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Compartmented Plan Update

5 Aug 2002

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Mission (Review)

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When directed by the President, USCENTCOM conducts offensive operations in Iraq to:


- Overthrow the Iraqi regime
- Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability
- Eliminate the regime's threat to the Iraqi people, the region, and the U.S.

On order, conduct follow-on operations to facilitate transition from war to peace.

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REVIEW

“Generated Start” Plan...
We execute the warfight on our timeline

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"Generated Start" Plan (Review)


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- **Execute a military option on our timeline**
- **Introduce SOF first to set conditions; then attack on multiple lines of operation simultaneously**
- **Leverage "shock and awe" with Information activities, themes and messages**
- **Structure deployment to build and maintain momentum**
 - **Coordinate flow of combat forces and enablers**
 - **Start force sets conditions for decisive operations**
- **Enable a coordinated scheme of USC preparation throughout initial deployment**
- **Deploy Northern Iraq Liaison Element (NILE) teams to:**
 - **Build relationships**
 - **Gain intelligence and assist in targeting**
 - **Facilitate rapid introduction of SOF**

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“Generated Start” Risks

- Provides Iraqi regime more time / opportunity to:
 - Gain indications and warnings (I&W)
 - Force an international shift in focus towards gaining a U.N. resolution
 - Leverage the Arab street to jeopardize our regional access (basing- staging- overflight)
- May prompt an Iraqi reaction to:
 - Conduct terrorist attacks
 - Conduct preemptive strikes (Israel, Kuwait, Kurds)
- Increased time between decision and action increases strategic exposure (Coalition, Congress, Public)

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Sir, We decided to address the risks associated w/each plan as we review the plan so that we could demonstrate how the “Credible military option/ Modified plan” we propose to support “Accelerated Regime Removal” counters and or mitigates the risks of the Gen Start and Run Start plan (as we developed it these last 6 weeks). The risks listed on this slide mirror the points made by DR. Rice when reviewing OPTION 1 in her paper. We viewed OPTION 1 as in line w/the Generated Start Plan. Fleshing out the risk slides and ensuring we get the point across later in the brief that the “Credible” option in fact mitigates these risks, are the key areas we still need to work and are looking for input.



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REVIEW

*Stand-Alone Military Options...
Employ operational fires that could lead to
"Running Start"*

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Military Options – Contingency Responses (Review)

| Response Option(s) 1-5 | Small | | Medium | Large |
|---|---|--|---|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Place Forces Existing Bases & Carrier Battle Group Response is condition-based 1 day duration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Place Forces Existing Bases, Carrier Battle Group Response within 4 hours 1-2 day duration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forces from the continental US (CONUS) Air Wing or a second Carrier Battle Group Additional beddown Response within 96 hours 5-7 day duration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CONUS Forces plus an Air Expeditionary Force and a third Carrier battle group Increased beddown Response within 11 days 14 day duration +... |
| Effects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Destroy active threat systems Targets linked to trigger Hostile Act Hostile Intent | Effects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degrade enablers Degrade selected capabilities Initial targets linked to trigger | Effects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defeat enablers Destroy/ degrade selected capabilities Begin to shape battlefield | Effects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defeat enablers Destroy/degrade multiple capabilities Country-wide effect, all target sets Continue to shape the battlefield | |
| ~ 100 Aim Points ~ 80 Aircraft Sorties | ~ 300 Aim Points ~ 90 Aircraft Sorties | ~ 1800 Aim Points ~ 1000 Aircraft Sorties | ~ 4300 Aim Points ~ 2400 Aircraft Sorties | |
| - Southern and Northern Watch - One Carrier Battle Group | - Southern and Northern Watch - One Carrier Battle Group - Tactical Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Shooters | Adds: Global Power / Intel Surveillance and Recon Aircraft / additional Air Wing or Carrier Battle Group / TLAM shooters in Mediterranean | Adds: Global Power / Intel Surveillance and Recon Aircraft / an additional 1-2 Carrier Battle Group(s) / an Air Expeditionary Force | |

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REVIEW

*“Running Start” Plan...
We enter the warfight sequentially...
Air Power first (Blue, White, Red) followed by
Ground Forces*

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"Running Start" Plan


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- Executes military option(s) (Blue, White, Red) initially while simultaneously flowing forces
- Introduces lines of operation sequentially
- Maximizes effectiveness of operational fires with early introduction of SOF forces -- operational fires throughout deployment
- Scales clandestine preparation to time available...
 - Deploy liaison teams (NILE) to build relationships
 - Conduct "in-country" training and arming of opposition groups, as soon as possible after A-day
- Focuses information operation actions, themes and messages
- Tailors Phase II objectives based on effects of operational fires
 - Initiate ground operations (conventional and SOF) against intermediate objectives
 - Anticipate ground pause to generate more sustainment and combat power
- Flows follow-on forces to achieve Phase III and IV objectives

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Sir, We are awaiting results of COMCFLCCs wargame to get from them the details of the size force that can be launched on what day. We should have that by Friday afternoon.

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


“Running Start” Risks

- Reduces time available for the diplomatic process to secure basing-staging- overflight jeopardizing deployment timelines
- Increases risk if plan is executed in the near term
 - Completing preparatory tasks reduces risk and enables more rapid execution
- Extends overall operational timeline due to sequential introduction of lines of operation
 - Allows Iraq time to react
 - Threatens the loss of operational momentum and flexibility to exploit success
- Provides Iraqi regime greater opportunity to inflict mass casualties
- Increases strategic exposure the earlier air strikes are initiated

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Sir, Our cut on the key risks of the running start CONPLAN as we developed the CONPLAN under the assumption we are responding to an Iraqi action/trigger.



Sir, Slide 24 is a synopsis of the strategy from DR. Rices paper and the OSD paper.

Slides 25-30 are our thoughts on implementing the strategy outlined in the papers.



Hybrid Option

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
When ordered by the President, USCENTCOM conducts military operations to overthrow the Iraqi regime...

- **Execute a modification of the "Running Start"...**
 - Accelerate ambiguous actions to generate capability
 - Initiate strikes in accordance with "Red" military option
 - Sequentially introduce lines of operations...Commence ground operations after initial air strikes
- **Use available time to...**
 - Finalize agreements for basing- staging- overflight
 - Posture the force and improve capabilities through ambiguous movement and preparation
 - Increase pressure on Iraqi regime through diplomatic engagement, military action, and information operations
- **Continue to refine options to increase initial force strength...**
 - Increase size and scope of Operations Northern and Southern Watch
 - Increase capability in the AOR under guise of exercise participation
 - Confirm participation / integration of coalition partner forces

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
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


Does not reflect CFLCC CDRs force size recommendation

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


Sir, Need to work w/CFLCC to ensure we capture the ground tasks for the initial force.




Sir, Need to work w/CFLCC to ensure we capture the ground tasks for the initial force.

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We will coordinate with the SOF (473) / 50 USC to have the Sunni OG's close the western LOC on or about D-1

On D-Day, SOF (473) / 50 USC with the Kurds will execute direct action missions against high payoff targets and conduct ambushes in key passes along the green line

The Shia will initiate widespread robust harassment and interdiction of key SSO and Baath party leaders

We will conduct near simultaneous air and ground operations against the regime. Air and TLAM strikes will attack key leaders, IADS, SSO and SRG forces (High collateral damage possible)

Ground assaults will:

Seize Umm Qasr

Seize Bridges over the Euphrates river north of Basrah

Isolate Basrah

Seize bridges over the Euphrates in the vicinity of Al Nasiriah

IO will continue to play a key role as we use Kinetics to destroy front line Arty forces to protect our forces from WMD and convince the remaining front line forces that resistance is futile

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Next steps...



| | |
|---|---------|
|  | Sec Def |
|  | DOS |
|  | DOD |
|  | NSC |

-  • Secure basing, staging, access (Begin now)
-  • Execute Information Operations (Begin now)
-  • Identify post-Iraq regime government (Ongoing)
-  • Identify mobilization requirements-- CRAF I, Stop loss, Reserve call-up (Begin now)
-  • Approve select high collateral damage targets (Sep brief)
-  • Build coalition (Ongoing)
-  • Refine targeting and ground scheme of maneuver (Aug-Sep)
-  • Develop:
 - Branches for employment from Turkey and Jordan (Sep)
 - Supporting strategic plan (Aug)
-  • Refine deployment data to reflect evolving planning (Continuous)
-  • Continue enabling actions and preparatory tasks (Aug - Dec)
-  • Work with Congress (Begin now)
-  • Craft diplomatic strategies... UN, Regional organizations, Israel (Begin now)

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Next Steps... Resource Considerations

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Fiscal 2002:

- \$ 1 Billion (\pm 25%)
 - Available within current DoD topline
 - May require some reprogramming
 - Would involve Congressional cooperation and awareness in August – October period

Fiscal 2003:

- \$ XX Billion Supplemental
 - Early in Calendar 2003
 - We will want to request managerial flexibility from the Congress
 - This will be in addition to \$10 billion "war reserve" in current 2003 budget proposal
 - "War Reserve" will be needed to sustain current operations through early 2003

Fiscal 2004:

- \$ XX Billion in additional topline in 2004 Defense Budget
 - Treat as "war reserve" as in 2003?
 - Requires flexibility from Congress in use of funds

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Next Steps... Resource Considerations

- **Timing**
 - FY03 Supplemental request should be submitted at about same time as FY04 budget submission
- **“Tin Cup” activities**
 - Has yielded \$1 billion for OEF thus far
 - Will need to be much larger effort
- **How to handle funds from Oil sales?**
 - Iraqi Humanitarian requirements
 - Reimburse for regional needs (Turkey, Jordan)
 - Repayment schedule for supportive Iraqi

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Sir, We also thought it best to address those things that could go wrong or impact our execution now inconjunction w/risk as well as the implications of losing Turkey to again demonstrate how our “Credible” option mitigates or addresses these as well. Additionally when we had them at the end of the brief you wind up ending the brief on a down note vice ending on a positive note, “....understand the issues but we can mitigate them and still accomplish the mission”



Backups


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| | |
|---------------------------------|-----------|
| • Iraq - current situation | # 26-28 |
| • Component rotations | # 29-34 |
| • Strategic risks | # 35-39 |
| • Support Requirements | # 40-56 |
| • Preparatory Tasks | # 57-64 |
| • Targeting | # 65-89 |
| • Master Air Attack Plan – Blue | # 90-102 |
| • Airfields and Oilfields | # 103-105 |
| • Command and Control | # 106-110 |

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Iraq -- Current Situation

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- **Military (Regular Army and Republican Guard)**
 - US/UK campaign in AFG has shaken self-confidence
 - Expect increased use of precision weapons; SOF w/tribal forces; ground attack from south and north; regional support for US/UK effort
 - Regime seriously concerned about poor morale & desertions
 - Expect early loss of comms & centralized control
 - 4 x Regional Commands established to control fight after comms disruption
- **Internal Security Forces**
 - Morale also adversely affected
 - Additional security forces sent to Governorates
 - Qusay charged w/Baghdad Security Plan
 - Expect disruption -- alternate control sites in residential areas
 - Republican Guard locally dispersed around Baghdad / Al Kut; limited defensive preparations noted
 - Will fight until they are convinced Saddam no longer rules
- **Political**
 - Saddam will accept UN inspector return when attack imminent

* Coordinated with (b)(6) USC § 3507, (b)(3) 10 USC § 424

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
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Casus Belli ? (Review)



| POTENTIAL IRAQI ACTIONS | NO | MAYBE | YES |
|---|----|---|-----|
| - Predator shutdown | ✓ |  | |
| - Violate no fly zones | ✓ | | |
| - Military enhancements (North/South Iraq) | ✓ | | |
| - Violation of Kuwaiti or Saudi Arabian airspace | ✓ | | |
| - Limited violence against individual Kurds / Shia | | ✓ | |
| - Interfere with / deny inspections | | ✓ | |
| - Provocative military posturing | | ✓ | |
| - Manned aircraft shutdown | | ✓ | |
| - Major No Drive Zone violation | | ✓ | |
| - Intel indicating possible Iraqi link to terrorist act | | ✓ | |
| - Confirmed weapons of mass destruction within Iraq | | | ✓ |
| - Large scale attack against Kurds / Shia | | | ✓ |
| - Employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) | | | ✓ |
| - Intel confirming Iraqi link to terrorist act | | | ✓ |
| - Major threat or attack on friendly regional neighbor(s) | | | ✓ |


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
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The branch plan uses a trigger at an unpredictable time to initiate execution of the plan. This slide shows how long it would take to get CVBGs into the area of operations over the next year. The Navy can always get 5 CVBGs to the fight by G-day (45 days after trigger). However, some times are better than others. One of those times is the December 2002 time frame. Four CVBGs will be underway at that time.

The example of optimal period in December is 12/21.

KHK always assumed to be no more than 20 days away.




Similarly for the ARG/MEUs, one ARG/MEU can always be in the Persian Gulf within 10 days, and usually within 5. However, it can take significantly longer to get a second ARG/MEU into the Gulf at certain times of the year. During the month of December, the optimal time for CVBGs, the time required to get the second ARG/MEU increase as BELLEAU WOOD / 11 MEU departs the AOR. In the base plan the BELLEAU WOOD / 11 MEU deployment is extended to provide the 2nd ARG/MEU on station.

There is an intersection of optimal periods for CVBG and ARG/MEU in latter November. There is a relatively long optimal period for amphibious forces in the Spring which coincides with the CVBG optimal period.

This slide assumes ESSEX / 31 MEU are not available.


IM02 = Exercise Infinite Moonlight

EM02 = Exercise Eager Mace




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Slide highlights SOF force flow (running and generated start)

- **JSOTF-S is in place late in both scenarios (esp running start)**
- **We are working prepo and TPFDD to mitigate this**
- Slide shows SOF as pre-D-Day force and need to have adequate ISR/CAS in place when SOF is employed
 - Generated Start
 - D-30 North/West
 - D-20 South
 - Running Start
 - D+2 North
 - D+7 West
 - D+28 South
- **“Initial” depicts first operational capability (not across full mission spectrum)**
- **“Full” depicts full force closure**



Recovery and transition overlap by functional areas

1.4c CI grows

Need significant force protection assets for military/civilian ops

CJTF must be established for CCHQ to redeploy (450 pax)

Force for recovery is low (at least 50K) ground/ISR and air forces

New slide:

Overlap governorates with key infrastructure/economic nodes

Identify force requirements for security

Align forces and Ios with governorates

Align mil with UN/coalition civilian regions

Ethnic considerations

Economic considerations ports/oil

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Examining things that could go wrong...
Strategic Risks

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Sources of Strategic Risk

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- Loss of, or restrictions on, our ability to base, stage or overfly
- Iraqi actions:
 - Attacks against Israel - WMD or conventional
 - Attacks on neighboring states (Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan) suspected of supporting US forces
 - Attacks by Iraqi-sponsored terrorists (against US or allies / coalition partners)
 - Attacks on Iraqi opposition groups intensify -- before force in place to protect
 - “Circle the wagons” vicinity Baghdad
 - Cut oil to Jordan / Turkey
- Early success -- Regime falls, but...
 - Post-regime government not established
 - Iraqi people fail to accept new government
 - Forces not in place to support new government
- Israel attacks / strikes Iraq preemptively
- Media interference / negative influence

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Addressing Strategic Risks

| Risk event | Mitigated by... | Road ahead |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| Attack on Israel | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SOF in west to deny launch area EUCOM LNO team to Israel | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seize H3 as a forward operating base/deploy forces in the West Incorporate UK/AUS Forces in plan operating from Turkey and Jordan |
| Attack on Kuwait | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OPLAN 1003-like defense; followed with decisive counter-attack Chemical units early in force flow to operate at APOD/SPOD | Deploy Patriots as preparatory action |
| Attack on Kurds | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ONW(+) aircraft in Turkey SOF/CIA with Kurds | Deploy ground forces through Turkey, Incorporate UK/ AUS Forces |
| Attack on Jordan | Deploy SOF and Patriots to Jordan | H3/Forces in West |
| Terrorist attack in US/Outside AOR | Maintaining GWOT pressure (Afghanistan with JTF-180, JTF-HOA) | Increase force protection posture |
| Attack on Shia | Provide lethal/ non-lethal aid to Shia | Refine UW operations plan |
| "Circle the Wagons" | Inside-out approach to targeting | Refine plan for Baghdad |
| Cutting Oil to neighbors | Securing oilfields as soon as possible to shorten time oil is cut-off | DOS supporting plan for alternative oil sources for Jordan and Turkey |
| Early success | Reapportion forces required for post-hostilities | Develop military role for establishment of post-regime government |
| Israel attacks Iraq | Plan for TBM suppression / defense | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance Jordanian capabilities --Identify Jordanian requirements Incorporate Israeli targets |
| Loss/ restrictions on basing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DOS lead in securing support Theater preparation tasks provide flexibility | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secure additional APOD in Iraq Continue TPFDD refinement |

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Unilateral Coalition Support Assumptions

Next slide

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Pages 39 through 40 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4b, 1.4b

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Pages 42 through 57 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4a, 1.4b

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Preparatory Tasks

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Prep Tasks Throughout the Region


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- Identified 32 preparatory tasks; 22 requiring host-nation approval
- Theater distribution of the tasks:
 - Kuwait - 9 tasks
 - Bahrain - 2 tasks
 - Qatar - 6 tasks
 - Oman - 4 tasks
 - KSA - 2 tasks
- Need to gain approval now

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Pages 61 through 65 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4a, 1.4b

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Targeting

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Focus of Effort

This pictorially displays how we plan on targeting Saddam and his regime

While 1 and 2 are the most desirable targets they are also the most elusive

Our plan is to attack the WMD wherever we have the opportunity to

Attacking the blue colored targets serves the main purpose

of leveraging groups 8, 9 10 in order to facilitate regime change
quicker

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Synergistic Application of Multiple Lines Of Operations (DOD and 50 USC)

Create multiple events / crises designed to trigger regime change by over

DOD and 50 USC synchronized actions

Create and maintain pressure on Saddam and his supporters

Synergy and speed are greatest threats to regime

Combination is key NOT individual events / targets

Saddam is regime's center of gravity

Sample synergistic events


Sabotage

Disarray in inner circle

Increased external support for opposition

Loss of income from oil exports

Loss of sovereignty in western and southern Iraq



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Targeting Imperatives First 72 Hours


~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS and GDR~~

- Degrade Regime C3
 - Destroy Critical Regime C2 Nodes/Facilities
 - Destroy Comms/Media IVO Baghdad
 - Degrade Regime Security Apparatus
- Fix RGFC Forces (Prevent collapse on Baghdad)
 - Attrit Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) fleet
- Degrade WMD Delivery Capability
- Achieve Air Supremacy
 - Destroy the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
 - Neutralize Iraqi Air Power
- Eliminate the Iraqi Naval Threat
 - Destroy CSSC-3 Delivery Platforms and Missile Storage
 - Destroy Naval Mine Storage and Delivery
- Neutralize Regular Army (RA) in the South
 - Destroy C2 (Division & Higher)
 - Attrit WMD-capable systems (Rocket launchers, ≥ 152 mm tube artillery) and Engineers

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Phasing Target Slices and Subsets



Target Slices

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|-----|----------|--------------|----------------|----------|
| Regime Leadership | Regime Security/BDP | WMD | RGFC/SRG | Regular Army | Infrastructure | Enablers |
|-------------------|---------------------|-----|----------|--------------|----------------|----------|

Initial Strikes/Restrike as Required

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|-----------|----------------|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Locations | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security Forces/BDP | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Delivery | SRG | Southern | Electric Power | IADS |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Palaces | <input type="checkbox"/> Logistics | Production | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RGFC | Northern | LOC's | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Act/Aid/Helo |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Comms | | R&D | Logistics | Logistics | Hydrology | Naval Tgts |
| | | | | | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HETs |

Follow On Strikes - ATO Planned

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|---------------------|--|-----------|-----------|---|--------------|
| Locations | Security Forces/BDP | Delivery | SRG | Southern | Electric Power | IADS |
| Palaces | Logistics | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Production | RGFC | Northern | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LOC's | Act/Aid/Helo |
| Comms | | R&D | Logistics | Logistics | Hydrology | Naval Tgts |
| | | | | | | HETs |

On order/Situation Dependent Strikes

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|---------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|----------------|--------------|
| Locations | Security Forces/BDP | Delivery | SRG | Southern | Electric Power | IADS |
| Palaces | Logistics | Production | RGFC | Northern | LOC's | Act/Aid/Helo |
| Comms | | R&D | Logistics | Logistics | Hydrology | Naval Tgts |
| | | | | | | HETs |

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RGFC HET Target: Baghdad RGFC Barracks

Target Significance:

One of three major Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) facilities in Iraq: 100+ HET's

Critical Elements:

HET prime mover and trailers maintenance facilities

CDE:


Low

Weaponizing:

Requires heavy weapons for destruction (over 700) or possibly aerial mines to fix HET's in place

Collateral Concerns:

Hospital and prison located on the facility



CINC'S COMMENTS:

Provides strategic lift for Iraqi military

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RGFC Target: RGFC Headquarters at Abu Ghurayb


Target Significance:
Main headquarters for
the RGFC

Critical Elements:
Headquarters building

CDE:
Low

Weaponing:
2000lb class weapons or
less

Collateral Concerns:
None



CINC'S COMMENTS:
Houses the RGFC Commander and Staff

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WMD Target: Latifiya Liquid Propellant Plant



Target Significance:
Iraq's primary Nitric Acid Production Plant supporting TBM engine production

Critical Elements:
Nitric & Sulfuric Acid Production buildings

Collateral Damage:
High (possible release of chemical plume)

Weaponneering:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and attack parameters.

Collateral Concerns:
Nitric & Sulfuric Acid Plumes

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CINC'S COMMENTS:
Produces a critical chemical component required in liquid rocket engine fuel

75

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


Chart one is intended to be an introductory chart that provides the name of the program/enabling center, the program manager, and the date.

Any reference to "program" included throughout these notes is intended to refer to programs and enabling centers.

The Requirement and Customers are lines intended to focus on the reason for the program and the customer for whom the program is being accomplished. The last two lines are not intended to provide a detailed justification of the program, but rather should focus on why the program is being accomplished and for whom. One or two sentences should be sufficient to provide the basis.

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WMD Target: Baghdad Barracks TBM Unit - Abu Ghurayb



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Target Significance:
Home to Iraq's First
Operational Al Samoud
SRBM Unit

Critical Elements:
Dispersed TELs and
Vehicle Sheds

CDE:
Low

Weaponering:
2000 lb weapon or less

Collateral Concerns:
None

CINC'S COMMENTS:
Primary base for the Al Samoud Short Range
Ballistic Missile capable of chemical weapons
delivery.

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Page 81 redacted for the following reason:

1.4c

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 **Enabling Target: LP-23 Long Range Radar**

Target Significance:
Located at Saddam Int'l
airport, Baghdad.
Provides radar coverage
of Southern No-fly Zone

Critical Elements:
Radar antenna

CDE:
High - Dual use (at airport)

Weaponizing:
Mitigate effects through
weapons selection and
time of attack

Collateral Concerns:
None

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CINC'S COMMENTS:
One of 13 long-range radars in Iraqi inventory

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Regime Leadership Target: The Presidential Diwan

Target Significance:
Prestigious meeting place for regime leadership. Also associated with Presidential Secretariat and personal staff.

Critical Elements:
Meeting hall and residence

Collateral Damage: High

Weaponizing:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and attack parameters.

Collateral Concerns:
Residential and public structure within 130 feet.



CINC'S COMMENTS:

Symbolizes Saddam's power and legitimacy

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 **Regime Leadership Target: Baath Party Headquarters**

Underground Facility

Target Significance:
Main party headquarters for the Baath Party in Iraq.

Critical Elements:
Multi-story headquarters building, central bunker, communications and security entrance buildings

Collateral Damage: High

Weaponneering:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and attack parameters.

Collateral Concerns:
Residential and public structures within 200 ft

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CINC'S COMMENTS:
Saddam's political party and power base

82

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


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 **Regime Security Target: Baghdad Protection Unit**

Target Significance:
Presidential bodyguard protection facility for off-duty personnel

Critical Elements:
Headquarters, barracks, vehicle parking and support buildings

Collateral Damage:
High

Weaponneering:
Mitigate effects through weapons selection and attack parameters.

Collateral Concerns:
Civilian and business structures within 100 ft

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CINC'S COMMENTS:
Saddam's Presidential bodyguards

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 **Regime Comms: Baghdad Main Exchange - Sinek**

Target Significance:
Primary TELCOM switching center for all domestic and international communications

Critical Elements:
Multi-story exchange and switching vault located beneath main building

Collateral Damage:
High

Weaponeering:
Requires multiple 2000lb class penetrator or larger

Collateral Concerns:
Civilian business structures within 100 ft

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CINC'S COMMENTS:
Single most important comms facility in Iraq.

85

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Baghdad Highway Bridge over the Tigris - 14th Tamuz



Target Significance:
Tigris River Highway bridge connecting central Baghdad with the eastern Shi'a District

Critical Elements:
Center span of bridge

Collateral Damage:
High - Dual Use

Weaponizing:
2000 lb class weapon or less

Collateral Concerns:
Dual use civilian-military infrastructure target

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CINC'S COMMENTS:
Cross river entrance to the Shi'a area; required for implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan

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Planned Target -- Recap



**Initial
Estimate**

| <u>Target Set</u> | <u>Initial Strikes</u> | | <u>Follow On Strikes</u> | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| | <u>Targets</u> | <u>Aimpoints</u> | <u>Targets</u> | <u>Aimpoints</u> |
| Regime Leadership/Palaces | 25 | 633 | 36 | 555 |
| Regime Communications & Media | 19 | 106 | 47 | 482 |
| Regime Security & SRG | 27 | 804 | 42 | 192 |
| WMD | 26 | 276 | 49 | 2814 |
| RGFC | 10 | 174 | 28 | 1223 |
| HETs | 3 | 72 | 3 | 751 |
| Aflds, Acft, Helos | 13 | 86 | 12 | 2034 |
| IADS | 32 | 128 | 10 | 388 |
| Naval | 4 | 46 | 4 | 187 |
| Regular Army | 11 | 80 | 38 | 2728 |
| TOTAL | 160 | 2405 | 269 | 11161 |

Total: 429 Targets 13,566 Aimpoints

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
Master Air Attack Plan (Blue)

- First 24 hours
- 124 Strike sorties
- 342 Aimpoints
- 88 TLAMs


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


Airfields and Oilfields

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
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Thinking about Iraqi Oilfields...



Saddam's potential actions...

- Employ "scorched earth" policy
- Ignite wells intentionally
- Dump oil into waterways and the North Arabian Gulf
- Cut ground transportation of oil to Jordan / Turkey
- Destroy key oil infrastructure



Kirkuk Oil Fields
(30% of legal exports, 95% of illegal exports)

Rumaila Oil Fields
(70% of legal exports, 5% of illegal exports)

Our options...

- Secure and hold using US / Coalition forces and wait for end of conflict
- If still functioning, use contractors to restore oil flow and escrow funds (DoD, State, 50 USC § 3507)
- If destroyed / damaged... employ SAP capabilities / US contractors to reestablish capability (DoD, State, 50 USC § 3507)

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


Command and Control


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
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
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CJTF-1.4a

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


*Securing Regional Support to Enable
Preparatory Actions*

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 *Lead for Basing, Staging and Overflight Approval* ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS and GDR~~

DOD **DOS**

1.4b

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Basing, Staging and Overflight Approval

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- Enter at a high level -- Initial entry is decision-maker
- Form Inter-agency negotiation team with OSD lead

| Country | Team Composition | When |
|---------|---------------------------------|-----------|
| 1.4b | DEPSECDEF, Ambassador, CINCCENT | September |
| | DEPSECDEF, Ambassador, CINCCENT | September |
| | DEPSECDEF, Ambassador, CINCCENT | September |
| | DEPSECDEF, Ambassador, CINCEUR | August |

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USAF Ambiguous Preparatory Actions

- Expedite and complete ongoing CENTAF staff augmentation
- Complete theater organizational realignment from Group to Wing structure
- Continue support for theater BOS and basing enablers
- Continue/expedite munitions procurement and complete movement/ redistribution of theater munitions
- Improved ISR capabilities
 - Use of UN U-2 missions out of Cyprus
 - Selective move of airborne ISR assets
 - Pre-positioning of MOBSTR into Turkey
 - Acquire additional Predator Launch and Recovery Elements (LRE) and additional CONUS based Ground Control Station (GCS) for multiple ops
- Introduction of fighters into Al Udeid AB, Qatar during Nov/Dec rotation
- Selective retention of assets during AEF rotations

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The branch plan uses a trigger at an unpredictable time to initiate execution of the plan. This slide shows how long it would take to get CVBGs into the area of operations over the next year. The Navy can always get 5 CVBGs to the fight by G-day (45 days after trigger). However, some times are better than others. One of those times is the December 2002 time frame. Four CVBGs will be underway at that time.

KHK always assumed to be no more than 20 days away.



US Army Ambiguous Preparatory Actions

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- CFLCC TOTAL COST = \$398.43M
- Preposition 7 Medium Truck Companies (POL) - \$5.1M
 - Transportation cost = \$4.55M
 - Maintenance cost = \$550K
- Build 2.4M Gal Bag Farm & POL Pipeline - \$27.93M
 - Pipeline to Al Jaber AB = \$8M
 - Pipeline to Ali As Salem AB = \$12M
 - Pipeline from Salem AB to Virginia kabal = \$7.6M
 - Bag Farm at VA kabal = \$330K
- Preposition 30 DOS for 50K - \$132.6M
 - Class I = \$34.4M
 - Class II/III/IV = \$5.8M
 - Chemical Defense Equipment = \$87.3M
 - Class VIII = \$4.6M
 - Class IX (batteries) = \$516K
- Sustain APS-5Q & APS-3 Equipment - \$71.8M
 - APS-5Q OPTEMPO (AUG02-JAN03) = \$33.75M
 - APS-5Q & APS-3 maintenance contract expansion = \$14.05M
 - APS-5Q surge maintenance/CL IX costs = \$24M
- Construct Beddown Sites in Kuwait - \$56.6M
 - Covers site preparation for 51,648 soldiers and Marines expected to pass through JRSOI enroute to forward battle positions.

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US Army Ambiguous Preparatory Actions


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- Information Superiority/Blue Force Tracking - \$34.5
 - Complete PH IIIA Gulf Digitization Project = \$9.2M
 - Complete Intelligence Info Dominance Ctr = \$1.6M
 - Complete 377th TSC C2 Center = \$7.7M
 - Buy High-Gain Satellite Antennas - \$6.03M
 - Purchase Prominas and USC-60 Tri-Band Terminals - \$9.97M
 - These devices allow CFLCC to maximize the capability of existing satellite bandwidth much as a multiplexor allows several FM frequencies to use the same antenna.
- Establish CENTCOM Forward HQ - \$69.9M
 - Infrastructure in Qatar = \$10.9
 - Initial BASEOPS = \$8.8M
 - Communications \$29M
 - Force Protection = \$1.1M
 - Transportation/set-up = \$2.6M
 - JSCE = \$1.4M
 - HQ equipment = \$16.1M


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Sir, We are awaiting results of COMCFLCCs wargame to get from them the details of the size force that can be launched on what day. We should have that by Friday afternoon.



Does not reflect CFLCC CDRs force size recommendation

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