



MNC-I Operations Through Iraqi Elections (for Planners Conference)

11 December 2004

This briefing is classified

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~~Derived from: Multiple sources~~

~~DECL ON: X1~~



Agenda

- ✧ Operation Al Hariyah (Greater Baghdad Strategy)
- ✧ Al Hariyah Phase IV
- ✧ Strategic Economic Security Plan
- ✧ Potential Detain Ops prior to Elections
- ✧ Borders
- ✧ Hajj
- ✧ Election Security
- ✧ Post Election Reset
- ✧ Bridging Strategy



Operation AL HARIYAH

(Greater Baghdad Strategy)

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Operation Al Hariyah MNC-I Mission

MNC-I, partnered with the IIG and the Iraqi security forces, conducts targeted offensive operations in the areas affecting Baghdad, to **disrupt** the AIF efforts. Concurrently, conduct full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations throughout Iraq, in order to set the conditions for successful elections in January 05.

Disrupt is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90)

** Full-Spectrum Operations when used in the Iraqi Counter-Insurgency environment create effects that influence all players on the battlefield through all elements of national power -- Informational, Diplomatic, Economic, Military -- by means of the MNF-I logical lines of operation: Security, Governance, Economics, Communicating.*



Commander's Intent

- ✧ The purpose of this operation is to set the conditions for the successful elections in January 2005.
- ✧ Key Tasks:
 - ✧ Seal strategic win in Fallujah
 - ✧ Pursue the insurgents, across Iraq, through the election period to deny AIF the ability to reconstitute following operations in Fallujah
 - ✧ O/O reposition forces to Baghdad and reorganize the battlespace to give MND-B operational control of the greater Baghdad area
 - ✧ Disrupt AIF to gain FOM for the southern accesses to Baghdad through N. Babil
 - ✧ Destroy AIF establishing and reinforcing bases of operation primarily in Baghdad and the surrounding areas
 - ✧ Disrupt the AIF efforts throughout the Al Anbar province
 - ✧ Return Mosul to governmental control
 - ✧ Disrupt AIF networks and LOCs
 - ✧ Deny enemy Freedom of Movement
 - ✧ Demonstrate IIG resolve to finish off AIF
- ✧ End State: The end state of this operation is to have disrupted the enemy's ability to re-establish operating bases and continue operations, thereby improving the security situation and allowing the IIG to conduct elections without significant AIF impact.



Operation Al Hariyah (1 of 2)

✧ Phase I – Seal Strategic Success in Fallujah (Now through 15 Dec)

- North Babil battlespace and 24 MEU to MND –B (6 Dec)
- MND – B Establishes Command Relationships and begins Intel gathering
- MNF – W Focus operations on Ramadi and Fallujah
- MNF – W continues Op Al Fajr and conducts offensive ops in Al Anbar, destroying remaining AIF networks and positions
- Supporting Ops continue in MND-NC and MNB-NW

✧ Phase II – Transition and Shaping Operation (15 Dec-O/O)


- Corps priority shifts to MND – B
- 2/1 Cav from MNF-W to MND-B (o/a 15 Dec)
- DRB(-) deploys (LAD=10 Dec into BIAP)
- MND-B Shaping operations, pressure on insurgents in Greater Baghdad
- MNF-W maintains pressure in Fallujah / Ramadi corridor, Al Fajr Phase IV continues.
- Enemy denied ability to re-group in Al Anbar and Greater Baghdad



Operation Al Hariyah (2 of 2)

- ✧ **Phase III - Decisive Combat Operations (O/O through Elections)**
 - O/O Chop Salman Pak and Abu Gharayb to MND-B
 - Destroy AIF across the expanded Baghdad battlespace
- ✧ **Supporting Operations in MND-NC, and MNB-NW**
 - Ops to destroy AIF in ZAAB Triangle
 - Op BATON ROUGE Phase IV continues in Samarra
 - Disrupt AIF Former regime stronghold areas
 - Restore Mosul to IIG control
- ✧ **Framework operations continue across Iraq to establish local control and set the conditions for elections**
 - Continue to build ISF capacity
 - Support the electoral process as required
- ✧ **Phase IV – “Seal the Strategic Win” - operations begin in areas of Greater Baghdad as offensive operations complete (Some phase IV operations will be concurrent with Phase III)**

MNF-W



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
Phase I

Eastern Al Anbar Operations

During Phase I MNF-West retains 2/1CD and 31 MEU. MNF-W gives up N Babil battle space to MND-B. MNF-West conducts offensive operations in eastern Al Anbar to destroy remaining AIF networks and consolidated pockets of AIF. Consolidate in Fallujah exploiting success. Continue progress in Ramadi while maintaining remainder of Al Anbar. MND-B begins Intel gathering and C2 relationships.

MND-West (Main Effort)

- ▲ NLT 06 Dec – 24 MEU and N. Babil chop to 1 CD
- ▲ I MEF employ 2/1 CAV BCT in AOR
- ▲ Continue to employ 31 MEU in AOR
- ▲ Continue Phase IIIb and IV operations in Fallujah
- ▲ Disrupt AIF in Ramadi
- ▲ Destroy AIF in Eastern Al Anbar
- ▲ Disrupt 1.4b Border
- ▲ Sustain Najaf
- ▲ Develop plan to release 2/1 CD o/a 15 Dec



Mission:

Conduct pursuit operations in AO to destroy AIF, develop actionable intelligence, and establish conditions for National Elections in January 05.

KEY Tasks:

- Focus ISR
- Deny the enemy escape
- Integrate ISF into operations
- Rapid transition from OBJ to OBJ
- Immediate HA and CA operations
- Execute an IO campaign for populace to remain neutral or non-supportive of AIF
- Continue enduring tasks
- Robust CA in Falluja to build on our successes

A. OP PLYMOUTH ROCK

N. Babil (Comp)

B. OP LIGHTNING BOLT

Amariyah (Comp)

C. OP LIGHTNING BOLT 1

Saqlawiyah (3 Dec)

D. OP LIGHTNING BOLT 2

Habbiniyah and Khalidiyah (3-5 Dec)

E. OP LIGHTNING BOLT 3

Karmah (8-10 Dec)


F. OP LIGHTNING BOLT 4

Nassir Wa Salem (11-14 Dec)
Zaidon (14-16 Dec)

G. OP PLYMOUTH ROCK 2

N. Babil (As Required)

H. RIP (15 Dec)




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MNF W Pursuit Operations with 2BCT


Stage F (sequels)

- Amariyah
- Abu Gharayb
- Nasser wa Salaam
- Khandaria



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Transition and Shaping Operations



During Phase II – Complete all OP FAJR Phase III ops in Fallujah and o/o release 2/1 CD to MND-B. 2 x IN BN from DRB deploy to MND-B. MND-B begins shaping ops in Baghdad while pressure is maintained on insurgents in other MSC's, particularly MNF-W. Enemy is denied ability to re-group in provincial areas.


MNF-West

Transition to Phase IV ops in Fallujah


- Clear to the southeastern part of Al Anbar
- Sustain Al Anbar (Ramadi)
- 15 Dec release 2/1 CD to MND-B

MND-B (o/o Main Effort)

- O/O Receive 2/1 CD
- Begin Shaping throughout Baghdad
- Begin operations to DISRUPT AIF in N. Babil in order to allow freedom of movement of civilians and CF through the N. Babil area and gain free access to Baghdad from the south.



MND-B



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
Phase III

Decisive Operations in Baghdad

O/O MND-B battlespace expands to include Abu Ghurayb and Salman Pak. MND-B conducts full spectrum ops throughout expanded AOR to destroy AIF, deny AIF sanctuary IOT maximize security in Baghdad prior to, during and after elections (30 Jan 05). Supporting operations in other MSC AORs.


MND-Baghdad (Main Effort)

- ▲ Conduct operations to destroy AIF cells operating in Baghdad and surrounding areas.
- ▲ Destroy AIF in potential new Bases of Operation, including
 - Tarmia
 - Abu Ghraib
 - Abu Sheer
 - North Babil
 - Salman Pak






Phase II & III Task Organization



As Of: 1 DEC 04

MND-NC




MND-North Center releases Salman Pak battlespace to MND-Baghdad. Upon RIP/TOA od 116 eSB with 2/25 ID conduct offensive operations to destroy AIF and set the conditions fofr elections . BPT provide one BN/TF as the Corps operational reserve. BPT reinforce MNB-NW in Mosul as required.

MND-North Center

- ✦ Boundary change with MNF-B to release Salman Pak
- ✦ ICW MNB-NW, conduct operations to destroy AIF in Zaab Triangle
- ✦ Phase IV operations in Samarra
- ✦ Sustain Kirkuk, Baqubah, Tikrit, & Bayji
- ✦ Sustain Kurdish areas
- ✦ Disrupt 1.4b Border

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All Phases Supporting Effort





Al Hariyah Phase IV

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OPERATION AL HARIYAH PHASE IV

(Greater Baghdad Operations)

11 December 2004

1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)



Agenda

- Commander's Guidance
- Facts and Key Assumptions
- Mission Statement (No Change to Al Hariyah)
- Updated Commander's Intent for Phase IV
- Draft Concept of Operations
- Risk Assessment
- Pre-conditions
- Review RFAs
- Issues
- Way Ahead



MNC-I Commander's Guidance

- ✧ Senior Planner's Meeting, 6 Dec
- ✧ Ask for top-level government support
 - Governance
 - Curfew
 - Restrict certain profiles
 - Borders
 - Economic
 - Security
- ✧ Prioritize Resources with Baghdad as the Main Effort
 - Greater Baghdad
 - Al Anbar Phase IV Operations
 - Mosul
 - Samarra
 - Borders
- ✧ Update guidance for Framework Operations



Facts (1 of 2)

✧ Operations

- Extended units will redeploy during Phase IV operations
 - 31st MEU ALD 28 Feb
 - 2/25 ALD 28 Feb
 - 2/1 CD ALD 7 Mar
 - DRB ALD 30 Mar
- Hajj from 19-21 Jan. Pilgrim mvt from 12 Jan – 9 Feb (Peak from 14 Jan – 26 Jan).
- Aashura-Arbe'en 19 Feb. ISF forces/QRF
- Al Anbar Province, Mosul and Baghdad at risk for local control by 31 December 04
- Registration for National Elections and Candidate Campaigning will continue.
- Security remains a key issue for the Iraqi populace.



Facts (2 of 2)

✧ CMO

- Additional CAT-A Forces are not available (1 CA Company will be Added to MND-B O/A 17 DEC 04)
- Current Projects = 62.8 Million/79 Scheduled
 - Musaayib Power Plant \$56 Million/2 Projects Underway
 - Projects in North Babil \$2 Million/15 Projects

✧ PAO

- IZ media will report negatively about MNF operations if we do not actively engage with them
- AIF will use media to highlight any civilian casualties and property damage and blame it on MNF.

✧ Logistics

- Dogwood does not have life support contracts



Key Assumptions (1 of 2)

✧ Operations

- Security Requirements for Hajj
 - Increase ISF (ING) at Ar Ar border
 - Airport Security Requirements (Basrah, BIAP, Irbil)
- FPS will uncover Infrastructure IOT provide election poll security.

✧ CMO

- Security environment in N. Babil will have to improve before CMO Forces will be able to engage local leaders and influential people to prioritize projects and synchronize CF/IIG efforts
- Infrastructure will not be damaged beyond rapid repair (3-6 months completion time)
- Short Term Specialty CMO Teams will be available for up to two months (**Corps asset from 353 CA BDE**)
- Population will remain in place unless forced to flee by catastrophic event



Key Assumptions (2 of 2)

✧ IO

- The majority of the people support the AIF operating in N. Babil.
- Attack on the PDS site or elections component could cause media to exploit a state of instability that might prevent elections.

✧ PSYOP

- 24th MEU will bring TPD with them.

✧ PAO

- Return of DC in Fallujah and elections in Baghdad will be focus of the media from now through the elections.

✧ Logistics

- Additional CL IV needed to secure major election sites
- Convoys will be limited/halted for 48-96 hrs during election period



MNC-I Mission (no change)

*MNC-I, partnered with the IIG and the Iraqi security forces, conducts targeted offensive operations in the areas affecting Baghdad, to **disrupt*** the AIF efforts. Concurrently, conduct **full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations**** throughout Iraq, in order to set the conditions for successful elections in January 05.*

*** Disrupt-- interrupt the enemy's timetable, or cause premature commitment of enemy forces, or the piecemealing of his attack (FM 101-5-1).*

** Full-Spectrum Operations when used in the Iraqi Counter-Insurgency environment create effects that influence all players on the battlefield through all elements of national power -- Informational, Diplomatic, Economic, Military -- by means of the MNF-I logical lines of operation: Security, Governance, Economics, Communicating.*



Draft Updated Commander's Intent

- ✧ **Purpose:** Capitalize on the success achieved during Phases I-III of Operation Al Hariyah by focusing on Civil-Military, Information, and Security Operations in Mosul, Al Anbar, Zaab Triangle, Samarra, and the Greater Baghdad Area that establish local control and popular support of the IIG which set the conditions for successful elections.

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Draft Updated Commander's Intent

✧ Key Tasks:

- Focus CMO and IO forces and resources in Greater Baghdad (Main Effort), Mosul, Al Anbar, Zaab Triangle, and Samarra.
- Continue Phase IV (AL FAJR) operations in Fallujah.
- Engage top-level government via MNF-I for support for Phase IV operations.
- Engage local religious and political leaders to develop relationships with them to establish IIG control.
- Continue to develop the capabilities of the ISF, particularly to counter the intimidation and infiltration of the IPS by the AIF.
- Develop consequence management plan prior to the start of Phase IV IOT ensure resources are available and ready to capitalize on successes of Phase III operations.
- Expedite assessments of collateral damage and BPT execute rapid repair and reestablish essential services.
- Influence populace to support the IIG and participate in the development of a representative government and elections.
- Stand up and outline procedures/responsibilities of the Exploitation Cell.
- Continue Framework Operations with the goal of setting the conditions for successful elections.




Draft Updated Commander's Intent

- ✧ **End State**: The desired end state is the a stable security environment throughout Iraq, local governments supportive of IIG and MNF partnership, local populace supportive of local government and IPS, and conditions set for successful elections.

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
MNC-I Operations through Elections

Al Hariyah Phase IV Ops CMO, IO, Local Security

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Information Operations
T1: Conduct IO focusing forces and resources in Greater Baghdad (Main Effort), Al Anbar, Mosul, Zaab Triangle, and Samarra.
P1: Degrade AIF support
P1: Promote legitimacy of the IIG, ISF, and the election process
T2: Establish Exploitation Cell
P2: Exploit success of Phase III and IV ops

Civil Military Operations
T1: Conduct Civil Military Operations focusing forces and resources in Greater Baghdad (Main Effort), Al Anbar, Mosul, Zaab Triangle, and Samarra.
P1: Establish local control, gain public support
T2: Coordinate the establishment of JECC
P2: Ensure resources are in place prior to the start of Phase IV operations





Framework Operations

- ✧ Continue MNF-I Campaign Plan to achieve local control 31 Dec
 - Key Terrain (15 cities)
 - Framework security operations (key persons, locs, institutions vital for sovereignty and the electoral process)
- ✧ BPT support election activities (Log, IO, interface with IECl)
- ✧ Large offensive operations only as the exception
- ✧ Focus on setting security conditions for elections
 - Precise targeting of terrorists (leadership and organizations)
 - Continue to develop and leverage MOI intel gathering capabilities
- ✧ CF to set the conditions for the IPS to operate effectively
 - Joint patrolling with IPS, progress towards IPS-only patrols
- ✧ Formalize ISF Partnerships
 - Partner all IAF/IIF Bde's with CF Bde's
- ✧ Continue/enhance the economic development security (Infrastructure, contractors, reconstruction projects)
 - Develop/refine CMOCs
- ✧ Enhanced IO to disrupt AIF mis-information



Risk Assessment: 1 of 2

Risk	Prob	Severity	Consequences	Mitigation
✧ Failure to follow through and/or maintain tempo on assistance/essential services.	Med	Med (+)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Destroys MNF credibility ✧ Lose support of the local populace ✧ Negative media portrayal ✧ Increased AIF recruiting and sympathy from population 	
✧ Security forces unable to maintain a secure environment for projects	High	Med (+)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Projects started, but not completed ✧ Lose support of the local populace ✧ Negative media portrayal 	
✧ Insufficient CF/ISF through Phase IV	Low	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Increased AIF activity/intimidation ✧ Projects started, but not completed 	
✧ Significant collateral damage during Phase III operations	Low	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Decreased popular support for CF actions ✧ High cost to rebuild 	
✧ Large number of non-combatant deaths	Low	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Loss of international support ✧ Loss of IIG support ✧ Strengthening of AIF resolve ✧ Loss of US political support 	



Risk Assessment: 2 of 2

Risk	Prob	Severity	Consequences	Mitigation
✧ Military action generates large numbers of displaced civilians	Low	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Overstretches essential services and infrastructure ✧ Loss of international support & heavy criticism by media and IGOs/NGOs ✧ Logistic burden on CF 	
✧ Increased AIF border activity	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Increased numbers of FF ✧ Increased CF requirement troop to task 	
✧ Operations during Hajj may have a negative impact on our operations	Med	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Increased CF requirement troop to task 	
✧ Operations during the Elections may have a negative impact on our operations	Med	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✧ Increased CF requirement troop to task 	



Preconditions

- ✧ Senior Iraqi engagement with local leadership to ensure support for elections and civil-military operations.
- ✧ IIG political overtures to Fallujah residents to keep them out of the fight.
- ✧ IIG extends State of Emergency through the elections. (See pending)
- ✧ Local mayor and interim city council appointed and prepared for key cities in North Babil. (Pending Assessment)
- ✧ Sufficient security forces (IPS) in cities within area of operations.
- ✧ JECC identified and established
 - Economic projects ready for execution
 - Immediate basic needs packages in place
 - Jobs creation program prepared for execution
 - Infrastructure Development Programs prepared for execution



Requests to MNF-I for Action

- ✦ “Emergency Law” (Pending Assessment)
- ✦ Synchronize long term projects that impact the economic lines of operation.
- ✦ Establish unified IO message that establishes the “drumbeat” of coalition operations within the area.
- ✦ Continue engagement of IIG to issue public statements to support operations.
- ✦ Prioritize/allocate ISF specific to Al Hariyah operations and ISO elections.
- ✦ Obtain approval for TIPs line for N. Babil.
- ✦ CERP/IRRF/OHDACA identified and in place for implementation.
- ✦ Establish a JECC ISO the Greater Baghdad Strategy.



Issues

- ✧ 1CD boundaries include N. Babil, Salman Pak, and Abu Gharyhb during Phase IV operations
- ✧ Requirement for “Emergency Law”

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Way Ahead

- ✧ Complete assessments
- ✧ Formalize RFAs
- ✧ FragO published during next week

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Strategic Economic Security Plan

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Background

- MNF-I Initiative
 - Key infrastructure security
 - Contractor intimidation = decreased progress in projects
- MNF-I Draft FragO
 - Established Economic Security Board
 - Corps representation
 - Lists a series of BPT tasks to Corps



Economic Security Board

- Meets Bi-weekly
- Responsibilities
 - Administer and manage strategic economic security operations
 - Review and approve prioritized list
- Co-chaired
 - Iraqi PM designee
 - DCG SPA
- Corps Representative
- Established (3) Working Groups
 - Critical Infrastructure Working Group → Corps Rep
 - Reconstruction/Projects Security Working Group → C-9 Rep
 - Strategic Economic Infrastructure Working Group → C-7 Rep



Way Ahead

- FRAGO establishing the Economic Security Board currently held at MNF-I
 - Economic Security Board continues to meet
 - In process of creating a prioritized list
 - No change to Infrastructure prioritized list
 - Incorporates/attempts to prioritize reconstruction project list
 - MSC Input?
 - Coordinate through C-7, C-9

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Potential Detain Ops Prior to Elections

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MNC-I Pre-Election Operation

✧ Cdr's Guidance

- Develop plan to conduct Corps-wide operation O/A 9 JAN (21 days before the elections) to detain known/suspect insurgents to prevent them from disrupting the 30 JAN Elections

✧ Way Ahead

- Initial OPT with key personnel conducted 5 DEC
- Data call to MSCs
- Update Cdr next Senior Plans Meeting

✧ Target Categories

- Unlocated MNF-I/MNC-I/MS C HVTs
- Located HVTs that we cannot target
- MSC known/suspect individuals below current threshold

✧ Key Issues

- 2nd and 3rd Order effects
 - Perception
 - Reprisals
- IO – below the noise level or part of Election IO campaign
- Guidance/Policy to the MSCs
- Scope of the operation



Border Operations

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
Commanders Guidance

- ✧ Establish and develop C2 mechanisms with DBE.
- ✧ Use CF to assist DBE in controlling borders, where necessary provide mentorship and augmentation, assist with CSS if necessary.
- ✧ Assist in DBE movement security.
- ✧ Establish mechanisms to allow DBE to restrict border movement on direction of the PM
- ✧ Establish interim measures to fulfill the liaison and joint control functions of the Joint Border Coordination Center (JBCC)

As of 24 Nov 04

Borders Operational Effectiveness


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DBE Operational Effectiveness By Province

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Color Codes	
85-100%	●
70-84%	●
51-69%	●
<50%	●



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As of 24 Nov 04


Mexico/U.S. Border 3,141km
Iraq Total Border 3,650km

POE ANALYSIS for IRAQ

TOTAL POEs:	7000
MAJOR POEs:	121
CLASS A&B:	27
Class A:	16
Class B:	11
OTHER:	94


Border POE Analysis

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


Operational Concept

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Operational Outline

- DBE will man forts, conduct patrols, BPT close POEs and/or intensify POE operations
- IHP conduct Highway patrols
- IPS and ING conducts TCPs and patrols around urbanized areas
- IAF/CF conduct patrols, TCPs, and interdiction missions ISO the DBE along rat lines
- JBCC concept may be needed to help C2 this operation
- CF will need to help reinforce the closure of POEs and logistics support to ISF





Support to the Hajj (19-21 Jan 05)

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Support to the Hajj

- Hajj 19 – 21 Jan 05
 - Hajj Pilgrim movements approx 7 Jan – 9 Feb
- MoT Projections
 - 40,000 Hajj Visas for planning purposes
 - Actual Saudi quota still unknown
 - Expect significant number of unauthorized pilgrims
 - Visitors to Najaf / Karbala shrines not expected to be over 15,000
 - 300+ buses to be privately contracted
 - Ar Ar border crossing only
 - Safwan border crossing expected to be closed
 - Air Travel TBD
 - BIAP, Irbil, Basrah APOEs/APODs
 - 1 flight per day from each airport (BIAP being considered for up to 3 / day)
- Hajj VTC 9 Dec
 - MSCs desire to plan for border camps rather than react (MNF-W, MND-SE)
 - Although Safwan crossing expected to be closed, pilgrims will still mass
 - Discussion of proactive CF IO campaign, especially at border crossings
- Additional issues
 - IIG needs Hajj Committee to coordinate and synchronize pilgrim movement
 - IIG official policy for foreign pilgrims transiting Iraq to Saudi Arabia unknown
 - Unknown if Red Crescent will provide HA, with CF supporting as necessary
 - Security role of CF during pilgrimage unknown



Elections Security Update

Approved for Release




Purpose

Provide an Elections Update for the Commander that updates the previous estimate of the threat and informs the commanders decision on Security for the conduct of Elections.

Approved for Release


ELECTIONS TIMELINE

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506





The threats are more than just “RPG’ing Polling Centers”...





MNF-I

Mission

- ✧ MNF-I, in partnership with the ISF, supports the IECI, UN, and IIG's ability to prepare for and conduct National Transitional Legislative Assembly elections that are perceived as successful and legitimate
NLT 31 Jan 05

Endstate

- ✧ Free, fair and representative elections are conducted by Iraqis; election results are viewed as reflective of the will of the Iraqi people, and coalition forces are viewed as not having influenced the outcome of the electoral process.



Facts

- ✧ MNCI impartiality is critical to the legitimacy of the elections process
- ✧ Voter registration is totally separate to the proposed Census
- ✧ ISF maintain primacy for all elections based security issues
- ✧ MNCI will provide a last resort option for all support (logistic, security and information operations)
- ✧ FRE/AIF/FF will continue to attempt to negatively impact the election process
- ✧ 15 cities are key to election process
- ✧ All available support will be given upon requests for support from the IIG/IECI
- ✧ IIG will conduct 4 iterations of elections over next 18 months
- ✧ Supported agency is the IECI
- ✧ UNAMI will provide technical assistance to IECI
- ✧ MNF-I CDR authorized to take "*all necessary measures*" to maintain security and stability during election period
- ✧ MNF-I must remain neutral in efforts to support election process
- ✧ 5 civilian organizations will be involved in election process
- ✧ Elections will occur NLT 31 Jan 05



Assumptions

- ✧ CF Main Effort during the Election period is the successful conduct of Iraqi Elections
 - CF will have to relieve ISF of some tasks to maximise ISF available for Election security
 - MNC-I C4 will be involved in a much greater role in logistics planning for ISF sustainment
- ✧ No decrease in insurgency tempo prior to elections
- ✧ IPS pri effort will be Election security
 - ISF improvement/enhancement will continue to be priority of effort outside of security operations
 - ISF will be called upon to participate in all operations
 - ISF priority will be given to the 15 key cities
 - ISF personnel voter registration and actual voting dates will be established
 - Diplomatic protective service will be responsible for PSDs to newly elected TAL
 - FPS will play a role in security of 6000 polling sites
 - ISF may be integrated in support of IO campaign in direct engagement with populace
- ✧ IECI infrastructure will be in place for elections by 30 Jan 05
 - Manning, logistics, C2 nodes etc
 - UN Election Advisors will ensure IECI polling material distribution is workable for 30 Jan 05
- ✧ Mentoring and local relationships will be key to development of ISF contingency planning
- ✧ ISF rehearsals will be coordinated through the JHQ/JOC/JCC with the PJCCs and JCCs directing provincial and local rehearsals among the ISF



MNC-I

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USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
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Confirmed Mission

MNC-I, in partnership with ISF is to provide military support* to the IIG and IECI to conduct legitimate elections NLT 31 Jan 05 in order to establish the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG)

**Support (JP 1-02) The action of a force which aids, protects, complements or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action.*



Key MNC-I Part 2 Election Tasks


- Set the conditions for the safe conduct of elections
- Establish and develop liaison with IECl officials
- BPT provide QRF support
- Continue to support IECl contractors (TBA) transporting elections materials by contract air
- BPT support the transport of elections materials
- BPT provide dedicated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as available, to support security of election materials convoy movements
- Coordinate with IPS and ING for security matters
- Provide technical assistance as indicated for approved tasks
- Continue to provide assigned contractor logistical/life support
- Conduct media and public relations tasks IAW MNF-I public affairs guidance
- Once results of the election for the transitional legislative assembly (TLA) are announced, elected officials will become tier III officials




Election Day Preparation

Develop and backbrief 2-week election preparation timeline for each Bde-level unit, including:

- Force set for election-day posture
- Rock-drills with IPS and ING units
- Plan for emergency support to IECI
- Rehearse and Recon QRFs routes
- Rehearse contingencies for violence and demonstrations
- Monitor threat streams for signs of impending violence
- Monitor traffic patterns to ensure safe routes for voters
- Evaluate border crossing sites
- Consider local curfews
- Plan for IO contingencies
- Reduce CF visibility IVO polling sites
- Minimize CF convoys
- Pre-stock supplies



Elections Security Concept



Outer Cordon – CF provides ORF and middle cordon augmentation when requested


Middle Cordon – Blocks vehicle traffic and searches voters (IPS / ING / IIF / RA)

Inner Cordon / Outside Polling Center – IPS controls voters entering center and provides armed security

Inside Polling Center – IECI searches male and female voters entering center and controls voter queue lines

MNC-I Election Security COA 1

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USOEN/CCM Chief of Staff
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Description: Corps pursuit operations cease being the main effort refocusing pursuit forces to stabilize and prepare for election security tasks. Intel based targeting continues. Corps Logistics surge early to generate logistic flexibility prior to the elections to allow emergency IECI support to occur. Logistic convoys are suspended during the period 29-31 Jan 04 to reduce presence and free CFs from MSR security for over watch security. Election support tasks continue as the ME through transition minimizing CF presence through to the establishment of the new Government.

PRO


- Continued pursuit operations
- Provides time for setting Election security posture
- Reduces CF presence
- Maximizes CF for Election security
- Capacity to meet IECI emergency support requests

CON

- AIF pursuit compromised to support Elections
- Some logistic risk due to convoy suspension period
- Reduces CF presence
- Maximizes CF for Election security

MNC-I Election Security COA 2

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PRO


- Continued pursuit operations without break
- MNC-I retain the initiative
- Corps logistics remain fully functional

CON

- Does not reduce CF presence
- Limited flexibility to respond to emergency IECI requests
- Least CF combat power option for Over Watch Election Support

MNC-I Election Security COA 3

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USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506



Description: Corps pursuit operations cease being the main effort early refocusing pursuit forces to stabilize and prepare for election security tasks. Intel based targeting continues until 26 Jan 05. Corps Logistics surge early to generate logistic flexibility prior to the elections. Logistic convoys are suspended during the period 26-31 Jan 04 to reduce presence and free CFs from MSR security for over watch security. MNC-I immediately resumes aggressive pursuit operations upon completion of the Election security tasks to deny the AIF the opportunity to exploit the Government transition period.

PRO


- Provides most time for setting Election security posture
- Minimises CF presence
- Maximizes CF for Election security
- Capacity to meet IECE emergency support requests and potentially full logistic support
- Continues pursuit operations at earliest opportunity

CON

- AIF pursuit compromised to support Elections
- Most logistic risk due to lengthy convoy suspension period and min time to surge Corps stocks
- Reduces CF presence
- Maximizes CF for Election security



Iraqi Elections Logistics Challenges



Issues:

- IECI Distribution plan is yet to be finalized and therefore IECI is unable to identify their own Election delay / engage CF decision point.
- Political decision on CF support for Election needs to be considered (delay or CF support).
- Identification of last safe MNC-I support date will determine the point at which the Election must be delayed.



Issues

- ✧ Funding of Security preparations
- ✧ IECI election material distribution planning
- ✧ Requests for action
- ✧ Forces for anticipated Election security tasks in Al Anbar and Ninewa
- ✧ Threat update (post election – transition period)
- ✧ MSC backbriefing Election security coordination and planning in BCT detail



Requests For Action

- ✧ Extension of Emergency Law until 15 Feb 05
- ✧ Request 2 x day Public Holiday 30/31 Jan 05
- ✧ Request the following restrictions be implemented between 291200 – 311200 Jan 05:
 - urban vehicle movement ban
 - weapon carriage ban
- ✧ Border Closure 29 – 31 Jan 05



Post Election Reset and Mitigation of Reduced Forces

C5

8 DEC 04



Agenda

- ✧ Background
- ✧ Facts
- ✧ Assumptions
- ✧ Options to Solve the Problem
- ✧ Corps Recommended Solution

Approved for Release



Problem Statements

- ✧ I MEF States a Requirement for Two Additional Battalions
- ✧ 155 eSB Must Be Integrated Into the MNC-I Battle Space Post Elections
- ✧ Must Account for Withdrawal of Election Set
- ✧ Account For Differences in OIF 2 to OIF 04-06 Structure
- ✧ Should Account for Stryker Move to Baghdad



Background

- ✦ On 2 NOV, II MEF Sent RFF # 4 To MNC-I Requesting, Among Other Capabilities, Two Infantry Battalions
- ✦ MNC-I Briefed the Shortfalls to CENTCOM Staff on 4 NOV
- ✦ Representatives From MARCENT Were Present at the Briefing, MG Mortenson, J4 and BG Raaberg, D/J3 Took the Briefing Along With Other OIF 05-07 Short Falls
- ✦ Guidance From That Briefing Resulted in CENTCOM Approved Business Rules For Rotation Related Short Falls
- ✦ Election Force Augmentation Increased Available Forces For MNC-I to 20 Brigades. This Force Will Reduce to 17 Brigades in the Months Following the Election



CENTCOM Business Rules (USMC)

- ✧ Issue recognized.
 - Before or After PDSS : Unit sends memo thru CoC to HQMC.
 - During PDSS: Unit outbriefs both MNC and MARCENT on shortfalls before departure. MNC and MARCENT capture shortfalls, begin analysis. Unit msg thru CoC to HQMC.
 - MNC-I or MARCENT generated issue: MARCENT msg to HQMC.
- ✧ HQMC analyzes and refines request, and sends message to MARCENT for comment.
- ✧ MARCENT (ICW MNC-I) provides amplifying comment back to HQMC
 - If the shortfall is a new tactical requirement beyond normal composition or unit type, MNC writes a new RFF for new or unforecasted capability. RFF enters Joint Sourcing once validated by CENTCOM.
 - If the shortfall is associated with 'man-equip-train' issues, HQMC takes for action and sources unit or requirement.
- ✧ CENTCOM J3 monitors RFF process.
- ✧ MARCENT monitors process for 'man-equip-train' issues.



Facts (1 of 2)

- ✧ 11 / 24 MEU TOA with 155 eSB 14 FEB and Occupy the 11 and 24 MEU AO
- ✧ 2/1 CAV Kuwait ALD is 16 FEB
- ✧ 82 ABN Kuwait ALD is 30 MAR
- ✧ 197 FAB TOA with 56 eSB is 11 FEB
- ✧ 1/25 IN (MNB-NW) TOA with 3 ACR is 14 APR
- ✧ Karbala Province transfer between MND-CS and MNF-W prior to 1 JAN 05
- ✧ USMC Contribution to MNC-I Reduces By Three Battalions In OIF 04-06
- ✧ 42 ID is Deploying With Two Battalions Fewer Than 1 ID With No Reduction to Battle Space
- ✧ 3 ID With Conduct Relief in Place With 1 CD (27 FEB TOA)
- ✧ 2/2 ID Deployed with 3 Additional Companies More Than 1/1 ID
- ✧ If 3 ACR Does Not RiP With Stryker, They Could Be Available in Baghdad on 1 APR




Facts (2 of 2)

- ✧ 56/36 ID Is Deploying With 5 Additional Companies and 1100 More Personnel Than 197 FA BDE
- ✧ 197th FA BDE (OIF 2 Theater Security BDE) Will Be Responsible for Logistic Convoy Escort From Tallil/CEDAR to SCANIA (by End of Oct).
- ✧ 29 BCT Replaces 81 BCT With a 16 March 05 TOA
- ✧ SECFOR BDE Requirements South of Baghdad Have Dispersed the 81st ESB From Balad to Saudi Arabia.
 - Southern Sector Iraq - 387 Pax (1 BN HQ and 3 COs)
 - Kuwait/Saudi Arabia - 615 Pax (1 FA BN and 1 CAV TRP)
- ✧ No Change to CFLCC Security is Acceptable
 - CFLCC Units Sourced For Other Missions Provide 49% of the SECFOR in Kuwait.
 - Current CFLCC Convoy Requirements From Kuwait to CSC Cedar II and LSA Anaconda: Approximately 290 Pax and 3 CO Sets
 - CDR, CFLCC Directed to Reduce the CFLCC Units Contribution to 30%




29 BCT Task Organization







Unless otherwise indicated, all elements stationed at LSAA



Current 56 BDE Task Org










56th AR BDE Forces Available
23 COs 2852 pax



*Security at CSC SCANIA (17) [backfill for HHC/1-185 AR]
 ** Security at CSC SCANIA (70) [backfill for HHC/1-185 AR]
 *** CEDAR II base defense (104) [including backfill for C/1-185 AR] and CSC SCANIA (50) [backfill for HHC/1-185 AR]
 **** ISG Security (192), CJSOTF-AP (22), and Camp BUCCA (36) [backfill 1/A/1-185 AR]

Missions


56 BCT Units	C2, Unit Support, LOGPA C	Convo y Escort	FM Relay Points	UXO Site Securit y	Fixed Site Securit y	JVB	R&R, Medical, REFRA D (12%)
 56 Bde (150 PAX)							
 2-142 (601 PAX)	150				17*		18
 2-112 (501 PAX)	80	373	← available for other missions →				72
 3-112 (501 PAX)	← available for other missions →						
 3-133 (596 PAX)							
 111 (444 PAX)	80		176	111	154***		72
 H 124 (50 PAX)	22				250*** *	91	53
		40					6
Total Mission	314	413	176	111	428	91	

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Pre-Decisional




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USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
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Proposed 56 BDE Task Org







56 BCT Composition: 2852 pax
Total Current Requirements: 1602 pax
Available for other Missions: 1250 pax

2-112 AR & 3-112 FA = **1002 pax**



Available
for other
missions




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Pre-Decisional

MNF-W Ground Force Rotation

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Assumptions

✧ Assumptions

- N. Babil Continue to Be Volatile Is Key to Stability of Baghdad
- MND-CS and MND-SE Battle Space Remains Constant
- Departure of 1.4b BG Has No Adverse Effect on Security in MND-SE
- Karbala and Najaf at Local Control
- MND-B AOR Is Defined by Current Boundaries (Salman Pak and Abu Ghraib – West Return to MNF-W and MND-NC)
- Stryker BDE to Baghdad As OP RES After 3 ACR RIP




Requirements/ Options


- ✧ I MEF States a Requirement for Two Additional Battalions
 - Do Not Validate the Requirement
 - Submit the RFF to USCENTCOM For Validation
- ✧ Re-Task Organize Battle Space to Maximize OIF 04-06 Capabilities
- ✧ Develop Courses of Action That:
 - Integrates 155 eSB Into the MNC-I Battle Space Post Elections
 - Accounts for Withdrawal of Election Set
 - Accounts For Differences in OIF 2 to OIF 04-06 Structure
 - Establishes a Time Line For Stryker Brigade/3 ACR Movement to MND-B

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USAFPTA COM Chief of Staff
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155 eSB Assumes All North Babil
COA 1





RISK
Greater Baghdad Area
Unity of Command
Until Stryker Arrival





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Split North Babil
COA 2



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Split North Babil
COA 3





Recommendation

✧ COA 1

- Provide MND-NC One Battalion
- Provide MNF-W One Battalion
- Expand MND-B Battlespace Following Stryker Move

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Bridging Concept for the Security Line of Operation Military Support to the Iraqi Security Forces

11 Dec 04



SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFL/XI

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CURRENT

TROOP TO TASK ESTIMATE

Required vs Actual (Coalition Forces Only)

30 NOV 04

	MND-Baghdad			MNF-W			MNB-NW			MND-CS			MND-NC			MND-SE		
On-Hand Strength	29526			39078			5867			4802			19881			11289		
	Req'd	Actual	Delta	Req'd	Actual	Delta	Req'd	Actual	Delta	Req'd	Actual	Delta	Req'd	Actual	Delta	Req'd	Actual	Delta
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS	11932	10500	-1432	19984	18075	-1909	2224	1857	-367	2160	1805	-355	8250	8226	-24	5901	5915	14
FORCE PROT (FOB)	4616	3953	-663	4800	4129	-671	1043	619	-424	997	613	-384	2350	2360	10	1260	1216	-44
OTHER	1512	1100	-412	1639	1231	-408	451	276	-175	760	419	-341	355	438	83	1451	1448	-3
REFIT	3251	2493	-758	1593	1354	-239	835	538	-297	225	202	-23	2550	1972	-578	361	263	-98
QRF	1239	886	-353	1869	940	-929	292	242	-50	391	267	-124	725	755	30	495	495	0
PROTECT IIG	663	565	-98	756	106	-650	102	22	-80	208	98	-110	200	200	0	0	0	0
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY	841	749	-92	1305	480	-825	2238	221	-2017	356	87	-269	1350	751	-599	448	421	-27
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS	719	426	-293	141	66	-75	467	309	-158	149	12	-137	450	444	-6	215	215	0
LOC	888	882	-6	2587	1840	-747	1178	301	-877	115	115	0	1450	1387	-63	260	269	9
ISF	1056	934	-122	1078	985	-93	77	72	-5	49	49	0	1500	516	-984	305	305	0
ELECTIONS / UN	144	144	0	348	48	-300	20	20	0	539	8	-531	78	45	-33	86	86	0
CEA	0	0	0	227	159	-68	10	6	-4	48	32	-16	400	238	-162	0	0	0
BORDERS	0	0	0	1557	162	-1395	200	52	-148	49	0	-919	700	228	-472	190	151	-39
Security for Other Entities	879	706	-173	805	148	-657	20	12	-8	289		-244	0	0	0	12	12	0
SURGE OPS																		
OUTSIDE PRIMARY	1872	1772	-100	217	217	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
MSC AOR																		
OFFENSIVE OPS	6372	4696	-1676	12454	9138	-3316	2187	1320	-867	2504	1050	-1454						
TOTAL SOLDIERS SHORT (CF ONLY)	-6378			-12282			-5477			-4907								
% REQ'D COMBAT FORCE NOT AVAILABLE	-18%			-24%			-48%			-51%			-15%			-2%		

Less than 3% of CF being used to train/mentor ISF

MND-B: 256 BCT completed RIP/TOA (3883 Soldiers); 2BCT (-), 15FSB, 2-82FA (-), 2-12CAV, 1-5 CAV, 1-227AV (-) OPCON to I MEF

MND-B: 1-5IN (Corps OPRES)

MNF-W: IPS disbanded by MOI

MNB-NW: 250 x ING from Irbil operating in Mosul; 458 x MOI Commandos in Mosul

Troop numbers are as of 27 NOV

SHORT




Bridging Concept



Current Operating Paradigm

- MSCs responsible for AOR
 - Intelligence
 - Offensive Ops
 - Defensive Ops
 - Sustainment
 - other
- ING units OPCON
- IAF TACON for Ops
- Liaison with Police
- JCCs for coordination



Interim or Bridge Operating Concept

- MSC BCTs fill the role as ISF trainers
- MSC BCTs mentor the ING, IAF, DBE
- MSCs perform the PATT mission
- MNC-I continues to provide QRF and target priority AIF targets

MATT, PATT, IATT Concept

- Sourced MATT, PATT, IATTs
- MNC-I in QRF and targeting terrorists

Independent IZ operations

- MNC-I in Strategic Overwatch
- IPS conducting basic Law and order operations
- Capable Army
- Effective border capability
- Credible COIN capability

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1.4b

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DRAFT Mission

On order, MNC-I forces' main effort shifts from offensive operations to partnering with the Iraqi security forces in order to bridge the gap from the current force structure and mission sets to the objective MATT/PATT/IATT structure and mission set, and to accelerate the process of training and mentoring the ISF to execute their internal defense mission independently.



DRAFT Commander's Intent

The purpose of this operation is to bridge the gap from the current force structure set to the objective MATT/PATT/IATT structure, and to accelerate the process to train, coach, teach, and mentor the ISF to execute their internal defense mission independently.

Key tasks:

- ✦ Units provide QRF, and continue to target priority AIF targets.
- ✦ Phased transition by Province based on ISF readiness and threat situation.
- ✦ CF units are not tied to terrain, but aligned with Iraqi forces and governmental organizations
- ✦ CF units partner with ING and IAF units, with focus on commander and staff training, officer and NCO leadership development.
 - Joint operations initially to instill confidence in the Iraqi units
 - Progress towards independent Iraqi operations
- ✦ CF units mentor the IPS and DBE, with a focus on staff training, leader development.
- ✦ Develop the Iraqi C4ISR capability at all levels, through direct interface


Interim End State: The process of building the ISF advanced to the point that the objective PATT/MATT/IATT organization can effectively continue the process to perform their function.

Long Term end state: The Iraqi security forces' able to independently conduct Law and order operations, effective counterinsurgency operations, effective border operations, and effective defense from external threats.




Generic BCT – Province relationships

Supply < Demand





IATT Concept – “A Way”





Fully integrated intelligence battlefield operating system; operate while teaching and mentoring

MOI
MOD

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Complex Battlespace





Challenges/Issues

- ✦ There are large differences in the maturity of the ISF in different parts of the country; Thus, transition to this concept should be condition-based
- ✦ Top to bottom command structure for ING or DBE will be maturing during our bridging effort.
- ✦ IZ Army forces are not stationary (although they have a home base, in theory, they have yet to be employed that way)
- ✦ The IPS chain of command goes from the MOI to the Provincial IPS to the local IPS, in most cases, but there are exceptions (Samara, Fallujah)
- ✦ MOI forces (including IPS) have no command relationship with the CF
- ✦ Very immature IZ intelligence structure
- ✦ Provincial Governors have little power WRT ISF, which makes linking with the governors less effective.
- ✦ FPS have little or no chain of command; very inefficient and their effectiveness is questionable
- ✦ CF lacks sufficient forces with appropriate skill sets to mentor IPS (MPs and ILO MP units)
- ✦ CF FOBs tend to tie us to terrain and static force protection missions



Conclusions

- ✧ While the intent is a full transition to the bridging concept quickly, each MSC's implementation of the bridging concept will be unique to their AOR.
- ✧ Current MSC commanders must begin the staff planning process and hand-off concepts at RIP/TOA.
 - Develop initial implementing concept and proposed timelines
- ✧ Each MSC must measure the risk to the campaign plan during the bridging period.
 - Determine acceptable risks
 - Develop risk mitigation plan



Questions?

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