jafa'ari will formally approve the anti-militia program, he will lack commitment to fully and effectively implement the program. JAM will continue to build its strength and operate across large parts of Baghdad, militia-inspired sectarian violence will likely continue, and may escalate. Jafa'ari may increasingly adopt a publicly anti-Coalition stance, though privately he will want the Coalition to remain. More likely, Sadists in the COR will take a more anti-Coalition stance, and Jafa'ari will be unable or unwilling to oppose them.

In the provincial elections, Sadists will likely retain control of Maysan, and will make significant gains in the other southern provinces. JAM will use intimidation to support Sadist political activity. Although JAM and SCIRI/Badr may cooperate in some provinces (for instance in Basrah so as to remove Governor Wa'ili) and de-conflict in others, there will likely still be considerable competition between them - likely leading to some clashes. It is unlikely, however, that Sistani, the Hawza and the senior leaders of SCIRI/Badr and JAM/OMS will allow such clashes to be sustained.

JAM's reaction to GOI/MNF policies towards militia activity. GOI/MNF driven policy against overt, armed militia will be a central concern for Sadr.
due to his reliance upon JAM. If the anti-militia policy is perceived as focused on JAM this will raise tensions, and likely lead to violence between JAM and CF. However, the March 26 ISF/MNF raid in Sha’ab indicated that although some were prepared to fight, many JAM members were unwilling to do so. Sadr probably recognizes this and is likely to attempt to use the threat of JAM violence as a form of intimidation, but will avoid widespread conflict due to the likelihood that large numbers of JAM members lack the staying power to engage the Coalition or ISF in sustained conflict.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) JAM’s initial reaction to attempts to reduce its overt armed presence on the streets will be to evade rather than confront the ISF and MNF. JAM will operate openly at times when it is least likely to lead to confrontation with ISF/MNF; JAM will operate under false flags—wearing ISF uniforms. Those ISF units that are effectively controlled by JAM (for instance in Sadr City) will cease openly displaying their allegiance to Sadr. The practices of JAM death squads, and other covert activities, are likely to continue, although possibly at a reduced level. JAM members within the ISF will provide intelligence to Sadr and JAM’s leadership. Meanwhile, Sadr and his supporters will lobby within the GOI and COR to reduce the efficacy and impact of these policies.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) A reduction in JAM’s armed presence would impair its ability to provide employment—leaving a large body of poor, unemployed Shi’a youth. Without genuine economic opportunities—undeliverable in the short term—these youths would migrate towards criminal groups, other Shi’a militias, or form radicalized militias.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) JAM and Sadr’s relationship with the clerical establishment. Sadr’s attempts to reach out to Sistani and the Hawza will continue, although the relationship will remain tense. JAM will continue to enhance its religious credential by improving the religious education of its members. This will be partly utilized to market JAM as a security force for religious sites and the broader Shi’a community. Sadr will aim to gain Sistani and the Hawza’s support for this activity in an attempt to gain legitimacy for JAM’s security role. He will also attempt to improve his own religious education to increase his status within the religious hierarchy of the Shi’a community.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Continued improvement of JAM’s command and control, discipline, training, and capabilities. Since September 2005, and increasingly since February 2006, JAM has improved its command and control, discipline and training. A central element in this program has been Sadr’s key lieutenants. He has taken a closer interest in them: disciplining some, and rotating many through a series of positions in different parts of the organization. This has partly been to prevent them building independent power bases, partly to place trusted associates in positions to maximize his influence across the organization, and partly to prevent them being targeted. This will likely continue over the coming months, regardless of ISF/MNF attempts to reduce JAM’s armed presence and capabilities. These improvements are vital to Sadr maintaining JAM as a tool to advance his religious, social and political agenda.
Sadr and JAM's policy in relation to the Sunni community. Sadr shares a number of goals in common with the Sunni leadership: a broadly Islamist approach to social and political mores, anti-federalism, anti-Coalition, shared suspicion of Iranian intentions and a commitment to Iraqi nationalism. He remains the only major figure within the UIA capable of reaching out to the Sunni political leadership. The Sunnis in the COR, particularly the Tawafuq bloc, will be likely to align with Sadr when legislation relating to Islam or its place in the Iraqi state arise in the COR.

Nonetheless Sadr's outreach to the Sunni community has decreased since 22 February. His rhetoric against takfiris/salafists and criticism of the MUC for not strongly opposing Sunni extremists has created distance between Sadr and the MUC. The involvement of JAM in attacks on Sunni mosques and sectarian killings since 22 February damaged his standing with Sunnis. JAM is unlikely to renounce its role as a protector of the Shi'a community, and this will continue to involve killings of Sunnis. Another significant attack against the Shi'a may lead to an increase in these killings, potentially creating a more indiscriminate self-sustaining cycle of retribution. If this occurs, the physical separation of Sunni and Shi'a communities will increase and Sadr will find it more problematic to maintain relations with the Sunni leadership.

Sadr and JAM's vulnerabilities; opportunities that can be utilized to reduce or negate Sadr and JAM's influence: risks associated with effects upon identified vulnerabilities. Sadr and JAM's vulnerabilities revolve around the public perception of Sadr and JAM, JAM's organizational weaknesses, and the political immaturity of Sadr's movement and political philosophy.

Vulnerability - Corruption. Reporting indicates that there is considerable disquiet amongst the Shi'a population over corruption and mismanagement of public funds. In addition, in Sadr City reporting shows that residents are angered by the misuse of locally-raised funds by Sadr-aligned politicians within the GOI. Moreover, Sadrist politicians, such as Minister of Transport Salam Awda al-Maliki, have treated their ministries as personal fiefdoms, misappropriating public funds and replacing experienced public servants with their own cronies.

- Means to exploit. Corruption by Sadrist ministers and officials could be exploited by an Iraqi IO and judicial campaign that demonstrates the corruption and points out that it is incongruous with the Sadrist message of public service and Islam.

- Risks. Given the endemic nature of corruption in Iraq, targeting the Sadists would appear to be singling them out and thus would play to a central part of the Sadrist political platform - their persecution complex.

Vulnerability - Falsely Claiming Credit for Reconstruction. Sadr and JAM's public support is partially based on their having falsely taking credit for reconstruction projects, particularly in Sadr City. It has been difficult for the Coalition or GOI to combat this due to JAM's control of Sadr City. This is unlike other parts of Iraq,
for instance in Muthanna Province, where more independent local authorities exist and are able to prevent this type of Sadrist propaganda.

- **(S-REL-TO-USA, MCFI) Means to Exploit.** To exploit this vulnerability it is necessary for JAM's stranglehold over Sadr City to be broken. This is necessary to enable the establishment of independent local government, non-partisan security forces, and effective GOI and Coalition public affairs activity.

- **(S-REL-TO-USA, MCFI) Risk.** To do so could lead to large-scale military confrontation with JAM, requiring long-term commitment of resources and likely causing heavy civilian casualties.

**Vulnerability - Reputation for Violence.** JAM's continued use of violence has damaged its reputation amongst the Shi'a public. Following the August 2005 clashes between Badr and JAM reporting indicated that locals blamed JAM for the fighting – reducing JAM's standing. JAM's use of the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf as a trial, torture and execution facility in 2004 created considerable ill-will amongst ordinary Shi'a, as did the associated damage to local revenues caused by the decline in pilgrim traffic through Najaf as a result of the conflict between the Coalition/ISF and JAM.

- **(S-REL-TO-USA, MCFI) Means to Exploit.** ISF, backed by MNF, taking direct action against JAM cells engaged in violence, accompanied by a robust IO campaign emphasizing the criminal activities of the targeted group and demonstrating that the reason for this kinetic action is to protect the population from those willing to use violence against them. The intent is to criminalize the activity of elements of JAM without explicitly targeting the organization.

- **(S-REL-TO-USA, MCFI) Risk.** JAM can mount a professional counter IO campaign (as they did after the 26 March Sha'ab raid). Effective use of such negative IO could unite the Shi'a, particularly in areas like Sadr City, and lead to widespread anti-MNF or anti-GOI violence.

**Vulnerability - Confrontations with Other Shi'a Leaders.** Sadr's public behavior has been characterized by public attacks upon other major Shi'a leaders – raising questions about his maturity, respect for behavioral norms and ability to interact with other Shi'a leaders. He is believed to be guilty of the 2003 murder of Ayatollah Khoei. He has publicly chastised SCIRI leader Abd al Aziz al Hakim for going into exile in Iran, and prior to the December 2005 election released a video in which he derided Hakim over his knowledge of Islamic law and Iraqi politics. He has publicly questioned Sistani's legitimacy as the pre-eminent religious authority in Iraq due to his Iranian nationality. Moreover, Sadr's low-level religious credentials further undermine his ongoing problematic relationship with the religious leadership and the Hawza.

- **(S-REL-TO-USA, MCFI) Means to Exploit.** A covert IO campaign against Sadr's personal weaknesses.
- SREL TO USA, MCFI Risk. This would be extremely difficult for the Coalition to undertake. The risk of focusing upon Sadr's character weaknesses is that it would feed into Sadr and JAM/OMS' persecution syndrome. Targeting Sadr's religious credentials would be prohibitively difficult for those outside the Shi'a Muslim religious hierarchy, as this would be perceived as ill-informed comment by outsiders and interference in internal Shi'a affairs.

1.4b, 1.4d

- SREL TO USA, MCFI Means to Exploit. This vulnerability could be exploited through a subtle IO campaign that demonstrates these links, and questions his Iraqi nationalism. Such a campaign would be most effective if backed by strong evidence and promoted by political rivals from within the UDA - for instance Fadlallah, who are serious competitors for the leadership of the Sadrist movement. This campaign could also be pursued at the local level by CMO officers or unit commanders who deal with Iraqis on a frequent basis. Doing so would help to inject this issue into Iraqi public discourse, at which time rumor, gossip and Iraqi conspiracy theories would help to spread this idea widely.

- SREL TO USA, MCFI Risk. If this is handled carefully this may be seen as another Coalition attempt to smear Sadr's name, and could further enhance his reputation by demonstrating how unpleasant he is to the Coalition.

SREL TO USA, MCFI Vulnerability. Organizational Weaknesses. JAM and OMS' lack of clearly articulated strategic vision and resultant loose organization - with strong and semi-autonomous leaders at the local level (particularly outside Baghdad) - generate fault-lines along which the organization might split.

- SREL TO USA, MCFI Means to Exploit. Promoting and supporting moderate leaders who are not engaged in violence. Likewise, Sadrist politicians, in the COR or in provincial or local government need to be engaged politically by the Coalition - those who are not closely linked to extremists and violent elements should be identified and supported. Leaders engaged in violence should be targeted kinetically; ideally this would be Iraqi-run and would involve judicial prosecution of these individuals. It is likely that Sadr will, as he has in the past, distance himself from such leaders. Kinetic action must be preceded by a robust IO campaign demonstrating their links to violence and criminal activity.

- SREL TO USA, MCFI Risk. Coalition or GOI support for moderate leaders could undermine their standing with their constituencies. Moreover, kinetic targeting of those engaged in violent or criminal activities may lead to widespread anti-Coalition and anti-GOI activity if the IO campaign failed to justify the actions. Indeed, targeting extremist elements without eliminating them could
increase their stature. Splitting JAM has the potential to exacerbate the problem.

In effect, there is the possibility that JAM’s more militant elements could re-
energize and, divorced from moderate elements and central leadership, splinter
into a multitude of local insurgencies, looking much like the Sunni insurgency.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Vulnerability - Military Limitations. Large numbers of JAM
fighters are poorly disciplined, and likely will not remain committed to the fight in the
event of serious engagements with CF or the more proficient elements of the ISF.
However, JAM is attempting to transform itself into a more professional fighting force.

- (S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Means to Exploit. Enforcing disarmament of publicly
armed militia patrols and checkpoints at this stage will cause less committed
members to disengage and this will disrupt the JAM reorganization program.

- (S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Risk. Unless the ISF can replace the JAM security
presence in Shi’i communities, particularly those in the midst of Sunni-majority
areas, this will result in the Coalition and GOI being seen as responsible for
removing protection for the Shi’a – further enhancing JAM’s reputation and
discrediting the militia disarmament program.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Significant risks that must be mitigated; the worst case
scenarios. The two worst case scenarios are dependent upon how the Coalition and Iraqi
Government deals with the JAM threat.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Worst case scenario: no action is taken against JAM’s
activities. JAM sectarian killings continue unabated, JAM extends and consolidates its
control in Baghdad, and potentially Najaf and other parts of the south. Sunni and Shi’a
relations continue to deteriorate. Numbers of internally displaced people increase; JAM’s
sectarian killings become increasingly indiscriminate and a cycle of retribution killings
becomes self-sustaining. Sunni terrorists accelerate the violence by symbolic or mass
casualty attacks. The end result of this process would be intense sectarian strife across
several provinces, likely resulting in civil war.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Worst case scenario: Coalition and GOI action against JAM
goes awry. Attempts to disarm militias are seen as unfairly targeting JAM, the IO
campaign fails to convince the Iraqi public the campaign is justified. Sadr and his senior
leadership do not feel that there are face-saving options available. It is likely that the
core elements of JAM would respond by widespread attacks on CF and ISF. This would
probably rapidly escalate into serious and sustained conflict – primarily against CF –
leading to heavy casualties. At the conclusion of this conflict JAM would cease to exist
in its current military form. However, sustained CF military action (likely involving
action against ISF units loyal to JAM) in Shi’a areas would lead to extensive damage,
civilian casualties and the dispersion of the residual JAM fighters throughout the
community. This would likely lead to a widespread Shi’a uprising, which would have
many of the characteristics of the current Sunni insurgency.
The Environment Facing The New Iraqi Government

17 April 2006

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Purpose: To characterize the security, political, and economic environment in Iraq and highlight key challenges that will face the newly seated government.

(U) Assumptions:

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) Shi’a will dominate the new Iraqi Government, but it will also include representatives from Kurd, Sunni and other minority blocs.

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) The security and economic situation will remain largely unchanged.

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) Endemic corruption will continue to impede effective governance.

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) AQI mass casualty attacks will continue but are unlikely to fuel widespread, self-sustaining ethno-sectarian violence.

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) There will be increasing public pressure on the Government of Iraq (GOI) to announce a Coalition withdrawal timetable.

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) Militias will challenge the authority and effectiveness of the ISF, but the ISF will resist fracturing along sectarian lines.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Scope: This analysis identifies opportunities and risks that will face the GOI in its first six months. While some long term trends are highlighted, the goal of the paper is to underscore issues of immediate importance to the GOI.

(U) Key Judgments:

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) The nature of the conflict is shifting from one based on the Sunni insurgency to a struggle between ethno-sectarian groups for power, territory and control of natural resources.

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) The new government’s initial inability to meet public expectations for security, essential services and economic development will diminish confidence and support in the central government.

- (S//REL USA, MCFI) The economy and security are mutually dependent; the new GOI should seek to harness currently destabilizing forces by integrating militias into the ISF.
and reintroducing national service, to develop infrastructure and the economy, and improve the security environment.

• (S//REL USA, MCFI) The security situation could also be enhanced through the use of an ‘oil spot’ strategy that saturates troubled areas with large numbers of ISF over extended periods.

• (S//REL USA, MCFI) Further opportunities exist to enhance national reconciliation through the process of constitutional review, allowing the chance to codify resource sharing and officially end de-Ba’athification.

(U) FACTORS IMPACTING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Fundamental Nature of the Struggle. The struggle in Iraq is shifting from primarily a Sunni insurgency that sought to derail the political process to a competition between Iraq’s social and political leaders and their ethno-sectarian constituencies for economic power and political influence. The struggle for power and resources will shape the national and provincial priorities over the first six months of the new administration.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Although counter-insurgency will remain a very important element of the campaign, the nature of the operation is on the verge of changing from being a counter-insurgency operation to a stabilization operation. This stabilization operation will require large numbers of professionalized ISF – backed by Coalition forces – to establish a secure environment across Iraq and deny insurgents, criminals and militias the freedom of action they have enjoyed in many parts of the country to date.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) The struggle will continue to be characterized by high levels of ethno-sectarian competition as groups attempt to increase their power in a climate where antagonists are increasingly holding a zero-sum world view. Shi’a will use their militia and control of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to maintain their influence, and the presence of Shi’a militiamen in the ranks of the ISF, especially Iraqi police units, is unlikely to change. Badr Organization and Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) representation in police forces will continue to fuel ethno-sectarian competition and undercut Sunni confidence in the police. The appointment of a Shi’a Minister of Interior with strong sectarian ties will exacerbate Sunni perceptions of persecution – making it preferable that a candidate is chosen who is broadly acceptable to the Sunni parties.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Heightened intra-Shi’a tensions could emerge as another manifestation in the shift in the nature of the struggle. Far from a monolithic bloc, competition between the various Shi’a organizations such as Dawa, Office of the Martyr Sadr, JAM, Fadilah, and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)/Badr could intensify. As provincial elections approach competition will increase and could result in clashes, especially between Badr and JAM. However, widespread intra-Shi’a violence is unlikely, as the Shi’a leadership would act quickly to de-escalate such conflict. Iran will also bring its influence to bear to keep fissures in the Shi’a community from deepening.
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(S//REL USA, MCFI) In a Shi'a dominated environment, some Sunnis will seek Coalition support and protection – further highlighting the shift in the nature of the struggle. However, a perceived failure of the Coalition to meet Sunni security expectations – chiefly protection from arbitrary arrests, detentions, and executions, and from terrorist activities – would encourage Sunnis to establish militias – a move that would further destabilize the security situation and undermine the central government.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) The new government will implement policies to reduce militia intimidation to allay concerns over the role of militias in Iraq's security landscape. However, the effectiveness of the programs will be diluted if Iraqi leaders owe their positions to the support of militia organizations. Establishing weapons-free zones and dismantling illegal checkpoints would also be problematic as it would be reliant upon police that are widely infiltrated by, supportive of, or intimidated by militias. This will make effective action against militias difficult for the new GOI to accomplish without extensive Coalition support.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Nature of the Violence. While AQI attacks have exacerbated sectarian violence, internecine tensions have been building since the fall of Saddam as sectarian groups jockey for power and influence. Shi'a militias bear prime responsibility for elevated levels of murders of Sunnis, while Sunni terrorists have targeted the Shi'a community with mass-casualty attacks. However, Sunni rejectionist groups mainly continue to target Coalition and ISF elements.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) We assess outbreaks of intense sectarian violence have been largely orchestrated by militia and insurgent leaders; they have not yet demonstrated a spontaneous or self-sustaining quality. We should expect to see continued use of low-level intimidation and violence to displace populations and expand sectarian power bases and territorial control over the next six months. Episodes of sectarian-motivated attacks will continue to occur, and have the potential to accelerate – if the ethno-sectarian leadership so desires. We believe it is unlikely the mainstream Sunni or Shi'a leaders will seek to escalate sectarian violence, but much will depend on their satisfaction with power-sharing arrangements in the new government.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Attack levels against Coalition forces probably will decrease slightly, as the nature of the struggle shifts and battlespace transitions to the ISF. Heightened levels of attack against ISF will result from its increased presence in Iraqi communities. Civilians will also remain victims of sectarianism and attacks are likely to increase if sectarian tensions elevate. Shi'a militias will continue to conduct extra-judicial killings of Sunnis and attempt to expand their territorial control over areas with Shi'a populations. This slight shift in insurgent targeting is partly the result of ethno-sectarian struggles, effective Coalition force protection and the transitioning of the fight to the ISF.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) AQI will continue efforts to spark self-sustaining sectarian violence through high profile attacks, mass casualty attacks and assassinations. AQI will attempt to expand its level of territorial control in rural areas of central and western Iraq, and attempt to maintain its current high level of control in Ramadi.
(S//REL USA, MCFI) Developing the ISF. Progress in developing effective army and police forces will likely remain uneven following the appointment of new ministers. The Iraqi Army’s (IA) tactical capabilities will continue to grow, owing to the embedded trainers present in the units, and Army battalions will continue to assume a greater share of battlespace. Army units, however, will remain dependent on the Coalition for most logistics, intelligence, and joint fire support. While many IA brigades are overwhelmingly comprised of a single ethno-sectarian group, the Army's policy of deploying recruits anywhere in the country, and increasing professional standards, reduce the risks of ethno-sectarian entrenchment. However, there are certain units, particularly those drawn from former Kurdish Peshmerga, whose loyalties lie primarily with their community, rather than to the Iraqi nation. This is likely to become problematic only in the event of widespread ethno-sectarian violence.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) lags behind the IA in professionalism, ethno-sectarian diversification and operational readiness. Improved vetting and training—in addition to the increasing presence of international police trainers—will gradually raise police performance through 2006. Police, unlike their military counterparts, are typically recruited and stationed locally, leaving them more vulnerable to insurgent infiltration. The lack of an effective functioning judiciary, the proliferation of unauthorized detention facilities, and the highly publicized existence of MOI death squads will further reduce public confidence that the new IPS is demonstrably different than the corrupt police of the previous regime.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Politics. Iraq’s glacial progress in government formation has had an erosive effect on public confidence in the political process. Delays in choosing a Prime Minister have effectively squandered any grace period the government may have received after formation. The Iraqi population is anxious for rapid improvements in security and basic services; however, in its first six months the government will not meet public expectations. While these unmet expectations will lead to popular frustration with the GOI, the Coalition will still be blamed for many of the failures of the new government. Furthermore, the continued presence of Coalition forces will act as an ongoing source of friction and fuel perceptions of occupation.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Overly centralized and inefficient government institutions will retard the government’s progress in its first six months. Ministerial micromanagement, inefficiency, and corruption will continue to hamper policy implementation. The absence of a functioning civil service to provide middle and senior management, coupled with historic cultural resistance to delegation of authority, will undermine the GOI’s ability to deliver essential services and support economic development.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Provincial elections are unlikely to occur in the first six months of the new government due to a lack of political will, the potential disestablishment of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) in May 2006, and contentious constitutional negotiations. However, pressure to hold provincial elections will increase towards the end of the government’s first six months in office.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) The mandated constitutional review will likely be a prominent item on the Council of Representatives’ (COR) policy agenda and Sunnis will push for a review once the government is formed. Sunnis want fair resource sharing, and will seek to head off Kurd and
Shi’a-inspired federalism, which would potentially leave them with no stake in the country’s oil reserves. Shi’a and Kurd parties will be in no hurry to amend the current constitution and will attempt to delay the process. The Kurds will not give up de facto control of territory gained since April 2003, especially Kirkuk, and will not allow a disarming of the Peshmerga, but will begrudgingly share oil revenues from the north.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) As negotiations over the constitutional review begin the new GOI will seek to demonstrate greater sovereignty. This will manifest itself in calls for a Coalition drawdown timetable, a gradual reduction in the Coalition footprint and the hand back of key government buildings and functions. The GOI will increase calls for more cooperation between Coalition forces and ISF, particularly the use of embedded trainers, but operational control of the IA is an important symbol of Iraqi sovereignty that they will likely demand. The approaching review of UNSCR 1637 on 15 June 06 and the expiration of the MNF-I mandate on 31 December 06 will force consideration of a status of forces agreement.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Once the GOI is formed, the Prime Minister and ministers will likely govern largely by decree vice engaging the legislative process, not least because security concerns will make regular sessions of the COR difficult. Issues receiving ministerial attention will reflect constituent pressures to address parochial concerns.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Economic factors. Overall, the national economy will remain dependent upon oil as the single source of revenue. The ability of the GOI to use oil revenues to create economic development and meet the social welfare expectations of the populace will remain very limited due to antiquated oil infrastructure and frequent insurgent interdiction. Oil revenues will likely continue to be funneled largely into paying government salaries, with little remaining for economic reconstruction projects.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Increased demand for power over the summer months will tax an already overwhelmed power infrastructure leading to widespread public dissatisfaction, particularly at a time when the population will be expecting to see results from the newly-seatd government.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) In the center and west of the country poor economic development, characterized by high levels of unemployment, provides a pool of human resources upon which insurgents can draw. This will continue to be the case until economic development both supplants insurgent funding and creates an environment where economic and social incentives outweigh the appeal of joining the insurgency. Lack of security will continue to inhibit international investment, further reducing prospects for economic improvement. The nexus between criminality and insurgent activity will continue to expand as organized crime flourishes in this environment of instability and economic stagnation. Likewise, cooperation between insurgent and terrorist groups will increase in this environment.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) The north and south of Iraq will remain relatively secure, and economic development will proceed, particularly in the northern Kurdish regions. Business and investment will continue to migrate north and south. This will also be followed by population movements—not always motivated so much by ‘ethnic cleansing’ as by the economic opportunities in the southern and northern provinces that are not available in the center and west. The disparity
between the troubled central and western provinces and the north and south will increase calls for federalism. Likewise, economic development will create increased demand for power and reduce the inclination to share national resources such as electricity and oil.

(U) OPPORTUNITIES FOLLOWING FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

(S//REL USA, MCFI) The government turnover presents the new four year administration an opportunity to focus on longer-term policy development and implementation. Sectarian squabbling has wasted the momentum the elections and referendum generated. Selling the benefits of democracy and creating realistic expectations should be an important IO priority for the new government. The GOI will be expected, by the populace, MNF-I, and the international community to quickly embark on a number of programs and policy initiatives that will provide important opportunities.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Reducing militia influence. Checking the ascendance of Iraq's multiple militias, beginning with PM Jafari's five-point plan, will provide an opportunity for the GOI, with MNF-I assistance, to lessen a substantial challenge to the successful transition to a democratic Iraq. Thus a combination of targeted kinetic action against extremist militia elements engaged in violent criminal behavior with political engagement of more moderate elements is most likely to yield dividends. Kinetic action would require justification via an IO campaign that stresses the criminal activities of those being targeted rather than their militia affiliation.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) In addition to actively reducing armed militia presence in Baghdad it will be necessary to address the root causes of militia activity. This must involve employing the large pool of youth who typically serve in militias to prevent recidivism and also addressing the security vacuum in many communities that has afforded militias fertile ground to sprout and bloom. The various elements of the security 'industry' will necessarily remain a major provider of employment in Iraq for years to come.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Integrating militia members into the ISF is a means to address these twin problems in the short term. Removing the arbitrary ceiling imposed on ISF numbers would
allow greater integration of militia elements. Thus, militia members who are currently providing security to Shi'a communities would be integrated into the police service. Although an increase in militia numbers in the police would have some negative effects—such as police acting to pursue militia interests—over time these negative effects would decline as loyalty is transferred from militias to state institutions. This approximately mirrors the process that is underway with Badr Organization members in the police.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Furthermore, a reintroduction of national service would facilitate the integration of militias and also engage the large pool of long-term unemployed from which militias draw recruits. This national service would not necessarily be purely military; large scale national infrastructure projects are essential for economic development to proceed. In particular, manpower-intensive tasks, such as building an underground oil pipeline network, would be a means to employ large numbers of unemployed youth. A rigorous IO campaign that creates prestige and engenders pride in those engaged in this program would be required to promote the policy. A potential risk to this policy would be it might fuel regional suspicions of a revanchist, militaristic Iraq.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Increasing Iraqi participation in counterinsurgency operations. While insurgents will probably remain capable of low-level attacks after the permanent government takes office, they will continue to lack the capability to launch large-scale operations on multiple Coalition or ISF targets. However, insurgents will be able to exert influence—through their presence or intimidation—in cities and towns that lack a dominant Coalition or ISF presence. Identifying these insurgent-controlled towns or locations and assisting Iraqis in saturating these areas with overwhelming numbers of ISF to establish government control provides Baghdad an opportunity to showcase ISF capabilities and restore public confidence. This strategy probably would focus initially on western Iraqi trouble areas and could expand along the lines of the “oil-spot” theory to encompass neighboring areas and over time push insurgents further away from traditional sanctuaries.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) The risks surrounding an Iraqi “oil-spot” strategy include generating sufficient numbers of Coalition forces and ISF to initiate the operation and then sustaining a large enough presence to prevent insurgents from returning to the area. However, while deploying a force this size may tax the ISF initially the burden would ease in the mid to long-term as locals—without the threat of insurgent retaliation—sought to join police forces.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Constitutional review. The Sunni parties will likely call for a constitutional review early in the new government’s term, presenting the opportunity to address a number of issues either as part of the review, or as part of the process of bringing the parties to the table.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) A Formal End to De-Ba’athification. A Sunni sense of detachment from the new Iraqi society remains, not least because they feel vilified by de-Ba’athification. While Sunni outreach efforts have met with some success, many qualified Sunnis are still excluded from participating in Iraqi institutions and civil service due to de-Ba’athification restrictions. An official end to de-Ba’athification and a formal amnesty for those not under investigation for human rights abuses will meet a long-standing demand of Sunni leaders and assist in drawing
more Sunni into civil society. Risks associated with de-Ba’athification include Shi’a accusations against the Coalition of bowing to Ba’athist pressure and the possibility of including human rights abusers in Iraqi institutions – rewarding, rather than punishing them. Rigorous vetting and a carefully managed IO campaign detailing the reasons for ending de-Ba’athification and de-stigmatizing past party membership will help mitigate some of these risks.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Codifying the national ownership and distribution of oil. The ownership and distribution of oil concessions and revenue lie at the heart of Sunni concerns about federalism and the new Constitution. Specific codification of national ownership during the upcoming Constitutional Review, coupled with an independent statutory body to oversee oil revenue distribution, will ease Sunni concerns that they will be deprived of a reliable revenue source. Easing Sunni concerns also will likely have a positive effect on the security environment, paving the way for oil infrastructure renovation and associated increases in revenue. Shi’a and Kurd parties probably will resist Sunni and Coalition prodding to review oil ownership and distribution; but persuading these parties that such a review would indirectly lessen the Sunni insurgency over time and allow infrastructure rebuilding to commence may spur them to undertake the review.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Truth and reconciliation. A constitutional review over the next six months could present an opportunity to begin progress towards a South African-style truth and reconciliation commission. Such a commission would allow ex-Ba’athists and Sunni rejectionists to rejoin civil society while also providing a venue for Shi’a militia elements that have been involved in murders and executions to rehabilitate. It is likely that over the next six months only initial discussions on a future commission would be possible as much of the violence will still be ongoing.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Preparations for Provincial elections. Preparations for early provincial elections will assist in keeping Sunni leaders engaged in the political process in the time between the seating of the government and the actual poll. Setting the conditions for provincial elections will require independent electoral oversight along with a reduction in insurgent and militia intimidation. Only in an environment free from intimidation will Iraqis feel able to vote for secular candidates based on their platform rather than along sectarian lines.

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Regardless of when they are run, provincial elections will result in increased calls for federalism in the north and south. Political victors in the north and south will likely feel justified calling for federalism if they have campaigned on that platform. In northern Kurdish areas parties advocating independence or expanded autonomy are likely to increase their representation, as is the Kurdish Islamic Union (running on an anti-corruption platform). Sunni may also increasingly see themselves as isolated from the rest of Iraq as the Baghdad Provincial Council remains controlled by Shi’a – particularly if there is continued movement of Sunni families out of west Baghdad into Anbar as a result of militia intimidation.

(U) RISKS FOLLOWING FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

(S//REL USA, MCFI) Ministries acting as fiefdoms. Even after the new ministers have been decided, the ministries will still operate as independent entities beholden to ethno-sectarian and
personal agendas. For example, MoD and MoI will continue to compete for power and influence as they carve out areas of responsibility and further develop distinct security forces. This will reduce effective governance, and increase political and ethno-sectarian tensions within the government.

(S/REL USA, MCFL) **Intensification of militia activity.** Militias have already shown a willingness to usurp police authority. Failure to curb militia expansion over the coming months will invite increasing lawlessness and instability. An outside risk is that militia perceive that the Coalition is afraid to confront them, and that the political process is running contrary to their interests; this could result in an increase in sectarian violence which, coupled with terrorist attacks on the Shi’a community, could lead to a self-sustaining pattern of inter-communal retribution and ultimately to widespread inter-communal strife.

(S/REL USA, MCFL) **Sistani dies.** The Shi’a reaction to Sistani’s death would depend on the manner of his death. A natural death would cause widespread public mourning accompanied by outbursts of violence. An assassination would spark an immediate and violent Shi’a response. In either case, his death would cause at least temporary paralysis in the GOI as leaders struggled to deal with nationwide chaos without the benefit of Sistani’s customary guidance and moderating influence. This would likely require Coalition intervention to restore civil order.
# Battle Casualty Analysis

1 Jan – 23 Apr 06

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Historical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>20-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.5-4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
<td>70-77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuated (% of WIA)</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Duty (% of WIA)</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Slight increase in fatalities and wounded evacuated out of Theater
- Significant decrease in Died of Wounds
- Benefits of protective equipment clearly demonstrated

Sources: Casualty Reports, 30th Med Bde Patient Status Reports
OTSG Casualty Statistics from WW II, Korea, Vietnam
Coalition Casualties By Region
1 Jan – 23 Apr 06

MNF-W

WIA – 618
KIA – 61

MND-B

WIA – 412
KIA – 59

MND-N

WIA – 264
KIA – 38

MND-CS & SE

WIA – 27
KIA – 5

Point: Casualty rates highest in MNF-W

WIA KIA

Source: Casualty Reports
# Battle Casualty Analysis

1 Jan – 23 Apr 06

## Weapon Lethality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Historical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED/Landmines</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Fire</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Return To Duty Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>79.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED/Landmines</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Fire</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Point:** Increased effectiveness of complex attacks in 2006

**Sources:** Casualty Reports, 30th Med Bde Patient Status Reports
OTSG Casualty Statistics from WW II, Korea, Vietnam
MNF-I UAH Cumulative Battle Losses
As of: 15 Apr 2006

Point: B/L per month shows a decrease over time

Source: MNF-I DCS R&S, MLCS
# MNF-I Composite Campaign Assessment

## Campaign Assessment

Political developments continue to drive levels of violence. **C1.** Delays in formation of the government over concerns regarding the sharing of power and resources created an opening for destabilizing influences. These groups exploited the situation by inflaming existing ethno-sectarian tensions through the use of high profile attacks and targeted criminal activity designed to erode confidence in the government & ISF. **Q2**

Claims that Iraq is in the middle of a civil war are not substantiated. Confidence in the ISF remains fairly high, all parties intend to vote in the provincial elections and political discourse continues. **Q3&4**

ISF proved effective at containing the violence. Excellent progress in development of IA units and transitioning security responsibility to the ISF. Over 46% of IA Battalions have transitioned to Iraqi Army Lead. **Q5&6** Preliminary Provincial Iraqi Control transition assessments indicate that 2 of 18 provinces are ready to transition security responsibility. **Q7**

Iraqis are generally dissatisfied with delivery of essential services. **Q8** Availability of electricity and refined fuels through the national infrastructure is inadequate, particularly in Baghdad. **Q9** The summer months will bring an increase in demand.

**Bottom Line:** Instability increased as Iraq worked through the democratic process of selecting government leaders. Despite an increase in long standing ethno-sectarian tensions, Iraq is not engaged in a civil war. ISF proved effective at containing the violence and the transition of security responsibility to the ISF continues.
Campaign Assessment Recommendations

Recommendations

**Issue:** Militias are gaining increased influence and deterring from the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government / ISF.

**Recommendation:** Enforce the ban on weapons and take measures to minimize/marginalize the role of militias in providing security as part of a long-term reconciliation effort.

**Issue:** Extra-judicial killings continue to increase.

**Recommendation:** Improve investigative capability to understand the nature of the extra-judicial killings in and around Baghdad to determine who the perpetrators are and take appropriate action to eliminate the threat.

**Issue:** Satisfaction with essential services is low and the ability to deliver electricity is constrained. Hours of power around Baghdad are below goals.

**Recommendation:** Reduce maintenance and fuel supply issues associated with the delivery of electricity. Complete scheduled maintenance now to reduce unscheduled maintenance and ensure maximum power generation during summer months. Stockpile fuel and repair parts in and around Baghdad. Increase the capability of the rapid repair teams.

**Issue:** Revenues from exports of oil are unable to meet budget requirements.

**Recommendation:** Fund necessary improvements to delivery systems such that they can export the increased flow of oil once wells come on line.
## Campaign Assessment Recommendations

### Recommendations

**Issue:** Iraqi prison and detention facilities lack capacity, and only a few meet international human rights standards; ISF personnel committing gross human rights violations are not effectively or consistently prosecuted.

**Recommendation:** Work with the Iraqis to increase capacity of prisons/detention facilities and assist them in the development of a strong and independent High Commission for Human Rights with substantial authority to inspect all prison and detention facilities, monitor human rights compliance and prosecute violations.

**Issue:** There is an insufficient number of judges and investigators. Threats to their security impair HJC’s ability to increase judicial output.

**Recommendation:** Work with Iraqis to increase the number of judges and increase security for judges, their families, and other court personnel.

**Issue:** Human rights prosecutions are not occurring.

**Recommendation:** Make Inspector Generals independent from ministries (funding and chain of responsibility). Ensure adequate protection for officials such that they are able to independently conduct investigations.

**Issue:** Subsidy reductions for fuel did not take place in March. Failure to eliminate subsidies compounds fuel shortage issues and provides incentives for smuggling and corruption which are a source of financing for the threat.

**Recommendation:** Implement subsidy reduction measures IAW the timelines established. Assist in the development of a public awareness campaign to help Iraqis understand why subsidy reduction must take place as a measure to prevent civil unrest.
# Campaign Assessment Recommendations

## Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Corruption supports the insurgency, undermines citizen confidence in the Iraqi Government and discourages commercial investment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommendation: Work with the Iraqis to develop the capacity of the Board of Supreme Audit, the Inspectors General, the Commission on Public Integrity, and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>As the Iraqi Government is established, much legislation needs to be introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommendation: Establish a strategy to coordinate legislative drafting assistance to Iraqi Government agencies, and review all proposed legislation submitted to the Council of Representatives that are of importance to the Coalition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pages 47 through 52 redacted for the following reasons:

DIA Document
Thoughts on the Way Ahead: An Independent “Red Team” of Operation Iraqi Freedom

The Anti-Iraq Forces (AIF) continue to grow in strength, capability and the range of threats they pose to Iraq and the Coalition

Signs that the AIF are growing in strength:

Despite the addition to CF of over 200,000 fielded ISF operating against the AIF:
- Average weekly attacks against CF, ISF and Civilians have consistently increased over the last two years.
- Aggregate average daily casualties (CF, ISF and civilian combined) have consistently grown over the past two years.
- In a “battle for hearts and minds” average civilian casualties have more than doubled in the past two years.
- Over the past year AIF have consistently averaged five “deadly days” per month that caused more than 100 casualties in a single effort, with 6 such days in February, 7 in March and 8 in April.

Shift in Sunni insurgent strategy from an “Urban Terrorist” strategy to a “Protracted War” strategy:
- Emergence of Muslim Ulema Council (MUC) as a political wing and its engagement by political representatives of the GOI is a historical indicator of the growing strength of an insurgency both in legitimacy and in popular support.
- Increase during the last six months of organized, complex large-scale (greater than platoon-size) attacks against CF and ISF by Sunni insurgents (Ramadi, Baquba, Baghdad) signaling a phase transition from an “Insipient Strategy” to one of “Guerilla Warfare”

Successful implementation by AQI of a strategy of destabilizing Iraq through inciting ethno-sectarian violence (articulated 14 Sep 05 by AMZ).
- Seizing the initiative through Golden Mosque bombing and Al Baratha Mosque suicide bombings to change the characterization of the problem from an insurgency to a civil war.
- Shifting the focus of attention and action from outlying cities (Ramadi, Fallujah, Tal Afar, Baquba, and Samarrah) where the fight was AQI vs CF to Baghdad where the fight is now Sunni vs Shia and then exploiting the resulting impact on the political process both within Iraq and in the US.

Growth in strength and activity of Extra-Governmental Armed Groups (EGAG), aka militias.
- Kurdish Peshmerga have remained active, in strength and under control of Kurdish leadership, even as ISF forces were generated and stationed in the Kurdish Region.
- Badr Organization remains an armed force providing support to select politicians, most notably SCIRI.
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The Mahdi Militia (JAM) loosely controlled by Muqtada al Sadr, has grown in strength in Baghdad, Najaf, Basra and other areas of southern Iraq exerting physical control over portions of Iraq, most notably Sadr City in Baghdad.

Consolidation and cooperation among formerly disparate AIF factions into more cohesive and capable groupings.

- Recent reporting of Sunni Rejectionists joining AQI in efforts to attack both the CF and ISF. Conclusion is that Sunni military expertise added to AQI, presents a far more potent adversary than when the two groupings operate independently.
- Recent reporting of increased cooperation between Badr Organization and JAM at the tactical level; primarily directed against Sunni and therefore increasing sectarian violence.

Remarkable resilience on the part of AIF and in particular AQI.

- Despite significant attrition due to focused efforts such as OPERATION SAYYID and persistent CF conventional operations, AIF (and in particular AQI) have continued and in fact increased operational tempo, as discussed in first paragraph above.
- Ability of AQI to attract skilled, experienced Sunni Rejectionists (1 May 06 C-2 Strategic assessment) provides a personnel base, decreasing reliance on Foreign Fighters.
- AIF have consistently demonstrated the ability to generate required resources (people, money, weapons, materiel) where and when required across the battlespace; despite deliberate CF efforts to interdict LOCs and disrupt flow across borders.
- Demonstrated ability over the last two and a half years to adapt and shift TTP faster than CF, thus retaining the initiative in terms of how the tactical fight is being fought.

Despite the growth of capable ISF and the consistent improvement in the excellence of Coalition tactical military operations...

AIF retain the initiative and the outcome of the campaign remains in balance.

Why is that the case?

In both the Coalition’s military and civilian sectors our daily actions demonstrate a lack of understanding and/or commitment to the fundamentals of COIN:

- Balanced Development and Mobilization: Failure to understand and focus efforts on the primary contest that exists in any COIN campaign; the contest between insurgents and the legitimate government for the support of the people.
- Neutralization and Security: CF confusion of their proven excellence in military training and efficiency with effectiveness in COIN operations; coupled with a failure to acknowledge that when committed ISF have proven as or more effective than CF at COIN.

Transition of the COIN campaign to ISF is seen as an end in itself, as opposed to a means to complete the defeat of the AIF and insurgency.
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq directs the defeat of terrorists and insurgents in Iraq using a Clear - Hold - Build methodology.

The focus on transition of the COIN fight to the ISF, without a corresponding direction of intent for CF and ISF to work together to defeat the terrorists and insurgents. PIC and Iraqi Self-Reliance are seen as ends to themselves, rather than the means to defeat the terrorists and insurgents and create a stable, enduring Iraq.

The lack of USG effort to provide essential services or invigorate the Iraqi economy ensures that the Iraqi people continue to turn away from the Coalition and the Government of Iraq and toward the insurgents or other extra-governmental agents (such as Muqtada al Sadr). Three years into the campaign:

- Oil revenues are decreasing, not increasing, with a severe impact on all aspects of the Iraqi economy. Southern oil pipelines are not affected by insurgent interdiction, but the USG has not created an effective Iraqi management structure, nor made the required repairs to oil infrastructure to maximize output.
- Baghdad, the acknowledged point of main effort for both the Coalition and the insurgents, continues to have less power available daily than anywhere else in the country. Citizens resort to generators for power, increasing demand for refined POL products that Iraq must import at great expense, further straining the Iraqi budget. This factor also contributes to significant black market in refined POL products, increasing criminal activity and corruption across the country.
- Daily nation-wide power output remains below pre-war levels. This provides numerous IO opportunities for MAS to speak out against the GOI and Coalition, gaining popular support and weakening the legitimacy of the GOI.

AIF strategic effects effectively gain the support of the Iraqi populous either through persuasion or coercion, while Coalition strategic effects focus on the American media and politicians to the detriment of campaign objectives.

- Coalition military and civilians at all echelons consistently fail to understand that the public information war must be won in Iraq, not in the US:
  - Winning hearts and minds of Iraqis will reduce friendly casualties and thus reduce pressure from media and politicians in the US on the campaign.
  - The overwhelming majority of Coalition Public Affairs effort is aimed at improving our capability to persuade American media and politicians of progress, rather than concentrating on developing a robust Iraqi civilian and military capability to address the Iraqi people.
- AIF consistently cycle public information faster than the Coalition, getting their version of the story out quicker after events and seizing the media initiative.
- Coalition kinetic operations, in particular US unilateral, indirect fire and CAS ground attack, are consistently exploited by AIF in terms of civilian casualties and collateral damage.

The initiative belongs to the Anti-Iraq Forces:

- Having divided Iraq into CF and ISF battalion sectors and allocated every CF and IA battalion to a sector, there is no ability on the friendly side to conduct a war of movement, mass at decisive points, or affect surprise.
- While CF have limited their flexibility; AIF have consistently demonstrated the ability to rapidly shift their main effort between Al Anbar, Ninewah, Salah A Din, Diyala and Baghdad Provinces.
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- In those cases when the GOI through its control of MOI National Police has attempted to conduct operational maneuver, mass in decisive locations, or seize the initiative, they have been frustrated by CF commanders. Rather than reinforcing Iraqi initiative, it has consistently been stifled, usually citing the demonstrably incorrect logic that “Shia can’t operate in Sunni-areas.”
- Recent actions to further tie National Police to specific battlespace reduces further the few uncommitted forces available to the Coalition and GOI to retain operational agility.
- In Al Anbar the AIF virtually control all territory west of Fallujah except those locations physically occupied by CF and ISF. AIF move at will, attack at will and dominate the population of Al Anbar. Indications over the last four months that the population of Al Anbar may be swing of AQI operations in their towns has not been exploited by CF.
- In Nineveh and At Tamim Kurdish elements continue to push control of terrain south and west to envelop and control the key cities of Kirkuk and Mosul taking advantage of Coalition focus on Sunni vs Shia ethno-sectarian conflicts. While this is known and understood, little has been done about it. We have not confronted the Kurds politically or militarily and demanded that Peshmerga pull back behind the Green Line.
- Our recent actions suggest that we have decided that the war will be fought and won here in Baghdad. At the same time there is a growing “bunker mentality.” We seem to be drawing in and holding on to what we have, allowing the enemy freedom of action in Al Anbar, Nineveh, Salah a Din, and Diyala.

Operational overmatch of AIF over CF in terms of method/approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>AIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attrition Warfare</td>
<td>Information Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical battlespace</td>
<td>Psychological Battlespace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass thru terrain</td>
<td>Dominate terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning horizon in days</td>
<td>Planning horizon in months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate operations</td>
<td>Targets of Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumbersome orders process</td>
<td>Operate off intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal is transition</td>
<td>Goal is victory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The challenge is:
How do we mentally, morally, and physically regain the initiative?

Cease all Coalition-only operations immediately, with the sole exception of TP
- That’s ALL operations, exceptions granted by CG, MNF-I and authority not delegated
- Concurrently, all combined operations will be conducted with ISF in the lead, CF forces providing only MTT/SPTT and CS/CSS support. No exceptions.
- All QRFs will be combined, so no CF-only response to any crisis. No exceptions.
- Intent is to immediately and significantly reduce the visibility of Coalition Forces with the intent of visibly demonstrating to the GOI, the ISF and the people of Iraq that the ISF is responsible for and capable of providing security to the people of Iraq.
  - Iraqis and CF must both understand that Iraqis are the key to victory not CF
  - ISF must win “hearts and minds,” not CF. That can not be accomplished with significant CF presence, which always overshadows the ISF.

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- Get CF out of the news and Iraqis in the news
  - Lessons the opportunity for terrorists and insurgents to use CF operations, losses and collateral damage as propaganda in support of their agendas.
  - Provides significant opportunities for GOI, provincial, tribal and ISF leaders to publicly make the case that Iraq is responsible for its own security as a sovereign nation.
- Forces CF Commanders to concentrate on improving ISF capabilities, since CF will no longer have the option of doing it themselves.

Concurrent with the seating of the new GOI announce that the Coalition will immediately begin a significant reduction in force down to 10 brigades by end of 2006
- Joint Iraqi PM, US Amb, and CG, MNF-I announcement so that terrorists and insurgents can not claim that GOI is forcing CF out or that CF are leaving before the mission is accomplished.
- Capitalizes on the IO opportunity to signify that progress is being made by reinforcing it with troop withdrawals.
- Reduces opportunity for terrorists and insurgents to claim that they are forcing CF out by their actions.
- Clearly shifts the burden of defeating the terrorists and insurgents to the ISF.
  - Forces IA Divisions to assume responsibility from CF for security in their AO.
  - Demonstrates CF confidence that ISF is capable of securing the country.
- Provides sufficient CF to support MTT/SPTT and provide overwatch/support to ISF.

Shift the focus of all Coalition actions to reinforcing an Iraqi information campaign with simple, clear messages
- Immediate and dramatic shift from Coalition being out front with the media to Iraqis in front.
  - No Coalition-only press conferences. No exceptions, not even the Pentagon Press Corps.
  - Mass Coalition media expertise on developing Iraqi Public Affairs capabilities.
- Clear, messages reinforced by actions
  - The nation of Iraq will endure as a democratic, multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian state and no effort by terrorists or insurgents will reverse that course.
  - The GOI and ISF are capable of proving the people of Iraq security and a quality of life that is better than it was under Saddam Hussein or that it would be if insurgents took control.
  - With the formation of a unity government there is no such thing as a legitimate insurgency.
- All military operations are designed first to support the Iraqi information campaign; any that don't directly support that campaign are not conducted.

Give the Coalition military the mission of rebuilding the oil and electricity capacity
- Failure to provide essential services is the single greatest source of strength to the insurgency and other anti-government actors (Sadr)
- **This must be the Coalition main effort.**
  - Take risk in all other areas/missions to ensure this mission is accomplished.
  - Security of oil/electric infrastructure becomes the main effort of MNC-I.
- Security of oil/electric infrastructure becomes main effort of Iraqi JHQ and IGFC.
- Reorganize GRD into a Lieutenant General's command with the mission of:
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- Generating a sustained capacity of 6000 MW by 1 Oct 06; 7000 MW by 1 Jan 07 and 8000 MW by 1 Mar 07.
- Rebuilding, not repairing, Iraq’s major oil infrastructure (daily BUA slide) by 1 Mar 07.
- Increase Iraq’s output of oil to 3.0 MBOPD NLT 1 Jan 07.
- Clear message from CG, CENTCOM and CG, MNF-I that the USG must provide sufficient resources to accomplish above.
  - Must have sufficient resources to contract the best in the world to accomplish this mission.
  - Absent those resources Victory in Iraq is not possible.
  - Failure to resource is a clear sign that the US has lost the political will to ensure a viable Iraqi nation and defeat the insurgency.
- CG, GRD given responsibility for development and transition of the oil and electricity Ministries and organizes along the lines of MNSTC-I Security Ministry Transition efforts.
- While in every other case the transition of functions and responsibilities to Iraq is more important than how well or how quickly those functions are executed, in this case the capability of providing essentials services to the people of Iraq must precede transition of that capability.
- Effort must utilize external design, expertise and major components; but employ as many Iraqis as possible.
- The entire effort must be used as a vehicle to develop Iraqi capability to operate and maintain their strategic infrastructure.

Reorganize the ISF to provide a mobile Operational Reserve and employ it to defeat terrorist and insurgent cadres:
- Consisting of both National Police Divisions, the 9th IA Div (Mech) and the 1st Brigade of the 1st IA Div (currently in Baghdad)
- Intent is:
  - Restore operational agility that was lost by assigning every CF and IA unit to a specific AO.
  - Rapidly move anywhere in Iraq and mass sufficient Iraqi combat power to overwhelm the terrorists and insurgents in any area and execute the Clear-Hold-Build strategy.
  - Shift main effort rapidly and without warning to regain the initiative.
  - Conduct simultaneous large-scale operations in multiple locations to force AQI and insurgents to react to multiple threats and defeat their ability to sidestep large-scale operations due to advance warning.
- Coalition provides sufficient lift to move the operational reserve rapidly and repeatedly throughout Iraq. MNSTC-I tasked with generating the operational movement capability within the ISF.
- Supported by robust Iraqi and Coalition civil affairs, engineers, and other stability operations enablers.
- Establish a joint Iraqi/Coalition cell within the JHQ for planning the employment of the Operational Reserve in Clear-Hold-Build operations, with a robust capability to coordinate across Iraqi Ministries and the Coalition for the non-kinetic functions necessary to ensure that security endures and quality of life improves after an operation.
- Operations by this Operational Reserve confront the insurgents with the paradox that while the CF draw down the pressure on them becomes more intense – clear
indication to them and to the people of Iraq that it is the ISF, not the CF, who are defeating the insurgency.

- Redistribute 1A forces in 2d and 10th IA Div AOs to provide 3 battalions from each division as reserves to participate in "Hold" operations in support of the Operational Reserve.
  - There being no operational purpose for the IA in northeast (where there has been virtually no insurgent activity for a year) or southeast Iraq (where there is no insurgency).
  - Predominantly Kurdish battalions from 2d IA Div can be employed for sustained periods of time in Sunni areas in Al Anbar.
  - Predominantly Shi'a battalions from 10th IA Div can be employed in mixed areas such as Baquba and North Babil.

Execute an effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Strategy

- Announced by the GOI soon after seating; in execution by 1 July 06
- Start immediately with Badr Organization, who has already offered to reintegrate into the ISF.
- Addressing in priority:
  - Sunnis insurgents. Political participation is the beginning. DDR participation is the proof that they are truly supportive of a peaceful Iraq.
  - Mahdi Militia (JAM). JAM’s growing power represents a long term threat to the viability of a democratic GOI. After nearly two years of failing to confront Muqtadr al Sadr and JAM it must begin this summer.
  - Other smaller EGAG
  - Peshmerga and Badr Organization. These two organizations are disciplined and controlled enough that they pose no threat to the GOI so long as their political leadership is satisfied with the pace of progress.
- Using a similar approach to all organizations above to ensure equal treatment across all sects.
- Emphasis on the Reintegration function
  - Employ former armed insurgents and militia members in rebuilding the infrastructure, so that they:
    - Are employed and can improve their quality of life
    - Have a vested interest in the rebuilding of Iraq
    - Are working away from their neighborhoods
- Disarmament conducted uniformly across the country
  - Publicized and enforced by GOI
  - Short turn-in/amnesty period
  - Executed by IA, not IPS, to maintain objectivity as much as possible

Remove FPS and PSD as a source of friction and exploitation by AIF

- FPS and PSD detract from the legitimate use of force by the ISF
  - Suggest ISF is incapable of securing the country
  - Used by select ministers as "private armies" to frustrate the GOI
- FPS absorbed into Mol effective 60 days after formation of new GOI
- Reduce FPS based on capabilities of ISF; DDR for those positions eliminated
- Reduce PSDs to close-in protection only, based on improved capabilities of ISF; conduct DDR for those positions eliminated
FROM: J2
TO: COMCENT
SUBJ: Desk Note – Who are we fighting in Iraq? (U)

(U) Sir, this desk note responds to your inquiry asking who the Coalition is fighting in Iraq.

(S//REL MCFL) Summary. We assess the primary resistance facing Coalition Forces (CF) is comprised of indigenous Sunni Iraqis. They range from former military and intelligence service members to the disenfranchised, unemployed, criminal Sunnis on the street. Attacks on CF are initiated primarily by small local/regional insurgent Sunni groups. Shia militants are responsible for a small number of attacks, yet inflict a disproportionate number of CF casualties due to the effectiveness of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). AQI/foreign fighters remain particularly well organized and capable of carrying out spectacular attacks. Most insurgent activity is focused against CF, though Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are enduring an increasing share of attacks. Violence remains focused primarily in Baghdad and Sunni-dominated areas.

(S//REL MCFL) Attack Trends. 99% of all reported attacks reported by MNF-I SIGACTS occur in Baghdad and the North, West MNF-I areas of responsibility. Despite increased sectarian violence as a result of the 22 Feb Samarra shrine bombing and the ISF’s higher profile, CF remain the primary insurgent focus. Despite CF targeting of insurgent leadership, organization, and logistics, attack levels have continued to rise. Shia and Kurdish empowerment, manifested in Iraq’s emerging national institutions, along with the ongoing CF presence, continue to rally insurgents. Despite political progress, Iraq’s leaders have been unable so far to deal effectively with the root factors driving the insurgency, though a Sunni-inclusive government: would likely help mitigate violence. Standoff attacks remain the insurgent method of choice (IEDs, VBIEDs, RPGs, mortars); however, indirect fire attacks have increased.

(S//REL MCFL) 14b. Supported Shia militant groups continue to target Coalition forces with EFPs. Although attacks by Shia militants represent a small percentage of overall attacks, they cause a disproportionate number of Coalition casualties. These attacks hit an all time high in Apr, with 40 total incidents resulting in 15 Coalition KIA and 45 WIA. This increased trend is continuing in May and may continue as 14b expands efforts to make life difficult for the U.S. in Iraq in order to discourage the U.S. from launching attacks on Iran.

(S//REL MCFL) Outlook. Insurgent attacks will remain focused on CF, although attacks on civilians and ISF are likely to continue rising. AQI will continue targeting Shia in order to exacerbate sectarian violence and magnify negative domestic and international perceptions of Iraqi stability and security. We expect to see increased militia influence and activity, along with a small increase in militant Shia attacks on the Coalition. For the near term, Sunni insurgents will retain their capability to maintain current levels of violence.

Custer

OPR: CCJ2-JOAQ, DSN: 6
Derived from: Multiple Sources; 11 May 2006
Declassify on: 20150511
RE: Thoughts on the Way Ahead: An Independent “Red Team” of OIF

15 May 2006
For: GEN Casey

Sir,

I have read the subject assessment. Having recently reviewed SPA’s attack analysis and a host of intelligence summaries, I give this assessment mixed reviews.

Bottom lines:

- I do not subscribe to much of their threat analysis; AIF is not unified and while it does regenerate itself, that reflects continued political issues as much as anything else.

I agree with the idea of a mobile, operational reserve. This was a recommendation from the AUG COIN Assessment. 9 DIV and the former IIF would seem like good candidates.

- I agree that we need to work IO differently. I have some thoughts on that.

- Security concepts. There is a need to approach Iraq as a mosaic. Where the ISF can lead, some of the recommendations here are appropriate; where the ISF cannot lead, cutting CF creates opportunity for the AIF. As ISF capability matures, we are gaining in the ability to clear and hold, but BIULD remains a challenge. It still appears that weakness in the government’s ability to do anything meaningful outside of Baghdad continues. That was the #1 issue in the August 2005 COIN survey. We are not investing enough effort in the civil side of the equation—we cannot win without success in the economic, services and government areas. My analysis from last year remains the same; fixing this requires another $20 billion and 11,000 people dedicated to ministerial, provincial and local government capacity building. Temporary “help” will not realize this effect.

- There is an imbalance in the COIN strategy; it is an imbalance between military and civil means and effects. I do not think that conditions will allow ISF in the lead everywhere. The authors offer no analysis to support that or the IO brigade ceiling on CF.

- Oil. Oil in the south needs massive work. Estimates are about $35 billion. This should not be a Coalition run “great IRRF project;” rather the GOI needs to fix its legal position so commercial investment like with ARAMCO can come in here and bring state of the art systems and best practices to the Iraqi oil industry. This commercial economic approach is sustainable. Our building or rebuilding the oil infrastructure is not sustainable.

  o For this to happen, there needs to be some legal movement to secure consensus on the disposition of oil wealth in Iraq and in the South and North, the Iraqis need to sort out the militia issues and Kirkuk.

Specific issues. To follow.
Impact of Delay in Forming New Iraq Government

30 May 2006

(U) Purpose: To describe the challenges facing the new Iraq Government over the next six months as a result of the delay in the appointment of the Prime Minister (PM) and his cabinet.

(U) Assumptions:

- *(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)* The Maliki Government will survive at least the first year of its term, although individual cabinet ministers may change.

- *(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)* Neighboring countries recognize the new government as legitimate and overtly seek positive relations with a safe, prosperous and stable Iraq.

- *(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)* Relations between Iraq and Iran will not result in direct, military confrontation.

(U) Key Judgments:

- *(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)* The short-term pain of the delay is outweighed by the long-term benefits of a more unified and functional leadership capable of effective governance. It allowed the establishment of a more effective government which is preferable to a government led by Ja'fari. Ultimately, a more widely accepted and stable government will result.

- *(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)* While the opportunity to capitalize on the post-election enthusiasm for the political process is lost, most other missed opportunities can be recovered with swift and determined action by the Iraq Government.

- *(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)* The delay in government formation has enabled Shi'a militias, such as Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), to increase their influence. The new Iraq Government has an opportunity to reassert its authority through programs such as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR).

- *(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)* MNF-I strategy has not been significantly disrupted - development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), putting Iraqi Army (IA) in the lead and securing Iraq's borders remain on track. However, the achievement of some objectives may be delayed, such as securing Baghdad and reducing violence to a level that the ISF can handle.

- *(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)* A permanent government - established prior to the February Golden Mosque bombing - is likely to have been more effective in controlling the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence.
• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) MNF-I and coalition government involvement in deliberations of the selection of the PM have strengthened international perceptions that Iraqi politicians are unable to resolve disputes without outside intervention.

• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The delay has enabled JAM to arm and to increase its influence in Baghdad and the south. This has added to the complexity of the Baghdad security environment and caused extremists and Sunni Rejectionists to react; increasing the sectarian nature of the fight. Opportunities for government action to improve the security situation have been complicated.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Background: Political maneuvering delayed government formation by three months. This delay was caused by a number of factors. The initial challenges to and subsequent Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) investigation of the electoral results meant that the results were not ratified until 2 February 2006. Jaafari’s surprise nomination as the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) candidate for PM resulted in a period of political maneuvering as members of the Sunni and Kurd blocs in the government, as well as certain elements of the ULA, opposed his premiership. This lasted until 22 April when PM Maliki’s nomination was announced. Had these difficulties not been encountered the government may have been seated in mid-February.

(U) CHALLENGES WITHIN IRAQ:

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) After the successful completion of the 15 December 2005 national elections the Iraqi population had unrealistically high expectations that the situation in the country would rapidly improve. While the legitimacy of the government is not openly questioned, the control of key ministries rests with the same political and sectarian blocs, leading to a feeling that nothing significant has changed. Indeed, the key ministerial posts remain divided along sectarian lines. The delay was exploited by those seeking to portray the government as illegitimate and a puppet of the coalition.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The delay and associated political infighting has increased the sense of disillusionment and a lack of confidence in the Iraq Government’s ability to effect change. However, the government’s eventual formation will likely reinvigorate hopes for effective governance. This provides PM Maliki with a short but definite opportunity to demonstrate positive results and effective leadership.

(U) EXTERNAL CHALLENGES TO IRAQ

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The security situation in Iraq overshadows perceptions of political inertia. However, the delay may have contributed in a small way to regional decisions regarding the establishment of diplomatic missions and encouraging investment in Iraq. Currently, Iran is the only Gulf state to have sent an ambassador to Baghdad; others are represented by Charges d’Affaires. The delay in the formation of the government also postponed the Arab League reconciliation conference in Baghdad to June 2006. This conference will present an opportunity
to highlight improvements in Iraq and to increase Arab League engagement by the Iraq Government, enhancing its regional legitimacy.

(S//REL-TO-USA, MCFl) The principle international perception of Iraq during the period of the government formation is one of a fractured society wracked by ethno-sectarian strife, with political leadership unable to reach compromise without outside intervention. Coalition members' attempts to influence the selection of the PM have reinforced perceptions that the Iraq Government is dependent and unable to resolve disputes without external assistance. Negative perceptions contributed to setbacks in funding streams as international donors and aid organizations adopted a wait-and-see policy until confirmation of a permanent government. The uncertainty has also discouraged engagement by financial institutions and private investors.

(U) IMPACT OF THE DELAY ON IRAQ'S SECURITY SITUATION

(S//REL-TO-USA, MCFl) Due in part to the delay, the new Iraq Government faces an emboldened and strengthened JAM that continues to infiltrate the ISF. JAM has used the delay to arm and increase influence in Baghdad and in the south. They have increased their targeting of MNF-I, including the use of sophisticated weapons such as EFPs and MANPADs. At the same time, they have extended their influence to providing public services normally associated with government ministries.

(S//REL-TO-USA, MCFl) The delay had a minimal affect on the actions of Sunni Rejectionists; however, it has impacted on the Iraq Government's ability to quickly deal with Sunni grievances and undermine Sunni Rejectionist support. While ethno-sectarian violence has settled somewhat since the February Golden Mosque attack, it remains at elevated levels and has drawn in some Sunni Rejectionists, while others have joined AQI. Although the tactics or strategies of AQI have been largely unaffected, the new Iraq Government must now address situations like that in Ramadi, where a lack of decisive government action has allowed AQI to strengthen.

(U) IMPACT OF DELAY ON MNF-I CAMPAIGN PLAN

(S//REL-TO-USA, MCFl) MNF-I strategy has not been significantly disrupted although the achievement of some objectives may be delayed. The greatest effect of the delay has been on securing Baghdad and disarming the militias. Progress towards defeating AQI in 2006 has been somewhat hindered by the unwillingness of former PM Ja'fari to commit to major action against AQI in Ramadi. Neutralizing the insurgency and consolidating Anbar were affected by the delay because there has not been an active government effort to engage Sunni insurgents. The effects on the Campaign Plan's individual lines of operation are discussed below:
(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Security: The security situation has deteriorated somewhat as attack levels have risen since December. Increasing sectarian tensions since February 2006 have gained prominence. The lack of a permanent government has also prevented the implementation of security policies, such as DDR, and other actions to minimize the influence of militias. The delay has not directly increased Sunni insurgency attack levels; however, it has hardened Sunni opinion, indirectly prolonging the Sunni Arab insurgency. Government formation was largely irrelevant to the extremists' agenda; therefore, extremists' operations were unaffected, although the Iraq Government's opportunity to implement policies against them was postponed.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Governance: The effects on the government have been mixed. While the aims of government formation have been met, efforts to build ministerial capacity are unlikely to meet projections – Ministerial Advisory Teams have not been able to work with nominated ministers and immediate staff until government formation was completed, impacting effective delivery of the basic services that these ministries provide. The Ministries of Interior and Defense have not been as severely affected as they receive much greater support at all levels of the organizations through the actions of Transition Teams. Conversely, the absence of a strong central government during this period actually improved governance capability in some areas as provincial councils in the Kurdish provinces and the southern provinces of Basrah, Maysan, and Muthanna were able to consolidate their authority and gain experience in self-governance.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Economic Development: Current funding streams from the US Government are coming to an end and aid from other donors was largely put on hold until the Iraq Government was confirmed. Additionally, necessary economic reform legislation will now have to compete for priority with other parliamentary business, including constitutional reform and provincial elections. This will likely result in a projected shortfall in funding streams for Iraq.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Communications: The delay has provided little opportunity for the Iraq Government to present itself in a positive light. Protracted political negotiations have reinforced the impression that the government remains driven by sectarian agendas. The government has lacked a public spokesperson to express policy objectives and achievements both to the Iraqi public and international community.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Transition: The delay in forming a government did not affect the raising and training of Iraqi Army (IA) units and Iraqi Police Service forces. IA and IPS units continue to achieve Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) level 2, meeting forecasted projections. IA units continue to assume the lead with greater than 70 percent of IA brigades achieving this by the summer. However, the delay in forming the government has not helped in the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). The timetable outlined in the May Provisional Security Transition Assessment that 15 out of 18 provinces would achieve PIC by the end of 2006 is unlikely to be realized, given the unanticipated growth of militias in several provinces and the delay in the development of provincial governance capabilities to manage security affairs.
(U) OPPORTUNITIES LOST BETWEEN THE ELECTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)** Government Effectiveness and Public Confidence: The quick formation of a permanent government would have demonstrated Iraqi sovereignty and given an opportunity to present a clear message to Iraqis and the international community that stabilizing influences in Iraq were taking hold.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)** Post-election enthusiasm of Iraqis and the international community was squandered by the extended time taken to form a government.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)** Following the December 2005 elections, public expectations were high that general improvements in delivery of essential services would begin. However, uncertainty surrounding the tenure of ministers during the delay exacerbated Iraqi bureaucratic tendency to depend on direct ministerial guidance, resulting in reluctance by mid-level administrators to make decisions and implement policy. Additionally, progress on reducing corruption within ministries has been stifled.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)** The average level of sectarian violence has tripled following the Golden Mosque bombing. An opportunity existed for the Iraqi officials to show leadership in the immediate aftermath of the attack and take measures such as public calls for calm and the deployment of ISF and MNF-I to prevent escalation of sectarian violence. While Ja’fari did issue statements, he was overshadowed by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Sadr. During this time, Sadr was able to present himself as a spokesman for the Shi’a and as the leader of an organization capable of delivering social and security services. Had a permanent government with effective leadership been in place, credit gained by Sadr could have been attributed to the government instead.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)** Sadr’s political standing has not been damaged by the delay – he received as many ministries as could be realistically expected. While Ja’fari was Sadr’s first choice, the appointment of Maliki as PM is unlikely to significantly hinder the continuing influence of the Sadrist movement in the new government.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)** Security and Transition: The lack of a permanent government prevented the establishment of security policies such as DDR and other actions to minimize the influence of militias.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)** The presence of a permanent Iraq Government is a prerequisite to effect the transition of the provinces to PIC status. The delay and the complications it caused to the security situation have set back the provincial transitional schedule and some MNF-I draw down plans.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)** PM Ja’fari’s unwillingness to commit to significant actions prior to final government selection likely squandered an opportunity to showcase ISF capabilities in a significant IA-led operation against AQI in Ramadi. This resulted in a loss of progress towards defeating AQI and consolidating Anbar Province.
(S//REL TO USA, MCFL//20160530)

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFL)** Economic Development: Foreign governments and international financial institutions have delayed aid donations and debt relief until confirmation of the government. Foreign business investors have postponed financial commitments in Iraqi until they could strike deals with a government with a four-year mandate. The delay in forming the government contributed to a climate of economic uncertainty. The confidence of investors and donors was adversely affected. Legislative inertia has led to a number of key economic reforms, particularly fuel liberalization laws, being postponed.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFL)** National Unity: The delay has dented the long term prospects of Iraqi national unity by allowing the Kurdish Regional Government to further entrench its de-facto independent state. Over the last five months, it has continued to circumvent the central government control by independently negotiating international business deals such as oil exploration deals and opening airline routes into Irbil. This has increased the determination of the Kurds to operate independent of the central government.

(U) IDENTIFY ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO QUICKLY REGAIN LOST MOMENTUM

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFL)** The short-term pain of the delay is outweighed by the long-term benefits of a more unified and functional leadership capable of effective governance. The delay allowed the establishment of a more effective government which is preferable to a government where questions over the leadership exist. Ultimately, a more widely accepted and stable government will result. PM Maliki enjoys broad support within the government and will be better able to implement effective policy. Had Ja'fari been approved as PM, the political wrangling of the last five months would likely have been protracted over at least the next year, creating an environment conducive to the growth of corruption and ripe for the further expansion of militias. It was unlikely that a Ja'fari government would have served a full-term, creating further political instability.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFL)** An opportunity exists for the Iraqi Government to send the message that continued violence towards the MNF-I and the ISF prolongs the presence of foreign forces. This should include a statement ending the legitimacy of the idea of honorable resistance followed by concrete action to address Sunni grievances and increase Sunni political inclusion.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFL)** Establishing and communicating a practical timetable for provincial elections would demonstrate this issue still has momentum and remains a priority.

- **(S//REL TO USA, MCFL)** Drawing up and publicizing a practical timetable for constitutional reform and a moderation of de-Ba'thification policies would demonstrate to the Sunni's that these issues remain on the agenda, even though they might not be achieved by the end of 2006.
• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Setting and achieving targets for progressive improvement of basic services, such as electricity supply, will show the effectiveness of PM Maliki and his cabinet while demonstrating progress on those issues most important to the Iraqi people. The targets should not be overly ambitious but should be achievable and sustainable.

• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The Government of Iraq should present itself as independent of foreign influence, dispelling the perception that it is a puppet of either

• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The Iraq Government should quickly engage the militias and embark on concrete programs to reduce their power. This is the crucial initial step in implementing the DDR process.

• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Set and achieve targets for transition to Provincial Iraqi Control, such as announcing the transition of a province within the first 100 days of the government. This demonstrates the sovereignty of the Iraq Government and MNF-I commitment to drawdown forces and transfer authority.

• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The Iraq Government should take responsibility and credit for foreign debt relief by announcing what progress has been made and explaining to the Iraqi people what benefits this will bring. Although the greatest benefits will be felt in the medium to long term, the announcement will show a strong Iraq Government in control of its own economic destiny.

• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Encouraging regional neighbors to establish full embassies in Iraq and deal with Iraq as an equal in regional forums such as Arab League will demonstrate the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Iraq Government. While Baghdad is the focus of media attention during the conference, PM Maliki could use the opportunity to announce that the security situation in parts of Iraq has sufficiently improved to allow a drawdown of MNF-I and transition to Iraqi control in those areas.

• (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The Iraq Government should make visible signs that the issue of government corruption is being taken seriously and being addressed by demonstrating a willingness to prosecute offenders and publicize it. This will encourage investment and build confidence in the Iraqi administration.

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Conclusion: Political wrangling surrounding Ja'fari's nomination led to a delay of approximately three months in the formation of the new Iraq Government. However, Maliki's eventual selection presents a better opportunity for a strong, effective government that will serve out its full term. The delay has not disrupted MNF-I's strategy, although it has compressed the timelines for completion of some stated objectives, such as transfer to PIC and ministerial capacity development. Other objectives, such as the raising and training of ISF units, have been largely unaffected. During the process of government formation the security situation, particularly in Baghdad, has grown more complex as JAM has increased its influence and sectarian violence has become more significant. PM Maliki now has a number of opportunities to quickly regain lost momentum and establish the authority of his government.
Organizing the US Effort in Iraq for Success

1. **Place the U.S. effort in Iraq under the direction of a single leader stationed in Iraq.** This will unify the Nation's disparate efforts and resources against common direction and intent and address policy issues from a common perspective and with a single vision. No one now owns the entire problem nor directs all US efforts in Iraq. This undermines mission effectiveness.

   A similar move to unify the British effort proved decisive in Malaya in 1951. Unifying the mission under Sir Gerald Templer (a retired LTG) as both high commissioner and chief of operations marked a turning point. Field Marshall Montgomery famously observed "When we have a plan and a man, we will succeed, not otherwise."

   This could be a military or civilian leader. The key benefit to a military leader is command of resources and responsive organizations. The rapid exploitation of Fort Riley troops not deployed in January, but then redirected to the police transition team mission is illustrative of this responsiveness. No other agency of government could act that quickly as the slow establishment of PRTs and the lack of meaningful ministry assistance teams. In either case, this single leader must have a clear vision suitable to Iraq and be empowered with authority and resources from Washington to act. This is more important than their agency of origin.

2. **Recognize that troop totals and effectiveness are not yet adequate.** Total Iraqi and Coalition forces are inadequate to protect and control the population while concurrently pursuing the insurgents, terrorists and militias that threaten Iraqi citizens and government legitimacy.

   Historically successful ratios average about 20 troops per 1000 of population; current levels are about 14 or 15:1000 counting all Coalition and Iraqi forces. This shortfall creates seams exploitable by the enemy.

   To succeed, Iraq must be secured. That doesn't necessarily mean more US troops. It does suggest the need for more ISF. It also means not taking risk in contested areas. In those areas, the enemy cannot find sanctuary, and nascent Iraqi forces and institutions must have time to grow and develop, eventually building credibility with the people. The military is clearing and tenuously holding, but not effectively in every location. Moving reserves to Al Anbar can help, but it is instructive that nearly 1 million Vietnamese troops still took 5 years to pacify the country. This effort was aided by a significant US funds and manpower. Who will pay and how is a question, but it is unlikely that the Iraqi budget can absorb increases in the near term.

   A national level strike force of selected Iraqi Army and Police forces would assist in dealing with challenges in contested regions where local forces are vulnerable to intimidation or subversion. Basra and Al Anbar are areas where these forces might be usefully employed.

   ISF loyalty to the Nation is not yet a common ethos. Long term presence by US advisors can help build this ethos, identifying and advancing promising leaders to higher leadership. However, that is a long term effort. Short term, Iraqi political leadership must embrace of the ISF as their own, demonstrating. Jaafari's failure to back the ISOF troops on the OMS/JAM raid was exactly wrong. In this case, PM Maliki should be encouraged to model himself on Allawi.

3. **Build meaningful government and economic capacity.**

   First, government remains your weak partner. The August 2005 COIN survey finding on a lack of government capacity appears to be unchanged. We should expand the capacity building capability within Central Government ministries and at the provincial and local levels by several fold. CORDS in Vietnam was about 7000 military and civilians for a country of 18 million; we have less than 2000 dedicated to this mission in a country of 27 million. The requisite manpower
bill is about 11,000. This requirement cannot be fulfilled without DOD stepping up to more fully support this capability with manpower and agree to secure them wherever they may be. If we are serious, this is the cost of doing business. State Department and other cabinet agencies are simply not manned to adequately respond to this sort of immediate mission requirement. This is not new. The Army was handed responsibility for occupation and administration of liberated North Africa at the ‘11th’ hour after State was unable to assume that role, despite fighting to take the mission to begin with. The military had the capacity, State did not. The same is true for Iraq.

Second, get more money. If others will pay, great, but if not, send $20 billion. Given estimates that Iraq can absorb about $10 billion in economic assistance annually and absent major progress with donations, direct foreign investment, or oil revenue, another $20 billion is warranted.

Neither we nor the Iraqis have meaningful capacity to BUILD in support of the strategy of Clear, Hold and BUILD. One of the reasons why the security situation ebbs and flows is because security forces Clear, Hold and WAIT because there are no meaningful BUILD resources. Absent the capacity to BUILD, Provincial Iraqi Control, even with Iraqi Army and Police at Level 1, particularly at current levels, will be a temporary condition that can regress quickly. Insurgency is political struggle that manifests itself in violence. Without supporting government capacity and economic progress to address popular expectations, Iraqi forces will likely find it more and more difficult to deal with security challenges as citizens again become ambivalent to or supportive of insurgent activity in the face of Iraqi government ineffectiveness.

However, unlike the initial U.S. investment or typical foreign aid, however, these funds should not be devoted to projects. This money must be flexible, devoted to development of economic sectors and granted at the lowest levels—where visibility, impact, creativity, and entrepreneurial spirit are the greatest and where overhead and corruption are the lowest.

For those who push back, it is interesting that US foreign aid to Vietnam was about $3 billion per year in current dollars, not counting US Corps of Engineer infrastructure development efforts. Conversely, the $2 billion in the supplemental this year is aimed predominantly at paying for the operation of the PRTs, not funding economic development.

4. Rededicate ourselves to WINNING the WAR. Victory will not be achieved by winning bureaucratic turf wars or promoting one year goals or program execution as success.

Washington’s approach and that of many agencies involved in Iraq is eerily similar to the escalatory, minimalist approaches and management by input, not output, damned by Ambassador Robert Komer’s “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing” and Daniel Ellsberg’s indictments in various Rand publications.

Komer noted that “Another constraint [on our success] was implicit in the incremental nature of our response, doing only what we believed minimally necessary at each stage . . . ”

Ellsberg noted that "the pressure for results in a single year has always been with us, to deadly effect. It has been fed by an optimism, born partly of ignorance and partly of bureaucratic pressures, that present methods were succeeding -- would succeed in a year, in fact -- and hence, it was thought unnecessary to take moves that might risk failing to succeed in one year."

This is not to suggest that Vietnam was a bureaucratic failure, it wasn’t. It was a failure of will, with our nation losing its determination just as the South Vietnamese were on the cusp of success. However, the bureaucratic response to Vietnam likely prolonged the conflict, exhausting the American public and sapping political leadership. Iraq faces a similar risk today.
DCSINT Monthly Threat Update

MG Zahner
2 June 2006

The Overall Classification of this briefing is:
Ethno-Sectarian Strife and Insurgency Effects

Ethno-sectarian levels of strife

- Lessening of communal restraint
- Perceptions of the Iraqi Government and security forces as partisan
- Targeting of civilians
- Population Displacement

Insurgency Effects Categories

- Effects of insurgents on effectiveness of the Iraqi Government
- Effects of insurgents on support of the Iraqi population
- Effects of ISF and CF operations on insurgents
- Effects of insurgents on the ISF and CF
Ethno-Sectarian Levels of Strife

**Bottom Line:** Sunni extremists and Shi'a militia seek to expand their influence in contested areas of Baghdad. Extremist goal is to leverage sectarian strife to radicalize population, generate support.

- Sectarian tensions up, evidenced by increases in executions and attacks on civilians
- In May, JAM continued to target Sunnis in retribution executions, sought to dominate mixed districts in Baghdad; also consolidate control over Shi'a dominated areas
- In Baghdad, attacks against civilians more concentrated on boundaries of mixed and ethnically-dominated areas. Sunni and Shi'a extremists are contesting control of ethnically mixed areas to expand existing areas of influence
- T&FF has expanded its ethno-sectarian attacks from Baghdad to Diyala with a shift towards targeting civilians. T&FF targeting Diyala to reignite the cycle of violence and repeat earlier success of Samarra bombing
- Since April, confidence in government effectiveness has continued to decline. Contributing factors are failure of government to deliver security and basic services, and delays in the government formation process. Confidence in Iraqi Police's ability to enforce the law equitably continues to fall
Lessening of Communal Restraint

Bottom Line: JAM is increasing activity against Sunnis in Baghdad, solidifying sectarian differences. JAM is actively pursuing Sunni terrorists; confrontations with Sunnis will increase as AQI establishes a presence in north Baghdad to conduct operations in Shi’a-dominated and mixed neighborhoods.

- AQI attempting to establish foothold in Adhamiyah; AQI and JAM battling for control of western Adhamiyah
  - May attacks in Adhamiyah up 40% over April
- JAM operating outside government authority and legal framework; continues undermining security, particularly in Baghdad
  - JAM conducted kidnapping events in the Sunni areas of Adhamiyah and Khan Bani Saad, Diyala
  - JAM targeted terrorists in western Baghdad in Mansour/Rashid
- JAM continues to weaken government authority through infiltration and intimidation resulting in ISF inaction
  - Furthers Sunni perception ISF is biased
Areas of Concentrated Killings
22 Feb 06 - 30 May 06

Locations of Reported Murder/Execution Victims in Baghdad
- 3,034 reported murdered/executed in Baghdad, 22 Feb to 30 May 06
- Eight circled areas encompass 1254 (41%)

Assessment: JAM is likely responsible for the majority of the sectarian killings in Baghdad; however, AQI's attempts to develop footholds in Sunni neighborhoods in western Baghdad are leading to retaliatory attacks against Shi'a. Bodies are concentrated near areas of significant JAM presence primarily in Sadr City, Ur, Adhamiya, Nur, Khadra, Ameriya, Bayaa and Al Doura. These locations comprise 40% of the executions and murders in Baghdad over the period 01 Jan to 15 May 06.
Lessening of Communal Restraint

Bottom Line: Sunni and Shi'a extremists succeeded in maintaining a level of sectarian strife that undermined confidence in the Iraqi Government. In May, a slight increase in ethno-sectarian incidents but decreased casualties, demonstrates a “sustained steady state” in heightened sectarian tensions since pre-Samarra bombing. Expect continued violence in Baghdad as militias and extremists vie for control of territory.

- Ethno-Sectarian Violence Trends
  - In May, total ethno-sectarian incidents increased slightly, casualties declined
    - March 469
    - April 362
    - May 382
    - compared to average of 91.3 for previous six months
  - Total ethno-sectarian casualties
    - March 1701
    - April 1210
    - May 1185
    - compared to average of 596/month for previous six months
  - Baghdad ethno-sectarian casualties as percentage share of total have increased from April to May
    - In April, ethno-sectarian casualties in Baghdad were 799, 68% of national total
    - In May, ethno-sectarian casualties in Baghdad were 853, 70% of national total

- Significant Ethno-Sectarian Casualties
  - Tal Afar VBIED mass casualty event 9 May (16 KIA, 134 WIA)
  - Adhamiyah SVBIED 16 May (21 KIA, 33 WIA)

- April-May Hot Spots
  - Sectarian violence tightened along the peripheries between ethnically homogeneous areas and the ethnically mixed areas of Al-Doura, Al-Rashid and Al-Adhamiyah in Baghdad

- Kidnappings and Executions
  - Escalated kidnapping incidents have become a part of daily life targeting all classes, ethnicities, and sects in Iraqi society; not just ethno-sectarian motive
  - Many kidnappings are not reported due to lack of confidence in the Iraqi Police; account for the major difference between execution vs kidnapping figures
Lessening of Communal Restraint
Ethno-Sectarian Violence Trends

Ethno-sectarian Monthly Incident and Casualty Trends
From May 2005 - May 2006

Note. Ethno-sectarian incidents are those acts directed by one ethnic or religious group against another and include casualties, threats, rhetoric and propaganda. Ethno-sectarian casualties are woundings and killings caused by ethno-sectarian conflict. Unassigned incidents are those where the evidence points to but cannot confirm ethno-sectarian motivation.

Assessment: Levels of violence stabilizing at levels higher than pre-Samarra bombing. Incidents inside Baghdad are rising as extremists and militias concentrate their activities on the capital in an effort to foment sectarian strife and discredit the Iraq Government.
Lessening of Communal Restraint Mass Casualty Sectarian Events

Sectarian Events
MAY 06

Legend
- Significant Sectarian Incident
- Town/City

Note: A significant ethno-sectarian casualty incident is one involving at least ten casualties.

Assessment: Ethno-sectarian attacks inflicting mass casualties are concentrated in Baghdad. Expect Baghdad focus to continue given AQI Baghdad-focus strategy and expansion of JAM (and to a limited extent Badr) elements engaged in targeted killings that will trigger a Sunnis response.
Lessening of Communal Restraint
April and May 06 Hotspots

Density
Attacks per Sq Km

- Least Dense
- Medium Density
- Most Dense

Note: Hotspots are derived from total civilian deaths per square km

Comment: New pattern of hotspots emerged in May. Civilian casualties in ethnically homogeneous areas are down. Attacks more concentrated on boundaries between mixed and ethnically homogeneous areas of Al-Doura, Al-Rashid, and Al-Adhamiyah. Attacks against mosques continued to decrease.
Lessening of Communal Restraint
Kidnappings and Executions

*Note: Executions: are murders bearing marks of any one of the following: bound, blindfolded, decapitated, other mutilations, reports that indicate "evidence of torture", hangings, shot in the BACK of the head, groups of three or more bodies found together

Comment: Since the Golden mosque bombing, there has been a close correlation between kidnappings and executions. Kidnappings and executions are significant features of ethno-sectarian violence as rival groups vie for territory within ethnically mixed areas.
**Perceptions of IG/ISF are Partisan**

**Bottom Line:** Confidence in IG/ISF continues to decline and appears to be directly related to the level of sectarian violence. Continuing violence will further erode public confidence in IG/ISF.

- Perceptions of those polled believing government effectiveness will improve over next 3 months:
  - Jan 47%
  - Feb 33%
  - Mar 23%
  - Apr 28%
  - May 15%

- Perceptions of those polled believing government effectiveness will improve over next 12 months:
  - Jan 78%
  - Feb 75%
  - Mar 61%
  - Apr 63%
  - May 53%

- Satisfaction with local government:
  - Jan 27%
  - Feb 25%
  - Mar 18%
  - Apr 20%
  - May 15%

- Perceptions of those polled believing ISF can improve over next 3 months:
  - Jan 47%
  - Feb 32%
  - Mar 21%
  - April 24%
  - May 14%

- Perceptions of those polled believing ISF can improve over the next 12 months:
  - Jan 77%
  - Feb 74%
  - Mar 55%
  - Apr 62%
  - May 47%

- Confidence in IP to enforce law equitably in Baghdad continues to be affected by ethno-sectarian demographic distribution:
  - Higher in Shia majority areas:
    - Thawra (Sadr City) 89% / Apr 90%
    - Kadhamiya 84% / Apr 67%
  - Lower in mixed and Sunni areas:
    - Rusafa (mixed) 24% / Apr 37%
    - Karkh (Sunni) 13% / Apr 11%

Note: based on May polling data sourced from 4ID
Perceptions of ISF are Partisan
Perceptions of Iraqi Police

IP Enforce the Law Equitably

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree- April</th>
<th>Strongly agree- April</th>
<th>Somewhat agree- May</th>
<th>Strongly Agree- May</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rusafa</td>
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<td>Rural</td>
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Baghdad Poll (10-17 May 2006)

Assessment: Predominately Sunni districts perceive IP to be partisan, infiltrated by Sh’ia militia and pursuing sectarian agenda. This undermines ability of ISF to combat sectarian violence and increases support for AQI. Perceptions of ISF will continue to decline if violence continues at current levels, providing a key challenge to the newly seated government.
**Targeting of Civilians**

**Bottom Line:** Although targeting of civilians will continue, extremist groups will attempt to focus on attacking CF and ISF to force withdrawal and illustrate government ineffectiveness at providing security. Civilians will be targeted to foment sectarian tensions and undermine confidence in the IG/ISF.

- **Percentage of attacks against civilians, as a proportion of total attacks:**
  - Nov 9%
  - Dec 9%
  - Jan 9%
  - Feb 10%
  - Mar 13%
  - Apr 11%
  - May 11%

- **Total attacks against civilians:**
  - Nov 194
  - Dec 201
  - Jan 177
  - Feb 212
  - Mar 342
  - Apr 319
  - May 336

- **Percentage of attacks against civilians in Baghdad, as a proportion of total attacks:**
  - Nov 9%
  - Dec 9%
  - Jan 9%
  - Feb 10%
  - Mar 13%
  - Apr 11%
  - May 11%
Targeting of Civilians
Attacks against CF, ISF and Civilians

Assessment: Total attacks against civilians nationally remain elevated. However, there has been a significant upward trend in attacks against civilians in Baghdad and Diyala, reflecting heightened sectarian tensions, particularly in vicinity of Baqubah. Basra has seen a limited number of high-profile murders of Sunni notables. Expect violence to continue at these levels.
Assessment: From March to mid-April, Sunni and Shi'a ethno-sectarian violence forced increasing numbers of families to migrate to their respective ethnic strongholds. In May, a small number of families migrating, reflect ongoing sectarian violence and lack of security. Total IDP numbers has stabilized. Minor population movements will continue in the near term but are not likely to cause humanitarian crisis as many move in with friends and family. Reporting indicates the possibility of a large-scale migration of middle class families at the end of the school term in June.
State of the Insurgency

Bottom Line: AQI continues to seek opportunities to stoke sectarian tensions while concurrently pursuing other lines of operation; leveraging military expertise of members of the former regime in anti-Coalition and anti-IG attacks. Militias, particularly JAM, are growing in strength and capability and usurp the ISF and fill perceived local security vacuums. They are responsible for perpetuating much of the AQI initiated cycle of ethno-sectarian violence.

• AMZ remains firmly entrenched as leader of AQI and driving force behind Mujahidin Shura Council. Baghdad remains strategic priority – crucible of new Iraqi government formation, Iraqi seat of power, IO centerpiece

• The majority of Sunni Rejectionists will continue the insurgency, but a hard line minority will be drawn towards terrorist groups, particularly AQI, others will elect political engagement

• AQI/AS complex attack capability will increase, benefiting from greater participation of former regime military in the planning and conduct of attacks

• Militias remain potential catalysts for ethno-sectarian violence; they derive from and act on behalf of sectarian rather than national interests

• Militias will continue to perpetuate a climate of intimidation and disregard for the rule of law

• Militia remain entrenched in Shi’a and Kurdish communities. Without government action by summer 2006, militia influence will continue to grow
Effectiveness of the IG

Bottom Line: Newly seated IG faced with ITG legacy of non-performance in delivery of effective security and essential services. AQI suicide operations impacted by CF - unable to generate extended spike to Mar IG installation. Militia-sponsored sectarian violence further complicates IG effectiveness.

- Suicide Attacks
  - Incidents dropped from 38 to 35
  - Continued pattern of repeated "pulses" to generate sectarian strife
  - Also employed as IO ploy to undermine IG progress
  - Unsynchronized employment strategy critiqued in OBJ LARCHWOOD document

- Assassination Trends
  - Targeted Senior ISF officers - Baghdad and Diyala
  - Marked increase in Basrah Sunni tribal leaders (7)
  - Baghdad no longer epicentre - 25% in May

- Essential Services
  - Dissatisfaction peaked at 90%, up from 79, reflecting impact of seasonal temperatures
  - Overall infrastructure attacks down 80% since January
  - Insurgents intimidation focused on restoration contractors, delaying slow recovery process

Note
CIIOC defines "assassination" as "The killing of a person, by virtue of their appointment/position, in order for a group to advance their political aims. These appointments can range from the city to national levels."
Effectiveness of IG

Ability to Provide Essential Services

Dissatisfaction with Electricity in Baghdad

Infrastructure Attacks

Attacks continued to decline in May. This likely unnecessary given lack of rapid repair through contractor intimidation. Dissatisfaction survey and electricity delivery failure for Maliki's social agenda.
Report of the Iraqi Population

IO Themes

Claims by Week

- In May, MSC made 636 claims and other groups made 414 claims.

The numbers vetted through message traffic pulls for accuracy in reporting.

Claims in May and continued to dominate cooperation of the citizens in Ramadi, Fallujah, an effort most effective in Anbar. These efforts to MSC/AQI propaganda.
Support of the Iraqi Population
Perceptions of Iraqi Government

Satisfaction with Local Government

Perception of Government Effectiveness

Assessment: Public perception of government effectiveness has declined during delayed formation of new Iraq Government. Notwithstanding the complications of delay, decisive response to security and economic issues by PM Maliki can rapidly reverse these trends as seen from previous polling of Government effectiveness.
ISF/CF Effects on Insurgents

Foreign Fighters Killed/ Captured

Bomb Makers Killed/ Captured

- The number of FF killed decreased from 53 in April to 26 in May
- The number of bomb makers captured decreased in May
  - Bomb makers captured in March: 7; April: 5; May: 1
  - VBIEDS continue decrease: March: 62; April: 41; May: 33
- 10% of suicide bombers are assessed to be Iraqi

Assessment: Decreasing numbers of FF killed reflects effectiveness of CF operations in disrupting FF infiltration. Reduction in IED attacks reflects effectiveness of counter-IED operations (capture of bomb-makers).
Effects of Insurgents on ISF and CF

**Bottom Line:** Overall attacks increased in May concentrated in Baghdad and the larger cities and towns in the Euphrates River Valley and the Tigris River Valley. ISF will sustain greater proportion of attacks as they assume more battle space.

- **Overall Attacks**
  - Overall attack levels increased
    - April 2890
    - May 3161
  - Total attacks in Baghdad increased
    - Jan 576
    - Feb 754
    - Mar 883
    - Apr 865
    - May 956

- **Attack Targets**
  - CF were the target
    - 66% of attacks in March
    - 68% of attacks in April
    - 67% of attacks in May
  - ISF were the target of
    - 21% of attacks in March
    - 20% of attacks in April
    - 22% of attacks in May
  - Effective attacks
    - against CF increased by 15%
    - against ISF they decreased by 4%

- **IED Comparison**
  - In May, 33% of all attacks, but high rate of found/cleared 23% (decrease from April)
  - IED attacks increased by 20% while casualties per detonation decreased by 2% in May to 0.87 casualties per attack (0.88 casualties in April)

- **VBIED events**
  - VBIED events increased by 15%
    - 48 in April
    - 55 in May
  - Casualties caused by VBIEDS increased by 74%
    - 299 in April
    - 520 in May
  - VBIED attack effectiveness increased
    - 7.3 casualties per attack in April
    - 12.7 casualties per attack in May
Assessment: Rise in attack levels reflects both a significant effort by hard-line rejectionists and T&FF to preclude the seating of a new government, and the lack of effective political outreach to Sunni insurgents by an Iraqi Government caught in an extended formation process. Growth also reflects sectarian violence in Baghdad and to a lesser extent, Diyala.
Effects of Insurgents on ISF / CF Complex Attacks

MAY 06
Two Large Scale Complex Attacks

Ramadi
181145MAY06
1 X CF CAS
~28 AIF KIA

Ad Duliyah
211506MAY06
22 X AI CAS
~11 AIF KIA

Note: Large scale attacks are twenty or more insurgents involved in one attack. The definition of a complex attack is an engagement with multiple weapon systems and involving two or more members in a group working in concert at the tactical level.

Assessment: In April, there were 6 large scale complex attacks: 4 in Ramadi, 1 in Fallujah and 1 in Baghdad. In May, there were just 2 large scale complex attacks: Ramadi and southwest Diyala. This reflects the relative lack of success against MNF using this TTP. Expect complex attacks against ISF and, where vulnerabilities are identified, against MNF.
Effects of Insurgents on ISF / CF Attack Targets

**Assessment:** The trend since January has seen a sharper increase in attacks against ISF in comparison to CF. Attack effectiveness against both CF and ISF has increased slightly in May. ISF (especially IP) remain more vulnerable by virtue of their greater exposure, less sophisticated force protection equipment.
**Effects of Insurgents on ISF / CF**

**IED Comparison**

**Assessment:** The sustained IED operational tempo in May likely reflects insurgent determination to maintain a high level of overall attacks. Use of simpler IEDs (in comparison to VBIEDs and suicide attacks) has increased. The reduction in EFP attacks from Apr is due to counter-IED operations targeting EFP cells, and improvements in training and ECM.
Effects of Insurgents on ISF / CF
VBIED Roll Up Nov 05-Apr 06

VBIED Events
MAY 06

VBIED Attacks From 1 Apr–31 May

3 Spike Day
10 days of 0 events
MAY
VBIED: 41
CAS: 520
G/A: 12.7
4 Spike Day
9 days of 0 events

Assessment: The decrease in VBIED events since March likely reflects the need to rebuild capacity for these more sophisticated weapon systems. VBIED attacks could re-surge as capacity is restored.
Jun-Nov 06 Hotspot Assessment

- **AT TAMIM-KIRKUK**
  - Potential for contained sectarian violence over issue of Kirkuk towards end of 2006

- **AL ANBAR**
  - T&FF intimidation of local Sunnis increases, hindering efforts to 'drive the wedge'
  - Large Sunni population infiltrated by multiple insurgent groups; significant freedom of movement/action

- **DIYALA / SALAH AD-DIN**
  - Sunni-Shi'a split in population. growing AQI presence causing sectarian violence flare ups
  - Increase in T&FF displaced from Al Anbar, Ninawa

- **S. BAGHDAD**
  - Latifiyah/Yusufiyah contested area for AQI
  - Mixed population likely to experience sectarian tension/violence

- **SOUTHERN PROVINCES**
  - Continued attacks on MNF by Shi'a militia
  - Increased Shi'a on Shi'a violence as Sadr challenges SCIRI for influence in advance of provincial elections
  - Sectarian violence primarily against Sunni minority driving direct Ig involvement in security situation
  - Extensive infiltration of IPS by JAM/Badr

- **BAGHDAD**
  - Vast majority of sectarian violence will occur in Baghdad over next six months; JAM increasing influence
  - Focal point for the Rejectionist fight against MNF, and T&FF efforts to spark self sustaining sectarian violence
Defeating AQI in 2006
Strategy

**Bottom Line:** AQI is carrying out its strategy as stated in documents recovered during OBJ LARCHWOOD. AQI is concentrating its efforts in Baghdad to halt the establishment of a functional Iraqi Government and ferment sectarian violence by targeting mixed and Shi'a dominant neighborhoods. AQI's second priority has been keeping the Foreign Fighter/Suicide Bomber routes open and establishing the Caliphate in Ramadi. In accordance with their strategy, AQI is additionally targeting ISF and Shi'a in Diyala province to undermine the government, ferment sectarian violence and develop staging areas to attack Baghdad.

- **Goal is to reduce pressure on Sunni areas**
  - Priority targets include Shi'a, ISF and militia
  - Diminish criticism from other Sunni contingents over Sunni casualties

- **Plan of action, focus on Baghdad**
  - First attack Shi'a areas to lull CF into a false sense of security in Sunni regions and at a later date resume attacking in Sunni areas
  - Targets include fixed elements: check points, bases, and major highways
  - Methods include snipers and IEDs

- **Benefits of sectarian violence**
  - Undermine Iraqi Government
  - Solidify Sunni Arab support
  - Position a conflict directly between Shi'a and Mujihaddin
## Primary AQI Areas of Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</table>
| **Baghdad** | Highest priority for AQI efforts  
- Movement of experienced operatives to Baghdad from northern Iraq  
- Movement is key to activities in Baghdad; “Baghdad Belts” north: Abu Ghurayb to Tal; south: Abu Ghurayb to Salman Pak facilitate operations  
- IEDs/VBIEDs/SVBIED/SVESTs targeting civilians and stationary IG targets  
- Attacks concentrated on mixed areas and Shi'a dominated areas  
- April-May: overall attack trends are down; attacks against civilians steady; attacks against CF/ISF down slightly. However, they are still at historically high attack levels |
| **Anbar** | Important province for entry of FF/Suicide Bombers and other material supporting AQI  
- AQI continues intense intimidation campaign in al Anbar  
- Coerced passive and limited Sunni support for AQI  
- Ramadi key city to controlling Anbar; largest population in Anbar; crossroad for transportation to/from Jordon and Wald; central access to Lake Thar Thar and Yusifiyah; desire to proclaim creation of Caliphate in the center of the Sunni triangle  
- Cooperation between AQI and rejectionist groups developing greater strains  
- AQI retains some freedom of movement; decreases with CF ops, increases as CF depart area  
- April-May: overall attacks against civilian, CF, ISF are down slightly |
| **Diyala** | Gaining in importance for operations in Baghdad and fermenting sectarian violence  
- Terrorist and foreign fighter groups increasingly exploit sectarian / tribal divides and stoke sectarian violence in Diyala  
- Terrorists operate primarily in southern and western Diyala, use area to stage for operations in Baghdad  
- Increased activity by members of former regime in cooperation with AQI, likely reflected in recent complex attacks  
- April-May: overall attacks on CF remain steady; attacks on ISF increasing |
### Situation

AQI will maintain presence where support persists; employ intimidation where support wanes
- Main operating areas Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Baqubah; still has presence in Mosul
- Iran used for sanctuary and key communication path to AQSL; Syria still most utilized country for facilitation of FF, money and equipment
- Baghdad the focus of attacks against civilians; CF/ISF focus of attacks in other areas; primary base of operations Ramadi to Baghdad corridor, particularly in out lying rural areas; CF/ISF operations in current AQI op areas will displace AQI into other locations; however, AQI will maintain solid presence in Baghdad
- Sunni provinces remain semi-permissive environments; foreign fighter flow reduced as result of internal and external GT efforts, concerted current CF ops against FFF in Iraq may impact flow over the next month

### Goals

Goals unchanged; major efforts in pursuit of:
- Establishment of a secure base from which to export terror from Iraq and creation of an Islamic state in Iraq
- Departure of a defeated MNF
- Destabilized nation, stop establishment of IG
- Radicalize Sunni base through generation of self-sustaining ethno-sectarian strife

### Operations and Methods

AQI will continue the use of terrorist attacks and a sophisticated I/O campaign
- Anti-Shi'a terrorist attacks and IO to maintain and provoke sectarian violence; Infrastructure attacks to interrupt basic services to de-legitimize IG
- Attack police and IA recruiting stations to halt growth; attack ISF to kill and/or intimidate members
- Assassinate opponents, government officials to intimidate and coerce to regain freedom of movement
- Appeal to Sunni Islamist roots to incite a civil war, enabling AQI to fill any void left when IG or provincial authority falls
- Attacks against MNF to break will of governments involved in coalition

### Support

Continued lessening of active or passive support from local communities
- AQI's indiscriminate targeting of civilians, Shi'a alienating AQSL and other T&FF groups' leadership
- AQI conducting intimidation campaign to stem loss of support, particularly in al-Anbar
- Continued external funding for AQI leadership from Gulf States; local cells funded by criminal activities
- Continued CT operations has impact on AQI ability to facilitate through AQI
- AQI does not attack in order to maintain permissive operating environment in
### Infrastructure – Facilitation Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Indications in May FF/SB crossed border with ERV in north and ERV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suicide attacks in Mosul, Tal Afar, Baghdad, Ramadi, and Fallujah indicate North route still preference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Routes Across Border</td>
<td></td>
<td>ERV route constrained or limited use. Two suicide attacks in Husaybah Indicate SB coming across at al-Qaim, but uncertain about facilitation down ERV. Suicide attacks in Fallujah, Ramadi, Hit and Baghdad could be supplied by Northern route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- North</td>
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<td>Some indications Waled-Rubah route used for facilitator and/or FF movement into Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>- ERV</td>
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<td>Leaders or facilitators may be using Saudi border, but no reporting of FF/SB crossing from KSA</td>
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<td>- South</td>
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<td>- Saudi crossings</td>
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**Assessment:**

Due to disruptions in northern route, expect increased activity on ERV, or possibly Walid route over the next month. Many Ghadiyah associates remaining who know ERV and northern facilitation routes. Likely build up of FF/SB at the border in waiting to cross into Iraq.
Infrastructure – Facilitation Networks

- Preference for northern route through Bi’aj, Mosul, down TRV, via Lake Thar Thar, and into Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad. No reflections route is closed
- ERV route constrained but still available
- Southern route through Walid to Rutbah or from Abu Kamal to Rutbah available but focuses on vehicle and oil smuggling, rather than human smuggling
Defeating AQI in 2006

- AQI remains the most dangerous terrorist group followed by Ansar Sunna, Islamic Army of Iraq and Mujahidin Army

- AQI continues efforts to provoke self sustaining sectarian violence in Baghdad and Diyala while pursuing other lines of operation including complex attacks on MNF/ISF

- Complex attacks increasing in sophistication and professionalism as hard-line Sunni Rejectionists bring military experience

- AQI showing indications of implementing some aspects of strategy outlined in OBJ LARCHWOOD Documents; heavily focused on Baghdad
  - Foment sectarian strife by focusing attacks against Shi’a in mixed and Shi’a-dominated districts; expand control of Sunni districts
  - Attacks against ISF and static checkpoints

- Key Vulnerabilities
  - Alienation from support base; loss of Sunni support; loss of funding
  - Interdiction of Foreign Fighter and supply routes, strongholds/staging areas
  - Coalition exploitation of OPSEC vulnerabilities; communications, detainee debriefs, materials from objectives
**Impact of Delay in Forming New Iraqi Government**

**BLUF:** Despite three month delay, Maliki's eventual selection presents opportunity for strong, effective government to serve full term. MNF-I's strategy not disrupted: compressed timelines for completion of some objectives (PIC, ministerial capacity development); Raising and training of ISF units largely unaffected. Security situation in Baghdad more complex; JAM influence increased, sectarian violence more significant. Maliki has opportunities to establish authority, regain lost momentum.

- Short-term challenges of delay outweighed by long-term benefits - unified, functional leadership, capable of effective governance. Allowed establishment of more widely accepted, stable government
- MNF-I strategy not significantly disrupted - development of ISF, IA in lead, securing borders - on track. Some objectives may be delayed - securing Baghdad, reducing violence to level ISF can handle
- Opportunity lost to capitalize on post-election enthusiasm: most other missed opportunities can be recovered with swift and determined action by Iraqi government
- Permanent government, established prior to the February Golden Mosque bombing, likely to have been more effective at controlling ethno-sectarian violence
- Delay enabled JAM to arm, increase influence; adding to complexity of Baghdad security environment. Extremists, Sunni Rejectionists reacted; increasing sectarian nature of fight. Opportunities for government action to improve security situation have been complicated
- Delay enabled Shi'a militias to increase influence. Iraqi government has opportunity to reassert authority through programs such as DDR
- MNF-I and coalition government involvement in deliberations of selection of PM strengthened international perceptions Iraqi politicians unable to resolve disputes without outside intervention
Government Effectiveness and Public Confidence:
- Quick formation of permanent government would have demonstrated Iraqi sovereignty; had stabilizing influence in Iraq
- Uncertainty surrounding tenure of ministers resulted in reluctance of administration to take decisions and implement policy. Progress against corruption stifled
- After Golden Mosque attack, opportunity existed for Iraqi officials to show leadership, call for calm and deploy ISF/MNF-I to prevent escalation of violence. Ja'fari statements overshadowed by al-Sistani and Sadr – Credit gained by Sadr could have been attributed to government
- Sadr’s political standing undamaged – received as many ministries as could be realistically expected. Ja'fari was Sadr’s first choice, Maliki unlikely to significantly hinder Sadrist influence in government

Security and Transition:
- Delay prevented establishment of DDR and other security policies to minimize the influence of militias
- Government formation prerequisite for transition to PIC. Delay and complex security situation set back provincial transitional schedule and some MNF-I draw down plans
- Ja'fari’s unwillingness to commit to IA-led operation against AQI in Ramadi resulted in loss of progress towards defeating AQI, consolidating Anbar Province and IO opportunity

Economic Development:
- Foreign investment, aid donations and debt relief delayed. Climate of economic uncertainty. Legislative inertia postponed economic reforms, particularly fuel liberalization laws

National Unity:
- Delay increased determination of Kurds to operate independent of central government. Damaged long-term prospects of Iraqi national unity
OPPORTUNITIES TO REGAIN LOST MOMENTUM

- Communicate that continued violence prolongs presence of foreign forces: end legitimacy of "honorable resistance"
- Address Sunni grievances; increase Sunni political inclusion
- Establish, communicate timetable for provincial elections, constitutional reform, moderation of de-Ba'athification
- Set realistic timeframe for basic services improvement, eg electricity: targets achievable and sustainable
- Present Government of Iraq as independent of foreign influence; dispel perception of Iraq as

  1.4b

- Quickly engage militias: embark on programs to reduce militia power - crucial initial step in implementing DDR
- Set and achieve targets for transition to PIC: announce province transition within first 100 days - demonstrates Iraqi sovereignty and MNF-I commitment to draw down
- Take responsibility for foreign debt relief: announce progress and explain benefits. Benefits medium to long term, but announcement shows strong Iraqi Government in control of economic destiny
- Encourage neighbors to establish full embassies in Iraq, deal on equal terms: Use Arab League Baghdad Conference to announce that security situation in parts of Iraq permits transition
- Demonstrate willingness to tackle corruption: prosecute offenders. Will encourage investment and build confidence
Trends to watch

- Attacks in Baghdad increase as AQI and JAM continue to contest territory and influence.
- Expansion of ethno-sectarian violence from Baghdad to SW Diyala.
- Expansion of Shi'a on Shi'a violence in southern provinces in run-up to provincial elections.
- Increase of large-scale complex attacks as AQI/AS leverage former regime members' military experience.
- "Industrial-scale" manufacturing of indigenous EFPs.
- Increased use of Iraqi suicide bombers.
- Establishment of Sunni militia.
- Assassination of Sunni political/tribal leaders.
Ten Bad Things

- Sadr directs JAM to shut down southern LOCs in response to MNF provocation
- to Shi’a, Sunni and AQI organizations in response to UNSC resolution
- AQSL relocates from Waziristan to NW
- Sunni politicians, coerced by AQI/hard-line Rejectionists, withdraw from political process
- AQI seizes, and holds for 24 hrs, Baghdad district
- Major failure of Iraqi Security Forces (subversion or military failure)
- Assassination of key leader (Sistani, PM, President, MAS)
- Catastrophic attack on iconic religious symbol
- Catastrophic PKK terrorist attack against Ankara initiates major military cross-border incursion by Turkey or
- Major AQI attack on oil export infrastructure in the south
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT – Mid 2006

- Sectarian parties create a government of national unity with representation in rough proportion to their December electoral success. Consequently, government effectiveness is challenged by sectarian agendas over direction of key ministries, control of key resources and particularly the strategy to confront insurgents and control militias.

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions to a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists. Cycles of sectarian strife define the pattern of violence in 2006. However, expected hardening ethno-sectarian identities, limited population displacements, and periodic militia mobilization will be insufficient to stop political and economic developments.

- T&FF remain a critical threat to the MNF-I end-state in 2006. AQI increasingly augmented by former hardline Rejectionist factions with anti-Coalition, anti-IG agendas. AMZ unyielding in his efforts to continue anti-Shi’a attacks to create self-sustaining sectarian violence; employing intimidation to coerce Sunni support. AQI aims are to expel the Coalition, render parts of Iraq ungovernable and create an Islamic caliphate from which to expand jihad.

- Sunni Rejectionists will continue “talk and fight” strategy over an extended period, adjusting levels of violence to achieve political aims with most ultimately adopting the mantle of an “honorable resistance.” A significant number of hardliners, rejecting political developments and fearing Shi’a domination, militias, join Sunni extremist/terrorist ranks, bringing professional military skills with them. Saddamists increasingly irrelevant.

- Militia organizations, acting both as extra-legal bodies and within government structures at multiple levels will pursue sectarian agendas; they respond militarily to perceived or actual provocations, undermining the government’s ability to improve the security environment and radicalizing moderate elements through fear. Shi’a militia support of political agendas during preparations for provincial elections or misinterpretation of CF actions will be potentially destabilizing.

- Failure by the new Iraqi government to establish an inclusive political framework and effective governance, free from undue that controls sectarian violence exploited by Sunni and Shi’a extremists, is the greatest long-term risk to MNF objectives.


1. How will AQI/AS pursue the strategy of inciting civil war?
2. Where are the critical support bases and infrastructure to support terrorist operations and who/where are the key enablers?
3. Is the new government broadly perceived as representative and is its policies and programs generating continued support for the political process?
4. Has unrestrained, self-sustaining sectarian strife spread?
5. Are militias mobilizing, stockpiling weapons and/or increasing their territorial control?
6. Are there indications of forced population movements?
7. Have Iraqi Rejectionists strategies and objectives changed?
8. Is Coalition outreach strategy with Sunnis increasing support for the Iraqi government? Are outreach efforts generating political backlash?

10. Is sectarian violence creating fractures within the Iraqi Armed Forces?
11. Are Ministries developing critical capabilities to deliver essential services, address the insurgency and reduce ethno-sectarian tensions?
Back Up Slides
Sunni Rejectionists

- Maintain dual track strategy – "talk and fight"
- Sunni engagement will achieve mixed results by mid-2006; reduction in attacks minimal through autumn
  - Only evidence of MNF withdrawal, effective IG governance, redress of Sunni grievances will remove insurgent motivations
  - Attack trends flat or rising even in the face of MNF transition to ISF
  - Localized groups/cells, no central leadership or direction makes engagement difficult
- Grievances remain: Shi’ā domination of IG institutions; security situation; lack of basic services, economic opportunities; attacks by Shi’ā militias; ongoing MNF “occupation”; intimidation of key Sunni leaders; detentions
  - Sunnis will likely protest ministerial selections if seen as inequitable; protests will center around control of the MoI and MoD
  - Increased activity by Shi’ā militias may pressure Sunnis to follow through with plans to form local militia groups for protection
  - Groups claim status as "honorable resistance", defenders of Sunni interests, but may lose momentum in face of national unity government
- Continued strategic incoherence
  - Some remain committed to insurgency
  - Some will engage with the political process
  - Early evidence of hardliners aligning with AQI
Terrorists and Foreign Fighters

- AQI remains most dangerous terrorist group, followed by Ansar al-Sunna, Islamic Army of Iraq and Mujahidin Army
  - AQI and AS areas of operation limited by ability to move FF, members and material between population centers
  - Baghdad remains top terrorist priority
- AQI continues to differ with other T&FF groups over strategy
  - Divisions between AQI and AS primarily over tactics, targets
  - Groups continue to cooperate at tactical and operational levels
  - AQSL effort to reunify T&FF and alter Zarqawi methods, underscores seriousness of their concern that Zarqawi’s tactics have hurt the Jihad
- Sectarian violence and dissatisfaction with political process may increase IZR Sunni cooperation with T&FF; increase sophistication and professionalism of attacks
- Freedom of movement to train, plan, practice and engage in a time and place of their choosing increases T&FF effectiveness
**Militia Influences**

**Bottom Line:** Militia remain entrenched in Shi’a and Kurdish communities. Without government action by summer 2006, militia influence will grow. Militias remain potential catalysts for ethno-sectarian violence; they derive from, act on behalf of sectarian not national interests. Militias will continue to propagate a climate of intimidation and disregard for the rule of law.

- Militia infiltration of ISF, particularly Iraqi Police (IP), reduces IP effectiveness and public confidence
- Badr Organization presence in Ministry of Interior facilitates sectarian agenda and targeting of Sunnis, encourages JAM to engage in similar activities
- JAM capable of rapid mobilization in Baghdad, throughout southern Iraq; greatest militia threat to MNF
  - Not subject to government control, operates outside the law – but with links to IP
  - JAM at increased readiness, prepared to respond to attacks or threats on Shi’a
  - Presence in government likely to grow as Sadr rewards supporters with key positions
  - JAM likely heavily involved in sectarian killings; target ISF units who are free of JAM influence: IA members, ISOF, SWAT units
  - JAM moving into Kirkuk, to oppose Kurd independence, rally local Shi’a around JAM
- Competition between Shi’a militias at national and provincial level are a threat to stability
- Peshmerga remains most effective militia in Iraq, essentially a Kurdish army; acts as guarantor of Kurdish autonomy
  - Elements of Peshmerga assimilated with 4th Div IA; will act to protect Kurd interest first
JUNE 2006 ASSESSMENT
Changing Nature of the Struggle in Iraq

MG Zahner
June 2006

The Overall Classification of this briefing is:
Changing Nature of the Conflict

The conflict in Iraq is transitioning to a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists. Cycles of sectarian strife will overlay, then define the pattern of violence in 2006. Sunni Rejectionists have arrived at a crossroads of continued insurgency, political engagement, or radicalization towards AQI/AS. Large-scale violence is no longer limited to "The Insurgency" but employed by an increasingly divergent array of militias, terrorist groups, criminals, former elites and Sunni Rejectionists to further individual agendas. The complex environment will confront the Iraqi government with insurgent, criminal and sectarian violence that challenges its critical need to deliver basic services and security to gain legitimacy and reduce underlying causes of violence.
**Hotspot Assessment**

**NINAWA / SALAH AD-DIN**
- Mosul remains a key staging area for AQI & AS
- Corridor for foreign fighter flow into Iraq remains

**AT TAMIM-KIRKUK**
- Potential for contained sectarian violence over issue of Kirkuk towards end of 2006

**AL ANBAR**
- T&FF intimidation of local Sunnis increases, hindering efforts to 'drive the wedge'
- Sunni population infiltrated by multiple insurgent groups; continued significant freedom of movement/action

**DIYALA**
- Sunni-Shi'a split in population, growing AQI presence causing sectarian violence flare-ups
- Increase in T&FF displaced from Al Anbar, Ninawa

**SOUTHERN PROVINCES**
- Continued attacks on MNF by JAM
- Increased Shi'a on Shi'a violence as Sadr challenges SCIRI for influence in advance of provincial elections
- Militias, criminal and political parties' agendas increasingly intermixed
- Extensive infiltration of IPS by JAM/Badr

**BAGHDAD**
- Vast majority of sectarian violence will occur in Baghdad over next six months; JAM expanding, increasing influence
- Focal point for the Rejectionist fight against MNF, and T&FF efforts to spark self sustaining sectarian violence
Cycle of sectarian violence

Assessment: In the last 6 months, cycles of sectarian violence revolved around AQI efforts to "spike" Shi'a casualties and JAM retaliatory violence. Sunni and Shi'a extremists have succeeded in maintaining a level of sectarian strife that has undermined confidence in the Iraqi government. Overall, a "sustained steady state" in heightened sectarian tensions since February continues, but not self-sustaining strife.

Since Golden Mosque, nine times more murders than VBIED/SVBIED kills

Golden Mosque

Unified Sunni counter action

Shi'a/JAM reaction

Shi'a/JAM counter reaction

Action: 22 February
Golden mosque bombing calculated to draw a violent reaction from Shi'a militants

Reaction: 22-23 February Shi'a/JAM attacks against Sunni Mosque; increased murders

Counter Action: 29 February - 12 March VBIED attacks against SN's civilian targets

Counter Reaction: AMZ likely calculates next phase will see increased attacks from JAM elements

VBIED and SVBIED Civilian Casualties
VBIED and SVBIED Civilian Deaths
Murders and Executions

Sunni Counteraction

TFF attack Shiite Mosque

TFF VBIEDs/SVBIED Attacks
Mid-2006: State of AQI

- AMZ remains firmly entrenched as leader of AQI, driving force behind Mujahidin Shura Council

- Continues efforts to incite self-sustaining sectarian violence, provoking Shi'a with mass casualty attacks

- Concentrating efforts in Baghdad as the strategic priority undermine, then destroy the Iraqi government, fomenting sectarian violence by targeting mixed and Shi'a dominant neighborhoods

- Attempting to establish Ramadi/Anbar as base for Caliphate in Iraq; functioning facilitation network/foreign fighter/suicide bomber routes critical to the Caliphate/global jihad

- Seeks to instigate sectarian division in Diyala Province by capitalizing on religious, ethnic, and tribal differences
  - Diyala completes Baghdad “belt” facilitating attacks in Baghdad from surrounding support bases

- Continues to pursue transnational operations, reinforcing its network and increasing its threat as a regional terrorist organization

- AQI/AS complex attack capability will increase, benefiting from greater inclusion of former regime military in planning and execution of attacks
Attacks increasingly focused in the eastern Euphrates River Valley, Baghdad and western Diyala
- Reflection of increased counterterrorism activities, previous operations, and reduction in T&FF freedom of movement

- Reflects strategic decision by AQI to focus efforts in central Iraq, particularly Baghdad
  - Plan and stage operations in Baghdad
  - Create chaos; make Iraq ungovernable

- Cooperation between AQI and hard-line IZR based on shared goals in Baghdad
Sunni Rejectionists

Bottom Line: Sunni Rejectionists will continue current attack levels throughout 2006; some hard-liners joining extremists, but by years end popular support for a purely Rejectionist agenda will wane.

- Steady attacks against MNF will continue throughout 2006 as ‘occupation’ weariness, fear of Iraqi government props up insurgency.
- By 2007 Sunni Rejectionists will weaken as security situation improves and effective governance becomes evident.
- Majority of Sunni Rejectionists will continue the insurgency; hard-line minority will be drawn towards terrorist groups, particularly AQI, others will elect political engagement.
- Hard-line Rejectionists, including former military, joining ranks of extremists, will enhance T&FF attack options – more complex attacks.
- Relationships with AQI increasingly characterized by AQI campaign of intimidation and coercion.
Militia influences

**Bottom Line:** Militia remain entrenched in Shi’a and Kurdish communities. Delay in formation of government allowed militia influence to grow, particularly in Baghdad and the south. Militias, especially JAM, remain catalysts for ethno-sectarian violence; they largely derive from and act on behalf of sectarian rather than national interests. Militias will continue to generate a climate of intimidation and disregard for the rule of law.

- JAM and Badr abuse government authority and target Sunnis suspected of supporting terrorists or MNF; destabilizing urban areas
  - Infiltrating, intimidating ISF; limited cooperation to target Sunnis
- JAM is expanding and responding to AQI provocation; maintaining heightened levels of ethno-sectarian violence with kidnapping/death squads
  - Continues to target Sunnis in retribution executions, seeks to dominate mixed districts in Baghdad; also consolidates control over Shi’a dominated areas through use of JAM-operated Shari’a courts
  - Capable of rapid mobilization in Baghdad and south
  - Benefits from weapons and training from and surrogates to increase its attacks on MNF
  - Opportunistic relationship with and
- Badr legally increasing presence in ISF, though motives remain sectarian
- Peshmerga remains largest and most effective militia
  - Will act to protect Kurdish interests over national interests; final guarantor of Kurdish autonomy
Conclusion

- Iraq is more violent, but not all violence is insurgent based (ethno-sectarian strife and overall attacks against civilians remains elevated from pre-Samarra Mosque period)

- AQI, the most dangerous terrorist group, remains adaptive with Zarqawi firmly entrenched as leader and is enacting a revised strategy with the main effort focused on Baghdad, Ramadi, and Diyala

- Majority of Sunni Rejectionists will continue insurgency; radicalized hard-line minority will be drawn towards terrorist groups (improving extremist’s weapons and tactics capability for complex attacks), others will elect political engagement

- Militias will continue to perpetuate a climate of intimidation and disregard for the rule of law. JAM is the single largest perpetrator of sectarian strife in the Baghdad area. JAM will continue efforts to expand their area of influence, particularly in run-up to provincial elections

- Public confidence in the effectiveness of the Iraqi government, including the Security Forces has declined reflecting dissatisfaction with levels of basic services, security challenges and ethno-sectarian distrust