Iraq Update
SECDEF
21 June 2006
Government formation process and Samarra bombing have added complexity to security situation.

Will take about six months to see if this government can make a difference.

Sectarian violence and looming confrontation with illegal armed groups complicates drawdown plans.

Army development remains on track - logistics and ministerial development lag.

Major effort needed to rebuild confidence in police.

Transfers of Provincial Control have begun and can continue through 2006/7.
Assumptions (1 of 2)

Political Situation -- "The new GOI will form in early 2006."
- The delay in government formation contributed to a more complex security environment.

Al Qaeda in Iraq -- "AQI's ability to foment sectarian violence is the most dangerous threat in 2006."
- The elimination of AMZ was a major blow to the network, but we expect AQI to continue attacks to foment civil war focused on Baghdad.

The Insurgency -- "The political process, in combination with MNF-I reductions, will diminish the Sunni Rejectionist component of the insurgency."
- Sunni participation in the political process has yet to impact levels of violence.

Armed Groups -- "Shi'a militia violence can be contained with local security efforts."
- Looming confrontation with Sadr; GOI may lack will and capability to deal with it.

Iraq Update v_21 June 2006

Iltizam Mushtaruk - United Commitment

SECRET//REL USA MCFI
Assumptions (2 of 2)

Iraqi Security Forces -- "ISF development will continue to match projections"
- Remains on track; ~50% of the IA is in the lead for COIN operations; police development progressing, but police loyalty questionable in some areas; ministerial capacity is developing but at a slower pace

Coalition-GOI Relationship -- "The GOI will continue to support the presence of MNF-I until the Coalition has completed its mission"
- The new GOI supports continued MNF-I presence in the short term. There will be tension between our desire to withdraw forces and the perceived security situation

SOFIA

Iraq Update v_21 June 2006

Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment
2006/2007 Key Security Tasks
- Defeat AQI
- Deny and Stabilize Anbar
- Neutralize Insurgency
- Transition to Iraqi Army Lead
- Build IPS
- Secure Borders
- Deny
- Secure Baghdad and 9 Key Cities
- Disarm Armed Groups
- Enhance Infrastructure Security
Concept of Transition

1. Implement Partnerships
   - MNF

2. Iraqi Army Lead
   - Tactical Overwatch
   - MNF

3. Iraqi Security Self-Reliance
   - IPS
   - MNF

4. Provincial Iraqi Control
   - IPS
   - MNF

---

Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment

Iraq Update v. 21 June 2006

SECRET//REL-USA-MCFI

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
Projected Iraqi Army Lead

Currently IAL

Division HQs

Brigade HQs

69 Battalions (2/18/69)

Total (DIV/BDE/BN)

IA Endstate (DIV/BDE/BN) – 10 Divisions, 36 Brigades, 112 Battalions

* 3/9 not formed

Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment
Provincial Iraqi Control

June 2006

December 2006

June 2007

December 2007

Ready for Transition
Partially Ready For Transition
Not Ready For Transition/ TBD
## Projections and Goals (2006-2007)

| Train and Equip IA           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Train and Equip Police       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| IA Divisions in Lead         | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| JHQ/IGFC in Lead             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Provincial Iraqi Control     | 5 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 11| 13| 15| 16|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Detainee Transfer            |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| MNF-I Reductions             | 14| 12| 10-12| 7-8| 5-6|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

## Goals

- **Baghdad + 9 Cities Secure**
- **National Reconciliation**
- **Reintegration Process**
- **Border Security**
- **Defeat AQI**

*Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Benchmarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>- Baghdad Security Plan</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>- Decision on constitutional amendment process and provincial elections</td>
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<td>- Announcement of reconciliation plan</td>
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<td>- De-Ba’athification plan announcement</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>- Announce conditions-based security transition road map</td>
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<td>- Militia Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) plan</td>
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<td>September</td>
<td>- Iraqi chain of command</td>
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<td>- Intelligence reorganization</td>
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<td>October</td>
<td>- Economic liberalization legislative package</td>
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<td>- Rule of law legislative package</td>
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<td>- National reconciliation agreement</td>
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<td>November</td>
<td>- International Compact</td>
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<td>December</td>
<td>- Iraqi Army in the Lead</td>
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</table>
US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF
Iraq Update and Way Ahead

Tank Update

21 June 2006
The Campaign

Liberation Occupation
- Combined Joint Task Force
- Multinational Force-Iraq

Partnership
- MNF-I
- IIG ITG Developing ISF
- US Mission

Self-Reliance
- Transformed Coalition
- Constitutively elected representative Government
- Capable Iraqi Security Forces

Building Capacity
- Normal Diplomatic and Security Relationships
- Stabilization
- Restoration of Civil Authority

Transition to Self-Reliance
- Support to Self-Reliance

Establishing the Foundation
- June 2003
- June 2004
- Referendum Oct 2005
- Elections - 2006
- Provincial Elections - 2006
- Constitution Amendment Referendum - 2006

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SECRET//REL USA MCFI
Situation

- Al Qaida continuing efforts to foment civil war; Baghdad is their focus
- Illegal Armed Groups continue to conduct kidnappings and murders; Baghdad is their focus
- There is increasing violence fueled by Sadr confrontation looming
- The fundamental conflict in Iraq is between and among its ethnic and sectarian groups over the distribution of power
- Ineffective government plus Samarra bombing and aftermath have created a more complex security environment
- The Government of National Unity is stronger however the pressures of on-going sectarian violence, lagging basic needs, and weak economic development will make it harder for the new government to demonstrate substantial progress
- The Sunni population is currently participating in the political process and may be recalculating their alternatives with respect to the insurgency
- New government will likely exercise their sovereignty more and press for “Way Ahead” on coalition presence and detainees
- Army development on track; police development progressing, but police loyalty questionable in some areas
- Completion of political process and recent operations have positioned us for decisive action over the next year
Evolving Security Environment

Division of Political and Economic Power by Iraqis

Sunni Extremists

Shia Extremists

RESISTANCE

1.4b, 1.4d
Strategy

The US Mission and Coalition Forces and the sovereign GOI will pursue an integrated civil-military strategy that seeks to progressively improve the capabilities of Iraqi institutions to enhance unity, to improve security and to build prosperity.

This strategy is shaped by a central tenet: **enduring strategic success in Iraq will be achieved by Iraqis.** Our approach will increasingly place the GOI and its institutions in the lead across all lines of operation, first with Coalition monitoring and support, and then with progressively less support until they can govern effectively without our assistance.
Joint Mission Statement

The US Mission and Coalition Forces will, in support of the Government of Iraq, contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the terrorists and irreconcilable insurgents, bringing other insurgents into the political process, reducing sectarian tensions and militias and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror.
Evolution of the Mission

August 2004 Campaign Plan
MNF-I...conducts full spectrum counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists...

April 2005 Campaign Action Plan
MNF-I...progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces...

May 2006 Joint Campaign Plan
USEMB and MNF-I...contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions...
Concept of Operations - Phases

Phase One – Stabilization (2006 to Early/Mid 2007)

- **Objective**: Stabilize the security situation to the point where political and economic development can take place without disruption.
- **Endstate**: Iraqi Army in the lead, AQI defeated and conditions set for the transfer of security responsibilities to capable Iraqi civil authorities. Ministerial and provincial development continuing.

Phase Two – Restoration of Civil Authority (Early/Mid 2007 to Early/Mid 2008)

- **Objective**: Place capable Iraqi civil authorities in the lead for security throughout Iraq. Build accountable local and national governments underpinned by a robust rule of law program.
- **Endstate**: Insurgency neutralized, Iraqi civil authorities in the lead, GOI ministries and institutions operating with minimum Coalition support and more normal security relationships established.

Phase Three – Support to Self-Reliance (Early/Mid 2008 Thru 2009)

- **Objective**: Achieve Iraqi self-reliance, across all lines of operation.
- **Endstate**: Achievement of our campaign endstate: Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.
**Lines of Operation**

- **Strategic Effects:**
  - Terrorists defeated and Insurgents neutralized
  - Representative government that promotes national unity
  - Strengthened rule of law
  - Meet basic needs
  - Economic reforms spur development
  - International support for Iraq increased
  - Enhanced understanding of Coalition efforts
  - Wedge driven
  - Capable ISF assume security lead

- **End-State:**
  - Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.

*Itizam Mushtarak - United Commitment*
2006/2007 Key Security Tasks

- Defeat AQI
- Deny and Stabilize Anbar
- Neutralize Insurgency
- Transition to Iraqi Army Lead
- Build IPS
- Secure Borders
- Deny 1.4b, 1.4d
- Secure Baghdad and 9 Key Cities
- Disarm Armed Groups
- Enhance Infrastructure Security

2006/2007 Operational Concept
ISF Trained and Equipped

Currently 265K

325K

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

- Ministry of Defense Forces
- Border Enforcement
- Iraqi Regular Police Service
- Other Police

Iraqi Update v_21 June 2006

Ilitzam Mushtar - United Commitment
## Projected Iraqi Army Lead

### Currently IAL

- **69 Battalions (2/18/69)**

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<th>Division HQs</th>
<th>Brigade HQs</th>
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### IA Endstate (DIV/BDE/BN)

- **10 Divisions, 36 Brigades, 112 Battalions**

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*3/9 not formed*
IGFC Assumption of C2
(Iraqi Army Divisions)

September 2006
IGFC reaches IOC
5 x IA DIVs

October 2006
8 x IA DIVs

December 2006
9 x IA DIVs

March 2007
10 x IA DIVs
# Projections and Goals (2006-2007)

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## Goals

- Baghdad + 9 Cities Secure
- National Reconciliation
- Reintegration Process
- Border Security
- Defeat AQI

---

*Iraq Update v.21 June 2006*

*Ilitzam Mushtarak - United Commitment*
C2 Transformation Concept

Combines MNF-I and MNC-I into CJTF-I

Common to all CJTF Options:
- 4-star leadership for:
  - Strategic engagement with GOI and ISF
  - Ensure Campaign Plan sustains momentum
  - Build US Embassy support in execution of Campaign Plan
  - OSC needed to continue development of MoD and Mol; develop normal defense relationship with Iraq
  - HQ element in the International Zone to drive Campaign Plan development across all lines of operation with US Embassy
Basing

Jun 2005 = 110 Bases  
Jun 2006 = 69 Bases  
Dec 2006 = 57 Bases  
Jun 2007 = 30 Bases  
Dec 2007 = 11 Bases

Contingency Operating Base (COB)  
Forward Operating Base (FOB)  
Convoy Support Center (CSC)  
Theater Internment Facility (TUF)

Iraq Update v_21 June 2006
Risks

- Loss of Coalition will
- Collapse of National Unity Government
- Sectarian violence leading to sustained sectarian conflict
- Fracture of Iraqi Security Forces along sectarian lines
- Illegal Armed Groups remain unchecked by government and fuel sectarian conflict
- Sunni population decides to support AQI out of 1.4b, 1.4d
- Rampant corruption and failure of the rule of law
- Strategic surprise
- Loss of or diminishing consent for Coalition presence/freedom of action
What Do We Need?

Interagency

- Continue diplomatic pressure on Iraq's neighbors to curb support for extremist groups in Iraq
- Regional engagement to increase support for the GOI
- Establish policy for enduring, normal security relationship
- Engage donor nations to follow through on pledges to sustain reconstruction post-IRRF

DOD

- Sustain force provider requirements in line with the changing nature of operations
- Sustain strategic, operational and potentially three MSC headquarters through the end of 2007
Back-Up Slides
Priority Objectives for Next 12 Months

- A government of national unity composed of representatives of all major political forces and led by professional and competent ministers (EMB)
- Adoption by the government of an ambitious program of reforms and action to improve the lives of the Iraqi people (EMB)
- An accommodation between the Iraqi government and the insurgents that results in an improving security situation (EMB/MNF)
- Baghdad and nine key cities secure (MNF/EMB)
- A governmental strategy to diminish the influence of Illegal Armed Groups (MNF/EMB)
- Iraqi government and security forces taking responsibility for security in an increasing number of areas. Police at a level where they can continue assuming responsibilities for domestic order (MNF)
- An increased capacity of Iraqi ministries and provincial governments to deliver good governance and basic services (EMB/MNF)
- An increased capacity by the Iraqi government to establish law and order through the rule of law and effective institutions. Detainee operations transferred to Iraqi control (EMB/MNF)
- Increased economic growth led by the private sector. (EMB)
- Containment and roll back of in Iraq and a strategic change in (EMB/MNF)
- A significant increase in the political and economic support from the international community and regional neighbors (EMB)
Assumptions (1 of 2)

Political Situation -- "The new GOI will form in early 2006"
- The delay in government formation contributed to a more complex security environment

Al Qaeda in Iraq -- "AQI's ability to foment sectarian violence is the most dangerous threat in 2006"
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- The new GOI supports continued MNF-I presence in the short term. There will be tension between our desire to withdraw forces and the perceived security situation
Force Structure Assessment

21 June 2006

This briefing is classified
SECRET
REL USA, AUS, GBR

Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: 6 June 2016

Ilizam Mushtarak – United Commitment
Bottom Line Up Front

- Formation of the Iraqi Government, coupled with the continuing development of the Iraqi Security Forces and the death of Zarqawi, sets the conditions to go forward with the next force structure step.

- On 5 May 06 we discussed the option for:
  - 2/28 ID is replaced with in-country forces.
  - 2/1 ID (based in Germany) does not deploy to Iraq; remains in Germany, prepared to deploy if additional forces required.
  - Announce formal off-ramp decision after formation of Prime Minister Maliki's Government.

- We have also completed our June Force Structure Assessment and recommend that we do not backfill 2 additional brigades that will depart in August. (~2000 People)

- Still require Call Forward Force and PTDO force to mitigate risk.

- Will discuss with Prime Minister in early July.
Government formation process and Samarra bombing have added complexity to security situation.

Will take about six months to see if this government can make a difference.

Sectarian violence and looming confrontation with illegal armed groups complicates drawdown plans.

Army development remains on track - logistics and ministerial development lag.

Major effort needed to rebuild confidence in police.

Transfers of Provincial Control have begun and can continue through 2006/7.
Progress

- Continued progress in Iraqi Security Force development.
  - Over 265,000 Iraqi Security Forces now trained and equipped (increase of ~50,000 since Nov 05).
  - 2 divisions, 18 brigades, and 69 battalions have assumed the lead in their areas (increase of one division, 14 brigades, and 46 battalions since Nov 05).
  - 5 divisions, ~32 brigades, and ~94 Iraq Army battalions are projected to assume the lead by the end of Sep 06.
- Continued professional performance by Iraqi Security Forces:
  - Exceptional performance of security forces in support of Referendum, Election and Arba’een security support.
  - Recent performance against the enemy in Baghdad and Diyala Provinces also very positive.
  - Police performance improving; but, in some places, loyalty remains questionable.
ISF Trained and Equipped

Ministry of Defense Forces
Border Enforcement

Iraqi Regular Police Service
Other Police

Currently 265K
325K

Iraq Update v_21 June 2006
Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment
Projected Iraqi Army Lead

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*Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment*
Security Forces in Iraq

From ~93,000 Mol forces in June 05 to ~166,000 Mol forces in June 06

ILTIZAM MUSHTARAK – United Commitment
Opportunity

- Continuing the gradual, conditions-based reduction of Coalition forces, tied to improved Iraqi Security Force capability, and done from a position of strength, can:
  + Build on the continued success of the Iraqi Security Forces.
  + Help the new Iraqi Government build momentum and gain legitimacy.
  + Create sense of urgency in the Iraqi Government and its security forces.
  + Undercut those calling for a Coalition withdrawal timeline.
  + Continue to remove a central motivation attracting foreign fighters and drawing Iraqis into the insurgency.
  + Send a signal that we are making progress.
  + Send a signal to Iraqis that we mean what we say, "As you stand up, we stand down."
- The effectiveness of the new Iraqi Government.
- Impact of the expected increased exercise of sovereignty.
- Impact of the illegal armed group threat in southeastern and central Iraq as well as the impact of efforts to address the militia challenge.
- Impact of the political process Sunni engagement on the insurgency.
- Impact of Zarqawi's death on AQIZ operations.
- Impact of AQIZ's continuing efforts to foment sectarian violence.
- Cumulative impact of increased Iraqi Army assumption of security lead and associated Coalition force transitions in the next six months.

1.4b, 1.4d

Ilitzam Mushtarâk – United Commitment
Risks if we do

- Going too fast could unhinge ISF progress — Moderate.
- Reduction in tactical and operational effectiveness and flexibility — Moderate.
- Insurgency increases in size and effectiveness and threatens political and economic progress — Moderate.
- Misperceived as US "running away" and creation of expectation for continuous reduction — Moderate.
- Ministries cannot sustain security forces — Moderate.
- Employment of a PTDO force could be seen as regressing — Moderate.
Risks if we don't

- Misses opportunity to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the new Iraqi Government.

- Misses opportunity to demonstrate progress and take advantage of the positive developments in Iraq.

- Misses opportunity to demonstrate that we do intend to depart as Iraqi Security Forces improve.

- Demonstrates a lack of confidence in Iraqi Security Force capability.

- Increases the potential for Iraqi dependency on Coalition forces.

- Strengthens perception of occupation in Iraq.
Force Structure Projection

Jan 06 Concept - US BCTs: 15 14 13 12 11 10

"Baseline" Course of Action

05-07 Off Ramped units

Current Conditions - US BCTs: 15 14 13 12 11 10

Conditions not yet set for further restructuring in Baghdad; will relook in Sep 06
Bottom Line / Way Ahead

- Request approval for:
  - Not backfill three brigades of Coalition Forces in Iraq
  - Retain one brigade in Kuwait and one on PTDO to mitigate risk
  - Announce formal off-ramp decision after consultation with the GOI (~ Early Jul 06)

- Way Ahead:
  - Next MNF-I force structure assessment in September 06; will assess opportunity for additional force restructuring.
Conditions
(5 Jan 06 Tank Briefing)

- Political process and Sunni engagement diminishes violence to level that the ISF can contain (with Coalition support) in affected areas.
- Threat of sectarian / militia-led violence remains low.
- Iraqi Army / Police development continues near projected levels; ISF assuming battlespace are consistently able to hold it.
- Iraqis assume greater security responsibility for Baghdad; improved security in the other 9 key cities.
- Sustained success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and border regions.
- Security ministries continue to improve and can sustain forces with Coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to Coalition reductions.

SD SVTC 6 Jun 06

*Iltizam Mushtarak – United Commitment*
Options to add 50 Battalions to Iraqi Army

- +50 Battalions @ 750 per Battalion = 37,500 add’l Soldiers.
  - 2350 Officer; 16750 NCO; 18850 Enlisted.
  - 2 years, ~$2B one time, $.75B annual.
- Two COAs
  - #1 Add 2xCompanies to each of 93 existing Infantry Battalions.
    - $1.8B one-time; $.7B annual sustainment.
  - #2 Add 4th Battalion to each Brigade plus 4 new Brigades.
    - $2B one-time; $.8B sustainment.
  - Infrastructure cost TBD depends on stationing. COA #2 costs more.
  - Analysis required to determine required logistics support increase.
  - Train (24 Months); Equip (5 months); Station (12 months).
- LIMFACs
  - Training throughput requires 2 yrs. Officer (1K/yr) and Enlisted (10K/yr).
    - Can mitigate Enlisted to 1 yr if 5 (v13) wk Basic Training.
    - Can mitigate Officer to 1 yr if accept ~1K former Army officers.
  - Iraqi Budget ability to absorb additional costs.
IRAQ UPDATE
23 June 2006
### Benchmarks for Progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>- Baghdad Security Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>- Decision on constitutional amendment process and provincial elections</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Announcement of reconciliation plan</td>
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<td>- De-Ba’athification plan announcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>- Announce conditions-based security transition road map</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Militia Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>- Iraqi chain of command</td>
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<td>- Intelligence reorganization</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>- Economic liberalization legislative package</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rule of law legislative package</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- National reconciliation agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>- International Compact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>- Iraqi Army in the Lead</td>
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# Projections and Goals (2006-2007)

## Projections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Train and Equip IA</td>
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<td>Train and Equip Police</td>
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<td>IA Divisions in Lead</td>
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<td>JHQ/IGFC in Lead</td>
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<td>Provincial Iraqi</td>
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<td>13-16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detainee Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Ghraib Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ft. Suse</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF-I Reductions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10-12</td>
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## Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tr>
<td>Baghdad + 9 Cities Secure</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Reconciliation</td>
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<td>Reintegration Process</td>
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<td>Border Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defeat AQI</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Baghdad/ Anbar - Baghdad*  
*Bucca - Cropper*  
*Abu Ghraib Closed - Ft. Suse*  
*MNDF - 5-6*  
*MNDF - 5-6*  
*MNDF - 5-6*  
*MNDF - 5-6*  
*MNDF - 5-6*  
*MNDF - 5-6*  
*MNDF - 5-6*  
*

*Iraq Update v_21 June 2006*

*Illizam Mushtarak - United Commitment*  
*SECRET//REL USA-MCFI*
Force Reduction Projection

US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF

Iraq Update v.21 June 2006

Ilizam Mushtarak - United Commitment

SECRET//REL-USA-MCFI
Force Flow 06-08 CENTCOM RFF 526 mod 3 (231800Z Sep06)

Cascading PTDO and/or Theater Reserve Through March 07

Ramadan

US BCTs: 15

Notes:
- Dates depicted represent TOA dates (LAD plus 30 days)
- Flow maintains 15 BCTs in Iraq through March 07
- *Denotes BOG extension beyond 365 days

Itizam Mushtarak – United Commitment
06-08 Theater Reserve/PTDO

- 172 SBCT not replaced, 4/1 CD retained as TR
- 3/3 ID called forward prior to PTDO to replace 1/34 ID as TS Bde
- Bring 4/1 CD forward from TR to replace 1/34 ID as TS Bde, and decide to bring 3/3 fwd from PTDO to TR or not

Ramadan:
- Sep
- Oct
- Nov
- Dec
- Jan
- Feb
- Mar

PTDO:
- AND MEU COVERAGE

Ilitizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

SECRET//REL TO USA, GBR, AUS
Force Flow Changes/Options

Changes Based on SecDef decisions 22 Sept 06

- Approved extension of 1/1 AD by 46 days (new TOA w/1/3 ID 17 Feb 07).
- 1/3 ID will NOT serve as a PTDO prior to arrival in Kuwait (18 Jan 07)
- 3/3 ID MAY be designated as PTDO effective 14 Feb 07
- 3/3 MAY be the replacement for 1/34 ID (Theater Security Brigade)
- SecDef has approved use of 2/82(-) and MEU as PTDO effective 3 Nov 06

Decisions: (assumptions based on commitment of 3/3 ID to PTDO and potential backfill for 1/34 ID)

1. Do NOT backfill 172 SBCT, Leave 4/1 CD as TR 18 NOV 06 (prior to 4/1 CD coming North from Kuwait)

2. Bring 3/3 ID Forward to replace 1/34 ID as Theater Security Bde 7 Dec 06 (normal 105 day flow from ordering ship to LAD) Can either bring 3/3 ID in as TR or to replace 1/34 ID IF 4/1 CD has NOT backfilled 172 SBCT. Assumes 3/3 ID available for alert notification on this date. APS5 utilization could be considered to mitigate shipping issues if required

3. Bring 4/1 CD forward from TR to replace 1/34 ID and leave 3/3 as PTDO or bring them forward as TR. 8 MAR 07

Ilizam Mushtarak – United Commitment
# 06 - 08 FOI Rotation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Rotation Dates</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MND-N</td>
<td>06 Jul - 05 Aug</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>06 Jul - 05 Aug</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF-W</td>
<td>28 Jun - 29 Jul</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>28 Jun - 29 Jul</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V CORPS</td>
<td>1 Dec - 31 Dec</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Dec - 31 Dec</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
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<td>THEATER SECURITY</td>
<td>06 Apr - 03 May</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
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<td>06 Apr - 03 May</td>
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<td>THEATER RESERVE KUWAIT</td>
<td>PTDO 29 Sep - 03 Dec</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
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<td>PTDO 29 Sep - 03 Dec</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
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<td>RWOT BCT</td>
<td>01 Aug - 08 Aug</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
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<td>10th MTN</td>
<td>06 Feb - 06 Feb</td>
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<td>06 Feb - 06 Feb</td>
<td>OIF/ OEF 05-07</td>
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</table>
GoI Reconstruction Funding Status

- Al Anbar Province ($171M)
  - DFI – Post Kinetic Reconstruction ($75M)
    - No funds transferred, 43 projects ready to award ($22.6M)
  - Iraqi Reconstruction / Development Funds ($96M)
    - No funds transferred

- Tall Afar ($50M) – promised by PM Jafari
  - $10M Humanitarian Relief – $7M spent / $3M with governor to distribute
  - $40M in Reconstruction - $32M left to transfer, $8M in contracts awarded, ongoing contracts slowed due to payment delays

- Samarra DFI – Post Kinetic Reconstruction ($25M)
  - No funds transferred

- Baghdad - Iraqi Reconstruction / Development Funds ($513M)
  - $204M transferred - $75 in contracts awarded

- Ninawa Province - Iraqi Reconstruction / Development Funds ($96M)
  - $39M transferred

- Salah Ad Din Province - Iraqi Reconstruction / Development Funds ($96M)
  - $39M transferred

Note: The Ninawa & Salah Ad Din transfers are similar to the other Provinces in the amount transferred. Al Anbar is the exception.
The numbers of KIA are a little lower than expected, but the analyses were being conducted as had

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>264</th>
<th>1490</th>
<th>8588</th>
<th>1199</th>
<th>1006</th>
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<th>MAR</th>
<th>109</th>
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<tr>
<td>WOUNDED</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>109</td>
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<tr>
<td>KILLED</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis in the TF provided the following data for total insurgent casualties since TOA:

Secret Official Use Only

Subject: Initial Insurgent Casualties Since TOA
To: Zimer McEachin (CC MNF-WI MEF FWD)
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 10:23 PM
From: Zimer McEachin (CC MNF-WI MEF FWD)
Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Approved for Release

---

Dear Brigade Commander,

I'm writing to you about your recent recommendations regarding the audit of our organization. Your proposal to implement new procedures and enhance our targeting policies is both timely and well-considered. I think it's a good step forward in our efforts to improve our efficiency.

Since your instructions to focus our efforts on these areas, we have been working to incorporate your recommendations into our daily operations. We have made significant progress, and I believe that we are on track to achieve our goals.

Thank you for your leadership and guidance. Your dedication to our mission is inspiring.

Best regards,

[Signature]

January 2023
One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They are first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly, predictable. It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, and therefore, which view ought to shape U.S. policy and world opinion on this important matter? Is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

June 7, 2004
people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair. Nor's battle, 'despise' - but we made it. We succeeded because the American people, our country, went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, it can be done. It has been done in the past. 

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a path to freedom. The path to freedom is not easy. Our path has always been difficult. But, the key is to have the courage to move forward. To appreciate the path to freedom is not easy.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the events of the past. Even more, when we look back on history, we see that there is no perfect history. There are victories and defeats, victories and losses. The key is to learn from history, to understand the lessons of the past.

Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences. Their perspectives are shaped by their experiences, their personal history or personal experiences.

Suñgle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic.
Many contend that Japan, Germany, and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."
To attack the United States and other civil societies.

A failed state, embroiled with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven.

are not extenuative. They include:

- Some say leave. When will the coalition leave? When will they leave?
- The possibilities of those who criticize and condemn themselves. For the length of the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, the number of people not leaving the United States is lost.
- Where will they be, the Americans to lose their lives?

It is instructive to ask: Where might be the achievements to the course we are on for.

Lives are better today. Despite the difficult of the country.

Here is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand their their

ability. Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the

perception of Iraqis, who believe in Sunnis. Despite the minority

percent of Iraqis who believe in Sunnis. Despite the minority

have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – the 70 percent of Iraqis say that

terrorism and extremism kill innocent Iraqis, kill citizens by the dozens each week – and

attacks, assassinations, and discrimination to services, and despite the fact that

whole. They are opposed to a breaking of the country. We know, despite terrorism

from them, more than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security, and the opportunities that will

with those prohibitions, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

deserve it from the media that sanctions from the constitutional provisions, and

deserve it from the Iraqi people. The American people deserve their. They

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills. Let there be no doubt – calls for

chiefs, at risk to their lives.

who have stepped up to become governors, city council members, and police

They have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of lives

progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an application of the courage

opened the schools shut and provided new textbooks and the economic
Parents,

Common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from demagoguery, it will be a fresh 21st-century vote in the November election. But when we are successful, it will be a fresher 21st-century vote in the November election. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be support for civil discourse. So, we have seen for a tough period in time in history, and it is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, scoundrels, and a week - for the first time. The cost of those who have committed war cannot be done, this situation only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done.

I repeat: there is no way the situation can be lost on the world. It cannot be lost.

The world, therefore, for the United States for the United States of America, for the United States for the United States of America, and the American people through these difficult years. There is no more support for those who are fighting for the American people, who are fighting for democracy. The American people, who are fighting for democracy, who are fighting for democracy, who are fighting for democracy, who are fighting for democracy, who are fighting for democracy.

A new Saddam Hussein could take control and impose a vicious dictatorship.

- A new splinter group of Iraq into several parts or
- Take over by a neighboring country and radical thieves.
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