USCENTCOM OPLAN 1003V (S/REL GBR AUS) - CHANGE 1

1. (U) Situation

   a. (U) General

      1. (S/REL GBR AUS) This is a Combined Force Commander (CFC) Operation Plan (OPLAN) for combat operations in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO).

      2. (S/REL GBR AUS) Area of Operations:

         a. (S/REL GBR AUS) Theater of War. The USCENTCOM Theater of War is defined as the entire USCENTCOM AOR. USCENTCOM's AOR includes Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Seychelles, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. It also includes the countries of the central Asian region, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and the Indian Ocean west of 68 degrees east, north of 5 degrees south, and west to the Kenyan/Tanzanian coastal border.

         b. (S/REL GBR AUS) Area of Interest. USCENTCOM's Area of Interest is global, due to the international nature of terrorism and the vast network of Al Qaida and other terrorist organizations. Extensive coordination between combatant commands, the interagency community, allies, coalition nations and forces, and international law enforcement agencies is required.

         c. (S/REL GBR AUS) Theater of Operations. The IRIQI Theater of Operations (ITO) is defined by the total airspace, land area, and boundaries of Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, those portions of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean within the USCENTCOM AOR (less
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Seychelles), the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el Mandeb, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal system. The ITO also includes (in coordination with USSEUCOM) portions of Turkey and (in coordination with USPACOM) Diego Garcia.

b. (S/REL-CGR-AUS) Enemy. Saddam Hussein's totalitarian rule of Iraq constitutes a national security threat to the United States, its allies, and its vital national interests. The Iraqi regime principally threatens U.S. interests in three ways. First, by destabilizing the region with repeated acts of military aggression and coercion, Iraq's military aggression challenges the survival of key U.S. allies and the continued flow of oil from the region. Second, Saddam's regime is complicit in the development, fielding, and repeated use of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction). Since the departure of UN weapons inspectors in 1998, Iraq has rebuilt most missile and WMD-related facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox, undertaken new construction at sites that formerly supported WMD programs, and continued suspicious procurement efforts. Third, Iraq supports terrorist groups. Iraq trains and fields its own force of terrorists, in addition to providing state sponsorship for non-Iraqi terrorist groups. The regime's proclivity for violence, in concert with its support of terrorism and an established pattern of developing and using WMD against civilians, demonstrates a clear, present, and continuing danger to the United States. Detailed information on Iraqi military capabilities and order of battle can be found at the JICCENT homepages, and in Appendix 11 to Annex B of this plan.

(i) (U) Threat Environment.

(a) (S/REL-CGR-AUS) Iraq. Saddam Hussein leads a totalitarian regime that asserts power through an oppressive security bureaucracy. The security apparatus extends from Baghdad to local villages and keeps watch over military leaders/units. The security structure ensures that no internal threats can rise up against the regime, and is vital to regime existence. Saddam's regime maintains a large military force structure, despite economic hardships resulting from international sanctions imposed since 1990. The Iraqi ground forces have 17 regular army divisions and 6 elite Republican Guard divisions. The Iraqi air defense forces field over 50 SAM batteries, an extensive array of AAA, and an integrated...
system of early warning sensors. The Iraqi Air Force has over 300 tactical aircraft. Iraq's military capabilities have deteriorated significantly as a result of 10 years of U.N. sanctions and damage inflicted by coalition and U.S. military operations. However, Iraqi forces, though degraded, remain capable of defeating internal Opposition Groups (OGs) and remain more capable than those of regional Arab states.


(a) (S/OC RSL GBR AUS) Strategy. Since 1991, Iraq's strategy has been to rebuild its strength by bypassing and deliberately violating UNSCRs without going to war. Iraq's strategy implementation has utilized diplomatic, political, economic, and military means in attempts to achieve its objectives: maintaining the regime's power, gaining support against the west, rebuilding WMD and military programs, and the repeal of U.N. sanctions. Iraq's overall desired end-state has been to reestablish pre-Gulf War diplomatic, political, economic, and military conditions, with repeal of U.N. sanctions and dissolution of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH. The
Iraqi regime has deliberately deprived its people of basic needs by siphoning “oil for food program” money into WMD and military projects, and using its hydrologic system, military, and security forces to dominate the population. Diplomatically, Iraq has continued to deny all charges of UNSCR violations, using information operations (IO) at home and abroad to blame the west for the horrendous internal conditions. Iraq’s IO efforts appeal to those who incorrectly believe U.N. sanctions are depriving the Iraqi people a humanitarian level of existence, and to fellow Arabs wary of western domination in the region. The Iraqi regime has managed to find support in bypassing full implementation of U.N. sanctions. Thus, Iraq has obtained some capital and resources to implement WMD and military programs. 

Faced with an impending U.S. attack, the Iraqi regime will not abandon its strategy and objectives. It will use all means available to continue its strategy while avoiding war, particularly since the regime is fully cognizant that its survival depends upon avoiding war with the U.S. or a coalition. Saddam Hussein will first and foremost attempt to use the U.N. as a tool to cause delays and roadblocks that fracture support for, and halt the momentum of, any U.S. or coalition operation. Saddam Hussein views time as a factor that works to his advantage prior to any operation against Iraq. He also views Arab/Muslim public opinion (especially those who oppose western influence in the region) and the instability of several neighboring regimes as force factors that work in his favor over time. Saddam will also try to use Iraq’s territorial sovereignty, with international legal ploys, as a factor to thwart U.S./coalition actions. Saddam will make incredible offers of compliance to avoid a UNSCR authorization for use of force against Iraq. He views a UNSCR authorizing the use of force as the greatest danger to his strategy because international leaders will use the UNSCR to legally justify war against Iraq.

The Iraqi regime, when faced with war, will desire to fight with all available means to protect the regime’s existence. Saddam will not assume defeat is a given. He will implement a defensive strategy that avoids early defeat of his ground forces but also incorporates offensive operations against perceived U.S./coalition weaknesses. His overall theory of victory is that a “tie” (i.e. not losing) would be a win, just as defeat of invading forces would be a win. Since survival of the regime is his aim, he will want to exert maximum effort
and all means to achieve a tie or win. Clearly, the value of the object (i.e. survival) is high to Saddam, his inner circle, and a portion of his 38,000+ man security apparatus. Saddam knows that he cannot defeat a U.S./coalition attack solely at the military unit level. Thus, Saddam will seek to cause high casualties early in order to raise the cost of war to a level that exceeds the coalition or U.S. public’s value of the object. If he cannot end the conflict in the short term through such means, he will attempt a war of long duration, whereby U.S./coalition casualties, combined with lack of battlefield progress, deplete his opponents’ will to fight. To accomplish this end, the regime will attempt to threaten U.S./coalition personnel and interests anywhere possible - both inside and outside Iraq.

(b) (S/VE REL-6BR AUS) Net Assessment from the Iraqi viewpoint. The Iraqi leadership sees its war aims as preserving the regime. The regime will desire to exert a total level of effort - diplomatically, economically, politically, and militarily, in order to win, or as stated above, to "not lose." The regime obviously views its existence as vital, however, this view is not held by the majority of the populace, whom Saddam would gladly offer as human shields against attacking forces. Although he exerts severe control of the population and military through his security and intelligence network, Saddam does not have the loyalty of the people to the extent needed for his strategy - unless the people/military see the defense of Saddam as their only option for survival. Saddam is probably aware that the majority of the populace and Regular Army do not have the will to fight for the regime. So, he will try to convince the populace, the military, and his Arab neighbors that any attack against Iraq is an attack against Islam to destroy Iraq and to control oil. The regime’s control of the media is key to the propaganda that will be disseminated to the Iraqi people. Saddam will attempt to garner some civilian resistance to an attack, while concurrently trying to create a level of fear that results in refugee traffic and Lines of Communication (LOC) blockage. Due to Saddam’s distrust of the military, oversight of the military by security force personnel will continue. Ideally, U.S./coalition casualties and maneuver delays are the quick victories that Saddam would like in order to bolster military confidence. The regime would prefer to win early, but as has been shown since 1991, will commit to a
long-term effort regardless of the negative impact on the 
Iraqi people and military. The regime will play upon 
international public opinion for as long as possible, and 
will likely take means to portray coalition attacks as 
causing severe humanitarian hardships on the Iraqi 
population. To cause high casualty situations, the regime 
will count on asymmetrical means to attack what it views 
are vulnerabilities within U.S./coalition centers of 
gravity. Saddam views the U.S./coalition war aims as 
unlimited since destruction of the regime is the goal. He 
will try to convince the Iraqi people and military that 
this translates to their destruction as well. Saddam sees 
the U.S. level of effort as limited because he does not 
believe full commitment of resources will be expended 
against Iraq due to conflicting resource requirements from 
other U.S. operations. He will try to prevent a coalition 
because he believes the U.S. cannot politically withstand 
a unilateral action, and that other ongoing U.S. 
operations necessitate a coalition effort to attack Iraq. 
Saddam does not view the U.S. or any coalition nation’s 
populace as believing that his removal has a high enough 
value to warrant large numbers of casualties or the 
expediture of vast resources, particularly in the 
economic arena. Saddam believes a U.S. or coalition 
built-up will take a long time, and time will be available 
to the regime to take measures to stop a war, or, to 
inflict casualties in any vulnerable location. Saddam 
most likely believes that the public will of the U.S. and 
most coalition nations cannot withstand a war of long 
duration.

(c) (S/OC REL GSR AUS) Strategic Center of Gravity. 
Iraq’s strategic center of gravity is comprised of the 
regime, Baghdad, and the Security Forces/Intelligence 
Service (IFS) structure. The regime and security 
forces/IFS control Iraq – the infrastructure, the 
military, and the populace. The city of Baghdad is the 
symbol of power and the nerve center of the country. The 
entry of an attacking division into Baghdad will be a 
strategic decisive point. Strategic regime strengths are 
control of oil, control of the population through the 
security forces, control of the media, control of the 
government infrastructure, WMD capability, and the 
centralized command and control structure. The denial of 
western Iraq’s "Scud baskets," which equates to the defeat 
of Saddam’s northern and western WMD capability, will be a 
strategic decisive point. Iraq’s strategic weaknesses are
will/war weariness of the people, lack of support for the regime, isolation (political/diplomatic, military, economic, and technological), Kurdish control in the North, and lack of loyalty within the Regular Army (RA) and potentially within the RGFC. If the military does not view itself as placed on death ground between Saddam and coalition forces, its lack of loyalty and readiness to fight for the regime are critical vulnerabilities. Saddam is not confident in the military’s loyalty, and he will most likely charge use of WMD and other war crimes acts to trusted agents within his security forces.

(d) (S/CC REL GNR AUS) Iraq’s View of the U.S. Strategic Center of Gravity. Saddam views the U.S. strategic center of gravity as consisting of the U.S. public will; the President and the Secretary of Defense; a coalition, force projection; and U.S. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). He sees critical strategic strengths as the U.S. economy, overall military capability, long-range strike capability, and regional support. Saddam views strategic weaknesses or vulnerabilities as U.S. public opinion (influenced by casualty aversion and the expectation of a short war), international public opinion, Arab fear of Western hegemony, Arab resentment of Israel, and lack of U.N. consensus regarding the legitimacy of an attack against a sovereign Iraq. He most likely sees the U.S. public desire for any war to be short, with low casualties, as a critical vulnerability. Saddam also views Arab dissent as a critical vulnerability that can be exploited through a combination of attacks that bring Israel into the equation.

(e) (S/CC REL GNR AUS) Operational Center of Gravity. Iraq’s operational center of gravity consists of the Special Security Organization (SSO)/Special Republican Guards (SSRG); Republican Guard Force Command (RGFC) in vicinity of Baghdad; and SSMs (operational fires). Iraq’s critical strengths include the extended security and intelligence structure, RG forces’ maneuverability in proximity of Baghdad, CBW capability in support of Republican Guard defenses and the overall Baghdad defense; hydrology infrastructure and integration with defenses; and oil as a weapon. Iraq’s critical operational weaknesses include the lack of readiness of the Air Force and Regular Army Ground Forces; Air Defense; lack of RGFC unit loyalty to the regime; communications links to
Baghdad once main nodes in Baghdad are incapacitated; Shia and Kurdish opposition; and tribal fractures. The lack of loyalty within the RGFC can be exploited as a critical vulnerability. Two intertwined operational decisive points that lead to coalition ground forces’ entry into Baghdad are: the first capitulation or defeat of a Republican Guard Division in the vicinity of Baghdad, and the collapse of the RGFC in vicinity of Baghdad.

(f) (S/REL-GBT-AUS) Iraq’s View of the U.S./Coalition Operational Center of Gravity. The Iraqi regime most likely views the U.S./Coalition operational center of gravity as consisting of precision strike capabilities, Special Operations Forces, ISR, fielded forces, and the Coalition Forces Command. Saddam will view operational level strengths as force maneuverability, force sustainability, joint operational fires, and support to coalition forces from the Kurds and Shias. He most likely sees U.S./Coalition critical operational weaknesses as counter-THM (Theater Ballistic Missile) capability, rear area security, OPSEC, time required to deploy forces and achieve operational capability, and host Arab nations’ lack of popular support to western force presence. If external terrorist support is available, Iraq will try to take clandestine actions that make rear area security a critical vulnerability.

(g) (S/REL-GBT-AUS) Tactical Center of Gravity. The Iraqi tactical center of gravity consists of the Regular Army Divisions in the South, and the Euphrates River crossing sites. The key Iraqi tactical strengths include the potential integration of hydrology with defenses, artillery, and defense integrated with terrain. The critical weaknesses are the lack of offensive capability, unit readiness and morale, and lack of loyalty to the regime among units. Lack of loyalty to the regime and the lack of will to fight unless survival is in question, can be exploited as critical vulnerabilities. The establishment of a lodgment on the Euphrates River, with a brigade-sized force successfully across the Euphrates River, will be a tactically decisive point.

(3) (U) Enemy Courses of Action.

(a) (S/REL-GBT-AUS) Most Likely. Saddam will defend in depth in southern Iraq with 6 RA (Regular Army) divisions positioned along major LOC’s. SA-2 and SA-3 batteries will...
deploy to both the northern and southern no-fly zones to support the defense. RGFC forces will defend Baghdad from positions outside the city near their garrisons and along the main approaches. In northern Iraq, RA and RGFC forces will defend along the green line. Harassing attacks against the Kurds are possible if Iraq perceives a large threat due to SDF operations in the area. There will most likely be no early, overt use of WMD since Saddam will not want to lose potential international public opinion by demonstrating that he is in violation of UNSCRs as charged. However, the probability of WMD use will increase as U.S./coalition forces move across the Euphrates and northward. Execution of hydrology infrastructure controlled flooding to channel and limit maneuver, combined with artillery-fired chemical munitions, is one likely means Iraq can use to inflict casualties and slow the attack. This is particularly likely as forces cross the Euphrates or attempt to approach Baghdad. As forces cross the Euphrates and threaten Baghdad, anti-tank weapons and artillery fire (with possibly chemical munitions) would likely be used against combat forces while SSMS and individuals would attack key soft targets, such as logistics, to inflict casualties and raise the cost and duration of war. The regime will plan to employ WMD as a final survival effort before U.S./coalition forces reach Baghdad. The Iraqi Air Force will remain grounded for the most part, although low-level numbers of aircraft attacks against high value coalition targets may be attempted. Iraq will most likely plan to attack Israel in an attempt to fracture any coalition.

(b) (S/REL-GBR-AUS) Most Dangerous. Saddam could attack into Kuwait with heavy divisions in the south, supported by an RGFC mechanised and an RGFC armored division. The ideal time for such an action is during force flow. In addition, SSMS forces might deploy to southern Iraq and conduct a preemptive WMD strike to disrupt and delay deployment and attack operations. Iraq may also launch offensive operations into Kurdish-controlled areas, focusing on seizure of key Kurdish population centers and LOC’s.

(c) (S/REL-GBR-AUS) Use of WMD. Saddam will avoid using WMD until he believes his regime’s survival is threatened. Key decision points for Saddam in his determination of whether to use WMD would include: U.S. forces entering Iraq; U.S. forces penetrating north of the Euphrates; U.S.
forces engaging RGFC divisions with ground forces; or significant progress by Goths.

(4) (U) Current Iraqi Military Capabilities Assessment.

(a) (S/NFIR REL GBR AUS) Air Force. The Iraqi Air Force (IZAF) has over 300 tactical aircraft and an infrastructure of operating bases throughout its country. The most capable air-to-air fighters in the Iraqi Air Force are the MiG-25/Foxbat E, MiG-23/Flogger G, Mirage F1, and MiG-29/Fulcrum. Large numbers of older MiG-21/Fishbed aircraft are still operational. The ability of the Iraqi Air Force to protect national airspace and to conduct effective offensive operations is minimal. The combat proficiency of most pilots is low and continues to decline.

(b) (S/NFIR REL GBR AUS) Air Defense Forces. Iraqi surface-to-air weapons include conventional surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), modified unguided SAMs, unguided rockets, other unidentified experimental weapons, and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). SAMs include the SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, SA-9, SA-13, ROLAND, and ASPIDE. Iraq’s primary strategic SAMs are the SA-2/Guideline and the SA-3/GOA. Manportable air defense systems (MANPADS) in the Iraqi inventory are the SA-7B, SA-14, and SA-16. The current Iraqi AAA inventory contains about 6,000 pieces of 14.5 mm up to 100 mm systems. However, the majority of Iraqi AAA is 40 mm and smaller. The Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) is a credible threat against a limited number of conventional targets, but a minimal threat against a large coordinated assault. Due to a lack of coordination and realistic training, a large-scale attack would overwhelm the Iraqi defenses and degrade the effective operation of the IADS. The Iraqi IADS is susceptible to Electronic Attack (EA), and typically can only track targets effectively in a non-electronic combat environment.

(c) (S/NFIR REL GBR AUS) Naval Forces. Iraq’s navy and coastal defense forces maintain a marginal capability to mount a defense against attacks. Naval forces have only a single ship capable of launching guided missiles. The most significant open water and coastal defense assets in the Iraqi inventory posing a threat to forces operating in the northern Persian Gulf are the CSSC-3 Seersucker Anti-ship Coastal Missiles (ASCM) and mines. Due to poor crew
proficiency and lack of maintenance, the Seersucker threat to forces is minimal, although it cannot be discounted. Iraq has a limited mining capability, but still has the mine inventory and ships necessary to conduct offensive mining in the northern Persian Gulf and to lay defensive minefields off its coast.

(d) [SEC REL GBR AUS] Ground Forces. Iraq’s ground forces consist of 23 divisions, including 17 Regular Army (RA) and 6 Republican Guard (RG) divisions. Their extensive program of training, exercises, and battlefield experience, contribute to the overall capability. A professional and competent officer corps leads Iraq’s largely conscripted ground forces. Saddam seeks to preserve the ground forces’ capabilities so they can protect the regime and maintain internal security. Despite this shielding, ground forces have suffered degradation in a number of areas: flagging troop readiness and morale, strained combat material availability, inadequate unit logistics and support, and weakened transportation networks and sustainment infrastructure.

(e) [SEC REL GBR AUS] Weapons of Mass Destruction. Iraq retains residual chemical and biological Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that can inflict severe damage on unprepared military forces and disrupt host-nation logistic functions and facilities that would be used to support the deployment of coalition forces. WMD delivery systems include long-range artillery, manned aircraft, the L-29 UAV and ballistic missiles. Iraq’s ballistic missile inventory consists of a small, covert force of scud-variant ballistic missiles (650km-range Al Husayn scud variant and possibly a few 900km-range Al Abbas missiles), two developmental Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) systems that have been successfully flight-tested (the 40km to 180km-range Al Samoud and the 135km to 210km-range Ababil-100), and a deployed force of short-range battlefield rockets (ASTROS-II and PROG-7) to strike targets near its borders.

(f) [SEC REL GBR AUS] Landmines. Iraq uses minefields as the primary means to channel and concentrate enemy forces into kill zones. Doctrinally, the Iraqis will employ mines on the most probable direction of enemy attack to the entire depth of the defense, covering the defending force’s flanks and gaps between friendly units. Minefields are used, instead of ambushes, in security and operational
zones. Minefield densities and placements are dictated by:
the amount of time available, the type of enemy force, and
the availability of mines and minelaying equipment.
Iraqi doctrine regarding minefield densities, mine
placement pattern, and countermine operations is adopted
from the doctrine of the former Soviet Union. In all
defenses, minefields are covered by machineguns and
supplemented by wire entanglements, tank traps, and
artillery fire. Iraqi forces may employ antitank,
antipersonnel, or a combination of antitank and
antipersonnel minefields, i.e., a mixed minefield. There
are five basic types of minefields employed by Iraqi
troops: protective, defensive, barrier (also referred to
as screening/restrictive/obstructive), disruptive, and
false.

1. (S//REL GBR AUS) Iraq may employ chemical
mines/minefields in front of its defensive lines as a
surprise attack against an enemy attack. These mines reportedly
could be detonated by friendly artillery fire or enemy
armored movement through the minefield. According to
reports, Iraqi special engineers would create the
chemical minefield under the cover of darkness. By
planting the chemical minefield at night, whether the
enemy nor Iraqi soldiers in their defensive positions
would be aware that the minefield had been emplaced.

2. (S//REL GBR AUS) A typical Iraqi antitank minefield
will have a length of 1000 meters and will include
approximately 1100 antitank mines. With this density Iraq
estimates that 70% of enemy tanks and 30% of enemy
armored personnel carriers and other vehicles passing
through the minefield will be disabled. Iraqi antitank
minefields are normally laid in a 1:3 ratio with
antipersonnel mines. According to Iraqi doctrine,
antipersonnel mines are planted with a density of
approximately 24 blast mines or 6 fragmentation mines for
every meter along the front.

3. (S//REL GBR AUS) It is common practice to use natural
obstacles as boundaries for minefields. Antipersonnel
mines are normally laid in two rows, in front of the
antitank minefield, in the direction of the enemy.

(5) (S//SCI GBR AUS) Iraqi Opposition Groups (OGs).

(a) (S//REL GBR AUS) Several of the viable OGs that exist
inside Iraq can be broadly described, by their sectarian
orientation, as Kurdish or Shia. However, the Iraqi opposition is generally skeptical of U.S. commitment to regime change. Their support of U.S. actions will be directly proportional to their perception of U.S. commitment. Three key actions which will motivate the opposition are: destruction of regime security forces and Ba'ath Party facilities—especially in urban areas; collapse, surrender, or capitulation of major elements of the regular army or co-optation of these forces by a new, acceptable Iraqi government; and entry of U.S. conventional ground forces into Iraq. While some Sunni tribes or sub-tribes have clashed with the regime in the past, there is no predominantly Sunni-organized opposition within Iraq.

(b) [S/REL-GER-AUS] The U.S. can motivate the QGs and gain their support by offering improved security, economic improvement by ending sanctions, elimination of the Baath party, and regime removal. CFC can also motivate the QGs by: offering the Kurds a representative voice in an Iraqi provisional/permanent government, offering the Shia a restoration of basic life services and a representative voice in an Iraqi provisional/permanent government, offering the Sunni tribes a leadership role in an Iraqi provisional/permanent government, restoration of a professional military, and territorial integrity for Iraq.

(c) [S/REL-GER-AUS] In turn, the QGs can provide: PSYOP support for regime change in Iraq, and tactical intelligence, active support of our Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) operations, and stability in urban areas under their control. In the north, the Kurds can assist by: fixing or encouraging the capitulation of Iraqi forces, conducting sabotage operations behind Iraqi lines, and disrupting Iraqi LOCs. In the south, the Shia can harass and interdict key Ba'ath security assets. The Sunni QGs can encourage and promote officer defection and conduct short-term disruption of LOCs.

c. [U] Friendly Forces

[1] [S/OC-REL-GER-AUS] U.S. Strategic Objectives. Operations in the ITO will support the following U.S. strategic objectives:
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(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Success in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD.

(2) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Military Objectives. Operations in the IIO will accomplish the following strategic military objectives:

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq. Gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorists and war criminals and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support international efforts to set conditions for long term stability in Iraq and the region.

(3) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Friendly Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities.

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Strategic Centers of Gravity are domestic / international will and coalition cooperation.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Centers of Gravity are: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functionality; force projection, strategic lift, operational fires, information operations (IO) and special operations forces (SOF).

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Critical Vulnerabilities are: inter-theater Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCS); Joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration
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(JRSG1) through two ports and one airfield in Kuwait, coalition cooperation and critical C2 nodes.

(4) (S/REL GBR AUS) Coalition Participation. CFC prefers to gain coalition support, but CFC will be prepared to conduct operations in the ITO unilaterally. Although CFC expects varying levels of support from the Global Counter-terrorism Task Force (GCTF) throughout the campaign, success does not depend on combat contributions from these countries. However, basing and over-flight access, Host Nation Support (HNS), and continuing political support are essential to our concept of operations.

(5) (U) Assumptions

(a) (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Host Nation Support to Operations

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) United Kingdom (U.K.) and Australia. Full overflight and full basing support may include: surface logistics staging, support aircraft basing, attack aircraft basing, HQ presence and humanitarian assistance supplies and support. May include operational capabilities to include combat forces.

2. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. Full overflight and full basing support.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Bahrain. Full overflight, basing for support, and ISR aircraft and HQ presence expected. Expansion beyond the current footprint may be possible.

4. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) UAE. Full overflight and basing for support aircraft expected. Expansion beyond the current footprint may be possible.

5. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Jordan. Full overflight, eewest basing support, and transportation and supplies to support humanitarian relief.

6. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Turkey. Full overflight, basing for aircraft, SOF, ground forces, transportation and supplies to support humanitarian relief and may include operational capabilities to include combat forces. May require financial support and a guarantee of no Kurdish state.

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7. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
Full overflight, basing for aircraft and SOF, and use of northern airspace refueling, DCA and ISR tracks.

(b) (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Continued freedom of navigation for shipping and naval forces through the Suez Canal / Strait of Hormuz / Northern Arabian Gulf.

(c) (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) No significant resources required for CJOA-Afghanistan, Yemen, or HOA operations will not require significant resources allocated during 1003V.

(d) (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) CRAF II, VISA Stage I and excess capacity will be authorized initially to support increased lift requirements.

(e) (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Iran/Syria will remain non-belligerent not employ conventional forces against coalition forces during with respect to the Iraq Conflict.

(f) (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) There will be no direct attacks on U.S. assets in space.

(g) (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) NOBLES EAGLE FP level at C or lower and air defense threat level at 3 or lower.

(h) (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Iraq will attempt to use WMD against coalition forces and or regional neighbors.

(i) (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Hydrology will not significantly affect CFLCC operational maneuver.

2. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Mission. USCENTCOM conducts offensive operations in Iraq to overthrow the Iraqi regime, destroy/eliminate WMD capability, and reduce/eliminate the regime’s threat to the Iraqi people, the region and the U.S. and coalition partners as part of the Global War on Terrorism. On order, conduct follow-on operations to facilitate the transition from war to peace.

3. (U) Execution.
   a. (U) Concept of Operations.
      (1) (U) Commander’s Intent.
(a) (S//REL CGR AUS) Purpose. The purpose of this operation is to remove the Iraqi regime, destroy Iraqi WMD capability, and reduce the threat Iraq poses to the region and the U.S. Removal of the Iraqi Regime is defined as the death, incarceration, or foreign flight of Saddam Hussein and his senior leadership and removal of their capability, within Iraq, to develop, proliferate, or employ WMD in / from Iraq, support terrorism, threaten Iraq's neighbors, or control the Iraqi people; prevent a new Iraqi government from assuming power. The purpose of this campaign is to force the collapse of the Iraqi regime and deny it the use of WMD to threaten its neighbors and U.S./Coalition interests as part of the Global War on Terrorism.

(b) (S//REL CGR AUS) Method. CFC forces will effect elimination of the Iraqi regime by pressuring Iraqi centers of gravity in order to create crises to which the regime cannot respond. We will employ Lines of Operation (Joint Functional Areas) sequentially. Once the President makes the decision, we will be Fast and Final in our actions. We will create overwhelming effects by attacking simultaneously along several lines of operation thereby creating multiple sets of conditions to which the Iraqi strategic and operational leadership cannot respond. This series of dilemmas will quickly overwhelm the regime and force its collapse through higher operational tempo. I want to capitalize on the synergistic effects of operating inside Hussein’s decision cycle. Therefore, we must be prepared for catastrophic success at any time and plan to exploit it. The regime’s control of security forces is an integral part of the overall climate that allows it to maintain power. It is imperative we shut down the regime-controlled media and C2 nodes to isolate Hussein. We will compel the regime to capitulate or render it ineffective by eliminating its influence and control over combat forces, security forces, and populace; thereby reducing its legitimacy, degrading its security and creating disarray in its inner circle. When we commence decisive operations we must do so rapidly with overwhelming force across all lines of operation, creating a “shock and awe” effect. It is imperative to demonstrate our will and capability to overthrow the current Iraqi regime through bold and decisive action. Speed is critical as time works against the coalition. Posturing to rapidly exploit success will allow continuous freedom of
action, foreclose enemy strategic options and prevent Iraqi forces from responding in an effective manner. Baghdad is the symbol of power and every opportunity must be taken to control it as quickly as possible in order to sever its control over the remaining military/security forces and the population. Exploit opportunities to move rapidly, accepting risk in order to maintain the initiative.

We must not allow Iraqi employment of WMD to significantly impact achieving our strategic and operational objectives. The rapidness of regime collapse is directly proportional to our ability of denying their use of WMD. We must ensure Iraq’s WMD infrastructure comes under our control as rapidly as possible in order to prevent proliferation.

Finally, we must ensure that all our actions in forcing the regime collapse set the conditions for quickly gaining control of Iraq and support reconstruction. I am concerned about the economic future of Iraq so we must protect the oil infrastructure to provide a source of revenue for the Iraqi people. Returning control of a stable Iraq to a broad-based government representing all ethnic, religious and tribal groups will add stability to the region and support the fight on the global war on terrorism.

Keys to success within each line of operation are:

- **Information Operations (IO):** Shaping the battlespace for offensive operations, aggressively undermining the regime’s legitimacy, and setting conditions for post-hostility operations.

- **Political-military (Pol-mil) Operations:** Building coalition and regional support for operations and coordinating with the interagency to deter third nations from interfering with CFC operations.

- **Special Operational Forces (SOF), Direct Action (DA) and directing operational fires to degrade Iraqi WMD threat, seizing key terrain and assisting in identifying the Iraqi units who will capitulate.**

- **Unconventional Warfare (UW) with Opposition Groups (OGs):** Creating internal opposition to regime responses and fixing Iraqi units to prevent their employment against CFC forces in a coherent manner.

- **Operational fires:** Attacking key Iraqi capabilities and vulnerabilities by striking key leadership targets, internal security and regime support apparatus as well as focusing fires on the immediate WMD threat and shaping the battlespace for SOF, conventional forces, and OGs.
• Operational Maneuver: Securing key terrain, destroying or controlling WMD delivery systems and infrastructure, and defeating or compelling Iraqi forces to capitulate.

• Civil-Military Operations (CMO): Developing and maintaining interagency and IO/NGO unity of effort to provide assistance to the Iraqi people, minimizing and controlling dislocated civilians, and providing emergency relief as required. Through proactive support to the population and being postured to assist in initiating and coordinating the recovery and reconstruction efforts, the CFC will set the conditions for a rapid transition from war to peace.

• Information Operations (IO) will shape the battle space for offensive operations and aggressively undermine the regime’s legitimacy.

• Political-military (PolMi) Operations will build coalition and regional support for operations and coordinate with the interagency to deter third nations from interfering with CFC operations.

• SOF employs strategic reconnaissance (SR) and operational fires to degrade Iraqi TNM threat, sets conditions for Unconventional Warfare (UW) with CCUs, and assists in determining which Iraqi units will capitulate or continue fighting.

• Operational fires enable the employment of other lines of operation to attack key Iraqi capabilities and vulnerabilities. Operational fires will strike key leadership targets focusing the weight of effort on internal security and regime support apparatus while maintaining the capability to strike the Iraqi leadership directly. Additionally, fires will focus on the immediate WMD threat and shaping the battle space for SOF conventional forces, and CCUs. Operational fires will also be apportioned to providing scheduled, on-call, and immediate close air support during ground operations.

• Operational maneuver secures key terrain, destroys or controls WMD delivery systems and infrastructure, and defeats or compels Iraqi forces to capitulate.

• Civil-Military Operations develop and maintain interagency and IO/NGO unity of effort in providing assistance to the Iraqi people, minimize and control dislocated civilians, and provide emergency relief as
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required. Civil-Military Operations will assist in initiating and coordinating recovery and reconstruction efforts during the transition from war to peace.

Disarray in the Regime's inner circle, increased external support for opposition groups, and loss of sovereignty, security and influence over its combat forces and the populace will compel the Regime capitulation or enable CFC forces to remove it.

(c) (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Endstate. The endstate for this operation is regime change. Success is defined as: regime leadership and power base destroyed; WMD capability destroyed or controlled; territorial integrity intact; ability to threaten neighbors eliminated; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place. The Endstate for this campaign is regime change. Success is defined as:

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) The death, incarceration, or foreign flight of Saddam Hussein and his senior leadership and the removal of their capability within Iraq to develop, proliferate, or employ WMD in and from Iraq; support terrorism; threaten Iraq's neighbors; control the Iraqi people or prevent a new Iraqi government from assuming power.

2. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi WMD capability destroyed or controlled.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) The territorial integrity of Iraq intact.

4. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) An acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.

(2) (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Lines of Operation. CFC forces will apply continually increasing pressure on Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Regime by synchronized activities along the following lines of operation:

(a) (S/CC REL USA GBR AUS) Operational Fires. CFC will synchronize attacks of long-range strike assets and other systems to apply kinetic pressure on Saddam and his regime. Operational fires include attacks from long-range strike aircraft to include CONUS bombers and Conventional...
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Air Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCM), strike-fighter aircraft, Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), and other long-range fires to include army attack aviation, artillery and rocket/missile attacks. Operational fires will focus on leadership, internal security, RGFC and select RA forces, WMD (delivery, production, storage, and research), and infrastructure, to include communications, power, and LOC's. The scope of selective attacks on infrastructure targets will be constrained and effects will be localized to the maximum extent possible. Operational fires will incorporate a layered and fully integrated combined arms approach. Apportionment of operational fires will be capabilities based, as each component is able to apply the desired effects by priority and weight of effort. Operational fires will often achieve desired effects independently, but it is important to always exploit opportunities to directly enable the other lines of operation.

(b) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) Operational Maneuver. CFC will employ operational maneuver to secure territory and defeat enemy forces (as required) through the application of maneuver, firepower, and shock. Operational maneuver will focus on seizing key terrain, defeating RGFC and select RA forces and establishing conditions for stability during Phase IV.

(c) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) Special Operations. CFC forces will employ special operations forces to obtain actionable intelligence and develop UW infrastructure, conduct UW special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA), and enable operational fires. Special operations will focus on regime leadership, internal security, infrastructure, and WMD delivery capability.

(d) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) UW and Support to COGs. CFC will synchronize activities of Other Government Agencies (OGA), UW activities, rewards programs, and work with the COGs to apply pressure to the Iraqi regime. UW operations will focus on facilitating the seizing of key terrain, attriting internal security forces, disrupting IZ combat forces, and facilitating the control of the civilian population.

(e) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) Information Operations (IO). CFC will employ all elements of IO to create doubt and disaffection against the regime in order to hasten its
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downfall. IO will also shape regime perception to prevent development of effective counter-strategies toward U.S. intentions and actions. The focus of influence operations is regime leadership, neutralizing regime command and control infrastructure and communications, internal security, select RA and RGFC forces, and the civilian population.

(f) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) POL-MIL Operations. POL-MIL activities will focus on applying pressure to deny Iraqi commercial and diplomatic leverage, building coalition and regional support, and preventing third nations from interfering with CFC operations.

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CMO. CMO objectives are to minimize the interference of civilians with military operations and reduce the impact of military operations on the Iraqi populace. Specifically, it includes activities regarding the CPC role in humanitarian assistance, recovery, reconstruction and the transition to long-term stability in Iraq. CMO will focus on the civilian population, Iraqi infrastructure, and developing commercial/diplomatic leverage through humanitarian assistance.

b. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phasing. Operations in Iraq will be conducted in four phases: Phase I—Preparation, Phase II—Shape the Battlespace, Phase III—Decisive Operations, and Phase IV—Post-hostilities.

(1) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase I—Preparation. This phase begins upon presidential notification and lasts 16 days.

(a) (U) Phase I Operational Objectives.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish air bridge and secure LOCs.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Alert, deploy, and posture forces for shaping operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Set conditions to neutralize Iraqi forces.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Interdict Iraqi TBM/WMD operations.

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35. S/CC REL GBR AUS Secure regional and international support for operations.

6. S/CC REL GBR AUS Degrade regime in order to prepare for Phase II operations.

7. S/CC REL GBR AUS Gain and maintain maritime and space superiority.

4. S/CC REL USA GBR AUS Prepare GGs for follow on operations.

(b) (U) Phase I Lines of Operation.

1. S/CC REL GBR AUS Operational Fires. Air and Maritime forces conduct Operations-operations, to include intrusive ISR, in order to enhance situational awareness and apply immediate pressure on the regime in preparation for shaping operations. CFACC and CNWCC forces provide force protection during the build up of forces and begin to degrade, defeat, or destroy Iraqi active air defense threat and WMD delivery systems using Response Options normally associated with Operation Southern Watch. CFC forces increase the capability to conduct time sensitive targeting and support the initiation of Phase II attacks.

2. S/CC REL GBR AUS Operational Maneuver. CPLCC alerts forces and begins to deploy enablers and pre-positioned assets for introduction of forces in Phase II.

(a) S/CC REL GBR AUS Land forces position forces in Kuwait, leveraging the Mechanized Infantry Division in Kuwait. An air assault division and Armored Cavalry Regiment moves by sea from CONUS while a Mechanized Infantry Division moves toward Turkey to support operations in Northern Iraq. Additionally, CFC will download pre-positioned stocks and build up supplies to prepare forces for operational maneuver.

(b) S/CC REL GBR AUS CFACC increases and repositions ISR platforms, attack, and support assets in the AOR according to the bed down plan and initiates intrusive ISR in Iraq. CFACC supports introduction of SOF forces in northern and western Iraq, conducts personnel recovery operations from
Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey and supports CFMCC in monitoring Iranian reaction and response.

(c) (S/SC REL GBR AUS) CFMCC positions naval forces in the north Arabian Gulf and coordinates with Commander Sixth Fleet for supporting naval forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Naval forces will include five carrier battle groups, multiple surface and sub-surface combatant TLAM shooters, two Amphibious Ready Groups, forces ashore to support the offload of Marine Corps equipment and forces, and various support and sustainment ships and forward logistics sites. Naval forces will establish maritime superiority throughout the Arabian Gulf, and be prepared to provide shallow-water mine clearance, salvage support and port waterside security for Kuwaiti sea ports of debarkation (SPODs), conduct MPF operations, support ISR and operational fires, and monitor Iranian reaction and response.

3. (S/SC REL GBR AUS) Special Operations. CFSOCC positions additional SOF in the region and initiates link up with OGs in the North and is prepared to conduct SR in western Iraq to support CFACC in suppressing Iraqi TBM/WMD capability. CFSOCC prepares to conduct special reconnaissance (SR)—focused on ground objectives, WMD, and high value targets including key Iraqi leadership/Personnel recovery operations, and clandestine actions to include UW and OG support. SOF will also begin to establish Direct Action (DA) capability, and an ability to monitor Iranian reaction, employ operational fires, conduct expanded UW activities, personnel recovery operations, and develop intelligence and situational awareness in support of Phase II operations.

4. (S/SC REL GBR AUS) UW and Support to OGs. Commences prior to Phase I. UW elements will link up with Other Governmental Agencies (OGA) operatives and OGs in northern, southern, and western Iraq to establish contacts and train the OGs for action; provide training and equipment to the Kurds, Shia, and western tribes; develop intelligence; provide situational awareness and develop a UAR capability. UW activities will garner Iraqi military units' support for U.S. objectives in Iraq and influence them to capitulate. UW elements
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will posture to conduct expanded UW activities in Phase II.

5. (S/CC REL GBR AIDS) Information Operations.
   Undermine confidence in the ability of the regime to maintain power by emphasizing U.S. resolve and the inevitability of the regime’s defeat. Deception operations deny and mislead the regime regarding knowledge of U.S. intentions and timing of actions.

   Build coalition and regional support and prevent third nations from interfering with CFC operations.

   Preposition sufficient humanitarian stores/resources to be used upon commencement of offensive operations and coordinate for regional and international support.

(c) (U) Phase I Endstate.

1. (S/CC REL GBR AIDS) Air bridge established and LOCs secured.

2. (S/CC REL GBR AIDS) CFC forces postured for shaping operations.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AIDS) CGs prepared to execute limited operations.


5. (S/CC REL GBR AIDS) Regional and international support for operations secured.

6. (S/CC REL GBR AIDS) Regime degraded in preparation for Phase II ops.


6/06/93 USA GBR AIDS COA C2s prepared for follow-on operations.

(a) (U) Phase II Operational Objectives.

[2] (S/CC REL GBR AIDS) Phase II—Shaping the Battlespace. This phase begins on D-day with air operations and will be approximately 5 days in duration.
1. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Continue to deploy and posture forces for decisive offensive operations.

2. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Disrupt or degrade Iraqi Regime's C2 and security forces.

3. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Deter WMD employment, suppress Iraqi TBM/WMD delivery/storage systems.

4. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Disrupt/degrade RGFC C2 and support to regime defense.

5. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Seize key terrain/infrastructure.

6. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Maintain international and regional support for operations.

7. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Disrupt/degrade RA forces and set the conditions for the capitulation of RA forces.

8. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Gain air and maintain maritime and space superiority.

9. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Suppress key TBM/WMD production processes and deny access to WMD facilities that represent a direct threat or a proliferation threat.

(b) (U) Phase II Lines of Operation.

1. (S/SCI REL GBR AUS) Operational Fires. The focus of operational fires is Regime security and leadership, WMD, Counter Information, Counter Air, Counter Maritime and Counter Land. CFACC establishes air superiority and space supremacy, strikes strategic targets, fractures regime security, denies sanctuary to regime leadership, and intercepts select RGFC and RA forces (specifically, C2 and logistics nodes that disrupt the RGFC's ability to reposition around Baghdad or withdraw into the city) in support of CFLCC operations in Iraq. Maritime forces will support operational fires with TACAIR and TLAM missions. CFLCC will conduct deep fires with ATACMS, MLRS, and attack aviation in support of CFACC and operational maneuver.
2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Maneuver. CFLCC will be prepared to seize key terrain (Umm Qasr, key oil nodes, bridgeheads, bridgeheads across the Euphrates, and key airfields) and establish a security zone by defeating opposing Iraqi forces in southern Iraq, protect LOCs, continue to conduct JRSQI of forces, and control existing humanitarian relief infrastructure and deliver humanitarian relief to affected populace. CFMCC will maintain maritime superiority, access to sea LOC’s and ports, support CFLCC SPOD operations and Marine sea-based air operations, continue conducting ISR and IPB, monitoring Iranian reaction and response, conducting shallow-water mine clearing and salvage support, and will be prepared to conduct amphibious operations. At the end of this phase, ground sustainment will be postured to support continued offensive operations and maneuver forces will be postured to exploit success to hasten regime collapse.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Special Operations. CFSOCO forces will insert teams and conduct SR to collect actionable intelligence on key leaders, WMD sites, and other high value targets. SOF will also establish DA capability and conduct DA against regime leadership, WMD delivery systems, oil and hydro nodes, coordinate and employ operational fires, and conduct UW.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) UW Operations and Support to OGS. UW elements will expand support to OGS to foment insurrection in the north, south, and west; conduct clandestine operations to fix, disrupt, or influence capitulation of RGFC and RA units; enhance friendly situational awareness; conduct personnel recovery, develop targets and actionable intelligence; and coordinate and employ operational fires.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Information Operations. In support of and concurrent with operational fires and maneuver, reduce Iraqi C4I capabilities and will to support the regime and build regional and international support for U.S. actions by stressing legitimacy themes.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Political-military Operations. Maintain the coalition and continue to garner domestic and international cooperation and support—particularly among regional partners, prevent/minimize regional and...
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international opposition to U.S. actions, and begin setting conditions for a provisional/permanent Iraqi government.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Civil Military Operations. CMD will be the primary mechanism within OG enclaves to promote and maintain stability in urban areas. Secure key humanitarian assistance infrastructure to enable International Organizations and Non-governmental Organizations (IO/NGO) to conduct humanitarian assistance activities. Minimize and manage dislocated civilians, and provide emergency relief to affected populations. Support regional countries with refugee relief operations as required.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase II Endstate.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CPC forces postured for decisive offensive operations.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi regime's C2 and security forces degraded or disrupted.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi TBM/WMD delivery systems/production facilities degraded or disrupted and enemy access to WMD facilities disrupted or denied.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi C2 nodes disrupted and OOGs prepared for follow on operation to defend against Iraqi forces and attack selected Iraqi targets.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) RA/REQ C2 disrupted/degraded.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Initial key terrain/infrastructure seized.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) International and regional support for operations maintained.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Air/ Maritime/ Space superiority maintained.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) TBM/WMD suppression achieved and access to WMD facilities denied.

(3) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase III–Decisive Operations. This phase begins upon the USCOMCENT decision to execute
conventional ground operations. CFC forces are postured to complete regime removal and may last up to 125 days.

(a) (U) Phase III Operational Objectives.

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Defeat or compel capitulation of Iraqi Forces.

2. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Neutralize regime leadership.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Neutralize Iraqi TBM/WMD delivery systems.

4. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Control WMD infrastructure.

5. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq.

6. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Deploy and posture CFC forces for post-hostility operations, initiating humanitarian assistance operations for the Iraqi people, within capabilities.

7. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Set military conditions for provisional/permanent government to assume power.

8. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Maintain international and regional support.

9. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Neutralize Iraqi regime’s C2 and security forces.

10. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Gain and maintain air, maritime and space supremacy.

(b) (U) Lines of Operation.

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Operational Fires. The focus during this phase is countering the Iraqi WMD capability. CFACC will degrade Regime C4I, support destruction of regime security forces, and defeat opposing military forces that resist Coalition forces by establishing and maintaining air and space supremacy in order to deny the Regime sanctuary and expose the Regime to popular uprising, coup attempt, assassination, or direct attack by maneuver or special operations forces. CFMCC will provide operational
fires in support of air operations and operational maneuver with TACAIR and TLAM strikes. CFLCC will conduct deep fires with ATACMS, MLRS, and attack aviation in support of operational maneuver.

2. (S//REL GBR AUS) Operational Maneuver. CFLCC will seize key terrain and defeat enemy forces in zone in order to complete Regime removal, begin eliminating Iraq's WMD threat by controlling or destroying WMD production capacity, storage capability, and delivery systems and conducting Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) operations. CFLCC will also initiate operations in northern Iraq to fix Iraqi forces; isolate Tikrit; prevent major disruption of significant oil infrastructure and control by Iraqi factions; control major hydrological nodes managing water supply in the south; destroy terrorist training camps; SBO exploit withdrawal of Iraqi forces and Regime destruction; and facilitate CMO/HA operations in the north. CFLCC will be prepared to isolates and enters Baghdad, while bypassing other urban areas, as required, monitors and/or secures capitulated Iraqi forces, and enables ID/M3C activities to provide humanitarian relief. CFC will also be prepared to provide support to the provisional government upon assumption of power or support military governance as required. CFMCC will conduct the full range of naval missions in support of land and special operations, gain and maintain maritime supremacy and access to sea LOC's and ports, support CMO and the flow of HA shipping, continue ISR, and be prepared to reconstitute amphibious forces for follow-on operations.

1. (SPEC REL GBR AUS) Special Operations. CFOSCC will conduct SR and DA on high value targets — particularly Regime leadership, WMD, and C2; conduct operations to fix and disrupt opposing RGFC and RA units and interdict attacks against Kurds, employ operational fires, assist monitoring of capitulated Iraqi army units, conduct UW, and will be prepared to support SSE.

Comment (GSS4): Opening the FAA and the port of Umm Qasr to CMO/HA operations begins during Phase III.
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4. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) UW and Support to OGS. UW elements will support opposition group activities to facilitate popular uprisings, coup attempts, or other activities to expose the Regime to direct attack by maneuver forces.

5. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Information Operations. Persuade key target audiences that Saddam is no longer relevant while building support for a post-Saddam government. Prepare to deter third-party countries from taking advantage of a weakened Iraq.

6. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Political-military Operations. Continue to sustain and expand coalition and international support. Garner resources, to include funds and personnel, required to support CMO and Phase IV activities.

7. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Civil Military Operations. Develop and maintain interagency and IO/NGO unity of effort in providing assistance to the Iraqi people; minimize/manage dislocated civilians; and provide emergency relief in areas inaccessible to IO/NGO's. Initiate recovery efforts in liberated areas and be prepared to assist in the establishment of a post-regime government in regional areas.

(c) (U) Phase III Endstate

1. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Iraqi Forces defeated or capitulated.

2. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Regime leaders dead, apprehended or marginalized.

3. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) WMD delivery systems and WMD infrastructure destroyed or controlled.

4. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Territorial integrity of Iraq intact.

5. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) CFC forces postured for post-hostility operations to include controlling critical infrastructure required to enable post-hostility operations and provide humanitarian assistance within capabilities.
6. (S//REL-GBR-AUS) Military conditions set for provisional government to assume power.

7. (S//REL-GBR-AUS) International and regional support for operations maintained.

8. (S//REL-GBR-AUS) Iraqi regime and C2 neutralized.

9. (S//REL-GBR-AUS) Air / Maritime / Space supremacy achieved.

(4) (S//REL-GBR-AUS) Phase IV—Post Hostilities. Certain tasks within this phase will begin during Phase III with the seizure of the port at Um Qasr, and will continue until the CFC transitions control. During this phase, Coalition forces will conduct military operations to re-establish internal and regional stability and assist in the reconstruction of Iraqi civil and military infrastructure and essential civilian services. Activation of a CJTF and select redeployment of non-essential personnel will occur. This phase will be conducted in three stages: stability, recovery, and transition.

(a) (S//REL-GBR-AUS) US strategic objectives for Phase IV (Post-hostilities) operations in Iraq are:

1. (S//REL-GBR-AUS) Establish a secure environment.

2. (S//REL-GBR-AUS) Rapidly improve civil order and material conditions.

3. (S//REL-GBR-AUS) Demonstrate US commitment to Iraq and the region.

4. (S//REL-GBR-AUS) Foster a national identity that unites all Iraqis while preserving their tribal, ethnic and religious heritage.

5. (U) Establish a broad-based, representative government that:

(a) (U) Adheres to the rule of law.

(b) (U) Respects basic rights of all Iraqis.

(c) (U) Does not threaten its neighbors and does not support terrorism.
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(d) (U) Does not pursue WMD capability.

(e) (U) Maintains territorial integrity.

(b) (U) Phase IV Military Objectives.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deter external threats from neighboring countries and, if deterrence fails, swiftly defeat them.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Prevent or defeat resistance from internal groups hostile to US and coalition forces.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support restoration of essential Iraqi infrastructure and social institutions.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support reformation of Iraqi military and security institutions to be capable of performing legitimate defense and public security missions.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Facilitate establishment of government functions and services necessary to stabilize Iraq and initiate reconstruction of the country. On order, support the transfer of these functions and services to a transitional US or international administration.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Assist in maintaining public order and safety.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support US interagency or international organization efforts to reorganize and train Iraqi law enforcement organizations, as required.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Identify, secure, document and destroy or dismantle all WMD/WMD infrastructure.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Destroy terrorist networks and apprehend all terrorists and war criminals.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Stabilization. CFC forces will maneuver rapidly to establish a permissive environment under military administration; promote regional stability; reduce threats to the new government; control or destroy WMD infrastructure; minimize civilian unrest and the impact of
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dislocated civilians and EFW's; build/maintain coalition, interagency, and NGO unity of effort and provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people as necessary.

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Purpose: To create a stable and secure environment that enables follow-on forces and civil agencies to begin recovery.

2. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Key Tasks: (CFLCC Lead)

- Build Iraqi, regional and international support through positive influence of the Iraqi populace, coalition, regional and world perception.
- Establish a stable environment within Iraq.
- Deter regional and trans-national threats to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq.
- Maintain civil order by exercising control through the existing legal system where possible.
- Assess and initiate integration of capitulated Iraqi forces into a transitional Iraqi self-defense force or civil work force.
- Support infrastructure recovery by initiating restoration of necessary civil infrastructure.
- Mitigate human suffering by enabling civilian engagement in emergency humanitarian assistance.
- Support governance and civil administration through the exercise of military authority.
- Continue to locate and secure WMD. Initiate and support disablement and elimination.
- Continue to support the destruction terrorist networks.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Phase IVa End-state: A stable environment with the territorial integrity of Iraq is intact; civil order is maintained; repairs to damaged civil infrastructure are underway; humanitarian assistance is provided; and an interim administration is established.

(d) (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Recovery. CFC forces will work with U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations to restore basic government and economic institutions; maximize use of Iraqi resources to speed recovery; and re-establish Iraqi military and security forces under a joint governance of Iraq. As the USG and international agencies are establishing their operations in
country, CFC will be in a supported role to assist in the distribution of supplies and reconstruction. As the agencies become able to assume control of operations with Iraq, the CFC will move into a supporting role to assist the agencies in their efforts.

1. (S/SC REL GBR AUS) Purpose: To develop a secure and stable environment which supports the process of national recovery and begin transition to Iraqi self-government.

2. (S/SC REL GBR AUS) Key Tasks: (CJTF-Iraq Lead)
   - Maintain Iraqi, regional and international support through positive influence.
   - Begin handover of responsibility for stability and security from Coalition military to responsible Iraqi institutions through a Transitional Civil Administration.
   - Support the rule of law by exercising control through a reformed legal system and continue operations in accordance with international law.
   - Support infrastructure recovery by continued restoration of civil infrastructure.
   - Lessen dependence on humanitarian assistance.
   - Provide governance and civil administration through the exercise of military and civil authority.
   - Continue to support the disposal and elimination of WMD.

3. (S/SC REL GBR AUS) Phase IVb End-state: Responsibility for stability and security is passed from Coalition military to responsible institutions; rule of law is established; necessary civil infrastructure is functioning and economic development underway; dependence on humanitarian assistance is lessened; and a transitional civil administration in place with increasing Iraqi participation.

- (e) Transition and Redeployment. CFC forces will be reduced to a minimum presence; transition CMO support to the post-regime government or IO/NGO's; set the conditions for peacetime security assistance; and redeploy.
1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Purpose: To complete the transition from an interim administration to an enduring, self-governing Iraq, in which the rule of law is well established and civil order is enforced by Iraqi authorities; civil infrastructure is functioning and economic development is continuing.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Key Tasks: (Interim administration Lead with/passing to TCA/Transitional Iraqi Authority/Iraqi government)

- Maintain Iraqi, regional and international support.
- Handover security tasks to Iraqi military and security organizations. Continue to decrease Coalition military presence.
- Transition the enforcement of the rule of law through an effective legal system, to Iraqi institutions operating in accordance with national and international law.
- Complete restoration of civil infrastructure, providing a basis for longer term infrastructure recovery.
- Minimize dependence on humanitarian assistance.
- As appropriate, pass responsibility for governance and civil administration from a Coalition lead to an emerging Iraqi government.
- Complete the elimination of WMD in Iraq.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase IVc End-state: A stable, self-sustaining Iraq with a viable governing body integrated within the international community.

(f) (U) Lines of Operation.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Unity of effort. The initial effort of the CFC is to fully integrate coalition forces into Phase IV efforts while maintaining national, regional and international support for the reconstruction of Iraq. This integration will provide increased leverage of CFC efforts to establish a secure environment within a self-sufficient Iraqi nation and to increase stability in the region.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Security. Components will conduct stability and support operations to set
conditions for the transition from war to peace. These activities will include SSE, securing the compliance of Iraqi military forces, destroying remaining pockets of resistance and controlling the Iraqi borders. CFLCC will support the elimination of WMD, conduct security operations to disarm the Iraqi military, and control the borders. CFACC will maintain air and space supremacy and BPT support HA and CMO operations. CFMCC will continue to maintain maritime supremacy, protect SLOCs and ensure port access to enable HA and CMO activities and to allow the safe redeployment of forces. Maritime forces will be prepared to support ISR operations in the NAO3, Strait of Hormuz and other maritime areas as directed, and conduct Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to preclude the escape of regime leadership and terrorists.

3. (SECRET/REL GBR AUS) Humanitarian Relief and resettlement. The CFC will support OGA/NGOs efforts to reduce human suffering and the amount of dislocated civilians as a result of combat operations. CFLCC will coordinate and maintain situational awareness of IO/NGO/USG/IIZ activities concerning emergency relief, resettlement and re-integration.

4. (SECRET/REL GBR AUS) Civil Administration. Initial forces will coordinate and assist with the rapid re-establishment of essential public utilities and infrastructure and public safety measures. CFLCC will support OGA reformation efforts concerning public health, communications, education and media reform to ensure there are new systems in place which are representative of the Iraqi population.

5. (SECRET/REL GBR AUS) Rule of Law. CFC forces will exercise control through the existing legal systems where practical and operate in accordance with international law. After existing local law enforcement and judiciary officials are vetted, they will be used to assist in establishing a rule of law cognizant of basic human rights. The CFC will dismantle the former regime’s internal security apparatus and support Iraqi efforts of reconciliation.

6. (SECRET/REL GBR AUS) Governance. COMUSCENTCOM will exercise military authority through selected Iraqi military and civil authorities. During initial phase
IV operations, units will interact with local councils to establish local administration. As the Iraqis develop their new form of government, the interim administration will work the Iraqis to ensure that it represents the interests of the all ethnic, religious and tribal groups and ensure an equal balance of power within the government to preclude a future dictator from assuming control of Iraq.

7. **(S/CC REL GBR AUS)** Economic Development. The key to long-term stability of Iraq is dependent on developing an Iraq that is economically viable. An established middle class will reduce tension among competing groups for scarce resources and reduce internal violence. Economic development will begin initially with oil production to stimulate the Iraqi economy and fund future reconstruction efforts. The CPC will assist other government agencies (OGAs) in the reformation of public finance, agriculture and privatization. An economically stable Iraq will enhance regional stability.

**(g) (U) Phase IV Endstate.**

1. **(S/CC REL GBR AUS)** Civil administration re-established with a representative government in place.

2. **(S/CC REL GBR AUS)** Iraqi military capable of defending their territorial borders and maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq.

3. **(S/CC REL GBR AUS)** A just, legal system that supports the rights of all Iraqis and maintains internal security.

4. **(S/CC REL GBR AUS)** Displaced civilians and refugees re-settled with a reduction in dependence on humanitarian assistance.

5. **(S/CC REL GBR AUS)** Iraq WMD capability destroyed, removed, or transitioned to competent authority.

6. **(S/CC REL GBR AUS)** Terrorists and war criminals detained and individuals unjustly detained under Iraqi regime freed.
7. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) An economic structure that supports growth and fiscal responsibility.

c. (U) Tasks

1. (U) CFLCC

(a) (U) All Phases

1. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) of forces to facilitate deployment and employment of forces.

2. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Establish, operate and maintain the Theater Transition Points—(north and south) to IOT support Levels I and II repatriation of isolated personnel.

3. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Perform JRAC functions for the designated Joint Rear Area (see para. 3.d.18, Coordinating Instructions).

4. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Provide base operating support, to include security, for USCENTCOM HQ forward IOT facilitate CPC command and control.

5. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Provide TBM defense capability to CPC forces IAW CPC Defended Asset List (DAL) IOT provide air and missile defense.

6. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Receive TACON of CFSCC DA/Shar Forces in CFLCC zone in support of CFLCC in order to IOT de-conflict and synchronize CFLCC and CFSCC operations.

7. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Receive TACON of Marine Air Ground Task Forces ashore.

8. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Receive OPCON of Coalition Forces.

9. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Receive TACON of any EUCOM support forces entering into the ITO.

10. (S/SD REL GBR AUS) Assume responsibilities for all Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and confinement operations for U.S. military prisoners in the ITO. Establish a
tribunal IAW Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 5. The authority to conduct a tribunal may be further delegated to the Commander, 890th Military Police Brigade. Establish, operate and maintain appropriate interrogation facilities at any location where EFWs are held in non-transit status.

11. (S/GO REL GBR AUS) Exercise TACON of units located in or transiting through the CFLCC JRA, to include 2/JTF-1CM, on a temporary basis when local threat conditions require an immediate and coordinated response.

12. (S/GO REL GBR AUS) BPT provide forces in support of GTF-Consequence Management (CM) in the joint rear area IOT rapidly respond to Iraqi WMD employment or humanitarian disasters.

13. (S/GO REL GBR AUS) BPT exercise TACON of TF 14a forces in CFLCC zone IOT de-conflict and synchronize operations.

(b) (U) Phase 1

1. (S/GO REL GBR AUS) Support establishment of CFQ Forward Headquarters facility in Qatar to IOT facilitate CFQ command and control.

2. (S/GO REL GBR AUS) Posture an Airborne Brigade Task Force (ABTF) in theater IOT exploit early success. Planning priority for the ABTF:

   (a) (S/GO REL GBR AUS) BPT seize Saddam International Airport (SIAP).

   (b) (S/GO REL GBR AUS) BPT deter or block attempts to seize Kirkuk or the Northern Oil Fields.

3. (S/GO REL GBR AUS) Coordinate with Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) for pre-positioning of material and personnel IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.
SECRET/GC/CON-REL-GBR-AUS

4. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) Exchange liaison officers with lOSSCAR IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

5. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT defend against an Iraqi preemptive attack IOT prevent disruption of force flow.

6. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT establish EPW collection point via Kuwait IOT maintain operational momentum.

7. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT receive TACON of elements of DIA Defense Service (DHS) from JSOTF-N in order to continue EPW/Detainee exploitation and SSE in the northern ITO.

8. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT release one airborne battalion OPCON to TF [14a]

(c) [U] Phase II

1. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT secure designated critical oil infrastructure associated with the South Rumaila field if Iraqi sabotage is imminent IOT minimize damage to critical oil infrastructure and prevent environmental damage.

2. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT transport detainees from JSOC-N to exploitation area IOT allow timely interrogation by designated agencies.

3. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT support CFSSOC to disable and secure key oil pumping facilities IOT mitigate environmental disaster.

4. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT provide Quick Reaction Force T24 AL RAM IBI CFSSOC forces ashore.

5. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT initiate humanitarian assistance operations IOT minimize the impact of displaced civilians on operations.

(d) [U] Phase III

1. (S/OC-REL-GBR-AUS) Seize Um Al Qasr to IOT enable flow of humanitarian assistance into Southern Iraq.
2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish an EPW collection points IOT maintain operational momentum.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Secure Al Faw peninsula NLT C+15 IOT enable CFMCC to clear SLOC to Umm Qasar.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish a SSE base and conduct SSE operations IOT facilitate joint and interagency SSE operations.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Control identified WMD delivery systems in zone IOT allow destruction by designated agencies.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct security and stability operations (SASO) and Civil-Military operations (CMO) IOT facilitate HA efforts and prevent interference with military operations.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) NLT A+5 secure designated critical oil infrastructure associated with the South Rumaila oilfield IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Clear designated critical oil infrastructure associated with the South Rumaila oilfield (Annex B) of mines, unexploded ordnance and NBC contamination IOT permit LOGCAP personnel to assess and repair Iraqi oil infrastructure.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide security for LOGCAP personnel IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) SEize Basrah International Airport IOT support CMO operations in the ITO. demonstrate coalition resolve.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Secure known WMD production and storage facilities and key WMD infrastructure in order to prevent proliferation, use, or access to WMD by terrorists. BPT support destruction/neutralization or transport of WMD munitions/delivery systems as required in order to eliminate terrorist access.
12. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Conduct liaison with, and monitor capitulated Iraqi forces co-IOG ensure their cooperation and compliance with CFC directives.

13. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Conduct Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) in order to IOG satisfy CFC intelligence requirements.

14. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Conduct civil-military operations (CMO) in order to IOG minimize civilian interference with military operations and reduce the effects of military operations on civilian populations.

15. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Seize bridgeheads across the Tigris River IOG facilitate rapid maneuver north and enable CMO.

16. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Secure Baghdad IOG complete the removal of the regime and facilitate the establishment of a new Iraqi government.

17. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Defeat ADNAN division IOG prevent reinforcement of Tikrit and Baghdad and facilitate the collapse of northern Iraqi RA forces.

18. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Secure key northern oil nodes within zone IOG prevent Kurdish control of oil resources.

19. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Provide port commander and forces to prepare the port of UMM QASR for HA operations.

20. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) D/O secure Tikrit IOG deny regime alternate refuge location.

21. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) BPT secure ground LOC to/from Jordan IOG facilitate operations and sustainment.

22. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) BPT secure Mosul IOG prevent Kurdish control of the city.

23. (S/OC REL-ORB-AUS) Seize BPT secure the Qadisiyah Dam to IOG minimize impact on CFC operations TVO Baghdad.
SECRET/ORCON-REL-GBR-AUS

SEC. 24. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT conduct relief in place with TF 14d vic Saddam International Airport.

SEC. 25. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT conduct port operations, to include the offload of HA vessels if required, prior to the transfer of such operations to USAID/HR/OGA.

(U) Phase IV


2. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) Complete SSR IOT control Iraqi WMD resources and infrastructure and identify personnel indicted for war crimes (PRWCs).

3. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) Support an interim security force and provisional or permanent government IOT provide a stable environment for the Iraqi population.

4. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) Clear oil infrastructure (see Annex B) of mines, unexploded ordnance and NBC contamination IOT permit LOGCAP personnel to assess and repair.

5. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) Provide security for LOGCAP personnel IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

6. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) C/O, transition civil affairs activities to IC/NCC/HR IOT enable OPC withdrawal.

7. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) C/O, release TACON of Marine forces to TASKCENT.

8. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) C/O, release TACON of SOF to TASKCENT.


10. (S/SCI-REL-GBR-AUS) BPT support the establishment of an Iraqi military IOT enable Iraq to maintain their territorial integrity.
11. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) BPT support destruction/transport of WMD/WMD infrastructure IOT eliminate Iraqi WMD capabilities.

12. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) BPT transition to CJTF-Iraq to IOT facilitate redeployment.

(2) (U) CFACC

(a) (U) All Phases

1. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) Serve as the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC), to IOT coordinate airspace and air defense in the ITO.

2. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) Maintain the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) for IOT conduct personnel recovery operations in the ITO.

3. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) Serve as the Personnel Recovery Coordinator (PRC) for all personnel recovery operations conducted in the ITO IOT facilitate recovery command and control.

4. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) Serve as coordinating authority regarding all inter-theater airlift issues IOT maintain effective air bridge operations.

5. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) Provide intra-theater airlift in support of component operations, including in support of CFSOCC operations to IOT facilitate re-supply and support to OGS.

6. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) Provide dedicate CSAR packages in the North, South, and West, capable of conducting 2 x point-to-point near simultaneous CSAR missions in any 24-hour period.

7. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) Provide inter-theater and intra-theater lift support, and aerial refueling support, as required.

8. (S//REL-GRB-AUS) Provide MEDEVAC airlift support assets and forces as required to support rearward movement of casualties.
9. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Perform Rear Area Operations within the JOA as specified in para 3.d.18., Coordinating Instructions.

10. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT establish alternate Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar IOT maintain continuous control of air component operations.

11. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct air delivery of lethal supplies ISO JSOTF-north to include use of conventional A/C when JSOTF-North A/C are unavailable.

12. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct air-land insertion of airborne assault operations ISO CFC "Early Regime Collapse" sequel to exploit early campaign success.

13. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT to conduct missions ISO CF SOCC and COMUSCENTRCENT S2E objectives.

(b) (U) Phase I

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Conduct JRSOT of forces and bed down aircraft IAW CFC bed down plan IOT facilitate employment and deployment of forces.

2. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide CAS ISO CF SOCC operations IOT support SOF forces operating in western Iraq and the KAZ.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) On order, shift ISR priority from Afghanistan to Iraq.

4. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) On order, assume OCONUS of Operation Northern Watch forces.

5. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct TBM suppression operations in order to suppress IZ TBM capability.

6. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Deploy MOABSTR to Turkey IOT conduct 0.2 ops over Northern Iraq.

(c) (U) Phase II

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Degrad security forces, select RGFC and RA forces, and regime C2 IOT diminish regime control over the population and fielded forces.
2. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) Establish and maintain air superiority and space supremacy in the ITO IOT support CFC operations.

3. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) Disrupt or degrade TNM and WMD delivery systems production facilities and disrupt or deny access to WMD storage facilities IOT prevent Iraqi employment against coalition forces or regional nations.

4. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) Conduct counter-maritime operations and counter mine-laying against I2 mine storage and mine-laying capabilities in support of ISAF CPMCC.

5. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) Provide air support to include CAS and ground directed interdiction (GDI) IOT enable CFSCC operations and protect dispersed forces.

6. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) BFT fix-interdict RGEC forces vicinity Baghdad IOT disrupt a withdrawal into Baghdad.

7. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) BPT support CFSCC or CFLCC operations to secure key hydrology nodes IOT prevent their use to inhibit CFC operations.

8. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) BPT establish and operate secured airfields in Iraq IOT establish alternate APODs in support of CFC operations.

9. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) BPT to conduct air delivery of lethal supplies ISO CFSCC forces in western and southern IRAQ to include use of conventional A/C when organic CFSCC A/C are unavailable.

10. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) BPT execute emergency aerial resupply of CFSCC forces to include use of conventional A/C when organic CFSCC A/C are unavailable.

11. (S/CC RSL CBR AUS) BPT conduct aerial delivery of non-lethal aid supplies to include NA ISO CFSCC and CMOC HA operations.

(c) (U) Phase III
1. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Conduct counter-land operations within the CFLCC AO to support ISO CFLCC scheme of maneuver.

2. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Continue to degrade security forces, select RGFC and RA forces, and regime C2 ICT defeat opposing Iraqi forces and enable regime removal.

3. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Continue to degrade WMD delivery systems production facilities and deny access to WMD storage facilities IOT prevent Iraqi employment against coalition forces or regional nations.

4. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Continue to conduct counter-maritime operations in support of ISO CFMOCC.

5. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Continue to provide air support to include CAS and ground directed interdiction (GDI) IOT enable CFMOCC operations and protect dispersed forces.

6. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Gain and maintain air and space dominance-supremacy in order to IOT facilitate regime removal and protect the force.

7. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Support SSA operations.

8. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Repair/operate or support the repair/operation of Basrah International Airport and Saddam International Airport once secured by CFLCC ICT establish alternate APOCs in support of CFC operations.

9. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Support, coordinate and integrate into theater non-conventional assisted recovery planning and execution.

10. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) BF establish and operate additional airfields in Iraq IOT establish alternate APOCs in support of CFC operations.

11. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) BF to conduct air delivery of lethal supplies ISO CFMOCC forces in western and southern IRAQ to include use of conventional A/C when organic CFMOCC A/C are unavailable.
12. (S/CC RGR AUS) BPT execute emergency aerial resupply of CPSCOCC forces to include use of conventional A/C when organic CPSCOCC A/C are unavailable.

13. (S/CC RGR AUS) BPT to conduct air delivery of lethal and non-lethal supplies ISO CFLCC forces IOT enable CFLCC scheme of maneuver.

14. (S/CC RGR AUS) BPT execute emergency aerial resupply ISO CFLCC forces IOT enable CFLCC scheme of maneuver.

15. (S/CC RGR AUS) BPT conduct aerial delivery of non-lethal aid supplies to include HA ISO CPSCOCC and CMOD HA operations.

(e) (U) Phase IV

1. (S/CC RGR AUS) Maintain air and space dominance.

2. (S/CC RGR AUS) Support land forces in the elimination of remaining pockets of enemy resistance.

3. (S/CC RGR AUS) Support CMQ to facilitate transition to a provisional/permanent government.

4. (S/CC RGR AUS) Support the re-establishment of civilian air space control and airspace infrastructure.

5. (S/CC RGR AUS) Continue to support SSE.

6. (S/CC RGR AUS) Repair/operate or support the repair/operation of selected, critical airfields IOT enable CMQ/HA operations.

7. (S/CC RGR AUS) Continue providing inter-theater and intra-theater airlift support, and aerial refueling support, as required or directed.

8. (S/CC RGR AUS) O/O, re-deploy forces.

9. (S/CC RGR AUS) BPT support the establishment of IZAP.

(3) (U) CFMCC
(a) (U) All Phases

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Maintain and secure SLOCs in the USCENTCOM AOR IOT support combat operations, sustainment and follow-on forces, and humanitarian assistance shipping as directed.

2. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Support CFLCC JROC with seaward port security and harbor defense for designated SPODs IOT respond to Level II threats and protect the force.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Support offload of all Marine forces and equipment the extended sea-basing of Marine aircraft until phased ashore.

4. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Serve as the TLAM strike coordinator for all TLAM tasking in the ITO IOT provide timely operational fires.

5. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Monitor Iranian reaction and response to CPC actions in the ITO IOT protect the eastern flank of CPC forces.

6. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate and support CSAR and personnel recovery operations with the JSRC.

7. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Support JROC and other functional component commanders in defense of the rear area to include response and defeat of a level II threat.

8. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Conduct mine countermeasures operations as required IOT keep SLOCs clear and designated SPODs open.

9. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Perform Rear Area Operations within the JOC as specified in para. 3.d.18., Coordinating Instructions.

10. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct NEO in the AOR IOT protect ANCLTs in the AOR.

11. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct salvage and in-extremis reconstruction for designated ports as required.
12. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct amphibious operations in the ITO IOT support the CFLCC scheme of maneuver.

13. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to assume CFCON or TACON of coalition forces.

14. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support SSR operations IOT provide unique CFMCC capabilities or shipping to move materials out of the AOR.

15. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide maritime environmental response to the deliberate release of oil generated from the NAG or in-land waterways IOT mitigate the environmental impact on the North Arabian Gulf.

Comment [GSS9]: Accuracy. We will conduct maritime response operations. Our focus will be to respond to oil spills generated within inland waterways or the NAG IOT mitigate the effects from these spills on the NAG.

(b) (U) Phase I

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Gain and maintain maritime dominance superiority in the Arabian Gulf IOT support CFC operations.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct MIO in support of UNSCRs IOT prevent Iraqi leadership from using the sea as a route of escape and to prevent the illegal movement of weapons and contraband.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct ISR operations vic. southern Iraq and western littoral Iran ISO PIR #1.10, Iranian reaction to CFC operations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Receive liaison officer from the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, provide Marine forces to COMUSMARCENT ISO CFLCC operations in Iraq.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide operational fires in support of CFC operations in the ITD.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT prevent the deliberate release of Iraqi oil into the Arabian Gulf.
SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

8. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Retain an ARG/MEU as a theater reserve.

(c) (U) Phase II

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Maintain maritime dominance/superiority in the Arabian Gulf IOT support CFC operations.

2. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Provide operational fires in support of ISO CFACC operations in the ITO.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Conduct MIO in the NAG IOT protect forces in the NAG, prevent mining, prevent Iraqi leadership from using the sea as a route of escape and to prevent the illegal movement of weapons and contraband.

4. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Assume control of seized GOPLATs in the Arabian Gulf from CFSOCC IOT prevent environmental disaster, and prevent interference and protect forces operating in the North Arabian Gulf and the Iraqi inland waterways.

5. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Position and maintain one T-AH (hospital ship) in the AG in support of CFC operations in the ITO.

6. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Clear seized GOPLATs of mines, unexploded ordnance and NBC contamination IOT permit LOGCAP personnel to assess and repair Iraqi oil infrastructure.

7. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) O/O, provide Marine forces to COMUSMARCENT ISO CFLCC operations in Iraq.

8. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide security for LOGCAP personnel onboard the GOPLATs IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

9. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide temporary confinement of PWS / detainees, along with transportation and security, to a theater transfer point.

10. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT assist CJTF-Consequence Management (CM) in response to oil spills in RAA waterway.
(d) (U) Phase III

1. (S/REL GBR AUS) Gain and maintain maritime supremacy in the North Arabian Gulf IOT support CFC operations.

2. (S/REL GBR AUS) Continue to provide operational fires in support of CFC operations in the ITO.

3. (S/REL GBR AUS) Continue to retain one ARG/MEU as the theater reserve.

4. (S/REL GBR AUS) Clear and maintain channel access to the port of Umm Qasr for humanitarian shipping in support of CPLCC CMO/HA.

5. (S/REL GBR AUS) Continue MIO IOT protect forces in the NAG, prevent mining, prevent Iraqi leadership from using the sea as a route of escape and to prevent the illegal movement of weapons and contraband.

6. (S/REL GBR AUS) Provide security for LOGCAP personnel onboard the GOPLATS IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

7. (S/REL GBR AUS) NET G-1A clear the KAA to Umm Qasr IOT enable HA operations. Establish local sea control in the KAA.

8. (S/REL GBR AUS) Provide forces in direct support of CPLCC operations at UMM QASR to conduct port/harbor clearance, seaward security, in-extremis reconstruction and salvage.

9. (S/REL GBR AUS) BPT support CMO/HA operations IOT facilitate efforts in Umm Qasr.

(e) (U) Phase IV

1. (S/REL GBR AUS) Retain one ARG/MEU as the theater reserve.

2. (S/REL GBR AUS) O/O, receive OPCON of Marine forces from COMUSMARCENT.
SECRET/ORCON REL GB R AUS

3. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) O/O, re-deploy forces as directed.

4. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) BPT support CMO to facilitate Iraqi transition to a provisional/ permanent government.

5. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) BPT support transport of WMD munitions/delivery systems IOT assist CFLCC to control WMD assets.

4) (U) COMUSMARCENT

(a) (O/OE REL GB R AUS) All Phases

1. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) Assume OPCON of all Marine forces ashore in the USCENTCOM AOR.

2. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) Assign MARCENT forces ashore, minus Marine Logistics Command, TACON to the CFLCC.

3. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) BPT transfer OPCON of MEU forces ashore back to the CPMCC to reconstitute a theater reserve afloat.

4. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) Ensure C/UTP is prepared to respond to WMD attacks or environmental/humanitarian disasters in the ITO IOT mitigate disruption of force flow or CFC operations and to mitigate the effects of an incident in any nation in the ITO and/or AOR.

5. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) Execute the RS01 of MARCENT forces IOT facilitate CFLCC ground operations.

6. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) BPT support amphibious operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf ITCW CPMCC IOT position forces ITCW CFLCC operations in Iraq.

(b) (O) Phase IV

1. (O/OE REL GB R AUS) O/O, assign Marine forces OPCON to CPMCC or re-deploy as directed.

(5) (U) CPSCOCU

[a] (U) All Phases
1. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) Establish, operate and maintain the theater Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center (UARCC) to coordinate NAR support.

2. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) Establish a Rescue Coordination Center (RCC), integrated with the JSRC, IOT support CSAR and FK.

3. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) Relinquish TACON of CP80CC forces conducting SR/DA in direct support of CP60CC and within CP80CC zone to CP60CC IOT de-conflict and synchronize CP60CC and CP80CC operations.

4. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) Establish, operate and maintain Theater Transition Point-North in Turkey to support repatriation of isolated personnel.

5. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) Conduct initial screening of EPWS and detain key personnel IOT enable SSE operations. O/O, transfer custody of enemy personnel to CP60CC.

6. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) Perform Rear Area Operations within the JCA as specified in para 3.d.18., Coordinating Instructions.

7. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) O/C relinquish OPCON of elements of 5 3 10 USC 424 to USCENTCOM. Elements will be TACON to CP60CC northern conventional forces to continue EPWS/Detainee exploitation and SSE in the northern ITO.

8. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) BPT to conduct Joint Personnel Recovery operations in support as was required.

9. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) BPT to assume OPCON or TACON of coalition special operation forces.

10. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) BPT conduct other special operations within the ITO in support of CFC objectives.

(b) (0) Phase I

1. (S/06 REL-GR-AUS) Establish initial UW operational capability in Northern IZ IOT fix Iraqi divisions along the green line.
2. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Conduct UW to coordinate with and leverage support for OG’s to IOT prevent the Iraqi population from interfering with CFC operations.

3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct SR in western JSOA IOT provide terminal guidance to CFACC for suppressing the I2 TBM capability.

4. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT support Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) activities in Turkey in order to minimize the impact of displaced civilians on operations.

(c) (U) Phases II

1. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) On A-Day, initiate UW operations against Northern I2 RA forces IOT compel capitulation of RA units and prevent the withdrawal of RA units into urban areas.


3. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Support Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) activities in Turkey in order to minimize the impact of displaced civilians on operations.

4. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct UW to coordinate with and leverage support for OG’s to prevent the Iraqi population from interfering with CFC operations.

5. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT assume control of FOB from TF-20 to support area denial.

6. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct SR/DA in western JSOA IOT provide terminal guidance to CFACC for suppressing the I2 TBM capability.

7. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) BPT deliver emergency non-lethal aid to OGs IOT sustain operations from the KAZ.
SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT seize and/or disable Qadisiyah Dam or Samarra Barrage IOT prevent Iraqi use to disrupt ground maneuver IVO Baghdad.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct SR/DA (TGO Rollover) of designated critical oil infrastructure (see Annex B) IOT prevent Iraqi sabotage of critical oil infrastructure and support CFLCC tasks to secure critical oil infrastructure.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT assume OPCON of airborne battalion.

(d) (U) Phase III

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support CMO IOT set conditions for the post-hostilities.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate operational fires in support of CFC operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct UW to coordinate with and leverage support for OG’s to prevent the Iraqi population from interfering with CFC operations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue UW operations against Northern IZ RA forces IOT compel capitulation of RA units and prevent their withdrawal into urban areas.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct liaison with and assist in monitoring capitulated Iraqi forces.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct SR/DA in western JSOC IOT provide terminal guidance to CPACC for suppressing the IZ TFM capability.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support CFLCC SSE operations.

(e) (U) Phase IV

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct UW/SR/DA in support of CFLCC operations in order to eliminate remaining pockets of resistance.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to support SSE operations.

SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS
1. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) Continue to support CMO.

2. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) 0/C, re-deploy forces.

3. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) BFT support establishment of Iraqi internal defense force.

(U) Task Force [4a]

(a) All Phases

1. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) Establish, operate and maintain a Recovery Coordination Center (RCC) and integrate with the Joint Personnel Recovery architecture at the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) in order to enhance JPR C2.

2. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) Conduct TST DA operations to kill/capture high level regime leadership personalities IOT disrupt regime C2 and facilitate rapid regime collapse.

3. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) O/O liberate captured U.S. and/or other designated personnel in order to free coalition POW’s and prevent them from being used as a bargaining tool/human shields by the Iraqi regime.

4. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) O/O conduct SR/DA SSE and seizure of WMD personalities or WMD HVT’s IOT prevent their employment against coalition forces or allied nations.

5. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) BFT seize Saddam International Airport (SIA) IOT exploit early regime collapse and provide a FOB for TST DA and counter-WMD operations IVO Baghdad. O/O conduct relief in place to CFLECC forces.

6. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) BFT to recover malfunctioning U.S. STRATCOM assets employed in Iraq to maintain control of strategic resources and capabilities.

7. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) BFT secure and transport WMD material discovered in Iraq in order to facilitate SSE operations.

8. (S/CC REL: GBR AUS) BFT support USCENTCOM forces with SSE capability IOT facilitate SSE operations non-
SECRET/ORDCN REL GBR AUS

permissive or uncertain environments throughout the ITO.

(b) (U) Phase II

1. (S/CO REL GBR AUS) Seize BW/CW facilities in western Iraq to obtain credible proof of Iraqi capability to develop/employ weapons of mass destruction and prevent its employment.

2. (S/CO REL GBR AUS) Conduct DA operation against high profile targets IOT demonstrate US ability and resolve to strike any target or key personality throughout the ITO.

3. (S/CO REL GBR AUS) BPT support CFLCC seizure of SIAP in order to exploit early success.

4. (S/CO REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct DA operations on Iraqi prisons that could house political prisoners IOT conduct INTEL exploitation.

(c) (U) Phase III

1. (S/CO REL GBR AUS) O/O support CFLCC seizure of SIAP in order to exploit early success.

2. (S/CO REL GBR AUS) BPT assume OPCON of one airborne battalion and seize a FOB of a G-3 IOT support follow-on DA operations.

3. (S/CO REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct a relief in place with CPSOCC forces and release the airborne battalion task force OPCON to CPSOCC in order to maintain control of the FOB at H-1 or H-2.

(7) (S/CO REL GBR AUS) COM/OOTF, Conduct psychological operations to support COMUSCENTCOM objectives and provide PSYOP support to Components as directed by CFC.

(8) (U) GSCUCOM

(a) (G/CO REL GBR AUS) Conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) of forces in Turkey to facilitate deployment and employment of forces.

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(b) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Coordinate HN support (basing, overflight, engineering, and logistics) for operations from Turkey.

(c) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Provide ODN forces OPCON to USCENTCOM. USEUCOM will retain ADCON over ODN forces.

(d) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Provide inter-theater and intra-theater lift support, and aerial refueling support, as required.

(e) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Provide force protection for forces to include MSC shipping within the EUCOM AOR as required.

(f) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Provide direct support and general support logistics and Base Operating Support (BOS) to OPC forces based in, or employed from, the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

(g) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Provide theater SOF subject matter expert augmentation to JSOTF-North as required.

(h) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Provide 1-2 SOF INOs to CPESC as requested.

(i) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Provide communications and intelligence support to JSOTF-north forces in Turkey and northern Iraq.

(j) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Support and coordinate 1st SPG(A) (JSOTF-north) operational preparation of the battle space [OPB]. ISO of USCENTCOM 14b

(k) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Support and coordinate support to USCENTCOM OOD infrastructure development ISO of IW/UR

(l) 1S/OC REL-080-AUS: Provide CONOPS for air delivery of lethal supplies ISO JSOTF-north to include use of conventional A/C when JSOTF-North A/C are unavailable.

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(n) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) Support, coordinate and integrate into theater non-conventional assisted recovery planning and execution.

(o) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) Provide detailed support for EPW handling ISO northern CFC forces. MD-30 Aug 92.

(p) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) Provide CMC support to CFC forces employed from Turkey.

(q) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) In conjunction with EUCOM FWD, the Turkish General Staff (TCG), the US Embassy (Ankara), the Turkish NATO, and CFCM coordinate the movement of ISO/NGO humanitarian assistance into Northern Iraq IOT provide immediate relief for displaced civilians.

(r) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) Establish Military Coordination Center (MCC) IOT synchronize support operations with Turkish military forces in southeast Turkey and de-conflict the activities of coalition forces operating ISO CFCM.

(s) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) Establish Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) in Turkey.

(t) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) BPT accept additional forces and assist USG agencies, UN, and designated NGOs in the provision and security of HA/relief supplies.

(u) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) BPT support bulk distribution of HA/relief supplies into Northern Iraq.

(v) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) BPT execute emergency aircraft re-supply of JSTOF north forces to include use of conventional A/C when JSTOF north A/C are unavailable.

(w) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) BPT air deliver non-lethal aid supplies to include HA ISO JSTOF-north.

(x) (S/OC RBL GBR AUS) BPT receive medical evacuees from USCENTCOM AOR and assist with class VIII A and B sustainment and emergency re-supply.
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[y] (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BFT support humanitarian assistance operations in northern Iraq IOT minimize the impact of displaced civilians on operations.

[9] (U) USPACOM

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Receive, support, and sustain forces in Diego Garcia.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide MPSRON support.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deploy forces ISO CEBT from operations as required.

[10] (U) USSTRANSCOM

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish tanker bridge to enable deployment/employment of global power and strike aircraft.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish strategic air and airlift bridge to enable deployment/employment of CFC forces, equipment, and sustainment.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide tanker support to USAF, USN, USMC tactical aircraft.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BFT provide strategic airlift to CONUS for WMD samples.

[11] (U) USSTRATCOM

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) At the direction of the CINC, BFT execute TMA in response to Iraqi WMD activities.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct satellite-related tasks as required to support CFC information operations.

[12] (U) [b] (3) 50 USC § 3507

See Annex V.

[13] (U) Department of State. See Annex V.

[14] (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Department of the Treasury. See Annex V.
d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) This order is effective for planning upon receipt and execution on order. Direct liaison and coordination is authorized among components, supporting commands, and supporting agencies for development of supporting operational concepts and plans.

(2) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) At D-Day, upon initiation of Phase II operations in Iraq, components are relieved of responsibility to execute DESERT BADGER and DESERT FURY immediate response.

(3) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) SPT provide personnel to man the Joint Real Tactical Operations Center (JrTOC) when established by the JRAC.

(4) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phasing times are provided for planning only. Actual times are based on the situation at the time of execution:

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) N-DAY, presidential notification. C-DAY MINUS FIVE (S-MIN-5).

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) C-DAY, commencement of deployment.


(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) G-DAY, commencement of decisive offensive operations. On CONCENT order to initiate ground operations. G-Day is the transition to Phase III. CONCENT DE #5.

(5) (S/REL GBR AUS) MOFP level delegated to component commanders.
(6) (S/REL GBR AUS) No air or ground operations within xx miles of air operations within 25 km (north of 31 degrees north latitude) of the Iraq - Iran border without CFC authorization. CCLC/CPACC will determine appropriate control measures south of 31 degrees north latitude to support combat operations and maintain Iranian sovereignty.

(7) (S/REL GBR AUS) Defended Asset List (DAL). See Tab A (DAL) to Appendix 17 (TMD) of Annex C (Operations).

(8) (S/REL GBR AUS) Deep attack and cross-border reconnaissance and ground delivered fires authorized at commencement of D-Day.

(9) (S/REL GBR AUS) Component commands will conduct personnel recovery operations in support of their own forces within their capability. All components will be prepared to support joint personnel recovery operations through coordination with the JSRC as required.

(a) (S/REL GBR AUS) All component RCC’s or functional equivalents will immediately notify the JSRC of any situation that isolates their personnel on the battlespace. Components are required to follow up immediate notification with hard copy (GENTEXT message) Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR) per CCR 525-33.

(b) (S/REL GBR AUS) All components must establish an initial repatriation point to receive isolated personnel who are returned to friendly control IAW CCR 525-10. Coordinate with the JSRC for all repatriation actions.

(c) (S/REL GBR AUS) Coordinate requirements with USCENTAF/A3-DOOR to develop and distribute blood chits, Evasion Plans of Action (EPA), and DD form 1833 Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREP) to support this CONPLAN. Ensure that each person subject to action in a hostile environment provides individual authentication data on an ISOPREP. Maintain copies of all ISOPREP’s at unit intelligence level, component RCC’s and/or the JSRC, as directed, in the SAR/CSAR/Personnel Recovery (PR) SPINS. Commanders will also insure these same persons develop an Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) or review an existing EPA each time they operate over or in potentially hostile areas.
(d) (U) Ensure assigned forces receive appropriate level PR / Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) theater preparation. Coordinate requirements with the JSRC IAM CCR 525-33.

(e) (S/REL GBR AUS) Components establish, operate and maintain a Recovery Coordination Center (RCC) and integrate with the joint personnel recovery architecture at the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC).

10) (U) Public affairs

(a) (S/REL GBR AUS) Release of information concerning this operation is not authorized. Pending OSD (PA) coordination, and after OSD announcement, modifications to PA posture will be published by USCENTCOM. Direct all questions to USCENTCOM public affairs, CCPA, DSN: (606)

(b) (U) Guidance for Command Information Programs

1. (U/REL GBR AUS) General order number 1A, as amended 30 Nov 01, remains in effect. Commanders will ensure compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

2. (S/REL GBR AUS) Protect the underlying true reasons for all deployments.

3. (S/REL GBR AUS) Statements regarding force movements can be misleading, but must be true. Attribute unit movements to ongoing support for OEF, planned exercises, and/or operations in the Horn of Africa where possible.

4. (S/REL GBR AUS) De-emphasize the size and emphasize the capabilities of all deploying units. Ensure command messages highlight the counter-terrorism capabilities of the unit.

5. (S/REL GBR AUS) Commanders will avoid the following: reference to U.S. - Israeli ties; implication of superiority of western culture; support for the particular interests of religious or ethnic minority groups in the region; political commitments or policy announcements without prior approval of USCENTCOM; and atrocity themes, unless specifically approved by USCENTCOM.
(21) [U] Deception Story. See Tab A to Appendix C to Annex C.

(22) [U] Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)

(a) [U] Critical Information Requirements.

1. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) A major terrorist attack within the U.S.

2. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Any TBM launch from or within Iraq.

3. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Loss of basing, staging or access in a Tier 1 or Tier 2 country.

4. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Any use of WMD within the AOR.

5. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Any change to the status of the Iraqi Regime.

6. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Any retaliatory or indicators of intent to retaliate against Iraq.

(b) [U] Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). See Appendix 1 to Annex B.

(c) [U] Critical Friendly Force Intelligence (CFFI)

1. [U] PHASE 1:

1.1 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Are TMD architecture and assets in place and operational? (AAOC)

1.2 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Are CFACC assets postured to support mission? (Strike, CAS, ISR, CSAR, C2) (CFACC)

1.3 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Is SOF prepared for insertion? (CFSOCC)

1.4 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Is CSS positioned to sustain SOF operations? (CFACC/CFLCC/CFSOCC)

1.5 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Is CSS positioned to sustain CFACC operations? (CFACC/CFXCC)
1.6 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Is CFLCC prepared to receive the MEU (CFLCC)

1.7 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Is SLOC open? (CFMCC)

1.8 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Is time available for MEU to transition ashore? (CFMCC/MARENT)

1.9 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Is another force available for theater reserve? (F2C2)

1.10 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Is A-Day beddown complete? (CFACC/CFMCC)

1.11 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Are 5X CVBGs in place? (CFACC/CFMCC)

1.12 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Are sufficient CFLCC forces postured to seize Southern Oil Fields? (CFLCC)

1.13 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Are SOF and UGs prepared to neutralize I2 units along Green Line? (CFSOCC)

1.14 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Are CFACC assets postured to support mission? (Strike, CAS, ISR, CSAR, C2, Airlift) (CFACC)

2. (U) PHASE II:

2.1 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Are TF144 assets postured for operations and de-conflicted with CFSoC? (TF-144/CFSOCC)

2.2 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Are CSS assets positioned to sustain TF144 operations? (CFLCC/CFACC)

2.3 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Is target intel confirmed by ISR? (M2 ISR)

2.4 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Is CAS/CSAR available? (CFACC)

2.5 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Are sufficient CFLCC assets postured to execute ground operations? (CFLCC)

2.6 (OCC REL GBR AUS) Is 40 CDO positioned to secure AI Faw pumping station?
2.7 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Have UN outposts been vacated? (CFLCC)

2.8 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Is CSS positioned to sustain CFLCC operations? (CFLCC)

2.9 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Are HA assets positioned/available to execute future HA operations? (CFLCC)

2.10 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Are ISR platforms tracking ROCF movement? (J2 ISR)

2.11 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Has sufficient degradation of IADS been achieved? (CFACC)

2.12 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Are locations of CFSSCC ER assets known? (CFACC/CFSSCC)

2.13 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Are CPACC assets postured and deconflicted to support CFSSCC and CFLCC sustainment and aerial resupply requirements as directed? (CFACC)

2.14 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Are sufficient mobility support forces [TALCE, MSL, etc] postured in ITO to open and support terminal operations at Saddam International O/O? (CFACC)

2.15 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Is the MEDEVAC system in place and forces and assets postured to support rearward movement of casualties? (CFLCC)

3. (U) PHASE III:

3.1 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Does CFLCC require the MEU? (CFLCC)

3.2 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Is 377th in control of UN Qasr? (CFLCC)

3.3 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Does CFLCC have sufficient combat power and CSS to conduct exploitation operations? (CFLCC)

3.4 (SECRET/ORDON RNL CBR AUS) Is CSS postured to sustain exploitation operations? (CFLCC)
3.5 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Are forces postured to seize and reinforce SIAP? (CFLCC)

3.6 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Have friendly forces secured Um Qasar and Basra Airfield and are they prepared to assist IO/GNC efforts? (CFLCC)

3.7 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Are IOs/GNC prepared to provide HA? Are HA supplies positioned? (JS-CMO)

3.8 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Are military and HN CSS assets postured to sustain planned operations? (CFLCC/JS-CMO)

3.9 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Are MSR/LOCs cleared or marked to enable CMC/HA flow? (CFLCC)

3.10 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Have CPAC terminal FOB terminal area security requirements been fulfilled to conduct night mobility airlift or airdrop sustainment operations?

3.11 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Have CPAC terminal FOB terminal area security requirements been fulfilled to conduct day mobility airlift or airdrop sustainment operations?

3.12 (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Are mobility support forces postured and in place for FOB airlift operations as directed?

(d) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)

1. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Details of numbers of combat systems, readiness status, and Assembly/Bed Down areas.

2. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Numbers and types of naval assets protecting strategic choke points along critical SLOCs.

3. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Timing and routing of strategic sealift assets flowing forces into theater.

4. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Timing and routing off strategic airlift assets flowing forces into theater.

5. (S/OC REL CBR AUS) Status of APODs, SPODs.
6. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Status of tanker air-bridge.

7. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Status of JRSO1 for major units (combat BDE and larger).

8. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Patriot missile deployment sites and associated missile types.

9. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Status and vulnerability of C4ISR capabilities and functionality.
   - Computer Network Critical Juncions
   - Satellite communication ground links
   - Coalition C2 capabilities/limitations


11. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Movements of key leaders (combatant and component commanders).

12. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Timing of major combat operations (prior to execution).

13. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Locations and missions of SOF Forces.

14. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Locations and missions of CGAs.

15. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Identity, locations, and operations of UW forces.

16. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Status river-crossing capabilities.

17. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Locations of unit command post elements.

18. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Status, timing and routing of intra-theater airlift forces operating in the theater.

19. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Locations and missions of intra-theater mobility forces.

20. (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Identity, status and quantity of passengers and cargo on board intra-theater airlift missions.
(e) [U] Requirements for Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.

1. [U] b 3 10 USC § 424 Chief, Central Security Service

(a) [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Provide tailored support to CDR, USCENTCOM/JTF, as required.

(b) [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Provide (to include and Information Security (INFOSEC)) advice and assistance to CDR, USCENTCOM through the NSA/CSS Representative (NCR) and Services Group (CSG) USCENTCOM. See Appendix 2 for details.

(c) [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Prepare a Support Plan (CSP) for this OPORD.

(d) [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Coordinate and related activities.

(e) [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Provide NCR USCENTCOM sufficient personnel, equipment, technical materials, parts, maintenance, and logistics to establish and support a CSS at the USCENTCOM forward deployed Headquarters.

(f) [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Coordinate with Service Elements to ensure appropriate and sufficient support exists at USCENTCOM component commands and joint task forces.

2. [C/OC REL CDR AUS] b 3 10 USC § 424 is requested to provide the following support. Coordinate support through [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Representative at USCENTCOM.

(a) [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Conduct intelligence collection operations world-wide in support of this OPORD.

(b) [C/OC REL CDR AUS] Task Defense Attacheés and collection elements to report intelligence information immediately and directly to CDR, USCENTCOM in response to collection requirements.
(c) (U) Prepare periodic threat / counter-intelligence assessments pertaining to the AO, as required.

(d) (S/GC-rel-CFR-AUS) Be prepared, upon presidential notification, to pass collection tasking authority of in theater national intelligence activities and assets to CDR, USCENTCOM IAW DOD Directive 5-3325.2.

(e) (U) Provide intelligence support to operational planning, production, I&W, IO, and collections.

(f) (U) Ensure expeditious dissemination of all national collection program information.

(g) (S/GC-rel-CFR-AUS) Prepare joint intelligence plans to support collection, production, and dissemination of national level intelligence to the theater, including plans to support deployable national capabilities.

(h) (U) Prepare assessments of national collection resource capabilities to support military operations.

(i) (U) Establish and maintain a dynamic intelligence priorities system to support collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence in support of this plan.

(j) (U) Advise the CCJ2 on interoperability issues concerning support to intelligence systems and architectures.

(k) (S/GC-rel-CFR-AUS) Identify and recommend solutions to deficiencies that may develop concerning implementation of this plan.

(l) (S/GC-rel-CPR-AUS) Establish Collection Operations Bases (COB) (north and south) to conduct RUMINT collection operations.

(m) (S/GC-rel-CFR-AUS) Provide augmentation personnel to CCJ2-X and be prepared to provide
augmentation to the Joint Intelligence Center Central (JICCENT).

(b) [S/CC REL OBR AUS) Provide personnel and material support to CFLCC-operated HKs, JIPs, JCMCEs, JDECs, and JIDCs, as appropriate.

14c

(p) [S/CC REL OBR AUS] Establish and maintain secure 24 hour JWICS connectivity from the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) to the USCENTCOM JIC.

3. [U] Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (DIANA). Provide Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S) support IAW Annex M of this OPORD, and as requested by CDR, USCENTCOM.


(a) [S/CC REL OBR AUS) Deploy Site Assessment Team (SAT) to provide screening of suspected WMD sites in advance of Mobile Exploitation Teams (MET), assistance to METs as required, and collect record and report indications of WMD to SSE planners in support of CFLCC SSE mission.

(b) [S/CC REL OBR AUS] Deploy Direct Support Team (DST) to provide Nuclear / Radiological Search capabilities in support of CFLCC SSE mission.

(b)(3) 50 USC § 3507
(g) (S/SCI REL GSA AUS) Provide equipment, connectivity, personnel, and access to the NUCIC Data System (NDS) at the deployed imagery collection section of USCENTCOM (or subordinate JTF).

(13) (S/SCI REL GSA AUS) USCENTCOM will provide Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) / Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) IOT facilitate focused strike operations in established killboxes. USCENTCOM will provide approved killbox structure to CFACC. Updates will appear in the Airspace Coordination Order (ACO). Further guidance on engagement zone operations
will be published in Tab A (Air Fire Plan) to Appendix 19 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations) of this CONPLAN.

(14) **SECRET/OSCOM REL DDR AUG** Force Protection. Commanders will establish an aggressive AT/FP program to protect U.S. and coalition forces and support the coalition force's ability to successfully complete the operation. This will be accomplished by ensuring implementation and enforcement of DOD and USCENTCOM standards and policies for force protection. Commanders will coordinate with base/installation commanders to ensure proper security measures are followed to protect the force. In cases where there is no base or installation commander, the senior commander will assume force protection responsibilities. (See Appendix 15 to Annex C)

(15) **SECRET/OSCOM REL DDR AUG** Legal Considerations

(a) **SECRET/OSCOM REL DDR AUG** International Law. International law recognizes the inherent right of a sovereign state, either alone or in conjunction with allies, to use military force in national self-defense. This principle is enshrined in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

(b) **SECRET/OSCOM REL DDR AUG** Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). All activities of U.S. forces will be consistent with LOAC. Operational plans and orders developed in furtherance of this plan will be reviewed by a judge advocate for consistency with U.S. domestic law, international law and the LOAC.

(c) **SECRET/OSCOM REL DDR AUG** Legal obligations of an occupying force.

(1) **SECRET/OSCOM REL DDR AUG** In the case of occupied enemy territory, US forces must be aware of their obligations under Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907 (see FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare) and custom international law. Commanders should seek legal guidance on and formulate a plan for issues that arise during an occupation of enemy territory.

(2) **SECRET/OSCOM REL DDR AUG** Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of US forces and when that authority can be effectively exercised.
Occupation does not constitute annexation of the territory.

(3)(U) Once territory is occupied, US forces shall take all measures in their power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.

(4)(U) US forces will respect the fundamental human rights of the civilian population in the occupied territory. For example, family honor and rights, private property, the lives of persons, and religious convictions and practices will be respected.

(5)(U) If resources in the occupied territory are inadequate, US forces shall ensure, to the extent that military conditions permit, that the civilian population in the occupied territory is provided with food, medical supplies, and medical treatment.

(c) `(S/CC REL GBR AUS)` Rules of Engagement (ROE). The following ROE are in effect: CJCS standing ROE; USCENTCOM theater-specific ROE; ENDURING FREEDOM ROE Serial Two (CJCS 21315Z NOV OCT 01), including modifications 001 through 004; ROE Authorization Serial One Operation ENDURING FREEDOM EXPANDED MIG (CJCS 171145Z SEP 02); YEMEN PHASE II EXORD/HOS (CJCS 121514 OCT 02); ROE authorization Serial Seven/Southwest Asia Region, including changes 001 and 002; and OPERATION DESERT SPRING ROE; and MJO ROE, including changes 001 and 002.

(d) `(S/CC REL GBR AUS)` Text of foregoing ROE are available

(e) `(S/CC REL GBR AUS)` Current ROE (OPERATIONS NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN WATCH): U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 986 (Movement Restrictions South of 32N Latitude) and the current ROE CJCS OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH ROE Serial Seven (DTG 101522Z Jan 99), including MODS 001 and 002 remain in effect. These arrangements allow any and all aircraft airborne at the time of incident to engage targets associated with Iraqi (IADS) south of 33N latitude if a hostile act is committed or hostile intent demonstrated. Operations in southern Iraq are conducted IAW CONOPS 2003 (COMUSCENTCOM 18225Z OCT 02). Current ROE
authorizes USCENTCOM to engage and destroy positively identified:

1. (S/CG REL GBR AUS) Military units penetrating south of 32N latitude within Iraq to include interdicting key LOC’s.

2. (S/CG REL GBR AUS) Recognized enhancements of military capability south of 32N latitude within Iraq. Includes multiple rocket launchers (MRL) and surface-to-surface missile systems.

3. (S/CG REL GBR AUS) SAMs (radars, transporter erector launchers (TEL’s)), resupply vehicles, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), man-portable air defense missiles, early warning (EW) and target acquisition radar (TAR) that either deploy to south of 33N latitude or that have moved or been enhanced (repaired, rebuilt, or reinforced) within Iraq south of 33N latitude.

4. (S/CG REL GBR AUS) SAMs, C2 facilities (Air Defense Operations Centers (ADOCs), Sector Operation Centers (SOCs), Intercept Operations Centers (IOC’s), Ground Control Intercept (GCI) sites, Reporting Posts (RP’s) and communications nodes), and military airfields and military aircraft within Iraq and south of 33N latitude supporting No Fly Zone (NFZ) and air defense operations.

5. (S/CG REL GBR AUS) In self defense, other IADS elements, military aircraft and airfields throughout Iraq that pose an imminent threat and place mission accomplishment at risk.

(S/CG REL GBR AUS) ROE in support of this OPLAN will be issued by SECDEF and CFC and published SEPCOR. The ROE contained in Annex C are for planning purposes only.

(S/CG REL GBR AUS) The status of U.S. personnel captured by Iraqi armed forces will be POW. Personnel held by other entities not affiliated with the Iraqi government will be considered hostages.

(S/CG REL GBR AUS) Mines. Non-self destructing/non-self deactivating anti-personnel and anti-tank land mines are prohibited with the exception of command detonated claymore mines. USCENTCOM Commander approval is required to employ
military operations. However, Commander, USCENTCOM intends to delegate the authority to employ mines to at least the component commander level. In addition to the guidance provided in Appendix B of Annex C, further guidance will be provided by SEFCOR. SECDIF has retained approval authority for employment of conventional mines. All safeguards regarding SCATMINE warnings, recording, and reporting obstacles will be observed.

(17) (S/OC REL-GBR AUS) Forces should minimize entering and avoid damaging or violating holy shrines, mosques or other religious, historical, or archeological sites or structures.

(18) (S/OC REL-GBR AUS) Joint Rear Area Coordination. The designated Joint Rear Area (JRA) is that area that directly affects CFLCC's ability to conduct and support operations. The remainder of the JOA will continue to function and operate under currently established command, control, reporting, and communications procedures.

(a) (S/OC REL-GBR AUS) The CFLCC JRA is defined as Kuwait and the portion of the Saudi Arabian coast line, inland to include the GLOCC, south to include the ports of Jubayl and Ad Dammam. CFLCC will provide JRAAC functions for the JRA.

(b) (S/OC REL-GBR AUS) JRA functions for the remaining land area of the JOA are the responsibility of those commands with current missions in those locations. Areas not specifically assigned to a command will become the responsibility of the component/CJTF with the preponderance of forces or as specified in an appropriate order/PRAGO. Base commanders, tenant units or commands from components based in those locations will report security status to USCENTCOM J30-Qatar through the specified component commander.

(c) (S/OC REL-GBR AUS) Commanders will establish an aggressive ATTF program to protect US and coalition forces and support the coalition forces' ability to successfully complete the operation. DOD and USCENTCOM standards and policies will apply to the force protection of all forces OPCOM to CPC. Commanders will coordinate with base/installation commanders to ensure proper security measures are followed to protect the force. Components will support JRAAC operations in the defense of the rear areas, provide rear area security and force protection, to include
response and defeat of Level II threat, for assigned areas of responsibility.

(19) ($/OC RSL OOB AUS) funding. Component commands or parent services will fund the cost of this operation and capture all incremental costs. DOD funds shall not be used to provide lethal or non-lethal supplies directly or indirectly to OOS. Humanitarian assistance expenses will be funded from an emerging ops fund. DOD transportation of non-DOD purchased lethal or non-lethal supplies to OOS is authorized. Any resupply drops that are directed exclusively to non-DOD personnel will be accomplished pursuant to the Economy Act. Report costs to service comptrollers.

(20) ($/OC RSL OOB AUS) Use of JDPES is directed.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Concept of Support

(1) ($/OC RSL OOB AWM) General. Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) will be executed through Commander USCENTCOM directive authority for logistics (DAL). Commander USCENTCOM will perform JTLM through the operations of Boards, Bureaus, Centers and Offices (BBCO). With the Coalition Logistics Operations Center (CLOC) serving as the central point responsible for the fusion of joint theater logistics. The CLOC will synchronize, integrate, monitor and coordinate logistic operations based on Commander USCENTCOM priorities. Logistics support within the AOR remains a service responsibility and is executed through USCENTCOM components. Commander USCENTCOM provides general support/direct support logistics and base operating support (BOS) to JFC forces based in or employed from the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), specifically TURKEY. Once CFLCC forces cross the Turkey/Iraq border, Commander USCENTCOM continues providing general support logistics to those CFLCC forces in IRAQ that employed from Turkey. CFLCC will receive GS logistics from Commander USCENTCOM forces and provide DS logistics to JFC forces inside IRAQ. Within IRAQ, CSPCC forces employed from Turkey will receive DS from Commander USCENTCOM forces via airland/airdrop or if possible DS on an area support basis from OOS forces. If required, Commander USCENTCOM CSS forces must be prepared to cross into Northern IRAQ in support of CYLCC and CSPCC operations. COMUSCENTCOM will provide direct support logistics to forces in Diego Garcia. Operations in the IRAQ Theater of Operations are the logistics support main effort within the USCENTCOM AOR.

c. (U) Health Service Support (HSS)

(1) (S/CC REL GBR AUS) Strategic level medical support in the joint operational area will be characterized by:
(a) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] Tailored, forward deployed surgical/evacuation capabilities designed to facilitate rapid stabilization and evacuation of casualties to level IV medical treatment facilities to ensure maximum availability of the limited inpatient bed capacity within the joint operational area.

(b) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] Responsive intra- and inter-theater aeromedical evacuation.

(c) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] Optimization of joint HSS capabilities.

(d) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] USEUCOM bed expansion and early employment of J.S. Navy hospital ship.

(e) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] Host Nation medical facilities may be used to offset U.S. medical requirements only if such support is reliable, measurable, and is equivalent to U.S. standards of clinical treatment.

(2) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] HSS is a service component responsibility, to include bed down site support. Units will deploy with organic Level I and II capabilities. Units without organic medical support will identify requirements to their higher HQ for resolution and coordination with CCSS.

(3) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] Movement of patients (inter/intra theater) will be requested through the Joint Patient Movements Requirements Center (JP-MRC), as appropriate.

(4) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] Class VIIIA Support. Units will deploy with service standard basic load of supply. Components will establish procedures for Class VIIIA sustainment through the CFLLC Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM). Components will establish accounting and distribution procedures for Class VIIIA from APD93 to requesting activities.

(5) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] Class VIIIB Support. Components will establish procedures to identify Class VIIIB requirements and submit consolidated requisitions to the USCENTCOM Joint Blood Program Office (JBP).}

(6) [S/CC RSL GER AUS] Aeromedical Evacuation (AE). AE forces have deployed to the AOX and established a tactical and
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strategic aeromedical evacuation system.

(7) [S/OC REL GBR AUS] Medical Regulating. USCENTCOM has established a Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC) at PSAB, KSA. Components will establish procedures for units to identify medical regulating requirements via TRAC2ES to component headquarters and the JPMRC. Component surgeons will maintain in-transit visibility (ITV) of all personnel transiting the AE system.

(8) [S/OC REL GBR AUS] Force Health Protection (FHP). Components will comply with (pre/post deployment) FHP requirements identified by USCENTCOM and available on USCENTCOM website - SPMGENF and/or CCSD as supplemented by individual unit deployment guidelines to include USCENTCOM message DGT 032242 OCT 01 Subject: USCENTCOM Personnel Policy Guidance.

(9) [S/OC REL GBR AUS] Preventive medicine support will be planned for and implemented at all ISB, FOB, APCD, and SPCD locations in support of operations.

(10) [S/OC REL GBR AUS] Medical Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) of medical and AE units will be IAW service and component Policies. Operational Control of the JPMRC and JSRF resides with USCENTCOM. CCSD is the senior medical staff advisor to USCENTCOM. Components will initiate and sustain reporting procedures IAW established standard operating procedures.

(11) [S/OC REL GBR AUS] Medical Reporting. Medical surveillance/MEDESIRE reporting is required and will be accomplished by existing theater SOP and Annex Q to this plan.

d. (U) Personnel

(1) (U) For Phases I and IV of the operation, component / supporting commanders will inform USCENTCOM of U.S. service member casualties by OPERF-3 Report, or the fastest available means. During phases II and III, daily casualty information will be reported to USCENTCOM via the Joint Personnel Status Report (OPPERSTAT). Report the status of isolated personnel as Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown (DUSTWUN). Coordinate with the component RCC and the JSRC to ensure consistent status reporting is maintained. Component/supporting commanders will also notify the applicable service casualty POCS identified in paragraph 4.d.(2) below and provide them

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the information in paragraph 4.d.(3) below. When reporting casualties through the appropriate service channels, USCENTCOM CCIJ will be an info addressee on all service casualty reports.

(2) (U) Commanders will contact the following service component POC's in the event of a casualty. This reporting, additive to JPERSSTAT requirements, is for next of kin purposes and is time sensitive.

(a) (U) United States Army. Commanders will report all U.S. Army casualties directly to the Kuwait Casualty Assistance Center (CAC). The Kuwait CAC is responsible for directly notifying HQ DA Casualty Branch and providing an information copy to HQ USCENTCOM/CCIJ. Points of contact at the Kuwait CAC may be reached at DSN 6.6.

(b) (U) United States Navy. Commanders will report all navy casualties to the COMNAVPERSCOM Millington, TN PERS-621/and MBR's parent command if MBR TAD to a different unit. Navy JAG WASHINGTON DC//95// and BURIED WASHINGTON DC//MED-31//; NAVSUPFAC BAHRAIN//MED CLINIC//JJ1//; COMUSNAVCENT//N4//N014//; and USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCIJ// should be information addresses. Points of contact at COMNAVPERSCOM may be reached after duty hours.

(c) (U) United States Marine Corps. Commanders will report all Marine casualties to the service member's parent command or HQ Marine Corps Casualty Section if unable to notify the parent command. Commanders will provide an information copy to HQ USCENTCOM/CCIJ, USNARCENT (Bahrain). Points of contact at HQ U.S. Marine Corps Casualty Section can be reached after duty hours at DSN 6.6. HQ U.S. Marine Corps Casualty Section may be reached during duty hours at DSN 6.6 commercial.

(d) (U) United States Air Force. Commanders will report all Air Force casualties to the supporting Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) or HQ Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) casualty services branch if a PERSCO team is not available. Commanders will provide
(3) (U) When contacting the service representatives in accordance with the above subparagraphs, commanders must be prepared to provide the following information in an unclassified format: type of casualty (hostile or non-hostile); casualty status (deceased or injured); category (military or civilian); SSN; name; rank; incident date/time; circumstances; and inflicting force (enemy or friendly fire). If any of the above information is classified, that item must be identified as "classified" and reported to the service casualty representatives in a separate classified message.

(4) (U) The following definitions from CJCSM 3150.11, Joint Reporting Structure - Personnel Manual, 1 Aug 99, will be used to categorize casualties:

(a) (U) HCAS - Hostile Casualties. A person who is the victim of a terrorist activity or who becomes a casualty "in action." "In action" characterizes the casualty as having been the direct result of hostile action, sustained in combat or relating thereto, or sustained going to or returning from a combat mission provided that the occurrence was directly related to hostile action. Included are persons killed or wounded, mistakenly or accidentally, by friendly force directed at a hostile force or where thought to be a hostile force. Exceptions are injuries or deaths due to the elements, self-inflicted wounds, combat fatigue, and, except in unusual cases, wounds or death inflicted by a friendly force while the individual is in AWOL, deserter, or dropped from role status or is voluntarily absent from a place of duty. The exceptions are not considered as sustained in action and are not to be interpreted as hostile casualties.

1. (U) KIA - Killed In Action. Casualty category applicable to a hostile casualty who is killed outright or who dies as a result of wounds received or other injuries before reaching a medical treatment facility.

2. (U) WIA - Wounded In Action. Casualty category applicable to a hostile casualty who received an injury due to external agent or cause.
(b) (U) NHCAS - Non-hostile Casualties. A person who becomes a casualty because of circumstances not directly attributable to hostile action or terrorist activity. Casualties due to the elements, self-inflicted wounds, and combat fatigue are non-hostile casualties.

1. (U) DO - Death Other. Personnel who died as a result of an accident or illness not related to hostilities during the reporting period.

2. (U) DUSTWUN - Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown. A transitory casualty status, applicable only to military personnel, that is used when the responsible commander suspects the member may be a casualty whose absence is involuntary but does not believe sufficient evidence currently exists to make a definitive determination of missing or deceased. Use this to report personnel designated as isolated and reported as such to the JSRC for recovery operations.

(c) (U) Missing

1. (U) Missing. A person is declared missing if the individual is: (a) beleaguered, (b) besieged, (c) captured, (d) detained, (e) interned, (f) missing, or (g) missing in action. Exclude personnel who are in an AWOL, deserter, or dropped from rolls status.

2. (U) Missing in Action (MIA). The casualty is a hostile casualty who is not present at his or her duty location because of apparently involuntary reasons and whose location is unknown. MIA is a subset of Missing. Commanders will initially place casualties that fall in this category in the DUSTWUN category pending an investigation.

(f) (U) For further casualty assistance or if you are unable to contact the services contact HQ USCENTCOM/J1 DSN: [b 6]

(b) (6)

c. (U) Religious Support

1. (U) The Command Chaplain, USCENTCOM (CCCH) will advise the Commander(s) on issues relating to religion, morals, morality, and ethics. The CCCH will also assist in
identifying religious sites and provide input relating to indigenous religious groups.

2. (U) The CCCH will coordinate with the command chaplain teams of Component Commands, other Unified Commands, and Coalition Forces to manage religious support throughout the area of responsibility, ensuring seamless religious support through all phases of the operation.

3. (U) Component Command Chaplains will provide SITREPS as required. See Annex A Reports.

5. (U) Command and Control
   a. (U) Command
      1) (U) Command Relationships
         a. (U/SCI REL CBR AUS) CDR USCENTCOM is the Combined Force Commander (CFC).
         b. (U/SCI REL CBR AUS) CDR USCENTCOM retains CCDC of service component commanders: COMUSARCENT (Commander 3d Army), COMUSCENTAF (Commander 9th Air Force), COMUSNAVCENT (Commander Fifth Fleet), COMMARCENT, and COMSOCCENT.
         c. (U/SCI REL CBR AUS) The following service component commanders are designated as functional component commanders:
            1. (U/SCI REL CBR AUS) COMUSARCENT (Commander 3d Army) is the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and is responsible for the conduct of land operations in the ITO. The CFLCC will also serve as JMFR in the area designated in paragraph 3.
            2. (U/SCI REL CBR AUS) COMUSCENTAF (Commander 9th Air Force) is the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), Airspace Control Authority (ACA), and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and is responsible for the conduct of air operations in the ITO. Additionally, the CFACC serves as the Personnel Recovery Coordinator and is responsible for the conduct of personnel recovery throughout the ITO.
            3. (U/SCI REL CBR AUS) COMUSNAVCENT (Commander Fifth Fleet) is the Combined Forces Maritime Component
Commander (CFCC) and is responsible for the conduct of naval operations in the ITO.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMSOCCENT is the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Commander (CFSOCOCC) and is responsible for the conduct of special operations in the USCENTCOM theater of war (AOR). CFSOCC retains OPCON of U.S. special operations forces, except selected Civil Affairs and tactical PSYOP forces, which will be OPCON to CFLCC until Phase IV. CFSOCC exercises command and control of coalition special operations forces as determined by individual country requirements and agreements. Designated CFSOCC forces operating in the ITO will be TACON to CFLCC if in direct support of CFLCC. CA and tactical PSYOP forces are in direct support of CFLCC and CFLCC subordinate units. Those CA and tactical PSYOP forces will be OPCON to CFLCC until Phase IV.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMUSMARCENT is responsible to CFC for the deployment of Marine forces and for the conduct of CM operations in the USCENTCOM AOR to include the Afghanistan ITO. COMUSMARCENT gives CFLCC TACON of 1 MEF. Marine forces operating in the ITO may be TACON to other component commanders.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CDR USCENTCOM (CFC) exercises C2 relationships with the following subordinate commands:

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Commander 8th BN, 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) is Commander Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (COMJPTF). COMJPTF is OPCON to CDR USCENTCOM, and is responsible for the conduct of psychological operations and is the coordinating authority for PSYOP in the USCENTCOM AOR.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) TF 144 is OPCON to CDR USCENTCOM and conducts special operations throughout the ITO.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) OPCON-ONW air forces and air assets will be transferred OPCON from CDR USEUCOM to CDR USCENTCOM for the conduct of operations in the ITO. All air assets flowing into Turkey ISO the ITO are OPCON to CDR USCENTCOM. CDR USEUCOM will retain ADCON of ONW forces. OPCON of ONW forces will be delegated to service component commanders.

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4. (S/REL RED AUS) USCENTCOM CPFACC has coordinating authority with CINCUSNAVAFOR/CIF to execute MAM tasking for USNORTHCOM naval forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean in support of operations in the ITO. CIF has TACON of assigned maritime strike forces. USCENTCOM CPFACC has coordinating authority with USNORTHCOM air forces providing direct support to USCENTCOM. CPFACC assumes TACON of USNORTHCOM air forces NLT N-Day.

5. (S/REL RED AUS) CJTF [14a] is OCPON to CDU USCENTCOM. COMCJTF [14a] is responsible for the conduct of planning and execution of operations within the Afghanistan Theater of Operations.

6. (S/REL RED AUS) COMCJTF-Horn of Africa (HOF) is responsible for the conduct of all operations within CJOM HOF.

7. (S/REL RED AUS) CDR USCENTCOM has established a Joint Inter-agency Coordination Group (JIACG) as part of the USCENTCOM staff to coordinate interagency activities. CFC will employ the USCENTCOM JIACG to coordinate the activities of each US governmental agency commensurate with their capabilities in support of CFC operations in the ITO, in accordance with JCS guidance on JIACGs.

8. (S/REL RED AUS) Command and control relationships of coalition forces will be determined separately based on individual country requirements and published in appropriate fragmentary order.

9. (S/REL RED AUS) CFC forces that are employed in Iraq from Turkey are TACON to USEUCOM for force protection while in Turkey and ADCON to USEUCOM for logistics while in Turkey or Iraq.

10. (S/REL RED AUS) USEUCOM ground forces that cross into USCENTCOM AOR while supporting CFC forces in the ITO are TACON to CDR USCENTCOM.

(e) (S/REL RED AUS) During all operations, the main effort is the supported effort for planning and execution of operations in Iraq. All other component commanders are conducting supporting efforts. Main effort designation is CP500C during Phase I, CPFACC during Phase II, and CPFLCC during Phase III and IV. As directed by CFC, other
component commanders may be designated the supported commander for specified operations, specific periods of time, or in designated joint operations areas. All agencies are supporting agencies for planning and execution.

1. (S/REI-0820A) CFLCC is the functional component commander responsible for the conduct of land operations within the ITO. CFLCC is responsible for the de-confliction of land space usage and synchronization of all land operations within the ITO.

2. (S/REI-0820A) CFLCC will exercise OPCON or TACON of land forces based within the ITO.

3. (S/REI-0820A) All land operations executed in the ITO must be coordinated with the CFLCC.

4. (S/REI-0820A) CPMCC naval forces conducting amphibious operations into the ITO will coordinate with CFLCC for de-confliction and synchronization of operations.

5. (S/REI-0820A) CSPCC will retain OPCON of U.S. special operations forces. Those special operations forces operating in the CPMCC AOR become TACON to CFLCC.

(2) (U) Command Posts

(a) (S/REI-0820A) GDR USCENTCOM is designated the CPC and the primary CPC HQ is located initially at MacDill AFB, FL. CPC's Contingency Forward Headquarters (CFH) is in Qatar. CFH will be transferred to CFH as directed by COMUSCENTCOM.

(b) (S/REI-0820A) CFLCC (COMUSCENTCOM) HQ is forward deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait.

(c) (S/REI-0820A) CPACC (COMUSCENTAF) HQ is forward deployed to PSAB, KSA. BPT move from PSAB, KSA to Al Udeid, Qatar.

(d) (S/REI-0820A) CPMCC (COMUSNAVCENT) HQ is located at NSA, Bahrain.
(e) (S/SS REL GBR AUS) CFSOCC (COMSOCCENT) is forward deployed to As Salihiyah, Qatar.

(f) (S/SS REL GBR AUS) COMUSARCENT HQ is located at NSA Bahrain. CJTF-CM is located at Camp Doha, Kuwait.

(g) (S/SS REL GBR AUS) 8th PSYOP BN, 4th PSYOP Group is the CJOFT and is located at Ft Bragg, NC.

3. (U) Succession of Command

(a) (S/SS REL GBR AUS) In the event that command of the force must pass from one commander to another, succession of command is as follows:

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) General Franks, CDR USCENTCOM/CCRC.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) LTG Abizaid, Deputy Commander CFC (DCFC).

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) LiGen Delong, Deputy Commander USCENTCOM (DCCDC).

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) LTG McKinnon, Commander USCENTCOM/CFLCC.

(b) (S/SS REL GBR AUS) In the event that CFC HQ/USCENTCOM can not effectively command and control as a HQ, then command and control will temporarily pass to the CFLCC (COMUSARCENT HQ) and the CFACC (COMUSCENTAF HQ), in order.

B. (S/SS REL GBR AUS) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4. USCENTCOM component headquarters will assist deploying units with frequency allocations as required. USCENTCOM will receive component headquarters' requests for relative priorities and allocation of satellite channels/circuits. Priority will be given to TSR SATCOM requests, specifically SATCOM requests in support of Predator, Global Hawk and JSTARS.


TOMMY R. FRANKS

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General, USA
Commander in Chief

Annexes:
A-Task Organization
B-Intelligence
C-Operations
D-Logistics
E-Personnel
F-Public Affairs
G-Civil Affairs
H-Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
J-Command Relationships
K-Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
L-Environmental Considerations
M-Geospatial Considerations
N-Space Operations
P-Host Nation Support
Q-Medical Services
R-Reports
S-Special Technical Operations (SETCOR)
T-Consequence Management
U-Information Management
V-Interagency Coordination
X-Execution Checklist (Synchronization Matrix)
Z-Distribution