



~~SECRET// REL to USA and MCFI //~~

STRATEGIC ROCKDRILL

MNC-I OPORD 05-02

Making the Elections Decisive

July 25, 2005

~~SECRET// REL to USA and MCFI //~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Making the Elections Decisive

CG MNC-I Planning Guidance to Staff:

- **Verify tasks support MNF-I strategic mission/end state**
- **Review current MNC-I tasks to identify limiting factors**
- **Identify requirements for assistance or further coordination**

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Making the Elections Decisive

Phase II: PROVINCIAL IRAQI SECURITY CONTROL

MNC-I Key Tasks

(MNF-I Campaign Action Plan)

- Establish Capable ISF (ME)
- Election Security
- Strategic Infrastructure
- Restore Control IZ Border
- Disrupt AIF
- Detainee Operations
- Base Closure/Handover
- Force Posturing

RIP/TOA

Off Ramp

MNC-I Key Effects

(MNC-I Operations Order 05-02)


- ISF capable of brigade-level operations with CF support
- Security environment where Iraqis feel safe to participate in the election process
- Infrastructure secured with minimal disruption of service
- GOI assumes responsibility for delivery of basic services
- Border control and institutions established (Al Anbar/Ninewa)
- Deny AIF sanctuary and disrupt freedom of action in Al Anbar and Ninewa

End State

(MNF-I Campaign Action Plan)

- Local and provincial ISF under TACON of CF take lead in COIN ops
- ISF and provincial civil authorities cooperate and coordinate actions
- AIF activity and freedom of action are reduced so that ISF asserts provincial control and domestic order

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

Strategic Effects

(MNF-I Campaign Plan):

- Capable ISF
- Insurgents and terrorists neutralized
- Legitimate Iraqi Govt

Strategic Tasks

(Draft Strategic Directive 8 July):

- Sustain gains in Baghdad
- Improve security in Mosul
- Secure Ramadi and Fallujah
- Sustain security in Najaf & Kirkuk
- Improve security in Samarra, Baqubah, and N. Babil
- Restore border cntrl/deny safe haven in Ninewa & Al Anbar
- Secure infrastructure against catastrophic disruption
- Increased Primacy of Rule of Law

Capable ISF

MNC-I Effects (OPORD 05-02):

- Capable ISF
- AIF neutralized
- ISF capable of BN Level Opns
- ISF capable of BDE Level Operations
- ISF controls territory across Region
- ISF capable of Division Opns
- ISF capable of Independent COIN
- Iraqi Security Forces Self Reliant

Key Tasks

(MNC-I 90 Day Update):

- Develop capable ISF and prepare the ISF to take the lead in Counterinsurgency Operations
- Continue the support and maintenance of JCCs and PJCCs
- Transition battlespace to Iraqi Control
- Implement Transition Team Programs
- (Assist the ITG and Provincial governments in developing and securing infrastructure)
- (Coordinate with border security forces and develop their capability)

Required Assistance

1. Develop ministerial capacity
2. Expansion of Police Partnership Program
3. Force Generation Acceleration
4. Rule of Law
 - a. Detention Facilities
 - b. Detainee Abuse
 - c. Judicial Process


ENDSTATE: Iraqi Security Forces capable of conducting independent COIN without Coalition support.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Capable ISF



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Develop Ministerial Capacity

▪ Issue: MOD / MOI Development

▪ Discussion:

- Following the Jan 05 election there was a 90 day period where all / most of the personnel changed out with the new government.
- Development of ministerial capacity and civil service is crucial to maintaining momentum following the elections.
- JHQ AST and certain MNF-I staff are partnered with some MOD staff.

▪ Recommendation:

- MOD
 - Accelerate partnership with MOD / JHQ to include action officer level (MNF-I)
 - Source MOD transition team (MNF-I)
 - Establishment of policies and systems ISO ISF (MOD / MNF-I)
- MOI
 - MOI assume lead for IPS recruiting (MOI)
 - Assume lead for development and coordination of PJCCs (MOI ?)
 - Sustain P3 MOI activities (MNF-I)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



ACCOUNTABILITY

Pay & Policies

- **ISSUE: IA Soldiers not being paid properly; No approved personnel policies**

CURRENT STATUS

STATUS	UNIT	PAY ISSUE	MITIGATING ACTION	INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS WORKING ISSUE
AMBER	ALL	Recruits may miss pay this month due to MOD budget constraints.	MOD is working the issue to shift money from another account to make up for the shortfall.	2 5
AMBER	Multiple	3,000 recruits who did not have the required paperwork to receive an MOD ID number/card, were not approved for pay.	JHQ/MNSTC-I will provide the list of names to DG Personnel (MG Sahran) who will waive the requirement for ID cards and pay the recruits.	2 5
AMBER	Multiple	Missed and incorrect pay amounts continue in all Iraqi Divisions Due to not following pay process.	IA-G1 contacted and informed JHQ, & is following up. The MOD pay procedures are still not being followed; M8 is aggressively working issue. A FRAGO has been released addressing the pay process steps.	1 2 3 4 5 6
AMBER	ALL	Five Personnel Policies awaiting signature by MOD. Additional policies working and in the staffing process.	2 policies with Minister awaiting signature. 1 in final staffing w/MOD M1, JHQ, MNSTC-I, MNC-ICI. 2 others under review at JHQ.	4 5 6
RED	ALL	Officer Promotion, Enlisted Promotion, and Reenlistment Policies.	These 3 policies with Minister awaiting signature impact pay and are major areas of concern from IA units and Coalition Units/MiTTs.	2 3 4 6 7
☒ No Action/Progress ☐ Action Working ☒ Action Complete				Action Complete

IND/ORG SUPPORTING: Key Iraqi Action Officers - IA Division G1s

- 1 -IGFC HQ G-1 (BG Read) 3 -JHQ AST 5 -MNSTC-I J1
- 2 -JHQ M1/M8 4 -MNCI C-1 6 -IGFC HQ MiTT
- 7 -DIR GEN, PERS, US EMB (Mr Stark)

IMPACT: Pay issues impact morale; lack of policies causing pay issues.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Equipping the ISF

- **Issue: Protected mobility for ISF. New requirements emerging.**

- **Discussion:**

- ISF possesses limited armored / protected vehicles.
- AIF targeting ISF unarmored vehicles.
- MNSTC-I initiative with SP CDO for up-armoring.
- Associated maintenance costs for potentially expanded capabilities.

- **Recommendation:**

- Sustain MNSTC-I procurement for protected vehicles
- Develop MOD equipment programming / procurement capacity
- JHQ determine emerging / unfunded requirements ISO ISF development

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



MOI Recruiting Current Assessment

Approved Policies and Procedures:

- MNC-I Recruiting SOP (developed in close coordination with CPATT)
- MNC-I Monthly Recruiting FRAGO (BPC and JIPTC)
- Weekly IPS Recruiting Review Board (MNC-I, CPATT, and MOI)

Friction Points/Areas of Concern:

- Current process is resource-intensive for MSCs (P3 Teams)
- Provincial CoP not engaged in selecting, screening, and vetting of IPS
- Hiring freeze – lack of resources and ethnic motivations

The Way Ahead:

- Transition ownership of the IPS recruiting process to the MOI, and subsequently to the Provincial CoP (MOI / MNSTC-I)
- Re-scope MSC role in recruiting process (MNF-I)
- Regional Recruiting Centers strategically located throughout the AO (MOI / MNSTC-I)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



MOI Recruiting

- **Issue:** MOI assuming lead for IPS recruiting process
- **Discussion:** IPS recruiting done at the local, tactical level. MSCs currently lead in the recruiting and vetting of IPS.
- **Recommendation:**
 - MOI assume ownership of IPS recruiting process.
 - CF enable process through transportation and security of IPS recruits

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



PJCC

▪ Issue: National PJCC integration

▪ Discussion: PJCCs are owned by the governors. There is no ministerial ownership of PJCC's (Iraqi FEMA ?). P3 program assists indirectly the PJCC development.

- Overall PJCC manning is 50%
- Overall equipment is 52%
- Overall operational training is 41%

▪ Recommendation:

- Assist ITG in developing ministerial linkages and ownership for PJCCs (ITG / MNF-I)
- Develop national security plan for role and way ahead for PJCCs (ITG / MNF-I)
- Increase Iraqi support and funding for development of PJCCs (ITG / MNF-I)
- Partnership with PJCCs through appropriate agency (MNF-I)(FEMA)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET// REL to USA and MCFI//~~



P3 Program Expansion

▪ Issue: Expansion of P3 Program to the district level and below.

▪ Discussion:

- Sustains:
 - Training programs – key to long term development of IPS
 - Coaching and assisting – to develop staff management skills
 - Coordinated activity – ensuring best practice adopted throughout AOR
- Improves:
 - IPS budget – rudimentary processes, poor management
 - IPS equipment – unaccounted, poor management
 - P3 sourcing – Out of Hide

▪ Recommendation:

- Seek enduring sourcing solution. (MNF-I)
- Seek support to expand P3 once the conditions permit. (MNF-I)

~~SECRET// REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//~~



P3 Expansion Cost

- **P3 Expansion Requirement:**
 - **P3 – Province Team Manpower estimate = 360 to 500 personnel**
 - **P3 – District Team Manpower estimate = 850 personnel**
 - **P3 – Province and District teams Optimum = 1350 + IPLO and Translators = 1750**

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



FORCE GENERATION ACCELERATION

- Issue: Requirements for out of hide MNC-I personnel
- Discussion:
 - Accelerate the generation of CS/CSS units to develop a self-reliant Iraqi Army capable of independent COIN: 103 HSC, MP, EN, ISR, EOD Companies
 - RFFs for additional forces as trainers have been denied
 - Low density high demand MOS's remain a challenge and will be more so after off ramp (MI, MP, EN)
- Recommendation:
 - Seek sourcing from other sources (Theater out of hide / Contractor) to fill instructor positions to accelerate ISF capability (MNF-I)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Detention / Corrections Operations Direct Impacts

- Issue: Iraqi ownership of detention / corrections facilities IAW Rule of Law.
- Discussion: The logistical, manpower, and dollar cost associated with current and future detention operations is extremely significant. Military side of detention operations continues to expand. We continue to capture more than we release—expect pre-election surge. Shortfalls in Iraqi judicial system result in inability to prosecute detainees in a timely manner, which creates a log jam at BIFs/DIFs/LIFs. TF 1.4a conducting training at facilities in conjunction with DOJ. Planning by TF 1.4a for handover of detention facilities to ITG continues. Long term plan for an MOJ solution to detention in Iraq is tied to development of the judiciary and establishment of the rule of law.
- Recommendations:
 - Expand the Iraqi-owned corrections system with partnership (MOJ w/ USEMB/DOJ)
 - Establish legal authority for detention (ITG w/ USEMB)
 - Ministerial oversight of Iraqi detention operations (ITG / MOJ)
 - o Construction of holding facilities for detainees currently held by MOI and MOD
 - Partnership and training of Iraqi corrections officers (MOJ w/ TF 1.4a / USEMB)
 - Transition life support costs to Iraqi control (MNF-I)
 - Involve other Iraqi government agencies as necessary
 - Transition from detentions to corrections

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Detainee Abuse

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Judicial Process

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Force Flow Example

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



1 July 05

XX Baghdad

Transition Readiness Assessment

- A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.
- A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
- A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

MND-B

Months to Assume Battle Space Legend

- Green #s = Improvement
- Black #s = On glide path
- Red #s = Below Glide Path
- Blue ltrs = Remarks

Personnel C2 Training Sustainment Equipment Leadership Overall

4 Months to Assume Battle space

*+1 Month, Infrastructure, Comms, Sustainment Billeting

	X Baghdad	X Baghdad	X Baghdad	X Baghdad	X Baghdad
1	6 256	6 2	6 3	6 2	6 4
1Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	1Bn/2Bde/6Div Baghdad	1Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	1Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	1Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	1Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad
2Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	2Bn/2Bde/6Div Baghdad	2Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	2Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	2Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	2Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad
3Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	3Bn/2Bde/6Div Baghdad	3Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	3Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	3Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	3Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad
4Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	4Bn/2Bde/6Div Baghdad	4Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	4Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	4Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	4Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad
5Bn/1Bde/6Div Baghdad	5Bn/2Bde/6Div Baghdad				

Personnel C2 Training Sustainment Equipment Leadership Overall

2

Personnel C2 Training Sustainment Equipment Leadership Overall

3

Personnel C2 Training Sustainment Equipment Leadership Overall

3

Personnel C2 Training Sustainment Equipment Leadership Overall

3

Personnel C2 Training Sustainment Equipment Leadership Overall

4

0 Months to Assume Battle space

2 Months to Assume Battle space

4 Months to Assume Battle space

7 Months to Assume Battle space

4 Months to Assume Battle space

*+1 Month, 2nd month slipped
Lacking storage facilities, wrong pay rates

*+1 Month, out of tribe recruiting possible moving current soldiers

*+1 Month, wrong pay rate
No fuel, no billets

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH~~



1 July 05


MND-NC

Transition Readiness Assessment

- A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.
- A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
- A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Months to Assume Battle Space Legend
Green #s = Improvement
Black #s = On glide path
Red #s = Below Glide Path
Blue ltrs = Remarks

5 Months to Assume Battle space



X Numaniyah



X KMTB



2Bn/1Bde/5Div KMTB

3Bn/1Bde/5Div KMTB



3 Months to Assume Battle space

2 Months to Assume Battle space

X Baqubah



1Bn/2Bde/5Div Baqubah

2Bn/2Bde/5Div Muqdadiyah

3Bn/2Bde/5Div KMTB

4Bn/2Bde/5Div Baqubah



4 Months to Assume Battle space

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MGFI//~~



1 July 05



MND-CS

Transition Readiness Assessment

- A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.
- A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
- A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Months to Assume Battle
Space Legend
Green #s = Improvement
Black #s = On glide path
Red #s = Below Glide Path
Blue ltrs = Remarks

5 Months to Assume Battle space



3 Months to Assume Battle space

4 Months to Assume Battle space

4 Months to Assume Battle space

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MGFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

Elections

Strategic Effects (MNF-I Campaign Plan, Aug 04)

Legitimate Iraqi Government
Drive a wedge driven between insurgents
and the population

Strategic Tasks (MNF-I 2005 Campaign Action Plan)

Assist in Security
Assist in Logistical Support
Support the IO Campaign
Facilitate C3

MNC- I Effect (MNC-I Campaign Plan 90 Day Update)
Iraqis acknowledge and participate in the
election and political / constitutional
processes

Key Tasks:

Security

Disrupt AIF

IO

Support Election Information Efforts

Command, Control and Communications

Conduct Elections COMMEX

Assess PJCC

Logistical Support

Coordinate with contractor

Assess Polling Sites

Support IECl logistical short falls

Required Assistance

1.

Need Mol Operation Order

2.

Need contract details

3.

Need IECl outreach initiatives products,
messages & themes

4.

BIAP potential labor dispute

End State: Registration, referendum and elections held in a secure
environment, conducted by Iraqis, brought about by the will of the Iraqi
people, without the perception of undue MNF-I influence.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Need MoI Operation Order

Request MoI OPORD

As of 21 July MOI Elections OPORD Draft not signed

Based on 12 July 05 IECI Working Group, the MoI OPORD Draft will address:

- Security Plan (Security of election sites by IP)

- CF Presence Plan (Location of CF well away from election sites)

- Communications Plan

- Media Plan

MNC-I Supporting Tasks beginning 20 July 05 for the Referendum:

- MSC Assess and Prioritize Resources

- BPT Move Materials and Resources

MoI/MoD are still working out the procedures to allow ISF/IA absentee voting

Need final MOI OPORD IOT determine short-falls and finalize our CONOPs for possible election support (Class I, Ballots, etc..)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Need contract details

Request IECI provide a plan to MNC-I

Contracts for logistical support and security of election material are critical to the success of the entire elections process.

LNOs with the contractors provide CF with SA throughout the process. Contractors are not obligated to receive or work with CF LNOs.

There are three separate contracts – Printing, Movement/Security, and Data Collection

Without knowing the contractors plan, MSCs cannot proactively plan to support potential logistical shortfalls.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Need IECI outreach initiatives products, messages & theme

Request IECI release its Public Information plan ASAP IOT ensure that Iraqis receive a consistent message and they understand how to participate in the democratic process

Lack of synchronized products, messages, and themes in contested areas may assist AIF in de-legitimizing the democratic process and discrediting the ITG

MNC-I (and MSCs) must be provided the details of the IECI public outreach plan IOT to support the overall Public Information campaign and identify shortfalls, such as satellite TV and radio spots. If there are shortfalls, additional funds might be required.

All people of Iraq support the political process and results of the constitutional referendum and general election

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH//~~



BIAP potential labor dispute

Request MoL and/or MoT BPT to resolve potential labor disputes with Global Security Inc.

Request MoJ and MoI decide who is responsible for BIAP security

Potential difficulties utilizing BIAP during the election would result in minimal impact to Registration, Referendum, and Election logistical support

If the civilian workforce in BIAP is not paid, it could create the need for greater CF involvement.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Elections

- **What IECI is doing:**
 - Negotiating contracts for logistical support/security during transit
 - Finalizing list of DEOs/GEOs/Polling Sites
 - Plans to distribute materials to GEOs 21-25 JUL, move to DEOs 25 JUL-1 AUG
 - Establish Mol Security Plan NLT 25 JUL
- **What IECI needs to do:**
 - Let contracts and release details to MNF-I (execution date set for 15 JUL)
 - Recruit staff for DEOs/GEOs/Polling Sites
 - Share the ITG IO plan to support the elections process IOT enable MNF-I/MNC-I to synchronize their efforts and support the elections
- **What MNF-I is doing:**
 - Coordinating with IECI/UNEAD/UNAMI for election support
- **What MNF-I needs to do:**
 - Emphasize to IECI that security and logistical support cannot be planned until contracts are let/details of contracts released
 - Release translated list of DEOs/GEOs/Polling Sites to MNC-I
 - Emphasize to IECI the critical requirement for fully staffed DEOs/GEOs/Polling Sites
 - Emphasize the need for an ITG IO Plan into which CF IO efforts can be integrated

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Elections

■ What MNC-I is doing:

- Executing MSC assessments of DEOs/GEOs IAW MNC-I FRAGO 58
- Developed IO plan to support Corps election support operations
- Developing Security and Logistical Support Plans IOT support the election process. Base Order and Phase 1 issued 3 JUL, Phase 2 issued on 5 JUL

■ What MNC-I needs to do:

- Upon receiving contract details, complete assessments – cannot be completed until finalized list of DEOs/GEOs/Polling sites is released
- Synchronize Corps IO effort with IECI's IO Plan
- Resource MSCs to enable them to support election operations security and logistical support requirements
- Finalize Corps Election Support Plan – Phase 3 NLT 31 AUG, Phase 4 NLT 31 SEP

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH~~

ELECTIONS



Phases Agency	Registration	Public Discussion	Support to the Referendum	Support to Election	Post Election Recovery
ITG		Leads public awareness campaign	Announce emergency measures		
	MOI Election SEC Guide NLT 29 JUL 05				
	MOC Election Commo Guidance				
IECI/UN	Publish/Execute IO Plan	Develops voter education program	Encourage public discourse and participation	Publish/Execute IO Plan	
	IECI - Lets Contracts				
	Provide GEO/DEO Locations	Develop IO themes	Execute referendum/ Provide Polling Locations	Execute election	Retrograde/ballot count and oversee consolidation of lists
DOS (IRMO)	Ensure IECI has sufficient budget/staff for elections	Supports voter education program	Provide tech support to IECI/UN for referendum		
	Encourages IECI to establish good Polling sites		Support int'l and domestic observation and monitoring	Encourage and facilitate int'l and domestic monitors	

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFL//~~

ELECTIONS



Phases Agency	Registration	Public Discussion	Support to the Referendum	Support to Election	Post Election Recovery
MNF-I	Decision point matrix & timeline	Coordinate/provide liaisons with ministries and IECI to support voter education program	Decision point matrix & timeline		
	FRAGO				
	Integrate IO plan with IECI				
	Contractor Log/Security Plan				
MNC-I	Decision point matrix & timeline	Provide support voter education program	Decision point matrix & timeline		
	FRAGO				
	Security Ops Plan to Set Conditions				
	Log Spt Plan to Enable Success				
	Integrate IO plan with IECI				

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFL//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH~~



CIVILIAN SIDE OF BIAP CLOSED

BIAP civilian side closed. Military side open.

Civil aviation uses military side of BIAP

Requiring prior coordination with Commander, 447th EOG for permission of Contract air delivery

Civilian aircraft logistical equipment/personnel moved to military side

Altered security measures – IECI/Contract Security personnel presence

Materials handling issues – Must not be perceived as Coalition effort

Further distribution is unchanged in accordance with original plan but using the military side of BIAP

Net impact: NONE

BIAP=Baghdad International Airport
FW = Fixed Wing
RW=Rotary Wing
EOG=Expeditionary Operations Group, USAF @ BIAP

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MGFI//~~



BIAP COMPLETELY CLOSED

If BIAP is closed, BALAD used as an alternate hub

Minor changes in flight times and routing for FW and RW support

NET IMPACT: Minor changes in flight planning

Materials destined for the two Baghdad GEOs are delivered from Balad via ground convoy

Net impact: 1) NONE to air assets 2) MINIMAL increase in Contractor logistical support and conveyance plan. Transportation and delivery plan of material must expand to compensate for Baghdad GEO registration delivery.

BIAP=Baghdad International Airport
FW = Fixed Wing
RW=Rotary Wing
EOG=Expeditionary Operations Group, USAF @ BIAP

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MGFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

Infrastructure Secure

Strategic Effects:

Legitimate Iraqi Government
Basic needs met
A wedge driven between insurgents & populace
(MNF-I Campaign Plan)

Strategic Tasks:

Protect critical infrastructure until IJF is able to
do so (MNF-I FRAGO 05-185)

MNC-I Effects:

Legitimate Iraqi Government
ITG assumes responsibility for delivery of basic
services
Critical infrastructure secure
(MNC-I OPORD 05-02)

What we are doing right now:



Key Tasks:

Secure oil distribution infrastructure
Secure 400kV electrical distribution network
Secure critical water distribution control points
Secure Karkh water treatment plant
Secure seven critical ITO bridges
Secure key port facilities (Umm Qasr)
BPT secure other critical infrastructure as required
Support establishment of PRDC
Influence IZ populace WRT infrastructure security
Develop C2 relationships with SIB
(MNC-I OPORD 05-02)

Required Assistance

1. Facilitate development of comprehensive Iraqi/CF Infrastructure Security Strategy
2. Support Coordination Efforts

ENDSTATE: Capable Iraqi infrastructure security forces providing adequate security to strategic infrastructure nodes and linear arrays with key vulnerabilities mitigated and minimal CF involvement (MNC-I OPORD 05-02, 90-day update)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Examples of Ongoing Corps Actions

OIL	ELECTRICITY
• Bayji-Baghdad Crude Line – 2 PLT-size recon patrols daily (CF); Air Recon; 2 SIB BNs • Hamman Al Alil Oil Depot – 1 BN (SIB); 1A patrols • Bayji Refinery – 2 PLT (CF); 578 Erinys guards; CF patrols (6 hours/day)	• Haditha Hydro Power Plant (MNF-W) – 1 CO (CF) • Najibaya Power Plant (MND-SE) – 1 CO (IA) • Mosul Dam (MNF-NW) – 1 BN (IA)
WATER	BRIDGES / KEY PORTS
• Karkh WTP (MND-B) – 2 PLT (CF/IA) • Sharkh Dijlah WT Plant (MND-B) – 1 CO (IP) • Water Pump Station #2 (MND-SE) – 1 PLT (FPS)	• Umm Qasr port – 1 BN (CF/IA/Ministry forces) • 21 key bridges – 15 PLTs total (CF/IA) (24 hours/day)


~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~





Kirkuk to Bayji Linear Infrastructure Security


ADDITIONAL IA OVERSIGHT
6 platoons dedicated to augment SIBs and overwatch all exposed pipe and well heads not covered by contracted security



ADDITIONAL CF OVERSIGHT

TF 1.4a Security Monitoring - Daily patrols along the pipeline in AO West
1-148 FA - Platoon to Al Fathah 3X per week / Patrols daily from Kirkuk to Dibis
IAF Over-flights (When Available)
- Weekly Coordination Meeting with NOC/IA/CF

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MGFI//~~



Hammam Al Ail Oil Depot
(38S LE 307 706)

- 1** Oil Depot is located in SBCT (1-5IN) AOR
- 2** Oil Depot is guarded by the 6th SIB (approx 450 personnel) augmented by FPS
- 3** 3d Bn, 2d BDE, 2d IA Division is stationed in Hammam Al Ail partnered with 1-5IN, MiTT and BaTT teams.

Security situation in Hammam Al Ail is the best it has been in over a year due to constant interaction with ISF/CF.

No IED since February
No SAF since November 2004

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MGFI//~~


~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Current Assessment

Attacking the symptoms, not the
cause

Way Ahead



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Comprehensive Effort

- Clearly defines critical infrastructure, acceptable security risk & priorities relative to Iraqi national interests
- Communicates GOI strategic goals to manage perceptions of populace
- Emphasizes to ministers that infrastructure reliability is a maintenance and police function in the long term
- Emphasizes a greater degree of inter-Ministerial infrastructure coordination
- Capital improvements to infrastructure

A comprehensive strategy would significantly enhance coordinated, long-term infrastructure security operations that carry us beyond the elections.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Infrastructure Security Efforts: Government of Iraq

■ What the Government is doing:

- Beginning to accept responsibility for infrastructure security (creating the Infrastructure Coordination Cell - ICC)
- Continuing to develop Infrastructure protection services and improve their pay system
- Deploying protection forces to critical nodes

■ What the Government needs to do:

Fix decrepit infrastructure

- Improve rapid repair, maintenance, reconstruction /development program

Engage tribes to gain support for security efforts

- Encourage ITG IO campaign that targets perpetrators
- Determine ROE, enforce Rule of Law, and allow use of deadly force
- Further develop SIB force generation and deployment plan

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Infrastructure Security Efforts: MNF-I

■ What MNF-I is doing:

- Coordinating contractor/ICC issues with ITG
- Mentoring agencies responsible for infrastructure security
- Providing liaison between ITG agencies and MNC-I

■ What we would like MNF-I to do:

– Emphasize to ministries that infrastructure reliability is a police and maintenance problem

- Coordinate DIRLAUTH between MNC-I MSCs, PCO, and IRMO
- Assist in training and equipping of EPSS (MNSTC-I)
- Assist Iraqis in developing ICC charter
- Provide additional ISR assets as required

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFL//~~



Infrastructure Security Efforts: MNC-I

■ What the Corps is doing:

- Directing units to immediately secure critical points in coordination with IA and infrastructure security forces
- Conducting TACAIR (8 hrs/day) over Baghdad-Bayji, Bayji-Kirkuk, Kirkuk-Baghdad and Basra-Baghdad corridors
- Allocating a total of \$20.5 mil funds ISO infrastructure projects (\$1.3mil applied to electrical infrastructure security)
- Conducting IO campaign (TIPS line, local media "support ISF," "securing Iraq's future")

■ What the Corps needs to do:

- Confirm composition/disposition/capability of Iraqi infrastructure protection forces 
- Continue refinement of reporting responsibilities
- Improve partnering relationship between CF and infrastructure protection forces
- Increase NTISR committed to infrastructure
- Increase TACAIR presence over linear infrastructure for deterrence
- Research additional COTS sensors via Rapid Equipment Fielding-Iraq

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFL//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Sample from Corps Database

TYPE	NAME	LOCATION	TIER	MEASURE	Carve Pri	Carve Significance
MND-NC						
Oil	Al Fathah River Crossing	38S LD 68517 79516	1	3-163 / 1.4a	1	Single crossing pt for the Tigris River for all oil from Kirkuk
Oil	K2 (Bayji) Pump Station	38S LD 553 646	1	TF 1.4a / OPF		
Oil	IT1A Pump Station	38S LE 349 049	1	TF 1.4a / OPF	6	Pumps crude oil export from storage tanks to Turkey
Oil	Bayji Refinery	38S LD 62850 75151	1	TF 1.4a / OPF	29	1 of 3 lgst refineries. Produces benzene and other oil prods. Psychologically important
Oil	K1 Pump Station	38S ME 34352 29500	1	116BCT / OPF	9	Transports crude from the Kirkuk storage tanks to the Bayji Refinery
Oil	IT1 Pump Station	38S ME 28158 20397	1	116BCT / OPF	24	Initial pumping station from Kirkuk Oil Fields to IT Export Line

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MGFI//~~



Infrastructure Security: **MND-NC**

- What MND-NC is doing:
 - Increasing CF presence, patrols and CPs
 - Working with local leaders, power companies, and security agencies to improve security (coordination, isolate and harden facilities)
 - Planning additional security projects for all facilities
 - Purchased six Tower Cranes to facilitate electrical repairs (Total cost \$1.6M)
 - Engaging with local leaders (tribal, religious and political)
- What MND-NC needs to do:
 - Maintain security responsibilities until otherwise directed
 - Conduct additional air patrols over critical infrastructure
 - Assume OPCON of EPSS in MND-NC AO
 - Accept and employ proven security technology

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MGFI//~~





Way Ahead



Are attacks coordinated strategic insurgent activities? (then military is main effort)

Are attacks economically motivated local criminal acts? (then police and governance are primary)

Enhanced Coordination Measures


~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//~~




Synchronization Model

Ministerial – Ambassadorial Engagement


National



Provincial



Local



Effective coordination will enable immediate improvements in infrastructure security and facilitate development and implementation of a long-term strategy.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



***Increased infrastructure
security will result from***

**Development of a coherent &
comprehensive security effort**

**Enhanced Coordination
Measures**

***Without a national strategy we will dilute our efforts and inhibit Iraqi/CF
ability to develop a long term solution.***

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Approved for Release
BACK-UP

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



INFRASTRUCTURE SECURE

Aspect Section	Infrastructure Strategy and Priorities	Infrastructure Capability	Business Model	Security Operations	Force Generation
<u>ITG</u>	1. Provide strategic guidance to Ministries a. Identify critical infrastructure by type and level b. Define level of acceptable risk c. Prioritize infrastructure by type and level d. Synchronization mechanism for infrastructure operations e. Inform populace of strategy and priorities	1. Determine requirements 2. Assessment/ Rapid repair capability 3. Parts on hand 4. Recapitalization Plan	1. Integrate with macro economic model 2. Apply rule of law to deter corruption 3. Provide & sustain capable resources 4. Standardize labor issues	1. Determine/coord security strategy (ICC) 2. Determine capability requirements for security forces and agencies 3. Vet employees 4. Centralize coordination of security operations 5. Apply economic incentives IOT prevent attacks 6. Inform populace of strategy and successes 7. Apply Rule of Law	1. Provide capable infrastructure security forces IAW strategy
<u>Ministries</u>	1. Develop Ministerial Capabilities 2. Implement ITG policy 3. MOI establish capability requirements & standards for Facilities Protection Services (FPS) 4. Coordinate between ministries				
DOS	1. Resource/support IRMO. 2. Assist in development of Ministers				
IRMO	1. Assist Ministries to develop capabilities 2. Assist Ministries to implement ITG policy 3. Participate in Infrastructure Working Group and ICC			Assist ministries to develop pay procedures	SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



INFRASTRUCTURE SECURE

Section	Aspect	Infrastructure Strategy and Priorities	Infrastructure Capability	Business Model	Security Operations	Force Generation
MNF-I		1. Participate in Infrastructure Working Group/ICC 2. Provide feedback to ITG			1. Participate in Infrastructure Working Group/ICC 2. Synergize Campaign Plan, FragOs, Directive and Infrastructure Plan with MNC-I.	Support MNSTC-I with Iraqi force development
MNSTC-I						Develop forces IAW priorities and timeframes
GRD		Provide technical advice in formulation of infrastructure security policies	Provide technical advice and surveys	Enact commercial operations in support of Economic Model	Provide technical assistance as requested to MNC-I	Execute projects as tasked
MNC-I					1. Secure critical infrastructure as directed 2. Engage with local leadership 3. Participate in Infrastructure Working Group/ICC	Support MNSTC-I as required

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH//~~



Potential Costs Associated with Security of 400KV Lines in MND-NC

- An increased allocation of troops to infrastructure security tasks:
 - Reduces battlefield circulation - increases ground convoys
 - Diminishes COIN capability
 - Decreases election outer cordon security
- Failure to provide 10 additional RW assets to MND-NC:
 - Limits surveillance and air QRF
 - Eliminates air assault missions
- Increasing EPSS capability:
 - Impacts ISF readiness
- Non-implementation of ITG measures:
 - Limits security improvements without contract approvals
 - Increases coordination difficulties (provision of LNO and C2 upgrades)
 - Diminishes effect without effective IO & anti-corruption measures
 - Diminishes effectiveness without OPCON of EPSS
 - Continued power loss due to structural failures (tech survey, maintain, repair, strategy)
- Dependent on ISR asset:
 - Use of JSTARS reduces effort in support of OP Eagle Focus or border surveillance supporting OP Sayaid
 - Use of Full Motion Video significantly increases theater shortfall
 - o Detracts from the AQIZ
 - o COIN and counter IED
 - o Election security support

Potential to fix CF, develop new AIF TTP and allow increased AIF mobility

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH//~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Infrastructure Secure

Actions Required: ITG

- Infrastructure Strategy & Priorities
 - Provide strategic guidance to Ministries
 - Identify critical infrastructure by type and level
 - Define level of acceptable risk
 - Prioritize infrastructure by type and level (export vs. domestic consumption, oil vs. electricity)
 - Centralize coordination of infrastructure operations (ICC)
 - Communicate strategy & priorities to MNF-I
 - Inform populace of strategy and priorities
- Infrastructure Capability: **Determine end-state system requirements**
- Define Economic Model
 - Determine economic model
 - Capital Reinvestment
 - Profit Sharing by Province / Incentives
 - Apply rule of law
 - Enforce stated anti-corruption policies
 - Aggressively prosecute criminals
 - Codify and communicate exclusion zones
- Resources
 - Provide and sustain capable resources
 - Standardize labor issues
- Security Operations
 - Determine security strategy
 - Determine capability requirements for security forces and agencies
 - Determine vetting & control measures
 - Centralize coordination
 - Input ITG priorities to MNF-I
 - Inform populace of strategy and successes
- Force Generation
 - Provide capable infrastructure security forces IAW strategy
 - Prioritize critical infrastructure and subsequent security requirements

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Actions Required: Ministries

Develop Ministerial Capabilities

- Implement ITG policy
- MOI establish capability requirements & standards for FPS
- Require Ministerial manning of JCC/PJCC/JCC network
- Establish maintenance sustainment operations
- Establish repair capability and capacity
- Optimize available resources with intent to transition to end-state
- Recapitalize to improve reliability (redundancy capability and equipment reliability)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Actions Required: MNF-I

1. Inform MNC-I of ITG Strategy, policy and priorities
2. Provide results feedback to ITG
3. Facilitate inter-Ministerial coordination via ICC
4. De-conflict Campaign Plan, FragOs, Directive and Infrastructure Plan
5. Inform MNC-I of ITG Strategy, policy and priorities
6. Provide results feedback to ITG
7. Facilitate inter-Ministerial coordination
8. Task MNC-I with operational security effort
9. ask MNSTC-I with Iraqi force development

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

Restore IZ Control of the Border

STRATEGIC EFFECTS:

- Legitimate Iraqi Government
- Capable ISF
- Insurgents and terrorists neutralized

Strategic Task:

- Restore control of the IZ border NLT 30NOV05

References: MNF-I Campaign Plan, AUG 04; MNF-I FRAGO 05-195 Operation SAYAID, 13 JUL 05

KEY TASKS:

- Monitor and enforce border laws
- Establish border forces
- BPT Construction and maintenance of infrastructure
- Disrupt AQIZ
- Influence Iraqi Populace; engage tribal leaders to deny AIF sanctuary

References: Specified and Implied Tasks from MNF-I Campaign Plan, MNF-I Campaign Action Plan, MNF-I FRAGO 05-195,

MNC-I EFFECTS:

Legitimate Iraqi Government
AIF neutralized
ISF capable of BDE /BN operations
Secure Borders

Reference: MNC-I OPORD 05-02

REQUIRED ASSISTANCE:

1. Clarify GOI and CF responsibilities for borders
2. Border infrastructure (POE, Forts, FOBs, Communications)
3. Synchronized deployment of DBE
4. ISF Sustainment and Support Systems
5. Continued Engagement with Syria

Endstate: Border sovereignty restored, Capable ISF established, and AIF LOCs and sanctuary disrupted in Ninewa and Al Anbar.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//Matrix~~

Pages 56 through 57 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4a, 1.4b

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Restore IZ Control of the Border Clarify GOI and CF Responsibilities

- **ITG:** Publish directive clearly assigning ministerial responsibility and C2 for restoring IZ border sovereignty to include establishing Ports of Entry
- **MNF-I:** Confirm that MNSTC-I has the lead in coordinating and synchronizing the effort to restore control of the borders with MOI; clarify the requirements and tasks to MNC-I
 - Border Tasks from MNF-I FRAGO 05-195, (Operation SAYAID), 13 JUL 05

MNC-I

- 3.C.3.A. (S//REL) Restore borders to Iraqi control NLT 30 November.
- **3.C.3.G.** (S//REL) Assist MOI in the synchronized integration of border forces and facilities.

MNSTC-I

- 3.C.4.A. (S//REL) Assist MOI in providing DBE forces and in establishing facilities that allow for the restoration of Iraqi control of the borders NLT 30 November.
- **3.C.4.B.** (S//REL) Assist MOI in the synchronized integration of border forces and facilities ICW MNC-I and STRATOPS.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH~~



Restore IZ Control of the Boraer Border Infrastructure

- **MOI with MNSTC-I: Fully resource and facilitate construction of border infrastructure by 30 NOV 05**

- Forts and FOBs along the border
- Construction to base IA force to protect DBE
- All-weather road network in support of Border Forts 1-9
- Communications network
- Port of Entry construction

If the current MOI plan cannot meet the 30 NOV 05 deadline, then the potential cost to MNC-I must be prioritized against the resource demands of the current efforts

- **Resources:** Engineer, Transportation, Supply, Aviation, ISR, Budget, Ground Maneuver Forces

Against

- **05-02 Tasks:** Election set security, Strategic Infrastructure, Disrupt AIF, Base Closure, Force Posture

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH~~



Page 60 redacted for the following reason:

1.4a, 1.4b

Approved for Release

~~SECRET// REL to USA and MCFI //~~



Restore IZ Control of the Border ISF Sustainment and Support Systems

- MOD and MNSTC-I: BSI must develop capability to provide forward support to deployed IA forces
- MOD, MOI, and MNSTC-I: DBE and IA life support must be capable

~~SECRET// REL to USA and MCFI //~~



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Restore IZ Control of the Border Continued Engagement with Syria


- **ITG and DOS: Maintain constant pressure on Syria**
 - Disrupt AQIZ infiltration and deny sanctuary
 - Formalize bi-lateral interaction and border law enforcement
 - Port of Entry at Al Qaim
 - Commerce
 - Immigration
 - Travel
- **ITG, DOS, MNF-I: Continue international engagement to influence neighboring nations and greater Muslim community to decrease terrorist support/recruitment and bolster Iraqi sovereignty**
- **DOS and MNF-I: Formulate policy to enable BTT interaction and coordination with Syrian border agencies**

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~



Agency	Political Tasks	Monitor and Enforce Border Laws	Establish Border Force	Construction and Maintenance of Infrastructure	Disrupt AQIZ	Information Operations
ITG	- Establish Border Law - Est. Bi-lateral Agreements / Int'l Engagement	Provide Funding for Border Control	- Identify POE - Provide Funding for Border Control	Public Information		
Ministries	- MOI: Develop Policy and Procedure to enforce laws - MOJ: Investigate / Adjudicate Border Violations - MOJ: Detainee Operations	- Recruit/Man DBE - Equip DBE - Train DBE - Deploy DBE - Sustain DBE	- Establish Border Forts and POE - Develop support infrastructure	- Budgetary Responsibility - Recruit/Man IA - Equip IA - Train IA - Deploy IA - Sustain IA	International engagement	
DOS	- Coordinating Responsibility - Assist ministries with Rule of Law / Int'l Relations - Int'l Engagement / Demarche	Provide Tng Teams	- Advise and assist: - POE construction - Highways - Nat'l Detention Facilities	Int'l Engagement	Public Announcements, F2F	
IRMO			- Coordinating Responsibility - Contracting - Budgeting - Establish Power, Comms, and Trans Architecture			
GRD			- Advise and assist: - POE construction - Highways - Nat'l Detention Facilities			
MNF-I	Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG	- Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG - Partner with MOI	Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG	- Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG - Partner with MOD / JHQ	- Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG - Partner with MOD / JHQ	
MNSTC-I	Train law enforcement agencies	- Coordinating Responsibility - Budget - Assist MOI - Develop Sustainment Concept	Budgetary Responsibility	- Assist MOD: - Train IA - Equip IA	Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG	
MNC-I		- Partner with DBE - Provide BTT - Provide DBE Security - Assist Support DBE Sustainment		- Coordinating Responsibility - Conduct Offensive operations - Budgetary Responsibility - Conduct IO - Establish Capable ISF	Partner with MOD / JHQ	

SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//


~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFL//~~

~~SECRET//REL TO A, IRQ and MCFT~~


Jul 05




IA




IPS



PJCC



DBE



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ and MCFT~~

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~

Assistance Take Aways

Capable ISF:

1. MOD accelerate partnership
2. MOD/MOI policies/systems for ISF
3. MNF-I external source for P3
4. MNF-I sourcing for Force Gen

Expansion

5. Rule of Law

Election Security:

1. MOI detailed operations order
2. IECL contract details
3. MOI Public Information Plan
4. Resolve BIAP labor dispute

Infrastructure Secure:

1. Ministerial development
2. Comprehensive ITG infrastructure development strategy
3. Interagency coordination from Ministries to boots on the ground

Control IZ Border:

1. Clarify border responsibilities (C2)
2. Border construction contracts
3. Synchronized deployment of forces
4. ISF sustainment support systems
5. Continued engagement with Syria

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//~~