Chapter Three
Anbar Insurgency: The Seeds are Planted –
The Formation and Motivating Factors
(2003)

Introduction

(U) On December 14, 2003, soldiers from the Raider Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division and U.S. special operations forces acted on a tip from a member of Saddam Hussein’s clan. They conducted a raid on the property of Saddam’s former personal attendant in the small town of al-Dawr, 15 miles south of Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit. Focusing on a rural farmhouse, U.S. troops cordoned off the area and found a narrow cellar or “spider hole” covered by a rug inside a hut. In it they found Saddam himself. The former Iraqi despot had surrounded himself with symbols of his lost power—two AK-47s, a pistol, and $750,000 in cash. Offering no resistance, the bewildered Saddam surrendered. As soon as his identity was confirmed U.S. administrator Paul Bremer proudly announced to journalists in Baghdad, “Ladies and gentlemen, we got him.”

(U) It soon became clear that Saddam’s capture did not end the violence in Iraq and was merely one transition point in the insurgency—that was consuming Anbar Province. The conditions for insurgency had been set during the first five months of 2003. Actions by Saddam, the Coalition, and by radicals who wanted to provoke an insurgency—exacerbated by high unemployment, poor living conditions, and strong religious and nationalist sentiments—coalesced. In response, former regime elements (FREs) and former regime loyalists (FRLs) initiated what was, at first, a disorganized resistance. Over time, they organized, first at the local and then the national level, into an effective resistance to Coalition Forces. To combat the insurgency, the Coalition focused on hunting down former regime leaders, most notably Saddam Hussein. During 2003, they achieved some successes, including Saddam’s capture, and ended the year with the splintering of the FRL groups that had been dedicated to the return of Saddam to power. Yet the insurgency in Anbar, while weakened by

1 [ | Open Source | TIME MAGAZINE/NANCY GIBBS: WE GOT HIM | 20031214 | (U) | ]
the loss of Saddam, remained active in the form of FRE, Sunni religious extremist (SRE), and Al Qaeda organizations destined to play a larger role in 2004.

**FRL, FRE AND SRE.** During the first year of the insurgency, Coalition Forces used a variety of terms to differentiate insurgent groups by motivation, objectives and/or origin. Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) were supporters of Saddam who fought the Coalition in order to return Saddam’s regime, in its entirety, to power. Former Regime Elements (FREs) were members of Saddam’s regime who did not want to see Saddam return to power, but were instead motivated to fight the Coalition for a variety of tribal, regional, and sectarian reasons. Sunni Religious Extremists (SREs), on the other hand, primarily fought for sectarian or religious reasons and did not necessarily have any ties to the former regime.

**Pre-OIF Error! Bookmark not defined., OIF and the War in Anbar (January – April 2003)**

(U) How did the insurgency begin? What were the key factors that led ordinary Anbaris to take up weapons against Coalition Forces? To understand the genesis of the insurgency, we must begin with the plans made by the combatants for the war and for a post-war Iraq.

**Iraqi Pre-War Planning**

(U) There is no evidence that Saddam Hussein developed any detailed plans for post-war resistance against the Coalition.\(^2\) Senior Iraqi leaders believed that either international pressure or the use of unconventional weaponry would deter the Coalition from overthrowing its regime.\(^3\) Nevertheless, the regime’s military preparations included an irregular component that helped to create the conditions and organization that would later prove invaluable to the formation of the insurgency.

(U) Saddam’s real fear was another uprising like the one in 1991. Based on that fear, he made three key decisions that later greatly assisted the organization of the insurgency. First, in order to protect himself from another Shia or Kurd uprising, Saddam established irregular and paramilitary organizations like the Saddam Fedayeen and the al-Quds Army (or Jaysh Quds). Second, as early as January 2003, the regime began giving large numbers of weapons (including RPGs, anti-aircraft guns, and anti-tank weapons) to loyalist tribal sheikhs to assist in controlling his borders and dissidents.\(^4\) Finally, in early 2003, Saddam decentralized command and control of the Iraqi military by dividing Iraq into four military districts.

(U) Saddam's intent was to insure his commanders had the forces, equipment and authority necessary to take immediate action against anti-government uprisings in their sectors. To protect himself against potential uprisings, Saddam was forced to grant local and regional commanders more

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\(^2\) [ | Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY REPORT: INTELLIGENCE BRIEF ON THE STATE OF THE INSURGENCY | 20060622 | (S/NF) | ]
\(^3\) [ | Open Source | INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS: IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT | pp. 31-32 | (U) | ]
\(^4\) [ | Open Source | NEW YORK TIMES | 20030105 | (U) | ]
autonomy than in the past.  In doing so, Saddam enabled them to initiate their own pre-planning for guerrilla and terrorist operations without central direction from Baghdad.

The terrorist component of Saddam’s strategy also served as an impetus for the insurgency. In late 2002, Saddam Hussein instructed Iraqi intelligence to send members of the elite M-14 directorate (Special Operation and “Anti-Terrorism”) to key Iraqi cities in to assist local commanders with carrying out attacks against Coalition forces using explosives. While many M-14 operatives were killed during the Coalition invasion, those who survived were well trained, widely dispersed and in place to provide the nucleus for much of the early Iraqi insurgency.

To prepare the people mentally and spiritually, some government-sponsored mosque sermons in Anbar preached stridently anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric, exhorting Iraqis to participate in resistance—a jihad—should the Coalition invade Iraq. The declaration by the prominent Islamic Research Center of al-Azhar University that a U.S.-led war in Iraq would compel all Muslims to participate in jihad further served to legitimize anti-Coalition violence even among Islamists who hated Saddam’s secular regime.

In contrast to Saddam and his inner circle, a number of senior members of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) were far less optimistic about the regime’s chances for survival in the event of a Coalition invasion. They began making survival plans of their own, independent of Saddam. These plans called for the IIS to operate as a clandestine organization, take over Sunni mosques under an Islamist façade, preserve arms caches and accumulate weaponry, assassinate members of the returning Iraqi émigré population who might be able to identify them, and infiltrate any new political parties and NGOs to sabotage these institutions from within. While these plans were only known to senior IIS officers, they helped to form the framework for many FRE and FRL groups to organize in the early stages of the insurgency.

Coalition Pre-War Planning

As would be expect, the United States also conducted planning for post-OIF. Iraq. On January 20, 2003 President Bush created the Office of Reconstruction and
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Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA! Bookmark not defined.) within the Department of Defense (DoD! Bookmark not defined.) under Lieutenant General Jay Garner, U.S. Army, (Retired), to assist Iraqis in developing democratic governance and reconstructing the country once Saddam Hussein was deposed. While DoD war planners created a branch plan for a post-war insurgency, no detailed contingency plan was written, nor were any resources for a counter-insurgency built into the final war plan.

Pre-War Planning by Islamic Militants

(S/REL TO MCET) Islamist militants, by contrast, made very definite plans to wage a guerrilla campaign against the Coalition. Although suppressed by Saddam, Al Qaeda and associated groups were already active inside Iraq pre-OIF! Bookmark not defined. under the leadership of senior Al Qaeda associates Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (AMZ), Abu Ayyub al-Masri, and Lu'ai Saqa.11 The vast majority of Islamist activity took place in the Kurdish areas where Operation NORTHERN WATCH protected them from Saddam's forces. Ansar al-Islam (AI) served as their primary hub in northern Iraq even as they maintained a presence inside regime-controlled areas including Baghdad! Bookmark not defined. and Mosul! Bookmark not defined..12 Senior Al Qaeda leaders including 'Usama bin Ladin and Sayfi al-Adl called on Iraqis to resist the Coalition, with al-'Adl even going as far as to write a military manual for Islamists fighting in Iraq which included Al Qaeda's "lessons learned" from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan! Bookmark not defined..13 Between forty and eighty Arab and Arabic-speaking members of Al Qaeda and its Pakistani associate group Lashkar-e-Taiba traveled from the Pakistani border with Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia under the cover of the Hajj. From Saudi Arabia, they entered Iraq for the specific purpose of fighting Coalition forces.14

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of AMZ

(U) ABU MUS'AB AL-ZARQAWI (Zarqawi) began life as a street thug in Zarqa, Jordan! Bookmark not defined.. During a stint in prison he met Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a charismatic Islamic cleric, who convinced him to dedicate his life to jihad, to the Wabbi's version of taawhid, and to implementing an extremist version of shari'a. Zarqawi also developed an intense hatred for the Shi'a, whom he thought of as heretics and "the worst of mankind." Once released from prison, Zarqawi made his way to Afghanistan! Bookmark not defined., where he met 'Usama bin Ladin and other Al Qaeda leaders. While the exact relationship of Zarqawi to Bin Ladin is unclear, Zarqawi received assistance from Bin Ladin even though he did not subordinate himself to Bin Ladin to the degree other Al Qaeda leaders had. Instead, he convinced the leadership of Al Qaeda to allow him to create a separate camp in Herat to train his own fighters. In Herat, Zarqawi attracted potential jihadi from Syria! Bookmark not defined., Jordan, and Iraq and began to form the nucleus for a new jihadi in those countries. When the Taliban regime was destroyed by the United States, Zarqawi and his fighters escaped from Afghanistan through Iran! Bookmark not defined. to northern Iraq.

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where they sought refuge with Ansar al-Islam. Zarqawi again did not want to join another militant group and soon formed his own, named Jihad wa’l-Tawhid. Only much later would Zarqawi decide to join Al Qaeda and rename his group Al Qaeda fi al-Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers), aka Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi was killed by Coalition Forces in June 2006.

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Al-Masri

(S/NF) ABU AYYUB AL-MASRI/ABU Hamza AL-MUHAJIR was a senior member of al-Sunnah organization within Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) under Al Qaeda senior leader Thirwat Salah Shihata. Active in EIJ since the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the 1980s, al-Masri first met Zarqawi in Afghanistan. Like Zarqawi, he fled to Iraq after the overthrow of the Taliban. Arriving in Baghdad ahead of Zarqawi, al-Masri renewed his contact with the other terrorist leader and agreed to continue to work with him on behalf of EIJ. Prior to OIF, al-Masri ran a terrorist training camp at a farm in Diyala that he obtained through his Iraqi contacts. Following the overthrow of Saddam, he traveled to Fallujah and commanded a group of foreign fighters under Umar Hadid. After Zarqawi’s demise, al-Masri assumed control of AQI as its new amir with ‘Usama bin Laden’s blessing under the kunyiat (assumed name) of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Lu’ai Saqa

(S/NF) LU’AI SAQA was a senior Al Qaeda associate known as Ala al-Din and "the Doctor" who provided logistical support for jihadi groups all over the world. Starting in the mid-1990s, he provided forged documents, money, and safehouses to AQ operatives. Prior to OIF, he operated mainly in Syria and Turkey. With Zarqawi by 2004. Regarded by many JTJ members as Zarqawi’s second-in-command or external operations chief, he was actually the direct link between the Iran-based Al Qaeda senior leader Abu Muhammed al-Masri and Zarqawi, having met the latter in Afghanistan in 2001. He played a key role in the November 2003 bombings in Istanbul that targeted 2 Jewish synagogues, the British Consulate, and the HSBC bank that killed 61 and was apprehended in Turkey in August 2005 while plotting to attack Israeli cruise ships.

(S/REL TO MCFI) Despite his secular ideology and distrust of Islamists, Saddam actively recruited foreign volunteers across the Arab and Islamic world to prepare to fight the Coalition. While not all of these foreign volunteers were Islamists (many belonged to other branches of the Ba’ath Party or were simply anti-American), a number of them were. One of these, Abu Iyad al-Urduni, was a Zarqawi associate who styled himself as “Amir of the Mujahideen in Baghdad.”

15 [Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS/NO AUTHOR: IRAQ ESTABLISHES TRAINING CAMP FOR FOREIGN SUICIDE BOMBERS | 20030311 | (U) ]
16 [Military | OPTIMIZED TRIBES AND RELIGIOUS ENGAGEMENT IN RAWAH AND AL QA’IM | 20030407 | (S/NF) ]
defined.” in communiqués sent to the London-based Islamist Center for the Defense of Legitimate Rights.17

**MCIA INSERT PICTURE OF AL-URDUNI**

(U) ABU IYAD AL-URDUNI. He later issued a public statement declaring the formation of the Armed Islamic Group of Al Qaeda, Fallujah. Branch, one of the first public indications that Al Qaeda was active in the city.

(U) ISLAMISM (SALAFISM) AND JIHADISM. Islamism (or Salafi Islam) is a political movement within Islam that was developed during the late 19th century. Islamists (or Salafis) are Muslims who believe that Islam must be practiced as it was in the 7th century and that Islam must have political power and a state. As a minimum goal, Islamists support the imposition of *shari’a* by an Islamic government. More radical members believe there must also be a Caliph, and therefore the creation of a Caliphate, for Islam to be correctly practiced. Islamists are divided over the means for creating the Islamic state, however. Some support democratic methods and the election of Muslims who will impose *shari’a*, while others believe that democracy is evil and therefore that some sort of socialization process—such as convincing Muslims to practice their religion more diligently through argument, by providing social services, or through intimidation—is the only way to create the perfect Islamic state. Jihadists (also called jihadis) are those Islamists who argue that an Islamic state can only be created through violence. Some non-Muslims call all jihad fighters “jihadis,” but this is incorrect: the proper term for jihad fighters in general is “mujahidin.” This is a term of respect and connotes legitimacy on the fighter and the war. If the war is illegitimate or the fighter is a criminal, he should be known as a “mufsadoon.”

OIF began on March 19, 2003 and Baghdad fell on April 9, far sooner than many Coalition or Iraqi planners had anticipated. Tikrit, Mosul, and Kirkuk fell just days later. Combat with the remaining Iraqi military forces consisted only of minor skirmishes. Major combat persisted in a few areas such as in al-Qa’im where, on April 11, the 3rd ACR defeated regime loyalists attempting to escape into Syria. Regime loyalists also continued fighting at the K3 Pumping Station near Haditha, a key oil infrastructure facility that was seriously damaged during the course of the fighting.18

(U) Except for the fighting in al-Qa’im and K3, the Coalition’s entry into Anbar was relatively bloodless. Small numbers of U.S., British, and Australian special operations forces had been active in Anbar since the beginning of OIF, searching for possible Iraqi Scuds in the desert, hunting for Iraqi leaders, and securing valuable infrastructure such as the Haditha Dam and al-Asad Airbase.

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17 [ | Open Source | COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS (CDLR)/TRANSLATED BY JIHAD UNSPUN | 20030418 | (U) | ]
18 [ | Open Source | CNN | 20030411 | (U) | ]
19 [ | Open Source | STRATFOR | IRAQ: DOWNED PUMPING STATION SHOULD HAVE LIMITED IMPACT ON EXPORTS | 20030619 | (U) | ]
(between HitError! Bookmark not defined. and Haditha near Khan-al-Baghdadi, 10 km west of the Euphrates River) to prevent their sabotage or destruction by fleeing regime loyalists.\textsuperscript{20}

(U) The official surrender of the remaining loyalist forces in Anbar province took place on April 15 at a special operations compound 30 miles west of Ramadi\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}. There, Major General Muhammed Thumayla, Western District Commander for the Iraqi Army, surrendered \textsuperscript{(b)(3), (b)(6)} of the 4th Brigade of the U.S. Army.\textsuperscript{21} During the surrender, Major General Thumayla informed \textsuperscript{(b)(3), (b)(6)} that although he had originally had more than 16,000 troops under his command, the majority of them had deserted him within five days after OIF\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}.\textsuperscript{22} Following his surrender, \textsuperscript{(b)(3), (b)(6)} asked Major General Thumayla to remain in uniform for the next 30 days, take control of his remaining troops, and assist the Coalition in restoring order in Ramadi.

(U) By the end of April, elements of the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division, the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division, and the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armored Calvary Regiment were sent to occupy cities and towns in Anbar and to suppress any remaining resistance from Iraqi loyalist military and security forces. Fallujah\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}.\textsuperscript{23} was occupied by the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division on April 24 but they were soon replaced by the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry Division's 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armored Calvary Regiment was headquartered in Fallujah\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}. and, along with units from the 2-325\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Infantry of the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division and the Florida National Guard's 1-124\textsuperscript{th} Infantry, was responsible for overseeing the rest of Anbar province.

City Story: HitError! Bookmark not defined.

(U) The small city of HitError! Bookmark not defined., located on the main route between central Iraq and SyriaError! Bookmark not defined., illustrates how the course of OIFError! Bookmark not defined. affected cities in Anbar. Hit, together with the nearby communities of MuhammadiError! Bookmark not defined. and KubaysahError! Bookmark not defined., had about 105,000 inhabitants, many engaged in farming and agriculture. Like the rest of Anbar province, Hit was better off than the Shi'a areas of Iraq but still the town was poor and to some extent neglected by the central government. Hit had no television or radio stations of its own, nor did it have a central sewage system, and its one hospital could only hold 100 patients. Like much of Anbar, Hit depended on the central government for cooking fuel and gasoline as well as other necessities, especially since the imposition of sanctions on Iraq and the creation of the Oil-for-Food Program.\textsuperscript{23}

(S/REL TO MCFI) Once the war started, these resources were less available, a fact that would deeply affect life in HitError! Bookmark not defined. by May 2003. Yet electricity and water

\textsuperscript{20} [ | Open Source | Globalsecurity.org | (U) | ]
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} [ | Military | 3RD ACR: ASSESSMENT OF HIT, IRAQ | 20030630 | (SRF) | ]
would only be cut intermittently during the fighting and, after combat ended, was restored to pre-
war levels. In fact these communities—like most of Anbar—suffered little damage from the 
Coalition during OIF*Error! Bookmark not defined.* and Coalition forces, thinly stretched over the 
very reaches of Anbar, could not physically occupy each small city. Hit was essentially left to its own 
devices until a first assessment by USAID*Error! Bookmark not defined.* on April 27, while the 
military would not assess the situation there until May 14. This benign neglect would become 
important as the insurgency began to form in April and May.

A Marine Looking At Anbar Province Sees Conditions for an Insurgency

(U) What would a Marine observe in the streets, shops, and mosques of a typical Anbari city 
following the collapse of government authority in early April 2003? What lessons could he draw 
from his observations, and how might the sights and sounds of that time inform his understanding 
of the events that followed?

Economy and Governance

(U) Anbar’s privileged status resulted from Saddam use of government largess in order to ensure the 
population’s loyalty to the regime. As a Sunni Arab area and an essential part of Saddam's power 
base, Anbar, in particular the towns along the Euphrates, benefited from the attention of the central 
government.

(U) Between 1970-1990 under the Ba'ath regime, Anbar became a center of quarrying and industry 
that included glass, cement, phosphate, milling, and engineering. In addition, collectivized agriculture 
around the provincial capital of Ramadi*Error! Bookmark not defined.* constituted one of the 
province's main sustainable employers. Prior to Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, about 20% 
of Anbaris made their living from agriculture, mainly growing dates, wheat and barley, and raising 
livestock such as sheep, camels, goats, and cattle. After Operation DESERT STORM, the primary 
source of food for Anbaris from the 1990s until 2003 was the United Nations, Oil for Food (OFF) 
program via the UN*Error! Bookmark not defined.* Food and Agriculture Organization’s Public 
Distribution System (PDS). This UN program devastated the market for agricultural products in 
Anbar and thus the Anbar agricultural system.

(U) Other industries - primarily cement factories and construction firms - were heavily dependent on 
state subsidies to operate. Municipal officials owed their positions to the central government and 
were unaccustomed to decision-making independent to Baghdad*Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
Saddam believed that guaranteed employment and patronage would assure Anbaris' loyalty to his 
regime. Others made their living from black market and smuggling activities which were largely run 
by clients of the Hussein family and other senior members of the regime.

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24 [ | USAID*Error! Bookmark not defined.* | DART ASSESSMENT OF HEET, AL HADITHAH | APRIL 27, 
20030427 | S/NF | ]
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(S/REL-TO-MCFT) In Haditha, employees at the hydroelectric dam and K3, oil pumping station (15 km south of the Haditha Dam) were as privileged as any in Baghdad, receiving free schooling, housing, and other benefits from the regime similar to the privileges of those in the Ministry of Oil and Gas.25

(U) Haditha's economy depended, to a large extent, on employment at the nearby dam over the Euphrates River. Haditha was home to the major oil pipeline crossing the Euphrates River and the K3 pumping station. Some oil was refined at K3 for local use. Our Marines would see convoys of trucks headed toward the Syrian border. Under Hussein, many Anbaris found employment trucking oil and refined petroleum from Iraq to Syria. The oil and oil products trucking system continued to function until 2003 and was used as a means through which Iraqis illegally sold oil through Syria. Other Anbaris found illicit employment smuggling oil and other goods into Syria and Jordan, a vocation perceived as entirely legitimate by Anbari merchants, tribal leaders and other elites who profited from the trade.

(U) Anbar was also far better off than many provinces of Iraq with regard to road infrastructure, sewage, water treatment, medical facilities, schools, and houses because of Saddam's patronage. Many mid-level Ba'ath Party members and security personnel lived in Anbar in areas comparable to the middle to upper class neighborhoods in Baghdad. In fact, many Anbari neighborhoods had all the amenities of the more affluent sections of Baghdad.

(U) The Marine would undoubtedly be taken aback by the disorder following OIF. In the three largest Anbari cities: Ramadi, Fallujah, and Haditha. With the collapse of central government in Iraq, the disintegration of the Ba'athist state's political and economic infrastructure soon followed, leaving a power vacuum that would not be filled for several critical weeks. As a result, he would see unemployed men and a lack of basic infrastructure common to any functioning city. He would see looting, although not on the same scale as that which occurred in Baghdad. Fallujah, for instance, was spared serious looting by the appeals of religious and tribal leaders to respect law and order. Conversely, in Ramadi government property was looted by men who would later go on to form insurgent groups in that city. Only the public school system continued to function adequately following the invasion. Hospitals and police departments were unable to retain staff, pay the salaries of those who remained, or obtain needed supplies. Some police departments swamped by a deluge of criminal activity – bank robbery, looting, and petty theft – were unable to independently restore order.

25 [Military] [ ] [B3, B6] PSYOP ASSESSMENT OF HADITHA | 20040108 | (S/NOF) [ ]
26 [Open Source] [K3] BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. was one of a series of major pumping stations along the national Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline that ran from the major refining center at Bayji (on the Tigris River about 37 km north of Tikrit, in bordering Salah Ad Din Province) west towards Jordan, BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. and Syria, BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. | (U) [ ]

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Though Anbar was better off than many other provinces, our Marine would find the physical infrastructure in an advanced state of deterioration. Fuel distribution centers lacked adequate supplies of propane, which most Anbaris used for home cooking and benzene, used by most Anbaris to fuel their vehicles. Sewer systems and other public water infrastructure often required wholesale replacement, with some sewage sluices emptying into sources of drinking water. The province’s electrical grid never quite recovered from the 1991 Gulf War, and again suffered some damage during the 2003 invasion.

On a positive note, subsistence and collectivized agriculture, already crippled by the UN Oil for Food program, was not directly damaged by the war. Further, the UN Public Distribution System was functioning and continued to provide food supplies for upwards of the 60% of the population. Other Anbaris found assistance through local mosques.

The situation for ordinary Anbaris was, however, grim. Unemployment in Fallujah reached as high as 80%, and in Ramadi between 40-60%. In the spring of 2003, a typical Anbari breadwinner could find food, but not cook it; find a hospital, but not receive medical treatment; and if lucky enough to find work or retain an old job, not be paid. The disintegration of Anbar’s infrastructure and command economy, including the officially sanctioned oil convoys, left Anbaris two employers: the farm and the black market.

Religion

If the Marine spent a day or more in a post-Ba’athist Anbari city, he would observe high traffic at the local mosques, and probably conclude these places of worship were the strongest remaining centers of authority in the chaotic scene before him. Indeed, after April 2003, mosques and other religious establishments assumed even greater significance in the life of ordinary Anbaris. The fall of Saddam released religious as well as political controls. Islamist and jihadist preachers could, for the first time, spread their ideas freely in the mosques, away from the eyes of our American Marine. To the outside observer, it might seem as if all were quiet, but within the mosques radical opinions about the Americans, the Coalition and the need for resistance were already being spread.

Resistance

Knowing only that the Sunni Arabs of Anbar were of the same ethnicity and sect as the leaders of the Ba’ath Party, and that many Anbaris benefited from Saddam’s rule, the Marine probably would express surprise at the generally low level of resistance to American forces upon their arrival in Anbar province in April 2003. One explanation for this was the tenuous relationship between many leading Anbari tribes and the Ba’athist regime. Despite the government subsidies, many Anbaris had serious grievances against the regime. Their hostility to the regime mitigated, for a brief time, Anbaris’ traditional suspicions of foreigners as they directed their discontent toward remnants of Saddam’s rule. In reality, some Anbari tribes welcomed the liberators who had rid them of Saddam while others were deeply suspicious and resented the Coalition because of the regime’s downfall.
Lessons

(U) Along with most Iraqis, Anbaris expressed astonishment and resentment that an army capable of destroying the Ba’athist regime in under a month could not prevent the total breakdown in law and order and the collapse of government services province-wide. Widespread unemployment, lawlessness, and criminality would gradually undermine the goodwill toward Coalition forces created by the ouster of Saddam Hussein, and fuel a budding insurgency.

City Study: Haditha

(U) How would all these conditions come together in an actual town? A look at the city of Haditha illustrates some of the underlying conditions for the insurgency. Haditha’s position on the Euphrates River gave it strategic and economic importance. It straddled the main trading route into Syria, and also had a major source of water and electricity for Anbar, the Haditha Dam. Haditha had expanded as it grew to include some rural (and tribal) areas, which depended on jobs in security, smuggling or farming for a living, while the townsmen provided the administrators, merchants, engineers, and doctors. The war left the Haditha Dam intact but there was little kerosene or gas for ordinary citizens. Twenty schools were damaged during the fighting, and looters had helped themselves to government property, crippling even the undamaged schools and leaving the hospital with little medicine. Teachers and other government employees had not been paid since the war ended and there were only twelve police officers available to keep law and order in the town.

(S/REL TO MCF) The lack of any governance in Haditha allowed Nayil al-Jaghayfi (or Jutayfi), an influential member of the al-Jaghayfah tribe, to simply declare himself mayor and seize control of the town with the help of his tribe before Coalition forces arrived. When troops from the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment entered Haditha, they gave them intelligence on Ba’athists and became a trusted intermediary to U.S. commanders, despite allegations that he and his tribesmen had looted the public buildings in the city. Al-Jaghayfi’s influence was sufficient to appoint his fellow tribesman as the

(S/REL TO MCF) At the same time, there was little sign of any active resistance to the Coalition. Only the ominous appearance of anti-American graffiti on the outside wall of a mosque in the north.
of Haditha. Yet in July the first insurgent group, called the Iraq Liberation Movement, showed itself in Haditha by carrying out sporadic attacks on Coalition troops and distributing leaflets warning Iraqis against “collaboration” with the U.S. A warning that when not heeded, led to the assassination of the mayor and his son on July 16.

The Proto-Insurgency (April-May 2003)

(U) The sudden collapse of effective governance and the economy in the province was not, however, enough to create the insurgency. The Coalition added to these basic conditions by disbanding the Iraqi Army. This action meant thousands of soldiers returned to their hometowns ready to listen to the various figures making their separate plays for power and influence. While the early insurgency was unorganized and lacked coherence, it nevertheless posed a significant challenge to the new Iraqi government and its coalition allies.

Iraqis Interpret Coalition Actions

(U) With the end of major hostilities around April 11, 2003, the Coalition imposed civilian governance by creating the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Ambassador Paul Bremer, formerly head of the Department of State (DOS) counter-terrorism office was appointed the head of CPA in May 2003. This contributed to the continuing power vacuum in Iraq since there was no on-scene American political authority for almost a month.

(U) During this period, the Coalition sought to restore order through the selection of new national leaders, provincial governors and mayors for the major cities. On a national level, General Garner (and his ORHA staff) invited roughly 100 Iraqis from different tribal, religious, and political groups to an April 15 conference in Nasariya to discuss the composition of a new Iraqi administration. The Sunni community was represented in proportion to their actual percentage of the Iraqi population, but many Sunnis believed that there should have been a higher number of Sunnis given their sense of their previous importance in running Iraq. They thought, after all, that they were the majority of the Iraqi population and the true representatives of Iraqi nationalism, while the Shi’a were more Iranian than Iraqi. When combined with the facts that only one representative from Anbar was chosen to attend and that no Anbaris were part of the core of the group (known as the Iraqi Leadership Council (ILC)) formed in December 2002 at a conference in London), many Anbaris regarded these actions as both a slight from the Coalition as well as vindication of the belief that Iraqi Sunnis were not being properly represented in the new political process.
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<th>(S/NF) GOVERNOR</th>
<th>TERM IN OFFICE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Karim Burjis al-Rawi</td>
<td>April 11, 2003—August 4, 2004</td>
<td>Forced by AQI. Error! Bookmark not defined. To resign as a condition to secure the release of his kidnapped three sons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Abed Awad</td>
<td>August 4, 2004—November 8, 2004</td>
<td>Sacked by Prime Minister Allawi after allegedly cooperating with terrorists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi</td>
<td>February — May 9, 2005</td>
<td>Kidnapped by insurgents in May 2005 and later killed in captivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maamoon Sami Rasheed al-Awani</td>
<td>June 1, 2005—Present</td>
<td>Incumbent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Governors of Anbar Province 2003-2006 (S/NF)

(U) On a local level, Anbar had a succession of governors. (see Table 1 above). Former Ba’athist and police officer Abdul Karim Burjis al-Rawi was chosen on April 11, 2003 to serve as Anbar governor following an informal selection process overseen by the sheikhs of the Albu Ali Sulayman tribe of the Dulaimi confederation. In Fallujah, religious and tribal leaders had already appointed their own civil management council before Coalition troops arrived. After Coalition forces took control they recognized this choice, Taha Bidaywi Hamad, as mayor, as well as the members of the new city council that he (and other tribal leaders) had appointed. In Hit, Naim Abd al-Muhsan, from the al-Goud tribe, was an officer from Zuwaya and an opportunist who presented himself to Coalition forces upon their arrival and persuaded them to appoint him as mayor. Meanwhile the mayor of Haditha had simply seized power, an act recognized by the Coalition after the 3rd ACR arrived in town.

32 [ | Open Source | AL JAZEERA ENGLISH ARCHIVE: IRAQI OFFICIAL QUTS TO WIN SONS FREEDOM | http://english.aljazeera.net/News/archive/archive?ArchiveID=3588 | (U) | ]
33 [ | Military | AL ANBAR CURRENT LEADERSHIPDRAFT_WORKING_050205 | 20050502 | (S/NF) | ]
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 [ | Open Source | SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE/AAMER MADHANI: US TROOPS FIND BODY OF ANBAR GOVERNOR | 20050601 | (U) | ]
38 [ | Open Source | IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE US, SUMAIDATE: WEB MEMO | 200306 | www sumsaidaie com / PersonalWeb / AlAnbarMemoformweb.pdf | (U) | ]
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(U) While these efforts served the Coalition objective of reestablishing local and tribally-supported governance in Anbar, only the government of Fallujah had the support of Anbaris. The other attempts at appointing leaders were regarded as heavy-handed and undemocratic foreign interference. This would help to create a popular perception in Anbar that U.S. rhetoric about bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq was not to be taken seriously.

(S/REL TO MCFT) Also on April 11, a Coalition bombing raid killed the influential tribal leader Malik al-Kharbit and 21 members of his family. Inaccurate intelligence indicated the Kharbits were sheltering Saddam Hussein. In actuality, the Kharbits were opposed to Saddam and were a potential ally of the Coalition. The Kharbit clan (leading members of the Dulaimi tribal confederation) sought to avenge their sheikh’s death for the next two years under the leadership of his son Mudhir Abed al-Kharbit. They mounted a failed attempt to seize control of the Dulaimi confederation, took up arms against the Coalition, and provided financial and logistical support to insurgent groups with similar aims, seemingly without care for their ideology or tactics.

(U) Matters took an even more serious turn on April 28, 2003. Fallujah demonstrated at a school being used as a U.S. observation post. They claimed the troops in the school could see into private family compounds where unveiled women went about their chores. The local population regarded this as a gross violation of the town’s women and a serious insult to their men.

(S/REL TO MCFT) While the demonstration was intended to be peaceful, Jalil al-Nur, a local demagogue and supporter of Saddam Hussein, organized a small group of followers and agent provocateurs called the “Saddam Mujahideen.” They infiltrated the crowd and began firing at the Coalition forces observing the demonstration. Coalition forces returned fire, killing fifteen and injuring eighty-five. This would be the first of many actions in Fallujah that turned the city into a major insurgent sanctuary in 2004.

Trained but Unemployed Soldiers Return to Homes in Anbar

(U) The situation in Anbar was further complicated by the mass return of officers and ordinary soldiers to their homes, families, and tribes in the province. Desertion of the Iraqi army began before fighting ended, but turned into a flood once the regime fell.

(U) In early May, Ambassador Paul Bremer, the newly-appointed head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), dissolved the Iraqi armed forces. In accordance

[References and footnotes]

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with international law, he stated that Coalition forces were “occupiers.” He issued CPA orders that officially disbanded the Army and removed all Ba’athist from the new Iraqi government (de-Ba’athification).\(^{45}\) By this point, the Iraqi Army had essentially disbanded itself. But the official disbandment removed all hope of rejoining the Army and sent more discontented, armed and trained men to Anbar looking for an opportunity to confront the Coalition.

\((\text{S/REL TO MCFI})\) Many of the individuals who would later become prominent in FRE and FRL organizations were former Iraqi military men, including officers and soldiers in the Special Republican Guard (SRG), as well as intelligence officers from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IISE\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\)) and Special Security Organization (SSO). Members of Saddam’s two paramilitary groups, al-Quds Army and Saddam Fedayeen, would also return to their homes in Anbar, contributing their expertise in irregular warfare.

\((\text{S/REL TO MCFI})\) These trained men would bring to the developing insurgency skills in interrogation, bomb making, and intelligence gathering—as well as irregular tactics and operational planning. Even more important, they maintaining their professional connections which created a network spanning the province. Members of former IISE\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\) units such as M-14 (“Special Operations and Anti-Terrorism”) or M-16 (Directorate of Criminal Investigations) had detailed knowledge about the construction of IEDs and would use it to build weapons for various insurgent groups.\(^{46}\) These skills were highly valued among insurgents, who, in the early days of the insurgency, would send requests to associates in order to secure the services of specified bomb makers or engineers.\(^{47}\)

\((\text{S/REL TO MCFI})\) M-14 AND M-16. Former members of the IISE\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\) directorates Special Operations and “Anti-Terrorism” (M-14) as well as Criminal Investigations (M-16) were involved in planning and conducting many of the IED\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\), Vehicle Borne IED, and Remote Controlled IED attacks throughout Iraq from 2003 through 2006. Pre-OIF\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\), M-14 had consisted of the Ghafiqi ("Challenge") Project that involved the creation of explosive devices and remote-controlled detonators, an assassination unit made up of convicted criminals and murderers, and a special cadre of 15-20 suicide bombers known as the al-Numur ("Tiger") Group who carried out many of the regime-sponsored suicide bombings during the invasion. After the fall of the Iraqi regime, former M-14 and M-16 personnel began providing their services to a variety of FRE and FRL insurgent groups as well as to Al Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, and Ansar al-Sunna.

**Fill the Religious Vacuum-Association of Muslim Scholars**

\((\text{S/REL TO MCFI})\) FREs and FRLs clearly dominated the early and somewhat confused insurgent environment, but were not the only insurgents. The religious vacuum in Iraq was rapidly filled by radical Iraqi clergy who encouraged the growth of religious resistance to the occupation embodied in

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\(^{45}\) In the Middle East, the term “occupation” draws parallels to either colonialism or to the Israeli-Palestinian issues.

\(^{46}\) Ghafiqi TGTs not in Baghdad.\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\)

\(^{47}\) [ | SIRHAN | (S/NF) | ]
SRE groups. Some of the most important figures in this movement were Sheikh Dr. Harith Sulayman al-Dhari, his son Muthanna Harith, and a number of other former regime clerics who formed the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS Error! Bookmark not defined.) on April 14. This all-Sunni religio-political organization claimed to represent the legitimate voice of the Sunni community. They seized control of Sunni mosques, appointed mosque preachers, and took over the Ministry of Awqaf. Anti-Coalition in outlook, AMS received the support of many local SRE and FRE groups opposed both to the Coalition and the rise of the Saudi supported “Wahhabis” influence.

**MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.** The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is the largest Islamist organization in the world. Founded in the 1920s by an Egyptian, Hasan al-Banna, the MB was designed to draw Muslims back to Islam as it was practiced in the 7th century through persuasion and education. It also had an armed branch that tried to overthrow the Egyptian government through violence. After WWII, the MB spread to almost every Islamic country. Brutal suppression by the Egyptian regime, forced the MB in Egypt to renounce violence. But splinter groups in Egypt, Syria Error! Bookmark not defined. and elsewhere refused to give up violence and became jihadist in orientation. Today, the international MB will not engage in violence to create an Islamic state, but it does support “defensive” jihads in Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan Error! Bookmark not defined. and elsewhere around the world.

**WAQF** means “religious endowment” and refers to any property or money that is given as charity for the good of the Islamic nation as a whole. *Waqf* property is endowed in perpetuity for the Islamic nation and cannot be bought or sold, while *waqf* funding is to be spent on charity for the poor and unemployed or to pay the salaries of the clergy. In many Islamic countries a government institution, the Ministry of Awqaf, manages *waqf* property and oversees the distribution of *waqf* funding.

(S/REL TO MCFI) Because of its prominence and national organization, the AMS Error! Bookmark not defined. often served as de facto spokesman for many religious FRE and SRE insurgent groups, enabling it to gain influence and prestige within the Sunni Anbari community. The nationalist bent of AMS led it to oppose any foreign influence inside Iraq, whether American, Saudi, or Iranian in origin. Thus, while al-Dhari disliked the Iraqi Shi’a and regarded Shi’a leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani as an Iranian puppet, he showed a willingness to cooperate with anti-Coalition Shi’a, such as those loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army, based on what he perceived as common interests.

(S/REL TO MCFI) Nor was AMS Error! Bookmark not defined. the only religio-political organization to form among Iraqi Sunnis during this early period. The Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP Error! Bookmark not defined.), which had operated clandestinely under Saddam Hussein, emerged from hiding to establish itself as a major player in Sunni areas. Led by Dr. Ahmed al-Kubaysi, the IIP quickly grew from an underground organization to a legitimate Islamist party, to the point where it could maintain 2,500 party activists in Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined. and 2,000 in Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. by the summer of 2003.
SADDAM’S REPRESSION OF POLITICAL PARTIES. According to an email from Amatzia Baram (19 January 2007) (and to be included in his forthcoming book, Mosque and State in Iraq 1968-2006, United States Institute for Peace Press, due 2007), “In 1969-1970, as soon as Saddam Hussein was safely established as the highest authority in domestic security, he introduced his strategy of total control that left no room at all for competing political forces. He cracked down first on the Communists, then on the Shi’a Da’wa, then on the MB and on the Sunni Tahrir Party. … While in the early 1970s the Da’wa went into deep underground but continued its activity, switching from chiefly educational work to violence, the MB simply moved abroad. … While in exile in Europe the MB changed their name to the IIP [Iraqi Islamic Party]. They resumed meaningful activities in Iraq only in 2003. They themselves claim that they did opposition work in Iraq under the Ba’ath. If true, then this was some kind of quiet educational work.”

Unlike AMS, which was controlled by a tight-knit clique of Sunni clerics led by al-Dhari, IIP had a more divided leadership between moderate and extremist Islamists. As long as this divide persisted, the moderate faction that included al-Kubaysi prevailed and the IIP officially supported the presence of Coalition forces inside Iraq. IIP refused to call for jihad against them, instead calling for Iraqis to wait and see if the Coalition fulfilled its promises. The extremist faction led by Abd al-Hafid Atiya Hamash opposed this stance and was supported by Islamist clerics in Saudi Arabia and Europe. 48

48 [ | Military | CJSOTF INTSUMS: KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | (S/NF) | ]
49 [ | Military | 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION ACE: FOB-53 INTELLIGENCE UPDATE | 20030923 | (S/NF) | ]; [ | Military | 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION ACE: WEEKLY TRENDS & PATTERNS BRIEF | DECEMBER 7-14, 2003 | (S/NF) | ]

Given their differing political agendas, tension between AMS and IIP is not surprising. Because AMS saw itself as the voice of the traditional Sunni religious establishment, it regarded the IIP with suspicion and frequently accused it of serving as a tool with which to market the occupation to Islamists.

In early 2003, Al Qaeda and associated Islamist movements became active in Fallujah. They circulated a video over the internet and in all of the major mosques that purported to show the rape of Iraqi women by Coalition forces. Aided by sympathetic Wahhabi non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the al-Haramain Foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organization, Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, and the Joint Relief Committee, Al Qaeda operatives began using Fallujah as a base of operations inside Iraq.
These operatives linked up with Islamist foreign fighters loyal to Abu Iyad who had fled Baghdad. When the situation became untenable, Arab members of Ansar al-Islam who fled south into central Iraq after their main base was destroyed during OIF. Al Qaeda had only an extremely small network inside Iraq during this period and focused primarily on recruiting, propaganda, and indoctrination. An AI training camp is believed to have been established at Rawah. Al Qaeda is a global Islamic terrorist network formed in 1989 and led by Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Made up of a central leadership, regional nodes, decentralized cells, and satellite or allied terrorist organizations that cooperate, work with, or are subordinate to the central leadership, Al Qaeda currently serves as the vanguard of the global jihad against the United States and its allies. One must be careful to distinguish between the global AQ and its local branches, such as in Iraq (AQI). While AQ maintained cells throughout Iraq in 2003, much of its activity in the country was overseen by local groups like Ansar al-Islam or JTJ. In 2003, AQ (global AQ) sent representatives to Iraq (foreign AQ members, Afghan Arabs, and some Iraqis) to evaluate the situation there and to lay the groundwork for later JTB/AQ organizational activities. During this period, Zarqawi developed his plans for establishing an AQ in Iraq and obtained approval from bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. With AQ’s approval in 2004, Zarqawi’s JTJ merged directly with Al Qaeda to form AQI in Iraq (AQI), which answered directly to the senior leadership of AQ (global). This allowed JT access to the network’s global resources in addition to its own external networks.

Snapshot: The Insurgency in April-May 2003

In April and May 2003, the insurgency was in its early organizational phase. It was mostly a local phenomenon characterized by individual resistance that looked like isolated acts of violence. At the same time, recruitment and organizational activity was occurring as insurgent-formed groups. The budding insurgent groups were overwhelmingly FRELs and FRLs, motivated by nationalist sentiment, by personal grievances, by resentment over the loss of Sunni power, and by the terrible economic conditions in Anbar. This latter point should not be underestimated. Insurgent groups offered salaries that were ten times what Iraqis made working for the government. They also offered large bounties for killing Coalition troops or Iraqi...
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"collaborators." Working for the insurgency was particularly attractive for unemployed Anbar residents, many of whom were former military and security officials. Despite these incentives, the only serious incident during this time period was the demonstration and shooting in Fallujah. Bookmark not defined. on April 28. FRE and FRL insurgents were quietly taking advantage of the perceived grievances of ordinary Anbaris to build organizations capable of executing attacks throughout the province.

The Insurgency Surfaces (May-August 2003)

(S/REL TO MCFE) Throughout the late spring and summer of 2003, the insurgency began to show itself openly. By the end of the summer, over eighty insurgent groups in Anbar had formed and carried out attacks against the Coalition, Iraqi police, and Iraqi infrastructure. Coalition forces saw these attacks as a problem of law and order, rather than the start of an insurgency, and the actions taken to restore stability show the effects of this reading of the situation.

Insurgent Growth and Cooperation

(S/REL TO MCFE) Throughout the spring and summer of 2003 new FRE groups (such as Ta'if al-Mansura and Ala Alafa'a) were formed, recruiting and propaganda efforts continued; additional bounties were offered for the killing of U.S. soldiers; and lists of suspected "collaborators" were drawn up. In keeping with historical norms, FRE organizations formed along social, tribal, and former regime status lines. In numerous cases, former officers contacted as many individuals as possible from their old units or tribes to ask if they would be willing to reenlist with them to fight the Coalition. In other cases, former Iraqi military and intelligence officials used religious rhetoric that they themselves did not agree with as a means of motivating local Islamists to fight for them.

(U) PHASES OR STAGES OF INSURGENCIES. Insurgencies are difficult to characterize as to their phases or stages. Few have actually laid out a plan. Among those that have are Mao and Che Guevara. Neither of their descriptions fit or describe the insurgency in Iraq as theirs were political and nationalistic, whereas in Iraq it is a religio-nationalist motivated insurgency. As such, Western attempts to fit the insurgency in Iraq into neat phases or stages was doomed to failure.

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR AND NZL) ZARQAWI'S STRATEGY FOR THE INSURGENCY. Little good information exists on how the Iraqi insurgents view their organizational structure or how they conceptualize the process of insurgency. The closest possible description of their process is found in an interrogation report published by MNC-I, CIOC, 22 July 2005, 20150722 (S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR AND NZL) ZARQAWI'S STRATEGY FOR THE INSURGENCY. Little good information exists on how the Iraqi insurgents view their organizational structure or how they conceptualize the process of insurgency. The closest possible description of their process is found in an interrogation report published by MNC-I, CIOC, 22 July 2005, 20150722

Subject: Paper One of a Two Part Series Assessing the Detainee Debriefs of Abu Umar al-Kurdi—Statements Regarding Abu Must'ab al-Zarqawi’s Strategy. This report lists Zarqawi’s strategy as:

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Inflame existing sectarian tension
Force the West to lose political will to wage war, and eventually leave
Reverse Shi'a domination
Bring the jihad to regional “apostate” regimes in the Arab Middle East, and then spread the global jihad.

(U) A STRATEGY TEMPLATE. For purposes of this Study, a number of sources were consulted including the new Army & Marine Corps FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Appendix M provides a discussion of the evolution (pathways) of the insurgency in Iraq.

(S/REL TO MCFI) The relationship between the FRE organizations and their FRL counterparts, who sought a revival of Ba'athist rule and a restoration of Saddam Hussein, was a curious one. While FRE organizations in Anbar routinely used Saddam’s name for propaganda and intimidation purposes, few of them possessed any genuine loyalty to the former regime. As a result, when Saddam and his FRL subordinates attempted to contact FRE organizations and consolidate them under his control they found themselves rebuffed. FRE organizations were more than happy to accept cash and logistical assistance from Saddam and FRL groups, but as 2003 wore on the FRL leaders found their former subordinates more and more difficult to control.

(S/REL TO MCFI) Ironically, the once cool relationship between FREs and Islamists, both domestic and international, led to a degree of mutual cooperation. While numerous IISErrror! Bookmark not defined. FREs attempted to use religious rhetoric to manipulate the Islamists to serve their purposes, many more became willing converts to Islamism and joined Islamist organizations out of genuine religious sincerity. In retrospect, this is not surprising as many low-ranking FREs had grown up under the influence of Saddam Hussein’s mid-1990s Faith Campaign. Moreover, many Islamist organizations were initially better organized and better-funded than their FRE equivalents by virtue of their international support networks and thus seemed far more likely to prevail against the Coalition.

(S/REL TO MCFI) An interesting example of this phenomenon is the rise of Abdullah al-Janabi, a prominent Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined. religious leader. Janabi was a former member of Saddam’s security services who became religious during the Faith Campaign. In the summer of 2003, Janabi actively coordinated and planned attacks against Coalition forces in Fallujah, where he was widely known as the “spiritual guide” for insurgents fighting throughout the city. Janabi cooperated with most insurgent factions operating in and outside of Fallujah, including SREs, FRLs and FREs, but he also headed his own insurgent organization, known as the Muhajideen Army. Janabi worked especially closely with Umar Hadid, an Islamist preacher who was also radicalized by the Faith Campaign and trained in Herat, Afghanistan Error! Bookmark not defined. by Al Qaeda. The two were known to visit Fallujah mosques and religious schools, giving fiery anti-American sermons and recruiting for a variety of insurgent groups.55

55 [ | Military | CTC 2004-30132 AND SHEIKH ABDULLAH AL-JANABI BST RALEIGH HVT NO. 2 | 20040801 | (S/NF) ] | Reporting from the era described Janabi as “the most powerful man in the city,” as he continually displayed the ability to influence the actions of most insurgent factions in the city. In November 2003, Janabi became frightened by rumors that the US wanted to send him to Guantanamo, and went undercover until February 2004 (S/NF).
MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Janabi

(S/NF) ABDULLAH JANABI. A former member of Saddam’s security services, Janabi later served as the imam of the Sa’ad Bin Abi Waqas Mosque in Fallujah. He has been involved in anti-Coalition attacks since November 2003, but a rumor that any religious leaders who called for jihad against the Coalition would be sent to Guantanamo Bay forced him to lower his profile until February 2004. A well-respected figure in Fallujah, he was allied with but not subordinate to Zarqawi and has urged his followers to fight against the Coalition at every opportunity. A pragmatic leader, he has been able to facilitate cooperation between various insurgent groups across tribal, ideological, and sectarian lines. He is regarded as a religious lunatic and an outcast by his own Janabi tribe.

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Umar Hadid

(S/NF) UMAR HADID. The amir of JTJ in Fallujah, Hadid has been involved in Islamist and criminal activity since the late 1990s. He led a Salafist group in Fallujah targeting liquor stores and unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the head of the Ba’ath Party in Fallujah in 1997. Fleeing to Afghanistan, he attended a terrorist training camp but departed before the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Returning to Fallujah in 2002, he met Zarqawi and established himself as the leader of a Sunni extremist group, traveling to Saudi Arabia during the 2002 Hajj as part of a special Iraqi unit to recruit Afghan, Pakistani, Saudi, Syrian, and Yemeni fighters to come to Fallujah prior to the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Insurgent Groups: Former Regime Elements

(S/REL TO MCFI) During this time period, the vast majority of insurgent groups appear to belong to local FRE organizations, which had relatively few members and relied on local or tribal support and access to nearby weapons caches. The following table indicates the most important and representative of the FRE groups in Anbar during May to August 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgent Group</th>
<th>Areas Where Active</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ta’if al-Mansura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ala Alafa’a Organization (AAO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar Forces (AAF)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarhid Abdi Sarhid Network (ASA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Awhal Group (AG)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Anbar FRE Insurgent Groups (May – August 2003) (S/NF)
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(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR) Ta‘if al-Mansura. Of the four, this was the earliest to emerge. It was formed by Ba‘athists led by Sheikh Ghanim al-Sabawi to avenge perceived grievances against the Iraqi Sunni community.56

(S/REL TO USA, AUS AND GBR) Ala Alafa’a Organization (AAO). Created by General Halaf La‘al Russi, AAO opposed the Coalition for both religious and nationalist reasons. The leaders of AAO believed that Muslims should not be ruled by non-Muslims and that Ba‘athists controlled the new Iraqi government.57 Based in Hawijah, a city in Diyala Province, northeast of Baghdad, AAO also had a presence in Ramadi and Kirkuk, where it threatened local officials for cooperating with the Coalition and ran auto theft rackets.58 AAO Shakir al-Duri was from the same tribe as Saddam’s top lieutenant Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri and AAO favored a restoration of Ba‘athist rule in Iraq. However, the group regarded the leadership of Saddam and his immediate family as a disaster for Iraq and wanted a new dictatorship led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri’s first cousin, Hashim Hussein Ramadan instead.59

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Al-Duri

(S/REL TO MCFI) IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI served as the Vice Chairman of Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council under Saddam Hussein from 1979-2003 and is the only surviving leader of the 1968 coup that brought the Ba‘ath Party to power. The son of an ice seller from the region near Tikrit, (earning him the nickname “the Ice Man”), he became one of the leading FRL insurgent figures following the capture of Saddam Hussein. He has allied with a variety of groups including Ansar al-Islam and JT Error! Bookmark not defined. He is known to have leukemia and has periodically issued print and audio statements in support of the insurgency. The Albu Duri tribe is located in Salahuddin province.

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR) Anbar Forces (AAF). AAF had as many as 3,000 former army, Ba‘athist and Fedayeen members in Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. and Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined. While AAF used religious rhetoric to both recruit and justify its activities, they apparently had no established political or religious agenda. Instead, its members were mostly recruited out of a desire for revenge against the Coalition or to increase the power and influence of the Albu Eissa (or Issaawi) tribe.60

56 [ | MILITARY | CJSOTF INTSUMS KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | (S/N) | ]
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
Sarhid Abdi Sarhid Network (SAS). The final major FRE group, SAS, was named after its leader Sarhid Abdi Sarhid, a former member of Iraqi Military Intelligence, who shared control of the group with Rukan Razuki Abd al-Ghafar Sulayman al-Nasiri, a former bodyguard for one of Saddam’s cousins.\(^{62}\) SAS was established through a series of personal visits by Sarhid and Rukan to the homes of former military, IIS\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\), and Saddam Fedayeen members from the Zuba tribe (of which he is a senior member and cousin of the ruling sheikh) in Fallujah\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\), Ramadi\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\), Mosul\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\), and Diyala\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\) (a city north of Baghdad\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\)).\(^{63}\) During these visits Sarhid and Rukan appealed to their kinsmen’s sense of Iraqi patriotism and fears of both Saddam’s wrath and the rise of Iranian influence. While both men were deeply secular, they often used Islamist rhetoric at mosques to attract prospective recruits.\(^{64}\)

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Sarhid

\(^{62}\) [ | Unknown | NESA SF 2003-30175 | (S/NF) | ]

\(^{63}\) Ibid.

\(^{64}\) Ibid.

\(^{65}\) Ibid.

Insurgent Groups: Former Regime Loyalists

The other major insurgent groups in Anbar were composed of FRLs. In contrast to the FRE insurgents that frequently rebuffed Saddam’s efforts to control them, FRL organizations enjoyed close relationships with Saddam and his inner circle and sought nothing less than the restoration of his regime. The leaders of FRL groups were often former high-ranking military officers, Ba’ath party officials or even members of Saddam’s family who had a personal loyalty that outweighed (at least during 2003) religious, tribal or ethnic partisanship. The largest and most active FRL groups active in Anbar were Hizb al-‘Awda and Jaysh Muhammed. The following

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Table 3: Anbar FRL Insurgent Groups (May – August 2003) (S/NF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgent Group</th>
<th>Areas Where Active</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hizb al-‘Awda (HA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaysh Muhammed (JM)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(S/REL TO MCFI) The **Hizb al-‘Awda (HA)**. Between the two, Hizb al-Awda (HA) or the “Party of Return,” was perhaps the most important during 2003. HA’s leadership consisted of some of Saddam’s inner circle, men such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti (Saddam’s half-brother).66 Members of HA were former Fedayeen or al-Quds Army soldiers who had been left unemployed and without social status following the fall of the regime.67

(S/REL TO MCFI) HA recruitment soon expanded to encompass rank-and-file Ba’athists. In contrast to Islamist groups, HA employed women as its primary recruiters and couriers,68 and organized through word of mouth, using Saddam’s reputation combined with the group’s access to regime assets. HA had its main hub in Fallujah, where it began.

(S/REL TO MCFI) The **Jaysh Muhammad (JM)**. JM has a more colorful pedigree and history. Originally formed by Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti with Saddam Hussein’s permission post-OIF69, JM was intended by FRLs to serve as a religious nationalist organization that could be used to drive the Coalition out of Iraq and then be either co-opted or crushed following the restoration of Ba’athist rule.69 JM had another, perhaps more important

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66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 [ | Open Source | THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. / SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE: HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS OF UNDERGROUNDS IN INSURGENCIES | 1965 | (U) | ] Studies of insurgencies in Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam show a high percentage of females (usually under 30) as covert underground elements, i.e., support roles. Pp. 73-77.
69 [ | Unknown | OIA SF 2004-30002 | (S/NF) | ]
purpose: it could also be used to preoccupy the Coalition while Saddam Hussein and other senior Iraqi leaders made their escape. Towards this end, millions of dollars in “seed money” were given to the group’s leaders from senior FRL leaders through intermediaries that included Counterintelligence Director Saad al-Samarrai.70

(S/REL TO MCFI) The religious-sounding name Jaysh Muhammad (“Army of Muhammad”) was chosen to conceal the true motivations of the group’s FRL backers.71 The Saraya al-Jihad subsidiary group formed later in 2003 as more sincerely religious individuals began to replace the JM leadership.72 As FRL leaders were captured or killed by the Coalition they were increasingly replaced by Islamists, leading to a gradual radicalization of the group. Despite the rise in religious influence over JM near the end of 2003, former Iraqi leaders like FRL Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and FREL Khamsi Sinhan al-Muhammad (prior to his capture in January 2004) continued to exercise considerable influence over the group even following the capture of Saddam Hussein.73 Because of JM’s religious nationalist orientation, the group quickly established ties with Iraqi Salafist leaders. However, JM cell leaders were instructed by IISError! Bookmark not defined. FRLs occupying mid-level positions in the organization not to coordinate with foreign fighters because they could not be trusted.74

(S/REL TO MCFI) Growing from a small cadre of 500 Saddam Fedayeens and 75-100 “Wahhabis,” JM soon included as many as 1,000 members, many of whom were trained by an FREL general in small arms and explosives.75 As a result of this training, JM was able to conduct RPG, IEDError! Bookmark not defined., and mortar attacks against Coalition forces to include downing two U.S. helicopters using MANPADS.76 JM was also involved in assassinations and the sabotage of Iraqi oil pipelines. Set up using classic insurgent cell structure, JM was based primarily out of mosques in FallujahError! Bookmark not defined., RamadiError! Bookmark not defined., and SamarraError! Bookmark not defined. with a council of seven amirs reporting to an unidentified sheikh in BaghdadError! Bookmark not defined. 77 The group’s most active leaders were Abd al-Jabbar al-Sai’di (amir of Saraya al-Jihad’s military wing) and Uday Mashadani (Ramadi amir and IISError! Bookmark not defined. FREL).78

[U] AMIR literally means “commander.” The term Amir is consistently used by jihadists to indicate the leader of an entire jihadist group or any sub-units of that group.

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 [ ] Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS: HELICOPTERS SHOT DOWN OR CRASHED IN IRAQ | 20040113
[U] The two helicopters shot down by JM members were a Chinook near FallujahError! Bookmark not defined. on November 2, 2003 and an OH-58D near Fallujah on December 9, 2003.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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(U) Saddam, meanwhile, was unable to take an active role in the insurgency, though his name was often invoked to coerce behavior by the population. He attempted to influence events by issuing periodic audiotapes exhorting Iraqis to take up arms against the Coalition and by sending letters via couriers to trusted subordinates ordering them to take certain actions, but his primary role in the insurgency was financial. His knowledge of those individuals entrusted with the care of Iraqi funds stored in Syria and Lebanon, and the UAE, combined with the infamous reputation he made for himself as dictator of Iraq, made him invaluable as a symbol to those elements of the insurgency that sought to restore the former regime.

Insurgent Groups: Sunni Religious Extremists (SRE)

(S/REL TO MCFI) In addition to the IIPE, extremists, smaller groups of isolated SREs also existed throughout Anbar. Those IIP splinter groups which disagreed with that organization’s political engagement with the Coalition began purchasing weapons, looting arms caches, and recruiting former al-Quds Army members into clandestine cells in Fallujah, Ramadi, Balad, and Samarra. These early SRE organizations would form and then collapse or be reabsorbed into either the IIP or existing FRE organizations following the capture of their leaders.

(S/REL TO MCFI) SREs briefly operated a training facility in the summer of 2003, but these were soon located and destroyed by Coalition forces along with those of their AI counterparts in Rawah and Tarmiyah. However, some trainees survived long enough to bring the tactics taught there onto the battlefield. Their presence increased the sophistication and lethality of insurgent attacks.

(S/REL TO MCFI) A number of mosques in Fallujah and Ramadi also served as planning centers, arms depots, and training facilities for SRE insurgents. One such mosque was the al-Hassan Mosque in Fallujah, where the unexpected detonation of an IED resulted in the death of a local imam and 9 others while injuring 15. Despite the fact that this incident occurred entirely as the result of insurgent actions, insurgent propaganda in Fallujah at the time claimed that the Coalition was responsible and had intended to destroy the mosque.

(S/REL TO USA, GBR, CAN, AUS) Other more sophisticated splinter groups of Iraqi Wahhabis and Salafis such as those loyal to Shamil Husayn al-Hibl had more experience at managing clandestine organizations. They were able to carry out small arms, land mine, and sabotage attacks in...
Anbar using weapons supplied by FRE or FRL organizations. Al-Hilul, in particular, attempted to bolster his organization by falsely claiming to be an Al Qaeda leader and citing ‘Usama bin Ladin's declaration of war as a justification for his activities.\(^{80}\) Other \textit{Wahhabi} groups, such as the one led by Saudi Mohammed Abdul Rahman, soon lost their initial religious focus and became heavily involved in the Ramadi drug trade.

**Insurgent Groups: Foreign Fighters and Al Qaeda**

\textit{(S/REL TO US, AUS, CAN, AND GBR)} Not all SREs were Iraqi in origin. The following table indicates the most important and representative of the foreign fighter groups in Anbar from May to August 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(S/NF) Insurgent Group</th>
<th>Areas Where Active</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katibat al-Faruq (KAF) (^{not defined.})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat al-Tawhid wa'I Jihad (JT) (^{not defined.})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Group of Al Qaeda, Fallujah (^{not defined.}) Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Table 4: Anbar Foreign Fighter Insurgent Groups (May – August 2003) (S/NF)}

\textit{(S/REL TO US, AUS, CAN, AND GBR). Katibat al-Faruq (KAF) \(^{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\).} A number of Islamist foreign fighters from Syria, Algeria, and Libya, while not loyal to Abu Iyad pre-OIF \(^{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) nevertheless fled with him to Anbar following the fall of Baghdad.\(^{81}\) Over time, they gradually reorganized into Katibat al-Faruq (KAF) under the leadership of Sadiq ‘Arif al-Karkhi, a former Iraqi soldier who together with a number of FREs embraced Islamism as an alternative ideology to Ba'athism.\(^{82}\) KAF was infiltrated by FRL and FRE III \(^{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) agents who used religious rhetoric in order encourage anti-U.S. attacks, and the group was given $23,000,000 in funding by former Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan.\(^{83}\) Despite this support KAF had no apparent loyalty to former regime leaders and engaged in attacks on Coalition forces in the al-Qa’im area with the help of a Syrian-based Al Qaeda associate and facilitator nicknamed Abu Bakr, who provided KAF members with training facilities and safe haven.\(^{83}\) While this cross-

\(^{80}\)[ | MILITARY | CJSTF INTSUMS KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | (S/NF) | ]

\(^{81}\) Ibid.

\(^{82}\) Ibid.

\(^{83}\) Ibid.
cooperation would have been unthinkable before OIF, various groups were able to put aside their differences in order to operate against the Coalition in Anbar.

(S/REL TO MCFI) Ansar al-Islam (AI) and Jamaat al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad (JTA) were far less active during this time period. Zarqawi spent much of the summer of 2003 organizing for future warfare and traveling to neighboring states (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon) to link up with the facilitators and financiers of his JTA organization.

(U) AFGHAN ARABS is a term used by the U.S. to refer to those Muslims, generally Arabs, who either fought in Afghanistan or supported the Soviet Union during the 1980s or early 90s (supported in large part by Saudi Arabia). They were trained during the 90s by Al Qaeda in special camps scattered throughout Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. At times it is used as a synonym for Al Qaeda. For Iraqis, the term “Afghan Arabs” means any foreign jihadis, and is not limited to those fighters trained in Afghanistan or to Al Qaeda affiliated warriors.

(S/REL TO MCFI) At the same time, AI was still recovering from the losses suffered in its defeat at the hands of U.S. military in Kurdistan at the beginning of OIF. AI had been reduced to a force of 300 Kurdish members and 60-70 Afghan Arab members who were able to escape to a safe haven inside Iran. Other Arab Al members fled south towards the Provinces of Salahuddin and Anbar. Turning against AI’s Norway-based leader Mullah Krekar, Al military chief Abu Abdallah al-Shafii implemented a new strategy in June 2003 to turn AI away from its Kurdish roots and into an umbrella organization that would unite other Sunni Islamist groups across Iraq. AI infiltrated members into Iran to solicit funding from al Qaeda and other Islamists abroad, and recruited and trained suicide bombers at Rawah.

MGIA Insert Picture Here Of Krekar

(M/N) MULLAH KREKAR is the assumed name used by Faraj Ahmad Najimuddin, an Iraqi Kurd who studied Islamic jurisprudence under Usama bin Laden’s mentor Abdullah Azzam and first met the Al Qaeda leader in Peshawar in 1990 while seeking funding for his Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK). Following the 1991 Gulf War, he received refugee status in Norway and led a state-funded Islamic congregation throughout the 1990s between trips to Iraq or Kurdistan. He disappeared following the September 11 attacks and reemerged in December 2001 as the leader of Ansar al-Islam. Expelled from Iran, in September 2002, he was arrested in the Netherlands and deported to Norway. He has been involved in a number of protracted legal battles to

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84 [Military] [CJSOTF INTSUMS KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ]
85 [Ibid.]
86 [US Army] [50 USC 3507]

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prevent him from being deported to Jordan (where he is wanted for heroin smuggling) or Iraq (where he is accused of being a terrorist), but he remains a free man in Norway because it is not illegal under Norwegian law to lead violent or military resistance in one's homeland.

(S/REL TO MCFI) Armed Group of Al Qaeda, Fallujah (Error! Bookmark not defined.)
In addition to AI, Al Qaeda established another small group inside Iraq led by Abu Iyad, who announced the establishment of the Armed Group of Al Qaeda, Fallujah Branch in July 2003. His announcement was not followed by any specific attack claims. According to Zarqawi’s January 2004 letter to the Al Qaeda leadership, the Al Qaeda groups active inside Iraq throughout 2003 were still extremely weak and believed that claiming responsibility for specific terrorist attacks inside Iraq would draw attention to them and jeopardize their security situation.87

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Al-Shafi’i

(S/NF) ABU ABDALLAH AL-SHAFI’I served as the leader of the Al Qaeda associate group Jund al-Islam who agreed to subordinate himself to Mullah Krekar in December 2001 to form Ansar al-Islam. Following Mullah Krekar’s deportation to Norway in September 2002, al-Shafi’i served as Ansar al-Islam’s amir, ruling first in Krekar’s name and then actively deposing him following the group’s losses in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He is currently based in Iran (Error! Bookmark not defined.), where he serves as the leader of both Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunnah.

Typical Insurgent Attacks and TTPs

(S/REL TO MCFI) The majority of attacks carried out by these insurgent groups during the summer of 2003 were small arms fire (SAF) attacks, at times combined with RPGs or grenades. The figure below shows the types of attacks during this period. An ambush carried out against Coalition forces in Ramadi (Error! Bookmark not defined.) on July 2 was typical. Two or three Iraqis fired their weapons at a Coalition patrol and then ran away when engaged, with no injuries on either side.88 A more complex attack was typified by an August ambush of troops on a presence patrol in Ramadi. Insurgents fired RPGs and small arms at the troops. There were again no injuries or damage to Coalition forces but Coalition troops were unable to kill or locate the insurgents, who followed typical hit-and-run guerrilla doctrine.89

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87 [ | Source unknown | ZARQAWI LETTER, JANUARY 2004 | (S/NF) | ]
88 [ | Military | Battlecpl-198751896859154 | (S/NF) | ]
89 [ | Military | 3ACRLNO-765972965757004 | (S/NF) | ]
Coalition Actions and the Insurgency

(U) The Coalition recognized the growing disorder in Anbar, and concentrated on three efforts to stabilize the situation:

- economic and reconstruction efforts
- working with the Iraqi police
- a major operation in Fallujah

(U) Coalition forces in Anbar had access to Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding, which commanders could spend at their discretion on building projects or infrastructure repair/creation. The first cache of CERP funding came from a stash of $100 million of Saddam’s money recovered by Coalition forces. In the six months after recovering this portion of Saddam’s money in June 2003, this money funded 12,000 projects, ranging from civic cleanup, electricity and irrigation to school buildings, healthcare and sanitation. By the end of the year, most of this money was spent and the U.S. Congress would soon appropriate $18.6 billion for further reconstruction aid.

(S/REL TO MCFL) A perception that the majority of the trouble in Anbar was caused by criminals and a lack of police presence, prompted the Coalition to focus on the Iraqi police as the best way to restore order to the province. The Ramadi police force shows the problems the Coalition faced with this strategy. They had little or no law enforcement training, were
“very ineffective,” and not respected by the local population.\textsuperscript{90} Insurgents stepped up their attacks with a spectacular bombing of a police graduation ceremony in mid-July.\textsuperscript{91} Many Ramadi police refused to return to work or, if they did, refused to accompany Coalition military police on patrols.\textsuperscript{92}

\textbf{(S/REL TO MCQI)} Insurgents also turned their attention to the chiefs of police across Anbar, leading to chaotic conditions in some cities, as Coalition force hired tried to keep pace with assassinations. There is no better illustration of this problem than the situation in al-Qa'im. The first chief, LTC Nasser, was assassinated by either insurgents or “smugglers” in October 2003, his successor was wounded two weeks later, the third chief was killed, and his replacement resigned because of concerns for his safety.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{(U)} In addition to distributing CERPE\textsuperscript{94} Bookmark not defined, funds, the Coalition took aggressive action to stabilize Anbar. In mid-June the 2 BCT/3ID conducted Operation SPARTAN SCORPION in and around Fallujah\textsuperscript{95} Bookmark not defined, in an attempt to remove remaining Ba'ath Party and paramilitary forces. The objectives were a suspected Saddam Fedayeen training facility, headquarters, safe house and possible weapons cache. The raids were followed up with humanitarian aid, but did not stop the escalating insurgency.

\textbf{City Story: Ramadi\textsuperscript{96} Bookmark not defined.}

\textbf{(S/REL TO MCQI)} The deterioration in the situation in Ramadi\textsuperscript{97} Bookmark not defined. illustrates the growing strength—and yet chaotic nature—of what would become a full-fledged insurgency. The insurgency advanced from a “defensive” stage to the “offense” during the summer of 2003. By July 2003, U.S. units in and around Ramadi were largely restricted to a handful of small bases.\textsuperscript{98} A major problem facing U.S. forces was the ability of insurgents to infiltrate the new Iraqi security organizations which were supposed to combat them. No better example of this penetration existed than General Ja'adu Muhammad al-Alwani, chief of police in Ramadi. A replacement for the previous chief who had been removed by the coalition in May Al-Alwani simultaneously cooperated with the coalition and enabled insurgents to carry on their attacks against the Coalition. This cooperation included replacing police killed by the insurgency with insurgents who were former members of the IIE\textsuperscript{99} Bookmark not defined. Al-Alwani found himself in trouble when the Coalition took over hiring, and the new recruits began to show their effectiveness. In response to this perceived betrayal, al-Alwani was targeted by insurgents, barely escaping with his life after an RPG attack on his house in August.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{90} Military | 3rd ACR, ASSESSMENT OF AR RAMADI, 13 JULY 2003 | (S/REL) |
\textsuperscript{91} Open Source | Source unknown | IRAQ TOWN BLAMES US TROOPS FOR FATAL EXPLOSION AT CADET GRADUATION | 20030707 | (U) |
\textsuperscript{92} Military | 3rd ACR, ASSESSMENT OF AR RAMADI, 13 JULY 2003 | (NO CLASSIFICATION) |
\textsuperscript{93} Military | 432nd CA BN: CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF AL-QA'IM, IRAQ | 20040128 | (S/NF) |
\textsuperscript{94} Military | 3rd ACR | ASSESSMENT OF AL-QA'IM | 20030713 | (S/NF) |
\textsuperscript{95} Open Source | www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ramadi.htm | (U) |
\textsuperscript{96} Military | General Jadan point paper | (NO CLASSIFICATION) |
\textsuperscript{97} Military | 3rd ACR: ASSESSMENT OF AR RAMADI | 20030908 | (S/NF) |
A look at groups active in Ramadi show that FRLs and FREs dominated the insurgency in the city, but that Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaeda had an increasing presence. The multiplicity of small groups many unknown outside Ramadi shows the depth of support for resistance to the Coalition and, at the same time, the inability of these groups to unite against their common enemy. The reaction of ordinary citizens to the escalating violence showed the widespread hatred of the Coalition. As we have seen, the police in Ramadi were targeted by insurgents throughout the summer of 2003, beginning with the killing of police cadets at a graduation ceremony. The response by locals to this attack was to accuse the Americans of planting the bomb and marching the first police class in their deaths in an effort to turn Sunni against Shi'a.

Snapshot: The Insurgency May-August 2003

Most insurgent groups active in Anbar during this time period did not possess a well-developed political or religious agenda beyond grievances against the Coalition, a desire for Sunni Arab control over Iraq, and a common conspiratorial worldview. Some, like the Al-Izza-based Awhal Group (AGE), formed to deal with the insecurity that plagued the area post-OIF. Only later would groups develop a political ideology through the influence of larger insurgent organizations and transition or merge into full insurgent groups. The only exception appears to have been in Ramadi, where SRE organizations, some of which maintained contact with or possessed ties to Al Qaeda, were active. The overwhelming majority of the attacks carried out by insurgents in Anbar during the spring and summer of 2003 occurred primarily due to the efforts of these local and in some cases regional organizations, and were characterized by simple SAF or IDF, at times combined.

The evolution of the insurgency in Anbar coincided with the rise of resentment against pro-Coalition officials in the province. This culminated in a concerted insurgent assassination campaign. The need to replace assassinated leaders created problems for the Coalition. For instance, when two gunmen assassinated the mayor of Haditha, appointed Hawash Khalaf Muteb as the new mayor. Later Hawash handpicked the men who chose a tribal leader to represent the town in the new provincial council in January 2004. The insurgents claimed Hawash’s appointment by an American proved the United States had no real interest in democracy but sought only to conquer the people of Iraq. Similar propaganda played well to the receptive minds of the Anbar population.

V. Consolidation of the Insurgency (August – November 2003)
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(S/REL TO MCFI) FRL and FRE organizations carried out the overwhelming majority of attacks against the Coalition during the late summer and fall of 2003. Whereas the insurgency started as local and disorganized groups, by the end of October a number of the local organizations in Anbar had consolidated into national or regional groups, with those remaining (or emerging) local organizations working in close tactical cooperation with their larger counterparts. Individuals like [(b)(6)] maintained simultaneous ties to most of the major FRL, FRE, SRE, and AI as well as local and tribal-based organizations. Thus, they became extremely important in both facilitating and escalating the insurgency in Anbar.98 99

Zarqawi Begins to Influence the Insurgency

(S/REL TO MCFI) The return of Zarqawi to Iraq in July 2003 offered a preview of the coming major shift in the composition and ideology of the insurgency. His organization carried out mass casualty terrorist attacks against the Jordanian Embassy on August 7 and the United Nations Headquarters on August 19. While Zarqawi primarily focused his attention against Baghdad-based targets, there is some evidence that he directed the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in An Najaf on August 29. Zarqawi himself claimed responsibility for the attack on senior Al Qaeda facilitator Lu'ay Saqa and also in a letter to the Al Qaeda leadership. His claim was disputed by some in the intelligence community who attributed the attack to Shi'a radical Muqtada al-Sadr.100 Despite Zarqawi's debut as a major player in the insurgency, the relatively small size of his organization (which was dominated by foreign fighters) meant that Al Qaeda would remain in the background for much of 2003. A letter sent from Zarqawi to the Al Qaeda leadership in January 2004 stated that they had carried out twenty-five suicide bombings during the course of 2003 but he did not believe their security situation secure enough to issue any claims of responsibility.101

(S/REL TO MCFI) The effect of Zarqawi's entry into the insurgency was not immediately apparent. Day-to-day attacks continued to be dominated by the groups that came into existence over the spring and summer as well as new or consolidated insurgent organizations that emerged during the fall. Nevertheless, the establishment of Al Qaeda in Iraq combined with the rise of Iraqi SRE groups as a major force within the insurgency led to widespread formal and informal tactical cooperation between them and a number of FRE and FRL organizations in Anbar. As a result of both the Faith Campaign and the aggressive Wahhabi proselytizing that had taken place in the province since the fall of Saddam, many Anbaris now viewed Islamism as an attractive alternative ideology to Ba'athist secular Arab nationalism.102 An example of this is one of the purported masterminds of the UN

98 [ ] Source unknown [ ] R N L FOR TARGETS [S/NF] [ ]
99 [ ] Military [1st BCT/TARGET FOLDER: 20040128 [S/NF] [ ]
100 [ ] B 350 USC 3507 [S/NF] [ ]
101 [ ] Source unknown [ ] ZARQAWI LETTER, JANUARY 2004 [S/NF] [ ]
102 [ ] Military [CTC 2003-30149] [S/NF] [ ]

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and Sunni Arab from Khalidiyah.\footnote{Bookmark not defined.} (a town in Anbar) he fled to Saudi Arabia and joined Al Qaeda, returning to Iraq pre-OIF.\footnote{Bookmark not defined.} to fight against Coalition forces. The growing problem of foreign fighters and their radical ideology was reflected in an early September statement by Al-Qa'ida leader al-Kubaysi that attacks on Coalition forces were being coordinated by “outsiders.”\footnote{103}

**Insurgent Strategy and Consolidation**

(S/REL TO MCFL) During the fall of 2003 FRL insurgents also began to consolidate into fewer, but larger, groups. (The Insurgency Organizational Evolution Chart provides an illustration of the merger trend.) While Saddam remained isolated from day-to-day operational planning, he and his subordinates made a concerted effort to unify the Ba'athists and Saddam Fedayeen loyal to them in al-Qa'im, Khalidiyah, Habaniyah, Fallujah.\footnote{Bookmark not defined.} and Ramadi.\footnote{Bookmark not defined.} Also in this “organizational” or “defensive” phase, Syrian-based FRL and FRE insurgents tried, with little success, to coordinate financial and logistical support for reestablishment of Sunni Arab control in Iraq. An example of this intensified cooperation and coordination among FRL organizations is the network headed up by Khudair al-Halbusi, who planned to carry out coordinated attacks against Coalition forces in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Baghdad.\footnote{Bookmark not defined.} on Saddam’s orders in November 2003. While the al-Halbusi network was something of an exception among FRL organizations because of Saddam’s direct operational role, it illustrates how organized the FRLs had become at this point.

(S/REL TO MCFL) The FRL strategy, to the extent that one existed beyond conducting regular attacks on the Coalition, appears to have been developed along quasi-Maoist lines. It viewed Anbar and its neighboring province of Salahuddin as rural sanctuaries in which they could regroup, reequip, and train. Though these ideas were not well developed by the time of Saddam’s capture, it appears the FRLs saw these rural sanctuaries as areas from which they could launch attacks into Baghdad.\footnote{Bookmark not defined.}

(S/REL TO MCFL) As noted previously, many Anbaris were wary of Saddam Hussein during his rule of Iraq and thus regarded his attempt at consolidation of FRL insurgent organizations with disdain. While FRE and SRE organizations continue to cooperate tactically with FRLs, they made it quite clear they would not subordinate themselves to Saddam.\footnote{104} In one such case, Saddam attempted to reach out to chemical engineer and political leader Harith al-Dhari, only to be told that al-Dhari had grown powerful enough that he did not need Saddam or his support.\footnote{105} The threat of Saddam’s power and the consequences of defying him were no longer able to motivate insurgent commanders. New leaders had moved into the power vacuum and saw little need for Saddam or his money.

\footnote{Military CSOTF INTSUM 322 S-NE }\footnote{Source unknown \(\text{(b)(6)}\) - PERSONALITIES FOR TARGETING S-NE }\footnote{Open Source \(\text{b 6} \) - TWICE ARMED: AN AMERICAN SOLDIER'S BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS IN IRAQ 2006 p. 140 (U) }
Insurgent Motivations and Ideology

(S/REL TO MCFI) Motivations for the rank-and-file insurgents during this period still varied widely. Some Anbaris continued to fight against what they saw as an unjust occupation. Others fought to avenge tribal grievances against perceived Coalition abuses such as the killing of Iraqi police in Fallujah. Following the apprehension of prominent Fallujah religious figures like SRE leader Barakat Albu Eissa. Following the apprehension of Barakat Albu Eissa, warnings were circulated by insurgent groups and their supporters that Western contractors might be targeted by the insurgency. This foreshadowed what would occur in Fallujah in April 2004.

(U) During this period, FRE and FRL propaganda framed the conflict within both a nationalist and a jihadist context. The Coalition was portrayed as an infidel power that occupied Iraq with various nefarious motives, such as neo-colonialism or as part of a conspiracy to destroy Islam. The average Iraqi saw the CPA announcement that the U.S. was an occupier as explicitly comparable to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Further, they saw a parallel between those Iraqis who supported the Coalition and those nations that supported Israel, thereby legitimizing their murder under either a political or a religious rationale.

(U) Another major element of Sunni insurgent motivation was the new role of Shi'a organizations such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in the new Iraqi government. Their long-standing ties with Iran played directly on Sunni Anbari fears of what they saw as the minority Shi'a controlling Iraq at the

| 1.4b, 1.4d | Both FRE and FRL propagandists understood the fears of their fellow Anbaris, and knew the messages most likely to push them into active insurgency.

Typical Insurgent Attacks and TTPs: Major Turning Points

(U) This “consolidation” stage enabled the insurgents time and space to develop new TTPs and improve existing ones as evidenced by the appearance of IEDs and suicide bombers. Insurgents attacked several categories of targets: Iraqi infrastructure, Iraqi security forces, Iraqi civilians, and Coalition forces. The following chart shows the types of attacks during 2003.

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106 Open Source | INTERVIEW: b 3 b 6 | OCTOBER 2006 | (U) |

107 Ibid.
(U) Attacks on Anbar’s infrastructure suggested the insurgents believed they had enough popular support and internal security to carry out these attacks without fear of a popular backlash. Insurgents also continued to attack Iraqi governance within Anbar, particularly leaders put into positions of power by or simply viewed as too close to the Coalition.

(S/REL TO MCFI) One of the first infrastructure targets was the rail system. Throughout late summer and fall, Jaysh Qods in cooperation with organized criminal elements carried out a number of attacks on the railroads. These attacks showed that at least part of the insurgency was becoming more sophisticated in its techniques.

(S/REL TO MCFI) Significantly, the first record of a casualty-producing IED killed a solider in Fallujah on July 18, 2003. The first IED used against the railroad system was near Fallujah on August 28, 2003. Within just a few weeks, the new weapon became common throughout Anbar. The insurgents began to refine their techniques for the use of IEDs. In some cases, IEDs were used to initiate ambushes affording the...
insurgents a low-risk stand-off weapon. In other cases, IEDs were used as minefields to provide early warning and deny, or hinder coalition forces entry into areas.

(S/REL TO MCFI) A November 12th attempt on the rail lines was particularly instructive. The 3rd BCT discovered a remote-controlled IED on the tracks as well as eight 125mm rounds daisy-chained together. Both innovations represented a significant leap in technique for the insurgency, one that would soon become a familiar sight to Coalition forces. By the end of the year, IED attacks had multiplied dramatically. However, from the start, they showed huge fluctuations in numbers, reflecting both the time of year (attacks would spike just before and after Ramadan) and availability of materials with which to build them. The following figure shows the timing and numbers of IED attacks.

![2003: IEDs by Month](image)

(Figure 3: IED Bookmarks not defined. Attacks 2003 (S/REL TO MCFI))

(S/REL TO MCFI) Railway attacks were not the only infrastructure sabotage by the Anbar-based insurgency. Water and power lines were cut frequently in Ramadi. Throughout Anbar, attacks on gas pipelines, electrical grids, and other critical infrastructure became common during the fall of 2003.

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109 [ | Military | 82LNO-92595144 | (S/NF) ]
110 [ | Military | 82nd Airborne Division SIGACTS (significant actions) | (S/REL TO MCFI) ]

Data used to construct these graphs is a compilation of 82nd Airborne Division SIGACTS (significant actions). This data base includes primarily data starting in June 2003 and may not be fully representative of all incidents in al Anbar Province. The number of relevant incident and attack reports was 321 from a total of 1,128. (S/REL TO MCFI)
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Perhaps the first known attack on power lines occurred in September, when Coalition troops caught two Iraqis pulling down the lines near the Haditha. Because the power lines were sold as scrap metal, it is unclear if it was an insurgent attack on the infrastructure per se, or a criminal profit-making activity, or both. In either case, the infrastructure attacks demonstrated that the Coalition was unable to protect the population and its infrastructure.

The suicide bombing in Ramadi on October 10, 2003 was the first indication that Al Qaeda and other foreign Islamist elements were active in the province. In the first recorded use of the technique in Anbar, an Iraqi simply walked up to an FOB with a box containing the bomb and detonated it as Coalition troops approached. A tactic employed almost exclusively by global jihadists and other foreign fighters, suicide bombings would prove as difficult to stop as IEDs, while also causing large-scale casualties among the civilian population of Iraq. However, for 2003 suicide bombers were not deployed in the numbers or the scale achieved in later years.

Another innovation was the use of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) or car bombs. Some of the most spectacular VBIED attacks in Anbar targeted government institutions, particularly the police. In September, a VBIED attack on the Fallujah police department’s training area caused massive casualties, while a December VBIED killed 17 police officers and wounded 33 in Khalidiya. Fortunately, VBIED attacks were very limited in 2003.

The police were under siege throughout the province. Various insurgent groups apparently concluded that only the defeat of the police would allow them to succeed. The situation was worst in al-Qa’im and Husaybah. As we have seen, the police chiefs in al-Qa’im were repeatedly attacked or intimidated into quitting and the entire police force was also threatened. Twenty armed men entered the al-Qa’im station on October 16 and told the officers that they would be killed if they continued to work with the Coalition. The police station at Husaybah was also repeatedly attacked by insurgents during October, culminating in nine separate attacks during the last week of the month and the assassination of the police chief. On November 6, insurgents launched a coordinated attack against municipal buildings in Fallujah, including the police station, while also engaging responding units. In Haditha there were two spectacular attacks on the police station in November; The first involved insurgents boldly entering the station and seizing weapons from the hands of the police, while in the second, dozens of insurgents gathered along the main road on November 12 and carried out an attack on the beleaguered city police station using RPGs.

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111 | Military | 82LNO-957591543951681 | (S/NF) | ]
112 | Military | 3ACRLNO-277401436898699 | (S/NF) | ]
113 | Military | ICDC Hit Error! Bookmark not defined. Briefing and 82LNO-71001738 | (S/NF) | ]
114 | Military | 82LNO-70911860309790 | (S/NF) | ]
115 | Military | 82LNO-4434876664528391 | (S/NF) | ]
116 | Open Source | BOSTON GLOBE | IRAQI TOWN GAINS SENSE OF NORMALCY | 20040201 | (U) | ]
117 | Open Source | THE GUARDIAN | UNDER USE NOSES, BRUTAL INSURGENTS RULE SUNNI CITADEL | 20050822 | (U) | ]

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Attacks against U.S. forces showed a steady increase leading up to Ramadan, which began October 26, 2003, and then a small decline after Ramadan. Small arms fire, RPGs and indirect fire comprised the major forms of attack against U.S. troops in 2003. IEDs were sometimes used in conjunction with the attacks. The figure below indicates the types of attacks in 2003.

**Attack Data (September – December 2003)**

The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (September to December 2003). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following six charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IEDs) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. There was no data available for Complex Attacks for this period.

The average number of enemy attacks during this period was the lowest sustained level of the entire insurgency. There are two patterns of interest that can be seen in the data. The first is that the TFC dataset recorded no Direct Fire or Indirect Fire incidents during the month of October 2003. In fact, the only category with recorded incidents is IEDs. This is more likely a recording error rather than a data outlier. The other significant pattern is a significant spike in activity within the Overall, Direct Fire, and Indirect Fire categories during the week of 6-12 November, likely related to Ramadan. Much of the spike can be attributed to activity in AO Denver, which had been very quiet otherwise. Almost all recorded activity previously was in AOs Raleigh and Topeka. There is also a smaller spike during the week of 18-24 September. The IED data shows a slightly different pattern that rises gradually, peaking during the week of 23-29 October, then gradually falls from there.
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Coalition Forces and the Insurgency

(U) Reacting to the growing unrest, Coalition forces mounted a series of operations in Anbar designed to suppress the insurgents. The CPA Error! Bookmark not defined. claimed the insurgent attacks were work of a few left-over Ba’athists, criminals, or “dead-enders,” and separate, unconnected incidents provoked by local concerns. Due to this poor analysis, almost all Coalition actions focused on one city at a time, had limited objectives, and were “cordon-and-search,” rather than “clear-and-hold,” operations. Some involved a thousand troops in very small areas. In Operation BULLDOG MAMMOTH, a brigade searched one apartment complex in Abu Gharyb. Others, such as the 82nd Airborne’s Operation OK CORRAL in Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined., attempted to cordon and search large parts of an entire city. A large number of operations involved targeted actions against former regime leaders, searches for weapons caches, and attempts to close the border to foreign fighters or to halt smuggling. After October 2003, the Coalition

\[17\] [ | Military | 82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION/ SIGACTS (SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS) (S/REL TO MCFI) ] ] Data used to construct these graphs is a compilation of 82nd Airborne Division SIGACTS (significant actions). This data base includes primarily data starting in June 2003 and may not be fully representative of all incidents in al Anbar Province. The number of relevant incident and attack reports was 380 from a total of 1,128 (S/REL TO MCFI).
increasingly undertook actions designed to find and destroy the IEDs that were causing increasing casualties for both Coalition and Iraqi forces.


(S/REL MCFI) The month of November saw over fifty IEDs explode in Anbar; twenty in the week of November 2-9 alone. This indicated a steady increase in the use of IEDs compared to June, July, and August. Throughout the fall, there was also growing concern about the number of foreign fighters filtering across the border, but there was no consensus about the ideology or motivation for these fighters.

City Story: Husaybah and Al-Qa‘im

(S/REL TO MCFI) Smaller towns and villages across Anbar were not spared the continuing upsurge in insurgent activity, especially areas near the Iraqi-Syrian border. The city of Husaybah witnessed a noticeable increase in violence during the month of October, as its proximity to the Syrian border and long history of profitable smuggling was exploited by the insurgents. The profits available from this trade also encouraged the rise of a criminal element within the insurgency, as local crime bosses allied with insurgents to maintain control over smuggling routes. Their resulting profits were then funneled into attacks targeting the coalition and their Iraqi government allies. The killings and intimidation of both Husaybah and al-Qa‘im police facilitated the rise of crime syndicates and insurgent groups and encouraged them to work together. The new boldness of the insurgency was shown by the types of attacks that they carried out after August. In October, insurgents brought down an OH-58 helicopter with small arms fire, while thirty-eight separate RPG attacks took place in September and October, suggesting a greater willingness among insurgents to conduct direct fire attacks.

(S/REL TO MCFI) Much like nearby Husaybah, Al-Qa‘im’s status as a hub for cross-border trade gave rise to a criminal organization which was populated by former Ba‘ath Party officials. These same figures aided small numbers of foreign fighters who transited the Syrian border, while also giving refuge and aid to local insurgents who facilitated their control of the smuggling routes. Rutbah also suffered due to its historic role as a center for smuggling. Small groups of foreign fighters utilized centuries-old smuggling routes in order to infiltrate the area. With the aid of insurgents from Husaybah, Rawah-based insurgents set up small training camps around the town to replace the one destroyed earlier by the Coalition.

(U) As coalition forces attempted to create a system of order and economic stability, those who had profited from crime and patronage frequently made common cause with insurgents. This dynamic of criminal elements allying with insurgents – or insurgents acting as profit-driven criminals – became a constant problem for the Coalition. It was particularly serious in the border towns such as Husaybah and Al-Qa‘im, where unregulated cross-border trade had long been a way of life.
One group embodied this synthesis. Dubbed “Al-Theeb” (The Wolf) the Husaybah-based group included amongst its ranks criminals, former Ba’athists, and foreign fighters. Al-Theeb was founded long before OIF by a former Iraqi soldier named Turki Abd Majid who called himself Abu Theeb (“Father of the Wolf”). Traveling to Syria and Lebanon before returning to Iraq in 1997, Majid made contact with Islamist extremist groups, some of which were linked to al-Qaeda, and agreed to assist them in moving personnel in and out of Iraq. Following the destruction of the AI training camp at Rawah by Coalition forces in July 2003, Majid assisted the survivors in fleeing to Ubaydi, al-Qa’im, and Husaybah. There he enlisted them as the leadership of AT, a purely criminal venture which dominated the smuggling routes through al-Qa’im. Once it began to control profit flows and area commerce, religious extremists and other Iraqis who were more ideologically motivated joined the group, creating a criminal insurgency.

This sort of inclusive insurgency, where names meant little when compared to the need for cooperation, was commonplace in Anbar. After Majid’s capture in August 2003, FRL Major General Abed Mohowsah al-Mahalowi assumed control of AT and completed the group’s transformation from a criminal organization to a hybrid network based around organized crime, foreign fighter smuggling, and anti-Coalition activity. While somewhat geographically isolated from the rest of Anbar, Al-Theeb serves as a perfect example of how cooperation and accommodation between insurgent groups frequently bypassed ideological differences.

Snapshot: The Insurgency August-December 2003

The insurgent environment in these border towns accurately represented the complex, broader threat environment facing the Coalition by the latter part of 2003. Far from a mass of uncoordinated groups and factions, the insurgency was showing signs of real organization and hierarchy, even though many factions seemingly opposed each others’ initiatives. The consolidation of smaller insurgent groups into larger coalitions was part of a larger trend that saw supposed ideological enemies willing to work together against the Coalition and its Iraqi supporters.

Insurgent attacks continued to show greater sophistication, both technically and tactically, although attack levels tended to vary considerably throughout the year. The development of IEDs, VBIEDs and suicide bombers gave insurgents a wide variety of new weapons for their arsenal, while growing numbers of complex attacks—including the use of RPGs and SAF—showed that at least some insurgents were learning close combat. Both the use of IEDs and complex attacks showed the insurgents were increasingly sophisticated.

118 [ | Source unknown | INTREP #04-019 | (S/NF) | ]
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Al-Theeb
122 Ibid.
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(S/REL TO MCFI) The insurgency in Anbar was now dominated by FREs, as vigorous Coalition targeting of FRL figures—and pursuit of Saddam—crippled this part of the insurgency and would soon lead to the capture of Saddam. At the same time, the reappearance of Zarqawi with spectacular mass attacks in BaghdadError! Bookmark not defined. and elsewhere, showed the threatening future of the insurgency in the province.

The Capture of Saddam Hussein (November – December 2003)

(S/REL TO MCFI) Believing that Saddam Hussein and his surviving subordinates were responsible for much of the violence (either directly or by proxy by his top lieutenants such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri or Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad) the Coalition intensified its efforts to hunt him down. Operations in November and December netted a number of senior FRL leaders including Brigadier General Daham Al Mahmedi in FallujahError! Bookmark not defined., who had indirect contact with Saddam through human couriers, as well as Jassam Mejbil and Mahamed Jassam Abad, two Fallujah crime lords who had been involved in financing, conducting IEDError! Bookmark not defined. attacks, and supplying weapons to FRL and FRE insurgent groups.123 124

(S/REL TO MCFI) Ironically, after having more or less consolidated FRL organizations under his leadership, Coalition actions forced Saddam deeper underground. This forced him to rely even more on top subordinates such as his half-brother Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti or Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, though FRE Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad remained one of the most active facilitators of FRL insurgents in Anbar. Coalition pursuit eventually chased Saddam to al-Dawr where he was captured in December.

Saddam’s Influence Diminishes

(S/REL TO MCFI) While Saddam’s remaining influence waned in Anbar as a result of his return to hiding, FRE and SRE organizations continued to grow. Making good on Barakat Albu Eissa’s previous threats, an SRE from Albu Eissa’s village near FallujahError! Bookmark not defined. successfully downed a U.S. Chinook helicopter on November 2, 2003 causing 16 U.S. KIAs.125 The image of the downed helicopter was prominently reflected in print and electronic insurgent propaganda from that point forward, even among groups opposed to Albu Eissa. And while FRLs were forced to lessen their attacks under pressure from the Coalition, groups like JM continued to carry out high-profile operations in Anbar such as the assassination of HitError! Bookmark not defined. mayor Na’im ‘Abd al-Muhsan and his chief of police in November 2003, prompting the installment of ‘Ali Hamdi Nassar al-‘Awi as his successor. The success of these attacks encouraged the insurgents and gave them renewed confidence to continue their attacks against the Coalition.

Al Qaeda in Iraq Expands

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123 [ | Open Source | CENTCOM: Press Release | 20031203 | (U) | ]
124 [ | Open Source | CENTCOM: Press Release | 20031211 | (U) | ]
125 [ | Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS: LIST OF DOWNED US HELICOPTERS IN IRAQ | 20040108 | (U) | ]

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The Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leadership saw an opportunity as Ba’athist influence both in Anbar and across Iraq was waning. As early as September 2003, groups loyal to AQI and Zarqawi’s JTJ were actively recruiting Iraqi members at the mosques in Fallujah and Ramadi and seeking to form alliances with local FRL, FRE, SRE, and tribal-based insurgent groups. While the vast majority of insurgents fighting the Coalition in Anbar, even those described as “Wahhabi,” did not agree with Al Qaeda’s political or religious views, insurgent leaders like Al’s Abu Talha in Ramadi and JTJ’s Zarqawi in Fallujah were able to persuade enough FREs and SREs to support them that by November 2003 JTJ had a viable organization in Anbar. The rise of Zarqawi’s JTJ intensified divisions within Ansar al Islam. Several factions split off from the Iran-based Ansar al Islam leadership to align with Zarqawi or to become part of Abu Abdallah al-Shafi’i’s umbrella organization Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna (AS).

Nor was the opportunity lost on Usama bin Ladin. As early as November 2003, he apparently convened a summit of the Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan and informed the Taliban that he would begin providing $1.5 million a month to the Iraqi insurgency. Bin Laden ordered senior and mid-level Arab and Turkish Al Qaeda associates to travel to Iraq to assist in the insurgency there. He instructed them to identify a commander he could appoint as the overall emir in Iraq. Among those who were sent to Iraq were KSM associate Hassan Ghul and Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, a high-ranking member of the organization’s global leadership who had previously been involved in the Afghan insurgency. In response to al-Iraqi’s request for a war plan for jihad in Iraq, Zarqawi’s wrote up a lengthy letter to the Al Qaeda leadership that would be captured by Coalition forces in January 2004.

Saddam Demythologized: Splintering of FRLs

After over a month and a half of concerted effort, on December 13, Coalition forces captured Saddam Hussein near Tikrit. Those in the Coalition who saw the insurgency as primarily motivated by FRLs thought that the end of Saddam, together with the earlier coalition killings of his two sons Uday and Qusay in Mosul on July 22, 2003, would serve the death blow to the violence in Iraq. For those FRL and FRE organizations that had relied on Saddam and his reputation as a symbol or rallying point, his capture was an enormous psychological blow. His supporters in Tikrit could not initially believe it was him.

During the course of his long and bloody rule of Iraq, Saddam had painstakingly constructed a mythology for himself in which he embodied the ideal of a strong Arab leader who dared to defy the West. He was regarded, even by those who opposed him, almost as a kind of demigod. Both his capture and the humiliating circumstances under which it occurred served to deconstruct him before the entire population of Iraq on national and satellite television.

126 [ | Open Source | NEWSWEEK: BIN LADEN’S IRAQ PLANS | December 8, 2003 | (U) | ]

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FRL Organizations Survive the Infighting after Saddam's Capture

(S/REL--TO--MCFI) According to Arab press and insurgent accounts, the capture of Saddam Hussein led to immediate clashes and infighting for control among FRL organizations. Three groups remained relatively effective. The following table illustrates the remaining groups.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgent Group</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Area of Operations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Hani Abdul-Latif al-Tilfah al-Tikriti</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri</td>
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<td>Muhsin Khudhair al-Khafiji</td>
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<td>Ferka et Hadi</td>
<td>Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad</td>
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Table 5: Insurgent Groups Remaining – December 2003 (S/NF)

(S/REL TO MCFI) The largest FRL group that remained was led by members of the Tikriti clan and headed up by Saddam’s cousin Colonel Hani Abdul-Latif al-Tilfah al-Tikriti and his brother and financed by Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti. HA and most of the surviving Ba’ath Party organization including many of the FRL Saddam Fedayeen fell under the control of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri. Al-Duri was the one-time Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In late 2003, he was the titular head of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party. The third and final major FRL organization that emerged at the end of the infighting was led by Muhsin Khudhair al-Khafiji who sought to improve relations with the Syrian Ba’athists and retained the services of FRE Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad for his Ferka et Hadi organization. Al-Khafiji was the most powerful FRL leader in Anbar. 128

Summary

Snapshot: The Insurgency at the End Of 2003

(S/REL TO MCFI) The capture of Saddam removed any realistic chance of restoring the regime to power, but rather than discouraging FREs into giving up the fight, it prompted most of them to seek other reasons, reflected in their propaganda, to continue resisting the occupation. Previously, almost all the major insurgent organizations had espoused a mixture of nationalist or religious slogans to rally Anbaris to their cause. A majority of Anbaris chose some form of Islamism or jihadism as their basic ideology. Anbaris did not seem to perceive any contradiction between these two ideals, and some groups began to mix nationalism and Islamism in a way unthinkable before Saddam’s capture.129

128 [ | Source unknown | PERSONALITIES FOR TARGETING | (S/NF) | ]
129 [ | Military | CTC 2003-30149 | (S/NF) | ]
Looking Ahead

(S/REL TO MCFI) This mixing of nationalism and Islamism continued to develop through the beginning of 2004, setting the stage for Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi’s debut at the center of the Iraqi insurgency in Anbar Province.