STRATEGIC ROCKDRILL
MNC-I OPORD 05-02

Making the Elections Decisive
July 25, 2005
Making the Elections Decisive

CG MNC-I Planning Guidance to Staff:

- Verify tasks support MNC-I strategic mission/end state
- Review current MNC-I tasks to identify limiting factors
- Identify requirements for assistance or further coordination
# Making the Elections Decisive

## Phase II: PROVINCIAL IRAQI SECURITY CONTROL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MNC-I Key Tasks</th>
<th>MNC-I Key Effects</th>
<th>End State</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(MNF-I Campaign Action Plan)</td>
<td>(MNF-I Operations Order 05-02)</td>
<td>(MNF-I Campaign Action Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish Capable ISF (ME)</td>
<td>• ISF capable of brigade-level operations with CF support</td>
<td>• Local and provincial ISF under TACON of CF</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Election Security</td>
<td>• Security environment where Iraqis feel safe to participate in the election process</td>
<td>• take lead in COIN ops</td>
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<td>• Strategic Infrastructure</td>
<td>• Infrastructure secured with minimal disruption of service</td>
<td>• ISF and provincial civil authorities cooperate and coordinate actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Restore Control IZ Border</td>
<td>• GOI assumes responsibility for delivery of basic services</td>
<td>• AIF activity and freedom of action are reduced so that ISF asserts provincial control and domestic order</td>
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<td>• Disrupt AIF</td>
<td>• Border control and institutions established (Al Anbar/Ninewa)</td>
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<td>• Detainee Operations</td>
<td>• Deny AIF sanctuary and disrupt freedom of action in Al Anbar and Ninewa</td>
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<td>• Base Closure/Handover</td>
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<td>• Force Posturing</td>
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<td>RIP/TOA</td>
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<td>Off Ramp</td>
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**Strategic Effects**
(MNF-I Campaign Plan):
- Capable ISF
- Insurgents and terrorists neutralized
- Legitimate Iraqi Govt

**Strategic Tasks**
(Draft Strategic Directive 8 July):
- Sustain gains in Baghdad
- Improve security in Mosul
- Secure Ramadi and Fallujah
- Sustain security in Najaf & Kirkuk
- Improve security in Samarra, Baqubah, and N. Babil
- Restore border control/deny safe haven in Ninewa & Al Anbar
- Secure infrastructure against catastrophic disruption
- Increased Primacy of Rule of Law

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**Key Tasks**
(MNC-I 90 Day Update):
- Develop capable ISF and prepare the ISF to take the lead in Counterinsurgency Operations
- Continue the support and maintenance of JCCs and PJCCs
- Transition battlespace to Iraqi Control
- Implement Transition Team Programs
  - (Assist the ITG and Provincial governments in developing and securing infrastructure)
  - (Coordinate with border security forces and develop their capability)

**Required Assistance**
1. Develop ministerial capacity
2. Expansion of Police Partnership Program
3. Force Generation Acceleration
4. Rule of Law
   - a. Detention Facilities
   - b. Detainee Abuse
   - c. Judicial Process

**ENDSTATE:** Iraqi Security Forces capable of conducting independent COIN without Coalition support.

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**Capable ISF**

**MNC-I Effects (OPORD vs-02):**
- Capable ISF
- AIF neutralized
- ISF capable of BN Level Opns
- ISF capable of BDE Level Operations
- ISF controls territory across Region
- ISF capable of Division Opns
- ISF capable of Independent COIN
- Iraqi Security Forces Self Reliant
Develop Ministerial Capacity

- **Issue:** MOD / MOI Development

- **Discussion:**
  - Following the Jan 05 election there was a 90 day period where all / most of the personnel changed out with the new government.
  - Development of ministerial capacity and civil service is crucial to maintaining momentum following the elections.
  - JHQ AST and certain MNF-I staff are partnered with some MOD staff.

- **Recommendation:**
  - MOD
    - Accelerate partnership with MOD / JHQ to include action officer level (MNF-I)
    - Source MOD transition team (MNF-I)
    - Establishment of policies and systems ISO ISF (MOD / MNF-I)
  - MOI
    - MOI assume lead for IPS recruiting (MOI)
    - Assume lead for development and coordination of PJCCs (MOI ?)
    - Sustain P3 MOI activities (MNF-I)
# ACCOUNTABILITY

## Pay & Policies

- **ISSUE:** IA Soldiers not being paid properly; No approved personnel policies

## CURRENT STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PAY ISSUE</th>
<th>MITIGATING ACTION</th>
<th>INDIVIDUALS/ORGANIZATIONS WORKING ISSUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMBER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>Recruits may miss pay this month due to MOD budget constraints.</td>
<td>MOD is working the issue to shift money from another account to make up for the shortfall.</td>
<td>2 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBER</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>3,000 recruits who did not have the required paperwork to receive an MOD ID number/card, were not approved for pay.</td>
<td>JHQ/MNSTC-I will provide the list of names to DG Personnel (MG Salzman) who will waive the requirement for ID cards and pay the recruits.</td>
<td>2 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBER</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Missed and incorrect pay amounts continue in all Iraqi Divisions. Due to not following pay process.</td>
<td>IA-G1 contacted and informed JHQ, is following up. The MOD pay procedures are still not being followed; MS is aggressively working issue. A FRAGO has been released addressing the pay process steps.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>Five Personnel Policies awaiting signature by MOD. Additional policies working and in the staffing process.</td>
<td>2 policies with Minister awaiting signature. 1 in final staffing w/MOD M1, JHQ, MNSTC-I, MNC-I CL. 2 others under review at JHQ.</td>
<td>4 5 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RED</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>Officer Promotion, Enlisted Promotion, and Reenlistment Policies.</td>
<td>These 3 policies with Minister awaiting signature impact pay and are major areas of concern from IA units and Coalition Units/MiTTs.</td>
<td>2 3 4 6 7 7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **IND/ORG SUPPORTING:** Key Iraqi Action Officers - IA Division G1s
  1. -IGFC HQ G-1 (BG Read)
  2. -JHQ M1/M8
  3. -JHQ AST
  4. -MNC-I C-1
  5. -MNSTC-I J1
  6. -IGFC HQ MiTT
  7. -DIR GEN, PERS, US EMB (Mr Stark)

**IMPACT:** Pay issues impact morale; lack of policies causing pay issues.
Equipping the ISF

- Issue: Protected mobility for ISF. New requirements emerging.

- Discussion:
  - ISF possesses limited armored / protected vehicles.
  - AIF targeting ISF unarmored vehicles.
  - MNSTC-I initiative with SP CDO for up-armoring.
  - Associated maintenance costs for potentially expanded capabilities.

- Recommendation:
  - Sustain MNSTC-I procurement for protected vehicles
  - Develop MOD equipment programming / procurement capacity
  - JHQ determine emerging / unfunded requirements ISO ISF development
MOI Recruiting Current Assessment

Approved Policies and Procedures:
- MNC-I Recruiting SOP (developed in close coordination with CPATT)
- MNC-I Monthly Recruiting FRAGO (BPC and JIPTC)
- Weekly IPS Recruiting Review Board (MNC-I, CPATT, and MOI)

Friction Points/Areas of Concern:
- Current process is resource-intensive for MSCs (P3 Teams)
- Provincial CoP not engaged in selecting, screening, and vetting of IPS
- Hiring freeze – lack of resources and ethnic motivations

The Way Ahead:
- Transition ownership of the IPS recruiting process to the MOI, and subsequently to the Provincial CoP (MOI / MNSTC-I)
- Re-scope MSC role in recruiting process (MNF-I)
- Regional Recruiting Centers strategically located throughout the AO (MOI / MNSTC-I)
MOI Recruiting

Issue: MOI assuming lead for IPS recruiting process

Discussion: IPS recruiting done at the local, tactical level. MSCs currently lead in the recruiting and vetting of IPS.

Recommendation:

- MOI assume ownership of IPS recruiting process.
- CF enable process through transportation and security of IPS recruits.
Issue: National PJCC integration

Discussion: PJCCs are owned by the governors. There is no ministerial ownership of PJCC’s (Iraqi FEMA ?). P3 program assists indirectly the PJCC development.
- Overall PJCC manning is 50%
- Overall equipment is 52%
- Overall operational training is 41%

Recommendation:
- Assist ITG in developing ministerial linkages and ownership for PJCCs (ITG / MNF-I)
- Develop national security plan for role and way ahead for PJCCs (ITG / MNF-I)
- Increase Iraqi support and funding for development of PJCCs (ITG / MNF-I)
- Partnership with PJCCs through appropriate agency (MNF-I)(FEMA)
P3 Program Expansion

- **Issue:** Expansion of P3 Program to the district level and below.

- **Discussion:**
  - Sustains:
    - Training programs – key to long term development of IPS
    - Coaching and assisting – to develop staff management skills
    - Coordinated activity – ensuring best practice adopted throughout AOR
  - Improves:
    - IPS budget – rudimentary processes, poor management
    - IPS equipment – unaccounted, poor management
    - P3 sourcing – Out of Hide

- **Recommendation:**
  - Seek enduring sourcing solution. (MNF-I)
  - Seek support to expand P3 once the conditions permit. (MNF-I)
P3 Expansion Cost

- P3 Expansion Requirement:
  - P3 – Province Team Manpower estimate = 360 to 500 personnel
  - P3 – District Team Manpower estimate = 850 personnel
  - P3 – Province and District teams Optimum = 1350 + IPLO and Translators = 1750
FORCES GENERATION ACCELERATION

- **Issue:** Requirements for out of hide MNC-I personnel

- **Discussion:**
  - Accelerate the generation of CS/CSS units to develop a self-reliant Iraqi Army capable of independent COIN: 103 HSC, MP, EN, ISR, EOD Companies
  - RFFs for additional forces as trainers have been denied
  - Low density high demand MOS's remain a challenge and will be more so after off ramp (MI, MP, EN)

- **Recommendation:**
  - Seek sourcing from other sources (Theater out of hide / Contractor) to fill instructor positions to accelerate ISF capability (MNF-I)
Detention / Corrections Operations
Direct Impacts

- **Issue:** Iraqi ownership of detention / corrections facilities IAW Rule of Law.

- **Discussion:** The logistical, manpower, and dollar cost associated with current and future detention operations is extremely significant. Military side of detention operations continues to expand. We continue to capture more than we release—expect pre-election surge. Shortfalls in Iraqi judicial system result in inability to prosecute detainees in a timely manner, which creates a log jam at BIFs/DIFs/TIFs. TF 1.4a conducting training at facilities in conjunction with DOJ. Planning by TF 1.4a for handover of detention facilities to ITG continues. Long term plan for an MOJ solution to detention in Iraq is tied to development of the judiciary and establishment of the rule of law.

- **Recommendations:**
  - Expand the Iraqi-owned corrections system with partnership (MOJ w/ USEMB/DOJ)
  - Establish legal authority for detention (ITG w/ USEMB)
  - Ministerial oversight of Iraqi detention operations (ITG / MOJ)
    - Construction of holding facilities for detainees currently held by MOI and MOD
  - Partnership and training of Iraqi corrections officers (MOJ w/ TF 1.4a / USEMB)
  - Transition life support costs to Iraqi control (MNF-I)
  - Involve other Iraqi government agencies as necessary
  - Transition from detentions to corrections
Force Flow Example
MND-NC

Transition Readiness Assessment
- A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.
- A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
- A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Months to Assume Battle Space

Legend:
- **Green #s** = Improvement
- **Black #s** = On glide path
- **Red #s** = Below glide path
- **Blue ltrs** = Remarks

1. Numaniyah
   - 1Bn/1Bde/5Div Taji
   - 2Bn/1Bde/5Div KMTB
   - 3Bn/1Bde/5Div KMTB
   - X Numaniyah
   - 3 Months to Assume Battle Space

2. KMTB
   - Personnel
   - C2
   - Training
   - Sustainment
   - Equipment
   - Leadership
   - Overall
   - 2 Months to Assume Battle Space

3. Baqubah
   - 1Bn/2Bde/5Div Baqubah
   - 2Bn/2Bde/5Div Muqadiyah
   - 3Bn/2Bde/5Div KMTB
   - 4Bn/2Bde/5Div Baqubah
   - X Baqubah
   - 3 Months to Assume Battle Space

4. Baqubah
   - Personnel
   - C2
   - Training
   - Sustainment
   - Equipment
   - Leadership
   - Overall
   - 4 Months to Assume Battle Space

Overall

1July 05
### Elections

**Strategic Effects (MNF-I Campaign Plan, Aug 04)**
- Legitimate Iraqi Government
- Drive a wedge driven between insurgents and the population

**Strategic Tasks (MNF-I 2005 Campaign Action Plan)**
- Assist in Security
- Assist in Logistical Support
- Support the IO Campaign
- Facilitate C3

### Key Tasks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>IO</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disrupt AIF</td>
<td>Support Election Information Efforts</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Command, Control and Communications**
- Conduct Elections COMMEX
- Assess PJCC

**Logistical Support**
- Coordinate with contractor
- Assess Polling Sites
- Support IECI logistical short falls

### Required Assistance

1. Need MoI Operation Order
2. Need contract details
3. Need IECI outreach initiatives products, messages & themes
4. BIAP potential labor dispute

---

**End State:** Registration, referendum and elections held in a secure environment, conducted by Iraqis, brought about by the will of the Iraqi people, without the perception of undue MNF-I influence.
Need Mol Operation Order

Request Mol OPORD

As of 21 July MOI Elections OPORD Draft not signed

Based on 12 July 05 IECI Working Group, the Mol OPORD Draft will address:
- Security Plan (Security of election sites by IP)
- CF Presence Plan (Location of CF well away from election sites)
- Communications Plan
- Media Plan

MNC-I Supporting Tasks beginning 20 July 05 for the Referendum:
- MSC Assess and Prioritize Resources
- BPT Move Materials and Resources

Mol/MoD are still working out the procedures to allow ISF/IA absentee voting

Need final MOI OPORD IOT determine short-falls and finalize our CONOPs for possible election support (Class I, Ballots, etc..)
Need contract details

Request IECI provide a plan to MNC-I

Contracts for logistical support and security of election material are critical to the success of the entire elections process.

LNOs with the contractors provide CF with SA throughout the process. Contractors are not obligated to receive or work with CF LNOs.

There are three separate contracts – Printing, Movement/Security, and Data Collection.

Without knowing the contractors plan, MSCs cannot proactively plan to support potential logistical shortfalls.
Need IECI outreach initiatives products, messages & theme

Request IECI release its Public Information plan ASAP IOT ensure that Iraqis receive a consistent message and they understand how to participate in the democratic process.

Lack of synchronized products, messages, and themes in contested areas may assist AIF in de-legitimizing the democratic process and discrediting the ITG.

MNC-I (and MSCs) must be provided the details of the IECI public outreach plan IOT to support the overall Public Information campaign and identify shortfalls, such as satellite TV and radio spots. If there are shortfalls, additional funds might be required.

All people of Iraq support the political process and results of the constitutional referendum and general election.
BIAP potential labor dispute

Request MoL and/or MoT BPT to resolve potential labor disputes with Global Security Inc.

Request MoJ and Mol decide who is responsible for BIAP security

Potential difficulties utilizing BIAP during the election would result in minimal impact to Registration, Referendum, and Election logistical support

If the civilian workforce in BIAP is not paid, it could create the need for greater CF involvement.
Elections

- What IECl is doing:
  - Negotiating contracts for logistical support/security during transit
  - Finalizing list of DEOs/GEOs/Polling Sites
  - Plans to distribute materials to GEOs 21-25 JUL, move to DEOs 25 JUL-1 AUG
  - Establish MoI Security Plan NLT 25 JUL

- What IECl needs to do:
  - Let contracts and release details to MNF-I (execution date set for 15 JUL)
  - Recruit staff for DEOs/GEOs/Polling Sites
  - Share the ITG IO plan to support the elections process IOT enable MNF-I/MNC-I to synchronize their efforts and support the elections

- What MNF-I is doing:
  - Coordinating with IECl/UNEAD/UNAMI for election support

- What MNF-I needs to do:
  - Emphasize to IECl that security and logistical support cannot be planned until contracts are let/details of contracts released
  - Release translated list of DEOs/GEOs/Polling Sites to MNC-I
  - Emphasize to IECl the critical requirement for fully staffed DEOs/GEOs/Polling Sites
  - Emphasize the need for an ITG IO Plan into which CF IO efforts can be integrated
**Elections**

- **What MNC-I is doing:**
  - Executing MSC assessments of DEOs/GEOs IAW MNC-I FRAGO 58
  - Developed IO plan to support Corps election support operations
  - Developing Security and Logistical Support Plans IOT support the election process. Base Order and Phase 1 issued 3 JUL, Phase 2 issued on 5 JUL

- **What MNC-I needs to do:**
  - Upon receiving contract details, complete assessments – cannot be completed until finalized list of DEOs/GEOs/Polling sites is released
  - Synchronize Corps IO effort with IECl's IO Plan
  - Resource MSCs to enable them to support election operations security and logistical support requirements
  - Finalize Corps Election Support Plan – Phase 3 NLT 31 AUG, Phase 4 NLT 31 SEP
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Public Discussion</th>
<th>Support to the Referendum</th>
<th>Support to Election</th>
<th>Post Election Recovery</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITG</td>
<td>MOI Election SEC Guide NLT 29 JUL 05</td>
<td>Leads public awareness campaign</td>
<td>Announce emergency measures</td>
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<td>MOC Election Commo Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IECI/UN</td>
<td>Publish/Execute IO Plan</td>
<td>Develops voter education program</td>
<td>Encourage public discourse and participation</td>
<td>Publish/Execute IO Plan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IECI - Lets Contracts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide GEO/DEO Locations</td>
<td>Develop IO themes</td>
<td>Execute referendum/Provide Polling Locations</td>
<td>Execute election</td>
<td>Retrograde/ballot count and oversee consolidation of lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS (IRMO)</td>
<td>Ensure IECI has sufficient budget/staff for elections</td>
<td>Supports voter education program</td>
<td>Provide tech support to IECI/UN for referendum</td>
<td>Support intl and domestic observation and monitoring</td>
<td>Encourage and facilitate intl and domestic monitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Decision point matrix &amp; timeline</td>
<td>Coordinate/provide liaisons with ministries and IECI to support voter education program</td>
<td>Decision point matrix &amp; timeline</td>
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<td>FRAGO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Integrate IO plan with IECI</td>
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<td>Contractor Log/Security Plan</td>
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<td>Provide support voter education program</td>
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<td>FRAGO</td>
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<td>Security Ops Plan to Set Conditions</td>
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<td>Log Spt Plan to Enable Success</td>
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<td>Integrate IO plan with IECI</td>
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CIVILIAN SIDE OF BIAP CLOSED

BIAP civilian side closed. Military side open.

Civil aviation uses military side of BIAP

Requiring prior coordination with Commander, 447th EOG for permission of Contract air delivery

Civilian aircraft logistical equipment/personnel moved to military side

Altered security measures – IECl/Contract Security personnel presence

Materials handling issues – Must not be perceived as Coalition effort

Further distribution is unchanged in accordance with original plan but using the military side of BIAP

Net impact: NONE

BIAP=Baghdad International Airport
FW = Fixed Wing
RW=Rotary Wing
EOG=Expeditionary Operations Group, USAF @ BIAP
BIAP COMPLETELY CLOSED

If BIAP is closed, BALAD used as an alternate hub

Minor changes in flight times and routing for FW and RW support

NET IMPACT: Minor changes in flight planning

Materials destined for the two Baghdad GEOs are delivered from Balad via ground convoy

Net impact: 1) NONE to air assets 2) MINIMAL increase in Contractor logistical support and conveyance plan. Transportation and delivery plan of material must expand to compensate for Baghdad GEO registration delivery.

BIAP=Baghdad International Airport
FW = Fixed Wing
RW=Rotary Wing
EOG=Expeditionary Operations Group, USAF @ BIAP
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>MNC-I Effects:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Required Assistance</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Iraqi Government service</td>
<td>1. Facilitate development of comprehensive Iraqi/CF Infrastructure Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic needs met</td>
<td>2. Support Coordination Efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A wedge driven between insurgents &amp; populace</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strategic Effects:**
- MNC-I Campaign Plan (MNC-I OPORD 05-02)

**Strategic Tasks:**
- Protect critical infrastructure until IJF is able to do so (MNC-I FRAGO 05-185)

**Key Tasks:**
- Secure oil distribution infrastructure
- Secure 400kV electrical distribution network
- Secure critical water treatment plant
- Secure Karkh water treatment plant
- Secure seven critical ITO bridges
- Secure key port facilities (Umim Qasr)
- Support establishment of PRDC
- Influence IJF populace WRT infrastructure security
- Develop C2 relationships with SIB (MNC-I OPORD 05-02)

**ENDSTATE:** Capable Iraqi infrastructure security forces providing adequate security to strategic infrastructure nodes and linear arrays with key vulnerabilities mitigated and minimal CF involvement (MNC-I OPORD 05-02, 90-day update)
## Examples of Ongoing Corps Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OIL</th>
<th>ELECTRICITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayji-Baghdad Crude Line – 2 PLT-size recon patrols daily (CF); Air Recon; 2 SIB BNs</td>
<td>Haditha Hydro Power Plant (MNF-W) – 1 CO (CF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamman Al Ali Oil Depot – 1 BN (SIB); IA patrols</td>
<td>Najibaya Power Plant (MND-SE) – 1 CO (IA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayji Refinery – 2 PLT (CF); 578 Erinys guards; CF patrols (6 hours/day)</td>
<td>Mosul Dam (MNF-NW) – 1 BN (IA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WATER</th>
<th>BRIDGES / KEY PORTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karkh WTP (MND-B) – 2 PLT (CF/IA)</td>
<td>Umm Qasr port – 1 BN (CF/IA/Ministry forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharkh Dijlah WT Plant (MND-B) – 1 CO (IP)</td>
<td>21 key bridges – 15 PLTs total (CF/IA) (24 hours/day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Pump Station #2 (MND-SE) – 1 PLT (FPS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kirkuk to Bayji Linear Infrastructure Security

ADDITIONAL IA OVERSIGHT
6 Platoons dedicated to augment SIBs and overwatch all exposed pipe and well heads not covered by contracted security

ADDITIONAL CF OVERSIGHT
TF 1-14 Security Monitoring - Daily patrols along the pipeline in AO West
1-148 FA - Platoon to Al Fathah 3X per week / Patrols daily from Kirkuk to Dibis
IAF Over-flights (When Available)
Weekly Coordination Meeting with NOC/IA/CF
Hamman Al Alil Oil Depot
(38S LE 307 706)

1. Oil Depot is located in SBCT (1-5IN) AOR

2. Oil Depot is guarded by the 6th SIB (approx 450 personnel) augmented by FPS

3. 3d Bn, 2d BDE, 2d IA Division is stationed in Hamman Al Alil partnered with 1-5IN, MiTT and BaTT teams.

Security situation in Hamman Al Alil is the best it has been in over a year due to constant interaction with ISF/CF.

- No IED since February
- No SAF since November 2004
Current Assessment
Attacking the symptoms, not the cause

Need to Identify The Problem
Are attacks coordinated strategic insurgent activities? (then military is main effort)
-OR-
Are attacks economically motivated local criminal acts? (then police and governance are primary)

Way Ahead

Develop coherent/comprehensive security effort
Enhance Coordination Measures

Current execution is not coordinated from ITG to Boots on the Ground
Comprehensive Effort

- Clearly defines critical infrastructure, acceptable security risk & priorities relative to Iraqi national interests
- Communicates GOI strategic goals to manage perceptions of populace
- Emphasizes to ministers that infrastructure reliability is a maintenance and police function in the long term
- Emphasizes a greater degree of inter-Ministerial infrastructure coordination
- Capital improvements to infrastructure

A comprehensive strategy would significantly enhance coordinated, long-term infrastructure security operations that carry us beyond the elections.
Infrastructure Security Efforts: Government of Iraq

What the Government is doing:
- Beginning to accept responsibility for infrastructure security (creating the Infrastructure Coordination Cell - ICC)
- Continuing to develop infrastructure protection services and improve their pay system
- Deploying protection forces to critical nodes

What the Government needs to do:
- Fix decrepit infrastructure
- Improve rapid repair, maintenance, reconstruction /development program
- Engage tribes to gain support for security efforts
- Encourage ITG IO campaign that targets perpetrators
- Determine ROE, enforce Rule of Law, and allow use of deadly force
- Further develop SIB force generation and deployment plan
Infrastructure Security Efforts: MNF-I

- What MNF-I is doing:
  - Coordinating contractor/ICC issues with ITG
  - Mentoring agencies responsible for infrastructure security
  - Providing liaison between ITG agencies and MNC-I

- What we would like MNF-I to do:
  - Emphasize to ministries that infrastructure reliability is a police and maintenance problem
  - Coordinate DIRLAUTH between MNC-I MSCs, PCO, and IRMO
  - Assist in training and equipping of EPSS (MNSTC-I)
  - Assist Iraqis in developing ICC charter
  - Provide additional ISR assets as required
Infrastructure Security Efforts: MNC-I

- What the Corps is doing:
  - Directing units to immediately secure critical points in coordination with IA and infrastructure security forces
  - Conducting TACAIR (8 hrs/day) over Baghdad-Bayji, Bayji-Kirkuk, Kirkuk-Baghdad and Basra-Baghdad corridors
  - Allocating a total of $20.5 mil funds ISO infrastructure projects ($1.3mil applied to electrical infrastructure security)
  - Conducting IO campaign (TIPS line, local media “support ISF,” “securing Iraq’s future”)

- What the Corps needs to do:
  - Confirm composition/disposition/capability of Iraqi infrastructure protection forces
  - Continue refinement of reporting responsibilities
  - Improve partnering relationship between CF and infrastructure protection forces
  - Increase NTISR committed to infrastructure
  - Increase TACAIR presence over linear infrastructure for deterrence
  - Research additional COTS sensors via Rapid Equipment Fielding-Iraq
### Sample from Corps Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TIER</th>
<th>MEASURE</th>
<th>Carve Pri</th>
<th>Carve Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MND-NC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>Al Fathah River Crossing</td>
<td>38S LD 68517</td>
<td>79516</td>
<td>3-163 / 1.4a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Single crossing pt for the Tigris River for all oil from Kirkuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>K2 (Bayji) Pump Station</td>
<td>38S LD 553 646</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TF / OPF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>IT1A Pump Station</td>
<td>38S LE 349 049</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TF / OPF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pumps crude oil export from storage tanks to Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>Bayji Refinery</td>
<td>38S LD 62850</td>
<td>75151</td>
<td>TF / OPF</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1 of 3 lgst refineries. Produces benzene and other oil prods. Psychologically important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>K1 Pump Station</td>
<td>38S ME 34352</td>
<td>29500</td>
<td>116BCT / OPF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Transports crude from the Kirkuk storage tanks to the Bayji Refinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>IT1 Pump Station</td>
<td>38S ME 28158</td>
<td>20397</td>
<td>116BCT / OPF</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Initial pumping station from Kirkuk Oil Fields to IT Export Line</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Infrastructure Security: MND-NC

What MND-NC is doing:
- Increasing CF presence, patrols and CPs
- Working with local leaders, power companies, and security agencies to improve security (coordination, isolate and harden facilities)
- Planning additional security projects for all facilities
- Purchased six Tower Cranes to facilitate electrical repairs (Total cost $1.6M)
- Engaging with local leaders (tribal, religious and political)

What MND-NC needs to do:
- Maintain security responsibilities until otherwise directed
- Conduct additional air patrols over critical infrastructure
- Assume OPCON of EPSS in MND-NC AO
- Accept and employ proven security technology
Current Assessment

Need to Identify The Problem

- Are attacks coordinated strategic insurgent activities? (then military is main effort)

- OR -

- Are attacks economically motivated local criminal acts? (then police and governance are primary)

Way Ahead

Attacking the cause, not the symptoms

Develop coherent/comprehensive security effort

Enhanced Coordination Measures
Effective coordination will enable immediate improvements in infrastructure security and facilitate development and implementation of a long-term strategy.
Increased infrastructure security will result from development of a coherent and comprehensive security effort. Enhanced coordination measures will dilute our efforts and inhibit Iraqi/C or ability to develop a long term solution.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Infrastructure Strategy and Priorities</th>
<th>Infrastructure Capability</th>
<th>Business Model</th>
<th>Security Operations</th>
<th>Force Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ITG     | 1. Provide strategic guidance to Ministries  
a. Identify critical infrastructure by type and level  
b. Define level of acceptable risk  
c. Prioritize infrastructure by type and level  
d. Synchronization mechanism for infrastructure operations  
e. Inform populace of strategy and priorities | 1. Determine requirements  
2. Assessment  
Rapid repair capability  
3. Parts on hand  
4. Recapitalization Plan | 1. Integrate with macro economic model  
2. Apply rule of law to deter corruption  
3. Provide & sustain capable resources  
4. Standardize labor issues | 1. Determine/coord security strategy (ICC)  
2. Determine capability requirements for security forces and agencies  
3. Vet employees  
4. Centralize coordination of security operations  
5. Apply economic incentives IOT prevent attacks  
6. Inform populace of strategy and successes  
7. Apply Rule of Law | 1. Provide capable infrastructure security forces IAW strategy |
| Ministries | 1. Develop Ministerial Capabilities  
2. Implement ITG policy  
3. MOI establish capability requirements & standards for Facilities Protection Services (FPS) | 1. Develop Ministerial Capabilities  
2. Implement ITG policy  
3. MOI establish capability requirements & standards for Facilities Protection Services (FPS) | 4. Coordinate between ministries | 1. Provide capable infrastructure security forces IAW strategy |
| DOS     | 1. Resource/support IRMO.  
2. Assist in development of Ministers | 1. Resource/support IRMO.  
2. Assist in development of Ministers | 4. Coordinate between ministries | 1. Provide capable infrastructure security forces IAW strategy |
| IRMO    | 1. Assist Ministries to develop capabilities  
2. Assist Ministries to implement ITG policy  
3. Participate in Infrastructure Working Group and ICC | 1. Assist Ministries to develop capabilities  
2. Assist Ministries to implement ITG policy  
# Infrastructure Secure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Infrastructure Strategy and Priorities</th>
<th>Infrastructure Capability</th>
<th>Business Model</th>
<th>Security Operations</th>
<th>Force Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| MNF-I  | 1. Participate in Infrastructure Working Group/ICC  
2. Provide feedback to ITG |  |  | 1. Participate in Infrastructure Working Group/ICC  
2. Synergize Campaign Plan, FragOs, Directive and Infrastructure Plan with MNC-I. | Support MNSTC-I with Iraqi force development |
| MNSTC-I |  |  |  |  | Develop forces IAW priorities and timeframes |
| GRD    |  |  |  |  | Execute projects as tasked |
| MNC-I  |  |  |  |  | Support MNSTC-I as required |
Potential Costs Associated with Security of 400KV Lines in MND-NC

- An increased allocation of troops to infrastructure security tasks:
  - Reduces battlefield circulation - increases ground convoys
  - Diminishes COIN capability
  - Decreases election outer cordon security
- Failure to provide 10 additional RW assets to MND-NC:
  - Limits surveillance and air QRF
  - Eliminates air assault missions
- Increasing EPSS capability:
  - Impacts ISF readiness
- Non-implementation of ITG measures:
  - Limits security improvements without contract approvals
  - Increases coordination difficulties (provision of LNO and C2 upgrades)
  - Diminishes effect without effective IO & anti-corruption measures
  - Diminishes effectiveness without OPCON of EPSS
  - Continued power loss due to structural failures (tech survey, maintain, repair, strategy)
- Dependent on ISR asset:
  - Use of JSTARS reduces effort in support of OP Eagle Focus or border surveillance supporting OP Sayaid
  - Use of Full Motion Video significantly increases theater shortfall
    - Detracts from the AQIZ
    - COIN and counter IED
    - Election security support

Potential to fix CF, develop new AIF TTP and allow increased AIF mobility
Infrastructure Secure

Actions Required: ITG

Infrastructure Strategy & Priorities
- Provide strategic guidance to Ministries
- Identify critical infrastructure by type and level
- Define level of acceptable risk
- Prioritize infrastructure by type and level (export vs. domestic consumption, oil vs. electricity)
- Centralize coordination of infrastructure operations (ICC)
- Communicate strategy & priorities to MNF-I
- Inform populace of strategy and priorities

Infrastructure Capability: Determine end-state system requirements

Define Economic Model
- Determine economic model
  - Capital Reinvestment
  - Profit Sharing by Province / Incentives
- Apply rule of law
  - Enforce stated anti-corruption policies
  - Aggressively prosecute criminals
  - Codify and communicate exclusion zones

Resources
- Provide and sustain capable resources
- Standardize labor issues

Security Operations
- Determine security strategy
- Determine capability requirements for security forces and agencies
- Determine vetting & control measures
- Centralize coordination
- Input ITG priorities to MNF-I
- Inform populace of strategy and successes

Force Generation
- Provide capable infrastructure security forces IAW strategy
- Prioritize critical infrastructure and subsequent security requirements
Actions Required: Ministries

Develop Ministerial Capabilities

- Implement ITG policy
- MOI establish capability requirements & standards for FPS
- Require Ministerial manning of JCC/PJCC/ICC network
- Establish maintenance sustainment operations
- Establish repair capability and capacity
- Optimize available resources with intent to transition to end-state
- Recapitalize to improve reliability (redundancy capability and equipment reliability)
Actions Required: MNF-I

1. Inform MNC-I of ITG Strategy, policy and priorities
2. Provide results feedback to ITG
3. Facilitate inter-Ministerial coordination via ICC
4. De-conflict Campaign Plan, FragOs, Directive and Infrastructure Plan

5. Inform MNC-I of ITG Strategy, policy and priorities
6. Provide results feedback to ITG
7. Facilitate inter-Ministerial coordination
8. Task MNC-I with operational security effort
9. ask MNSTC-I with Iraqi force development
Restore IZ Control of the Border

STRATEGIC EFFECTS:
- Legitimate Iraqi Government
- Capable ISF
- Insurgents and terrorists neutralized

Strategic Task:
- Restore control of the IZ border NLT 30NOV05

References: MNF-I Campaign Plan, AUG 04; MNF-I FRAGO 05-195 Operation SAYAID, 13 JUL 05

MNC-I EFFECTS:
- Legitimate Iraqi Government
- AIF neutralized
- ISF capable of BDE /BN operations
- Secure Borders

Reference: MNC-I OPORD 05-02

KEY TASKS:
- Monitor and enforce border laws
- Establish border forces
- BPT Construction and maintenance of infrastructure
- Disrupt AQIZ
- Influence Iraqi Populace; engage tribal leaders to deny AIF sanctuary

References: Specified and Implied Tasks from MNF-I Campaign Plan, MNF-I Campaign Action Plan, MNF-I FRAGO 05-195,

REQUIRED ASSISTANCE:
1. Clarify GOI and CF responsibilities for borders
2. Border infrastructure (POE, Forts, FOBs, Communications)
3. Synchronized deployment of DBE
4. ISF Sustainment and Support Systems
5. Continued Engagement with Syria

Endstate: Border sovereignty restored, Capable ISF established, and AIF LOCs and sanctuary disrupted in Ninewa and Al Anbar.
 Restore IZ Control of the Border
Clarify GOI and CF Responsibilities

- ITG: Publish directive clearly assigning ministerial responsibility and C2 for restoring IZ border sovereignty to include establishing Ports of Entry

- MNF-I: Confirm that MNSTC-I has the lead in coordinating and synchronizing the effort to restore control of the borders with MOI; clarify the requirements and tasks to MNC-I

  - Border Tasks from MNF-I FRAGO 05-195, (Operation SAYAID), 13 JUL 05
    MNC-I

MNSTC-I

- 3.C.4.A. (S//REL) Assist MOI in providing DBE forces and in establishing facilities that allow for the restoration of Iraqi control of the borders NLT 30 November.

- 3.C.4.B. (S//REL) Assist MOI in the synchronized integration of border forces and facilities ICW MNC-I and STRATOPS.
Restore IZ Control of the Border Infrastructure

- MOI with MNSTC-I: Fully resource and facilitate construction of border infrastructure by 30 NOV 05
  - Forts and FOBs along the border
  - Construction to base IA force to protect DBE
  - All-weather road network in support of Border Forts 1-9
  - Communications network
  - Port of Entry construction

If the current MOI plan cannot meet the 30 NOV 05 deadline, then the potential cost to MNC-I must be prioritized against the resource demands of the current efforts

- **Resources:** Engineer, Transportation, Supply, Aviation, ISR, Budget, Ground Maneuver Forces

  **Against**

- **05-02 Tasks:** Election set security, Strategic Infrastructure, Disrupt AIF, Base Closure, Force Posture
• MOD and MNSTC-I: BSU must develop capability to provide forward support to deployed IA forces

• MOD, MOI, and MNSTC-I: DBE and IA life support must be capable
Restore IZ Control of the Border
Continued Engagement with Syria

- ITG and DOS: Maintain constant pressure on Syria
  - Disrupt AQIZ infiltration and deny sanctuary
  - Formalize bi-lateral interaction and border law enforcement
    o Port of Entry at Al Qaim
    o Commerce
    o Immigration
    o Travel
- ITG, DOS, MNF-I: Continue international engagement to influence neighboring nations and greater Muslim community to decrease terrorist support/recruitment and bolster Iraqi sovereignty
- DOS and MNF-I: Formulate policy to enable BTT interaction and coordination with Syrian border agencies
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Monitor and Enforce Border Laws</th>
<th>Establish Border Force</th>
<th>Construction and Maintenance of Infrastructure</th>
<th>Disrupt AQIZ</th>
<th>Information Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITG</td>
<td>Establish Border Law Est. Bi-lateral Agreements / Int'l Engagement</td>
<td>Provide Funding for Border Control</td>
<td>Identify POE Provide Funding for Border Control</td>
<td>Provide Funding for Nat'l Defense Forces Int'l Engagement</td>
<td>Public Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministries</td>
<td>MOI: Develop Policy and Procedure to enforce laws MOJ: Investigate / Adjudicate Border Violations MOJ: Detainee Operations</td>
<td>Recruit/Man DBE Equip DBE Train DBE Deploy DBE Sustain DBE</td>
<td>Establish Border Forts and POE Develop support infrastructure</td>
<td>Budgetary Responsibility Recruit/Man IA Equip IA Train IA Deploy IA Sustain IA</td>
<td>International engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Coordinating Responsibility Assist ministries with Rule of Law / Int'l Relations Int'l Engagement / Demarche</td>
<td>??Provide Tng Teams</td>
<td>Advise and assist: POE construction Highways Nat'l Detention Facilities</td>
<td>Int'l Engagement</td>
<td>Public Announcements, F2F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRMO</td>
<td>Coordinating Responsibility Contracting Budgeting Establish Power, Comms, and Trans Architecture</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRD</td>
<td>Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG</td>
<td>Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG Partner with MOI</td>
<td>Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG Partner with MOD / JHQ</td>
<td>Coordinate and Assess Military Spt to ITG Partner with MOD / JHQ</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Train law enforcement agencies Coordinating Responsibility Budget Assist MOI Develop Sustainment Concept</td>
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<td>Budgetary Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Partner with DBE Provide BTT Provide DBE Security Assist Support DBE Sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC-I</td>
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</table>
Making the Elections Decisive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONAL TIMELINE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Establish Capable ISF

- **Phase I:** Plan and Reg
- **Phase II:** Pub Outreach - A
- **Phase III:** Spt Referendum
- **Phase I Immediate Action to Secure**
- **Phase II Strategic Infrastructure Battalions**
- **GOI assumes responsibility for Basic Services**

### Election Security

- **Ph I:** Plan and Reg
- **Ph II:** Pub Outreach - A
- **Ph III:** Spt Referendum
- **Ph II:** B
- **Ph V:** Post Election
- **New GOI seated**

### Strategic Infrastructure

- **ISF Brigade-level operations w/CF support**

### Restore Control of IZ Border

- **OPERATION SAYAID Phase II Enduring ISF**
- **OPERATION SAYAID Phase I Disrupt AIF (W. Al Anbar)**
- **OPERATION THUNDER (Baghdad)**
- **VETERANS FORWARD (Tal Afa)**
- **Guardian Sword**
- **Open Window**
- **Sea Horse**
- **Great Shield**
- **Great Strike**

### Disrupt AIF (COIN)

- **ISF increasingly outfront for COIN ops**

### Force Transformation

- **Base Closure/Handover**
- **Force Posturing**
- **91 FOBs**
- **17 BCT**
- **DRB**
- **16 BCT**
- **15 BCT**
- **13 BCT**
- **56 FOBs**
- **16 BCT**
- **15 BCT**
- **13 BCT**

Approved for Release
## Assistance Take Aways

### Capable ISF:
1. MOD accelerate partnership
2. MOD/MOI policies/systems for ISF
3. MNF-I external source for P3
4. MNF-I sourcing for Force Gen Expansion
5. Rule of Law

### Election Security:
1. MOI detailed operations order
2. IECI contract details
3. MOI Public Information Plan
4. Resolve BIAP labor dispute

### Infrastructure Secure:
1. Ministerial development
2. Comprehensive ITG infrastructure development strategy
3. Interagency coordination from Ministries to boots on the ground

### Control IZ Border:
1. Clarify border responsibilities (C2)
2. Border construction contracts
3. Synchronized deployment of forces
4. ISF sustainment support systems
5. Continued engagement with Syria