Compartmented Plan Update
5 Aug 2002

Copy__ of 16
When directed by the President, USCENTCOM conducts offensive operations in Iraq to:

- Overthrow the Iraqi regime
- Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability
- Eliminate the regime's threat to the Iraqi people, the region, and the U.S.

On order, conduct follow-on operations to facilitate transition from war to peace.
"Generated Start" Plan...
We execute the warfight on our timeline
“Generated Start” Plan (Review)

- Execute a military option on our timeline
- Introduce SOF first to set conditions; then attack on multiple lines of operation simultaneously
- Leverage “shock and awe” with Information activities, themes and messages
- Structure deployment to build and maintain momentum
  - Coordinate flow of combat forces and enablers
  - Start force sets conditions for decisive operations
- Enable a coordinated scheme of preparation throughout initial deployment
- Deploy Northern Iraq Liaison Element (NILE) teams to:
  - Build relationships
  - Gain intelligence and assist in targeting
  - Facilitate rapid introduction of SOF
“Generated Start” Plan (Review)

Operational Timeline

PHASE I
Preparation
Complete Posturing of Initial Force

~30 DAYS
~60 DAYS

PHASE II
Attack Regime

~45 DAYS

PHASE III
Complete Regime Destruction

~90 DAYS

PHASE IV
Post-hostilities

Clandestine Insertion / Training

Strategic and Operational Information Operations

Deploy Forces
Air / Ground Operations

Start Prep
Start Deployment
A-Day
G-Day
Follow-on ground forces deploy...

A = Air Operations Begin
G = Ground Operations Begin
Sir, We decided to address the risks associated w/each plan as we review the plan so that we could demonstrate how the “Credible military option/Modified plan” we propose to support “Accelerated Regime Removal” counters and or mitigates the risks of the Gen Start and Run Start plan (as we developed it these last 6 weeks). The risks listed on this slide mirror the points made by DR. Rice when reviewing OPTION 1 in her paper. We viewed OPTION 1 as in line w/the Generated Start Plan. Flesching out the risk slides and ensuring we get the point across later in the brief that the “Credible” option in fact mitigates these risks, are the key areas we still need to work and are looking for input.
REVIEW

Stand-Alone Military Options...
Employ operational fires that could lead to
“Running Start”
"Running Start" Plan...
We enter the warfight sequentially...
Air Power first (Blue, White, Red) followed by
Ground Forces
“Running Start” Plan

- Executes military option(s) (Blue, White, Red) initially while simultaneously flowing forces
- Introduces lines of operation sequentially
- Maximizes effectiveness of operational fires with early introduction of SOF forces -- operational fires throughout deployment
- Scales clandestine preparation to time available...
  - Deploy liaison teams (NILE) to build relationships
  - Conduct “in-country” training and arming of opposition groups, as soon as possible after A-day
- Focuses information operation actions, themes and messages
- Tailors Phase II objectives based on effects of operational fires
  - Initiate ground operations (conventional and SOF) against intermediate objectives
  - Anticipate ground pause to generate more sustainment and combat power
- Flows follow-on forces to achieve Phase III and IV objectives
Sir, We are awaiting results of COMCFLCCs wargame to get from them the details of the size force that can be launched on what day. We should have that by Friday afternoon.
“Running Start” Risks

- Reduces time available for the diplomatic process to secure basing-staging-overflight jeopardizing deployment timelines
- Increases risk if plan is executed in the near term
  - Completing preparatory tasks reduces risk and enables more rapid execution
- Extends overall operational timeline due to sequential introduction of lines of operation
  - Allows Iraq time to react
  - Threatens the loss of operational momentum and flexibility to exploit success
- Provides Iraqi regime greater opportunity to inflict mass casualties
- Increases strategic exposure the earlier air strikes are initiated

Sir, Our cut on the key risks of the running start CONPLAN as we developed the CONPLAN under the assumption we are responding to an Iraqi action/trigger.
Minimize risk and maximize opportunities...
Refining the plan

Sir, Slide 24 is a synopsis of the strategy from DR. Rice's paper and the OSD paper.
Slides 25-30 are our thoughts on implementing the strategy outlined in the papers.
When ordered by the President, USCENTCOM conducts military operations to overthrow the Iraqi regime...

- Execute a modification of the “Running Start”...
  - Accelerate ambiguous actions to generate capability
  - Initiate strikes in accordance with “Red” military option
  - Sequentially introduce lines of operations...Commence ground operations after initial air strikes

- Use available time to...
  - Finalize agreements for basing, staging, overflight
  - Posture the force and improve capabilities through ambiguous movement and preparation
  - Increase pressure on Iraqi regime through diplomatic engagement, military action, and information operations

- Continue to refine options to increase initial force strength...
  - Increase size and scope of Operations Northern and Southern Watch
  - Increase capability in the AOR under guise of exercise participation
  - Confirm participation / integration of coalition partner forces
Does not reflect CFLCC CDRs force size recommendation
Sir, Need to work w/CFLCC to ensure we capture the ground tasks for the initial force.
Phase II - Shape the Battlespace
(A-Day to G-Day)
16 Days

**GROUND OPERATIONS**
- Artillery attacks
- Aviation attacks
- Establish security zone
- Conduct ground recon
- Clear attack routes
- Conduct small unit raids

**SOF OPERATIONS**
- Direct actions against high-value targets (WMD, command and control, air defense, oil platforms)
- Overland special operations
- Unconventional warfare (IED, ambush, etc.)
- Support unit attacks (Kurds, Shia, Sunni)
- Suppress airfields
- Conduct air attacks against WMD
- On order seize WMD
- Intimidate attacks against Kurds

**AIR NAVAL OPERATIONS**
- Destroy, neutralize, or disrupt targets (Iraqi air defense)
- Upgrade/Destroy Iraqi regime leadership
- Degraded Iraqi security forces
- Degraded/Destroy Iraqi WMD delivery and production capability
- Destroy Iraqi forces and capabilities in 24/48 (IN, NES, C2)
- Fix IGRF forces in Baghdad

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS**
- Reduce Iraqi command and control capabilities
- Maximize Iraqi military will to fight
- Build regional/international support for U.S./Coalition ops
- Influence Iraqi leadership not to use WMD

Sir, Need to work w/CFLCC to ensure we capture the ground tasks for the initial force.
Phase III - Decisive Operations
G-day to G+125
126 Days

**GROUND OPERATIONS**
- Secure bridgeheads across Euphrates River
- Secure southern/northern oil fields
- Defeat Iraqi forces in zone
- Secure co-opted Iraqi forces
- Secure/Secure Baghdad
- Secure/Co-control WMD & conduct exploitation operations
- On order/coordinate coalition effort in the north and west

**SOF OPERATIONS**
- Direct Action against high value targets (WMD, command and control, Air defenses)
- Conventional/Warfare Ops with Opposition Groups (Kurds, Shia, Sunni) to disrupt co-opted and conventional forces
- Suppress ballistic missile launchers to prevent WMD use
- On order, launch WMD
- Interdict/attacks against Kurds
- Support opposition group activities in Baghdad

**AERONAVAL OPERATIONS**
- Maintain air supremacy
- Complete destruction of Iraqi regime leadership
- Complete destruction of Iraqi security forces
- Disrupt/Destroy Iraqi WMD delivery and production capability
- Disrupt/Destroy Iraqi forces in zone

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS**
- Encourage Iraqi forces not to fight
- Convey fungibility of supporting current regime
We will coordinate with the SOF to have the Sunni OG’s close the western LOC on or about D-1.

On D-Day, SOF with the Kurds will execute direct action missions against high payoff targets and conduct ambushes in key passes along the green line.

The Shia will initiate widespread robust harassment and interdiction of key SSO and Baath party leaders.

We will conduct near simultaneous air and ground operations against the regime. Air and TLAM strikes will attack key leaders, IADS, SSO and SRG forces (High collateral damage possible)

Ground assaults will:

Seize Umm Qasr

Seize Bridges over the Euphrates river north of Basrah

Isolate Basrah

Seize bridges over the Euphrates in the vicinity of Al Nasiriah
IO will continue to play a key role as we use Kinetics to destroy front line Arty forces to protect our forces from WMD and convince the remaining front line forces that resistance is futile.
### Next steps...

- Secure basing, staging, access (Begin now)
- Execute Information Operations (Begin now)
- Identify post-Iraq regime government (Ongoing)
- Identify mobilization requirements -- CRAFT I, Stop loss, Reserve call-up (Begin now)
- Approve select high collateral damage targets (Sep brief)
- Build coalition (Ongoing)
- Refine targeting and ground scheme of maneuver (Aug-Sep)
  - Develop:
    - Branches for employment from Turkey and Jordan (Sep)
    - Supporting strategic plan (Aug)
- Refine deployment data to reflect evolving planning (Continuous)
- Continue enabling actions and preparatory tasks (Aug - Dec)
- Work with Congress (Begin now)
- Craft diplomatic strategies... UN, Regional organizations, Israel (Begin now)
Next Steps... Resource Considerations

**Fiscal 2002:**
- $1 Billion (± 25%)
  - Available within current DoD topline
  - May require some reprogramming
    - Would involve Congressional cooperation and awareness in August – October period

**Fiscal 2003:**
- $XX Billion Supplemental
  - Early in Calendar 2003
  - We will want to request managerial flexibility from the Congress
  - This will be in addition to $10 billion “war reserve” in current 2003 budget proposal
    - “War Reserve” will be needed to sustain current operations through early 2003

**Fiscal 2004:**
- $XX Billion in additional topline in 2004 Defense Budget
  - Treat as “war reserve” as in 2003?
  - Requires flexibility from Congress in use of funds
Next Steps... Resource Considerations

- Timing
  - FY03 Supplemental request should be submitted at about the same time as FY04 budget submission

- "Tin Cup" activities
  - Has yielded $1 billion for OEF thus far
  - Will need to be much larger effort

- How to handle funds from Oil sales?
  - Iraqi Humanitarian requirements
  - Reimburse for regional needs (Turkey, Jordan)
  - Repayment schedule for supportive Iraqi

Sir, We also thought it best to address those things that could go wrong or impact our execution now in conjunction w/risk as well as the implications of losing Turkey to again demonstrate how our "Credible" option mitigates or addresses these as well. Additionally when we had them at the end of the brief you wind up ending the brief on a down note vice ending on a positive note, "....understand the issues but we can mitigate them and still accomplish the mission"
Backups

- Iraq - current situation # 26-28
- Component rotations # 29-34
- Strategic risks # 35-39
- Support Requirements # 40-56
- Preparatory Tasks # 57-64
- Targeting # 65-89
- Master Air Attack Plan – Blue # 90-102
- Airfields and Oilfields # 103-105
- Command and Control # 106-110
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Iraq -- Current Situation

- Military (Regular Army and Republican Guard)
  - US/UK campaign in AFG has shaken self-confidence
    - Expect increased use of precision weapons; SOF w/tribal forces; ground attack from south and north; regional support for US/UK effort
  - Regime seriously concerned about poor morale & desertions
  - Expect early loss of comms & centralized control
    - 4 x Regional Commands established to control fight after comms disruption
- Internal Security Forces
  - Morale also adversely affected
    - Additional security forces sent to Governorates
  - Qusay charged w/Baghdad Security Plan
    - Expect disruption -- alternate control sites in residential areas
  - Republican Guard locally dispersed around Baghdad / Al Kut; limited defensive preparations noted
    - Will fight until they are convinced Saddam no longer rules
- Political
  - Saddam will accept UN inspector return when attack imminent
  
*Coordinated with...*

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## POTENTIAL IRAQI ACTIONS

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- Predator shootdown
- Violate no fly zones
- Military enhancements (North/South Iraq)
- Violation of Kuwaiti or Saudi Arabian airspace
- Limited violence against individual Kurds / Shia
- Interfere with / deny inspections
- Provocative military posturing
- Manned aircraft shootdown
- Major No Drive Zone violation
- Intel indicating possible Iraqi link to terrorist act
- Confirmed weapons of mass destruction within Iraq
- Large scale attack against Kurds / Shia
- Employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Intel confirming Iraqi link to terrorist act
- Major threat or attack on friendly regional neighbor(s)

*Multiple events may have a cumulative effect*
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The branch plan uses a trigger at an unpredictable time to initiate execution of the plan. This slide shows how long it would take to get CVBGs into the area of operations over the next year. The Navy can always get 5 CVBGs to the fight by G-day (45 days after trigger). However, some times are better than others. One of those times is the December 2002 time frame. Four CVBGs will be underway at that time.

The example of optimal period in December is 12/21.

KHK always assumed to be no more than 20 days away.
Similarly for the ARG/MEUs, one ARG/MEU can always be in the Persian Gulf within 10 days, and usually within 5. However, it can take significantly longer to get a second ARG/MEU into the Gulf at certain times of the year. During the month of December, the optimal time for CVBGs, the time required to get the second ARG/MEU increase as BELLEAU WOOD / 11 MEU departs the AOR. In the base plan the BELLEAU WOOD / 11 MEU deployment is extended to provide the 2nd ARG/MEU on station.

There is an intersection of optimal periods for CVBG and ARG/MEU in latter November. There is a relatively long optimal period for amphibious forces in the Spring which coincides with the CVBG optimal period.

This slide assumes ESSEX / 31 MEU are not available.

IM02 = Exercise Infinite Moonlight
EM02 = Exercise Eager Mace
The branch plan uses a trigger at an unpredictable time to initiate execution of the plan. This slide shows how long it would take to get CVBGs into the area of operations over the next year. The Navy can always get 5 CVBGs to the fight by G-day (45 days after trigger). However, some times are better than others. One of those times is the December 2002 time frame. Four CVBGs will be underway at that time.

KHK always assumed to be no more than 20 days away.
Slide highlights SOF force flow (running and generated start)

- JSOTF-S is in place late in both scenarios (esp running start)
- We are working prepo and TPFDD to mitigate this
- Slide shows SOF as pre-D-Day force and need to have adequate ISR/CAS in place when SOF is employed
  - Generated Start
    - D-30 North/West
    - D-20 South
  - Running Start
    - D+2 North
    - D+7 West
    - D+28 South
- “Initial” depicts first operational capability (not across full mission spectrum)
- “Full” depicts full force closure
Recovery and transition overlap by functional areas

- **1.4c**: CI grows
- Need significant force protection assets for militart/civilian ops

CJTF must be established for CCHQ to redeploy (450 pax)

Force for recovery is low (at least 50K) ground/ISR and air forces

New slide:

- Overlap governorates with key infrastructure/economic nodes
- Identify force requirements for security

Align forces and Ios with governorates

Align mil with UN/coalition civilian regions
Ethnic considerations

Economic considerations ports/oil
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Sources of Strategic Risk

- Loss of, or restrictions on, our ability to base, stage or overfly
- Iraqi actions:
  - Attacks against Israel - WMD or conventional
  - Attacks on neighboring states (Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan) suspected of supporting US forces
  - Attacks by Iraqi-sponsored terrorists (against US or allies / coalition partners)
  - Attacks on Iraqi opposition groups intensify -- before force in place to protect
  - “Circle the wagons” vicinity Baghdad
  - Cut oil to Jordan / Turkey
- Early success -- Regime falls, but...
  - Post-regime government not established
  - Iraqi people fail to accept new government
  - Forces not in place to support new government
- Israel attacks / strikes Iraq preemptively
- Media interference / negative influence
### Addressing Strategic Risks

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<tr>
<th>Risk event</th>
<th>Mitigated by...</th>
<th>Road ahead</th>
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<tr>
<td>Attack on Israel</td>
<td>- SOF in west to deny launch area&lt;br&gt;- EUCOM LNO team to Israel</td>
<td>- Seize H3 as a forward operating base/deploy forces in the West&lt;br&gt;- Incorporate UK/AUS Forces in plan operating from Turkey and Jordan</td>
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<td>Attack on Kuwait</td>
<td>- OPLAN 1903-like defense; followed with decisive counter-attack&lt;br&gt;- Chemical units early in force flow to operate at APOD/SPOD</td>
<td>Deploy Patriots as preparatory action</td>
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</table>
| Attack on Kurds  | - OWR(+)
   aircraft in Turkey<br>- SOF/CIA with Kurds                               | Deploy ground forces through Turkey, Incorporate UK/AUS Forces H3/Forces in West |
| Attack on Jordan | Deploy SOF and Patriots to Jordan                                               | H3/Forces in West                                                            |
| Terrorist attack in US/Outside AOR | Maintaining GWOT pressure (Afghanistan with JTF-160, JTF-HOA) | Increase force protection posture                                             |
| Attack on Shia   | Provide lethal/non-lethal aid to Shia                                            | Refine UW operations plan                                                     |
| “Circle the Wagons” | Inside-out approach to targeting<br>- Securing oilfields as soon as possible to shorten time oil is cut-off | Refine plan for Baghdad                                                      |
| Early success    | Reapportion forces required for post-hostilities                               | Develop military role for establishment of post-regime government             |
| Israel attacks Iraq | Plan for TBM suppression / defense                                             | - Enhance Jordanian capabilities<br>- Identify Jordanian requirements<br>- Incorporate Israeli targets |
| Loss/restrictions on basing | - DOS lead in securing support<br>- Theater preparation tasks provide flexibility | - Secure additional APOD in Iraq<br>- Continue TPFDD refinement               |

### Unilateral Coalition Support Assumptions

**Next slide**
Pages 39 through 40 redacted for the following reasons:
-------------------------------
1.4b, 1.4b
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Pages 42 through 57 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4a, 1.4b
Preparatory Tasks
Prep Tasks Throughout the Region

- Identified 32 preparatory tasks; 22 requiring host-nation approval
- Theater distribution of the tasks:
  - Kuwait - 9 tasks
  - Bahrain - 2 tasks
  - Qatar - 6 tasks
  - Oman - 4 tasks
  - KSA - 2 tasks
- Need to gain approval now
## Preparatory Action Plan

All actions interrelated - each affects timeline for execution & risk to mission.

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**As of 24 July 02**

Assumes a 15 AUG action start date.
Targeting
Focus of Effort

This pictorially displays how we plan on targeting Saddam and his regime. While 1 and 2 are the most desirable targets they are also the most elusive. Our plan is to attack the WMD wherever we have the opportunity to. Attacking the blue colored targets serves the main purpose.
of leveraging groups 8, 9 10 in order to facilitate regime change quicker
Synergistic Application of Multiple Lines Of Operations (DOD, 50 USC, synchr)
Create multiple events / crises designed to trigger regime change by over
DOD and 50 USC, synchronized actions
Create and maintain pressure on Saddam and his supporters
Synergy and speed are greatest threats to regime
Combination is key NOT individual events / targets
Saddam is regime’s center of gravity
Sample synergistic events
Sabotage
Disarray in inner circle
Increased external support for opposition
Loss of income from oil exports
Loss of sovereignty in western and southern Iraq
Big question is:
Based on Guidance, Objectives, Priorities and Effects
- What Must Be hit and When?

Target or Target Set

What can be struck preemptively?

What can be planned in Air Tasking Cycle?

What requires Time Sensitive Target or on order execution?

What are the factors?
Targeting Imperatives First 72 Hours

• Degrade Regime C3
  – Destroy Critical Regime C2 Nodes/Facilities
  – Destroy Comms/Media IVO Baghdad
  – Degrade Regime Security Apparatus
• Fix RGFC Forces (Prevent collapse on Baghdad)
  – Attrit Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) fleet
• Degrade WMD Delivery Capability
• Achieve Air Supremacy
  – Destroy the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
  – Neutralize Iraqi Air Power
• Eliminate the Iraqi Naval Threat
  – Destroy CSSC-3 Delivery Platforms and Missile Storage
  – Destroy Naval Mine Storage and Delivery
• Neutralize Regular Army (RA) in the South
  – Destroy C2 (Division & Higher)
  – Attrit WMD-capable systems (Rocket launchers, ≥152mm tube artillery) and Engineers
Targets in the Deck

Planned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Aimpoints</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>429</td>
<td>13,566</td>
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Other Developed Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Aimpoints</th>
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<tr>
<td>541</td>
<td>16,811</td>
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Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Aimpoints</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>970</td>
<td>30,377</td>
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</table>

Does not include mobile ground force targets: 16,000 Aimpoints
Target Significance:
One of three major Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) facilities in Iraq; 100+ HET's

Critical Elements:
HET prime mover and trailers maintenance facilities

CDE:
Low

Weaponology:
Requires heavy weapons for destruction (over 700) or possibly aerial mines to fix HET's in place

Collateral Concerns:
Hospital and prison located on the facility

CINC'S COMMENTS:
Provides strategic lift for Iraqi military
Target Significance:
Main headquarters for the RGFC

Critical Elements:
Headquarters building

CDE:
Low

Weaponerying:
2000lb class weapons or less

Collateral Concerns:
None

CINC'S COMMENTS:
Houses the RGFC Commander and Staff
WMD Target: Latifiya Liquid Propellant Plant

Target Significance:
Iraq's primary Nitric Acid Production Plant supporting TBM engine production

Critical Elements:
Nitric & Sulfuric Acid Production buildings

Collateral Damage:
High (possible release of chemical plume)

Weaponing:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and attack parameters.

Collateral Concerns:
Nitric & Sulfuric Acid Plumes

CINC'S COMMENTS:
Produces a critical chemical component required in liquid rocket engine fuel
Chart one is intended to be an introductory chart that provides the name of the program/enabling center, the program manager, and the date.

Any reference to “program” included throughout these notes is intended to refer to programs and enabling centers.

The Requirement and Customers are lines intended to focus on the reason for the program and the customer for whom the program is being accomplished. The last two lines are not intended to provide a detailed justification of the program, but rather should focus on why the program is being accomplished and for whom. One or two sentences should be sufficient to provide the basis.
Target Significance:
Home to Iraq's First Operational Al Samoud SRBM Unit

Critical Elements:
Dispersed TELs and Vehicle Sheds

CDE:
Low

Weaponerying:
2000 lb weapon or less

Collateral Concerns:
None

CINC'S COMMENTS:
Primary base for the Al Samoud Short Range Ballistic Missile capable of chemical weapons delivery.
Target Significance:
Located at Saddam Int'l airport, Baghdad.
Provides radar coverage of Southern No-fly Zone

Critical Elements:
Radar antenna

CDE:
High - Dual use (at airport)

Weaponing:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and time of attack

Collateral Concerns:
None

CINC'S COMMENTS:
One of 13 long-range radars in Iraqi inventory
Regime Leadership Target: The Presidential Diwan

Target Significance:
Prestigious meeting place for regime leadership. Also associated with Presidential Secretariat and personal staff.

Critical Elements:
Meeting hall and residence

Collateral Damage: High

Weaponing:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and attack parameters.

Collateral Concerns:
Residential and public structure within 130 feet.

CINC'S COMMENTS:
Symbolizes Saddam's power and legitimacy
Regime Leadership Target: Baath Party Headquarters

Target Significance:
Main party headquarters for the Baath Party in Iraq.

Critical Elements:
Multi-story headquarters building, central bunker, communications and security entrance buildings.

Collateral Damage: High

Weaponizing:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and attack parameters.

Collateral Concerns:
Residential and public structures within 200 ft.

CINC'S COMMENTS:
Saddam's political party and power base.
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The Requirement and Customers are lines intended to focus on the reason for the program and the customer for whom the program is being accomplished. The last two lines are not intended to provide a detailed justification of the program, but rather should focus on why the program is being accomplished and for whom. One or two sentences should be sufficient to provide the basis.
Regime Security Target: Baghdad Protection Unit

Target Significance:
Presidential bodyguard protection facility for off-duty personnel

Critical Elements:
Headquarters, barracks, vehicle parking and support buildings

Collateral Damage:
High

Weaponizing:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and attack parameters.

Collateral Concerns:
Civilian and business structures within 100 ft

CINC’S COMMENTS:
Saddam’s Presidential bodyguards
Regime Comms: Baghdad Main Exchange - Sinek

Target Significance:
Primary TELCOM switching center for all domestic and international communications

Critical Elements:
Multi-story exchange and switching vault located beneath main building

Collateral Damage:
High

Weaponizing:
Requires multiple 2000lb class penetrator or larger

Collateral Concerns:
Civilian business structures within 100 ft

CINC’S COMMENTS:
Single most important comms facility in Iraq.
Baghdad Highway Bridge over the Tigris - 14th Tamuz

Target Significance:
Tigris River Highway bridge connecting central Baghdad with the eastern Shi'a District

Critical Elements:
Center span of bridge

Collateral Damage:
High - Dual Use

Weaponizing:
2000 lb class weapon or less

Collateral Concerns:
Dual use civilian-military infrastructure target

CINC'S COMMENTS:
Cross river entrance to the Shi'a area; required for implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Set</th>
<th>Initial Strikes</th>
<th>Follow On Strikes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>Aimpoints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Leadership/Palaces</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>633</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime Communications</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>&amp; Media</td>
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<td>804</td>
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<td>Regime Security &amp; SRG</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>276</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>174</td>
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<td>RGFC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>HETs</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Afields, Acft, Helos</td>
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<td>128</td>
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<td>IADS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>Naval</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2405</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total: 429 Targets  13,566 Aimpoints
Master Air Attack Plan
(Blue)

- First 24 hours
- 124 Strike sorties
- 342 Airmixs
- 88 TLAMs
South
- 24-hour DCA Cap
- 24-hour AWACS coverage
- 18-hour RJ coverage
  Assumes: both jets green
- 24-hour Predator coverage
- 2 U2 vults (5 hour coverage)

North
- Two "gos" per day; E3 / RJ on both goes
package A Airfields (30 TLAM C)

Afriqi: 8AMs to:
- Isolate Kirkuk to allow access to 81st WCR and isolate Q West for access to airfield
- Isolate Taqadum and Ramadi to allow access to airfields
- Isolate southern Baghdad to allow access to ~ 3330 North line

CA = COUNTER AIR
CM = COUNTER MARITIME
CI = COUNTER INFORMATION
CL = COUNTERLAND
SL = LEADERSHIP
SR = REGIME SECURITY
SS = SUSTAINMENT / LOG
SW = WMD
Package D
6 PGM, 2 F16 CJ, 4 F16 CJ (S), 3 FA66
CA44, Mosul Ambush Site
  2 PGM – GBU12 (2 DMPM)
CA20, Kirkuk ADEF Sector HQ
  1 F16 CJ – 2 GBU31 (2 DMPM)
CA36, Kirkuk Airfield
  4 PGM – 2 GBU31 (8 DMPM)
  1 F16 CJ – 2 GBU31 (2 DMPM)

Package E = [25 TLAM C]
CA20, Kirkuk ADEF Sector HQ
  4 TLAM C (4 DMPM)
CA21, Kirkuk ADEF IOC (81st WCR)
  3 TLAM C (2 DMPM)
C179, Baghdad Main Central SIGINT
  1 TLAM C (11 DMPM)
C189, Baghdad SIGINT Substation
  2 TLAM C (2 DMPM)
CA01, Tall ADEF IOC & Radar (14th WCR)
  9 TLAM C (9 DMPM)
CA24, Baghdad Tempo ADEF Sector HQ
  1 TLAM C (1 DMPM)
CA02, Baghdad ADEF HQ (1 ADSOC)
  4 TLAM C (4 DMPM)
C198, Tall Airfield Mil Cable**
  1 TLAM C (1 DMPM)
** If no AGM 130 in Pkg B

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Package J (1330 TOT)
10 F18, 2 F14, 4 F15CJ, 2 EA6

CL06, Bahrahad RGFC Bde – Fort Rash
2 F18 – 2 SLAMET (4 DMPI)

SW35, Al Fedia Launcher Assembly Fac
4 F18 – 2 GBU31 (7 DMPI)
CM19, Al Fedia Hydraulics / Suspension
2 F16 – 2 GBU31 (5 DMPI)
SW33, Bahrahad Barracks Bde School AG
2 F16 – 2 GBU31 (6 DMPI)

SW35, Abu Ghurayb Probable Msi Fac
2 F14 – 2 GBU31 (4 DMPI)

Package K (1430 TOT)
4 A10 – XCAS

Counter-Naval XCAS – Basrah / Al Faw
2 AGM84, 8 MK82, Gurn

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SW = WMD

Approved for Release
MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
Package L (1600 TOT)
8 F16, 4 F14, 2 EA6B, 2 F18 (S)
CL26, Khan Al Manzil Skis School HQ
4 F14 - 2 GBU31 (6 DMPI)
-- Frog Storage Area
SRF27, Ramadi Range Army Camp SGFC
7 F18 - 2 GBU31 (13 DMPI)
-- Frog Storage

Package M (1630 TOT)
4 PGM, 2 F16CJ, 2 F16CJ (S), 3 EA6
SW26, Mosul (Al Kiefi) ROTAE Center
4 PGM - 2 GBU31 (6 DMPI)
2 F16CJ - 2 GBU31 (4 DMPI)
Package N (1600 TOT)
4 A10 - XCAS
Counter Naval XCAS - Basrah / Al Faw
2 AGM-109, 8 MK82, Gun

Package O (1600 TOT)
4 PGM, 4 F16CJ, 1 EA6
SW05, Abu Ghurayb Probable Maj Fac
4 PGM – 2 GBU31 (8 DMPL)

CA = COUNTER AIR
CM = COUNTER MARITIME
CI = COUNTER INFORMATION
CL = COUNTER LAND
SL = LEADERSHIP
SR = REGIME SECURITY
SS = SUSTAINMENT / LOG
SW = WMD
Airfields and Oilfields
Thinking about Iraqi Oilfields...

Saddam’s potential actions...
- Employ “scorched earth” policy
- Ignite wells intentionally
- Dump oil into waterways and the North Arabian Gulf
- Cut ground transportation of oil to Jordan / Turkey
- Destroy key oil infrastructure

Our options...
- Secure and hold using US / Coalition forces and wait for end of conflict
- If still functioning, use contractors to restore oil flow and escrow funds (DoD, $131B, 50 US$ = 3507)
- If destroyed / damaged... employ SAP capabilities / US contractors to reestablish capability (DoD, $1,500,000)

Kirkuk Oil Fields
(30% of legal exports, 95% of illegal exports)

Rumaila Oil Fields
(75% of legal exports, 5% of illegal exports)
Command and Control
CFC-IRAQ

CFC

DCINC IRAQ

CFACC CENTCOM

CFCC ARCENT

CMCC NAVCENT

CFSOCC SOCCENT

MARCEN

CF

Coalition Forces HQ's

US Air Forces

Coalition Air Forces

US Ground Forces

Coalition Ground Forces

US Naval Forces

Coalition Naval Forces

US SOF

Coalition Special Forces

CFACC CENTCOM

CFCC ARCENT

CMCC NAVCENT

CFSOCC SOCCENT

MARCEN

CJTF-OIR

US Forces

USMC Forces

Coalition Forces

COCOM OPCON C2ORD

107
Securing Regional Support to Enable Preparatory Actions
Basing, Staging and Overflight Approval

- Enter at a high level -- Initial entry is decision-maker
- Form Inter-agency negotiation team with OSD lead

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Team Composition</th>
<th>When</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEPSECDEF, Ambassador, CINCENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4b</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEPSECDEF, Ambassador, CINCEUR</td>
<td>August</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The branch plan uses a trigger at an unpredictable time to initiate execution of the plan. This slide shows how long it would take to get CVBGs into the area of operations over the next year. The Navy can always get 5 CVBGs to the fight by G-day (45 days after trigger). However, some times are better than others. One of those times is the December 2002 time frame. Four CVBGs will be underway at that time.

KHK always assumed to be no more than 20 days away.
US Army Ambiguous Preparatory Actions

- CFLCC TOTAL COST = $398.43M
- Preposition 7 Medium Truck Companies (POL) - $5.1M
  - Transportation cost = $4.55M
  - Maintenance cost = $550K
- Build 2.4M Gal Bag Farm & POL Pipeline - $27.93M
  - Pipeline to Al Jaber AB = $8M
  - Pipeline to Ali As Salem AB = $12M
  - Pipeline from Salem AB to Virginia kabal = $7.6M
  - Bag Farm at VA kabal = $330K
- Preposition 30 DOS for 50K - $132.6M
  - Class I = $34.4M
  - Class II/III/IV = $5.8M
  - Chemical Defense Equipment = $87.3M
  - Class VIII = $4.6M
  - Class IX (batteries) = $516K
- Sustain APS-5Q & APS-3 Equipment - $71.8M
  - APS-5Q OPTEMPO (AUG02-JAN03) = $33.76M
  - APS-5Q & APS-3 maintenance contract expansion = $14.05M
  - APS-5Q surge maintenance/CL IX costs = $24M
- Construct Beddown Sites in Kuwait - $56.6M
  - Covers site preparation for 51,648 soldiers and Marines expected to pass through JRSOI enroute to forward battle positions.
US Army Ambiguous Preparatory Actions

- Information Superiority/Blue Force Tracking - $34.5
  - Complete PH IIIA Gulf Digitization Project = $9.2M
  - Complete Intelligence Info Dominance Ctr = $1.6M
  - Complete 377th TSC C2 Center = $7.7M
  - Buy High-Gain Satellite Antennas - $6.03M
  - Purchase Prominias and USC-60 Tri-Band Terminals - $9.97M
  - These devices allow CFLCC to maximize the capability of existing satellite bandwidth much as a multiplexor allows several FM frequencies to use the same antenna.
- Establish CENTCOM Forward HQ - $69.9M
  - Infrastructure in Qatar = $10.9
  - Initial BASEOPS = $8.8M
  - Communications $29M
  - Force Protection = $1.1M
  - Transportation/ set-up = $2.6M
  - JSCE = $1.4M
  - HQ equipment = $16.1M
Sir, We are awaiting results of COMCFLCCs wargame to get from them the details of the size force that can be launched on what day. We should have that by Friday afternoon.
Does not reflect CFLCC CDRs force size recommendation