Phase IV
Reconstruction
"Wars end not because the victor declares success, but when the vanquished accept defeat."

- Ambassador Charles Freeman

What legacy will the CFC leave in the region following Phase IV?
US Strategic Objectives

1. ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT.
2. RAPIDLY IMPROVE CIVIL ORDER AND MATERIAL CONDITIONS.
3. DEMONSTRATE US COMMITMENT TO IRAQ AND THE REGION.
4. FOSTER A NATIONAL IDENTITY THAT UNITES ALL IRAQIS WHILE PRESERVING THEIR TRIBAL, ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS HERITAGE.
5. ESTABLISH A BROAD-BASED, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT THAT:
   - ADHERES TO THE RULE OF LAW.
   - RESPECTS BASIC RIGHTS OF ALL IRAQIS.
   - DOES NOT THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS AND DOES NOT SUPPORT TERRORISM.
   - DOES NOT PURSUE WMD CAPABILITY.
   - MAINTAINS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.
US Military Objectives

1. EXTERNAL THREATS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES DETERRED AND, IF DETERRENCE FAILS, SWIFTLY DEFEATED.
2. RESISTANCE FROM INTERNAL GROUPS HOSTILE TO US AND COALITION FORCES PREVENTED OR DEFEATED.
3. ESSENTIAL IRAQI INFRASTRUCTURE AND SOCIAL SERVICES RAPIDLY RESTORED.
4. REFORMED IRAQI MILITARY AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING LEGITIMATE DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY MISSIONS.
5. GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS AND SERVICES NECESSARY TO STABILIZE IRAQ AND INITIATE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY ARE ESTABLISHED. ON ORDER, TRANSFER THESE FUNCTIONS AND SERVICES TO A TRANSITIONAL US OR INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION.
6. PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY MAINTAINED.
7. AS REQUIRED, US INTERAGENCY OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION EFFORTS TO REORGANIZE AND TRAIN IRAQI LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED.
8. ALL WMD IDENTIFIED, SECURED, DOCUMENTED AND DESTROYED OR DISMANTLED AS APPROPRIATE.
9. DESTRUCTION OF TERRORIST NETWORKS COMPLETED AND ALL TERRORISTS AND WAR CRIMINALS IN CUSTODY.
Phase IV will be the strategically decisive phase.
The CFC/CJTF will move from being the supported effort by civilian agencies to the supporting effort for civilian initiatives.
Phase IV activities overlap with Phases II & III. Ground combat forces will be required for all operations.
Information operations will be a critical effort. Once the shooting stops, non-kinetic measures will be the primary means to affect the battlespace.
The CFC’s focus of effort will switch to Phase IV before CFLCC.
Afghanistan Phase IV requirements will compete with Iraq Phase IV requirements.
Post-hostility occupation will be used by terrorists and extremists to further anti-western sentiment.
Assumptions

- There will be no national governing structure initially following hostilities to assist in the administration of Iraq. (i.e. no “government in waiting”)
- There will be an international mandate at some point in time creating an international administration.
- The TPFDD will complete the planned force flow.
- The CFC will integrate coalition forces and IOs/NGOs during Phase IV.
- The force structure will allow the CFC to finish meeting immediate humanitarian crisis needs and resettlement before HA resources run out (estimated supply of 3-6 months).
- Reconstruction efforts will address actions as a result of the war and not the last 10 years of economic sanctions.
- The Endstate is tied to a “model for change,” but this is not seen favorably by regional partners.
Limitations

- Regional interests will constrain operations in Iraq (GCC, OPEC)
- Sanctions will restrict the sale of oil and import/export of goods and services
- Conflicting national objectives within the coalition will impact on unity of effort
- Becoming an occupation force requires the CFC to uphold Iraqi treaties and commercial agreements
- An international mandate will affect the size, composition and requirements for the occupation force
Proposed Mission Statement

UPON DIRECTION OF CDR USCENTCOM, CFC CONDUCTS STABILITY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ TO PROVIDE A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT AND FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT OF A FUNCTIONING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WHICH ADHERES TO THE RULE OF LAW, PROMOTES REGIONAL STABILITY AND ELIMINATES THREATS FROM TERRORISM AND WMD.

O/O TRANSITION RESPONSIBILITY TO AN APPROPRIATE CIVIL AUTHORITY ENABLING CFC FORCES TO WITHDRAW.

1. Sector remains uneasy.

2. Assessing further.

3. Civilian Vehicles vic woodline.


5. More pressure on insurgents = less reason for Serbs to act harshly.

6. No change to TF 1.4a
Phase IV Transition Points

Phase III
- Cultural Ties
- Capacity Building

Phase IV
- C/J/M
- Inter-Agency Coordination
- International Administration
- Required for Resources
- Required for International Legitimacy
- Required for Strategic Success

Transition
- Force Posture
- In Region?
- Transition Criteria?
- STRAT OBJ #1
- IRAQ
- Country Governance
- Joint Governance
- Civil Administration
- Military Administration
- US/Coalition
- International Administration (Supported)
- Inter-Agency Coordination (Supporting)
Purpose Considerations

**PURPOSE:** Establish conditions for civil authority

**OR**

Instill a sense of shared determination in the Iraqi people to foster a national identity

**OR**

Create successful conditions to leverage thereby enhancing regional stability and reducing the global threat of terrorism.

**ENDSTATE:** A stable, self-sustaining Iraq with a viable governing body integrated within the international community.
**Commander’s Intent**

**PURPOSE:** Establish conditions for civil authority and leverage the successful conditions to enhance regional stability and reduce the threats from terrorism.

**ENDSTATE:** A stable, self-sustaining Iraq with a viable governing body integrated within the international community.
Achieving Strategic Success

PHASE IV
- Governance
- Rule of Law
- Civil Administration
- Unity of Effort
- Security
- Resettlement
- Economic Development

STRAATEGIC OBJECTIVES
- Broad-based, representative government
- Leveraging success for regional stability and the GWOT

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2002)
- Opening societies/Building democracies
- Cooperative action w/other powers
- Defeat global terrorism
- Defuse regional conflicts
- Prevent threat of WMD
- Human Dignity
- Global Economic Growth

SUCCESS should not be thought of in terms of "see what we did," but in terms of "look what we're doing."
Concept of Operations
CFC Initiative Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
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<tr>
<td>1QTR</td>
<td>2QTR</td>
<td>3QTR</td>
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**UNITY OF EFFORT**
- Coalition
- International
- Regional

**SECURITY**
- Homeland
- Wars
- Exchanges
- Civilian
- Military

**REFUGEE & DISPLACED**
- Resettlement
- Protection
- Repatriation
- Integration
- Citizenship

**CIVIL ADMIN**
- Public Health
- Transportation
- Communications
- Electricity
- Education

**RULE OF LAW**
- Law enforcement
- Justice
- Security
- Diplomatic
- Representation

**GOVERNANCE**
- Media reforms
- Local/Regional issues

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**
- Oil production
- Agriculture
- Tourism

(Note: The diagram illustrates the progression and connections between different initiatives across various fiscal years and sectors.)
A framework is needed to articulate purpose and provide unity of effort.
We developed objectives that are linked to achieving progress over time.
Each function within the task force is assigned objectives that are linked to achieving the desired end state.
Companies focus on stability, safe and secure environment.
Intellectual energy is dedicated at building joint cooperation, finding employment opportunities.
CA/IO work to influence behavior and attitudes.
NGOs/TOs, although not in unison with our objectives, can provide resources that we aim.
TASK FORCE
Organization
The Task Force is arranged functionally by line of operation. Each planning cell will consist of a military lead planner and civilian counterpart. The civilian counterparts will become the lead experts for the civil administrator and eventually become the core group that will comprise the civil administrator's staff once in country.
Not every milestone will have all these participants. This is an example of the organizations that should get involved in reconstruction planning.
NOTE: National positions are notional and will be determined based on capabilities and coalition agreements.
# Synchronizing the Effort

(Required for each Milestone)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>BAGHDAD</th>
<th>RIVER</th>
<th>KAZ</th>
<th>DESERT</th>
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<td>TASK</td>
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<td>SURVEILLANCE</td>
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<td>OF CIVILIAN</td>
<td>EFFORTS</td>
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<td>DOMESTIC RESOURCES</td>
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<td>GOOD NEWS STORIES (modifying behavior)</td>
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Summary – the Dynamic of Stability Operations

KEY TO SUCCESS:
Integrating and synchronizing the efforts of civilian organizations within the lines of operation at the local, regional and national level.

INTERIM ADMINISTRATION
IOs/PVOs/NGOs

NATIONAL
REGIONAL
LOCAL

SYNERGY
CIV LEAD
MIL LEAD
MILESTONE

LINES OF OPERATION
(arrangement of activity over time)

NATIONAL
REGIONAL
LOCAL

Approved for Release
The way ahead

- Begin coordination now with USG, coalition, IO/NGOs to determine available resources and required support. Stand up CJTF 4 to begin planning the efforts associated for each milestone.
- ID/procure Phase IV requirements (HMMWVs, non-lethal weapons, interpreters, base camp construction, etc.)
- Determine force structure, develop rotation policy
- Conduct Phase IV IPB
- ID conditions and determine minimum standards for systems:
  - Which locals can be in charge, which can’t
  - Legal issues
- Contract support services (B&R-type agency)
- ID Coalition requirements
- ID Iraqi treaties and commitments (commercial & diplomatic)
Commander’s Guidance
Backup Slides
Force Structure Considerations

- **IFOR**: 60,000 coalition troops for 3 million inhabitants in a country the size of West Virginia
- **KFOR**: 48,000 coalition troops for 1.8 million inhabitants in a province the size of Rhode Island
- Using these two models the force requirement would be:
  - IFOR Model: 480,000 troops
  - KFOR Model: 460,000 troops
- Should "catastrophic success" occur, assuming a force structure of 3ID and 7RLT, the initial troop to task requirement would be similar to conducting the IFOR mission with a Brigade Combat Team in a country twice the size of Idaho.

Differences from the IFOR operation:
- We entered after the war vice starting it
- We had a coalition and conducted required planning
- We were not committed to a contingency elsewhere
"If you’re going to build a shithouse, you better make sure you’ve got some nails and wood... unless you plan on taking a “virtual” dump."

- General Gary Luck

**What legacy will the CFC leave in the region following Phase IV?**
Example transition of a Milestone

CJTF-IRAQ AND
CFC MILITARY POLICE

IRAQI
POLICE
SERVICE

CIVILIAN/INT’L
AGENCY


☆ IPTF ARRIVE IN IRAQ.
☆ IPTF FIRST CLASS GRADUATES.
☆ IPS OPERATING DETENTION FACILITIES.
☆ IPS CONTINUES TO PRODUCE GRADUATES.
☆ REunas ed IPTF MEMBERS ARRIVE.
☆ Will occur at the local, regional and national level.

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Method of Strategy Development

1. Conduct initial AO assessment (30 Days)
2. Develop an overarching framework for understanding important to articulate purpose (Macro)
3. Identify natural progression towards achieving goals (Micro)
4. Select 2-3 areas to focus on
5. Determine what has been accomplished and where progress is needed (on 2-3 Areas)
6. Chart out a course, assigning objectives to forces/functions – aimed at achieving CFC objectives in selected areas
7. Conduct routine assessments and refinements of the strategy

- Get a grip on country first
- The Funnel articulates how activities are linked to progress over time
- Blow up of past accomplishments and future goals
- Should be linked to Iraqi return to normalcy - self sufficiency
- May require more time to gather information
- Execution matrix is used to synchronize functions
- Assessments and objectives Refined every 90 days
- Potential for crisis exists where spheres of influence overlap
- US presence on fault lines reduces potential for clashes between regional super-states.
- This presence yields a stabilizing influence similar to the effect of 2ID in Korea.