MNC-I Operations
Through Iraqi Elections
(for Planners Conference)

11 December 2004
Agenda

- Operation Al Hariyah (Greater Baghdad Strategy)
- Al Hariyah Phase IV
- Strategic Economic Security Plan
- Potential Detain Ops prior to Elections
- Borders
- Hajj
- Election Security
- Post Election Reset
- Bridging Strategy
Operation AL HARIYAH
(Greater Baghdad Strategy)
Operation Al Hariyah MNC-I Mission

MNC-I, partnered with the IIG and the Iraqi security forces, conducts targeted offensive operations in the areas affecting Baghdad, to disrupt the AIF efforts. Concurrently, conduct full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations throughout Iraq, in order to set the conditions for successful elections in January 05.

Disrupt is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90)

* Full-Spectrum Operations when used in the Iraqi Counter-Insurgency environment create effects that influence all players on the battlefield through all elements of national power -- Informational, Diplomatic, Economic, Military -- by means of the MNF-I logical lines of operation: Security, Governance, Economics, Communicating.
Commander’s Intent

The purpose of this operation is to set the conditions for the successful elections in January 2005.

Key Tasks:
- Seal strategic win in Fallujah
- Pursue the insurgents, across Iraq, through the election period to deny AIF the ability to reconstitute following operations in Fallujah
- O/O reposition forces to Baghdad and reorganize the battlespace to give MND-B operational control of the greater Baghdad area
- Disrupt AIF to gain FOM for the southern accesses to Baghdad through N. Babil
- Destroy AIF establishing and reinforcing bases of operation primarily in Baghdad and the surrounding areas
- Disrupt the AIF efforts throughout the Al Anbar province
- Return Mosul to governmental control
- Disrupt AIF networks and LOCs
- Deny enemy Freedom of Movement
- Demonstrate IIG resolve to finish off AIF

End State: The end state of this operation is to have disrupted the enemy’s ability to re-establish operating bases and continue operations, thereby improving the security situation and allowing the IIG to conduct elections without significant AIF impact.
Operation Al Haryiah (1 of 2)

Phase I – Seal Strategic Success in Fallujah (Now through 15 Dec)
- North Babil battlespace and 24 MEU to MND –B (6 Dec)
- MND – B Establishes Command Relationships and begins Intel gathering
- MNF – W Focus operations on Ramadi and Fallujah
- MNF – W continues Op Al Fajr and conducts offensive ops in Al Anbar, destroying remaining AIF networks and positions
- Supporting Ops continue in MND-NC and MNB-NW

Phase II – Transition and Shaping Operation (15 Dec-O/O)
- Corps priority shifts to MND – B
- 2/1 Cav from MNF-W to MND-B (o/a 15 Dec)
- DRB(-) deploys (LAD=10 Dec into BIAP)
- MND-B Shaping operations, pressure on insurgents in Greater Baghdad
- MNF-W maintains pressure in Fallujah / Ramadi corridor, Al Fajr Phase IV continues
- Enemy denied ability to re-group in Al Anbar and Greater Baghdad
Operation Al Hariyah (2 of 2)

Phase III - Decisive Combat Operations (O/O through Elections)
- O/O Chop Salman Pak and Abu Gharayb to MND-B
- Destroy AIF across the expanded Baghdad battlespace

Supporting Operations in MND-NC, and MNB-NW
- Ops to destroy AIF in ZAAB Triangle
- Op BATON ROUGE Phase IV continues in Samarra
- Disrupt AIF Former regime stronghold areas
- Restore Mosul to IIG control

Framework operations continue across Iraq to establish local control and set the conditions for elections
- Continue to build ISF capacity
- Support the electoral process as required

Phase IV – “Seal the Strategic Win” - operations begin in areas of Greater Baghdad as offensive operations complete (Some phase IV operations will be concurrent with Phase III)
MNC-I Operations through Elections

Phase I

OPERATION AL FAJIR
Pursuit Operations (Al Anbar)

Main Effort
2/1 CD TACON to MNF-W

31 MEU available (ALD 28 Feb)

Phase II

OPERATION AL FAJIR
Phase IV Operations

AL Hariyah Phase IV

Main Effort
Operation AL Hariyah

2xIN BN from DRB Employment (ALD 30 Mar)
2/1 CD Employed in Baghdad (ALD 7 Mar)

Supporting Ops in MND-NC

Phase III

Phase IV

Phase V

Supporting Ops in MND-NC

116 eSB RfP

2/25 CBT Pwr available (ALD 28 Feb)
During Phase I MNF-West retains 2/1CD and 31 MEU. MNF-W gives up N Babil battle space to MND-B. MNF-West conducts offensive operations in eastern Al Anbar to destroy remaining AIF networks and consolidated pockets of AIF. Consolidate in Fallujah exploiting success. Continue progress in Ramadi while maintaining remainder of Al Anbar. MND-B begins Intel gathering and C2 relationships.

**MND-West (Main Effort)**

- NLT 06 Dec – 24 MEU and N. Babil chop to 1 CD
- I MEF employ 2/1 CAV BCT in AOR
- Continue to employ 31 MEU in AOR
- Continue Phase IIIb and IV operations in Fallujah
- Disrupt AIF in Ramadi
- Destroy AIF in Eastern Al Anbar
- Disrupt Border
- Sustain Najaf
- Develop plan to release 2/1 CD o/a 15 Dec
Mission:
Conduct pursuit operations in AO to destroy AIF, develop actionable intelligence, and establish conditions for National Elections in January 05.

KEY Tasks:
- Focus ISR
- Deny the enemy escape
- Integrate ISF into operations
- Rapid transition from OBJ to OBJ
- Immediate HA and CA operations
- Execute an IO campaign for populace to remain neutral or non-supportive of AIF
- Continue enduring tasks
- Robust CA in Falluja to build on our successes

A. OP PLYMOUTH ROCK
   N. Babil (Comp)
B. OP LIGHTNING BOLT
   Amariyah (Comp)
C. OP LIGHTNING BOLT 1
   As Saqlawiyah (3 Dec)
D. OP LIGHTNING BOLT 2
   Habbiniyah and Khalidiyah (3-5 Dec)
E. OP LIGHTNING BOLT 3
   Karmah (8-10 Dec)
F. OP LIGHTNING BOLT 4
   Nassir Wa Al Salem (11-14 Dec)
   Zaidon (14-16 Dec)
G. OP PLYMOUTH ROCK 2
   N. Babil (As Required)
H. RIP (15 Dec)
During Phase II – Complete all OP FAJR Phase III ops in Fallujah and o/o release 2/1 CD to MND-B. 2 x IN BN from DRB deploy to MND-B. MND-B begins shaping ops in Baghdad while pressure is maintained on insurgents in other MSC’s, particularly MNF-W. Enemy is denied ability to re-group in provincial areas.

MNF-West
- Transition to Phase IV ops in Fallujah
- Clear to the southeastern part of Al Anbar
- Sustain Al Anbar (Ramadi)
- 15 Dec release 2/1 CD to MND-B

MND-B (o/o Main Effort)
- O/O Receive 2/1 CD
- Begin Shaping throughout Baghdad
- Begin operations to DISRUPT AIF in N. Babil in order to allow freedom of movement of civilians and CF through the N. Babil area and gain free access to Baghdad from the south.
Decisive Operations in Baghdad

O/O MND-B battlespace expands to include Abu Ghurayb and Salman Pak. MND-B conducts full spectrum ops throughout expanded AOR to destroy AIF, deny AIF sanctuary IOT maximize security in Baghdad prior to, during and after elections (30 Jan 05). Supporting operations in other MSC AORs.

MND-Baghdad (Main Effort)

- Conduct operations to destroy AIF cells operating in Baghdad and surrounding areas.
- Destroy AIF in potential new Bases of Operation, including
  - Tarmia
  - Abu Ghraib
  - Abu Sheer
  - North Babil
  - Salman Pak
MND-North Center releases Salman Pak battlespace to MND-Baghdad. Upon RIP/TOA od 116 eSB with 2/25 ID conduct offensive operations to destroy AIF and set the conditions for elections. BPT provide one BN/TF as the Corps operational reserve. BPT reinforce MNB-NW in Mosul as required.

MND-North Center
- Boundary change with MNF-B to release Salman Pak
- ICW MNB-NW, conduct operations to destroy AIF in Zaab Triangle
- Phase IV operations in Samarra
- Sustain Kirkuk, Baqubah, Tikrit, & Bayji
- Sustain Kurdish areas
- Disrupt 1.4b Border

All Phases Supporting Effort

Al Hariyah Phase IV
OPERATION AL HARIYAH PHASE IV
(Greater Baghdad Operations)

11 December 2004
Agenda

- Commander’s Guidance
- Facts and Key Assumptions
- Mission Statement (No Change to Al-Hariyah)
- Updated Commander’s Intent for Phase IV
- Draft Concept of Operations
- Risk Assessment
- Pre-conditions
- Review RFAs
- Issues
- Way Ahead
MNC-I Commander's Guidance

Senior Planner's Meeting, 6 Dec

- Ask for top-level government support
  - Governance
    - Curfew
    - Restrict certain profiles
      - Borders
  - Economic
  - Security

- Prioritize Resources with Baghdad as the Main Effort
  - Greater Baghdad
  - Al Anbar Phase IV Operations
  - Mosul
  - Samarra
  - Borders

- Update guidance for Framework Operations
Facts (1 of 2)

Operations

- Extended units will redeploy during Phase IV operations
  - 31st MEU ALD 28 Feb
  - 2/25 ALD 28 Feb
  - 2/1 CD ALD 7 Mar
  - DRB ALD 30 Mar
- Aashura-Arbe’en 19 Feb. ISF forces/QRF
- Al Anbar Province, Mosul and Baghdad at risk for local control by 31 December 04
- Registration for National Elections and Candidate Campaigning will continue.
- Security remains a key issue for the Iraqi populace.
CMO
• Additional CAT-A Forces are not available (1 CA Company will be Added to MND-B O/A 17 DEC 04)
• Current Projects = 62.8 Million/79 Scheduled
  • Musaayib Power Plant $56 Million/2 Projects Underway
  • Projects in North Babil $2 Million/15 Projects

PAO
• IZ media will report negatively about MNF operations if we do not actively engage with them
• AIF will use media to highlight any civilian casualties and property damage and blame it on MNF.

Logistics
• Dogwood does not have life support contracts
Key Assumptions (1 of 2)

- **Operations**
  - Security Requirements for Hajj
    - Increase ISF (ING) at Ar Ar border
    - Airport Security Requirements (Basrah, BIAP, Irbil)
  - FPS will uncover Infrastructure IOT provide election poll security.

- **CMO**
  - Security environment in N. Babil will have to improve before CMO Forces will be able to engage local leaders and influential people to prioritize projects and synchronize CF/IIG efforts
  - Infrastructure will not be damaged beyond rapid repair (3-6 months completion time)
  - Short Term Specialty CMO Teams will be available for up to two months *(Corps asset from 353 CA BDE)*
  - Population will remain in place unless forced to flee by catastrophic event
Key Assumptions (2 of 2)

- **IO**
  - The majority of the people support the AIF operating in N. Babil.
  - Attack on the PDS site or elections component could cause media to exploit a state of instability that might prevent elections.

- **PSYOP**
  - 24th MEU will bring TPD with them.

- **PAO**
  - Return of DC in Fallujah and elections in Baghdad will be focus of the media from now through the elections.

- **Logistics**
  - Additional CL IV needed to secure major election sites
  - Convoys will be limited/halted for 48-96 hrs during election period
MNC-I Mission (no change)

MNC-I, partnered with the IIIG and the Iraqi security forces, conducts targeted offensive operations in the areas affecting Baghdad, to disrupt* the ALF efforts. Concurrently, conduct full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations** throughout Iraq, in order to set the conditions for successful elections in January 05.

** Disrupt-- interrupt the enemy's timetable, or cause premature commitment of enemy forces, or the piecemealing of his attack (FM 101-5-1).
* Full-Spectrum Operations when used in the Iraqi Counter-Insurgency environment create effects that influence all players on the battlefield through all elements of national power -- Informational, Diplomatic, Economic, Military -- by means of the MNF-I logical lines of operation: Security, Governance, Economics, Communicating.
Purpose: Capitalize on the success achieved during Phases I-III of Operation Al Hariyah by focusing on Civil-Military, Information, and Security Operations in Mosul, Al Anbar, Zaab Triangle, Samarra, and the Greater Baghdad Area that establish local control and popular support of the IIG which set the conditions for successful elections.
Draft Updated Commander’s Intent

Key Tasks:

- **Focus CMO and IO forces and resources** in Greater Baghdad (Main Effort), Mosul, Al Anbar, Zaab Triangle, and Samarra.
- **Continue Phase IV (AL FAJR) operations** in Fallujah.
- **Engage top-level government via MNF-I** for support for Phase IV operations.
- Engage local religious and political leaders to develop relationships with them to establish IIG control.
- Continue to develop the capabilities of the ISF, particularly to counter the intimidation and infiltration of the IPS by the AIF.
- **Develop consequence management plan** prior to the start of Phase IV IOT ensure resources are available and ready to capitalize on successes of Phase III operations.
- Expedite assessments of collateral damage and **BPT execute rapid repair and reestablish essential services**.
- **Influence populace to support the IIG and participate in the development of a representative government** and elections.
- Stand up and outline procedures/responsibilities of the **Exploitation Cell**.
- **Continue Framework Operations** with the goal of setting the conditions for successful elections.
Draft Updated Commander's Intent

**End State:** The desired end state is the a stable security environment throughout Iraq, local governments supportive of IIG and MNF partnership, local populace supportive of local government and IPS, and conditions set for successful elections.
Framework Operations

- Continue MNF-I Campaign Plan to achieve local control 31 Dec
  - Key Terrain (15 cities)
  - Framework security operations (key persons, locs, institutions vital for sovereignty and the electoral process)
- BPT support election activities (Log, IO, interface with IECI)
- Large offensive operations only as the exception
- Focus on setting security conditions for elections
  - Precise targeting of terrorists (leadership and organizations)
  - Continue to develop and leverage MOI intel gathering capabilities
- CF to set the conditions for the IPS to operate effectively
  - Joint patrolling with IPS, progress towards IPS-only patrols
- Formalize ISF Partnerships
  - Partner all IAF/IIF Bde’s with CF Bde’s
- Continue/enhance the economic development security (Infrastructure, contractors, reconstruction projects)
  - Develop/refine CMOCs
- Enhanced IO to disrupt AIF mis-information
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<th>Severity</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
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| Failure to follow through and/or maintain tempo on assistance/essential services. | Med  | Med (+)  | ▲ Destroys MNF credibility  
▲ Lose support of the local populace  
▲ Negative media portrayal  
▲ Increased AIF recruiting and sympathy from population |            |
| Security forces unable to maintain a secure environment for projects | High | Med (+)  | ▲ Projects started, but not completed  
▲ Lose support of the local populace  
▲ Negative media portrayal |            |
| Insufficient CF/ISF through Phase IV                                | Low  | High     | ▲ Increased AIF activity/intimidation  
▲ Projects started, but not completed |            |
| Significant collateral damage during Phase III operations           | Low  | Low      | ▲ Decreased popular support for CF actions  
▲ High cost to rebuild |            |
| Large number of non-combatant deaths                                | Low  | High     | ▲ Loss of international support  
▲ Loss of IIG support  
▲ Strengthening of AIF resolve  
▲ Loss of US political support |            |
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<td>Military action generates large numbers of displaced civilians</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>- Overstretches essential services and infrastructure</td>
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<td>- Loss of international support &amp; heavy criticism by media and IGOs/NGOs</td>
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<td>- Logistic burden on CF</td>
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<td>Increased AIF border activity</td>
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<td>- Increased numbers of FF</td>
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Preconditions

- Senior Iraqi engagement with local leadership to ensure support for elections and civil-military operations.
- IIG political overtures to Fallujah residents to keep them out of the fight.
- IIG extends State of Emergency through the elections. *(See pending)*
- Local mayor and interim city council appointed and prepared for key cities in North Babil. *(Pending Assessment)*
- Sufficient security forces (IPS) in cities within area of operations.
- JECC identified and established
  - Economic projects ready for execution
  - Immediate basic needs packages in place
  - Jobs creation program prepared for execution
  - Infrastructure Development Programs prepared for execution
Requests to MNF-I for Action

- “Emergency Law” (Pending Assessment)
- Synchronize long term projects that impact the economic lines of operation.
- Establish unified IO message that establishes the “drumbeat” of coalition operations within the area.
- Continue engagement of IIIG to issue public statements to support operations.
- Prioritize/allocate ISF specific to Al Hariyah operations and ISO elections.
- Obtain approval for TIPs line for N. Babil.
- CERP/IRRF/OHDACA identified and in place for implementation.
- Establish a JECC ISO the Greater Baghdad Strategy.
Issues

- 1CD boundaries include N. Babīl, Salman Pak, and Abu Gharyhb during Phase IV operations
- Requirement for “Emergency Law”
Way Ahead

- Complete assessments
- Formalize RFAs
- FragO published during next week
Strategic Economic Security Plan
Background

- MNF-I Initiative
  - Key infrastructure security
  - Contractor intimidation = decreased progress in projects
- MNF-I Draft FragO
  - Established Economic Security Board
    - Corps representation
  - Lists a series of BPT tasks to Corps
Economic Security Board

- Meets Bi-weekly
- Responsibilities
  - Administer and manage strategic economic security operations
  - Review and approve prioritized list
- Co-chaired
  - Iraqi PM designee
  - DCG SPA
- Corps Representative
- Established (3) Working Groups
  - Critical Infrastructure Working Group → Corps Rep
  - Reconstruction/Projects Security Working Group → C-9 Rep
  - Strategic Economic Infrastructure Working Group → C-7 Rep
Way Ahead

- FRAGO establishing the Economic Security Board currently held at MNF-I
  - Economic Security Board continues to meet
  - In process of creating a prioritized list
  - No change to Infrastructure prioritized list
  - Incorporates/Attempts to prioritize reconstruction project list
  - MSC Input?
    - Coordinate through C-7, C-9
Potential Detain Ops Prior to Elections
MNC-I Pre-Election Operation

Cdr’s Guidance
- Develop plan to conduct Corps-wide operation O/A 9 JAN (21 days before the elections) to detain known/suspect insurgents to prevent them from disrupting the 30 JAN Elections

Way Ahead
- Initial OPT with key personnel conducted 5 DEC
- Data call to MSCs
- Update Cdr next Senior Plans Meeting

Target Categories
- Unlocated MNF-I/MNC-I/MSC HVTs
- Located HVTs that we cannot target
- MSC known/suspect individuals below current threshold

Key Issues
- 2nd and 3rd Order effects
  - Perception
  - Reprisals
- IO – below the noise level or part of Election IO campaign
- Guidance/Policy to the MSCs
- Scope of the operation
Border Operations
Commanders Guidance

- Establish and develop C2 mechanisms with DBE.

- Use CF to assist DBE in controlling borders, where necessary provide mentorship and augmentation, assist with CSS if necessary.

- Assist in DBE movement security.

- Establish mechanisms to allow DBE to restrict border movement on direction of the PM

- Establish interim measures to fulfill the liaison and joint control functions of the Joint Border Coordination Center (JBCC)
DBE Operational Effectiveness By Province

Province Capability Key

- Green = Effective
- Yellow = Moderately Effective
- Orange = Slightly Effective
- Red = Ineffective

Color Codes

- 85-100%
- 70-84%
- 51-69%
- <50%

As of 24 Nov 04

Approved for Release
POE ANALYSIS for IRAQ

TOTAL POEs: 7000
MAJOR POEs: 121
CLASS A&B: 27
  Class A: 16
  Class B: 11
OTHER: 94

Syria

Jordan

Kuwait

Mexico/U.S. Border 3,141km
Iraq Total Border 3,650km
Operational Concept

Operational Outline

- DBE will man forts, conduct patrols, BPT close POEs and/or intensify POE operations
- IHP conduct Highway patrols
- IPS and ING conducts TCPs and patrols around urbanized areas
- IAF/CF conduct patrols, TCPs, and interdiction missions ISO the DBE along rat lines
- JBCC concept may be needed to help C2 this operation
- CF will need to help reinforce the closure of POEs and logistics support to ISF
Support to the Hajj
(19-21 Jan 05)
Support to the Hajj

- Hajj 19 – 21 Jan 05
  - Hajj Pilgrim movements approx 7 Jan – 9 Feb
- MoT Projections
  - 40,000 Hajj Visas for planning purposes
    - Actual Saudi quota still unknown
  - Expect significant number of unauthorized pilgrims
  - Visitors to Najaf / Karbala shrines not expected to be over 15,000
  - 300+ buses to be privately contracted
    - Ar Ar border crossing only
    - Safwan border crossing expected to be closed
  - Air Travel TBD
    - BIAP, Irbil, Basrah APOEs/APODs
    - 1 flight per day from each airport (BIAP being considered for up to 3 / day)
- Hajj VTC 9 Dec
  - MSCs desire to plan for border camps rather than react (MNF-W, MND-SE)
  - Although Safwan crossing expected to be closed, pilgrims will still mass
  - Discussion of proactive CF IO campaign, especially at border crossings
- Additional issues
  - IIG needs Hajj Committee to coordinate and synchronize pilgrim movement
  - IIG official policy for foreign pilgrims transiting Iraq to Saudi Arabia unknown
  - Unknown if Red Crescent will provide HA, with CF supporting as necessary
  - Security role of CF during pilgrimage unknown
Elections Security Update
Purpose

Provide an Elections Update for the Commander that updates the previous estimate of the threat and informs the commanders decision on Security for the conduct of Elections.
The threats are more than just "RPG’ing Polling Centers"...

Actions or conditions which have the potential to undermine the legitimacy or stop the electoral process:

- Disenfranchisement of the electorate:
  - Physical or psychological factors prevent willing voters from participating in the electoral process.

- Coercion or subversion of candidates or the electorate:
  - Intimidation or inducement of candidates or voters resulting in corruption of electoral results.

- Illegitimate Voting:
  - Corruption of electoral results by the participation of illegitimate voters.

- IECI fails due to inadequate security environment:
  - Actual or perceived security situation prevents IECI from meeting their already tight schedule.

- Coalition taints process:
  - Elections process perceived to be coalition dominated.

Disenfranchisement of a willing minority is the greatest threat to electoral legitimacy.

• RPG’ing Polling Centers
  • Voters don’t feel safe
  • Wild West Cities
  • Militia based violence

• Stacked slates
  • Threatened voters

• 3 Million Iranian Voters
  • 1 Million Kurdish Voters
  • Illegitimate Voter Register

• Can’t hire/train
  • Unable to keep offices open

• Perceived CF Bias
  • Perceived CF Influence
Mission

➤ MNF-I, in partnership with the ISF, supports the IECI, UN, and IIG’s ability to prepare for and conduct National Transitional Legislative Assembly elections that are perceived as successful and legitimate NLT 31 Jan 05

Endstate

➤ Free, fair and representative elections are conducted by Iraqis; election results are viewed as reflective of the will of the Iraqi people, and coalition forces are viewed as not having influenced the outcome of the electoral process.
Facts

- MNCI impartiality is critical to the legitimacy of the elections process
- Voter registration is totally separate to the proposed Census
- ISF maintain primacy for all elections based security issues
- MNCI will provide a last resort option for all support (logistic, security and information operations)
- FRE/AIF/FF will continue to attempt to negatively impact the election process
- 15 cities are key to election process
- All available support will be given upon requests for support from the IIG/IECI
- IIG will conduct 4 iterations of elections over next 18 months
- Supported agency is the IECI
- UNAMI will provide technical assistance to IECI
- MNF-I CDR authorized to take “all necessary measures” to maintain security and stability during election period
- MNF-I must remain neutral in efforts to support election process
- 5 civilian organizations will be involved in election process
- Elections will occur NLT 31 Jan 05
Assumptions

- CF Main Effort during the Election period is the successful conduct of Iraqi Elections
  - CF will have to relieve ISF of some tasks to maximise ISF available for Election security
  - MNC-I C4 will be involved in a much greater role in logistics planning for ISF sustainment
- No decrease in insurgency tempo prior to elections
- IPS pri effort will be Election security
  - ISF improvement/enhancement will continue to be priority of effort outside of security operations
  - ISF will be called upon to participate in all operations
  - ISF priority will be given to the 15 key cities
  - ISF personnel voter registration and actual voting dates will be established
  - Diplomatic protective service will be responsible for PSDs to newly elected TAL
  - FPS will play a role in security of 6000 polling sites
  - ISF may be integrated in support of IO campaign in direct engagement with populace
- IECI infrastructure will be in place for elections by 30 Jan 05
  - Manning, logistics, C2 nodes etc
  - UN Election Advisors will ensure IECI polling material distribution is workable for 30 Jan 05
- Mentoring and local relationships will be key to development of ISF contingency planning
- ISF rehearsals will be coordinated through the JHQ/JOC/JCC with the PJCCs and JCCs directing provincial and local rehearsals among the ISF
MNC-I, in partnership with ISF is to provide military support* to the IIG and IECI to conduct legitimate elections NLT 31 Jan 05 in order to establish the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG)

*Support (JP 1-02) The action of a force which aids, protects, complements or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action.
Key MNC-I Part 2 Election Tasks

- Set the conditions for the safe conduct of elections
- Establish and develop liaison with IECI officials
- BPT provide QRF support
- Continue to support IECI contractors (TBA) transporting elections materials by contract air
- BPT support the transport of elections materials
- BPT provide dedicated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as available, to support security of election materials convoy movements
- Coordinate with IPS and ING for security matters
- Provide technical assistance as indicated for approved tasks
- Continue to provide assigned contractor logistical/life support
- Conduct media and public relations tasks IAW MNF-I public affairs guidance
- Once results of the election for the transitional legislative assembly (TLA) are announced, elected officials will become tier III officials
Develop and backbrief 2-week election preparation timeline for each Bde-level unit, including:

- Force set for election-day posture
- Rock-drills with IPS and ING units
- Plan for emergency support to IECI
- Rehearse and Recon QRFs routes
- Rehearse contingencies for violence and demonstrations
- Monitor threat streams for signs of impending violence
- Monitor traffic patterns to ensure safe routes for voters
- Evaluate border crossing sites
- Consider local curfews
- Plan for IO contingencies
- Reduce CF visibility IVO polling sites
- Minimize CF convoys
- Pre-stock supplies
**Elections Security Concept**

- **IPS (3 per center)**
- **IECI (20-40 per center)**
- **TCP / Vehicle Road Block**
- **Cordon (10 IPS / RA / IIF per cordon)**

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**Outer Cordon** – CF provides QRF and middle cordon augmentation when requested.

**Middle Cordon** – Blocks vehicle traffic and searches voters (IPS / ING / IIF / RA).

**Inner Cordon / Outside Polling Center** – IPS controls voters entering center and provides armed security.

**Inside Polling Center** – IECI searches male and female voters entering center and controls voter queue lines.
**Description:** Corps pursuit operations cease being the main effort refocusing pursuit forces to stabilize and prepare for election security tasks. Intel based targeting continues. Corps Logistics surge early to generate logistic flexibility prior to the elections to allow emergency IECl support to occur. Logistic convoys are suspended during the period 29-31 Jan 04 to reduce presence and free CFs from MSR security for over watch security. Election support tasks continue as the ME through transition minimizing CF presence through to the establishment of the new Government.

**PRO**
- Continued pursuit operations
- Provides time for setting Election security posture
- Reduces CF presence
- Maximize CF for Election security
- Capacity to meet IECl emergency support requests

**CON**
- AIF pursuit compromised to support Elections
- Some logistic risk due to convoy suspension period
- Reduces CF presence
- Maximizes CF for Election security
Description: Continue pursuit operations denying AIF the opportunity to interdict elections through concerted disruption operations. MSC manage, within boundaries, IECI support related tasks, generating flexibility to support the IECI within MSC resources.

**PRO**
- Continued pursuit operations without break
- MNC-I retain the initiative
- Corps logistics remain fully functional

**CON**
- Does not reduce CF presence
- Limited flexibility to respond to emergency IECI requests
- Least CF combat power option for Over Watch Election Support
Description: Corps pursuit operations cease being the main effort early refocusing pursuit forces to stabilize and prepare for election security tasks. Intel based targeting continues until 26 Jan 05. Corps Logistics surge early to generate logistic flexibility prior to the elections. Logistic convoys are suspended during the period 26-31 Jan 04 to reduce presence and free CFs from MSR security for over watch security. MNC-I immediately resumes aggressive pursuit operations upon completion of the Election security tasks to deny the AIF the opportunity to exploit the Government transition period.

PRO
- Provides most time for setting Election security posture
- Minimises CF presence
- Maximizes CF for Election security
- Capacity to meet IECI emergency support requests and potentially full logistic support
- Continues pursuit operations at earliest opportunity

CON
- AIF pursuit compromised to support Elections
- Most logistic risk due to lengthy convoy suspension period and min time to surge Corps stocks
- Reduces CF presence
- Maximizes CF for Election security
Iraqi Elections Logistics Challenges

Can the IECI successfully distribute Elections materials?
- IECI YES
- IECI NO

Will the CF distribute Election materials?
- CF EXECUTE YES
  - Election 30 Jan 05
- CF EXECUTE NO
  - Election delayed

Last point at which MNC-I can successfully distribute Elections materials is unknown at this time

Issues:
- IECI Distribution plan is yet to be finalized and therefore IECI is unable to identify their own Election delay / engage CF decision point.
- Political decision on CF support for Election needs to be considered (delay or CF support).
- Identification of last safe MNC-I support date will determine the point at which the Election must be delayed.
Issues

- Funding of Security preparations
- IECI election material distribution planning
- Requests for action
- Forces for anticipated Election security tasks in Al Anbar and Ninewa
- Threat update (post election – transition period)
- MSC backbriefing Election security coordination and planning in BCT detail
Requests For Action

- Extension of Emergency Law until 15 Feb 05
- Request 2 x day Public Holiday 30/31 Jan 05
- Request the following restrictions be implemented between 291200 – 311200 Jan 05:
  - urban vehicle movement ban
  - weapon carriage ban
- Border Closure 29 – 31 Jan 05
Post Election Reset and Mitigation of Reduced Forces

C5
8 DEC 04
Agenda

- Background
- Facts
- Assumptions
- Options to Solve the Problem
- Corps Recommended Solution
Problem Statements

- I MEF States a Requirement for Two Additional Battalions
- 155 eSB Must Be Integrated Into the MNC-I Battle Space Post Elections
- Must Account for Withdrawal of Election Set
- Account For Differences in OIF 2 to OIF 04-06 Structure
- Should Account for Stryker Move to Baghdad
Background

- On 2 NOV, II MEF Sent RFF # 4 To MNC-I Requesting, Among Other Capabilities, Two Infantry Battalions
- MNC-I Briefed the Shortfalls to CENTCOM Staff on 4 NOV
- Representatives From MARGENT Were Present at the Briefing, MG Mortenson, J4 and BG Raaberg, D/J3 Took the Briefing Along With Other OIF 05-07 Short Falls
- Guidance From That Briefing Resulted in CENTCOM Approved Business Rules For Rotation Related Short Falls
- Election Force Augmentation Increased Available Forces For MNC-I to 20 Brigades. This Force Will Reduce to 17 Brigades in the Months Following the Election
CENTCOM Business Rules (USMC)

- Issue recognized.
  - Before or After PDSS: Unit sends memo thru CoC to HQMC.
  - During PDSS: Unit outbriefs both MNC and MARCENT on shortfalls before departure. MNC and MARCENT capture shortfalls, begin analysis. Unit msg thru CoC to HQMC.
  - MNC-I or MARCENT generated issue: MARCENT msg to HQMC.
- HQMC analyzes and refines request, and sends message to MARCENT for comment.
- MARCENT (ICW MNC-I) provides amplifying comment back to HQMC
  - If the shortfall is a new tactical requirement beyond normal composition or unit type, MNC writes a new RFF for new or unforecasted capability. RFF enters Joint Sourcing once validated by CENTCOM.
  - If the shortfall is associated with 'man-equip-train' issues, HQMC takes for action and sources unit or requirement.
- CENTCOM J3 monitors RFF process.
- MARCENT monitors process for 'man-equip-train' issues.
Facts (1 of 2)

- 11 / 24 MEU TOA with 155 eSB 14 FEB and Occupy the 11 and 24
  MEU AO
- 2/1 CAV Kuwait ALD is 16 FEB
- 82 ABN Kuwait ALD is 30 MAR
- 197 FAB TOA with 56 eSB is 11 FEB
- 1/25 IN (MNB-NW) TOA with 3 ACR is 14 APR
- Karbala Province transfer between MND-CS and MNF-W prior to 1
  JAN 05
- USMC Contribution to MNC-I Reduces By Three Battalions In OIF 04-
  06
- 42 ID is Deploying With Two Battalions Fewer Than 1 ID With No
  Reduction to Battle Space
- 3 ID With Conduct Relief in Place With 1 CD (27 FEB TOA)
- 2/2 ID Deployed with 3 Additional Companies More Than 1/1 ID
- If 3 ACR Does Not RiP With Stryker, They Could Be Available in
  Baghdad on 1 APR
Facts (2 of 2)

- 56/36 ID is deploying with 5 additional companies and 1100 more personnel than 197 FA BDE
- 197th FA BDE (OIF 2 Theater Security BDE) will be responsible for logistic convoy escort from Tallil/CEDAR to SCANIA (by end of Oct).
- 29 BCT replaces 81 BCT with a 16 March 05 TOA
- SECFOR BDE requirements south of Baghdad have dispersed the 81st ESB from Balad to Saudi Arabia.
  - Southern Sector Iraq - 387 Pax (1 BN HQ and 3 COs)
  - Kuwait/Saudi Arabia - 615 Pax (1 FA BN and 1 CAV TRP)
- No change to CFLCC security is acceptable
  - CFLCC units sourced for other missions provide 49% of the SECFOR in Kuwait.
  - Current CFLCC convoy requirements from Kuwait to CSC Cedar II and LSA Anaconda: Approximately 290 Pax and 3 CO sets
  - CDR, CFLCC directed to reduce the CFLCC units contribution to 30%
29 BCT Task Organization

Unless otherwise indicated, all elements stationed at LSAA
**Current 56 BDE Task Org**

**56th AR BDE Forces Available**

- **23 COs**
- **2852 pax**

**TF 1.4a**

- **HHC**
  - **A**
  - **B**
  - **C**
  - **B**

- **5 COs**
- **703 pax**

**TF 1.4a**

- **HHC**
  - **A**
  - **B**
  - **C**

- **5 COs**
- **594 pax**

**TF 1.4a**

- **HHC**
  - **A**
  - **B**
  - **C**

- **5 COs**
- **594 pax**

**111 EN**

- **HHC**
  - **A**
  - **B**
  - **C**

- **4 COs**
- **444 pax**
**Missions**

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<th>C2, Unit Support, LOGPAC</th>
<th>Convoy Escort</th>
<th>FM Relay Points</th>
<th>UXO Site Security</th>
<th>Fixed Site Security</th>
<th>JVB</th>
<th>R&amp;R, Medical, REFRA D (12%)</th>
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<td><strong>111</strong></td>
<td><strong>428</strong></td>
<td>91</td>
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**Proposed 56 BDE Task Org**

56 BCT Composition: 2852 pax  
Total Current Requirements: 1602 pax  
Available for other Missions: 1250 pax  
2-112 AR & 3-112 FA = 1002 pax

---

**Available for other missions**

2-142 IN  
HHC 2-142 (262 PAX)  
A 2-142 (146 PAX)  
B 2-142 (146 PAX)  
C 2-142 (146 PAX)  
4 COs 610 pax

2-112 AR  
HHC 2-112 (282 PAX)  
A 2-112 (73 PAX)  
B 2-112 (73 PAX)  
C 2-112 (73 PAX)  
4 COs 501 pax

3-112 AR  
HHC 3-112 (282 PAX)  
A 3-112 (73 PAX)  
B 3-112 (73 PAX)  
C 3-112 (73 PAX)  
4 COs 501 pax

111 EN  
HHC 111 (132 PAX)  
A 111 (104 PAX)  
B 111 (104 PAX)  
C 111 (104 PAX)  
4 COs 444 pax
Total Shortfalls:
- 1 x LAV Company
- 1 x LAV Bn Hq
- 1 x Inf Bn (1/7 MAR)
- 1 x Fixed Site Sec Bn (x3 FA Batteries 4/14 MAR)
Assumptions

- N. Babil Continue to Be Volatile Is Key to Stability of Baghdad
- MND-CS and MND-SE Battle Space Remains Constant
- Departure of 1.4b BG Has No Adverse Effect on Security in MND-SE
- Karbala and Najaf at Local Control
- MND-B AOR Is Defined by Current Boundaries (Salman Pak and Abu Ghraib – West Return to MNF-W and MND-NC)
- Stryker BDE to Baghdad As OP RES After 3 ACR RIP
Requirements/ Options

- I MEF States a Requirement for Two Additional Battalions
  - Do Not Validate the Requirement
  - Submit the RFF to USCENTCOM For Validation
- Re-Task Organize Battle Space to Maximize OIF 04-06 Capabilities
- Develop Courses of Action That:
  - Integrates 155 eSB Into the MNC-I Battle Space Post Elections
  - Accounts for Withdrawal of Election Set
  - Accounts For Differences in OIF 2 to OIF 04-06 Structure
  - Establishes a Time Line For Stryker Brigade/3 ACR Movement to MND-B
Draft
Pre-Decisional

155 eSB Assumes 11/24 MEU Battlespace
- Attach From 56 eSB
  - x1 BN to MNF-W
  - x1 BN to MND-NC
- Expand MND-B Battlespace After Stryker Arrival

RISK
Greater Baghdad Area
Unity of Command
Until Stryker Arrival

3 ACR Available in
Baghdad

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
J3/36, 201506
MND-NC has 1 less BN TF in OIF 04-06

- MND-B Assumes “Southern Baghdad” Battlespace
- 155 eSB Assumes Najaf, Karbala, and Southern Half of North Babil
- Attach From 56 eSB
  - 1 x BN/TF to MND-B
  - 1 x BN/TF to MNF-W

3 ACR Available in Baghdad
MNF-W maintains Karbala, Najaf, and Southern N. Babil with 155 eSB

- MND-B Assumes “Southern Baghdad” Battlespace
- 155 eSB Assumes Najaf, Karbala, and Southern Half of North Babil
- Attach From 56 eSB
  - 1 x BN/TF to MND-B
  - 1 x BN/TF to MND-NC

3 ACR Available in Baghdad
Recommendation

COA 1

- Provide MND-NC One Battalion
- Provide MNF-W One Battalion
- Expand MND-B Battlespace Following Stryker Move
Bridging Concept for the Security Line of Operation

Military Support to the Iraqi Security Forces

11 Dec 04
# TROOP TO TASK ESTIMATE

**30 Nov 04**

## Required vs Actual (Coalition Forces Only)

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<th>MND-Baghdad</th>
<th>MNF-W</th>
<th>MNB-NW</th>
<th>MND-CS</th>
<th>MND-NC</th>
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**TOTAL SOLDIERS**

- **SHORT (CF ONLY)**
  - **-6378**
  - **-12282**
  - **-5477**
  - **-4907**

**% COMBAT FORCE**

- **-18%**
- **-24%**
- **-48%**
- **-51%**

**NOT AVAILABLE**

- **-2%**

---

MND-B: 256 BCT completed RIP/TOA (3883 Soldiers); 2BCT (-), 15FSB, 2-82FA (-), 2-12CAV, 1-5CAV, 1-227AV (-) OPCON to I MEF
MND-B: 1-5IN (Corps OPRES)
MNF-W: IPS disbanded by MOI
MNB-NW: 250 x ING from Irbil operating in Mosul; 458 x MOI Commandos in Mosul

Troop numbers are as of 27 Nov.
**Bridging Concept**

Local Control ---- Regional Control ---- Strategic Overwatch

**Current Operating Paradigm**
- MSCs responsible for AOR
  - Intelligence
  - Offensive Ops
  - Defensive Ops
  - Sustainment
  - Other
- ING units OPCON
- IAF TACON for Ops
- Liaison with Police
- JCCs for coordination

**Interim or Bridge Operating Concept**
- MSC BCTs fill the role as ISF trainers
- MSC BCTs mentor the ING, IAF, DBE
- MSCs perform the PATT mission
- MNC-I continues to provide QRF and target priority AIF targets

**MATT, PATT, IATT Concept**
- Sourced MATT, PATT, IATTs
- MNC-I in QRF and targeting terrorists

**Independent IZ operations**
- MNC-I in Strategic Overwatch
- IPS conducting basic Law and order operations
- Capable Army
- Effective border capability
- Credible COIN capability
Page 91 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b
On order, MNC-I forces’ main effort shifts from offensive operations to partnering with the Iraqi security forces in order to bridge the gap from the current force structure and mission sets to the objective MATT/PATT/IATT structure and mission set, and to accelerate the process of training and mentoring the ISF to execute their internal defense mission independently.
DRAFT Commander's Intent

The purpose of this operation is to bridge the gap from the current force structure set to the objective MATT/PATT/IAATT structure, and to accelerate the process to train, coach, teach, and mentor the ISF to execute their internal defense mission independently.

Key tasks:
- Units provide QRF, and continue to target priority AIF targets.
- Phased transition by Province based on ISF readiness and threat situation.
- CF units are not tied to terrain, but aligned with Iraqi forces and governmental organizations.
- CF units partner with ING and IAF units, with focus on commander and staff training, officer and NCO leadership development.
  - Joint operations initially to instill confidence in the Iraqi units
  - Progress towards independent Iraqi operations
- CF units mentor the IPS and DBE, with a focus on staff training, leader development.
- Develop the Iraqi C4ISR capability at all levels, through direct interface

Interim End State: The process of building the ISF advanced to the point that the objective PATT/MATT/IAATT organization can effectively continue the process to perform their function.

Long Term end State: The Iraqi security forces’ ability to independently conduct Law and order operations, effective counterinsurgency operations, effective border operations, and effective defense from external threats.
Generic BCT – Province relationships

Supply < Demand

- **BCTs**
  - Maneuver BNs
    - QRF
    - SPT ING
    - SPT IA
  - CS BNs
  - CSS BNs

- **MNSTC-I**
  - CPATT
    - IPAs
  - CMATT
    - ASTs

- **CJSOTF-AP**
  - CSTs
  - ODAs

- **Provincial Capital**
  - PJCCs

- **ING**
  - Bdes
  - BNs

- **Iraqi Army**
  - HQs (Div/Bde)
  - BNs

- **Border Forces**
  - IPS
  - FPS
Fully integrated intelligence battlefield operating system; operate while teaching and mentoring
Challenges/Issues

- There are large differences in the maturity of the ISF in different parts of the country; Thus, transition to this concept should be condition-based.
- Top to bottom command structure for ING or DBE will be maturing during our bridging effort.
- IZ Army forces are not stationary (although they have a home base, in theory, they have yet to be employed that way).
- The IPS chain of command goes from the MOI to the Provincial IPS to the local IPS, in most cases, but there are exceptions (Samara, Fallujah).
- MOI forces (including IPS) have no command relationship with the CF.
- Very immature IZ intelligence structure.
- Provincial Governors have little power WRT ISF, which makes linking with the governors less effective.
- FPS have little or no chain of command; very inefficient and their effectiveness is questionable.
- CF lacks sufficient forces with appropriate skill sets to mentor IPS (MPs and ILO MP units).
- CF FOBs tend to tie us to terrain and static force protection missions.
Conclusions

- While the intent is a full transition to the bridging concept quickly, each MSC’s implementation of the bridging concept will be unique to their AOR.

- Current MSC commanders must begin the staff planning process and hand-off concepts at RIP/TOA:
  - Develop initial implementing concept and proposed timelines

- Each MSC must measure the risk to the campaign plan during the bridging period:
  - Determine acceptable risks
  - Develop risk mitigation plan
Questions?