

~~SEC: T//REL USA MCFI~~



Iraq Update

SECDEF

21 June 2006

~~SECRET//REL USA MCFI~~



Bottom Line Up Front ✓

- Government formation process and Samarra bombing have added complexity to security situation.
- Will take about six months to see if this government can make a difference. *EDR - Benchmark 11/5/11*
- Sectarian violence and looming confrontation with illegal armed groups complicates drawdown plans. *Bashed 6/5/11 Police*
- Army development remains on track - logistics and ministerial development lag.
- Major effort needed to rebuild confidence in police.
- Transfers of Provincial Control have begun and can continue through 2006/7.

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Assumptions (1 of 2)

Political Situation -- "The new GOI will form in early 2006"

- The delay in government formation contributed to a more complex security environment *sectarian violence; militia; politics*

Al Qaeda in Iraq -- "AQI's ability to foment sectarian violence is the most dangerous threat in 2006"

- The elimination of AMZ was a major blow to the network, but we expect AQI to continue attacks to foment civil war focused on Baghdad *Big event*

The Insurgency -- "The political process, in combination with MNF-I reductions, will diminish the Sunni Rejectionist component of the insurgency"

- Sunni participation in the political process has yet to impact levels of violence - *will take a while*

Armed Groups -- "Shi'a militia violence can be contained with local security efforts"

- Looming confrontation with Sadr; GOI may lack will and capability to deal with it → *ISF can't do themselves*

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Assumptions (2 of 2)

✓ Iraqi Security Forces -- *"ISF development will continue to match projections"*


- Remains on track; ~ 50% of the IA is in the lead for COIN operations; police development progressing, but police loyalty questionable in some areas; ministerial capacity is developing but at a slower pace

1.4b, 1.4d

Coalition-GOI Relationship -- *"The GOI will continue to support the presence of MNF-I until the Coalition has completed its mission"*

- The new GOI supports continued MNF-I presence in the short term.
- There will be tension between our desire to withdraw forces and the perceived security situation



SOFA



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

Concept of Transition



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Projected Iraqi Army Lead



* 3/9 not formed

IA Endstate (DIV/BDE/BN) – 10 Divisions, 36 Brigades, 112 Battalions

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Provincial Iraqi Control

June 2006

December 2006

Ready for Transition
Partially Ready For Transition
Not Ready For Transition/ TBD

June 2007

December 2007

29

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Projections and Goals (2006-2007)

	2006							2007											
Projections	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Train and Equip IA							★												
Train and Equip Police							★												
IA Divisions in Lead	2	4	5	7	8		9	★ 10											
JHQ/IGFC in Lead				★															
Provincial Iraqi Control		5	7	8	9	11	13	15	16										
Detainee Transfer			★ Abu Ghraib Closed					★ Ft. Suse								★ Bucca		★ Cropper	
MNF-I Reductions	14		12				10-12						7-8						5-6
Goals																			
Baghdad + 9 Cities Secure										★									
National Reconciliation		★				★													
Reintegration Process			★														★		
Border Security							★												
Defeat AQI													★						

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
Benchmarks for Progress

June	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Baghdad Security Plan
July	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Decision on constitutional amendment process and provincial elections■ Announcement of reconciliation plan■ De-Ba'athification plan announcement
August	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Announce conditions-based security transition road map■ Militia Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) plan
September	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Iraqi chain of command■ Intelligence reorganization
October	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Economic liberalization legislative package■ Rule of law legislative package■ National reconciliation agreement
November	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ International Compact
December	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Iraqi Army in the Lead

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Force Reduction Projection



US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF

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RESS

-5 MOS-

(b)(6)

① GOOD - UNITY - SECURITY - PROSPERITY

- 2 WKS - TIME TO GET LEGS UNDER THEM

- RELEASE

- BAD SEC PLAN

- PIC

- WTL RECONCILIATION

21/3 CH
STRESS

② COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

- NOT HURT / NOT DEAD - DOCUMENTS

- LEGIT ARMED GROUPS

- SUNNI DISAGREEMENT - CONDITIONS SET FOR RETRY

1.4b, 1.4d

- INDICATED NOT BEHIND GEOMETRICALLY

NO SAFE NUM

NOT STOP POL PLACE

NOT STOP ISF DEV

14/18 < 9
- 30 MI RADIUS
(WIDE AREA)

③ ISF PROGRESS

ARMY - 3/18/16 75% 30 34E; 900 40Y

LEAD

1/4/23 - 10 MOS 400

POLICE - UNARMED - WITNESSES MOI CAPTURED

- PIC - MULTIMULT EXPAN

MID CAPACITY

④ WELL-PROTECTED
ONA/ISF/Parade

⑤

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Iraq Update and Way Ahead


Tank Update

21 June 2006

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The Campaign



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
Situation

- Al Qaida continuing efforts to foment civil war; Baghdad is their focus
- Illegal Armed Groups continue to conduct kidnappings and murders; Baghdad is their focus
- There is increasing violence fueled by 1.4b, 1.4d Sadr confrontation looming
- The fundamental conflict in Iraq is between and among its ethnic and sectarian groups over the distribution of power
- Ineffective government plus Samarra bombing and aftermath have created a more complex security environment
- The Government of National Unity is stronger however the pressures of on-going sectarian violence, lagging basic needs, and weak economic development will make it harder for the new government to demonstrate substantial progress
- The Sunni population is currently participating in the political process and may be recalculating their alternatives with respect to the insurgency
- New government will likely exercise their sovereignty more and press for "Way Ahead" on coalition presence and detainees
- Army development on track; police development progressing, but police loyalty questionable in some areas
- Completion of political process and recent operations have positioned us for decisive action over the next year

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Evolving Security Environment



~~SECRET//REL USA MCFI~~



Strategy

The US Mission and Coalition Forces and the sovereign GOI will pursue an integrated civil-military strategy that seeks to progressively improve the capabilities of Iraqi institutions to enhance unity, to improve security and to build prosperity

This strategy is shaped by a central tenet: enduring strategic success in Iraq will be achieved by Iraqis. Our approach will increasingly place the GOI and its institutions in the lead across all lines of operation, first with Coalition monitoring and support, and then with progressively less support until they can govern effectively without our assistance

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Joint Mission Statement

The US Mission and Coalition Forces will, in support of the Government of Iraq, contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the terrorists and irreconcilable insurgents, bringing other insurgents into the political process, reducing sectarian tensions and militias and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror

~~SECRET//REL USA MGFI~~



Evolution of the Mission

August 2004 Campaign Plan

MNF-I...conducts full spectrum counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists...

April 2005 Campaign Action Plan

MNF-I...progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces...

May 2006 Joint Campaign Plan

USEMB and MNF-I...contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions...

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Concept of Operations - Phases

Phase One – Stabilization (2006 to Early/Mid 2007)

- **Objective:** Stabilize the security situation to the point where political and economic development can take place without disruption.
- **Endstate:** Iraqi Army in the lead, AQI defeated and conditions set for the transfer of security responsibilities to capable Iraqi civil authorities. Ministerial and provincial development continuing.

Phase Two – Restoration of Civil Authority (Early/Mid 2007 to Early/Mid 2008)

- **Objective:** Place capable Iraqi civil authorities in the lead for security throughout Iraq. Build accountable local and national governments underpinned by a robust rule of law program.
- **Endstate:** Insurgency neutralized, Iraqi civil authorities in the lead, GOI ministries and institutions operating with minimum Coalition support and more normal security relationships established.


Phase Three – Support to Self-Reliance (Early/Mid 2008 Thru 2009)


- **Objective:** Achieve Iraqi self-reliance, across all lines of operation.
- **Endstate:** Achievement of our campaign endstate: Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists

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Lines of Operation






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
Security Lines of Operation



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

ISF Trained and Equipped



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Projected Iraqi Army Lead



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


IGFC Assumption of C2 (Iraqi Army Divisions)

September 2006


IGFC reaches IOC

5 x IA DIVs




October 2006

8 x IA DIVs



December 2006

9 x IA DIVs



March 2007

10 x IA DIVs



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Provincial Iraqi Control

June 2006



December 2006



June 2007



December 2007



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Projections and Goals (2006-2007)


Projections	2006												2007											
	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D					
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<u>Goals</u>																								
Baghdad + 9 Cities Secure										★														
National Reconciliation		★				★																		
Reintegration Process			★															★						
Border Security							★																	
Defeat AQI													★											

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C2 Transformation Concept

Combines MNF-I and MNC-I into CJTF-I




Common to all CJTF Options:

- 4-star leadership for:
 - Strategic engagement with GOI and ISF
 - Ensure Campaign Plan sustains momentum
 - Build US Embassy support in execution of Campaign Plan
 - OSC needed to continue development of MoD and MoI; develop normal defense relationship with Iraq
- HQ element in the International Zone to drive Campaign Plan development across all lines of operation with US Embassy

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Basing



Jun 2005 = 110 Bases
Jun 2006 = 69 Bases
Dec 2006 = 57 Bases
Jun 2007 = 30 Bases
Dec 2007 = 11 Bases

- Contingency Operating Base (COB)
- Forward Operating Base (FOB)
- Convoy Support Center (CSC)
- Theater Internment Facility (TUF)

~~SECRET//REL USA MGFI~~



Risks

- Loss of Coalition will
- Collapse of National Unity Government
- Sectarian violence leading to sustained sectarian conflict
- Fracture of Iraqi Security Forces along sectarian lines
- Illegal Armed Groups remain unchecked by government and fuel sectarian conflict
- Sunni population decides to support AQI out of 1.4b, 1.4d
1.4b, 1.4d
- Rampant corruption and failure of the rule of law
- Strategic surprise
- Loss of or diminishing consent for Coalition presence/freedom of action

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What Do We Need?

Interagency

- Continue diplomatic pressure on Iraq's neighbors to curb support for extremist groups in Iraq
- Regional engagement to increase support for the GOI
- Establish policy for enduring, normal security relationship
- Engage donor nations to follow through on pledges to sustain reconstruction post-IRRF

DOD

- Sustain force provider requirements in line with the changing nature of operations
- Sustain strategic, operational and potentially three MSC headquarters through the end of 2007

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Back-Up Slides

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Priority Objectives for Next 12 Months

- A government of national unity composed of representatives of all major political forces and led by professional and competent ministers (EMB)
- Adoption by the government of an ambitious program of reforms and action to improve the lives of the Iraqi people (EMB)
- An accommodation between the Iraqi government and the insurgents that results in an improving security situation (EMB/MNF)
- Baghdad and nine key cities secure (MNF/EMB)
- A governmental strategy to diminish the influence of Illegal Armed Groups (MNF/EMB)
- Iraqi government and security forces taking responsibility for security in an increasing number of areas. Police at a level where they can continue assuming responsibilities for domestic order (MNF)
- An increased capacity of Iraqi ministries and provincial governments to deliver good governance and basic services (EMB/MNF)
- An increased capacity by the Iraqi government to establish law and order through the rule of law and effective institutions. Detainee operations transferred to Iraqi control (EMB/MNF)
- Increased economic growth led by the private sector. (EMB)
- Containment and roll back of 1.4b, 1.4d in Iraq and a strategic change in 1.4b, 1.4d
1.4b, 1.4d (EMB/MNF)
- A significant increase in the political and economic support from the international community and regional neighbors (EMB)

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Assumptions (1 of 2)

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- The delay in government formation contributed to a more complex security environment

Al Qaeda in Iraq -- *"AQI's ability to foment sectarian violence is the most dangerous threat in 2006"*

- The elimination of AMZ was a major blow to the network, but we expect AQI to continue attacks to foment civil war focused on Baghdad

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1.4b, 1.4d

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- The new GOI supports continued MNF-I presence in the short term. There will be tension between our desire to withdraw forces and the perceived security situation

~~SECRET~~ ~~REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



Force Structure Assessment

21 June 2006

This briefing is classified

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~~REL USA, AUS, GBR~~

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: 6 June 2016

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Bottom Line Up Front

- **Formation of the Iraqi Government, coupled with the continuing development of the Iraqi Security Forces and the death of Zarqawi, sets the conditions to go forward with the next force structure step.**
- **On 5 May 06 we discussed the option for:**
 - **2/28 ID is replaced with in-country forces ✓**
 - **2/1 ID (based in Germany) does not deploy to Iraq; remains in Germany, prepared to deploy if additional forces required.**
 - **Announce formal off-ramp decision after formation of Prime Minister Maliki's Government.**
- **We have also completed our June Force Structure Assessment and recommend that we do not backfill 2 additional brigades that will depart in August. (-2000 People) /**
- **Still require Call Forward Force and PTDO force to mitigate risk.**
- **Will discuss with Prime Minister in early July.**

~~SEC.~~ //REL USA MGFI



Situation

- Government formation process and Samarra bombing have added complexity to security situation.
- Will take about six months to see if this government can make a difference.
- Sectarian violence and looming confrontation with illegal armed groups complicates drawdown plans.
- Army development remains on track - logistics and ministerial development lag.
- Major effort needed to rebuild confidence in police.
- Transfers of Provincial Control have begun and can continue through 2006/7.

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Progress


- Continued progress in Iraqi Security Force development.
 - Over 265,000 Iraqi Security Forces now trained and equipped (increase of ~ 50,000 since Nov 05).
 - 2 divisions, 18 brigades, and 69 battalions have assumed the lead in their areas (increase of one division, 14 brigades, and 46 battalions since Nov 05).
 - 5 divisions, ~32 brigades, and ~94 Iraq Army battalions are projected to assume the lead by the end of Sep 06.
 - Continued professional performance by Iraqi Security Forces:
 - Exceptional performance of security forces in support of Referendum, Election and Arba'een security support.
 - Recent performance against the enemy in Baghdad and Diyala Provinces also very positive.
 - Police performance improving; but, in some places, loyalty remains questionable.

69
46
23

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

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Projected Iraqi Army Lead




* 3/9 not formed

IA Endstate (DIV/BDE/BN) – 10 Divisions, 36 Brigades, 112 Battalions

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



Security Forces in Iraq



From ~93,000 Mol forces in June 05 to ~ 166,000 Mol forces in June 06

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



Opportunity

- Continuing the gradual, conditions-based reduction of Coalition forces, tied to improved Iraqi Security Force capability, and done from a position of strength, can:
 - + Build on the continued success of the Iraqi Security Forces.
 - + Help the new Iraqi Government build momentum and gain legitimacy.
 - + Create sense of urgency in the Iraqi Government and its security forces
 - + Undercut those calling for a Coalition withdrawal timeline.
 - + Continue to remove a central motivation attracting foreign fighters and drawing Iraqis into the insurgency.
 - + Send a signal that we are making progress.
 - + Send a signal to Iraqis that we mean what we say, "As you stand up, we stand down."

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



Unknowns

- The effectiveness of the new Iraqi Government.
- Impact of the expected increased exercise of sovereignty.
- Impact of the illegal armed group threat in southeastern and central Iraq as well as the impact of efforts to address the militia challenge.
- Impact of the political process Sunni engagement on the insurgency.
- Impact of Zarqawi's death on AQIZ operations.
- Impact of AQIZ's continuing efforts to foment sectarian violence.
- Cumulative impact of increased Iraqi Army assumption of security lead and associated Coalition force transitions in the next six months.

1.4b, 1.4d

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



Risks if we do

- Going too fast could unhinge ISF progress – Moderate.
- Reduction in tactical and operational effectiveness and flexibility – Moderate.
- Insurgency increases in size and effectiveness and threatens political and economic progress – Moderate.
- Misperceived as US “running away” and creation of expectation for continuous reduction – Moderate.
- Ministries cannot sustain security forces – Moderate.
- Employment of a PTDO force could be seen as regressing – Moderate.

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~




Risks if we don't

- Misses opportunity to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the new Iraqi Government.
- Misses opportunity to demonstrate progress and take advantage of the positive developments in Iraq.
- Misses opportunity to demonstrate that we do intend to depart as Iraqi Security Forces improve.
- Demonstrates a lack of confidence in Iraqi Security Force capability.
- Increases the potential for Iraqi dependency on Coalition forces.
- Strengthens perception of occupation in Iraq.

~~SECRET~~//REL USA, AUS, GBR



Force Structure Projection



~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



Bottom Line / Way Ahead

- Request approval for:
 - Not backfill three brigades of Coalition Forces in Iraq
 - Retain one brigade in Kuwait and one on PTDO to mitigate risk
 - Announce formal off-ramp decision after consultation with the GOI (~ Early Jul 06)
- Way Ahead:
 - Coordinate message across the US Government, Coalition Partners, and the Iraqi Government.
 - Next MNF-I force structure assessment in September 06; will assess opportunity for additional force restructuring.

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Conditions

(5 Jan 06 Tank Briefing)

- Formation of a representative Iraqi government by Spring 2006.
- Political process and Sunni engagement diminishes violence to level that the ISF can contain (with Coalition support) in affected areas.
- Threat of sectarian / militia-led violence remains low.
- Iraqi Army / Police development continues near projected levels; ISF assuming battlespace are consistently able to hold it.
- Iraqis assume greater security responsibility for Baghdad; improved security in the other 9 key cities
- Sustained success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and border regions.
- Security ministries continue to improve and can sustain forces with Coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to Coalition reductions.



Options to add 50 Battalions to Iraqi Army

- +50 Battalions @ 750 per Battalion = 37,500 add'l Soldiers.
 - 2350 Officer; 16750 NCO; 18850 Enlisted.
 - 2 years, ~\$2B one time, \$.75B annual.
- Two COAs
 - #1 Add 2xCompanies to each of 93 existing Infantry Battalions.
 - \$1.8B one-time; \$.7B annual sustainment.
 - #2 Add 4th Battalion to each Brigade plus 4 new Brigades.
 - \$2B one-time; \$.8B sustainment.
 - Infrastructure cost TBD depends on stationing. COA #2 costs more.
 - Analysis required to determine required logistics support increase.
 - Train (24 Months); Equip (5 months); Station (12 months).
- LIMFACs
 - Training thrupt requires 2 yrs. Officer (1K/yr) and Enlisted (10K/yr).
 - Can mitigate Enlisted to 1 yr if 5 (v13) wk Basic Training.
 - Can mitigate Officer to 1 yr if accept ~1K former Army officers.
 - Iraqi Budget ability to absorb additional costs.



SECRET // REL TO USA and MCFI//20160623



Porus

IRAQ UPDATE

23 June 2006

SECRET // REL TO USA and MCFI//20160623

~~SECRET//REL USA MCFI~~

Public?



Benchmarks for Progress

June	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Baghdad Security Plan
July	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Decision on constitutional amendment process and provincial elections■ Announcement of reconciliation plan■ De-Ba'athification plan announcement
August	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Announce conditions-based security transition road map■ Militia Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) plan
September	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Iraqi chain of command■ Intelligence reorganization
October	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Economic liberalization legislative package■ Rule of law legislative package■ National reconciliation agreement
November	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ International Compact
December	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Iraqi Army in the Lead

~~SECRET//REL USA MCFI~~




Projections and Goals (2006-2007)

	2006												2007							
Projections	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	
Train and Equip IA							★													
Train and Equip Police							★													
IA Divisions in Lead	2	4	5	7	8		9	10												
JHQ/IGFC in Lead				★																
Provincial Iraqi Control		5	7	8	9	11	13	15	16											
Detainee Transfer			★	Abu Ghraib Closed				★	Ft. Suse											
MNF-I Reductions	14		12				10-12						7-8							
Goals																				
Baghdad + 9 Cities Secure								★												
National Reconciliation		★				★														
Reintegration Process			★															★		
Border Security							★													
Defeat AQI													★							

~~SECR.~~ REL USA MCFI




Force Reduction Projection



US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF



VNF-W




US BCTs: 15

~~ECR REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



06-08 Theater Reserve/PTDO



~~ECR REL USA, GBR, AUS~~



Force Flow Changes/Options

Changes Based on SecDef decisions 22 Sept 06

- Approved extension of 1/1 AD by 46 days (new TOA w/1/3 ID 17 Feb 07).
- 1/3 ID will NOT serve as a PTDO prior to arrival in Kuwait (18 Jan 07)
- 3/3 ID MAY be designated as PTDO effective 14 Feb 07
- 3/3 MAY be the replacement for 1/34 ID (Theater Security Brigade)
- SecDef has approved use of 2/82(-) and MEU as PTDO effective 3 Nov 06

Decisions: (assumptions based on commitment of 3/3 ID to PTDO and potential backfill for 1/34 ID)

- ★ Do NOT backfill 172 SBCT, Leave 4/1 CD as TR **18 NOV 06** (prior to 4/1 CD coming North from Kuwait)
- ★ Bring 3/3 ID Forward to replace 1/34 ID as Theater Security Bde **7 Dec 06** (normal 105 day flow from ordering ship to LAD) Can either bring 3/3 ID in as TR or to replace 1/34 ID IF 4/1 CD has NOT backfilled 172 SBCT. Assumes 3/3 ID available for alert notification on this date. APS5 utilization could be considered to mitigate shipping issues if required
- ★ Bring 4/1 CD forward from TR to replace 1/34 ID and leave 3/3 as PTDO or bring them forward as TR. **8 MAR 07**

CRE) L TO US, AUS, GBR

06 - 08 FOI E ROTATION

OIF/OEF 05-07

SE LAD DATE

OIF/OEF 06-08

TOA DATE



V CORPS

BOG 06 JAN 07

 MND-N BOG 23 SEPT 06	3 BCT - 101AA 1 BCT - 101AA 3 BCT - 4 ID 	 3BCT- 2 ID (5132) 	 	 	X X TOA 13 SEP 06 LAD 14 AUG 06
	2 BCT - 28 ID 1 BCT - 1 AD RCT 7 RCT 5 	 	 	 	X X TOA 9 FEB 07
 MND BAGHDAD BOG 06 JAN 07	172 SBCT 2 BCT - 4 ID 4 BCT - 101AA 4 BCT - 4 ID 1 BCT - 4 ID 2 BCT - 101AA 1 BCT - 10 ID 2 BDE - 1 AD 	 	 	 	X X TOA 15 NOV 06 LAD 22 OCT 06
	THEATER SECURITY 				THEATER SECURITY
THEATER RESERVE KUWAIT		 	 	 	THEATER RESERVE KUWAIT
THEATER RESERVE PTDO					THEATER RESERVE PTDO
RWOT BCT					RWOT BCT
 10th MTN BOG 06 FEB 07	3 BCT - 10 ID 				
	53 BCT (IN) FL 				TOA 02 FEB 07 LAD 19 JAN 07

DRAFT

As of
24 SEP 06
Includes
RFF 526 Mod 3
DTG SEP 06



TOA 14 DEC 06

LAD 30 NOV 06

POC:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CCJ3-S

(b)(6)

See
Notes page

GoI Reconstruction Funding Status

- **Al Anbar Province (\$171M)**
 - **DFI – Post Kinetic Reconstruction (\$75M)**
 - No funds transferred, 43 projects ready to award (\$22.6M)
 - **Iraqi Reconstruction / Development Funds (\$96M)**
 - No funds transferred
- **Tall Afar (\$50M) – promised by PM Jafari**
 - \$10M Humanitarian Relief – \$7M spent / \$3M with governor to distribute
 - \$40M in Reconstruction - \$32M left to transfer, \$8M in contracts awarded, ongoing contracts slowed due to payment delays
- **Samarra DFI – Post Kinetic Reconstruction (\$25M)**
 - no funds transferred
- **Baghdad - Iraqi Reconstruction / Development Funds (\$513M)**
 - \$204M transferred - \$75 in contracts awarded
- **Ninawa Province- Iraqi Reconstruction / Development Funds (\$96M)**
 - \$39M transferred
- **Salah Ad Din Province - Iraqi Reconstruction / Development Funds (\$96M)**
 - \$39M transferred

Note: The Ninawa & Salah Ad Din transfers are similar to the other Provinces in the amount transferred. Al Anbar is the exception.

UNCLASSIFIED

MSIT

Zilmer MajGen Richard (CG MNF-W/ I MEF FWD)

From: Zilmer MajGen Richard (CG MNF-W/ I MEF FWD)
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 10:23 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) (CE G2 AC/S)
Subject: RE: ~~TSJ~~ Total Insurgent Casualties Since TOA
Categories: ~~SECRET, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
Classification Caveat: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
Classification Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classification: SECRET//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(3), (b)(6) Many thanks. May need to run this stat again from time to time. Detentions are huge. V/R Z

~~Classification: SECRET//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) (CE G2 AC/S)
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 5:24 PM
To: Zilmer MajGen Richard (CG MNF-W/ I MEF FWD)
Cc: Neller BGen Robert (DCG (O) MNF-W/ I MEF FWD)
Subject: ~~TSJ~~ Total Insurgent Casualties Since TOA

~~Classification: SECRET~~

General: analysts in the TFC provided the following data for total insurgent casualties since TOA:

	KILLED	WOUNDED	DETAINED
MAR	109	27	1037
APR	229	48	293
MAY	271	57	1174
JUN	201	27	953
JUL	167	41	1066
AUG	168	44	149
SEP	45	20	688
TOTAL	1190	264	5360

The numbers for KIA are a little lower than I expected, but the analysts were being conservative, as I had instructed. The vast majority of enemy casualties were in Ramadi and environs.

V/R

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AC/S G-2 I MEF (Fwd)

DVNT

VOIP: (b)(6)

JWICS: (b)(3), (b)(6)

~~Classification: SECRET~~

9/25/2006

Page 66 redacted for the following reason:

not readable

Approved for Release



16 SEP 2006

then every

give

Let your instructions to
JAG our how we would
prepare & move targeted
approach to JAG, this is
our recommendation. I
think it's about right.

VR

PETE

Approved for Release

- KIRKUC

- FEO when

1.4b, 1.4d

- GOVT Ref SURF MICROS

- ISF-TRIPICE - CIDSIM

- POL ISSUES

- GOVT. RICE

(b)(6)

Approved for Release

POTUS

w/rt draw down in
FtC of violence?

- ① Ensuring success only
achieved by degree
- ② BATTLES CAPACITY V. DEMAND
- ③ PLANS FOR TRANSITION
IN PLACE + STARTING
- 2/14/40 in 6 mos
- PIC
- ④ LET'S ENJOY CONTROL
TEND OF W/D
- ⑤ LESSONS NEEDED TO RELAXING
- ⑥ STILL SIGNIFICANTLY
POTENTIAL CBT FORCE +
CMT RETAIN

Approved for Release

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

struggle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21st century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.

(b)(6)

Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq