SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

HEADQUARTERS, US CENTRAL COMMAND
MACDILL AFB, FL 33621-5101
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USCENTCOM OPLAN 1003V(S/OC REL GBR AUS) CHANGE 1

(U) References: (a) Theater Campaign Plan
                    (b) CJCS Planning Order 092220Z Jul 02

1. (U) <u>Situation</u>

   a. (U) <u>General</u>

      (1) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) This is a Combined Force Commander
      (CFC) Operation Plan (OPLAN) for combat operations in the
      IRAQI Theater of Operations (ITO).

      (2)(S/REL GBR AUS) <u>Area of Operations.</u>

         (a)(S/REL GBR AUS) <u>Theater of War</u>. The USCENTCOM Theater
         of War is defined as the entire USCENTCOM AOR.
         USCENTCOM's AOR includes Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
         Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
         Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, United Arab
         Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Seychelles, Gulf of Aden,
         Gulf of Oman, Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. It also
         includes the countries of the central Asian region,
         Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
         Tajikistan, and the Indian Ocean west of 68 degrees east,
         north of 5 degrees south, and west to the Kenyan/Tanzanian
         coastal border.

         (b)(S/REL GBR AUS) <u>Area of Interest</u>. USCENTCOM's Area of
         Interest is global, due to the international nature of
         terrorism and the vast network of Al Qaida and other
         terrorist organizations. Extensive coordination between
         combatant commands, the interagency community, allies,
         coalition nations and forces, and international law
         enforcement agencies is required.

         (c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) <u>Theater of Operations</u>. The IRAQI
         Theater of Operations (ITO) is defined by the total
         airspace, land area, and boundaries of Iraq, Kuwait,
         Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Saudi
         Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of
         Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, those portions of the Arabian
         Sea and Indian Ocean within the USCENTCOM AOR (less

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Seychelles), the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el Mandeb, the Red
Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez
Canal system. The ITO also includes (in coordination with
USUSEUCOM) portions of Turkey and (in coordination with
USPACOM) Diego Garcia.

b. (S/REL GBR AUS) Enemy. Saddam Hussein's totalitarian rule of
Iraq constitutes a national security threat to the United
States, its allies, and its vital national interests. The Iraqi
regime principally threatens U.S. interests in three ways.
First, by destabilizing the region with repeated acts of
military aggression and coercion, Iraq's military aggression
challenges the survival of key U.S. allies and the continued
flow of oil from the region. Second, Saddam's regime is
complicit in the development, fielding, and repeated use of WMD
(Weapons of Mass Destruction). Since the departure of U.N.
weapons inspectors in 1998, Iraq has rebuilt most missile and
WMD-related facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox,
undertaken new construction at sites that formerly supported WMD
programs, and continued suspicious procurement efforts. Third,
Iraq supports terrorist groups. Iraq trains and fields its own
force of terrorists, in addition to providing state sponsorship
for non-Iraqi terror groups. The regime's proclivity for
violence, in concert with its support of terrorism and an
established pattern of developing and using WMD against
civilians, demonstrates a clear, present, and continuing danger
to the United States. Detailed information on Iraqi military
capabilities and order of battle can be found at the JICCENT
homepages, [b 6] and [b 6]
[b 6] (SIPRNET), and in Appendix 11 to Annex B of
this plan.

(1) (U) Threat Environment.

(a) (S/REL GBR AUS) Iraq. Saddam Hussein leads a
totalitarian regime that asserts power through an
oppressive security bureaucracy. The security apparatus
extends from Baghdad to local villages and keeps watch
over military leaders/units. The security structure
ensures that no internal threats can rise up against the
regime, and is vital to regime existence. Saddam's regime
maintains a large military force structure, despite
economic hardships resulting from international sanctions
imposed since 1990. The Iraqi ground forces have 17
regular army divisions and 6 elite Republican Guard
divisions. The Iraqi air defense forces field over 50 SAM
batteries, an extensive array of AAA, and an integrated

system of early warning sensors. The Iraqi Air Force has
over 300 tactical aircraft. Iraq's military capabilities
have deteriorated significantly as a result of 10 years of
U.N. sanctions and damage inflicted by coalition and U.S.
military operations. However, Iraqi forces, though
degraded, remain capable of defeating internal Opposition
Groups (OGs) and remain more capable than those of
regional Arab states.

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(2) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi Strategy and Centers of Gravity.

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Strategy. Since 1991, Iraq's
strategy has been to rebuild its strength by bypassing and
deliberately violating UNSCRs without going to war.
Iraq's strategy implementation has utilized diplomatic,
political, economic, and military means in attempts to
achieve its objectives: maintaining the regime's power,
gaining support against the west, rebuilding WMD and
military programs, and the repeal of U.N. sanctions.
Iraq's overall desired end-state has been to reestablish
pre-Gulf War diplomatic, political, economic, and military
conditions, with repeal of U.N. sanctions and dissolution
of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH. The

Iraqi regime has deliberately deprived its people of basic needs by siphoning "oil for food program" money into WMD and military projects, and using its hydrologic system, military, and security forces to dominate the population. Diplomatically, Iraq has continued to deny all charges of UNSCR violations, using information operations (IO) at home and abroad to blame the west for the horrendous internal conditions. Iraq's IO efforts appeal to those who incorrectly believe U.N. sanctions are depriving the Iraqi people a humanitarian level of existence, and to fellow Arabs wary of western domination in the region. The Iraqi regime has managed to find support in bypassing full implementation of U.N. sanctions. Thus, Iraq has obtained some capital and resources to implement WMD and military programs.

   Faced with an impending U.S. attack, the Iraqi regime will not abandon its strategy and objectives. It will use all means available to continue its strategy while avoiding war, particularly since the regime will be fully cognizant that its survival depends upon avoiding war with the U.S. or a coalition. Saddam Hussein will first and foremost attempt to use the U.N. as a tool to cause delays and roadblocks that fracture support for, and halt the momentum of, any U.S. or coalition operation. Saddam Hussein views time as a factor that works to his advantage prior to any operation against Iraq. He also views Arab/Muslim public opinion (especially those who oppose western influence in the region) and the instability of several neighboring regimes as force factors that work in his favor over time. Saddam will also try to use Iraq's territorial sovereignty, with international legal ploys, as a factor to thwart U.S./coalition actions. Saddam will make incredible offers of compliance to avoid a UNSCR authorization for use of force against Iraq. He views a UNSCR authorizing the use of force as the greatest danger to his strategy because international leaders will use the UNSCR to legally justify war against Iraq.

   The Iraqi regime, when faced with war, will desire to fight with all available means to protect the regime's existence. Saddam will not assume defeat is a given. He will implement a defensive strategy that avoids early defeat of his ground forces but also incorporates offensive operations against perceived U.S./coalition weaknesses. His overall theory of victory is that a "tie" (i.e. not losing) would be a win, just as defeat of invading forces would be a win. Since survival of the regime is his aim, he will want to exert maximum effort

and all means to achieve a tie or win. Clearly, the value
of the object (i.e. survival) is high to Saddam, his inner
circle, and a portion of his 38,000+ man security
apparatus. Saddam knows that he cannot defeat a
U.S./coalition attack solely at the military unit level.
Thus, Saddam will seek to cause high casualties early in
order to raise the cost of war to a level that exceeds the
coalition or U.S. public's value of the object. If he
cannot end the conflict in the short term through such
means, he will attempt a war of long duration, whereby
U.S./coalition casualties, combined with lack of
battlefield progress, deplete his opponents' will to
fight. To accomplish this end, the regime will attempt to
threaten U.S./coalition personnel and interests anywhere
possible - both inside and outside Iraq.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Net Assessment from the Iraqi
viewpoint. The Iraqi leadership sees its war aims as
preserving the regime. The regime will desire to exert a
total level of effort - diplomatically, economically,
politically, and militarily, in order to win, or as stated
above, to "not lose." The regime obviously views its
existence as vital, however, this view is not held by the
majority of the populace, whom Saddam would gladly offer
as human shields against attacking forces. Although he
exerts severe control of the population and military
through his security and intelligence network, Saddam does
not have the loyalty of the people to the extent needed
for his strategy - unless the people/military see the
defense of Saddam as their only option for survival.
Saddam is probably aware that the majority of the populace
and Regular Army do not have the will to fight for the
regime. So, he will try to convince the populace, the
military, and his Arab neighbors that any attack against
Iraq is an attack against Islam to destroy Iraq and to
control oil. The regime's control of the media is key to
the propaganda that will be disseminated to the Iraqi
people. Saddam will attempt to garner some civilian
resistance to an attack, while concurrently trying to
create a level of fear that results in refugee traffic and
Lines of Communication (LOC) blockage. Due to Saddam's
distrust of the military, oversight of the military by
security force personnel will continue. Ideally,
U.S./coalition casualties and maneuver delays are the
quick victories that Saddam would like in order to bolster
military confidence. The regime would prefer to win
early, but as has been shown since 1991, will commit to a

long-term effort regardless of the negative impact on the
Iraqi people and military. The regime will play upon
international public opinion for as long as possible, and
will likely take means to portray coalition attacks as
causing severe humanitarian hardships on the Iraqi
population. To cause high casualty situations, the regime
will count on asymmetrical means to attack what it views
are vulnerabilities within U.S./coalition centers of
gravity. Saddam views the U.S./coalition war aims as
unlimited since destruction of the regime is the goal. He
will try to convince the Iraqi people and military that
this translates to their destruction as well. Saddam sees
the U.S. level of effort as limited because he does not
believe full commitment of resources will be expended
against Iraq due to competing resource requirements from
other U.S. operations. He will try to prevent a coalition
because he believes the U.S. cannot politically withstand
a unilateral action, and that other ongoing U.S.
operations necessitate a coalition effort to attack Iraq.
Saddam does not view the U.S. or any coalition nation's
populace as believing that his removal has a high enough
value to warrant large numbers of casualties or the
expenditure of vast resources, particularly in the
economic arena. Saddam believes a U.S. or coalition
build-up will take a long time, and time will be available
to the regime to take measures to stop a war, or, to
inflict casualties in any vulnerable location. Saddam
most likely believes that the public will of the U.S. and
most coalition nations cannot withstand a war of long
duration.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Strategic Center of Gravity.
Iraq's strategic center of gravity is comprised of the
regime; Baghdad; and the Security Forces/Intelligence
Service (IIS) structure. The regime and security
forces/IIS control Iraq - the infrastructure, the
military, and the populace. The city of Baghdad is the
symbol of power and the nerve center of the country. The
entry of an attacking division into Baghdad will be a
strategic decisive point. Strategic regime strengths are
control of oil, control of the population through the
security forces, control of the media, control of the
government infrastructure, WMD capability, and the
centralized command and control structure. The denial of
western Iraq's "Scud baskets," which equates to the defeat
of Saddam's northern and western WMD capability, will be a
strategic decisive point. Iraq's strategic weaknesses are

will/war weariness of the people, lack of support for the
regime, isolation (political/ diplomatic, military,
economic, and technological), Kurdish control in the
North, and lack of loyalty within the Regular Army (RA)
and potentially within the RGFC. If the military does not
view itself as placed on death ground between Saddam and
coalition forces, its lack of loyalty and readiness to
fight for the regime are critical vulnerabilities. Saddam
is not confident in the military's loyalty, and he will
most likely charge use of WMD and other war crimes acts to
trusted agents within his security forces.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraq's View of the U.S. Strategic
Center of Gravity. Saddam views the U.S. strategic center
of gravity as consisting of the U.S. public will; the
President and the Secretary of Defense; a coalition; force
projection; and U.S. Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR). He sees critical strategic strengths as the U.S.
economy, overall military capability, long-range strike
capability, and regional support. Saddam views strategic
weaknesses or vulnerabilities as U.S. public opinion
(influenced by casualty aversion and the expectation of a
short war), international public opinion, Arab fear of
Western hegemony, Arab resentment of Israel, and lack of
U.N. consensus regarding the legitimacy of an attack
against a sovereign Iraq. He most likely sees the U.S.
public desire for any war to be short, with low
casualties, as a critical vulnerability. Saddam also
views Arab dissent as a critical vulnerability that can be
exploited through a combination of attacks that bring
Israel into the equation.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Center of Gravity.
Iraq's operational center of gravity consists of the
Special Security Organization (SSO)/Special Republican
Guards (SRG); Republican Guard Force Command (RGFC) in
vicinity of Baghdad; and SSMs (operational fires). Iraq's
critical strengths include the extended security and
intelligence structure, RG forces' maneuverability in
proximity of Baghdad, CBW capability in support of
Republican Guard defenses and the overall Baghdad defense;
hydrology infrastructure and integration with defenses;
and oil as a weapon. Iraq's critical operational
weaknesses include the lack of readiness of the Air Force
and Regular Army Ground Forces; Air Defense; lack of RGFC
unit loyalty to the regime; communications links to

Baghdad once main nodes in Baghdad are incapacitated; Shia
and Kurdish opposition; and tribal fractures. The lack of
loyalty within the RGFC can be exploited as a critical
vulnerability. Two intertwined operational decisive
points that lead to coalition ground forces' entry into
Baghdad are: the first capitulation or defeat of a
Republican Guard Division in the vicinity of Baghdad, and
the collapse of the RGFC in vicinity of Baghdad.

(f) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraq's View of the U.S./Coalition
Operational Center of Gravity. The Iraqi regime most
likely views the U.S./Coalition operational center of
gravity as consisting of precision strike capabilities,
Special Operations Forces, ISR, fielded forces, and the
Coalition Forces Command. Saddam will view operational
level strengths as force maneuverability, force
sustainability, joint operational fires, and support to
coalition forces from the Kurds and Shias. He most likely
sees U.S./Coalition critical operational weaknesses as
counter-TBM (Theater Ballistic Missile) capability, rear
area security, OPSEC, time required to deploy forces and
achieve operational capability, and host Arab nations'
lack of popular support to western force presence. If
external terrorist support is available, Iraq will try to
take clandestine actions that make rear area security a
critical vulnerability.

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Tactical Center of Gravity. The
Iraqi tactical center of gravity consists of the Regular
Army Divisions in the South, and the Euphrates River
crossing sites. The key Iraqi tactical strengths include
the potential integration of hydrology with defenses,
artillery, and defense integrated with terrain. The
critical weaknesses are the lack of offensive capability,
unit readiness and morale, and lack of loyalty to the
regime among units. Lack of loyalty to the regime and the
lack of will to fight unless survival is in question, can
be exploited as critical vulnerabilities. The
establishment of a lodgment on the Euphrates River, with a
brigade-sized force successfully across the Euphrates
River, will be a tactically decisive point.

(3) (U) Enemy Courses of Action.

(a) (S/REL GBR AUS) Most Likely. Saddam will defend in
depth in southern Iraq with 6 RA (Regular Army) divisions
positioned along major LOC's. SA-2 and SA-3 batteries will

deploy to both the northern and southern no-fly zones to support the defense. RGFC forces will defend Baghdad from positions outside the city near their garrisons and along the main approaches. In northern Iraq, RA and RGFC forces will defend along the green line. Harassing attacks against the Kurds are possible if Iraq perceives a large threat due to SOF operations in the area. There will most likely be no early, overt use of WMD since Saddam will not want to lose potential international public opinion by demonstrating that he is in violation of UNSCRs as charged. However, the probability of WMD use will increase as U.S./coalition forces move across the Euphrates and northward. Execution of hydrology infrastructure controlled flooding to channel and limit maneuver, combined with artillery-fired chemical munitions, is one likely means Iraq can use to inflict casualties and slow the attack. This is particularly likely as forces cross the Euphrates or attempt to approach Baghdad. As forces cross the Euphrates and threaten Baghdad, anti-tank weapons and artillery fire (with possibly chemical munitions) would likely be used against combat forces while SSMs and individuals would attack key soft targets, such as logistics, to inflict casualties and raise the cost and duration of war. The regime will plan to employ WMD as a final survival effort before U.S./coalition forces reach Baghdad. The Iraqi Air Force will remain grounded for the most part, although low-level numbers of aircraft attacks against high value coalition targets may be attempted. Iraq will most likely plan to attack Israel in an attempt to fracture any coalition.

(b) (S/REL GBR AUS) Most Dangerous. Saddam could attack into Kuwait with heavy divisions in the south, supported by an RGFC mechanized and an RGFC armored division. The ideal time for such an action is during force flow. In addition, SSM forces might deploy to southern Iraq and conduct a preemptive WMD strike to disrupt and delay deployment and attack operations. Iraq may also launch offensive operations into Kurdish-controlled areas, focusing on seizure of key Kurdish population centers and LOC's.

(c) (S/REL GBR AUS) Use of WMD. Saddam will avoid using WMD until he believes his regime's survival is threatened. Key decision points for Saddam in his determination of whether to use WMD would include: U.S. forces entering Iraq; U.S. forces penetrating north of the Euphrates; U.S.

forces engaging RGFC divisions with ground forces; or
significant progress by OGs.

(4) (U) Current Iraqi Military Capabilities Assessment.

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Air Force. The Iraqi Air Force
(IZAF) has over 300 tactical aircraft and an
infrastructure of operating bases throughout its country.
The most capable air-to-air fighters in the Iraqi Air
Force are the MIG-25/Foxbat E, MIG-23/Flogger G, Mirage
F1, and MIG-29/Fulcrum. Large numbers of older MIG-
21/Fishbed aircraft are still operational. The ability of
the Iraqi Air Force to protect national airspace and to
conduct effective offensive operations is minimal. The
combat proficiency of most pilots is low and continues to
decline.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Air Defense Forces. Iraqi surface-
to-air weapons include conventional surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs), modified unguided SAMs, unguided rockets,
other unidentified experimental weapons, and anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA). SAMs include the SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8,
SA-9, SA-13, ROLAND, and ASPIDE. Iraq's primary strategic
SAMs are the SA-2/Guideline and the SA-3/GOA. Man-
portable air defense systems (MANPADS) in the Iraqi
inventory are the SA-7b, SA-14, and SA-16. The current
Iraqi AAA inventory contains about 6,000 pieces of 14.5 mm
up to 100mm systems. However, the majority of Iraqi AAA
is 40mm and smaller. The Iraqi Integrated Air Defense
System (IADS) is a credible threat against a limited
number of conventional targets, but a minimal threat
against a large coordinated assault. Due to a lack of
coordination and realistic training, a large-scale attack
would overwhelm the Iraqi defenses and degrade the
effective operation of the IADS. The Iraqi IADS is
susceptible to Electronic Attack (EA), and typically can
only track targets effectively in a non-electronic combat
environment.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Naval Forces. Iraq's navy and
coastal defense forces maintain a marginal capability to
mount a defense against attacks. Naval forces have only a
single ship capable of launching guided missiles. The
most significant open water and coastal defense assets in
the Iraqi inventory posing a threat to forces operating in
the northern Persian Gulf are the CSSC-3 Seersucker Anti-
ship Coastal Missiles (ASCM) and mines. Due to poor crew

proficiency and lack of maintenance, the Seersucker threat
to forces is minimal, although it cannot be discounted.
Iraq has a limited mining capability, but still has the
mine inventory and ships necessary to conduct offensive
mining in the northern Persian Gulf and to lay defensive
minefields off its coast.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Ground Forces. Iraq's ground
forces consist of 23 divisions, including 17 Regular Army
(RA) and 6 Republican Guard (RG) divisions. Their
extensive program of training, exercises, and battlefield
experience, contribute to the overall capability. A
professional and competent officer corps leads Iraq's
largely conscripted ground forces. Saddam seeks to
preserve the ground forces' capabilities so they can
protect the regime and maintain internal security.
Despite this shielding, ground forces have suffered
degradation in a number of areas: flagging troop readiness
and morale, strained combat materiel availability,
inadequate unit logistics and support, and weakened
transportation networks and sustainment infrastructure.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Weapons of Mass Destruction. Iraq
retains residual chemical and biological Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) that can inflict severe damage on
unprepared military forces and disrupt host-nation
logistic functions and facilities that would be used to
support the deployment of coalition forces. WMD delivery
systems include long-range artillery, manned aircraft, the
L-29 UAV and ballistic missiles. Iraq's ballistic missile
inventory consists of: a small, covert force of scud-
variant ballistic missiles (650km-range Al Husayn scud
variant and possibly a few 900km-range Al Abbas missiles),
two developmental Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
systems that have been successfully flight-tested (the
40km to 180km-range Al Samoud and the 135km to 210km-range
Ababil-100), and a deployed force of short-range
battlefield rockets (ASTROS-II and FROG-7) to strike
targets near its borders.

(f) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Landmines. Iraq uses minefields as
the primary means to channel and concentrate enemy forces
into kill zones. Doctrinally, the Iraqis will employ mines
on the most probable direction of enemy attack to the
entire depth of the defense, covering the defending
force's flanks and gaps between friendly units. Minefields
are used, instead of ambushes, in security and operational

zones. Minefield densities and placements are dictated by:
the amount of time available, the type of enemy force, and
the availability of mines and minelaying equipment.
Iraqi doctrine regarding minefield densities, mine
placement pattern, and countermining operations is adopted
from the doctrine of the former Soviet Union. In all
defenses, minefields are covered by machineguns and
supplemented by wire entanglements, tank traps, and
artillery fire. Iraqi forces may employ antitank,
antipersonnel, or a combination of antitank and
antipersonnel minefields, i.e., a mixed, minefield. There
are five basic types of minefields employed by Iraqi
troops: protective, defensive, barrier (also referred to
as screening/ restrictive/obstructive), disruptive, and
false.

  1. (S/REL GBR AUS) Iraq may employ chemical
mines/minefields in front of its defensive lines as a
surprise against an enemy attack. These mines reportedly
could be detonated by friendly artillery fire or enemy
armored movement through the minefield. According to
reports, Iraqi special engineers would create the
chemical minefield under the cover of darkness. By
planting the chemical minefield at night neither the
enemy nor Iraqi soldiers in their defensive positions
would be aware that the minefield had been emplaced.

  2. (S/REL GBR AUS) A typical Iraqi antitank minefield
will have a length of 1000 meters and will include
approximately 1100 antitank mines. With this density Iraq
estimates that 70% of enemy tanks and 30% of enemy
armored personnel carriers and other vehicles passing
through the minefield will be disabled. Iraqi antitank
minefields are normally laid in a 1:3 ratio with
antipersonnel mines. According to Iraqi doctrine,
antipersonnel mines are planted with a density of
approximately 24 blast mines or 6 fragmentation mines for
every meter along the front.

  3. (S/REL GBR AUS) It is common practice to use natural
obstacles as boundaries for minefields. Antipersonnel
mines are normally laid in two rows, in front of the
antitank minefield, in the direction of the enemy.

(5) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi Opposition Groups (OGs).

  (a) (S/REL GBR AUS) Several of the viable OGs that exist
inside Iraq can be broadly described, by their sectarian

orientation, as Kurdish or Shia. However, the Iraqi opposition is generally skeptical of U.S. commitment to regime change. Their support of U.S. actions will be directly proportional to their perception of U.S. commitment. Three key actions which will motivate the opposition are: destruction of regime security forces and Ba'ath Party facilities—especially in urban areas; collapse, surrender, or capitulation of major elements of the regular army or co-option of these forces by a new, acceptable Iraqi government; and entry of U.S. conventional ground forces into Iraq. While some Sunni tribes or sub-tribes have clashed with the regime in the past, there is no predominantly Sunni-organized opposition within Iraq.

(b) (S/REL GBR AUS) The U.S. can motivate the OGs and gain their support by offering improved security, economic improvement by ending sanctions, elimination of the Baath party, and regime removal. CFC can also motivate the OGs by: offering the Kurds a representative voice in an Iraqi provisional/permanent government, offering the Shia a restoration of basic life services and a representative voice in an Iraqi provisional/permanent government, offering the Sunni tribes a leadership role in an Iraqi provisional/ permanent government, restoration of a professional military, and territorial integrity for Iraq.

(c) (S/REL GBR AUS) In turn, the OGs can provide: PSYOP support for regime change in Iraq, [14c] and tactical intelligence, active support of our Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) operations, and stability in urban areas under their control. In the north, the Kurds can assist by: fixing or encouraging the capitulation of Iraqi forces, conducting sabotage operations behind Iraqi lines, and disrupting Iraqi LOC's. In the south, the Shia can harass and interdict key Ba'ath security assets. The Sunni OGs can encourage and promote officer defection and conduct short-term disruption of LOCs.

c. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) U.S. Strategic Objectives. Operations in the ITO will support the following U.S. strategic objectives:

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Success in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD.

(2) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Military Objectives. Operations in the ITO will accomplish the following strategic military objectives:

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq. Gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorists and war criminals and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region.

(3) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Friendly Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities.

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Strategic Centers of Gravity are domestic / international will and coalition cooperation.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Centers of Gravity are: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functionality; force projection, strategic lift, operational fires, information operations (IO) and special operations forces (SOF).

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Critical Vulnerabilities are: inter-theater Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCS); Joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration

(JRSOI) through two ports and one airfield in Kuwait, coalition cooperation and critical C2 nodes.

(4) (S/REL GBR AUS) Coalition Participation. CFC prefers to gain coalition support, but CFC will be prepared to conduct operations in the ITO unilaterally. Although CFC expects varying levels of support from the Global Counter-terrorism Task Force (GCTF) throughout the campaign, success does not depend on combat contributions from these countries. However, basing and over-flight access, Host Nation Support (HNS), and continuing political support are essential to our concept of operations.

(5) (U) Assumptions

  (a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Host Nation Support to Operations

    1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) United Kingdom (U.K.) and Australia. Full overflight and full basing support may include: surface logistics staging, support aircraft basing, attack aircraft basing, HQ presence and humanitarian assistance supplies and support. May include operational capabilities to include combat forces.

    2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. Full overflight and full basing support.

    3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Bahrain. Full overflight, basing for support, and ISR aircraft and HQ presence expected. Expansion beyond the current footprint may be possible.

    4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) UAE. Full overflight and basing for support aircraft expected. Expansion beyond the current footprint may be possible.

    5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Jordan. Full overflight, covert basing support, and transportation and supplies to support humanitarian relief.

    6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Turkey. Full overflight, basing for aircraft, SOF, ground forces, transportation and supplies to support humanitarian relief and may include operational capabilities to include combat forces. May require financial support and a guarantee of no Kurdish state.

SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).
Full overflight, basing for aircraft and SOF, and use
of northern airspace refueling, DCA and ISR tracks.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continued freedom of navigation for
shipping and naval forces through the Suez Canal / Strait
of Hormuz / Northern Arabian Gulf.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) No significant resources required
for CJOA-Afghanistan, Yemen, or HOA operations will not
require significant resources allocated during 1003V.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CRAF II, VISA Stage I and excess
capacity will be authorized initially to support increased
lift requirements.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iran/Syria will remain non-
belligerentnot employ conventional forces against
coalition forces during with respect to the Iraq conflict.

(f) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) There will be no direct attacks on
U.S. assets in space.

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) NOBLE EAGLE FP level at C or lower
and air defense threat level at 3 or lower.

(h) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraq will attempt to use WMD
against coalition forces and/or regional neighbors.

(i) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Hydrology will not significantly
affect CFLCC operational maneuver.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Mission. USCENTCOM conducts offensive
operations in Iraq to overthrow the Iraqi regime, destroy eliminate
WMD capability, and reduce eliminate the regime's threat to the
Iraqi people, the region and the U.S. and coalition partners as
part of the Global War on Terrorism. On order, conduct follow-on
operations to facilitate the transition from war to peace.

3. (U) Execution.

   a. (U) Concept of Operations.

      (1) (U) Commander's Intent.

SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Purpose. ~~The purpose of this operation is to remove the Iraqi regime, destroy Iraqi WMD capability, and reduce the threat Iraq poses to the region and the U.S. Removal of the Iraqi Regime is defined as the death, incarceration, or foreign flight of Saddam Husayn and his senior leadership and removal of their capability, within Iraq, to: develop, proliferate, or employ WMD in / from Iraq; support terrorism; threaten Iraq's neighbors; control the Iraqi people; prevent a new Iraqi government from assuming power.~~ The purpose of this campaign is to force the collapse of the Iraqi regime and deny it the use of WMD to threaten its neighbors and U.S./Coalition interests as part of the Global War on Terrorism.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Method. ~~CFC forces will effect elimination of the Iraqi Regime by pressuring Iraqi centers of gravity in order to create crises to which the regime cannot respond. We will employ Lines of Operation (Joint Functional Areas) sequentially.~~ Once the President makes the decision, we will be Fast and Final in our actions. We will create overwhelming effects by attacking simultaneously along several lines of operation thereby creating multiple sets of conditions to which the Iraqi strategic and operational leadership cannot respond. This series of dilemmas will quickly overwhelm the regime and force its collapse through higher operational tempo. I want to capitalize on the synergistic effects of operating inside Hussein's decision cycle. Therefore, we must be prepared for catastrophic success at any time and plan to exploit it.
The regime's control of security forces is an integral part of the overall climate that allows it to maintain power. It is imperative we shut down the regime-controlled media and C2 nodes to isolate Hussein. We will compel the regime to capitulate or render it ineffective by eliminating its influence and control over combat forces, security forces and populace; thereby reducing its legitimacy, degrading its security and creating disarray in its inner circle
When we commence decisive operations we must do so rapidly with overwhelming force across all lines of operation, creating a "shock and awe" effect. It is imperative to demonstrate our will and capability to overthrow the current Iraqi regime through bold and decisive action. Speed is critical as time works against the coalition. Posturing to rapidly exploit success will allow continuous freedom of

action, foreclose enemy strategic options and prevent Iraqi forces from responding in an effective manner. Baghdad is the symbol of power and every opportunity must be taken to control it as quickly as possible in order to sever its control over the remaining military/security forces and the population. Exploit opportunities to move rapidly, accepting risk in order to maintain the initiative.

We must not allow Iraqi employment of WMD to significantly impact achieving our strategic and operational objectives. The rapidness of regime collapse is directly proportional to our ability of denying their use of WMD. We must ensure Iraq's WMD infrastructure comes under our control as rapidly as possible in order to prevent proliferation.

Finally, we must ensure that all our actions in forcing the regime collapse set the conditions for quickly gaining control of Iraq and support reconstruction. I am concerned about the economic future of Iraq so we must protect the oil infrastructure to provide a source of revenue for the Iraqi people. Returning control of a stable Iraq to a broad-based government representing all ethnic, religious and tribal groups will add stability to the region and support the fight on the global war on terrorism.

Keys to success within each line of operation are:

- Information Operations (IO): Shaping the battlespace for offensive operations, aggressively undermining the regime's legitimacy, and setting conditions for post-hostility operations.
- Political-military (Pol-mil) Operations: Building coalition and regional support for operations and coordinating with the interagency to deter third nations from interfering with CFC operations.
- Special Operations: Conducting strategic reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA) and directing operational fires to degrade Iraqi TBM threat, seizing key terrain and assisting in identifying the Iraqi units who will capitulate.
- Unconventional Warfare (UW) with Opposition Groups (OGs): Creating internal opposition to regime responses and fixing Iraqi units to prevent their employment against CFC forces in a coherent manner.
- Operational fires: Attacking key Iraqi capabilities and vulnerabilities by striking key leadership targets, internal security and regime support apparatus as well as focusing fires on the immediate WMD threat and shaping the battlespace for SOF, conventional forces, and OGs.

- Operational Maneuver: Securing key terrain, destroying or controlling WMD delivery systems and infrastructure, and defeating or compelling Iraqi forces to capitulate.
- Civil-Military Operations (CMO): Developing and maintaining interagency and IO/NGO unity of effort to provide assistance to the Iraqi people, minimizing and controlling dislocated civilians, and providing emergency relief as required. Through proactive support to the population and being postured to assist in initiating and coordinating the recovery and reconstruction efforts, the CFC will set the conditions for a rapid transition from war to peace.

- Information Operations (IO) will shape the battlespace for offensive operations and aggressively undermine the regime's legitimacy.

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- Political-military (Pol-mil) Operations will build coalition and regional support for operations and coordinate with the interagency to deter third nations from interfering with CFC operations.

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- SOF employs strategic reconnaissance (SR) and operational fires to degrade Iraqi TBM threat, sets conditions for Unconventional Warfare (UW) with OGs, and assists in determining which Iraqi units will capitulate or co-opt.
- Operational fires enable the employment of other Lines of Operation to attack key Iraqi capabilities and vulnerabilities. Operational fires will strike key leadership targets focusing the weight of effort on internal security and regime support apparatus while maintaining the capability to strike the Iraqi leadership directly. Additionally, fires will focus on the immediate WMD threat and shaping the battlespace for SOF, conventional forces, and OGs. Operational fires will also be apportioned to providing scheduled, on-call and immediate close air support during ground operations.

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- Operational maneuver secures key terrain, destroys or controls WMD delivery systems and infrastructure, and defeats or compels Iraqi forces to capitulate.
- Civil-Military Operations develop and maintain interagency and IO/NGO unity of effort in providing assistance to the Iraqi people; minimize and control dislocated civilians; and provide emergency relief as

required. Civil-Military Operations will assist in
initiating and coordinating recovery and reconstruction
efforts during the transition from war to peace.

Disarray in the Regime's inner circle, increased
external support for opposition groups, and loss of
sovereignty, security and influence over its combat
forces and the populace will compel the Regime
capitulation or enable CFC forces to remove it.

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(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Endstate. The endstate for this
operation is regime change. Success is defined as: regime
leadership and power base destroyed; WMD capability destroyed
or controlled; territorial integrity intact; ability to
threaten neighbors eliminated; and an acceptable
provisional/permanent government in place. The Endstate for
this campaign is regime change. Success is defined as:

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) The death, incarceration, or foreign
   flight of Saddam Hussein and his senior leadership and
   the removal of their capability within Iraq to develop,
   proliferate, or employ WMD in and from Iraq; support
   terrorism; threaten Iraq's neighbors; control the Iraqi
   people or prevent a new Iraqi government from assuming
   power.

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2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi WMD capability destroyed or
   controlled.

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3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) The territorial integrity of Iraq
   intact.

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1.4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) An acceptable
   provisional/permanent government in place.

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(2) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Lines of Operation. CFC forces will
apply continually increasing pressure on Saddam Hussein and
the Iraqi regime by synchronized activities along the
following lines of operation:

(a) (S/OC REL USA GBR AUS) Operational Fires. CFC will
synchronize attacks of long-range strike assets and other
systems to apply kinetic pressure on Saddam and his
regime. Operational fires include attacks from long-range
strike aircraft to include CONUS bombers and Conventional

Air Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCM), strike-fighter
aircraft, Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), and other
long-range fires to include army attack aviation,
artillery and rocket/missile attacks. Operational fires
will focus on leadership, internal security, RGFC and
select RA forces, WMD (delivery, production, storage, and
research), and infrastructure, to include communications,
power, and LOC's. The scope of selective attacks on
infrastructure targets will be constrained and effects
will be localized to the maximum extent possible.
Operational fires will incorporate a layered and fully
integrated combined arms approach. Apportionment of
operational fires will be capabilities based, as each
component is able to apply the desired effects by priority
and weight of effort. Operational fires will often
achieve desired effects independently, but it is important
to always exploit opportunities to directly enable the
other lines of operation.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Maneuver. CFC will
employ operational maneuver to secure territory and defeat
enemy forces (as required) through the application of
maneuver, firepower, and shock. Operational maneuver will
focus on seizing key terrain, defeating RGFC and select RA
forces and establishing conditions for stability during
Phase IV.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Special Operations. CFC forces
will employ special operations forces to obtain actionable
intelligence and develop UW infrastructure, conduct UW
special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA), and
enable operational fires. Special operations will focus
on regime leadership, internal security, infrastructure,
and WMD delivery capability.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) UW and Support to OGs. CFC will
synchronize activities of Other Government Agencies (OGA),
UW activities, rewards programs, and work with the OGs to
apply pressure to the Iraqi regime. UW operations will
focus on facilitating the seizing of key terrain,
attriting internal security forces, disrupting IZ combat
forces, and facilitating the control of the civilian
population.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Information Operations (IO). CFC
will employ all elements of IO to create doubt and
disaffection against the regime in order to hasten its

downfall. IO will also shape regime perception to prevent development of effective counter-strategies toward U.S. intentions and actions. The focus of influence operations is regime leadership, neutralizing regime command and control infrastructure and communications, internal security, select RA and RGFC forces, and the civilian population.

(f) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) POL-MIL Operations. POL-MIL activities will focus on applying pressure to deny Iraqi commercial and diplomatic leverage, building coalition and regional support, and preventing third nations from interfering with CFC operations.

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CMO. CMO objectives are to minimize the interference of civilians with military operations and reduce the impact of military operations on the Iraqi populace. Specifically, it includes activities regarding the CFC role in humanitarian assistance, recovery, reconstruction and the transition to long-term stability in Iraq. CMO will focus on the civilian population, Iraqi infrastructure, and developing commercial/diplomatic leverage through humanitarian assistance.

b. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phasing. Operations in Iraq will be conducted in four phases: Phase I—Preparation, Phase II—Shape the Battlespace, Phase III—Decisive Operations, and Phase IV—Post-hostilities.

(1) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase I—Preparation. This phase begins upon presidential notification and lasts 16 days.

(a) (U) Phase I Operational Objectives.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish air bridge and secure LOCs.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Alert, deploy, and posture forces for shaping operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Set conditions to neutralize Iraqi forces.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deter/interdict Iraqi TBM/WMD operations.

35. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Secure regional and international support for operations.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Degrade regime in order to prepare for Phase II operations.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Gain and maintain maritime and space superiority.
4. (S/OC REL USA GBR AUS Prepare OGs for follow on operations.

(b) (U) Phase I Lines of Operation.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Fires. Air and Maritime forces conduct Operations operations, to include intrusive ISR, in order to enhance situational awareness and apply immediate pressure on the regime in preparation for shaping operations. CFACC and CFMCC forces provide force protection during the build up of forces and begin to degrade, defeat, or destroy Iraqi active air defense threat and WMD delivery systems using Response Options normally associated with Operation Southern Watch. CFC forces increase the capability to conduct time sensitive targeting and support the initiation of Phase II attacks.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Maneuver. CFLCC alerts forces and begins to deploy enablers and pre-positioned assets for introduction of forces in Phase II.

   (a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Land forces position forces in Kuwait, leveraging the Mechanized Infantry Division in Kuwait. An air assault division and Armored Cavalry Regiment moves by sea from CONUS while a Mechanized Infantry Division moves toward Turkey to support operations in Northern Iraq. Additionally, CFC will download pre-positioned stocks and build up supplies to prepare forces for operational maneuver.

   (b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFACC increases and repositions ISR platforms, attack, and support assets in the AOR according to the bed down plan and initiates intrusive ISR in Iraq. CFACC supports introduction of SOF forces in northern and western Iraq, conducts personnel recovery operations from

Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey and supports CFMCC in monitoring Iranian reaction and response.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFMCC positions naval forces in the north Arabian Gulf and coordinates with Commander Sixth Fleet for supporting naval forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Naval forces will include five carrier battle groups, multiple surface and sub-surface combatant TLAM shooters, two Amphibious Ready Groups, forces ashore to support the offload of Marine Corps equipment and forces, and various support and sustainment ships and forward logistics sites. Naval forces will establish maritime superiority throughout the Arabian Gulf, and be prepared to provide shallow-water mine clearance, salvage support and port waterside security for Kuwaiti sea ports of debarkation (SPODs), conduct MPF operations, support ISR and operational fires, and monitor Iranian reaction and response.

> **Comment [GSS1]:** CFMCC will not position C6F assets in the E. Med, rather we will coordinate with C6F as required.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Special Operations. CFSOCC positions additional SOF in the region and initiates link up with OGs in the North and is prepared to conduct SR in western Iraq to support CFACC in suppressing Iraqi TBM/WMD capability. CFSOCC prepares to conduct special reconnaissance (SR)—focused on ground objectives, WMD, and high value targets including key Iraqi leadership—personnel recovery operations, and clandestine actions to include UW and OG support. SOF will also begin to establish Direct Action (DA) capability, and an ability to monitor Iranian reaction, employ operational fires, conduct expanded UW activities, personnel recovery operations, and develop intelligence and situational awareness in support of Phase II operations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) UW and Support to OGs. Commences prior to Phase I. UW elements will link-up with Other Governmental Agencies (OGA) operatives and OGs in northern, southern, and western Iraq to establish contacts and train the OGs for action; provide training and equipment to the Kurds, Shia, and western tribes; develop intelligence; provide situational awareness and develop a UAR capability. UW activities will garner Iraqi military units' support for U.S. objectives in Iraq and influence them to capitulate. UW elements

will posture to conduct expanded UW activities in Phase II.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) <u>Information Operations</u>. Undermine confidence in the ability of the regime to maintain power by emphasizing U.S. resolve and the inevitability of the regime's defeat. Deception operations deny and mislead the regime regarding knowledge of U.S. intentions and timing of actions.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) <u>Political-military Operations</u>. Build coalition and regional support and prevent third nations from interfering with CFC operations.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) <u>Civil-military Operations</u>. Preposition sufficient humanitarian stores/resources to be used upon commencement of offensive operations and coordinate for regional and international support.

(c) (U) <u>Phase I Endstate.</u>

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Air bridge established and LOCs secured.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFC forces postured for shaping operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) OGs prepared to execute limited operations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Assets in place to suppress TBMs in western Iraq.

35. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Regional and international support for operations secured.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Regime degraded in preparation for Phase II ops.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Maritime / Space superiority achieved.

(S/OC REL USA GBR AUS) OGs prepared for follow-on operations.

(2) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) <u>Phase II—Shaping the Battlespace</u>. This phase begins on D-day with air operations and will be approximately 5 days in duration.

(a) (U) <u>Phase II Operational Objectives.</u>

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to deploy and posture forces for decisive offensive operations.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Disrupt or degrade Iraqi Regime's C2 and security forces.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deter WMD employment, suppress Iraqi TBM/WMD delivery/storage systems.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Disrupt/degrade RGFC C2 and support to regime defense.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Seize key terrain/infrastructure.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Maintain international and regional support for operations.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Disrupt/degrade RA forces and set the conditions for the capitulation of RA forces.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Gain air and maintain maritime and space superiority.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Suppress key TBM/WMD production processes and deny access to WMD facilities that represent a direct threat or a proliferation threat.

(b) (U) Phase II Lines of Operation.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Fires. The focus of operational fires is Regime security and leadership, WMD, Counter Information, Counter Air, Counter Maritime and Counter Land. CFACC establishes air superiority and space supremacy, strikes strategic targets, fractures regime security, denies sanctuary to Regime leadership, and interdicts select RGFC and RA forces (specifically, C2 and logistics nodes that disrupt the RGFC's ability to reposition around Baghdad or withdraw into the city) in support of CFLCC operations in Iraq. Maritime forces will support operational fires with TACAIR and TLAM missions. CFLCC will conduct deep fires with ATACMS, MLRS, and attack aviation in support of CFACC and operational maneuver.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Maneuver. CFLCC will
be prepared to seize key terrain (Umm Qsar, key oil
nodes, bridgeheads, bridgeheads across the Euphrates,
and key airfields) and establish a security zone by
defeating opposing Iraqi forces in southern Iraq,
protect LOCs, continue to conduct JRSOI of forces, and
control existing humanitarian relief infrastructure and
deliver humanitarian relief to affected populace.
CFMCC will maintain maritime superiority, access to sea
LOC's and ports, support CFLCC SPOD operations and
Marine sea-based air operations, continue conducting
ISR and IPB, monitoring Iranian reaction and response,
conducting shallow-water mine clearing and salvage
support, and will be prepared to conduct amphibious
operations. At the end of this phase, ground
sustainment will be postured to support continued
offensive operations and maneuver forces will be
postured to exploit success to hasten regime collapse.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Special Operations. CFSOCC
forces will insert teams and conduct SR to collect
actionable intelligence on key leaders, WMD sites, and
other high value targets. SOF will also establish DA
capability and conduct DA against Regime leadership,
WMD delivery systems, oil and hydro nodes, coordinate
and employ operational fires, and conduct UW.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) UW Operations and Support to OGs.
UW elements will expand support to OGs to foment
insurrection in the north, south, and west; conduct
clandestine operations to fix, disrupt, or influence
capitulation of RGFC and RA units; enhance friendly
situational awareness; conduct personnel recovery,
develop targets and actionable intelligence; and
coordinate and employ operational fires.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Information Operations. In
support of and concurrent with operational fires and
maneuver, reduce Iraqi C4I capabilities and will to
support the regime and build regional and international
support for U.S. actions by stressing legitimacy
themes.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Political-military Operations.
Maintain the coalition and continue to garner domestic
and international cooperation and support—particularly
among regional partners, prevent/ minimize regional and

Comment [GSS2]: Support to CFLCC
during Phase II is limited to
support at the SPODs.

Comment [GSS3]: Marine Corps forces
will be a land force supported by
MARCENT Marine Logistics Command
and CFLCC. The extent of our
support to Marine forces ashore is
the continued support to their
aviation assets that remain
embarked and operating from
amphibious shipping.

international opposition to U.S. actions, and begin
setting conditions for a provisional/permanent Iraqi
government.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Civil Military Operations. CMO
will be the primary mechanism within OG enclaves to
promote and maintain stability in urban areas. Secure
key humanitarian assistance infrastructure to enable
International Organizations and Non-governmental
Organizations (IO/NGO) to conduct humanitarian
assistance activities. Minimize and manage dislocated
civilians, and provide emergency relief to affected
populations. Support regional countries with refugee
relief operations as required.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase II Endstate.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFC forces postured for decisive
offensive operations.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi regime's C2 and security
forces degraded or disrupted.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi TBM / WMD delivery
systems/production facilities degraded or disrupted and
enemy access to WMD facilities disrupted or denied.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi C2 nodes disrupted and OGs
prepared for follow on operationsto defend against
Iraqi forces and attack selected Iraqi targets.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) RA/RGFC C2 disrupted/ degraded.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Initial key terrain/
infrastructure seized.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) International and regional
support for operations maintained.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Air / Maritime / Space
superiority maintained.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) TBM / WMD suppression achieved
and access to WMD facilities denied.

(3) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase III—Decisive Operations. This
phase begins upon the USCOMCENT decision to execute

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conventional ground operations. CFC forces are postured to complete regime removal and may last up to 125 days.

    (a) (U) Phase III Operational Objectives.

        1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Defeat or compel capitulation of Iraqi Forces.

        2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Neutralize regime leadership.

        3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Neutralize Iraqi TBM/WMD delivery systems.

        4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Control WMD infrastructure.

        5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq.

        6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deploy and posture CFC forces for post-hostility operations, initiating humanitarian assistance operations for the Iraqi people, within capabilities.

        7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Set military conditions for provisional/permanent government to assume power.

        8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Maintain international and regional support.

        9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Neutralize Iraqi regime's C2 and security forces.

        10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Gain and maintain air, maritime and space supremacy.

    (b) (U) Lines of Operation.

        1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Fires. The focus during this phase is countering the Iraqi WMD capability. CFACC will degrade Regime C4I, support destruction of regime security forces, and defeat opposing military forces that resist Coalition forces by establishing and maintaining air and space supremacy in order to deny the Regime sanctuary and expose the Regime to popular uprising, coup attempt, assassination, or direct attack by maneuver or special operations forces. CFMCC will provide operational

fires in support of air operations and operational
maneuver with TACAIR and TLAM strikes. CFLCC will
conduct deep fires with ATACMS, MLRS, and attack
aviation in support of operational maneuver.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Operational Maneuver. CFLCC will
seize key terrain and defeat enemy forces in zone in
order to complete Regime removal, begin eliminating
Iraq's WMD threat by controlling or destroying WMD
production capacity, storage capability, and delivery
systems and conducting Sensitive Site Exploitation
(SSE) operations. CFLCC will also initiate operations
in northern Iraq to fix Iraqi forces; isolate Tikrit,
prevent major disruption of significant oil
infrastructure and control by Iraqi factions; control
major hydrological nodes managing water supply to the
south; destroy terrorist training camps; BPT exploit
withdrawal of Iraqi forces and Regime destruction; and
facilitate CMO/HA operations in the north. CFLCC will
be prepared to isolates or and enters Baghdad, while
bypassing other urban areas, as required, monitors
and/or secures capitulated Iraqi forces, and enables
IO/NGO activities to provide humanitarian relief. CFC
will also be prepared to provide support to the
provisional government upon assumption of power or
support military governance as required. CFMCC will
conduct the full range of naval missions in support of
land and special operations, gain and maintain maritime
supremacy and access to sea LOC's and ports, support
CMO and the flow of HA shipping, continue ISR, and be
prepared to reconstitute amphibious forces for follow-
on operations.

Comment [GSS4]: Opening the KAA and
the port of Umm Qasr to CMO/HA
operations begins during Phase III.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Special Operations. CFSOCC will
conduct SR and DA on high value targets —particularly
Regime leadership, WMD, and C2; conduct operations to
fix and disrupt opposing RGFC and RA units and
interdict attacks against Kurds, employ operational
fires, assist monitoring of capitulated Iraqi army
units, conduct UW, and will be prepared to support SSE.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) UW and Support to OGs. UW
elements will support opposition group activities to
facilitate popular uprisings, coup attempts, or other
activities to expose the Regime to direct attack by
maneuver forces.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Information Operations. Persuade
key target audiences that Saddam is no longer relevant
while building support for a post-Saddam government.
Prepare to deter third-party countries from taking
advantage of a weakened Iraq.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Political-military Operations.
Continue to sustain and expand coalition and
international support. Garner resources, to include
funds and personnel, required to support CMO and Phase
IV activities.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Civil Military Operations.
Develop and maintain interagency and IO/NGO unity of
effort in providing assistance to the Iraqi people;
minimize/manage dislocated civilians; and provide
emergency relief in areas inaccessible to IO/NGO's.
Initiate recovery efforts in liberated areas and be
prepared to assist in the establishment of a post-
regime government in regional areas.

(c) (U) Phase III Endstate.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi Forces defeated or
capitulated.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Regime leaders dead, apprehended
or marginalized.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) WMD delivery systems and WMD
infrastructure destroyed or controlled.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Territorial integrity of Iraq
intact.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFC forces postured for post-
hostility operations to include controlling critical
infrastructure required to enable post-hostility
operations and provide humanitarian assistance within
capabilities.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Military conditions set for provisional government to assume power.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) International and regional support for operations maintained.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi regime and C2 neutralized.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Air / Maritime / Space supremacy achieved.

(4) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase IV—Post Hostilities. Certain tasks within this phase will begin during Phase III with the seizure of the port at Um Qasr, and will continue until the CFC transitions control. During this phase, Coalition forces will conduct military operations to re-establish internal and regional stability and assist in the reconstruction of Iraqi civil and military infrastructure and essential civilian services. Activation of a CJTF and select redeployment of non-essential personnel will occur. This phase will be conducted in three stages: stability, recovery, and transition.

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) US strategic objectives for Phase IV (Post-hostilities) operations in Iraq are:

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish a secure environment.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Rapidly improve civil order and material conditions.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Demonstrate US commitment to Iraq and the region.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Foster a national identity that unites all Iraqis while preserving their tribal, ethnic and religious heritage.

5. (U) Establish a broad-based, representative government that:

(a) (U) Adheres to the rule of law.

(b) (U) Respects basic rights of all Iraqis.

(c) (U) Does not threaten its neighbors and does not support terrorism

(d) (U) Does not pursue WMD capability.

(e) (U) Maintains territorial integrity.

(b) (U) Phase IV Military Objectives.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deter external threats from neighboring countries and, if deterrence fails, swiftly defeat them.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Prevent or defeat resistance from internal groups hostile to US and coalition forces.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support restoration of essential Iraqi infrastructure and social institutions.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support reformation of Iraqi military and security institutions to be capable of performing legitimate defense and public security missions.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Facilitate establishment of government functions and services necessary to stabilize Iraq and initiate reconstruction of the country. On order, support the transfer of these functions and services to a transitional US or international administration.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Assist in maintaining public order and safety.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support US interagency or international organization efforts to reorganize and train Iraqi law enforcement organizations, as required.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Identify, secure, document and destroy or dismantle all WMD/WMD infrastructure.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Destroy terrorist networks and apprehend all terrorists and war criminals.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Stabilization. CFC forces will maneuver rapidly to establish a permissive environment under military administration; promote regional stability; reduce threats to the new government; control or destroy WMD infrastructure; minimize civilian unrest and the impact of

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dislocated civilians and EPW's; build/maintain coalition, interagency, and NGO unity of effort and provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people as necessary.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Purpose: To create a stable and secure environment that enables follow-on forces and civil agencies to begin recovery.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Key Tasks: (CFLCC Lead)

- Build Iraqi, regional and international support through positive influence of the Iraqi populace, coalition, regional and world perception.
- Establish a stable environment within Iraq.
- Deter regional and trans-national threats to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq.
- Maintain civil order by exercising control through the existing legal system where possible.
- Assess and initiate integration of capitulated Iraqi forces into a transitional Iraqi self-defense force or civil work force.
- Support infrastructure recovery by initiating restoration of necessary civil infrastructure.
- Mitigate human suffering by enabling civilian engagement in emergency humanitarian assistance.
- Support governance and civil administration through the exercise of military authority.
- Continue to locate and secure WMD. Initiate and support disablement and elimination.
- Continue to support the destruction terrorist networks.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase IVa End-state: A stable environment with the territorial integrity of Iraq is intact; civil order is maintained; repairs to damaged civil infrastructure are underway; humanitarian assistance is provided; and an interim administration is established.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Recovery. CFC forces will work with U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations to restore basic government and economic institutions; maximize use of Iraqi resources to speed recovery; and re-establish Iraqi military and security forces under a joint governance of Iraq. As the USG and international agencies are establishing their operations in

country, CFC will be in a supported role to assist in the
distribution of supplies and reconstruction. As the agencies
become able to assume control of operations with Iraq, the CFC
will move into a supporting role to assist the agencies in
their efforts.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Purpose: To develop a secure and
   stable environment which supports the process of
   national recovery and begin transition to Iraqi self-
   government.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Key Tasks: (CJTF-Iraq Lead)

   - Maintain Iraqi, regional and international support
     through positive influence.
   - Begin handover of responsibility for stability and
     security from Coalition military to responsible
     Iraqi institutions through a Transitional Civil
     Administration.
   - Support the rule of law by exercising control
     through a reformed legal system and continue
     operations in accordance with international law.
   - Support infrastructure recovery by continued
     restoration of civil infrastructure.
   - Lessen dependence on humanitarian assistance.
   - Provide governance and civil administration
     through the exercise of military and civil
     authority.
   - Continue to support the disposal and elimination
     of WMD.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase IVb End-state:
   Responsibility for stability and security is passed
   from Coalition military to responsible institutions;
   rule of law is established; necessary civil
   infrastructure is functioning and economic
   development underway; dependence on humanitarian
   assistance is lessened; and a transitional civil
   administration in place with increasing Iraqi
   participation.

(e)   Transition and Redeployment. CFC forces will be
   reduced to a minimum presence; transition CMO support to the
   post-regime government or IO/NGO's; set the conditions for
   peacetime security assistance; and re-deploy.

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1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Purpose: To complete the
   transition from an interim administration to an
   enduring, self-governing Iraq, in which the rule of
   law is well established and civil order is enforced
   by Iraqi authorities; civil infrastructure is
   functioning and economic development is continuing.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Key Tasks: (Interim administration
   Lead with/passing to TCA/Transitional Iraqi
   Authority/Iraqi government)

   - Maintain Iraqi, regional and international
     support.
   - Handover security tasks to Iraqi military and
     security organizations. Continue to decrease
     Coalition military presence.
   - Transition the enforcement of the rule of law,
     through an effective legal system, to Iraqi
     institutions operating in accordance with national
     and international law.
   - Complete restoration of civil infrastructure,
     providing a basis for longer term infrastructure
     recovery.
   - Minimize dependence on humanitarian assistance.
   - As appropriate, pass responsibility for governance
     and civil administration from a Coalition lead to
     an emerging Iraqi government.
   - Complete the elimination of WMD in Iraq.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phase IVc End-state: A stable,
   self-sustaining Iraq with a viable governing body
   integrated within the international community.

(f) (U) Lines of Operation.

   1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Unity of effort. The initial
   effort of the CFC is to fully integrate coalition
   forces into Phase IV efforts while maintaining
   national, regional and international support for the
   reconstruction of Iraq. This integration will provide
   increased leverage of CFC efforts to establish a secure
   environment within a self-sufficient Iraqi nation and
   to increase stability in the region.

   2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Security. Components will
   conduct stability and support operations to set

conditions for the transition from war to peace. These activities will include SSE, securing the compliance of Iraqi military forces, destroying remaining pockets of resistance and controlling the Iraqi borders. CFLCC will support the elimination of WMD, conduct security operations to disarm the Iraqi military, and control the borders. CFACC will maintain air and space supremacy and BPT support HA and CMO operations. CFMCC will continue to maintain maritime supremacy, protect SLOCS and ensure port access to enable HA and CMO activities and to allow the safe redeployment of forces. Maritime forces will be prepared to support ISR operations in the NAG, Strait of Hormuz and other maritime areas as directed, and conduct Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to preclude the escape of regime leadership and terrorists.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Humanitarian Relief and resettlement. The CFC will support OGA/IO/NGOs efforts to reduce human suffering and the amount of dislocated civilians as a result of combat operations. CFLCC will coordinate and maintain situational awareness of IO/NGO/USG/IZ activities concerning emergency relief, resettlement and re-integration.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Civil Administration. Initial forces will coordinate and assist with the rapid re-establishment of essential public utilities and infrastructure and public safety measures. CFLCC will support OGA reformation efforts concerning public health, communications, education and media reform to ensure there are new systems in place which are representative of the Iraqi population.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Rule of Law. CFC forces will exercise control through the existing legal systems where practical and operate in accordance with international law. After existing local law enforcement and judiciary officials are vetted, they will be used to assist in establishing a rule of law cognizant of basic human rights. The CFC will dismantle the former regime's internal security apparatus and support Iraqi efforts of reconciliation.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Governance. COMUSCENTCOM will exercise military authority through selected Iraqi military and civil authorities. During initial phase

IV operations, units will interact with local councils
to establish local administration. As the Iraqis
develop their new form of government, the interim
administration will work the Iraqis to ensure that it
is represents the interests of the all ethnic,
religious and tribal groups and ensure an equal balance
of power within the government to preclude a future
dictator from assuming control of Iraq.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Economic Development. The key to
long-term stability of Iraq is dependant on developing
an Iraq that is economically viable. An established
middle class will reduce tension among competing groups
for scarce resources and reduce internal violence.
Economic development will begin initially with oil
production to stimulate the Iraqi economy and fund
future reconstruction efforts. The CFC will assist
other government agencies (OGAs) in the reformation of
public finance, agriculture and privatization. An
economically stable Iraq will enhance regional
stability.

(g) (U) Phase IV Endstate.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Civil administration re-
established with a representative government in place.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraqi military capable of
defending their territorial borders and maintaining the
territorial integrity of Iraq.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) A just, legal system that
supports the rights of all Iraqis and maintains
internal security.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Displaced civilians and refugees
re-settled with a reduction in dependence on
humanitarian assistance.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Iraq WMD capability destroyed,
removed, or transitioned to competent authority.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Terrorists and war criminals
detained and individuals unjustly detained under Iraqi
regime freed.

7. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ An economic structure that supports growth and fiscal responsibility.

c. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) CFLCC

(a) (U) All Phases

1. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) of forces ~~to~~ IOT facilitate deployment and employment of forces.

2. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Establish, operate and maintain the Theater Transition Points—(north and south) ~~to~~IOT support Levels I and II repatriation of isolated personnel.

3. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Perform JRAC functions for the designated Joint Rear Area (see para. 3.d.18. Coordinating Instructions).

4. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Provide base operating support, to include security, for USCENTCOM HQ forward IOT facilitate CFC command and control.

5. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Provide TBM defense capability to CFC forces IAW CFC Defended Asset List (DAL) IOT provide air and missile defense.

6. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Receive TACON of CFSOCC DA/SR forces in CFLCC zone in support of CFLCC ~~in order to~~IOT de-conflict and synchronize CFLCC and CFSOCC operations.

7. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Receive TACON of Marine Air Ground Task Forces ashore.

8. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Receive OPCON of Coalition forces.

9. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Receive TACON of any EUCOM support forces entering into the ITO.

10. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Assume responsibilities for all Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and confinement operations for U.S. military prisoners in the ITO. Establish a

tribunal IAW Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 5. The
authority to conduct a tribunal may be further
delegated to the Commander, 800th Military Police
Brigade. Establish, operate and maintain appropriate
interrogation facilities at any location where EPWs are
held in non-transit status.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Exercise TACON of units located
in, or transiting through, the CFLCC JRA, to include
C/JTF-CM, on a temporary basis when local threat
conditions require an immediate and coordinated
response.

12. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide forces in support of
CJTF-Consequence Management (CM) in the joint rear area
IOT rapidly respond to Iraqi WMD employment or
humanitarian disasters.

13. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT exercise TACON of TF 1.4a
forces in CFLCC zone IOT de-conflict and synchronize
operations.

(b) (U) Phase I

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support establishment of CFC
Forward Headquarters facility in Qatar to IOT
facilitate CFC command and control.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Posture an Airborne Brigade Task
Force (ABTF) in theater IOT exploit early success.
Planning priority for the ABTF:

    (a)   (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT seize Saddam
        International Airport (SIAP).

    (b)   (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT deter or block
        attempts to seize Kirkut or the Northern Oil
        Fields.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate with Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) for pre-positioning
of materiel and personnel IOT facilitate the rapid
restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Exchange liaison officers with LOGCAP IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT defend against an Iraqite preemptive attack IOT prevent disruption of force flow.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT establish EPW collection point vic Kuwait IOT maintain operational momentum.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT receive TACON of elements of DIA Defense [14c] Service (DHS) from JSOTF-N in order to continue EPW/Detainee exploitation and SSE in the northern ITO.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT release one airborne battalion OPCON to TF [1.4a]

(c) (U) Phase II

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT secure designated critical oil infrastructure associated with the South Rumaila oilfield if Iraqi sabotage is imminent IOT minimize damage to critical oil infrastructure and prevent environmental damage.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT transport detainees from JSOA-N to exploitation site IOT allow timely interrogation by designated agencies.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support CFSOCC to disable and secure key oil pumping facilities IOT mitigate environmental disaster.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide Quick Reaction Force IVO AL FAW ISO CFSOCC forces ashore.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT initiate humanitarian assistance operations IOT minimize the impact of displaced civilians on operations.

(d) (U) Phase III

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Seize Umm Qasr to IOT enable flow of humanitarian assistance into Southern Iraq.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish an EPW collection points IOT maintain operational momentum.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Secure Al Faw peninsula NLT C+15 IOT enable CFMCC to clear SLOC to Umm Qasr.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish a SSE base and conduct SSE operations IOT facilitate joint and interagency SSE operations.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Control identified WMD delivery systems in zone IOT allow destruction by designated agencies.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct security and stability operations (SASO) and Civil-Military operations (CMO) IOT facilitate HA efforts and prevent interference with military operations.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) NLT A+5 secure designated critical oil infrastructure associated with the South Rumaila oilfield IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Clear designated critical oil infrastructure associated with the South Rumaila oilfield (Annex B) of mines, unexploded ordnance and NBC contamination IOT permit LOGCAP personnel to assess and repair Iraqi oil infrastructure.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide security for LOGCAP personnel IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) SSeize Basrah International Airport in order toIOT support CMO operations in the ITO. demonstrate coalition resolve.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Secure known WMD production and storage facilities and key WMD infrastructure in order to prevent proliferation, use, or access to WMD by terrorists. BPT support destruction/neutralization or transport of WMD munitions/delivery systems as required in order to eliminate terrorist access.

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12. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct liaison with, and monitor capitulated Iraqi forces to IOT ensure their cooperation and compliance with CFC directives.

13. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) in order to IOT satisfy CFC intelligence requirements.

14. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct civil-military operations (CMO) in order to IOT minimize civilian interference with military operations and reduce the effects of military operations on civilian populations.

15. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Seize bridgeheads across the Euphrates River IOT facilitate rapid maneuver north and enable CMO.

16. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Secure Baghdad IOT complete the removal of the regime and facilitate the establishment of a new IZ government.

17. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Defeat ADNAN division IOT prevent reinforcement of Tikrit or Baghdad and facilitate the collapse of northern Iraqi RA forces.

18. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Secure key northern oil nodes within zone IOT prevent Kurdish control of oil resources.

19. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide port commander and forces to prepare the port of UMM QASR for HA operations.

20. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O secure Tikrit IOT deny regime alternate refuge location.

21. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT secure ground LOC to/from Jordan IOT facilitate operations and sustainment.

22. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT secure Mosul IOT prevent Kurdish control of the city.

23. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Seize BPT secure the Qadisiyah Dam to IOT minimize impact on CFC operations IVO Baghdad.

24. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct relief in place with TF-1.4a vic Saddam International Airport.

25. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct port operations, to include the offload of HA vessels if required, prior to the transfer of such operations to USAID/HN/OGA.

(e) (U) Phase IV

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Defeat remaining pockets of resistance IOT establish a safe environment for post-hostility operations.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Complete SSE IOT control Iraqi WMD resources and infrastructure and identify personnel indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs).

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support an interim security force and provisional or permanent government IOT provide a stable environment for the Iraqi population.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Clear oil infrastructure (see Annex B) of mines, unexploded ordnance and NBC contamination IOT permit LOGCAP personnel to assess and repair.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide security for LOGCAP personnel IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, transition civil affairs activities to IO/NGO/HN IOT enable the CFC withdrawal.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, release TACON of Marine forces to MARCENT.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, release TACON of SOF to SOCCENT.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, re-deploy forces.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support the establishment of an Iraqi military in order to IOT enable Iraq to maintain their territorial integrity.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support destruction/
transport of WMD/WMD infrastructure IOT eliminate Iraqi
WMD capabilities.

12. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT transition to CJTF-Iraq to
IOT facilitate redeployment.

(2) (U) CFACC

   (a) (U) All Phases

     1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Serve as the Airspace Control
Authority (ACA), and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)
to IOT coordinate airspace and air defense in the ITO.

     2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Maintain the Joint Search and
Rescue Center (JSRC) for IOT conduct personnel recovery
operations in the ITO.

     3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Serve as the Personnel Recovery
Coordinator (PRC) for all personnel recovery operations
conducted in the ITO IOT facilitate recovery command
and control.

     4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Serve as coordinating authority
regarding all inter-theater airlift issues IOT maintain
effective air bridge operations.

     5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide intra-theater airlift in
support of component operations, including in support
of CFSOCC operations to IOT facilitate re-supply and
support to OGs.

     6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide dedicate CSAR packages in
the North, South, and West, capable of conducting 2 x
point-to-point near simultaneous CSAR missions in any
24-hour period.

     7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide inter-theater and intra-
theater lift support, and aerial refueling support, as
required

     8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide MEDEVAC airlift support
assets and forces as required to support rearward
movement of casualties.

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9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Perform Rear Area Operations within the JOA as specified in para 3.d.18., Coordinating Instructions.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT establish alternate Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar IOT maintain continuous control of air component operations.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct air delivery of lethal supplies ISO JSOTF-north to include use of conventional A/C when JSOTF-North A/C are unavailable.

12. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct air-land insertion or airborne assault operations ISO CFC "Early Regime Collapse" sequel to exploit early campaign success.

13. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to conduct missions ISO CFSOCC and COMUSARCENT SSE objectives.

(b) (U) Phase I

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct JRSOI of forces and bed down aircraft IAW CFC bed down plan IOT facilitate employment and deployment of forces.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide CAS ISO CFSOCC operations IOT support SOC forces operating in western Iraq and the KAZ.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) On order, shift ISR priority from Afghanistan to Iraq.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) On order, assume OPCON of Operation Northern Watch forces.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct TBM suppression operations in order to suppress IZ TBM capability.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deploy MOBSTR to Turkey IOT conduct U-2 ops over Northern Iraq.

(c) (U) Phase II

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Degrade security forces, select RGFC and RA forces, and regime C2 IOT diminish regime control over the population and fielded forces.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish and maintain air superiority and space supremacy in the ITO IOT support CFC operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Disrupt or degrade TBM and WMD delivery systems production facilities and disrupt or deny access to WMD storage facilities IOT prevent Iraqi employment against coalition forces or regional nations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct counter-maritime operations and counter mine-laying against IZ mine storage and mine-laying capabilities in support of ISO CFMCC.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide air support to include CAS and ground directed interdiction (GDI) IOT enable CFSOCC operations and protect dispersed forces.

6. S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT fix interdict RGFC forces vicinity Baghdad IOT disrupt a withdrawal into Baghdad.

7. S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support CFSOCC or CFLCC operations to secure key hydrology nodes IOT prevent their use to to inhibit CFC operations.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT establish and operate secured airfields in Iraq IOT establish alternate APODs in support of CFC operations

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to conduct air delivery of lethal supplies ISO CFSOCC forces in western and southern IRAQ to include use of conventional A/C when organic CFSOCC A/C are unavailable.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT execute emergency aerial re-supply of CFSOCC forces to include use of conventional A/C when organic CFSOCC A/C are unavailable.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct aerial delivery of non-lethal aid supplies to include HA ISO CFSOCC and CMO HA operations.

(d) (U) Phase III

SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct counter-land operations within the CFLCC AO to support ISO CFLCC scheme of maneuver.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to degrade security forces, select RGFC and RA forces, and regime C2 IOT defeat opposing Iraqi forces and enable regime removal.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to degrade WMD delivery systems production facilities and deny access to WMD storage facilities IOT prevent Iraqi employment against coalition forces or regional nations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct counter-maritime operations in support of ISO CFMCC.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to provide air support to include CAS and ground directed interdiction (GDI) IOT enable CFSOCC operations and protect dispersed forces.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Gain and Maintain maintain air and space dominance supremacy in order to IOT facilitate regime removal and protect the force.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support SSE operations.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Repair/operate or support the repair/operation of Basrah International Airport and Saddam International Airport once secured by CFLCC IOT establish alternate APODs in support of CFC operations.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support, coordinate and integrate into theater non-conventional assisted recovery planning and execution.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT establish and operate additional airfields in Iraq IOT establish alternate APODs in support of CFC operations.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to conduct air delivery of lethal supplies ISO CFSOCC forces in western and southern IRAQ to include use of conventional A/C when organic CFSOCC A/C are unavailable.

12. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT execute emergency aerial re-supply of CFSOCC forces to include use of conventional A/C when organic CFSOCC A/C are unavailable.

13. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to conduct air delivery of lethal and non-lethal supplies ISO CFLCC forces IOT enable CFLCC scheme of maneuver.

14. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT execute emergency aerial re-supply ISO CFLCC forces IOT enable CFLCC scheme of maneuver.

15. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct aerial delivery of non-lethal aid supplies to include HA ISO CFSOCC and CMO HA operations.

(e) (U) Phase IV

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Maintain air and space dominancesupremacy.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support land forces in the elimination of remaining pockets of enemy -resistance.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support CMO to facilitate transition to a provisional/permanent government.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support the re-establishment of civilian airspace control and airspace infrastructure.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to support SSE.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Repair/operate or support the repair/operation of selected, critical airfields IOT enable CMO/HA operations.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue providing inter-theater and intra-theater airlift support, and aerial refueling support, as required or directed.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, re-deploy forces.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support the establishment of IZAF.

(3) (U) CFMCC

(a) (U) All Phases

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Maintain and secure SLOCs in the USCENTCOM AOR IOT support combat operations, sustainment and follow-on forces, and humanitarian assistance shipping as directed.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support CFLCC JRAC with seaward port security and harbor defense for designated SPODs IOT respond to Level II threats and protect the force.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support offload of all Marine forces and equipment the extended sea-basing of Marine aircraft until phased ashore.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Serve as the TLAM strike coordinator for all TLAM tasking in the ITO IOT provide timely operational fires.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Monitor Iranian reaction and response to CFC actions in the ITO IOT protect the eastern flank of CFC forces.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate and support CSAR and personnel recovery operations with the JSRC.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support JRAC and other functional component commanders in defense of the rear area to include response and defeat of a level II threat.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct mine countermeasures operations as required IOT keep SLOCs clear and designated SPODs open.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Perform Rear Area Operations within the JOA as specified in para. 3.d.18., Coordinating Instructions.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct NEO in the AOR IOT protect AMCITs in the AOR.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct salvage and in-extremis reconstruction for designated ports as required.

Comment [GSS5]: Correctly indicates Cmd Relationship for port security/harbor defense forces and clarifies our support to JRAC listed in a subsequent task recommended for deletion.

Comment [GSS6]: Through numerous meetings with I MEF and MARCENT, this is the only support ashore that CFMCC forces are providing to Marines.

Comment [GSS7]: Strike coordinator duties have been divided with CFMCC as the coordinator for all tasking and both CFMCC and COMSIXTHFLT sharing strike coordinator duties for execution.

Comment [GSS8]: Accuracy. In-extremis reconstruction better reflects U.S. Navy organic capabilities.

12. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct amphibious operations in the ITO IOT support the CFLCC scheme of maneuver.

13. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to assume OPCON or TACON of coalition forces.

14. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support SSE operations IOT provide unique CFMCC capabilities or shipping to move materials out of the AOR.

15. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide maritime environmental response to the deliberate release of oil generated from the NAG or in-land waterways IOT mitigate the environmental impact on the North Arabian Gulf.

> **Comment [GSS9]:** Accuracy. We will conduct maritime response operations. Our focus will be to respond to oil spills generated within inland waterways or the NAG IOT mitigate the effects from these spills on the NAG.

(b) (U) Phase I

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Gain and maintain maritime dominancesuperiority in the Arabian Gulf IOT support CFC operations.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct MIO in support of UNSCRs IOT prevent Iraqi leadership from using the sea as a route of escape and to prevent the illegal movement of weapons and contraband.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct ISR operations vic southern Iraq and western littoral Iran ISO PIR #1.10, Iranian reaction to CFC operations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Receive liaison officer from the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, provide Marine forces to COMUSMARCENT ISO CFLCC operations in Iraq.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide operational fires in support of CFC operations in the ITO.

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7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT prevent the deliberate release of Iraqi oil into the Arabian Gulf.

8. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Retain an ARG/MEU as a theater reserve.

(c) (U) Phase II

1. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Maintain maritime ~~dominance~~superiority in the Arabian Gulf IOT support CFC operations.

2. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Provide operational fires ~~in support of~~ISO CFACC operations in the ITO.

3. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Conduct MIO in the NAG IOT protect forces in the NAG, prevent mining, prevent Iraqi leadership from using the sea as a route of escape and to prevent the illegal movement of weapons and contraband.

4. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Assume control of seized GOPLATs in the Arabian Gulf from CFSOCC IOT prevent environmental disaster, and prevent interference and protect forces operating in the North Arabian Gulf and the Iraqi inland waterways.

5. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Position and maintain one T-AH (hospital ship) in the AG in support of CFC operations in the ITO.

6. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ Clear seized GOPLATs of mines, unexploded ordnance and NBC contamination IOT permit LOGCAP personnel to assess and repair Iraqi oil infrastructure.

7. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ O/O, provide Marine forces to COMUSMARCENT ISO CFLCC operations in Iraq.

8. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ BPT provide security for LOGCAP personnel onboard the GOPLATs IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

9. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ BPT provide temporary confinement of EPWs / detainees, along with transportation and security, to a theater transfer point.

10. ~~(S/OC REL GBR AUS)~~ BPT assist CJTF-Consequence Management (CM) in response to oil spills in KAA waterway.

Comment [GSS10]: Accuracy. The GOPLATs, i.e, at sea, is the only location CFMCC is currently planning to be able to provide security for LOGCAP personnel attempting to restore the oil industry.

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(d) (U) Phase III

    1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Gain and maintain maritime dominance supremacy in the North Arabian Gulf IOT support CFC operations.

    2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to provide operational fires in support of CFC operations in the ITO.

    3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to retain one ARG/MEU as the theater reserve.

    4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Clear and maintain channel access to the port of Umm Qasr for humanitarian shipping in support of CFLCC CMO/HA.

    5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue MIO IOT protect forces in the NAG, prevent mining, prevent Iraqi leadership from using the sea as a route of escape and to prevent the illegal movement of weapons and contraband.

    6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide security for LOGCAP personnel onboard the GOPLATs IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.

    7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) NET C+16 clear the KAA to Umm Qasr IOT enable HA operations. Establish local sea control in the KAA.

    8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide forces in direct support of CFLCC operations at UMM QASR to conduct port/harbor clearance, seaward security, in-extremis reconstruction and salvage.

    9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support CMO/HA operations IOT facilitate efforts in Umm Qasr.

(e) (U) Phase IV

    1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Retain one ARG/MEU as the theater reserve.

    2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, receive OPCON of Marine forces from COMUSMARCENT.

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3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, re-deploy forces as directed.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support CMO to facilitate Iraqi transition to a provisional/ permanent government.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support transport of WMD munitions/delivery systems IOT assist CFLCC to control WMD assets.

(4) (U) COMUSMARCENT

    (a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) All Phases

        1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Assume OPCON of all Marine forces ashore in the USCENTCOM AOR.

        2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Assign MARCENT forces ashore, minus Marine Logistics Command, TACON to the CFLCC.

        3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT transfer OPCON of MEU forces ashore back to the CFMCC to reconstitute a theater reserve afloat.

        4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Ensure C/JTF [1.4b] [1.4b] (CJTF [1.4b] is prepared to respond to WMD attacks or environmental/ humanitarian disasters in the ITO IOT mitigate disruption of force flow or CFC operations and to mitigate the effects of an incident in any nation in the ITO and/or AOR.

        5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Execute the RSOI of MARCENT forces IOT facilitate CFLCC ground operations.

        6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support amphibious operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf ICW CFMCC IOT position forces ISO CFLCC operations in Iraq.

    (b) (U) Phase IV

        1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, assign Marine forces OPCON to CFMCC or re-deploy as directed.

(5) (U) CFSOCC

    (a) (U) All Phases

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish, operate and maintain the theater Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center (UARCC) to coordinate NAR support.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish a Rescue Coordination Center (RCC), integrated with the JSRC, IOT support CSAR and PR.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Relinquish TACON of CFSOCC forces conducting SR/DA in direct support of CFLCC and within CFLCC zone to CFLCC IOT de_conflict and synchronize CFLCC and CFSOCC operations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish, operate and maintain a Theater Transition Point-North in Turkey to support repatriation of isolated personnel.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct initial screening of EPWs and detain key personnel IOT enable SSE operations. O/O, transfer custody of enemy personnel to CFLCC.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Perform Rear Area Operations within the JOA as specified in para 3.d.18., Coordinating Instructions.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O relinquish OPCON of elements of [b 3 10 USC 424] to USCENTCOM. Elements will be TACON to CFLCC northern conventional forces to continue EPW/Detainee exploitation and SSE in the northern ITO.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to conduct Joint Personnel Recovery operations in support ofas required.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to assume OPCON or TACON of coalition special operation forces.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct other special operations within the ITO in support of CFC objectives.

(b) (U) Phase I

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish initial UW operational capability in Northern IZ IOT fix Iraqi divisions along the green line.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct UW to coordinate with and leverage support for OG's to IOT prevent the Iraqi population from interfering with CFC operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct SR in western JSOA IOT provide terminal guidance to CFACC for suppressing the IZ TBM capability.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) activities in Turkey in order to minimize the impact of displaced civilians on operations.

(c) (U) Phases II

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) On A-Day, initiate UW operations against Northern IZ RA forces IOT compel capitulation of RA units and prevent the withdrawal of RA units into urban areas.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) On A-Day, seize key oil pumping facilities (Mina Al Bakr GOPLAT, Khor Al Amaya GOPLAT, Al Faw Manifold) vic Al Faw Peninsula IOT prevent environmental disaster. O/O, disable select key oil pumping facilities in southern Iraq IOT prevent environmental disaster and disruption of maneuver.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) activities in Turkey in order to minimize the impact of displaced civilians on operations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct UW to coordinate with and leverage support for OG's to prevent the Iraqi population from interfering with CFC operations.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT assume control of FOB from TF-20 to support area denial.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct SR/DA in western JSOA IOT provide terminal guidance to CFACC for suppressing the IZ TBM capability.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT deliver emergency non-lethal aid to OGs IOT sustain operations from the KAZ.

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT seize and/or disable
Qadisiyah Dam or Samarra Barrage IOT prevent Iraqi use
to disrupt ground maneuver IVO Baghdad.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct SR/DA (TGO Rollover)
of designated critical oil infrastructure (see Annex B)
IOT prevent Iraqi sabotage of critical oil
infrastructure and support CFLCC tasks to secure
critical oil infrastructure.

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT assume OPCON of airborne
battalion.

(d) (U) Phase III

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support CMO IOT set conditions
for the post-hostilities.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate operational fires in
support of CFC operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct UW to
coordinate with and leverage support for OG's to
prevent the Iraqi population from interfering with CFC
operations.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue UW operations against
Northern IZ RA forces IOT compel capitulation of RA
units and prevent their withdrawal into urban areas.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct liaison with and
assist in monitoring capitulated Iraqi forces.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to conduct SR/DA in
western JSOA IOT provide terminal guidance to CFACC for
suppressing the IZ TBM capability.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support CFLCC SSE operations.

(e) (U) Phase IV

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct UW/SR/DA in support of
CFLCC operations in order to eliminate remaining
pockets of resistance.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to support SSE
operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Continue to support CMO.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O, re-deploy forces.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support establishment of Iraqi internal defense force.

(6) (U) Task Force 14a

    (a) (U) All Phases

        1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish, operate and maintain a Recovery Coordination Center (RCC) and integrate with the Joint Personnel Recovery architecture at the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) in order to enhance JSR C2.

        2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct TST DA operations to kill/capture high level regime leadership personalities IOT disrupt regime C2 and facilitate rapid regime collapse.

        3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O liberate captured U.S. and/or other designated personnel in order to free coalition POW's and prevent them from being used as a bargaining tool/human shields by the Iraqi regime.

        4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O conduct SR/DA SSE and seizure of WMD personalities or WMD HVT's IOT prevent their employment against coalition forces or allied nations.

        5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT seize Saddam International Airport (SIA) IOT exploit early regime collapse and provide a FOB for TST DA and counter-WMD operations IVO Baghdad. O/O conduct relief in place to CFLCC forces.

        6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT to recover malfunctioning U.S. STRATCOM assets employed in Iraq to maintain control of strategic resources and capabilities.

        7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT secure and transport WMD material discovered in Iraq in order to facilitate SSE exploitation.

        8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support USCENTCOM forces with SSE capability IOT facilitate SSE operations non-

permissive or uncertain environments throughout the ITO.

(b) (U) Phase II

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Seize BW/CW facilities in western Iraq to obtain credible proof of Iraqi capability to develop/employ weapons of mass destruction and prevent its employment.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct DA operation against high profile targets IOT demonstrate US ability and resolve to strike any target or key personality throughout the ITO.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support CFLCC seizure of SIAP in order to exploit early success.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct DA operations on Iraqi prisons that could house political prisoners IOT conduct INTEL exploitation.

(c) (U) Phase III

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) O/O support CFLCC seizure of SIAP in order to exploit early success.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT assume OPCON of one airborne battalion and seize a FOB o/a G+3 IOT support follow-on DA operations.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT conduct a relief in place with CFSOCC forces and release the airborne battalion task force OPCON to CFSOCC in order to maintain control of the FOB at H-1 or H-2.

(7) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMJPOTF. Conduct psychological operations to support COMUSCENTCOM objectives and provide PSYOP support to Components as directed by CFC.

(8) (U) USEUCOM

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) of forces in Turkey to facilitate deployment and employment of forces.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate HN support (basing, overflight, engineering, and logistics) for operations from Turkey.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide ONW forces OPCON to USCENTCOM. USEUCOM will retain ADCON over ONW forces.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide inter-theater and intra-theater lift support, and aerial refueling support, as required.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide force protection for forces to include MSC shipping within the EUCOM AOR as required.

(f) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide direct support and general support logistics and Base Operating Support (BOS) to CFC forces based in, or employed from, the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide theater SOF subject matter expert augmentation to JSOTF-North as required.

(h) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide 1-3 SOF LNOs to CFSOCC as requested.

(i) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide communications and intelligence support to JSOTF-north forces in Turkey and northern Iraq.

(j) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support and coordinate 10th SFG(A) (JSOTF-north) operational preparation of the battlespace (OPB) ISO of USCENTCOM 1.4b
1.4b

(k) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support and coordinate support to USCENTCOM OPB infrastructure development ISO of UW/UAR
1.4b

(l) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide CONOPS for air delivery of lethal supplies ISO JSOTF-north to include use of conventional A/C when JSOTF-North A/C are unavailable.

1.4b

(n) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Support, coordinate and integrate into theater non-conventional assisted recovery planning and execution.

(o) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide CONOP support for EPW handling ISO northern CFC forces. NLT 30 Aug 02.

(p) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide CMO support to CFC forces employed from Turkey.

(q) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) In conjunction with EUCOM FWD, the Turkish General Staff (TGS), the US Embassy (Ankara), the Turkish MFA, and CFLCC coordinate the movement of IO/NGO humanitarian assistance into Northern Iraq IOT provide immediate relief for displaced civilians.

(r) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish Military Coordination Center (MCC) IOT synchronize support operations with Turkish military forces in southeast Turkey and de-conflict the activities of coalition forces operating ISO CFLCC.

(q) (S/OC REL USA GBR AUS) Provide logistics concept of support to CINCCENT NLT 30 Aug 02. Request ECJ4 backbrief logistics concept of support 22-23 Sep 02 to CCJ4.

(s) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) On order, establish a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) in Turkey.

(t) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT accept additional forces and Assist USG agencies, UN, and designated NGOS in the provision and security of HA/relief supplies.

(u) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support bulk distribution of HA/relief supplies into Northern Iraq.

(v) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT execute emergency aerial re-supply of JSOTF-north forces to include use of conventional A/C when JSOTF-north A/C are unavailable.

(w) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT air deliver non-lethal aid supplies to include HA ISO JSOTF-north.

(x) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT receive medical evacuees from USCENTCOM AOR and assist with class VIII A and B sustainment and emergency re-supply.

(y) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT support humanitarian assistance operations in northern Iraq IOT minimize the impact of displaced civilians on operations.

(9) (U) USPACOM

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Receive, support, and sustain forces in Diego Garcia.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide MPSRON support.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deploy forces ISO CENTCOM operations as required.

> Comment [DJT11]: Need this to support the ongoing validation of forces etc efforts with USPACOM.

(10) (U) USTRANSCOM

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish tanker bridge to enable deployment / employment of global power and strike aircraft.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish strategic air and sea lift bridge to enable deployment / employment of CFC forces, equipment, and sustainment.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide tanker support to USAF, USN, USMC tactical aircraft.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide strategic airlift to CONUS for WMD samples.

(11) (U) USSTRATCOM

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) At the direction of the CINC, BPT execute TNO in response to Iraqi WMD activities.

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(a) (b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct satellite-related tasks as required to support CFC information operations.

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(11 12) (U) (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 . See Annex V.

(12 13) (U) Department of State. See Annex V.

(13 14) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Department of the Treasury. See Annex V.

(1415) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigations. See Annex V.

(1616) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) National Security Council. See Annex V.

(17) (U) [(b)(3) 10 USC § 424] See Annex B for specific operations and Annex V for authority.

d. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) This order is effective for planning upon receipt and execution on order. Direct liaison and coordination is authorized among components, supporting commands, and supporting agencies for development of supporting operational concepts and plans.

(2) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) At D-Day, upon initiation of Phase II operations in Iraq, components are relieved of responsibility to execute DESERT BADGER and DESERT FURY immediate response.

(3) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) BPT provide personnel to man the Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center (JRTOC) when established by the JRAC.

(4) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Phasing (times are provided for planning only. Actual times are based on the situation at the time of execution):

    (a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) N-DAY, presidential notification. C-DAY MINUS FIVE (5 DAYS).

    (b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) C-DAY, commencement of deployment.

    (c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) D-DAY, commencement of hostilities equals A-DAY, commencement of Operational Fires. C-DAY PLUS ELEVEN (11 DAYS). COMCENT DP #2.

    (d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) G-DAY, commencement of decisive offensive operations. On COMCENT order to initiate ground operations. G-Day is the transition to Phase III. COMCENT DP #5."

(5) (S/REL GBR AUS) MOPP level delegated to component commanders.

(6) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) No air or ground operations within xx miles5 km or air operations within 25 km (north of 31 degrees north latitude) of the Iraq - Iran border without CFC authorization. CFLCC/CFACC will determine appropriate control measures south of 31 degrees north latitude to support combat operations and maintain Iranian sovereignty.

(7) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Defended Asset List (DAL). See Tab A (DAL) to Appendix 17 (TMD) of Annex C (Operations).

(8) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deep attack and cross-border reconnaissance and ground delivered fires authorized at commencement of D-Day.

(9) (S/REL GBR AUS) Component commands will conduct personnel recovery operations in support of their own forces within their capability. All components will be prepared to support joint personnel recovery operations through coordination with the JSRC as required.

  (a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) All component RCC(S) or functional equivalents will immediately notify the JSRC of any situation that isolates their personnel on the battlespace. Components are required to follow up immediate notification with hard copy (GENTEXT message) Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR) per CCR 525-33.

  (b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) All components must establish an initial repatriation point to receive isolated personnel who are returned to friendly control IAW CCR 525-10. Coordinate with the JSRC for all repatriation actions.

  (c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate requirements with USCENTAF/A3-DOOR to develop and distribute blood chits, Evasion Plans of Action (EPA), and DD form 1833 Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREP) to support this CONPLAN. Ensure that each person subject to action in a hostile environment provides individual authentication data on an ISOPREP. Maintain copies of all ISOPREP's at unit intelligence level, component RCC's and/or the JSRC, as directed, in the SAR/CSAR/ Personnel Recovery (PR) SPINS. Commanders will also insure these same persons develop an Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) or review an existing EPA each time they operate over or in potentially hostile areas.

(d) (U) Ensure assigned forces receive appropriate level PR / Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) theater preparation. Coordinate requirements with the JSRC IAW CCR 525-33.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Components establish, operate and maintain a Recovery Coordination Center (RCC) and integrate with the joint personnel recovery architecture at the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC).

(10) (U) Public affairs

(a) (S/REL GBR AUS) Release of information concerning this operation is not authorized. Pending OSD (PA) coordination, and after OSD announcement, modifications to PA posture will be published by USCENTCOM. Direct all questions to USCENTCOM public affairs, CCPA, DSN: (b)(6)

(b) (U) Guidance for Command Information Programs

1. (S/REL GBR AUS) General order number 1A, as amended 30 Nov 01, remains in effect. Commanders will ensure compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

2. (S/REL GBR AUS) Protect the underlying true reasons for all deployments.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Statements regarding force movements can be misleading, but must be true. Attribute unit movements to ongoing support for OEF, planned exercises, and/or operations in the Horn of Africa where possible.

4. (S/REL GBR AUS) De-emphasize the size and emphasize the capabilities of all deploying units. Ensure command messages highlight the counter-terrorism capabilities of the unit.

5. (S/REL GBR AUS) Commanders will avoid the following: reference to U.S. - Israeli ties; implication of superiority of western culture; support for the particular interests of religious or ethnic minority groups in the region; political commitments or policy announcements without prior approval of USCENTCOM; and atrocity themes, unless specifically approved by USCENTCOM.

(11) (U) Deception Story. See Tab A to Appendix 3 to Annex C.

(12) (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)

    (a) (U) Critical Information Requirements.

        1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) A major terrorist attack within the U.S.

        2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Any TBM launch from or within Iraq.

        3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Loss of basing, staging or access in a Tier 1 or Tier 2 country.

        4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Any use of WMD within the AOR.

        5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Any change to the status of the Iraqi Regime.

        6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Any [1.4b] retaliation or indicators of intent to retaliate against Iraq.

    (b) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). See Appendix 1 to Annex B.

    (c) (U) Critical Friendly Force Intelligence (CFFI)

        1. (U) PHASE I:

            1.1 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are TMD architecture and assets in place and operational? (AADC)

            1.2 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are CFACC assets postured to support mission? (Strike, CAS, ISR, CSAR, C2) (CFACC)

            1.3 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is SOF prepared for insertion? (CFSOCC)

            1.4 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is CSS positioned to sustain SOF operations? (CFACC/CFLCC/CFSOCC)

            1.5 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is CSS positioned to sustain CFACC operations? (CFACC/CFMCC)

1.6 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is CFLCC prepared to receive the MEU (CFLCC)

1.7 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is SLOC open? (CFMCC)

1.8 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is time available for MEU to transition ashore? (CFMCC/MARCENT)

1.9 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is another force available for theater reserve? (F2C2)

1.10 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is A-Day beddown complete? (CFACC/CFMCC)

1.11 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are 5 X CVBGs in place? (CFACC/CFMCC)

1.12 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are sufficient CFLCC forces postured to seize Southern Oil Fields? (CFLCC)

1.13 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are SOF and OGs prepared to neutralize IZ units along Green Line? (CFSOCC)

1.14 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are CFACC assets postured to support mission? (Strike, CAS, ISR, CSAR, C2, Airlift) (CFACC)

2. (U) PHASE II:

2.1 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are TF 1.4a assets postured for operations and de-conflicted with CFSOCC? (TF-1.4a/CFSOCC)

2.2 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are CSS assets positioned to sustain TF 1.4a operations? (CFLCC/CFACC)

2.3 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is target intel confirmed by ISR? (J2 ISR)

2.4 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is CAS/CSAR available? (CFACC)

2.5 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are sufficient CLFCC assets postured to execute ground operations? (CFLCC)

2.6 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is 40 CDO positioned to secure Al Faw pumping station?

2.7 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Have UN outposts been vacated? (CFLCC)

2.8 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is CSS positioned to sustain CFLCC operations? (CFLCC)

2.9 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are HA assets positioned/ available to execute future HA operations? (CFLCC)

2.10 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are ISR platforms tracking RGFC movement? (J2 ISR)

2.11 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Has sufficient degradation of IADS been achieved? (CFACC)

2.12 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are locations of CFSOCC SR assets known? (CFACC/CFSOCC)

2.13 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are CFACC assets postured and deconflicted to support CFSOCC and CFLCC sustainment and aerial resupply requirements as directed? (CFACC)

2.14 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are sufficient mobility support forces (TALCE, MST, etc) postured in ITO to open and support terminal operations at Saddam International O/O? (CFACC)

2.15 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is the MEDEVAC system in place and forces and assets postured to support rearward movement of casualties? (CFLCC)

3. (U) PHASE III:

3.1 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Does CFLCC require the MEU? (CFLCC)

3.2 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is 377th in control of Um Qasr? (CFLCC)

3.3 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Does CFLCC have sufficient combat power and CSS to conduct exploitation operations? (CFLCC)

3.4 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Is CSS postured to sustain exploitation operations? (CFLCC)

3.5 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are forces postured to seize
and reinforce SIAP? (CFLCC)

3.6 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Have friendly forces secured
Um Qsar and Basrah IAP and are they prepared to
assist IO/NGO efforts? (CFLCC)

3.7 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are IOs/NGOs prepared to
provide HA? Are HA supplies positioned? (J5-CMO)

3.8 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are military and HN CSS assets
postured to sustain planned operations? (CFLCC/J5-
CMO)

3.9 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are MSRs/LOCs cleared or
marked to enable CMO/HA flow? (CFLCC)

3.10 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Have CFACC terminal FOB
terminal area security requirements been fulfilled
IOT conduct night mobility airland or airdrop
sustainment operations?

3.11 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Have CFACC terminal FOB
terminal area security requirements been fulfilled
IOT conduct day mobility airland or airdrop
sustainment operations?

3.12 (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Are mobility support forces
postured and in place ISO FOB airland operations as
directed?

(d) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Details of numbers of combat
systems, readiness status, and Assembly/Bed Down areas.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Numbers and types of naval assets
protecting strategic choke points along critical SLOCs.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Timing and routing of strategic
sealift assets flowing forces into theater.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Timing and routing off strategic
airlift assets flowing forces into theater.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Status of APODs, SPODs.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Status of tanker air-bridge.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Status of JRSOI for major units (combat BDE and larger).

8. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Patriot missile deployment sites and associated missile types.

9. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Status and vulnerability of C4ISR capabilities and functionality.
   * Computer Network Critical Junctions
   * Satellite communication ground links
   * Coalition C2 capabilities/limitations

10. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Rear Area Security Status and Force Protection Measures in place.

11. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Movements of key leaders (combatant and component commanders).

12. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Timing of major combat operations (prior to execution).

13. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Locations and missions of SOF Forces.

14. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Locations and missions of OGAs.

15. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Identity, locations, and operations of UW forces.

16. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Status river-crossing capabilities.

17. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Locations of unit command post elements.

18. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Status, timing and routing of intra-theater airlift forces operating in the theater.

19. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Locations and missions of intra-theater mobility forces.

20. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Identity, status and quantity of passengers and cargo on board intra-theater airlift missions.

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SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

(e) (U) Requirements for Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.

1. (U) [b 3 10 USC § 424] Chief, Central Security Service (CSS).

(a) (C/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide tailored [1.4c] support to CDR, USCENTCOM/CJTF, as required.

(b) (C/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide [1.4c] (to include [1.4c] and Information Security (INFOSEC)) advice and assistance to CDR, USCENTCOM through the NSA/CSS Representative (NCR) and [1.4c] Services Group (CSG) USCENTCOM. See Appendix 2 for details.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Prepare a [1.4c] Support Plan (CSP) for this OPORD.

(d) (C/OC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate [1.4c] and related activities.

(e) (C/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide NCR USCENTCOM sufficient personnel, equipment, technical materials, parts, maintenance, and logistics to establish and support a CSG at the USCENTCOM forward deployed Headquarters.

(f) (C/OC REL GBR AUS) Coordinate with Service [1.4c] Elements to ensure appropriate and sufficient [ ] support exists at USCENTCOM component commands and joint task forces.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) [b 3 10 USC 424] [b 3 10 USC 424] is requested to provide the following support. Coordinate support through the [b 3 10 USC § 424] Representative at USCENTCOM.

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Conduct intelligence collection operations world-wide in support of this OPORD.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Task Defense Attachés and collection elements to report intelligence information immediately and directly to CDR, USCENTCOM in response to collection requirements.

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SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

(c) (U) Prepare periodic threat / counter-
intelligence assessments pertaining to the AO, as
required.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Be prepared, upon
presidential notification, to pass collection
tasking authority of in theater national
intelligence activities and assets to CDR, USCENTCOM
IAW DOD Directive 5-3325.2.

(e) (U) Provide intelligence support to operational
planning, production, I&W, IO, and collections.

(f) (U) Ensure expeditious dissemination of all
national collection program information.

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Prepare joint intelligence
plans to support collection, production, and
dissemination of national level intelligence to the
theater, including plans to support deployable
national capabilities.

(h) (U) Prepare assessments of national collection
resource capabilities to support military
operations.

(i) (U) Establish and maintain a dynamic
intelligence priorities system to support
collection, production, and dissemination of
intelligence in support of this plan.

(j) (U) Advise the CCJ2 on interoperability issues
concerning support to intelligence systems and
architectures.

(k) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Identify and recommend
solutions to deficiencies that may develop
concerning implementation of this plan.

(l) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish Collection
Operations Bases (COB) (north and south) to conduct
HUMINT collection operations.

(m) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide augmentation
personnel to CCJ2-X and be prepared to provide

augmentation to the Joint Intelligence Center
Central (JICCENT).

(n) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide personnel and
material support to CFLCC-operated IEBs, JIFs,
JCMECs, JDECs, and JIDCs, as appropriate.

1.4c

(p) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Establish and maintain secure
24 hour JWICS connectivity from the National
Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) to the
USCENTCOM JIC.

3. (U) Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(DIRNIMA). Provide Geospatial Information and Services
(GI&S) support IAW Annex M of this OPORD, and as
requested by CDR, USCENTCOM.

4. (U) Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DIRDTRA).

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deploy Site Assessment Team
(SAT) to provide screening of suspected WMD sites in
advance of Mobile Exploitation Teams (MET),
assistance to METs as required, and collect record
and report indications of WMD to SSE planners in
support of CFLCC SSE mission.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Deploy Direct Support Team
(DST) to provide Nuclear / Radiological Search
capabilities in support of CFLCC SSE mission.

5.

(b)(3) 50 USC § 3507

(b)(3) 50 USC § 3507

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Provide equipment,
connectivity, personnel, and access to the NPIC Data
System (NDS) at the deployed imagery collection
section of USCENTCOM (or subordinate JTF).

(13) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) USCENTCOM will provide Named Areas of
Interest (NAIs) / Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) IOT
facilitate focused strike operations in established
killboxes. USCENTCOM will provide approved killbox structure
to CFACC. Updates will appear in the Airspace Coordination
Order (ACO). Further guidance on engagement zone operations

will be published in Tab A (Air Fire Plan) to Appendix 19
(Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations) of this CONPLAN.

(14) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Force Protection. Commanders will
establish an aggressive AT/FP program to protect U.S. and
coalition forces and support the coalition force's ability to
successfully complete the operation. This will be
accomplished by ensuring implementation and enforcement of
DOD and USCENTCOM standards and policies for force
protection. Commanders will coordinate with
base/installation commanders to ensure proper security
measures are followed to protect the force. In cases where
there is no base or installation commander, the senior
commander will assume force protection responsibilities. (See
Appendix 15 to Annex C)

(15) (U) Legal Considerations

    (a) (U) International Law. International law recognizes
the inherent right of a sovereign state, either alone or
in conjunction with allies, to use military force in
national self-defense. This principle is enshrined in
article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

    (b) (U) Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) All activities of
U.S. forces will be consistent with LOAC. Operational
plans and orders developed in furtherance of this plan
will be reviewed by a judge advocate for consistency with
U.S. domestic law, international law and the LOAC.

    (c) (U) Legal obligations of an occupying force.

        (1)(U) In the case of occupied enemy territory, US
Forces must be aware of their obligations under Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 1949 and Hague Convention No.
IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
1907
(see FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare) and customary
international law. Commanders should seek legal
guidance on and formulate a plan for issues that arise
during an occupation of enemy territory.

        (2)(U) Territory is considered occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of US forces and
when that authority can be effectively exercised.

Occupation does not constitute annexation of the
territory.

(3)(U) Once territory is occupied, US forces shall take
all measures in their power to restore and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety.

(4)(U) US forces will respect the fundamental human
rights of the civilian population in the occupied
territory. For example, family honor and rights,
private property, the lives of persons, and religious
convictions and practices will be respected.

(5)(U) If resources in the occupied territory are
inadequate, US forces shall ensure, to the extent that
military conditions permit, that the civilian
population in the occupied territory is provided with
food, medical supplies, and medical treatment.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Rules of Engagement (ROE). The
following ROE are in effect: CJCS standing ROE; USCENTCOM
theater-specific ROE; ENDURING FREEDOM ROE Serial Two
(CJCS 212315Z NO5.OCT 01),including modifications 001
through 004; ROE authorization Serial One Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM EXPANDED MIO (CJCS 171145Z SEP 02); YEMEN
PHASE II EXORD/ROE (CJCS 121531Z OCT 02); ROE
authorization Serial Seven/Southwest Asia Region,
including changes 001 and 002; and OPERATION DESERT SPRING
ROE; and MIO ROE, including changes 001 and 002.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Text of foregoing ROE are available

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(b)(6)
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(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Current ROE (OPERATIONS NORTHERN
AND SOUTHERN WATCH): U.N. Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 949 (Movement Restrictions South of 32N Latitude)
and the current ROE CJCS OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH ROE
Serial Seven (DTG 101522Z Jan 99), including MODS 001 and
002 remain in effect. These arrangements allow any and all
aircraft airborne at the time of incident to engage
targets associated with Iraqi (IADS) south of 33N latitude
if a hostile act is committed or hostile intent
demonstrated. Operations in southern Iraq are conducted
IAW CONOPS 2003 (COMUSCENTCOM 18225Z OCT 02). Current ROE

authorizes USCENTCOM to engage and destroy positively
identified:

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Military units penetrating south
of 32N latitude within Iraq to include interdicting key
LOC's.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Recognized enhancements of
military capability south of 32N latitude within Iraq.
Includes multiple rocket launchers (MRL) and surface-
to-surface missile systems.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) SAMs (radars, transporter erector
launchers (TEL's)), resupply vehicles, anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA), man-portable air defense missiles,
early warning (EW) and target acquisition radar (TAR)
that either deploy to south of 33N latitude or that
have moved or been enhanced (repaired, rebuilt, or
reinforced) within Iraq south of 33N latitude.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) SAMs, C2 facilities (Air Defense
Operation Centers (ADOCS), Sector Operation Centers
(SOCS), Intercept Operation Centers (ICOS), Ground
Control Intercept (GCI) sites, Reporting Posts (RP's)
and communications nodes), and military airfields and
military aircraft within Iraq and south of 33N latitude
supporting No Fly Zone (NFZ) and air defense
operations.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) In self defense, other IADS
elements, military aircraft and airfields throughout
Iraq that pose an imminent threat and place mission
accomplishment at risk.

(f) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) ROE in support of this OPLAN will
be issued by SECDEF and CFC and published SEPCOR. The ROE
contained in Annex C are for planning purposes only.

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) The status of U.S. personnel
captured by Iraqi armed forces will be POW. Personnel
held by other entities not affiliated with the Iraqi
government will be considered hostages.

(16) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Mines. Non-self destructing/non-self
deactivating anti-personnel and anti-tank land mines are
prohibited with the exception of command detonated claymore
mines. USCENTCOM Commander approval is required to employ

mines in the Iraqi Theater of Operations. However, Commander, USCENTCOM intends to delegate the authority to employ mines to at least the component commander level. In addition to the guidance provided in Appendix 6 to Annex C, further guidance will be provided SEPCOR. SECDEF has retained approval authority for employment of conventional mines. All safeguards regarding SCATMINE warnings, recording, and reporting obstacles will be observed.

(17) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Forces should minimize entering, and avoid damaging or violating holy shrines, mosques or other religious, historical, or archeological sites or structures.

(18) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Joint Rear Area Coordination. The designated Joint Rear Area (JRA) is that area that directly affects CFLCC's ability to conduct and support operations. The remainder of the JOA will continue to function and operate under currently established command, control, reporting and communications procedures.

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) The CFLCC JRA is defined as Kuwait and the portion of the Saudi Arabian coast line, inland to include the GLOCs, south to include the ports of Jubayl and Ad Dammam. CFLCC will provide JRAC functions for the JRA.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) JRA functions for the remaining land area of the JOA are the responsibility of those commands with current missions in those locations. Areas not specifically assigned to a command will become the responsibility of the component/CJTF with the preponderance of forces or as specified in an appropriate order/FRAGO. Base commanders, tenant units or commands from components based in those locations will report security status to USCENTCOM JSD-Qatar through the specified component commander.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Commanders will establish an aggressive AT/FP program to protect US and coalition forces and support the coalition forces' ability to successfully complete the operation. DOD and USCENTCOM standards and policies will apply to the force protection of all forces OPCON to CFC. Commanders will coordinate with base/installation commanders to ensure proper security measures are followed to protect the force. Components will support JRAC operations in the defense of the rear areas, provide rear area security and force protection, to include

response and defeat of Level II threat, for assigned areas of responsibility.

(19) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Funding. Component commands or parent services will fund the cost of this operation and capture all incremental costs. DOD funds shall not be used to provide lethal or non-lethal supplies directly or indirectly to OGs. Humanitarian assistance expenses will be funded from an emerging ops fund. DOD transportation of non-DOD purchased lethal or non-lethal supplies to OGs is authorized. Any resupply drops that are directed exclusively to non-DOD personnel will be accomplished pursuant to the Economy Act. Report costs to service comptrollers.

(20) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Use of JOPES is directed.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

   a. (U) Concept of Support

   (1) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) General. Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) will be executed through Commander USCENTCOM directive authority for logistics (DAL). Commander USCENTCOM will perform JTLM through the operations of Boards, Bureaus, Centers and Offices (BBCOS), with the Coalition Logistics Operations Center (CLOC) serving as the central point responsible for the fusion of joint theater logistics. The CLOC will synchronize, integrate, monitor, and coordinate logistic operations based on Commander USCENTCOM priorities. Logistics support within the AOR remains a service responsibility and is executed through USCENTCOM components. Commander USEUCOM provides general support/direct support logistics and base operating support (BOS) to CFC forces based in or employed from the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), specifically TURKEY. Once CFLCC forces cross the Turkey/Iraq border, Commander USEUCOM continues providing general support logistics to those CFLCC forces in IRAQ that employed from Turkey. CFLCC will receive GS logistics from Commander USEUCOM forces and provide DS logistics to CFC forces inside IRAQ. Within IRAQ, CFSOCC forces employed from Turkey will receive DS from Commander USEUCOM forces via airland/airdrop or if possible DS on an area support basis from CFLCC forces. If required, Commander USEUCOM CSS forces must be prepared to cross into Northern IRAQ in support of CFLCC and CFSOCC operations. COMUSPACOM will provide direct support logistics to forces in Diego Garcia. Operations in the IRAQ Theater of Operations are the logistics support main effort within the USCENTCOM AOR.

1.4a

1.4a

b. (U) Logistics. See Annex D, Logistics.

c. (U) Health Service Support (HSS)

(1) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Strategic level medical support in the joint operational area will be characterized by:

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Tailored; forward deployed surgical/evacuation capabilities designed to facilitate rapid stabilization and evacuation of casualties to level IV medical treatment facilities to ensure maximum availability of the limited inpatient bed capability within the joint operational area.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Responsive intra- and inter-theater aeromedical evacuation.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Optimization of joint HSS capabilities.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) USEUCOM bed expansion and early employment of U.S. Navy hospital ship.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Host Nation medical facilities may be used to offset U.S. medical requirements only if such support is reliable, measurable, and is equivalent to U.S. standards of clinical treatment.

(2) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) HSS is a service component responsibility, to include bed down site support. Units will deploy with organic Level I and II capabilities. Units without organic medical support will identify requirements to their higher HQ for resolution and coordination with CCSG.

(3) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Movement of patients (inter/intra theater) will be requested through the Joint Patient Movements Requirements Center (JPMRC), as appropriate.

(4) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Class VIIIA Support. Units will deploy with service standard basic load of supply. Components will establish procedures for Class VIIIA sustainment through the CFLCC Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM). Components will establish accounting and distribution procedures for Class VIIIA from APODS to requesting activities.

(5) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Class VIIIB Support. Components will establish procedures to identify Class VIIIB requirements and submit consolidated requisitions to the USCENTCOM Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO).

(6) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Aeromedical Evacuation (AE). AE forces have deployed to the AOR and established a tactical and

strategic aeromedical evacuation system.

(7) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Medical Regulating. USCENTCOM has
established a Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center
(JPMRC) at PSAB, KSA. Components will establish procedures
for units to identify medical regulating requirements via
TRAC2ES to component headquarters and the JPMRC. Component
surgeons will maintain in-transit visibility (ITV) of all
personnel transiting the AE system.

(8) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Force Health Protection (FHP).
Components will comply with (pre/post deployment) FHP
requirements identified by USCENTCOM and available on
USCENTCOM siprnet SIPRNET and/or CCSG as supplemented by
individual unit deployment guidelines to include USCENTCOM
message DTG 032024Z OCT 01 Subject: USCENTCOM Personnel
Policy Guidance.

(9) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Preventive medicine support will be
planned for and implemented at all ISB, FOB, APOD, and SPOD
locations in support of operations.

(10) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Medical Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C4I) of medical and AE
units will be IAW service and component policies. Operational
Control of the JPMRC and JBPO resides with USCENTCOM. CCSG is
the senior medical staff advisor to USCENTCOM. Components
will initiate and sustain reporting procedures IAW
established standard operating procedures.

(11) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Medical Reporting. Medical
surveillance/MEDSITREP reporting is required and will be
accomplished by existing theater SOP and Annex Q to this plan.

d. (U) Personnel

(1) (U) For Phases I and IV of the operation, component /
supporting commanders will inform USCENTCOM of U.S. service
member casualties by OPREP-3 Report, or the fastest available
means. During phases II and III, daily casualty information
will be reported to USCENTCOM via the Joint Personnel Status
Report (JPERSTAT). Report the status of isolated personnel
as Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown (DUSTWUN). Coordinate
with the component RCC and the JSRC to ensure consistent
status reporting is maintained. Component/supporting
commanders will also notify the applicable service casualty
POCs identified in paragraph 4.d.(2) below and provide them

the information in paragraph 4.d.(3) below. When reporting
casualties through the appropriate service channels,
USCENTCOM CCJ1 will be an info addressee on all service
casualty reports.

(2) (U) Commanders will contact the following service
component POC's in the event of a casualty. This reporting,
additive to JPERSTAT requirements, is for next of kin
purposes and is time sensitive.

(a) (U) United States Army. Commanders will report all
U.S. army casualties directly to the Kuwait Casualty
Assistance Center (CAC). The Kuwait CAC is responsible
for directly notifying HQ DA Casualty Branch and providing
an information copy to HQ USCENTCOM/CCJ1. Points of
contact at the Kuwait CAC may be reached at DSN [b 6]

[(b)(6)]

(b) (U) United States Navy. Commanders will report all
navy casualties to the COMNAVPERSCOM Millington, TN PERS-
621//and MBR's parent command if MBR TAD to a different
unit. Navy JAG WASHINGTON DC//35// and BUMED WASHINGTON
DC//MED-31//; NAVSUPPACT BAHRAIN//MED CLINIC//JJJ//;
COMUSNAVCENT//N4/N014//; and USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB
FL//CCJ1// should be information addresses. Points of
contact at COMNAVPERSCOM may be reached after duty hours

[(b)(6)]

(c) (U) United States Marine Corps. Commanders will
report all Marine casualties to the service member's
parent command or HQ Marine Corps Casualty Section if
unable to notify the parent command. Commanders will
provide an information copy to HQ USCENTCOM/J1, USMARCENT
(Bahrain). Points of contact at HQ U.S. Marine Corps
Casualty Section can be reached after duty hours at DSN
[b 6] HQ U.S. Marine Corps Casualty Section may be
reached during duty hours at DSN [b 6] commercial
[(b)(6)]

(d) (U) United States Air Force. Commanders will report
all Air Force casualties to the supporting Personnel
Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) or HQ Air
Force Personnel Center (AFPC) casualty services branch if
a PERSCO team is not available. Commanders will provide

an information copy to HQ USCENTCOM/J1, and CENTAF
(forward/Saudi Arabia). Points of contact for HQ AFPC may

(b)(6)

(3) (U) When contacting the service representatives in
accordance with the above subparagraphs, commanders must be
prepared to provide the following information in an
unclassified format: type of casualty (hostile or non-
hostile); casualty status (deceased or injured); category
(military or civilian); SSN; name; rank; incident date/time);
circumstances; and inflicting force (enemy or friendly fire).
If any of the above information is classified, that item must
be identified as "classified" and reported to the service
casualty representatives in a separate classified message.

(4) (U) The following definitions from CJCSM 3150.13, Joint
Reporting Structure - Personnel Manual, 1 Aug 99, will be
used to categorize casualties.

(a) (U) HCAS - Hostile Casualties. A person who is the
victim of a terrorist activity or who becomes a casualty
"in action." "In action" characterizes the casualty as
having been the direct result of hostile action, sustained
in combat or relating thereto, or sustained going to or
returning from a combat mission provided that the
occurrence was directly related to hostile action.
Included are persons killed or wounded, mistakenly or
accidentally, by friendly force directed at a hostile
force or what was thought to be a hostile force.
Exceptions are injuries or deaths due to the elements,
self-inflicted wounds, combat fatigue, and, except in
unusual cases, wounds or death inflicted by a friendly
force while the individual is in AWOL, deserter, or
dropped from rolls status or is voluntarily absent from a
place of duty. The exceptions are not considered as
sustained in action and are not to be interpreted as
hostile casualties.

1. (U) KIA - Killed In Action. Casualty category
applicable to a hostile casualty who is killed outright
or who dies as a result of wounds received or other
injuries before reaching a medical treatment facility.

2. (U) WIA - Wounded In Action. Casualty category
applicable to a hostile casualty who received an injury
due to external agent or cause.

(b) (U) NHCAS - Non-hostile Casualties. A person who becomes a casualty because of circumstances not directly attributable to hostile action or terrorist activity. Casualties due to the elements, self-inflicted wounds, and combat fatigue are non-hostile casualties.

    1. (U) DO - Death Other. Personnel who died as a result of an accident or illness not related to hostilities during the reporting period.

    2. (U) DUSTWUN - Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown. A transitory casualty status, applicable only to military personnel, that is used when the responsible commander suspects the member may be a casualty whose absence is involuntary but does not believe sufficient evidence currently exists to make a definite determination of missing or deceased. Use this to report personnel designated as isolated and reported as such to the JSRC for recovery operations.

(c) (U) Missing

    1. (U) Missing. A person is declared missing if the individual is: (a) beleaguered, (b) besieged, (c) captured, (d) detained, (e) interned, (f) missing, or (g) missing in action. Exclude personnel who are in an AWOL, deserter, or dropped from rolls status.

    2. (U) Missing in Action (MIA). The casualty is a hostile casualty who is not present at his or her duty location because of apparently involuntary reasons and whose location is unknown. MIA is a subset of Missing. Commanders will initially place casualties that fall in this category in the DUSTWUN category pending an investigation.

(5) (U) For further casualty assistance or if you are unable to contact the services contact HQ USCENTCOM/J1 DSN: | b 6 |

| (b)(6) |

e. (U) Religious Support

    1. (U) The Command Chaplain, USCENTCOM (CCCH) will advise the Commander(s) on issues relating to religion, morals, morality, and ethics. The CCCH will also assist in

identifying religious sites and provide input relating to indigenous religious groups.

2. (U) The CCCH will coordinate with the command chaplain teams of Component Commands, other Unified Commands, and Coalition Forces to manage religious support throughout the area of responsibility, ensuring seamless religious support through all phases of the operation.

3. (U) Component Command Chaplains will provide SITREPS as required. See Annex R Reports

5. (U) Command and Control

a. (U) Command

(1) (U) Command Relationships

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CDR USCENTCOM is the Combined Force Commander (CFC).

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CDR USCENTCOM retains COCOM of service component commanders: COMUSARCENT (Commander 3d Army), COMUSCENTAF (Commander 9th Air Force), COMUSNAVCENT (Commander Fifth Fleet), COMMARCENT, and COMSOCCENT.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) The following service component commanders are designated as functional component commanders:

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMUSARCENT (Commander 3d Army) is the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and is responsible for the conduct of land operations in the ITO. The CFLCC will also serve as JRAC in the area designated in paragraph 3.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMUSCENTAF (Commander 9th Air Force) is the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), Airspace Control Authority (ACA), and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and is responsible for the conduct of air operations in the ITO. Additionally, the CFACC serves as the Personnel Recovery Coordinator and is responsible for the conduct of personnel recovery throughout the ITO.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMUSNAVCENT (Commander Fifth Fleet) is the Combined Forces Maritime Component

Commander (CFMCC) and is responsible for the conduct of naval operations in the ITO.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMSOCCENT is the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Commander (CFSOCC) and is responsible for the conduct of special operations in the USCENTCOM theater of war (AOR). CFSOCC retains OPCON of U.S. special operations forces, except selected Civil Affairs and tactical PSYOP forces, which will be OPCON to CFLCC until Phase IV. CFSOCC exercises command and control of coalition special operations forces as determined by individual country requirements and agreements. Designated CFSOCC forces operating in the ITO will be TACON to CFLCC if in direct support of CFLCC. CA and tactical PSYOP forces are in direct support of CFLCC and CFLCC subordinate units. Those CA and tactical PSYOP forces will be OPCON to CFLCC until Phase IV.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMUSMARCENT is responsible to CFC for the deployment of Marine forces and for the conduct of CM operations in the USCENTCOM AOR to include the Afghanistan TO. COMUSMARCENT gives CFLCC TACON of I MEF. Marine forces operating in the ITO may be TACON to other component commanders.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CDR USCENTCOM (CFC) exercises C2 relationships with the following subordinate commands.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Commander 8th BN, 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) is Commander Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (COMJPOTF). COMJPOTF is OPCON to CDR USCENTCOM, and is responsible for the conduct of psychological operations and is the coordinating authority for PSYOP in the USCENTCOM AOR.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) TF 14a is OPCON to CDR USCENTCOM and conducts special operations throughout the ITO.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) OPCON ONW air forces and air assets will be transferred OPCON from CDR USEUCOM to CDR USCENTCOM for the conduct of operations in the ITO. All air assets flowing into Turkey ISO the ITO are OPCON to CDR USCENTCOM. CDR USEUCOM will retain ADCON of ONW forces. OPCON of ONW forces will be delegated to service component commanders.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) USCENTCOM CFMCC has coordinating authority with COMUSNAVEUR/C6F to execute TLAM tasking for USNAVEUR naval forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean in support of operations in the ITO. C6F has TACON of assigned maritime strike forces. USCENTCOM CFACC has coordinating authority with USNAVEUR air forces providing direct support to USCENTCOM. CFACC assumes TACON of USNAVEUR air forces NLT N-Day.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CJTF-[1.4a] is OPCON to CDR USCENTCOM. COMCJTF-[1.4a] is responsible for the conduct of planning and execution of operations within the Afghanistan Theater of Operations.

6. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMCJTF-Horn of Africa (HOA) is responsible for the conduct of all operations within CJOA HOA.

7. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CDR USCENTCOM has established a Joint Inter-agency Coordination Group (JIACG) as part of the USCENTCOM staff to coordinate interagency activities. CFC will employ the USCENTCOM JIACG to coordinate the activities of each US governmental agency commensurate with their capabilities in support of CFC operations in the ITO, in accordance with JCS guidance on JIACGs.

8. (C/OC REL GBR AUS) Command and control/command relationships of coalition forces will be determined separately based on individual country requirements and published in appropriate fragmentary order.

9. (C/OC REL GBR AUS) CFC forces that are employed in Iraq from Turkey are TACON to USEUCOM for force protection while in Turkey and ADCON to USEUCOM for logistics while in Turkey or Iraq.

10. (C/OC REL GBR AUS) USEUCOM ground forces that cross into USCENTCOM AOR while supporting CFC forces in the ITO are TACON to CDR USCENTCOM.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) During all operations, the main effort is the supported effort for planning and execution of operations in Iraq. All other component commanders are conducting supporting efforts. Main effort designation is CFSOCC during Phase I, CFACC during Phase II, and CFLCC during Phase III and IV. As directed by CFC, other

component commanders may be designated the supported
commander for specified operations, specific periods of
time, or in designated joint operations areas. All
agencies are supporting agencies for planning and
execution.

1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFLCC is the functional component
commander responsible for the conduct of land
operations within the ITO. CFLCC is responsible for
the de-confliction of land space usage and
synchronization of all land operations within the ITO.

2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFLCC will exercise OPCON or
TACON of land forces based within the ITO.

3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) All land operations executed in
the ITO must be coordinated with the CFLCC.

4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFMCC naval forces conducting
amphibious operations into the ITO will coordinate with
CFLCC for de-confliction and synchronization of
operations.

5. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFSOCC will retain OPCON of U.S.
special operations forces. Those special operations
forces operating in the CFLCC AOR become TACON to
CFLCC.

(2) (U) Command Posts

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CDR USCENTCOM is designated the CFC
and the primary CFC HQ is located initially at MacDill
AFB, FL. CFC's Contingency Forward Headquarters(-)(CFH(-
)) is in Qatar. C2 will be transferred to CFH(-) as
directed by COMUSCENTCOM.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFLCC (COMUSARCENT) HQ is forward
deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait.

(c) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFACC (COMUSCENTAF) HQ is forward
deployed to PSAB, KSA. BPT move from PSAB, KSA to Al
Udeid, Qatar.

(d) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFMCC (COMUSNAVCENT) HQ is located
at NSA, Bahrain.

(e) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) CFSOCC (COMSOCCENT) is forward deployed to As Saliyah, Qatar.

(f) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) COMUSMARCENT HQ is located at NSA Bahrain. CJTF-CM is located at Camp Doha, Kuwait.

(g) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) 8th PSYOP BN, 4th PSYOP Group is the JPOTF and is located at Ft Bragg, NC.

(3) (U) Succession of Command

(a) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) In the event that command of the force must pass from one commander to another, succession of command is as follows.

  1. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) General Franks, CDR USCENTCOM/CFC.

  2. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) LTG Abizaid, Deputy Commander CFC (DCFC).

  3. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) LtGen Delong, Deputy Commander USCENTCOM (DCDR).

  4. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) LTG McKiernan, Commander ARCENT/CFLCC.

(b) (S/OC REL GBR AUS) In the event that CFC HQ/USCENTCOM can not effectively command and control as a HQ, then command and control will temporarily pass to the CFLCC (COMUSARCENT HQ) and the CFACC (COMUSCENTAF HQ), in order.

b. (S/OC REL GBR AUS) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4. USCENTCOM component headquarters will assist deploying units with frequency allocations as required. USCENTCOM will receive component headquarters' requests for relative priorities and allocation of satellite channels/circuits. Priority will be given to ISR SATCOM requests, specifically SATCOM requests in support of Predator, Global Hawk and JSTARS.

c. (C) POC. [b 3 b 6] CCJ5-P, DSN [b 6].

TOMMY R. FRANKS

SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS

General, USA
Commander in Chief

Annexes:

A—Task Organization
B—Intelligence
C—Operations
D—Logistics
E—Personnel
F—Public Affairs
G—Civil Affairs
H—Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
J—Command Relationships
K—Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
L—Environmental Considerations
M—Geospatial Considerations
N—Space Operations
P—Host Nation Support
Q—Medical Services
R—Reports
S—Special Technical Operations (SEPCOR)
T—Consequence Management
U-Information Management
V—Interagency Coordination
X—Execution Checklist (Synchronization Matrix)
Z—Distribution

SECRET/ORCON REL GBR AUS