Chapter Four
The Insurgency Grows and Fights Pitched Battles
(2004)

Introduction

The capture of Saddam Hussein in late 2003 represented a watershed event. The man who ruled so long and loomed so large was now a prisoner. Hopes for the regime’s restoration had ended. The prominence of the FRLs also soon ended. While 2004 saw the splintering of the FRLs, this did not end the insurgency. As the year would show, the insurgency proved adaptable and resilient. Although 2004 began on a hopeful note with a reduced level of insurgent activity, various FRE, SRE, and Al Qaeda insurgent groups swiftly filled the power vacuum in Anbar. Insurgent activity increased not only in frequency but in complexity and intensity, most notably in the two major battles fought in Fallujah (Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and Operation Al FAJR).

Although each battle resulted in numerous insurgent deaths and captures, insurgent groups showed their resilience and continued to reorganize, recruit, and re-arm. Despite the losses of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, the insurgency managed to exploit opportunities – such as negotiations, the creation of the Fallujah Brigade, and the Coalition’s need to focus on Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army – to increase its influence throughout much of Anbar. Insurgent influence was demonstrated by the fact the new government was unable to project its authority in Anbar. Government officials were often the targets of insurgent threats and violence. After a series of tense stand-offs, negotiations, and skirmishes during the summer and fall of 2004, a second battle took place in Fallujah. In Operation Al FAJR, the Coalition destroyed the center of insurgent power in Anbar, killing or capturing thousands. The year ended with the insurgents again reorganizing and the Coalition and Iraqi Interim Government preparing for upcoming elections.

Saddam Hussein’s capture severely weakened the FRLs. Saddam’s followers began fighting among themselves for the leadership, funds and infrastructure of the FRE groups. Some, such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, issued propaganda statements seeking to distance themselves from the former dictator’s atrocities. Others championed themselves as Saddam’s true heirs. FRL members sought to cooperate with insurgent leaders who’d established themselves in 2003. As the FRLs weakened in early 2004, the power gap in Anbar was quickly filled by emerging leaders who were either former regime elements (FREs), Sunni religious extremists (SREs) or members of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi’s Jamaat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (JTJ) organization. These three groups were the Coalition’s primary enemies in Anbar for the remainder of 2004.

Early in 2004, the insurgency was still very local – no truly national group had yet emerged. FRE influence across Anbar remained pervasive throughout the year among these local insurgent groups (many with criminal or religious motivations). But they gradually changed from a focus on restoring their former influence and power to Wahhabism or Salafism and used religious rhetoric to
rally Anbaris to their cause.\textsuperscript{1} Despite their changed mindset, the Coalition continued to classify many of them as FREs because of their positions in the former Iraqi regime.

\textbf{(S/REL TO MCFI)} In early 2004, Ba'athist infighting finally resulted in the complete splintering of the party. While divisions had been papered over throughout 2003, giving the appearance of a unified power structure, in practice a high degree of factionalization existed. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri (now the titular political head of the Ba’athists as a result of his pre-OIF status as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council) and the head of the Party’s military wing, Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad, engaged in a power struggle that would continue throughout the insurgency.

\textbf{(U)} \textbf{Iraqi National Guard:} Together with the CPA and U.S. forces, Iraqi officials worked to re-establish a paramilitary presence within the country. In late 2003 and early 2004 the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Iraqi National Guard were established, members recruited, trained and deployed – some to Anbar Province. The ING became the focus of insurgent efforts to prevent the re-establishment of a government presence.

\textbf{(U)} \textbf{IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS (ICDC) AND IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD (ING) – 2003-2004.} The ING evolved from the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which was formed in the fall of 2003 by the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA). CPA Order No. 28 established the ICDC on September 3, 2003. It was to be a temporary agency built to complement Coalition efforts aimed at providing security and emergency services. Battalions included mainly non-military Iraqi personnel who worked directly for the Coalition Task Force. Two months later, the ICDC role was expanded to include a Counterinsurgency Battalion composed of 750-850 militiamen selected by five of the main political parties in Iraq.\textsuperscript{2} Under extreme political pressure, training time for ICDC members was increased to three weeks and the numbers grew from an estimated 700 initial members to over 15,000 members by January 2004. Their missions include: counter-insurgency operations, working with Iraqi police and fire departments to respond to civil disturbances, securing public buildings and providing security on Main Supply Routes (MSRs).

\textbf{(U)} \textbf{IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD: 2004-2005.} In April 2004, the ICDC was transferred to the Ministry of Defense.\textsuperscript{4} By July 2004, as the ICDC continued to become more involved in offensive operations, the Iraqi Government decided to convert this force into an Iraqi National Guard (ING). The first new recruits completed training on July 10, 2004 after being trained for 20 days at the ING Training Academy in Tikrit by Coalition and Iraqi instructors with training modeled after U.S. Army Basic Training. Between July 2004 and January 2005, the ING membership fluctuated between an estimated 36,229 members and 43,455 members.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{(U)} \textbf{Iraqi Special Police Forces:} As a law enforcement adjunct to the ING, various national police units were established:

\textbf{(U)} \textbf{IRAQI SPECIAL POLICE FORCES: 2004.} Since 2004, Iraqi governments have developed and evolved various forms of national-level police. The Special Police Forces (SPF), composed of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Military | GRINSTM 050208 | 050208 | (S/REL MCFI) |
\item \textsuperscript{2} [Open Source] | http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Iraqi_Civil_Defense_Corps | (U) |
\item \textsuperscript{3} [Open Source] | http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ing.htm | (U) |
\item \textsuperscript{4} [Open Source] | http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ing.htm | (U) |
\item \textsuperscript{5} [Department of State] | IRAQ WEEKLY STATUS REPORT | http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rbs/rpt/iraqstatus/ | (U) |
\end{itemize}
three major elements (commandos, public order brigades, and the 1st Special Police Mechanized Brigade) was formed in 2004 by the government of Iyad Allawi. They are used when local police (the Iraqi Police Service) are unable to contain situations. Many Ba’athist former military personnel were recruited by the Sunni then-Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib.

PUBLIC ORDER BRIGADES (POBs): 2004. The POBs are considered a Shi’a organization and frequently referred to as the Shi’a Public Order Brigades. They were formed by Ministry of Interior after the Shia gained control of the Ministry post-transfer of authority in July 2004. Their purpose was to provide national-level rapid-response with light armor capability to counter insurgency activities, provide support to Ministry of Interior taskings, crowd control, and security of high value installations. The POBs were trained and supervised by U.S. advisors of the Special Police Transition Teams (SPTT), the National Police Order Division of MNC-I. One example of their activities stands out: the POBs were used in cities such as Falluja after Operation AL FAJR (2004) to clear remaining pockets of insurgents and establish security until local police could be reestablished.

All Quiet in Anbar from January to March

With the capture of Saddam, damage to nationalist ideology, and resulting insurgency reorganization, the beginning of 2004 was quiet in Anbar. There were indications, however, that SRE groups – both newly Islamized organizations as well as established groups – were growing in size. This would prove correct. SRE growth continued throughout 2004. The Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, and JTJ all put out propaganda (leaflets and internet statements in particular), recruited heavily, and took over mosques in preparation for launching an insurgent campaign against the Coalition.

The rise of JTJ in Anbar and throughout Iraq soon became a major concern to the Coalition. A number of prominent foreign JTJ members had been killed in Fallujah prior to and following the apprehension of Al Qaeda emissary and KSM associate Hassan Ghul in January 2004. His capture and revelations about JTJ’s activities inside Iraq prompted the Coalition to reevaluate its assumptions about Zarqawi and his activities inside Iraq. As a result, the Coalition began to publicize Zarqawi as the primary terrorist threat to the Coalition by early February 2004.

JTJ appears to have responded by dropping the veil of secrecy that had characterized its actions throughout 2003. After the Coalition began to publicize Zarqawi’s activities inside Iraq, JTJ and other Al Qaeda-associated groups such as Ansar al-Sunna and Ansar al Islam apparently concluded they had nothing left to hide. They began issuing regular claims of responsibility for acts of violence. They disseminated text and video messages via the Internet or media organizations that coincided with a number of mass casualty terrorist attacks. These attacks were directed against the Kurdish


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leadership during a conference in Irbil in February 2004, against the Iraqi Shi’a in Karbala and Baghdad during a celebration of their holy festival of Ashura, and against a large number of Iraqi police at a recruiting station in Iskandariyah. These attacks provided a clear indication that Zarqawi and his allies were able to back up their threats with action.

(S/NF) Relatively little of this terror campaign, however, took place within Anbar proper. There were several reasons for this. First, insurgent groups typically avoid carrying out mass casualty attacks near their primary recruiting grounds and centers of support. While Zarqawi and other insurgents had few reservations about killing perceived collaborators, they didn’t target Sunnis in the way they did Shi’a or Kurdish populations. Second, JTJ was still building local alliances. These alliances – with other SRE and FRE insurgent groups and with anti-Coalition elements within powerful Anbari tribes such as the Mohamdi, the Albu Nimr, the Zobai and the Albu Lissa – might have been jeopardized by conducting mass casualty attacks in the province. Third, Zarqawi was interested in starting a civil war between Sunni and Shia and needed the support of the Sunnis.

Khamis Sirhan and the FRLs

(S/NF) One of the individuals of great interest to the Ba’athist pretenders that emerged following Saddam’s capture was Khamis Sirhan and his Saqlawiyah-based Ferka et Hadi (FeH) network. The former Ba’ath Party chairman in Karbala, Khamis Sirhan had fled to Anbar post-OIF. There he established FeH to fight the Coalition before reuniting with his FRL comrades who were now fighting under the banner of Hizb al-’Awdah. FeH was more involved in facilitating the attacks of local groups than with conducting attacks. It soon became an invaluable ally to FRL and FRE insurgent organizations in Anbar. Khamis Sirhan maintained ties with multiple FRL, FRE, and SRE insurgent organizations and acted as a nexus for inter-group communication and cooperation. When Khamis Sirhan agreed that FeH should join Ba’athist pretender Muhsin Khudhair al-Khafiji’s organization in late December 2003, it gave al-Khafiji access to one of the best-established FRE insurgent networks in Anbar. It also made neutralizing Khamis Sirhan a top priority for the Coalition.

(S/NF) Khamis Sirhan’s usefulness for al-Khafiji would be short-lived. On January 11, 2004 elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and special operations forces captured him in Ramadi. In the absence of Khamis Sirhan and his immediate family, the FeH network either collapsed or was heavily sought after Saddam’s capture.

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9 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: KHAMIS SIRHAN: PERSONALITIES FOR TARGETING POWERPOINT BRIEFING | Possibly created 200401xx | (S/NF) ]
10 [ | Military | CIIR-3-66-39-03-084 | (S/NF) ]
11 Ibid.
12 [ | Open Source | TAHERI, AMIR: WHO THE COALITION IS FACING IN IRAQ | 20031230 | (U) ]
absorbed by other FRE insurgent groups. The dissolution of FeH led in turn to the splintering of the Hizb al-'Awd. With this, whatever tenuous hold the FRLs had hoped to gain in Anbar slipped away. Other FRE and SRE organizations rapidly moved to fill this power vacuum.

Insurgent Networks and Coordination across Anbar

(S/NE) Despite JTJ's public debut, the majority of day-to-day attacks inside Anbar continued to be conducted by local and provincial FRE or SRE organizations (though the line between FRE and SRE became increasingly blurred as a result of Islamization). Infighting and rivalries initially hindered FRLs or FREs coordination of activities. Religious organizations stepped into the void and began facilitating cooperation by creating loose but not well-organized coalitions between the various insurgent groups. This cooperation enabled a great deal of permeability between insurgent groups, with members of one organization often blending or merging into another depending on the situation.

(S/NE) The clandestine Ramadi Shura Council (an overwhelmingly FRE organization) served as an informal coordinating body for insurgents based in and around Ramadi and throughout Anbar. It was dominated by [ ] and met periodically with various insurgent leaders from the Jaysh Mohammed, the JTJ, the 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Green Battalion as well as smaller local groups like Abu Harun Group, Hawra Network, and the Black Flags Battalion at mosques in Ramadi. Like many insurgent clerical organizations, the Ramadi Shura Council maintained close ties to AMS and influential Iraqi Sunnis including the Kharbit family. Similar informal and formal shuras soon appeared in other major cities in Anbar. Though not tightly hierarchical, these shuras remained, in principle at least, subordinate to the Ramadi Shura Council and later the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura.

(S/REL USA AND MCEF ABD AL-LATIF HUMAYIM AL-KHARBIT, a wealthy Amman-based banker and scion of the influential Kharbit family, was a major Ramadi Shura Council financier. He was a former religious advisor to Saddam Hussein and the founder of Islamic banks in Baghdad and Ramadi.

(S/NE) The Ramadi Shura Council's ideology was as diverse as the groups it worked with. Latif was a deeply religious man with a moderate view of *ibar'a*. He sought to restore Sunni power in Iraq and saw himself as a defender of the Qur'an. In contrast, Daham was not very religious in his behavior, despite being a leading member of Ramadi Shura Council and supposedly adhering to a *Salafist* view of Islam.

13 [ ] Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | (S/NE) | ]
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 [ ] Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | (S/NE) | ]
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(S/REL USA AND MCFI) Another approach, used by Jaysh Mohammed (now based at the southern end of Lake Thar Thar among the many chicken farms), was the creation of semi-autonomous subsidiary groups tailored to suit local interests. Thus, groups like Sataya al-Jihad or Colonel Mohammed Khudry Sabah al-Halbusi’s Green Battalion were set up or reinforced in Ramadi, Karmah, Saqlawiyah, Shahabi, and Khalidiyah with the intent of appealing to Islamist Anba’is from the Halbousi and Jumayli tribes. They drew recruits who might have balked at joining Jaysh Mohammed, which by early 2004 was supported in part through money sent by intermediaries of Saddam Hussein’s daughter and [b(6)]

(S/NF) At the same time that the insurgent groups were competing and cooperating with each other, important events were occurring in the major cities of Anbar province.

City Stories – Early 2004

(U) Although the insurgency may have been quiet while reorganizing and retooling, the Coalition was active. Early 2004 saw a great deal of activity designed to stabilize Anbar. To suppress the insurgency, the Coalition based forces throughout the province under the command of the 82nd Airborne Division. Tiger Squadron of the 3rd ACR had three operating bases at Al Asad Airbase, Haditha Dam and al Qa’im. 1st Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team (1st BCT, 1st ID) was in Fallujah. 1/124, Florida National Guard and 325th Airborne Infantry were in Ramadi. As Coalition forces spread out, they discovered each city of Anbar had its own particular circumstances that colored the organization, ideology, and activities of the insurgent groups operating there, specifics the Coalition had to consider when designing a strategy for stability and reconstruction.

Al-Qa’im

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) In Al-Qa’im, the insurgency engaged in criminal activity more than attacks on the Coalition. Between January and March 2004, there were fewer than ten attacks on Coalition forces in the city.19

Because of its proximity to the border, insurgent groups and their allies in the Albu Mahal tribe used Al-Qa’im as a hub to smuggle insurgents to and from Syria. The two largest insurgent groups were the SRE organization Omar al-Mukhtar under Ghanem Mohovsh and the FNE criminal organization Al-Theeb (see Chapter 3 for a description of the latter).20 Of the two, Omar al-Mukhtar had the wider reach, operating in Al-Qa’im, Anah, Rawah, Hadithah, and Muhamadi, but Al-Theeb was unquestionably the predominant group in the Al-Qa’im area.21

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 [ | Military | 03JANMCFI | 20040102 | (S/NF) | ]; [ | Military | 3 ACR TEXT INTSUM | 20040103 | (S/NF) | ];
20 [ | Military | 06JANNOFORN | 20040105 | (S/NF) | ]; [ | Military | 27 FEB NOFORN | 20040226 | (S/NF) | ];
21 [ | Military | NOFORN | 20040231 | (S/NF) | ]; [ | Military | 12MARNOFORN | 20040310 | (S/NF) | ];
22 [ | Military | 14MAR MCFT | 20040314 | (S/NF) | ]; [ | Military | 13MARTW | 20040314 | (S/NF) | ];
23 Ibid.

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Hadithah

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Disgruntled former Ba’athists, smugglers plying routes to Jordan and Syria, a thriving black market, and sabotaged electric lines (with the metal removed and sold as scrap) were all part of Hadithah’s landscape in early 2004.22 As was elsewhere, the insurgency was relatively quiet. Between January and March 2004, there were only nineteen attacks against the Coalition.23

(S/NF) Nonetheless, local intimidation efforts remained an issue, and the former mayor of Hadithah, Hawash Kalaf Metab, and police chief, Hosan Horat Waber, continued to collaborate with FRE insurgents in the city against Coalition forces.24 Hadithah’s proximity to Lake Thar Thar and strategic intersection within Anbar meant that the town served as an ideal staging area for FRE groups like Jaysh Mohammed.25 Senior Ba’athists began relocating to the Hadithah area during the run-up to Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, aided by sympathetic members of the Jughayfah tribe.26

(U) To counteract the appeal of the insurgency and to restore water distribution and power throughout Anbar, the Army Corps of Engineers, with support from CPA’s Program Management Office, began a $12,000,000 project to overhaul and rehabilitate the Hadithah Dam. The project employed more than one hundred Iraqi workers at any given time, including those who had previously worked on the Dam. Earlier restoration projects in Hadithah had included the restoration of transmission lines to link the hydropower dam to the Iraqi power grid, a project overseen by the Washington Group International.

Hit

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Hit, although far smaller than Hadithah, suffered more attacks during early 2004 compared to November-December 2003. Most consisted of IEDs, although the vast majority were found and defused before being detonated.27

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23 [ | Military | CJSOTF-AP: INTSUM | 20040104 | (S/NE) ] | |
24 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: HADITHAH CURRENT ASSESSMENT | 200408XX | (S/NF) ] | |
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 [ | Military | 20 FEBMCFI | 20040220 | (S/NE) ] | | Military | 21 FEBMCFI | 20040221 | (S/NE) | |
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(S/NF) Insurgent intimidation and infrastructure problems led many Hit residents to see the Coalition as the cause. Residents complained that promises to restore the infrastructure and provide basic needs went unfulfilled. Meanwhile, the city’s corrupt police chief, General Salam, facilitated the travel of insurgents and foreign fighters through the town and assisted their anti-Coalition propaganda efforts, while police captain Mohab Nabih provided information to both sides. Salam, however, had earlier been the target of insurgent intimidation, suggesting that his cooperation may not have been entirely voluntary. The intimidation of public officials by insurgents was a common tactic throughout 2004.

Husaybah

(S/NF) In Husaybah, the insurgency consisted largely of local FRE groups who mounted retributive attacks, generally with RPGs. They recruited new members from disgruntled tribes and sent them to Abu Kamal in 1.4b for training. Many members of these FRE groups were former military or IIS officers who trained the local police and were operating in conjunction with Al-Theeb in Al-Qa’im while cooperating on a tactical basis with JTJ. SRE networks also used Husaybah as a way station for foreign fighters and a staging area for attacks in other parts of Anbar.

Ramadi

(S/NF) In Ramadi and Fallujah, the situation was quite different from the rest of Anbar. In both cities, the insurgency was better entrenched and coordinated. This allowed for more sophisticated attacks against the Coalition.

(S/NF) Along with Ramadi Shura Council coordinated activities, two major insurgent networks conducted many of the attacks in Ramadi. The al-Shabani Group and the Brigadier General Abd Sulayman al-Khalifawi network. Most active of the two was the informal FRE network loyal to Khalidiyah-based Brigadier General Abd Sulayman al-Khalifawi. This network, established in July 2003, had expanded by early 2004 to encompass most of eastern Anbar. Also active in Ramadi was the also based in Khalidiyah, led by explosives expert

(S/NF) Ramadi also hosted a number of major insurgent facilitators and financiers. Foremost were members of the Khabbit family led in Ramadi by Abd al-Hamid al-Khabbit and Abd al-Latif Humayim al-Khabbit. As discussed earlier, they provided funding for a wide variety of insurgent

29 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: HIT CURRENT ASSESSMENT 200408XX (S/NF) ]
29 [Military AL HIT ASSESSMENT - SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 200405xx (S/NF) ]
30 [Military 02 FEBMCFI 20040202 (S/NF) ]
31 [Military 01JANMCFI 20040101 (S/NF) ]; [Military 3 ACR: INTSUM 200401040600 (S/NF) ];
31 [Military AO ATLANTA ASSESSMENT 20040101 (S/NF) ]
32 [Military AO ATLANTA ASSESSMENT 20040228 (S/NF) ]
33 [Military AO ATLANTA ASSESSMENT 20040202 (S/NF) ]
34 [Military OIA SF 2004-30038 (S/NF) ]
35 Ibid. 
leaders and organizations throughout Anbar. Anti-Coalition members of the Ghanim clan of the Albu Khalifah as well as the Fahad tribe facilitated the insurgency in Ramadi proper, providing documents, propaganda, and counterfeiting assistance to many groups active in the city.

**S/REL TO USA, MCFI** Ramadi Attacks Grow More Sophisticated: Over 150 increasingly sophisticated attacks against the Coalition and its supporters occurred from January through March. Insurgents in Ramadi tended to carry out more complex attacks than in the smaller towns. Daisy-chained IEDs produced more deadly explosions. Ramadi was often the site of innovative techniques, among them the placement of IEDs in dead animals.

(U) Even with these attacks, Ramadi’s streets were generally more secure than Fallujah’s. Coalition forces patrolled actively. Reconstruction efforts proceeded, with rehabilitation of schools, water treatment facilities, irrigation systems, and bridges. Unemployment was at 30% in Ramadi, in contrast to 40-60% throughout Anbar during the same period.

(U) Meanwhile, the Coalition worked to establish institutions that could govern both the city and the province. In January 2004, a 400-member conference of experts, notables, and professionals met at the Government Headquarters of Anbar Province in Ramadi. Conference committees organized caucuses and elections. Those with criminal records and senior members of the Ba’ath Party and IIS were ineligible. Press reports noted the debate regarding the status of former Ba’athists. The caucus system also generated friction between opposing factions and left some Anbaris feeling excluded. In the end, the caucuses selected the council, with Ali Mukhlif al-Assafi as head of council administration. The new council had one woman member (selected by the women’s conference) and a broad swath of men from across Anbari society. Members included tribal chiefs, businessmen, clergy, engineers, health and education sector workers, lawyers, laborers, and a former soldier in the Iraqi army. The IIP, Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and the Anbar National Congress (ANC) were all represented in the council, as were ten tribal leaders.

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36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 [ | Military | MCFI: 02JANMCFI | 20040102 | (S/NE) | ] ; MCFI: 06 FEBMCFI | 20040206 | (S/NE) | ] ;
[ | Military | 28 FEB MCFI | 20040228 | (S/NE) | ] ;
39 [ | Military | 03JANMCFI | 20040103 | (S/NE) | ] ; [ | Military | 18JAN REL 4 EYES | (S/NE) | ] ;
[ | Military | 20JANNOFORN | (S/NE) | ] ; [ | Military | 12 FEBMCFI | (S/NE) | ] ;
[ | Military | 28 FEB MCFI | (S/NE) | ] ; [ | Military | 21FEBMCFI | (S/NE) | ] ;
40 [ | Military | 18JAN REL 4 EYES | 20040118 | (S/NE) | ] ; [ | 21JANREL 4 EYES | 20040121 | (S/NE) | ]
Insurgent Reorientation and Reconciliation (January – March)

Further FRL Splintering

(S/REL TO MCEF) It would be a mistake to assume with the capture of Saddam Hussein that the remaining Ba’athist leaders immediately gave up. Despite the splintering of the Hizb al-‘Awdah infrastructure, FRL leaders still regarded themselves as the best-organized insurgents. They believed they were the ones most likely to triumph against the Coalition. In the absence of Saddam’s cult of personality, FRL propaganda reminded members of the 1960s, when the Party had to operate as a clandestine organization prior to rising up and seizing control of the country. Despite their efforts, the FRLs faltered. They were unable to re-establish the organization that had been in place during the fall of 2003. In fighting, factionalization, and a steady stream of defections by Ba’athists to stronger and more active FREL and SRE insurgent groups continued to diminish FREL in Anbar and across Iraq.42

(S/REL TO MCEF) The decline of FRL influence in Anbar represented a major success for Coalition counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts. Through targeting of FRL leaders, facilitators, and financiers, the Coalition successfully disrupted their ability to organize and conduct attacks. Moreover, COIN efforts degraded FRL facilitation of allied groups in the province. The decline of the Ba’athist FRLs prompted a major restructuring of the insurgency. Many key individuals who had previously been active with FRLs joined or allied with FREL or SRE organizations. In many cases, the 1993 Faith Campaign (see Chapter 2) that Saddam engineered in order to bolster his rule appears in the case of Anbar to have worked entirely too well. Over the course of 2004, many Anbari FRLs and FRELs found Sunni Arab nationalism or the religious appeal of the international jihad movement more attractive as an organizing principle than the socialist and pan-Arab ideology of the Ba’ath Party.

Anbar SREs and Al Qaeda

(S/NF) The Beginnings of Zarqawi and JTJ: As the influence of FRL groups declined in Anbar at the beginning of 2004, other insurgent groups – particularly those with an Islamist outlook – capitalized on that decline to improve their position. As noted in Chapter 3, a number of Al Qaeda operatives, associates, and allied terrorist organizations were active in Iraq in 2003, with Zarqawi’s JTJ the largest single group. While JTJ was responsible for a number of spectacular terrorist attacks in 2003, perhaps as many as twenty-five suicide bombings, the group had only a small presence inside Iraq. They spent most of the year forging alliances and building coalitions with the assistance of SRE and FREL insurgent organizations.

(S/NF) Merger Talks: In late 2003, senior Al Qaeda leader Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi apparently met with Zarqawi, possibly in Fallujah, to discuss a direct merger between JTJ and Al Qaeda. Zarqawi
apparently thought this meant he was being offered overall command of the jihad in Iraq. In response to al-Iraqi’s request for a detailed war plan for the Iraqi insurgency, Zarqawi wrote a 17-page letter meant for the global Al Qaeda leadership. He entrusted the letter to Hassan Ghul, an associate of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who served as the primary liaison between JTJ and Al Qaeda senior leadership. Ghul had come to Iraq with the intention of expanding Al Qaeda presence in the country.

(U) ABDUL HADI AL-IRAQI. A member of the Al Qaeda leadership and trusted lieutenant of Osama bin Laden, al-Iraqi serves as the emissary and public face of the Al Qaeda shura majlis (ruling council) to Zarqawi and other Islamist leaders of the Iraqi insurgency.

(U) In January 2003 Hassan Ghul was captured near the town of Kalar by Kurdish peshmerga with Zarqawi’s letter in his possession. Another copy was discovered on a compact disc recovered from a Zarqawi safe house in Baghdad. It appears, however, that his message eventually reached Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi and the rest of Al Qaeda’s senior leadership.

(S/NF) Zarqawi’s Plan for Sectarian War: Zarqawi’s letter to Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi reveals much about the state of JTJ in early 2004. According to Zarqawi, JTJ had found it difficult to create a base inside Iraq to train new recruits. It was also hesitant to issue a general call to arms since Iraq has “no mountains to seek refuge or forests in which to hide.” Zarqawi also complained that the Iraqi population “will give … refuge” to JTJ fighters, but that they “will not allow you to make their home a safe house.”

(U) Despite these limitations, Zarqawi stated that JTJ had been involved in “overseeing, preparing, and planning” as many as twenty-five suicide bombings throughout Iraq in 2003. Although he agreed that the United States, the Kurdish factions, and the Iraqi security forces were enemies, Zarqawi argued that it was most important to target Shi’a religious, political, and military symbols. This would incite an Iraqi civil war that would force the Sunni population to side with him and keep the Coalition from taking over the country.

(U) No Civil War Yet: Zarqawi’s plans to mount a sectarian war in Iraq were initially rejected. According to a May 2005 letter by second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda (a Sunni organization) leadership believed a sectarian war in Iraq would antagonize Iran (a Shi’a country). This was not desired at a time where Al Qaeda sought Iran’s cooperation against the U.S. Atiyat al-Jaziri, another senior Al Qaeda leader, provided an alternate justification. In a December 2005 letter, he reminded Zarqawi how disastrous the fighting in Algeria had been for the Al Qaeda associated groups Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching (Call) and Combat (GSPC). During the 1990s, the GIA massacred tens of thousands of Algerian civilians, which drove a majority of the population into the arms of the government to the detriment of the Islamists.

(U) According to a Zarqawi statement released in October 2004, JTJ and the Al Qaeda leadership conducted extensive negotiations in the period between Hassan Ghul’s capture in January and September 2004. They finally reached an understanding. The primary issue was Al Qaeda’s...
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insistence that its associated groups adhere to two rules: maintain an anti-U.S. focus and not worsen
intra-Islamic disputes until after the U.S. was defeated. By September, they reached agreement
concerning the second rule. Zarqawi’s desire to gain bin Ladin’s blessing for JTJ was not merely
symbolic. It meant access to Al Qaeda’s global network of resources, personnel, propaganda, and
financing.

(S/NF) Zarqawi and Umar Hadid While negotiations with Al Qaeda leadership were taking place,
JTJ expanded its activities in Fallujah and Ramadi. Although often characterized as foreign terrorists,
by 2004 JTJ had recruited enough Iraqi members they now represented a majority of the
organization’s rank-and-file members.49 While foreign fighters constituted most of JTJ’s leadership,
Iraqi jihadiis also held senior positions within the organization. In addition to Thamir Mubarak
Atroun (mentioned in Chapter 3), by early 2004 Umar Husayn Hadid al-Khurayyfwi al-Mahamdi
(Umar Hadid) had become one of Zarqawi’s most trusted lieutenants and facilitators in the Fallujah
area.44 This allowed Zarqawi to recruit Iraqis into his organization by exploiting mosque
connections, family ties, and tribal rifts (in addition to his ruthless command style and robust
international support).

(S/NF) The Golden Chain: The activities of JTJ and other Al Qaeda groups in Anbar were aided
by the financial support they received from members of the Golden Chain. The Golden Chain is a
global network of radical Islamist businesses, financiers, clerical organizations, and NGOs who
support Al Qaeda and associated jihadiis movements. Drawing on supporters from Saudi Arabia
(Sulayman al-Alwani), the UAE (Salim al-Shamsi) to Jordan (Jamal al-Basha), the UK (Muhammad
bin Suri) and the U.S. (Luqman Aleem), these individuals channeled large amounts of money to
JTJ and similar organizations in Anbar and throughout Iraq.45 International Islamist organizations
including Hizb al-Tahrir and the International Muslim Brotherhood also raised money for jihadiis
groups active in Iraq.46

(S/NF) The Iraqi Salafists: Early 2004 saw an increasing Islamization in the insurgency. Existing
Iraqi SRE organizations, and in particular Salafist groups, moved to exploit the power vacuum in
Anbar left by Saddam Hussein’s capture and the decline of the more political and nationalist FRLs.
The two earliest manifestations are the rise of Mahdi Sumaydi’s Salafi Jihad organization and the
Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi Network (see Index of Insurgent groups). Both used or infiltrated
existing Sunni religious and political organizations such as AMS and IIP in order to recruit fighters
to carry out anti-Coalition attacks.47

49 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 [Military | OIA SF 2004-30052 | S/NF | ]
These Salafist groups formed in 2003. They had operated primarily as clandestine organizations and hadn’t taken an active role in conducting attacks on Coalition forces. Salafi Jihad was the larger of the two, with an estimated 3,000 followers in Kirkuk, Baghdad, Mosul, and Fallujah. Following the January 2004 detention of Mahdi Sumaydi, Salafi Jihad's military leader Abd al-Jabbar al-Habuth al-Saidi (Abu Rukia) took control of the group, allying it closely with Jaysh Mohammed and Zarqawi. Abu Mohammad al-Adnani's Secret Islamic Army formed as a result of the latter alliance. Secret Islamic Army acted as an umbrella organization to facilitate cooperation between Salafi Jihad and Zarqawi.

(U) MAHDI SUMAYDI. The self-proclaimed “Amir al-Salafi” in Iraq, Sumaydi founded the Taimil al-Qur'an Salafist secret society in the al-Yusufiyah neighborhood of Baghdad in early 2001. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, he formed the Salafi Jihad organization to fight the Coalition and was detained as a result from January to November 2004.

(S/NF) ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-NAQSHBANDI. An Iraqi Salafist leader, he issued a fatwa in October 2003 calling for jihad against Coalition forces. He married the widow of a Naqshbandi Sufi leader and adopted her name in order to conceal his Salafist views. He operated throughout Anbar and served as one of the most prominent Iraqi Salafist leaders within the insurgency in early 2004.

(S/NF) Salafi Jihad's greatest asset in Anbar lay in the ability to use Sumaydi's name and self-declared title. This title, Amir al-Salafi (“Commander of the Salafi”), helped attract funding from Salafist movements in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Morocco, and Egypt. Salafi Jihad also received funding from Lebanon-based Al Qaeda leader Muhammad Salim and even the Secretary General of the Arab Nationalist Movement in Lebanon, Ma'an Basheir. This foreign funding enabled Salafi Jihad to enhance its influence in Anbar far beyond its actual size by actively financing a variety of FRE and SRE groups.

(S/NF) Networks: As with Salafi Jihad, the Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi Network was also aligned with Jaysh Mohammed and other FRE organizations. Believed to possess up to 1,000 members, Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi Network was made up largely of former Iraqi soldiers and intelligence officials who had made a sincere conversion to Salafism following the fall of the Iraqi regime. Adil al-Hathibi, an associate of AMS leader Harith al-Dhari, served as head of the organization’s military wing. He was one of the main organizers of Earthquake. This operation, which was planned for December 2003 but not executed, was to involve a massive, coordinated FRE and FRL attack against Coalition forces. This is significant, as it further demonstrates the

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. The attack failed to occur.
degree of cooperation and cohesion that already existed between FRL, FRE, and SRE groups following the capture of Saddam, a trend that would only intensify throughout 2004.

**The Consolidation of FREs**

(S/NE) Larger FRE organizations such as Jaysh Muhammad and its Saraya al-Jihad subsidiary group had already been active in Anbar at the provincial level in 2003 (as “false flag” FRL/FRE organizations that used religious rhetoric to gain popular support).

(U) **A “FALSE FLAG” OPERATION** is one where a person or organization pretends to be something else, to cover its real identity and/or to create an appeal or blame based on different motivations. False flag operations are also used to enlist persons to learn their political or religious orientation.

(S/NE) By 2004 these groups abandoned their earlier allegiance to Sunni Arab nationalism. Though Anbar was not a hotbed of wahabism, the religious rhetoric, adopted by IIS mid-level officers as a means to enlist Anbaris, was slowly embraced by many insurgents at nearly every level. As its more secular leaders were detained or killed by the Coalition’s attacks in early 2004, Jaysh Mohammed expanded its existing alliance with Iraqi Salafist insurgent groups led by Mahdi Sumaydi and Sheikh Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi. These alliances radicalized Jaysh Mohammed (JM) and Saraya al-Jihad (SAJ), leading to their gradual adoption of a religious-extremist agenda and sectarian worldview during 2004 was unthinkable earlier.

(S/NE) **The Saraya al-Jihad Group**: For Saraya al-Jihad this radicalization happened quickly as it adopted a variant of Al Qaeda’s global jihad worldview. Its rapid radicalization can be explained in two ways: 1) it maintained formal and informal cooperation with several radical groups and 2) its Mosul-based leader Abu Haditha fell under the influence of Ansar al-Sunna and JTJ in early 2004.

(U) **AL QAEDA'S GLOBAL JIHAD**: Before 2001, most jihadist groups were motivated by a belief in jihad aimed at overthrowing local leaders, killing local Shi’a or other “apostates,” expelling occupiers of Islamic lands, and/or creating an Islamic state in their own country. In the early 1990s, Al Qaeda’s leadership argued that the United States should be the sole focus of jihad, because it was the source of all evil in the world (the “greater unbelief”) and because expelling it from Islamic lands was the easiest way to accomplish the other objectives of jihadist groups around the world. Since 2001, Al Qaeda has worked to unite other jihadist groups in this global jihad against the United States.

(S/NE) Though originally set up as a subsidiary of Jaysh Mohammed (a nationalist jihadist organization), SAJ’s key individuals had pre-OIF ties to Al Qaeda and Ansar al-Sunna’s parent organization Ansar al-Islam (AI).

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56 [ | Military | CJSOTF: INTSUMS: ORGANIZATIONS WITH IRAQ: KEY REPORTING | 2003 0527 to 17 July 20030717 ] | (S/NE) | ]; [ | Military | JISE: 318-230-0329 | (S/NE) ]
57 [ | Military | OIA SF 2004-30052 | (S/NE) ]
58 [ | Military | OIA SF 2004-30002 | (S/NE) ]
59 [ | Military | JITF-CT: ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI NETWORK: MOSUL, IZ NETWORK PRESENCE | 20050107 | (S/NE) ]
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(S/REL TO MCFD) ANSAR AL-SUNNA AND ANSAR AL-ISLAM: After the defeat of Ansar al-Islam in 2003, the survivors of the group who escaped into Iran split into several organizations, the largest of which joined Abu Abdullah al-Shafei to form Ansar al-Sunna. While Ansar al-Sunna cooperated with J Tiffany and later AQI, al-Shafei blamed Zarqawi for the loss of Ansar al-Islam’s base in northern Iraq and refused to accept his authority, sending his own report to the Al Qaeda leadership that were heavily critical of Zarqawi.

(S/NF) The 1920 Revolution Brigade: Other FREs grew from small local organizations in 2003 to major players in 2004. The best example is the 1920 Revolution Brigade (Kata’ib Thawrat al-Ishrin). The 1920 Revolution Brigade was formed in July 2003 by Sheikh Muhammad al-Kubaysi (known within the group as Sheikh Abu al-Habib al-Dhahiri) and his aides General Hamid Sha‘ban and Major General Hamid Mahmud al-Abid. They formed the 1920 Revolution Brigade in response to a fatwa issued in the summer of 2003 by AMS leader Harith al-Dhari. This fatwa called for the Zobai tribe and the Sunni Arab al-Jibir areas of Nineveh, Diyala, and Anbar to form an umbrella Sunni insurgent organization to fight the Coalition. By early 2004, the 1920 Revolution Brigade was still organized along tribal lines, but it had become a national organization, with five regional commands across Iraq. Each region was reportedly led by a former colonel answering to a leadership council of twenty-five tribal leaders. Using the National Islamic Resistance as its political wing and the Islamic Response Movement as its internal security wing, the 1920 Revolution Brigade had established itself in the Fallujah and Ramadi areas of Anbar by early 2004 and formed a loose tactical alliance with J Tiffany for their mutual benefit.

(S/NF) The Islamic Army of Iraq: Another major group to emerge in early 2004 was the Islamic Army of Iraq. Islamic Army of Iraq was an umbrella organization for local and regional FRE groups such as the Khaled bin Walid Corps and the Mujahideen Brigades. The group gained a great deal of notoriety in Anbar by kidnapping foreign nationals and contractors. They either killed their captives for political reasons or ransomed them for large sums of money that could be used to support the insurgency.

Further Islamization of the Insurgency

(S/REL TO MCFD) The movement toward Islam was part of a larger phenomenon. Saddam’s capture, the discrediting of Ba‘athist secular and nationalist ideology, effects of the Faith Campaign, and an influx of Wahhabist Salafist preachers resulted in changing motivations, with an Islamization and radicalism expressed in six different ways:

1. Implementation of sbar ‘a, especially the badd punishments;

60 [ Military ] US CENTRAL COMMAND: 1920 REVOLUTION BRIGADE (KATA’IB THAWRAT AL ISHRIN) | 20060911 | (S/NF) |
61 Ibid.
62 [ Military ] DIIR IMEF THT204 0002 05 | (S/NF) |
63 Date based on interview with (b)(3), (b)(6)
64 [ Military ] MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR: INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | Slides 88-9 (No sources listed.)
65 Ibid.

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(U) **HADD (PL. HUDUD)** literally, “limits,” are the punishments specified in the Qur’an for five different sins: adultery (execution or beating), apostasy (execution), stealing (cutting off of the left hand), murder (beheading) and intoxication (beating). Jihadists as well as radical Islamists believe that the *hadd* must be applied in order to practice Islam correctly.

2. Inclusion of clergy in insurgent leadership and decision-making (through the issuing of fatwas that the groups saw as binding);
3. New emphasis on creating an Islamic state (the Caliphate);
4. Establishment of a shura council;
5. Creation of committees to promote virtue and prevent vice;
6. Belief in a Jewish-led American global conspiracy against Islam and the need to defeat it in Iraq through jihad.

(S/NF) By early 2004, a plurality of the 57 verified insurgent groups active in Anbar (including many FRE organizations), had not only adopted Islamic rhetoric but had become at least to some degree Islamist. While this did not immediately translate into support for the more radical positions of Salafism or Zarqawi’s agenda, it did make many insurgent groups and rank-and-file insurgents more likely to accept these positions as legitimate.

(S/NF) The “Islamization” of the insurgency coincided with the rise of Salafist clerics such as Mahdi Sumaydi and Sheikh Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi, in addition to AMS. They provided ideological, and in some cases operational, leadership for insurgent groups. Previously, prominent to mid-level political and military officials from the former regime filled such positions. In 2003, pro-insurgent members of Anbar’s Sunni clergy limited their support to sermons and other public statements. By early 2004, some insurgent organizations enlisted Salafist and other Islamist clerics to assist them in finding religious justifications for their actions and to help in an active operational capacity. This involvement did not reflect the majority of Anbari clerics. Most were "on the fence" regarding whether or not to actively support the insurgency.

(U) The Islamization of the Iraqi insurgency should not be confused with an adoption or acceptance of Al Qaeda’s ideology. Insurgents came to view their activities from an Islamist (rather than nationalist) perspective. They saw supporters of the Coalition as apostates instead of collaborators. They viewed the Shi’a as heretics. And, they believed the Coalition’s actions occurred within the
context of a global conspiracy against Islam. However, in an overwhelming majority of cases, this did not translate into support for Al Qaeda or its tactics (particularly the use of suicide bombers) or Zarqawi’s strategy to trigger sectarian war and eradicate the Shi’a. Even within Al Qaeda, Zarqawi was regarded as an extremist and sectarian. This became an issue of contention and negotiation between Zarqawi and the Al Qaeda leadership when he sought to serve as their representative in Iraq.

Snapshot: The Insurgency January-March 2004

(S/NF) During early 2004, there was far more religious content in the insurgency’s propaganda and motivation. The once clear lines between Arab nationalist and Salafist or Wahhabi groups began to blur. With the splintering of FRL organizations that followed the capture of Saddam Hussein, many former FRLs joined or supported new groups with Islamic or even Islamist ideologies (such as the Islamic Army of Iraq). Other FRL groups, such as those loyal to Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, began providing support to "mixed" FRE/SRE groups. FRE groups like the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh Muhammad also became more religious in their propaganda and justifications for attacks.

(U) The emergence of JTJ and Zarqawi as major players in the insurgency underlined this turn toward a more extremist Islamist agenda. Although he had only carried out a few spectacular attacks, Zarqawi’s anti-Shi’a orientation found wide appeal in Anbar. Like Zarqawi, the province had always viewed the Shi’a with suspicion and disdain. Zarqawi’s negotiations with Al Qaeda would soon yield an agreement that would allow funding and support from the global jihad to flow freely to JTJ with two signification consequences. First, Iraq became a central part of Al Qaeda’s strategic vision. Second, Zarqawi’s targeting of the Shi’a became associated with Al Qaeda, leading eventually to a tarnishing of Bin Ladin’s image in the Islamic world because he was seen as killing other Muslims (whereas he desires to be seen as defending Muslims against the ‘evil’ West).

(U) Anbar seemed quiet during this period with fewer attacks against the Coalition. The decrease in attacks can mostly be explained by a lowered Coalition presence and the withdrawal of the 82nd Airborne Division to bases outside the cities.

(U) Reconstruction and stabilization efforts progressed. Still, the continuing violence in Ramadi and Fallujah indicated that all was not well in this Sunni stronghold. In retrospect, the rapidly changing nature of the insurgency makes clear that the quiet on the surface hid the action taking place below.

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Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE (March - April 2004)

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Fallujah was experiencing a high degree of violence and intimidation. By the end of 2003, the insurgency had developed into a sophisticated network of groups, adept at raising money, recruiting young men, training would-be jihadis, and carrying out attacks against the Coalition. Numerous arms dealers made it easy for insurgents to acquire weapons. Moreover, the many FRE explosives experts continued to refine their techniques.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The result was a series of attacks on the Coalition as well as everyday violence that escalated throughout early 2004. On January 6, two French nationals were shot and killed after their car broke down in Fallujah. This was followed on February 12 by an attack on the convoy carrying General John Abizaid. Two days later an organized raid by twenty-five insurgents on a police station killed twenty-three Iraqis who collaborated with the Coalition. The first three months of 2004 saw IED attacks of new sophistication, including increased use of remote detonation (especially with cell phones), concealment in concrete or trash, the inclusion of shrapnel with the explosives, and secondary charges.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Insurgents also began to impose their religious ideas on the citizens of Fallujah. They insisted everyone follow their version of Islamic law (shari'a), punishing people who refused to comply. Thus there would be no pornography, alcohol, smoking, or modest dress by women or long hair for men. Those who violated these norms were publicly beaten or even killed. Businessmen and merchants received threats if they did not provide basic staples at a “fair” price. These were not idle threats. Businesses that violated the new rules were vandalized or destroyed.

Prelude to Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE

(S/NE) Death of Blackwater Contractors: The surge in violence reached a tipping point on March 31, 2004. Albu Eissa tribesmen from the Islamic Army of Iraq murdered four American Blackwater contractors. International TV (with sources among the insurgents) broadcast video images of their bodies being burnt and mutilated. As noted in Chapter 3, following the detention of Sheikh Barakat Albu Eissa in September 2003, his followers had threatened to target Coalition contractors in Fallujah. This attack made good on that threat. In response to the attack, the Coalition initiated Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. The operation’s mission was to deny the insurgency a sanctuary in Fallujah and apprehend those responsible for the murder of American civilians.

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67 [ ] Open Source | All taken from the Guardian |
69 [ ] Military | 09JANMCFI | 2004 0109 | (S/NE) |
69 [ ] Military | 14JANMCFI | 2004 0113 | (S/NE) |
69 [ ] Military | 15FEBNOFORN | 2004 0115 | (S/NE) |
69 [ ] Military | DIIR IMEF HET05 0195 05 |
70 [ ] Military | IMEF HET05: DIIR 0195 05 | (S/NE) |
71 [ ] Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR: INSURGENCY GROUPS |
72 [ ] Open Source | INTERVIEW: | 3, 6 | US ARMY, TRIBAL ADVISOR TO CPA | 200610xx | (U) |

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(S/NF) The Coalition faced groups spanning the full range of the insurgency, from Al Qaeda to SRE, FRE, and FRL organizations. The ease with which these groups were able to operate in Fallujah was due to cooperation with local tribesmen. Tribesmen were generally anti-Coalition in outlook and supportive of the insurgency, though they preferred that violence not affect their own territory. The Ba'athist and IIS remnants of Khamis Saghir's network were also active in the city and receiving financial support from the surviving members of Saddam's inner circle.

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Three Insurgent Groups in Fallujah: There were, in fact, three large insurgent networks in Fallujah in April 2003. They were:

- FREs and Hizb al-'Awda members from Khamis Saghir's organization. This network included former Ba'athists, soldiers, and IIS officers led by Fallujah Ba'ath Party leader Nuri Zbar al-Munajjat.
- SRE Yasin Hamudi Asaf Group. This network included Fallujah Islamist working closely with foreign fighters in the city.
- The third and largest network was an FRE group led by Brigadier General Ali Dawud Sulayman Nayif al-Khalifawi, who maintained ties to Zarqawi and Sheikh Abdullah Janabi.

(S/NF) While it would be a mistake to regard any one individual as being the center of the Fallujah insurgency, Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi had assumed the role of general organizer and coordinator. In this role, he drew on his connections to Al Qaeda, [T], Ansar al-Sunnah, AMS, Jaysh Mohammed, and less prominent FRE and SRE insurgent groups in the city. Janabi (aided by his lieutenant Daif al-Ubaydi al-Baqiri, better known as Sheikh Daif) played the most prominent role in Fallujah. Janabi's prominence continued as he later became, in a sense, the grey eminence within the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura serving as its political face.

The Battle

(S/REL TO USA, MCF) Following the brutal murder of four Coalition contractors by the Fallujah insurgents, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, and CPA Ambassador Paul Bremer decided that a military response was needed to deny the

73 Ibid.
74 [ ] Military | IRAQ: POWER VACUUM AIDED INSURGENTS IN AL FALLUJAH | 20040402 | (S/NF) |
75 [ ] Military | OIA SF 2004-30007 | (S/NF) |
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 [ ] Military | SHEIKH ABDULLAH AL JABIRI - BST RALEIGH HVT #2 | 20040601 | (S/NF) |
79 Ibid.
80 [ ] Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH | 200404xx | (S/NF) |

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insurgents a sanctuary and to arrest those responsible for the murder of civilian contractors. On April 4, elements of the I MEF launched their offensive into the city. Operation VIGILANTE RESOLVE had begun.

(U) Prior to the beginning of VIGILANTE RESOLVE, RCT-1 of the First Marine Division set up a traffic control cordon around Fallujah to isolate the city's insurgent forces and prevent their escape. While food and medical supplies were allowed into the city, only women, children, and old men were allowed to leave. Other Coalition units conducted operations in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Karmah, and northern Babil to prevent outside insurgent groups from aiding Fallujah. Civilians were repeatedly warned to evacuate the city.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Marine Units Attack: On April 4th, the attack began. 2,000 troops, mostly infantry, from two battalion task forces from RCT-1 assaulted Fallujah. They were supported by ten M1A1 tanks, twenty-four AAVP-7 amphibious tractors, and a battery of M198 howitzers. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1) attacked the Jolan district. 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (1/5) attacked the industrial Shuhidah district. The Coalition plan was to trap the insurgent force between these two pincers. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment (2/2) provided a screening force to the south. On April 13, 4th Light Armored Infantry Battalion attacked from the west. Air support included Marine Corps rotary-wing aircraft and AC-130s (particularly feared by the insurgents, with the mere appearance of AC-130s discouraging most of their movement at night).

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Roughly 2,000 Iraqi soldiers and police were deployed in support. Many, however, deserted soon after the fighting began. This forced some Marine units to reposition to maintain the cordon around the city. For instance, of 700 Iraqi soldiers from the 2nd New Iraqi Army Battalion, 38% deserted after coming under fire on April 5 while moving to Fallujah. An exception was the 400 Iraqis from the 36th Iraqi National Guard Battalion that together with seventeen Special Forces advisors took part in the fighting in Jolan.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) After two days of fighting, 2/1 had penetrated into northeastern Jolan and 1/5 had seized a stronghold in the southeastern Shuhidah district that would serve as a staging ground for patrols deeper into Fallujah. These patrols began to push up against the south side of Highway 10 almost immediately.

Insurgent Strength in Fallujah

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The enemy was, on the surface at least, an impressive one. Insurgent forces in Fallujah numbered 500-1,000. They possessed small arms, RPGs, machine guns, IEDs, and mortars. Operating in small teams and conducting hit-and-run attacks, insurgents moved from building to building as they fell back on pre-positioned weapon and supply caches. In addition, insurgents had hardened certain areas of the city with barriers, dug-in positions and traps designed to kill Coalition forces as they advanced.

(S/NF) Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi served as de facto commander of the Fallujah insurgents. He, along with fellow cleric Dafir al-Ubaydi, spent the battle encouraging residents to fight. Zarqawi
personally oversaw the defense of 5-10% of the city with one hundred foreign fighters while his
deputy Umar Hadid led the Iraqi JTJ fighters in the city. Other insurgent leaders active in Fallujah
were former Republican Guard (RG) or Special Republican Guard (SRG) commanders, Islamic
Army of Iraq leaders, and prominent members of the Mohamdi tribe.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Some higher-ranking insurgent leaders, financiers, and facilitators fled
Fallujah prior to the attack, leaving lower-level figures to conduct the fighting.

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Mosques served as local insurgent command centers with the
al-Hadhra al-Muhammediya mosque the primary command and control center for Janabi and his
followers. In most cases, the city's defenses were organized by armed groups of young men tied to
local mosques.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) There was no city-wide central command responsible for coordinating the
activities of Fallujah’s fighters. While an organization akin to the later Fallujah Mujahideen Shura
existed, it was still informal and ill-defined. A limited amount of operational planning – such as
assigning defensive zones to major groups, setting up observation posts, and pre-registering mortars
– took place. Once the fighting began, command and control became chaotic and decentralized with
many insurgent cells acting autonomously.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Yet it would be false to claim that no command and control existed.
Some cells had a clear chain of command, issued written orders, set up observation points, and used
organized scouts on motorcycles. Others simply ran towards the nearest sounds of fighting, relying
on smoke and fire as reference points for their RPGs and machine guns.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The insurgents generally employed a dispersed, nonlinear defense in
depth, although there were some tactical advances by small mobile combat cells. These mobile
combat cells carried out hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and standoff attacks using mortars and
IEDs. They did not attempt to defend, nor did the Marines attempt to clear every house in a given
area. Most insurgents moved in groups of 5-10 as they ran forward, opened fire, and then retreated
back into the alleys.

External Support for Fallujah Insurgents

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The Fallujah insurgents were not acting alone. They received support
from other networks in Ramadi, Saqlawiyah, Amariyah, and Karmah. As a result, when VIGILANT
RESOLVE began, allied insurgents attempted to surge their activities to stretch Coalition forces.
They hoped this would allow Fallujah's insurgents to hold their ground. These allied insurgents set
up roadblocks, IEDs, and ambushes along key Coalition lines of communication with the intent of
interdicting supply convoys and patrols. They also attempted to destroy key bridges, including the
Thar Thar canal crossing.

(S) Anbar was no longer the quiet province of January through March 2004. Fighting also took place
in Husaybah, which like Fallujah had served as an insurgent staging area prior to the beginning of
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VIGILANT RESOLVE. During this fighting, the Coalition clashed with the entire pro-insurgent Husaybah police department.81

(S/NF) The fighting in Anbar included large-scale attacks. Some numbered more than one hundred fighters, including those mounted by FREs and Ansar al-Sunna in Ramadi, Qusaybah, and Karmah. Insurgents apparently used the fighting in Fallujah as their model.82

(S/NF) Al-Qa’im-based Omar al-Mukhtar leader Juma Hamid Khalaf al-Mahalawi traveled to Ramadi with 40-60 fighters to support the Fallujah insurgents.83 Other leaders in al-Qa’im, Mosul, Kirkuk, Tarmiyah, Tikrit, Sharqat, and Hillah all sent fighters and supplies to Fallujah.84

(S/NF) Shi’a Support for Sunnis in Fallujah: The Coalition attack on Fallujah stimulated Shi’a support for the Anbari Sunnis. Even Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army provided support. By early April 2004, liaison had been established between the Fallujah insurgents and the Mahdi Army. This offered a loose framework for cooperation despite the obvious sectarian differences.85 In mid-April, Sadr sent weapons, supplies, and even some fighters to Fallujah under the cover of providing humanitarian aid.86

Political Pressure and the End of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE85

(U) Political pressure for a halt to Coalition military operations in Fallujah swiftly built. Key reasons included the following:

- Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army began attacking Coalition forces on April 2
- The closure of his Harka newspaper and arrest of a top aide
- Al-Sadr’s uprising put added pressure on the Coalition

81 Carter Malkasian, I MEF Operations in Iraq, March – April 2004, 20040822
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.

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Cooperating insurgent cells began escalating attacks in other parts of Anbar, particularly in Ramadi where 12 Marines were killed on April 6 alone.

There was pressure from the British government for a halt to the attack on Fallujah.

The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal became public knowledge in late April 2004, causing widespread anger against the U.S. throughout the Arab and Muslim world.

Al-Jazeera claimed 600 Iraqi civilians had been killed by the Coalition in Fallujah, broadcasting images of dead children across the Arab world.

The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) began to unravel. Three members quit and five threatened to quit. This prompted an April 8 meeting with Ambassador Bremer to discuss Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. Sunni politicians considered the attack on Fallujah to be collective punishment and argued that mass demonstrations were about to occur.

(U) As a result of this pressure, on April 9 the CPA prevailed on General Abizaid to order a halt to offensive ground operations in Fallujah. Despite this, fighting in the city continued, with occasional lulls in the fighting. Although insurgents remained in their defensive positions and did not launch head-on assaults, insurgent mortar attacks remained common, as did minor Coalition maneuvers. Air strikes continued and snipers on both sides made movement through the city hazardous.

(U) Over the next several weeks, Fallujah sheikhs loyal to Harith al-Dhari's AMS and other local leaders met with CPA, IGC and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) representatives to negotiate conditions for a permanent cease-fire. The U.S. National Command Authority pressed for options other than a return to fighting. On April 30, I MEF and CJTF 4 held their operations and turned control over to the newly-created Fallujah Brigade. Commanded by former Ba'athist officers, the brigade was a Sunni militia consisting primarily of "former" insurgents. Its effect on the security situation in Fallujah was minimal.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) After twenty-six days of fighting in Fallujah, eighteen Marines were dead and ninety-six wounded. I MEF estimated 600-700 insurgents were killed and an unknown number wounded. In addition, 150 air strikes had destroyed seventy-five buildings including two mosques.

Aftermath of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE (May 2004)

(S/NF) In the aftermath, insurgent networks and organizations based in Fallujah gained prestige and influence in Anbar. In both internal correspondence and public propaganda, insurgent leaders believed they had defeated the Coalition through their superior resolve. They also believed Fallujah's example could be replicated throughout the province.²⁹

(S/NF) Renewed insurgent cooperation soon followed across much of Anbar. Many smaller organizations merged into larger groups or umbrella organizations. The intent was to reduce.

²⁹ [ | (b)(2)50 USC 3507 | IRAQ: MORE INSURGENT ATTACKS ON URBAN AREAS, BASES | 20040518 | (S/NF) | ]

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infighting and conflicting goals. An example of this can be seen in the creation of the Fallujah Resistance Brigade (different organization than the above mentioned Fallujah Brigade), which combined the 1920 Revolution Brigade, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin Brigades, and the Jihad Brigades of Imam Ali bin Abi Taleb into a single organization.

The Fallujah Mujahideen Shura (FMS)

Efforts to reduce internal conflict and improve command and control led to the formation of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura. Fallujah Mujahideen Shura improved the organization and coordination of insurgent groups not only in Fallujah but across Anbar. The Fallujah Mujahideen Shura had no clearly identified leader. Instead it relied on the consensus of various insurgent leaders. The absence of a single leader enabled the most extreme elements of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, such as JTJ, to further radicalize the rest of the Fallujah insurgency and turn the city into a magnet for foreign fighters.

(U) **IJMA’** (CONSENSUS). For many Islamic cultures consensus is seen as the best way to determine correct action while minimizing conflict within the community. In Islamic law, the *ijma* of the ‘ulama’ is one of the traditional methods for interpreting the Qur'an and hadith and thus for establishing the tenets of Islamic law and norms for pious Islamic behavior. Sunnis are more prone to seek consensus among leaders and people; whereas Shi’a tend to rely on their religious hierarchy for guidance. (See Appendix A for more on Sunni-Shi’a differences and similarities.)

(S/NF) The two dominant figures in the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura were Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi and Umar Hadid. Other, less influential members within the city included Zarqawi, Sheikh Dafir al-Ubaydi, Sheikh Jamal Nazzal, Sheikh Barakat Albu Eissa, Sheikh Hikmat al-Muhamdi, Sheikh Khalid Hamud al-Jumayli, Ismail al-Jumayli, General Khalaf al-Ulayan, Dr. Mahmud al-Mashadani, Dr. Fakhri al-Qaysi, Abd al-Nasir, and Colonel Hatim Karim Mandib al-Falahi. Fallujah Mayor Ibrahim Juasi al-Muhamdi had no influence among Fallujah Mujahideen Shura or the general population of the city, who believed him to be a homosexual.
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(S/NF) The FMS's diverse character is evidenced by the 39 insurgent groups active in Fallujah (and represented to some degree by Fallujah Mujahideen Shura). Members ranged from Al Qaeda-affiliated groups (including foreign organizations) and other SREs to FRELs and the remnants of FRLs. Some groups had as few as fifty fighters (MAU). Others had as many as several thousand (MF or JT). Nor were they all Sunni organizations. The names of two (JBIAT and LI) appear to indicate the presence of Shia groups in Fallujah. This may indicate the continued informal cooperation between the Fallujah insurgents and Muqtada al-Sadr. Cooperation was reciprocal: as fighting intensified between al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and Coalition forces in southern Iraq, Fallujah Mujahideen Shura sent heavy arms, ammunition, and fighters from Fallujah, Khalidiyah, and Ramadi to assist al-Sadr's forces in An Najaf.

The Role of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS)

(S/NF) The AMS greatly enhanced its prestige by brokering the ceasefire negotiations in Fallujah. The AMS negotiated with the Iraqi Government and the Coalition, acting as an intermediary. The group's representatives provided and guaranteed safe passage for the Government and Coalition negotiators. This brought AMS closer to its goal of being the Sunni community's main voice in Iraq. Its outspoken opposition to the Coalition appealed to many Anbaris, while the fact it stopped just short of calling for violence enabled AMS to "have its cake and eat it too." AMS successfully exploited Anbari support for the insurgency while not being associated with any of its losses or atrocities. The much smaller Iraqi National Unity Movement (INUM), led by UAE-based insurgent financier Ahmed Kubaysi (to be distinguished from the IIP leader of the same name), gained a lesser degree of prominence through much the same means.

Foreign Fighters

(S/NF) Not all groups active in Fallujah were Iraqi in origin. As many as 75 members of Palestinian HAMAS traveled to Fallujah through Syria in March 2003 to fight the Coalition. They made up the
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core of the Sheikh Ahmed Yassin Brigade (SAYB), named in honor of their group’s founder. Ten of the 35 members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) were active in Fallujah. They served as military advisors to several of the larger insurgent groups. The Algerian Group for Preaching (Call) and Combat (GSPC), whose leader had publicly pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in the fall of 2003, had been sending GSPC and other North African Islamist fighters to Iraq via Syria to support Zarqawi since April 2003. By May 2004, enough of them were active in Fallujah to form their own organization, Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad bil-Maghrib (JTJM). Later, JTJM would remain an Al Qaeda associate group subordinate to Zarqawi, presenting a security threat in North Africa in 2005.

(S/NF) A network of more than fifty professional smugglers, some experienced at circumventing UN sanctions under the former regime, facilitated the arrival of foreign fighters to Iraq and Anbar.

The Fallujah Brigade

(S/NF) During ceasefire negotiations, Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi and Sheikh Dafir al-UBaydi sought to name General Jassim Mohammed Saleh as commander of the Fallujah Brigade. They were upset by the decision to instead name General Mohammed Latif commander because Latif was seen as less amicable to Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi than Saleh. This was due to Saleh’s ties to the insurgency. As the Brigade formed, Janabi met with Saleh and Latif, using his influence in the city to force them to accept the inclusion of 300-350 FNE and SRE insurgents into the 2,100-strong Fallujah Brigade. He also had Fallujah Brigade officers fired if they were not insurgents. After the Brigade’s formal establishment, Janabi informed foreign fighters and other insurgents he would no longer support activities against the Brigade because it was made up of native Fallujahns. General Latif and General Saleh deferred to Janabi. They consulted with him prior to major decisions or activities in the city. On May 24, General Latif relinquished command to General Abdullah al-Muhammadi, who had been Janabi’s second choice to lead the Fallujah Brigade after Saleh.

105 [B3 50 US$ 3507] IRAQ: SOME PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS JOINING INSURGENCY 2004 09 20 (S/NF)
106 Ibid.
107 [B3 50 US$ 3507] IRAQ: ENTRANCED REGIONAL FACILITATORS AIDING JIHADIST TRAVEL 2004 07 10 (S/NF)
108 [B3 50 US$ 3507] IRAQ: ENTRANCED REGIONAL FACILITATORS AIDING JIHADIST TRAVEL 2004 07 10 (S/NF)
109 [B3 50 US$ 3507] IRAQ: ENTRANCED REGIONAL FACILITATORS AIDING JIHADIST TRAVEL 2004 07 10 (S/NF)
110 [B3 50 US$ 3507] IRAQ: ENTRANCED REGIONAL FACILITATORS AIDING JIHADIST TRAVEL 2004 07 10 (S/NF)
111 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.

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The Coalition was divided as to the role and effectiveness of the Fallujah Brigade. Many Marines regarded it as a nepotistic “jobs program” heavily infiltrated by insurgent fighters. The Fallujah Brigade was viewed as an expedient method to encourage law and order in the city after the battle. Other Coalition officials saw it as calming the city’s population and recommended the possibility of creating similar units for other cities in Anbar, such as Ramadi.116

Contrary to the latter view, the Fallujah Brigade did not serve as a serious check on Janabi’s ambitions or insurgent activities. Shari’a law, implemented even before Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE by some groups, was imposed much more widely. So too were the trappings of an Islamist doctrinaire state.117 Muhisba (religious police, meant to “promote virtue and prevent vice”) were established. Qadis (religious judges) were appointed to head up shari’a courts. Suspected “traitors” received Hadd punishments.118 In one show trial, Janabi served as qadi, convicting and personally executing a civilian outside the al-Hadra Muhamadiya mosque.119 SREs and foreign fighters loyal to Zarqawi based in the Jolan district increased their movements and activities in the city and soon began manning checkpoints on the outskirts of the town.120

The insurgency continued to view the battle as a major victory against the Coalition. With the ceasefire in effect and Fallujah Brigade compromised, insurgents possessed a major base of operations in Anbar from which they could conduct attacks elsewhere in Iraq.

Abu Ghraib Prison

While the battle for Fallujah occurred, another major development began to affect the fortunes of the insurgency. The U.S. military had been investigating claims of maltreatment at the prison in Abu Ghraib since December 2003. A military report issued in January failed to attract attention. When photographs surfaced, however, a scandal over Abu Ghraib erupted on the front pages of newspapers and magazines around the world.

The Abu Ghraib scandal had many consequences. Most important for the insurgency in Anbar was the creation of a cause celebre for the jihad in Iraq. Jihadist recruiters used the graphic photographs to convince young Muslim men to join the fight in Iraq, just as they would use their belief that Fallujah was a “victory” to argue for the impending victory of the mujahidin.

The Al-Sadr Uprising

U.S. Focus Shifts to Sadr: After Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, the Coalition focus shifted to southern Iraq to deal with the Mahdi Army uprising led by the Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
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(U) MUQTADA AL-SADR. The son of the beloved Shi'a cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada has used his father's legacy and his own charisma to build a popular following among poor urban Shi'a in Iraq, though his lack of clerical credentials have forced him to rely on the Qom-based Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khadhim Husayn al-Haeri for religious authority. He is the leader of the Mahdi Army, a sectarian Shi'a militia made up of his followers that have fought U.S. troops and targeted suspected Sunni insurgents as well as civilians since 2003. Because of his fondness for computer games in his youth he was often called "Mullah Atari". Sadr's father, uncle and brothers were killed by Saddam in the 1980s.

(U) The emergence of Muqtada al-Sadr as a major threat to the Coalition in southern Iraq was another reason why the Coalition shifted its efforts away from Fallujah. Having established a following among the Shi'a slums in Baghdad, Basra, and Kirkuk through his father's social services network, Sadr had been a thorn in the Coalition's side ever since April 2003 when his followers were the suspected perpetrators of the murder of the pro-U.S. Shi'a cleric Majid al-Khorri. Sadr believed that establishing himself as an anti-American Iraqi nationalist would make him an acceptable leader of Iraq for Sunnis as well as Shias. He refused to accept the leadership of authority of Grand Ayatollah Sistani and openly challenged the powerful Shi'a factions SCIRI and the Badr Brigade.

(U) Establishing a cult-like following among the urban Shi'a poor, Sadr created his Mahdi Army militia and began fighting the Coalition in April 2004, gaining footholds in Baghdad, Basra, and most notably the holy city of Karbala, where commerce provided by pilgrims' visits to the Shrine of Imam Husayn provided him with the funding to continue his operations.

(U) Still own and inexperienced, without religious training, Sadr allowed himself to be manipulated by Lebanese Hezbollah, and even Ahmed Chalabi during the course of summer of 2004, he violated a truce agreement with Coalition forces and occupied the Shi'a holy city of An Najaf and in particular the Shrine of Imam Ali and the vast necropolis surrounding it. Coalition troops fought pitched battles against the Mahdi Army in An Najaf, eventually reaching the walls of the shrine itself, when Grand Ayatollah Sistani intervened to negotiate a cease-fire. While Sistani regarded Sadr as an enemy and had likely intended for the Coalition to put an end to him, he believed that any damage to the shrine itself would spark a fury of popular outrage that could easily result in the disintegration of Iraq.

(U) Following the cease-fire, Sadr rebuilt the Mahdi Army and began challenging SCIRI's dominance in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a regions of Iraq, demanding that SCIRI and the Coalition stay out of the slum areas that he regarded as being within his sphere of influence. Because of his support for a strong Iraqi state, Sadr allied himself with the Da'wa Party (SCIRI envisioned Iraq as a loose federation made up of strong autonomous regions). SCIRI was most powerful in Basra and

122 Ibid., p. 193
123 Ibid., pp. 191-192
124 Ibid., p. 191
125 Ibid., p. 194
126 Ibid., p. 195
127 Ibid.
Nasariya where residents were distrustful of Baghdad, while Sadr had the most influence over Shi'a living in the mixed urban areas of Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Mosul. They feared that the loose confederation envisioned by SCIRI would spell disaster for Shi'a living in the mixed region.128

**Attack Data (January – April 2004)**

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (January to April 2004). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The first four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following four charts (small format) show the types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED) arrayed over the 2003-2007 time frame and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. Complex Attack data was not yet available during this period.

(S) The average number of enemy attacks during this period was similar to the previous period through the end of February, but in the weeks leading up to and during Fallujah I, the number of attacks increased. The rate of attacks peaked in mid-April, particularly in AO Raleigh, during the height of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. Note that the patterns of Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED incidents closely correlate to the overall attack patterns. Also, the IED data was dominated by incidents in AO Topeka.

128 Ibid., pp. 195-196
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All Incidents

Weekly Incidents by Region (2003 - 2007)

Weekly Incidents by Region (Jan - Apr 2004)

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Summer Interlude (May – August 2004)

(U) Despite the difficulties in Fallujah, the spring and summer saw two notable triumphs for the Iraq Government. First, in May, Ayad Alawi was appointed prime minister of the Iraqi Interim Government. A moderate Shi'a who believed in a secular vision for Iraq, Alawi’s appointment suggested political progress toward the creation of a free, independent and stable Iraq. Second, on June 28 (two days ahead of schedule), Paul Bremer handed over control and sovereignty to Alawi and the Iraqi Interim Government. From this moment on, the Iraqi government would have a say in how the insurgency would be fought.

(S) The establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government, combined with reduced Coalition presence (resulting from efforts to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army), provided a period of enthusiasm for the new Iraqi government in Anbar. This enthusiasm was short lived. It rested largely on the Sunni perception that Coalition forces would soon withdraw entirely and once that occurred, the insurgency would serve as the catalyst for renewed Sunni rule of Iraq.

(S) When this didn’t occur and the Iraqi Interim Government adopted an aggressive stance against the insurgency, Sunni moderates decided to adopt a “wait and see” approach. In the early summer, moderate Anbari sheikhs and imams remained warily neutral. They feared for the survival of their local mosques and worried about being targeted if seen as providing support to either side.

(S) Meanwhile the larger insurgent organizations such as JTJ and the Ramadi Shura Council were encouraged by their perceived success in Fallujah and partial withdrawal of Coalition forces. They intensified attacks against civilians, police, and government officials to undercut Iraqi Interim Government support. Insurgents also conducted violent attacks on Iraqi contractors engaged in Coalition-funded reconstruction. This kept civilians and local officials from cooperating with the Coalition. The lack of cooperation crippled many of the Iraqi security forces in Anbar throughout July and August 2004. The result was stark: a briefing to General Abizaid described Fallujah as “a safe haven for the best organized, most effective terror network in Iraq.”

(S) Early enthusiasm for Iraqi Interim Government gave way by the end of the summer to widespread apathy. Many Anbaris thought it better to acquiesce to insurgent demands than to fight them. While the Coalition was tolerated if it provided local protection and civil assistance, Anbaris tired of the constant violence and blamed Coalition “occupiers” for their state of affairs.
City Stories – Summer 2004

Ramadi

(S/NF) The situation in the capital of Anbar deteriorated noticeably over the summer. The Ramadi Shura Council and other insurgent groups in Ramadi wielded enough influence and control that by late July 2004 AQI was able to kidnap the three sons of Anbar’s then-governor, Abdul Karim Burjis (see Chapter 3). While Governor Burjis claimed not to have paid a ransom for their release, he did release a humiliating videotaped statement in which he stated that, in exchange for their safe return, he had “repented” for having collaborated with the Coalition.\(^{138}\) AQI also forced him to resign as governor.

(S/NF) In August 2004, the newly-appointed governor of the province, Mohammad Awad stated that “the province has collapsed and we feel like hostages.”\(^{139}\) The largest and most organized insurgent groups active in Ramadi itself were Jaysh Mohammed, Anbar Mujahideen Brigade, Hizb al-'Awda, Islamic Army of Iraq, Saraya al-Jihad, and the criminal organization Hasnah’s Sons, all of which appeared to cooperate under the Ramadi Shura Council umbrella.\(^{140}\)

(S) The Ramadi Shura Council allowed insurgents to better organize. Moreover, it facilitated larger terrorist attacks. Insurgents now could operate in squad to platoon-size units, with several instances of heavy street-fighting in the city.\(^{141}\) One particular incident, on July 14, stands out for its planning, logistical support and coordinated use of firepower. This indicated that the insurgency was attempting to move to a higher form of warfare. The attack involved as many as fifty insurgents. They carried out a complex attack on a Marine combat outpost with RPGs, machine-gun fire, and grenades. They used trucks to carry fighters to the battle. The attack ended with twelve insurgents dead or wounded and twenty-one in custody, plus the capture of a weapons cache.\(^{142}\)

(S/NF) The relationship between the Ramadi Shura Council and the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura was that of equals working in parallel rather than a chain of command.\(^ {143}\) While the Ramadi Shura Council deferred to the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura on a number of major decisions affecting specific operations, the Ramadi Shura Council was far more unified under Latif and Daham and hence able to maintain a more coordinated alliance of insurgent organizations.\(^ {144}\)

\(^{138}\) [ | Open Source | WASHINGTON POST | CONSTABLE, PAMELA : 300 SHIITE MILITIAMEN KILLED IN IRAQI SOUTH | 20040807 | (U) | ]

\(^{139}\) Ibid.

\(^{140}\) Ibid.

\(^{141}\) Ibid.

\(^{142}\) [ | Military | SIGACTS | (S/NF) | ]

\(^{143}\) [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT: STATE OF THE INSURGENCY IN MND-WEST | (S/NF) | ]

\(^{144}\) Ibid.
Hit

(S/NF) Hit remained a major transit point for foreign fighters, arms smugglers and other insurgent facilitators. Three insurgent leaders were based in the town:

1) 
2) 
3) 
(b)(6)

(S/NF) Hit also became a major staging area for Ramadi insurgents, who seem to have confined local action to attacks against Coalition convoys moving from Ramadi to Al-Qa'im. This meant that the level of violence declined during the summer, with the local Albu Nimr, al-Suwatla, Oawam Alin, and al-Botoma tribes more supportive of the Coalition.143

(S/REL USA, AUS, CAN and GBR) The city council actively cooperated with the Coalition. It formed a “Pursuit Committee” that identified strangers in the city and determined their intentions. Coalition forces concentrated on the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and rooting out infiltrators in the police and security forces. This resulted in the removal of police chief Salam, a decision supported by the city council. Insurgents, as elsewhere, turned their attention to the ISF, carrying out a series of attacks against Iraqi forces during the summer, including three assassination attempts against the commander of the local Iraqi National Guard (ING) battalion.146

Hadithah

(S/NF) The security situation in Hadithah deteriorated dramatically over the summer of 2004 as a result of the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign. Emboldened insurgents conducted attacks against the Hadithah Dam and the police station. Intimidated local elites turned a blind eye to their activities.147 The most spectacular attack was a dual car bombing in July of the Iraqi National Guard (ING) and the police station. This attack killed ten men, wounded many others and damaged every vehicle attached to the ING unit.148 Although the al-Jaghayfah (TFC spelling: al-Jagayfah) tribe was openly anti-Coalition, it had a tense relationship with the insurgents. When a member of the

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143 Ibid. (N.B. Except for the Albu Nimr, these tribes are little known.)
146 [Military | HADITHAH CURRENT ASSESSMENT | 20060126 | (S/NF)]
147 [Military | DIIR HET03 003 04 | (S/NF)]
148 [Military | HADITHAH CURRENT ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 2004 | 200408xx | (S/NF)]
tribe was killed by the mujahidin, the tribe kidnapped twelve insurgents in Husaybah and tortured them in retaliation.\(^{149}\)

(S/NF) As a result of Coalition counter-insurgency operations, the Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi Network that had previously used Hadithah as a base was destroyed. Their leader, al-Naqshbandi, was on the run. Unfortunately the Coalition counter-insurgency (COIN) operations did not defeat the Hizb al-Awda, the Hwair cell, and the Salafia insurgent groups who remained active in the city. The main insurgent leaders in Hadithah were smuggler Mustafa Waisma Hamad, foreign fighter facilitator Munir Simran, and Athir Nassif Turki, the leader of the Athir Group street gang (who went to Fallujah after Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and would later be killed during Operation PHANTOM FURY). Over time, these local figures became subordinated to far more dangerous individuals, notably Zarqawi lieutenant Hamed al-Izawi, weapons smuggler Sheed Ali Hwair, and Sheikh Abdul Kareem Hadithah who served as the liaison between the Hadithah insurgents, Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, and Ramadi Shura Council.\(^{150}\)

(U) The small bright spot was Hadithah’s economy, which had somewhat better prospects by the summer. In June, several new transmission projects at the Hadithah Dam were completed. This, along with rehabilitation of a turbine unit, meant for the first time since 1990 four of the six turbines at the Dam were in full operation. Operating at close to full capacity, the hydropower plant could generate 660 megawatts of electricity for both Baghdad and the province.\(^{151}\)

Al-Qa’im\(^{152}\)

(S/NF) The situation in Al-Qa’im was similarly dire. Four major insurgent groups were active in the city and surrounding area. The situation was similar to that in Fallujah prior to Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and the creation of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura. Using mosques as command and control centers and supply depots, insurgent leaders delivered strident anti-Coalition rhetoric. Heavily infiltrated by the insurgency, the city would be used as a major base and staging area until well into 2005.

(S/NF) Unlike Fallujah, however, in Al-Qa’im insurgents were motivated as much by criminal activity as by religion. The long-standing Al-Theeb criminal organization remained the largest and most prominent insurgent and criminal organization in the area. Al-Theeb merged with Omar al-Mukhtar and local Saraya al-Jihad members into a single organization commanded by Riyadh

\(^{149}\) Ibid.

\(^{150}\) Ibid.

\(^{151}\) [Open Source | GLOBALSECURITY.ORG: HADITHA | (U) | ]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/haditha.htm

\(^{152}\) [Military | IMEF | 14c | (S/NF) | ]; [Military | DIIR MEF HET 01 0183 04 | (S/NF) | ]; [Military | ISG DET B | 14c | (S/NF) | ]; [Military | 14c | (S/NF) | ];

1.4c | (S/NF) | ]

Above sources drawn from [Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR: INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | (S/NF) | ]

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Matloub. After Al-Theeb, the most active groups in the city were General Hassan al-Mahlawi’s 1,100-strong FRE organization, Ghanem Hashim Mahowish’s Saraya al-Jihad splinter group, and the Lebanese Salafia Group. Of the four major insurgent groups in al-Qa’im, the Lebanese Salafia Group provided funding, direction, and leadership to the others. The Lebanese Salafia Group also successfully infiltrated the local police and border guards, enabling its members to pass freely between Iraq and Syria.

Habbaniyah

(S/NE) Habbaniyah served as a key insurgent transit point between Fallujah and Ramadi. While many tribal groups in the area remained neutral, elements of the Albu Eissa, Albu Qatran, Albu Shahed, Albu Sha’aban, Albu Khalifah, Albu Fahid, and Hazeem tribes supported the insurgency. They provided transiting insurgents with safe haven and support. Fedayeen Mujahideen leader Muhammad Khalaf al-Ulayan was the top insurgent facilitator active in the city.

Rutbah

(S/NE) Rutbah is a small desert outpost of 17,000 inhabitants, who depend heavily on smuggling for their livelihood. Many tribes in the town were suspicious of the Coalition. The local Shammar tribesmen supported the local insurgency, which centered around the Jordanian-born Hadithah-based SRE Sheikh ‘Abd al-Karim Hadithah. The former imam of the Mustafa Mosque, Sheikh Hadithah led a group of criminals, smugglers, and SREs to Fallujah following the conclusion of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. This left control of the insurgency in the area to FREs led by former Ba’athists Tariq Mohammed Sinheed and Ibrahim Bedawi.

Fallujah

(S/REL MCCF) Fallujah the Mujahideen Shura continued to serve as the real power in Fallujah given the weakness of the mayor, city council, and other local officials. Umar Hadid quickly established himself as the head of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura’s military wing. As a result, much of the practical power in the city rested with JTJ and other Al Qaeda associate groups. This was soon
reflected by the prominent insurgent leaders. The most powerful leaders after Hadid were Jaysh Mohammed leader Sheikh Khalid Hamud al-Jumayli; Al Qaeda members Abdullah al-Tunisi, Abu Qudama al-Filisteeni, and Dr. Muhammad Hardan al-Issawi; FREs Karim Karkaz, Mahmud Alawi al-Jumayli; and FRE Lieutenant Colonel Maki Husayn Zaydan al-Jughayfi, who served as Hadid’s intelligence chief.\(^\text{157}\)

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Just as months earlier, the SREs, now dominant in Fallujah, along with foreign fighters loyal to Hadid and Zarqawi patrolled Fallujah. They directed traffic and set up checkpoints.\(^\text{158}\) Imposing shari’a in the city, they required women to wear the hijab and implemented hadd punishments.\(^\text{159}\)

(S/NE) Sheikh Janabi’s Influence:\(^\text{160}\) Under the direction of Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi, the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura continued its kidnappings and murders against real and perceived enemies in Fallujah and surrounding communities. Attempting to centralize control of Fallujah under his rule, Janabi ran a robust counter-intelligence campaign. He sent sources to the Coalition that provided misinformation. Sometimes, this misinformation appears to have included negative reporting on Janabi. Knowing this would be contradicted by other Coalition intelligence sources, Janabi could disavow claims he was complicit in insurgent activities as being part of a smear campaign. Still, Janabi remained aware of the danger posed by Coalition military intervention. He used his influence within Fallujah Mujahideen Shura to forbid insurgents from carrying out attacks unless they were approved by him. This enabled Fallujah Mujahideen Shura to overcome the tactical impatience of individual insurgent cells and fighters.

(S/NE) Friction Among Fallujah Insurgents:\(^\text{161,162}\) Friction quickly developed between the more pragmatic Janabi and the Zarqawi-aligned insurgents in Fallujah led by Umar Hadid, who favored all-out war against the Coalition. Arguments arose within the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura over the wisdom of carrying out attacks against Coalition forces, fearing a renewed Coalition assault. Tensions rose throughout the summer. Eventually, Janabi and al-Ubaydi issued a fatwa ordering the killing of Abu Azzam, Zarqawi’s “Amir fi'l-Anbar” (“Commander in Anbar”) and Hadid’s superior within JTJ. Azzam had already been expelled from Fallujah by Janabi in May. Azzam had been recruiting local youths to serve as suicide bombers and inciting SREs against non-Salafist groups in the city. Azzam was killed by Jumayli tribesmen when he attempted to return. In June, 450 foreign fighters led by Hadid killed six Shi’a contractors loyal to Janabi, leading al-Ubaydi to kill five Syrians loyal to Hadid in reprisal.

\(^{157}\) [ | Military | CG INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, NOVEMBER 7-8, 2004: OPERATION PHANTOM FURY UPDATE | 20041108 | (S/NE) ]
\(^{158}\) [ | Military | I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY | 20040608 | (S/NE) ]
\(^{159}\) Ibid.
\(^{160}\) [ | Military | IRAQI REACH BACK TEAM: FALLUJAH – IO ANALYSIS (PART B) | 20041001 | (S/NE) ]
\(^{161}\) Ibid.
\(^{162}\) [ | Military | AO RALEIGH SIGNIFICANT REPORTING JULY 10-20, 2004 | presumed 20040720 | (S/NE) ]

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Possibly fearing for his own safety in light of what had happened to Abu Azzam, Hadid temporarily left Fallujah in late June with a group of JTJ fighters to carry out attacks against targets in Baghdad. When Hadid returned to Fallujah in early July, they reached a reconciliation regarding the religious legitimacy of conducting attacks against Coalition targets in and around Fallujah. Key to this seems to be a July 8 meeting of Fallujah Mujahideen Shura attended by Zarqawi. The JTJ leader reportedly ordered them to put aside internal feuding and threatened violent retaliation if they refused to do so. This led to a split between Janabi and al-Ubaydi. The latter believed that allowing foreign fighters to reside in Fallujah would bring disaster to the city.

The friction within Fallujah was not limited to clashes between Janabi and Hadid. When members of the Albu Eissa tribe attempted to set up a new group of Jordanian-trained police in mid-July, Sheikh Barakat Albu Eissa’s nephew Enis was kidnapped by Janabi’s SREs. A number of Albu Eissa tribesmen attempted to assassinate Janabi at one of the tribal meetings in retaliation, but the plot was foiled by their own clumsiness.

The Fallujah Brigade, already an unreliable force as a result of Fallujah Mujahideen Shura infiltration, proved to be no match for the insurgents—not that they attempted to assert real control. The Brigade deteriorated when, as noted earlier, Janabi began firing non-insurgent officers. Brigade members were further intimidated when Fallujah Mujahideen Shura began assassinating the few non-insurgent officers or members of their families.

A major turning point for the insurgency in Fallujah was the August 2004 attack on the 505th and 506th Iraqi National Guard compounds. JTJ and FMS fighters led by Hadid and Janabi carried out this attack. The compounds fell without a fight. Once secured, Janabi addressed the ING soldiers, informing them that a member of the ING had been cooperating with the Coalition and that the organization would now be disbanded in Fallujah. Seizing all ING weapons and equipment, Janabi told the soldiers to go home and warned that any who returned to Fallujah as ING would be killed.

This prompted a conflict between Janabi and the Albu Maree (TFC spelling: Mar’āī) tribal leaders. Tribal leaders gave the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura 48 hours to release the kidnapped 506th commander Lieutenant Colonel Suliman, his deputy Captain Ali, and 505th commander Lieutenant Colonel Jubayr. While Jubayr was able to make a deal with Janabi to secure his release, Suliman and Ali were personally tortured and then executed by Janabi and Hadid. This led to a break between the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura and the Albu Maree tribe. The tribe agreed to support the Coalition in return for a promise they would be allowed to exercise thurār (vengeance) by killing Janabi and Hadid.

Following their “victory” over the 506th and 505th ING battalions, Hadid and 200 foreign JTJ members began using the 505th compound as their command and control center.
Snapshot: The Insurgency May-August 2004

Several factors encouraged the insurgents in Anbar and in Fallujah: the insurgents believed they had achieved a “victory” over the Coalition in Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, the on-going scandal about prisoner abuse by the U.S. at Abu Ghraib, and Coalition decision to focus on al-Sadr following his uprising in southern Iraq.

Insurgent groups began to expand operations across the province. They attempted to kill or intimidate those who cooperated or worked with the Coalition. They used Fallujah and Ramadi as urban bases for attacks throughout the province. The climate they fostered in Fallujah—including the implementation of hadd punishments, enforcement of strict norms of dress and behavior, and public beatings or even executions of those who dissented—was a foretaste of the state the Salafists and Al Qaeda affiliated groups hoped to create in Iraq. The insurgency continued to take on a more religious tone in parts of Anbar: in Fallujah there were no serious objections from supposedly secular Ba’athists and nationalists to the imposition of shari’a in the city.

Meanwhile, ordinary Sunnis in Anbar, at first encouraged by the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government, became more distrustful as the summer progressed. The insurgents’ intimidation campaigns turned moderates who might have supported the Coalition into wary and weary citizens. Many blamed the Coalition as much as the insurgents for the violence they were suffering.

Attack Data (May – August 2004)

The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the middle trimester (May to August 2004). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following four charts (small format) show the types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED) arrayed over the 2003-2007 time frame and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. Complex Attack data was not yet available during this period.

The average number of enemy attacks during this period was higher than the previous period and sharply increased throughout the period. While the overall attack, Direct Fire, and Indirect Fire incident counts increased, the count of IED incidents remained relatively stable. During this period, the majority of incidents were taking place in AO Raleigh and AO Topeka, while AO Denver levels were still relatively lower. Two weeks in particular showed peaks in the overall, Direct Fire, and Indirect Fire attack counts – the weeks of 24-30 June and 12-18 August, with the increases particularly attributable to activity in AO Raleigh.
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All Incidents

Weekly Incidents by Region (2003 - 2007)

Weekly Incidents by Region (May - Aug 2004)

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Direct Fire Incidents

Indirect Fire Incidents

IED Incidents

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Run-Up to Operation Al FAJR (September – October 2004)

Further Tensions in Fallujah

Coalition efforts against the Mahdi Army came to at least a temporary conclusion in August 2004. The main focus of Coalition counter-insurgency efforts returned to Fallujah. With the infiltration of the Fallujah Brigade followed by the seizure of two ING compounds, the threat was clear. The Coalition began preparations to remove what had in effect become a parallel center of political authority in Anbar to that of the legitimate Iraqi Interim Government.

Tensions also continued to flare in Fallujah. Despite their temporary reconciliation, by mid-September Janabi once again found himself at odds with Hadid. He encouraged his followers to distance themselves from JTJ. At the core of the dispute was Janabi’s belief that Hadid’s activities in Fallujah were eroding public support for Janabi. Janabi had been working with Fallujah Mujahideen Shura in an effort to find a way to continue the insurgency outside Fallujah. Meanwhile, Hadid had been insistent on working with the muhisha to implement the most extreme interpretations of shari’a. However, this alienated less religious FREs in the city. Another major source of controversy was Hadid’s decision to collect a religious tax from residents to support JTJ’s activities in Fallujah. Hadid also claimed to have received a fatwa from Janabi calling for the seizure of the possessions of those who failed to cooperate. Janabi had never issued such a fatwa and was angered that Hadid made such a radical move without his permission.

Nor was the fatwa the only recent issue of contention. During early September, Hadid executed Ahmad al-Shamsah al-Issawi and Ahmad al-Hasna al-Krifawi, two popular Fallujah residents he claimed were cooperating with the Coalition. In response, the Albu Eissa tried (but failed) to capture Hadid and turn him over to the Albu Hatim, the tribe to which these two men belonged. Although Hadid killed the two men without consulting with the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, the Albu Hatim blamed Janabi and joined the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura’s growing list of enemies.

Negotiations and Airstrikes

Prior to Operation Al FAJR, the Iraqi Interim Government and the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura representatives met repeatedly. The purpose was to discuss turning the city over to Iraqi Interim Government without fighting. In reality, Fallujah Mujahideen Shura was playing for time. Both Janabi and Sheikh Khalid Hamud al-Jumayli remained active in Fallujah Mujahideen Shura and JTJ activities. At the same time, they were supposedly seeking a peaceful solution with the government. Prior to his detention, al-Jumayli told a group of insurgents in Khalidiyah in early
October that the ongoing negotiations were little more than a ruse to allow the insurgents to prepare their defenses.\textsuperscript{170}

(U) The Coalition decided against a major assault on Fallujah until after the conclusion of the 2004 U.S. presidential elections.\textsuperscript{171} Instead, the Coalition conducted decapitation air strikes against senior insurgent leaders and foreign fighters based in Fallujah and other parts of Iraq. The Coalition scored a number of notable successes.\textsuperscript{172} Perhaps most important was the killing of Omar Yusuf Jumah (Sheikh Abu Anas al-Shami), JTJ's spiritual leader who had served as a close advisor to Zarqawi and provided the group with Islamic legal justification for its activities.\textsuperscript{173}

**Insurgent Preparations**

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR) As early as the seizure of the ING compounds in August, insurgents began preparing defenses for a possible Coalition attack.\textsuperscript{174} Defenders were made up of roughly 50% Fallujahns, 32% other Anbaris, and 18% foreign fighters.\textsuperscript{175} The Fallujah Brigade had now ceased to exist as an institution. With the removal of the Iraqi National Guard, Janabi, Hadid, and the rest of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura had complete control over the city. Despite his strength in the city, Hadid began relocating foreign commanders to Ramadi to prevent senior foreign fighters from being targeted in the anticipated Coalition offensive.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The Fallujah Mujahideen Shura coordinated with allied or satellite insurgent groups in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah, Saqlawiyah, al-Amariyah, Karma, Latifiyah, Abu Gharib, and Baghdad. The purpose was to prepare for widespread attacks as soon as the fighting began.\textsuperscript{176}

(S/NE) These conventional insurgent preparations coincided with attempts by Zarqawi and Hadid to develop crude World War I-era chemical weapons for Fallujah's defense.\textsuperscript{177} Coalition raids in 2004 discovered insurgent cells in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Tal Afar attempting to modify conventional mortar rounds to contain cyanide, pesticides, or industrial chemicals. One of JTJ's Fallujah-based cells attempted to manufacture mustard, tabun, and ricin but was unable to resolve the technical

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{171} [ | Open Source | LOS ANGELES TIMES/ MAZZETTI, MARK : MAJOR ASSAULTS ON HOLD UNTIL AFTER US ELECTION | 20041011 | (U) | ]

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{173} [ | Open Source | TERRORISM FOCUS, VOLUME 1, ISSUE 5 / STEPHEN ULPH : SHEIKH AL-SHAMI, AL-ZARQAWI'S MENTOR, KILLED | 20041001 | (U) | ]

\textsuperscript{174} [ | Military | IRAQI REACH BACK TEAM: FALLUJAH - IO ANALYSIS (PART B) | 20041001 | (S/NE) | ]

\textsuperscript{175} [ | Military | MNCI | FALLUJAH-RAMADI CORRIDOR, MNCI C2 PLANS, SEPTEMBER 17, 2004 | 20040917 | (S/NE) | ]

\textsuperscript{176} [ | Military | NGIC | 14c | S/NE | ]

\textsuperscript{177} [ | Iraq: ZARQAWI INTENT ON CW ATTACKS | 20040701 | (S/NE) | ]

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{171} [ | Open Source | LOS ANGELES TIMES/ MAZZETTI, MARK : MAJOR ASSAULTS ON HOLD UNTIL AFTER US ELECTION | 20041011 | (U) | ]

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{173} [ | Open Source | TERRORISM FOCUS, VOLUME 1, ISSUE 5 / STEPHEN ULPH : SHEIKH AL-SHAMI, AL-ZARQAWI'S MENTOR, KILLED | 20041001 | (U) | ]

\textsuperscript{174} [ | Military | IRAQI REACH BACK TEAM: FALLUJAH - IO ANALYSIS (PART B) | 20041001 | (S/NE) | ]

\textsuperscript{175} [ | Military | MNCI | FALLUJAH-RAMADI CORRIDOR, MNCI C2 PLANS, SEPTEMBER 17, 2004 | 20040917 | (S/NE) | ]

\textsuperscript{176} [ | Military | NGIC | 14c | S/NE | ]

\textsuperscript{177} [ | Iraq: ZARQAWI INTENT ON CW ATTACKS | 20040701 | (S/NE) | ]

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difficulties prior to the Coalition attack.\textsuperscript{178} Had they succeeded, their plan was to fill rockets and mortars with chemical agents and fire them at Coalition forces as soon as they entered the city.\textsuperscript{179}

The Birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

(U) As noted, Zarqawi had been actively seeking the blessing of the Al Qaeda senior leadership. He wished to establish himself as the undisputed leader of the jihad in Iraq. Moreover, he wanted to consolidate all Al Qaeda associate groups such as Al and Ansar al-Sunna under his leadership. By October 2004, Zarqawi had apparently secured that blessing. He issued a public statement in which he swore bay'at to Osama bin Ladin. He renamed JIT as Tanzim Qa'dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidain (Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers, QJBR, or AQI, a Coalition term).\textsuperscript{180} After eight months of negotiations, the Al Qaeda leadership "showed understanding for the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad movement" and agreed to support Zarqawi’s "style and system" provided he adhered to their strategy and directives.\textsuperscript{181} Zarqawi gained a great deal of prestige among Sunni Islamists inside and outside of Iraq during the run-up to Operation Al Fajr, paving the way for his emergence as the preeminent leader of the insurgency in Anbar.

Operation AL FAJR (November 2004)\textsuperscript{182}

The Battle

(U) In the run-up to the second battle for Fallujah, Coalition forces once again set up roadblocks and encouraged civilians to flee the city. The next Coalition phase consisted of several weeks of air strikes and ground feints by Coalition infantry and armor. This was designed to lure out and kill insurgent fighters. It was also designed to force insurgents to reveal their defensive positions on the east and southeast outskirts of Fallujah. The attack into the city began on November 7 with the seizure of the main hospital and two bridges over the Euphrates River. American and Iraqi forces created a tight cordon around Fallujah, secured the ground lines of communication, prevented insurgents from traveling to and from the city, and conducted robust counter-insurgency operations throughout Anbar.

(U) On November 8, 6,500 U.S. troops from six maneuver battalions breached insurgent defenses along the northern edge of the city, using artillery and close air support to hit suspected insurgent positions. Over 2,000 Iraqi troops followed their U.S. counterparts in a support role to secure lines of communication and clear sensitive buildings such as mosques. Initial Coalition progress was rapid. RCT-7 pushed 800 meters into the Askari neighborhood by the end of the first day. Fighting...
in the western Jolan district was not as fierce as had been expected. Within three days of fighting the Coalition had already swept through the northern half of Fallujah, refitted, and begun their push across Route 10 to clear the industrial district in the eastern half of the city.

(U) As Coalition forces advanced, mosque loudspeakers blared "Prepare for jihad!" and "Allahu Akbar!" The insurgent forces conducted a fluid defense, moving to reinforce defenses as needed. Sometimes seeming to appear from nowhere, they fired small arms and RPGs from groups of 3-6 men before fleeing into nearby buildings. South of Route 10 insurgent resistance stiffened, particularly in the southwestern Resala and Nazal districts. Small groups of insurgents rushed Marine positions and dozens of RPGs struck tanks and other armored vehicles. On several occasions, insurgents fought to the death to defend individual buildings, prompting Coalition infantry to call for air support to flatten the structures.

(U) The Coalition continued to make steady progress, advancing 600 meters every six hours. By November 12, the Coalition had driven the insurgents into their last remaining strongholds in southwestern Fallujah. The smaller their area of operation became, the larger the insurgent cells grew, with some fielding as many as fifty fighters in a single engagement. Many of these holdouts fought to the last man rather than surrender.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) After seven days of heavy fighting, the Coalition had completed its sweep through Fallujah. Clearing operations followed to deal with isolated pockets and unexploded ordnance. Cells that remained active at this point operated in extremely small groups, fighting in close quarters with small arms and hand grenades. A few cells relocated to the "cleared" parts of northern Fallujah. The fighting that occurred in these previously cleared areas appears to have been due to a combination of relocated cells, sleeper cells, and insurgents who had previously fled Fallujah returning to the city to continue fighting.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Between November 16 and late December, Coalition forces conducted further sweeps to clear buildings, sometimes on multiple occasions. It took nearly two weeks before all of Fallujah could be declared completely free of IEDs and enemy pockets. Even so, as late as December 20, surviving insurgent fighters continued to stage small attacks in Fallujah using undiscovered tunnels and facilities. Phase IV operations were then initiated to clean up the streets, restore damaged buildings, and position food and water for the return of the civilian population in late December 2004.

(U) From November 7-30, Coalition losses were seven Iraqi military and civilian deaths and 43 wounded. U.S. casualties included 69 dead and 619 wounded. MNF-I detained 2,052 suspected insurgents and estimated that 2,175 insurgents were killed during the fighting.
Insurgent Strategy

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) As in the first battle for Fallujah, the insurgent’s relied on a dispersed, non-linear fluid defense. They used networks of small cells to elude, harass, and attrit Coalition forces as they advanced into the city. Insurgents mixed direct fire with small arms and RPGs, hit-and-run, and indirect fire. Some cells attacked Coalition forces from within one building, relocated to another, and attacked again. Others used mortars in conjunction with the attacks described above. The goal behind these tactics was to inflict casualties while gaining media attention and support for their cause. By defending a well-known symbol, they hoped to focus international attention on the civilian collateral damage and use Fallujah as a catalyst for stirring up retributive violence throughout Iraq.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The insurgent plan for defending Fallujah also called for the dispersal of 50% of the city’s total fighters to nearby towns and rural areas from Ramadi to Baghdad and south into northern Babil. The goal was to open a second front by attacking Coalition forces from the rear along the outer perimeter and energizing other insurgent groups into stepping up their attacks. While coordinated insurgent activity did increase throughout the Sunni Triangle, the outer cordon of Fallujah was never seriously threatened.

(U) The reasons for the insurgents’ failure to threat Fallujah’s outer cordon were two-fold:

- Aggressive Coalition operations and increased troop presence in Ramadi disrupted insurgent plans to carry out attacks to penetrate the perimeter and relieve Fallujah’s defenders. The Coalition established checkpoints, patrolled supply routes, carried out cordon sweeps, conducted counter-rocket and counter-mortar operations, and conducted movement to contact operations combined with the clearing of IEDs.

- Small groups of insurgent fighters did penetrate the outer perimeter to reach Fallujah on foot but were unable to challenge the presence of Coalition combined arms patrols on major roads.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) As earlier, Fallujah Mujahideen Shura assigned defensive sectors and zones to individual cells or groups of cells. They established eight primary defensive sectors, including the Jolan and Sina’a districts. At least some of the planning incorporated detailed maps, sketches, and annotated high-resolution imagery consistent with past urban defenses in other parts of the world.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Despite these preparations, three factors led to unexpected weaknesses in the city’s defense:

- On the second day of the Coalition assault, on November 8, Janabi, Zarqawi and many other Fallujah Mujahideen Shura leaders fled Fallujah. This reduced the level of cohesion among the city’s defenders.
Another significant factor was rivalries within the remaining insurgent leadership, combined with a lack of coordinated communications between groups.

Orders to individual cells were sent from senior facilitators or remaining Fallujah Mujahideen Shura leaders still present in the city, such as Hadid, though some cell leaders countermanded, ignored, or dismissed these orders and issued their own.

Cooperation between Hadid’s forces and those loyal to Janabi was tenuous at best. It is unclear to what degree the two factions set aside their differences in the face of a concentrated Coalition threat. AQI foreign fighters made up only thirty-eight of the detainees after the battle, with another thirty probable foreign fighters identified from the remains of dead insurgents, indicating that most of those that had been present in the city left with Zarqawi on November 8.

Insurgent communications consisted of radios, cell phones, runners, and visual and auditory signaling. Numerous commercial hand-held mobile radios were captured by the Coalition from insurgent arms caches and living quarters, suggesting that they were widely available but seldom used. Fallujah’s power was cut off on November 8, degrading landline communication so that cell phones became one of the few means of communication. To supplement the cell phones, black flags were used to signal between groups and mosque loudspeakers broadcast tactical information. Former RG and SRG generals, on the other hand, issued written orders complete with Saddam-era official letterheads to subordinates who snapped salutes.

As during Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, insurgent cells were small, semi-autonomous and widespread throughout the city. They conducted a decentralized defense. The most common cell organization was a hub network made up of cells of 3-6 fighters, though some were as large as thirty. As the fighting wore on and insurgents were left isolated in the southeastern part of the city, cell size increased to groups of as many as fifty fighters by November 13. No single leader appears to have been in control of more than fifteen fighters, with the exception of Hadid who personally led as many as 200 into battle.

Further Cooperation between Fallujah Mujahideen Shura and Al-Sadr

As with his earlier support during Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, Muqtada al-Sadr sent 100 of what he called his “elite fighters” from his Mahdi Army in Thawra to Fallujah to assist in its defense.\(^\text{183}\) Al-Sadr also sent Hadid money. This money, raised during the weapons buy-back program, was to be used for the defense of Fallujah.\(^\text{184}\) Once the Coalition initiated a full-scale attack on Fallujah, the number of Mahdi Army fighters in the city rose to as many as 350.\(^\text{185}\) This is significant, as it illustrates that low-level cooperation was not viewed as

\(^{183}\) [ | Military | INTREP# 04-159 | S/NF | ]

\(^{184}\) Ibid.

\(^{185}\) [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | S/NF | ]

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inconceivable between the second-in-command of the stridently sectarian JTJ and the Khomeinist Mahdi Army.

**Endgame**

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The insurgency suffered a significant blow with the fall of Fallujah. Insurgents lost their primary safe haven. Their networks were disrupted and scattered. They were deprived of major weapons caches and IED factories and roughly 4,000 fighters were killed or detained.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) There were many reasons for Coalition success during Operation AL FAJR, which contrast with the experience of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE:

- Coalition forces were three times larger, comprising roughly 15,000 troops.
- With 4,000 estimated insurgent defenders, the Coalition had a 3 to 1 force advantage. This resulted in a far more effective cordon around the city than in April.
- Insurgents underestimated the precision and volume of Coalition firepower at the disposal of the infantry. Some insurgents became extremely frustrated with the power exhibited by Coalition combined-arms attacks.
- The Coalition information campaign prior to the beginning of Operation AL FAJR persuaded most of the civilian population to evacuate the city. PM Ayad Allawi declared a round-the-clock curfew in Fallujah. The small number of civilians who chose to remain stayed off the streets, leaving fewer human shields than previously to complicate targeting. Civilian vehicles were completely banned, depriving insurgents of their ability to use VBIEDs.
- Approval of Coalition operations by the Iraqi Interim Government and participation by Iraqi troops helped defuse potential Sunni Arab backlash against the Coalition. The relatively muted response saw only IIP leaving the Iraqi government and only AMS calling for a boycott of the January elections. This undermined the insurgent plan to use the fighting in Fallujah as a catalyst for stirring up support for the insurgency throughout Iraq.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) In Operation AL FAJR, the Coalition destroyed the center of insurgent power in Anbar but did not end the insurgency or eliminate AQI. Still, Operation AL FAJR was a major blow to the insurgents. They would again have to reorganize, recruit, and re-arm. The roughly 4,000 fighters killed or captured included experienced leaders like Hadid, who would take time to replace. These losses, and the ensuing reorganization of insurgent networks, were a major reason that the insurgents could not disrupt the January 2005 Iraqi elections. But, many senior leaders and

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their lieutenants fled Fallujah beforehand, and they would resume their activities as soon as they were able.

Aftermath of Operation Al FAJR (December 2004)

Post-Fallujah Effects in Anbar

(S/NF) The fall of Fallujah prompted a temporary reevaluation of AMS’s support for FRE and SRE insurgent groups. AMS had previously been divided between supporting the January elections and supporting the insurgency. The organization now found that it had lost face because its decision to back Janabi meant that it was tied to his defeat in Fallujah. AMS leader Harith al-Dhari, who had sent $5,000,000 to support Janabi during Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE was even detained and then released by Iraqi Interim Government Ministry of the Interior in November 2004.

(S/REL TO AUS, CAN, GBR) On November 30, the Sunni Endowment (Auqaf) manager Dr. Adnan Muhammad Salman al-Dulaimi hosted a meeting of imams, scholars, and clerics from across Anbar. He informed them there was no legitimate jihadi in Iraq and that violence against Coalition forces would not be tolerated. When some attendees dissented, al-Dulaimi pointed out that he had delivered this warning to Janabi prior to Operation AL FAJR. He noted that because Janabi had not heeded it, Fallujah was now “a ghost town.” Warning attendees not to let this happen to their cities and informing them that anyone who continued to preach jihadi would be removed from their positions, al-Dulaimi secured the majority’s support for a proclamation calling for an end to Islamist violence in Anbar.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The apparent (in temporary) shift of the Anbari clergy away from the insurgency soon spread across the province. Moderate Iraqis saw the insurgency losing momentum post-Fallujah. Sunni moderates wanted to retain some measure of power in Iraqi Interim Government at all costs. A number of Sunni elites viewed the waning of the insurgency in Anbar as a sign they could win concessions from Shi’a and Kurdish political blocs in return for an end to violence and Sunni participation in the political process.

Insurgent Dispersal and Reorganization

(S/NF) However, the majority of insurgents in Iraq and Anbar were not ready to give up the fight. Many were able to flee Fallujah and relocate as far north as Mosul and across central Iraq. Fighters

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187 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: 14c | (S/NF) | ]
188 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | (S/NF) | ]
189 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | (S/NF) | ]
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | (S/NF) | ]
193 Ibid.
escaped by crossing the Euphrates or by avoiding main roads and checkpoints. With the loss of Fallujah as their primary sanctuary, some rank-and-file insurgents retreated to secondary sanctuaries in western Anbar such as al-Qa‘im and Hadithah. Others headed east, attempting to export violence to Baghdad in retaliation for Fallujah. Or they sought refuge with other insurgent and tribal figures in northern Babil or along the Fallujah-Abu Ghraib corridor, where weak security environments were perceived to exist.\footnote{Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Military | CG INTELLIGENCE UPDATE : OPERATION PHANTOM FURY UPDATE, OCTOBER 23-24, 2004 | presumed 200411024 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.} Criminal and SRE activity surged in Hit, Hadithah, al-Qa‘im, and Husaybah as more and more insurgents sought refuge in western parts of the province. They believed these areas vulnerable due to low Coalition and Iraqi Interim Government presence.\footnote{Military | AO TOPEKA SIGNIFICANT REPORTING, DECEMBER 4, 2004  |  20041204 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.} However, for the remainder of the year the insurgents were unable to compensate for the manpower, leadership, and infrastructure destroyed in Fallujah.

\textbf{AQI Regroups}

After the defeat in Fallujah, AQI also relocated its base of operations. With assistance from the Ramadi Shura Council and Albu Ghanim tribe, some leaders traveled to the Sufiah and Husaybah Sharqiah districts of Ramadi.\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.} Ramadi Shura Council leader Latif assisted this move. Latif agreed to combine his forces with those previously loyal to Hadid. This allowed him to better dominate activities between Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Fallujah. Many rank-and-file AQI and SRE fighters fled west to al-Qa‘im and Hadithah. Others remained in Karmah or Saqlawiyah near Fallujah. Large numbers of foreign fighters headed east to rural Ta‘iji and Tarmiya north of Baghdad. Of the leaders who’d been active in Fallujah, Zarqawi is believed to have fled to Mosul, and Janabi used his tribal alliances to seek refuge in northern Babil.\footnote{Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.} With the death of Hadid in Fallujah, Ramadi Shura Council leader Daham was promoted to serve as Zarqawi’s top lieutenant in Anbar.\footnote{Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | (S/NE) | }

\textbf{(S/NE) The insurgent intimidation and murder campaign between Hit and Hadithah, begun during the summer, deterred local support for the Coalition. Post-Fallujah, the AQI presence in Hadithah surged as fighters displaced from Fallujah field west.\footnote{Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Military | CG INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, “OPERATION PHANTOM FURY UPDATE, NOVEMBER 5-6, 2004 | presumed 20041106 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Military | AO TOPEKA SIGNIFICANT REPORTING, DECEMBER 4, 2004 | presumed 20041204 | (S/NE) | } This served as a radicalizing force for}
Hadithah insurgents, shifting them towards something of a fusion between the Salafist and criminal mindsets.²⁰⁴

(S/NF) In Hit, the influx of AQI was not nearly as profound. Local insurgent groups, motivated by a desire for self-rule, continued to dominate the insurgency in the city.²⁰⁵ These sentiments in Hit predated OIF, and many locals regarded any outside force seeking to control it, insurgent or Coalition, as illegitimate.²⁰⁶

Summary

(U) In many ways, 2004 was a turning point for the insurgency in Anbar province. The capture of Saddam in late 2003 changed the insurgency forever, splintering the FRL resistance. Insurgent groups moved away from the secular, socialist, pan-Arab Ba’athist ideology toward an Islamist-based ideology. As a result, in 2004, Al Qaeda and Zarqawi began a rise to prominence, although neither dominated the insurgency. Insurgent activity surged, with increasing levels of sophistication in attacks and greater coordination (frequently facilitated by clerics) between and among groups. Insurgent activities were not nearly as localized as they had been in 2003.

(U) 2004 saw the first major battles in Anbar since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In both Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and Operation AL FAJR, insurgent groups fought protracted battles with Coalition and Iraqi forces. Their goal was not only to resist the Coalition and the Iraqi interim government, but to set up a kind of parallel society that included the imposition of shari’a law. The insurgent defeat at the conclusion of Operation AL FAJR was a major blow that forced them to regress from attempts to fight the Coalition in semi-conventional warfare to regrouping and reorganization. Despite the insurgents’ defeat, Anbar’s Sunni community increasingly objected to and resisted the Iraqi Interim Government, which would have significant consequences for future efforts to enlist Iraqi Sunnis in the political process during 2005. Insurgents undertook efforts to weaken the perceived credibility of the Coalition as well as governance at all levels – local, provincial, and national – as reflected in aggressive targeting of government officials, foreshadowing the contest for legitimacy to be waged in 2005.

(U) 2004 closed with an Anbar insurgency that had been damaged but not destroyed, and was still dangerous. The survival of most of the larger insurgent organizations following Operation AL FAJR demonstrated their resilience and flexibility. This had previously been shown in the insurgent reorganization and reorientation that occurred following the capture of Saddam Hussein as well as both battles in Fallujah. The flexibility of the insurgency allowed it to evolve and adapt to changes in Coalition tactics and strategy, with tactical cooperation even occurring between groups that had markedly different agendas. This was reflected by Coalition intelligence analysis, which showed a constantly changing insurgent landscape as groups allied, merged, or splintered on a regular basis (see Appendix J).

²⁰⁴ Ibid.
²⁰⁵ Ibid.
²⁰⁶ Ibid.
(U) In 2005, the following trends within the insurgency would continue:

- rebuilding, expanding and consolidating the numerous groups into tighter organizational and command and control structures
- preventing the emergence of any effective national governance
- establishing their own parallel governance
- imposing shari'a law
- adapting to Coalition changes in strategy and tactics with increased flexibility and resilience

(U) Yet, despite the insurgents’ efforts, the 2005 elections would go forward, although most Anbaris would boycott them. While this started the year on a positive note, AQI took advantage of opportunities and continued to grow during the rest of the year.

Snapshot: The Insurgency at the End of 2004

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) While the insurgency had lost momentum as a result of its losses in Operation AL FAJR, they soon began to regroup and reorganize. Many mid- and high-level commanders who had been killed in the fighting were not easily replaced. Those leaders who survived were more focused on staying alive and evading capture than on conducting attacks. Fleeing to areas with less Coalition presence, these insurgent leaders managed to regroup, reequip, and recruit new fighters to replace those captured or killed during the fighting. It took several months for this to occur, however, resulting in attack levels in Anbar that were far lower than those seen prior to Operation AL FAJR. December 2004 insurgent attacks in Anbar fell more than 50% from the pre-Operation AL FAJR numbers. The result was that the insurgents lost too much momentum to prevent or disrupt the January 2005 elections.207

Attack Data (September – December 2004)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the last trimester (September to December 2004). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following six charts (small format) show the types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED) arrayed over the 2003-2007 time frame and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. Complex Attack data was not yet available during this period.

(S) The average number of enemy attacks during this period was higher than the previous period and featured a significant spike concurrent with Fallujah II. The spike in total counts during the week of 11-17 November represents the highest weekly figure recorded to date, with most activity focused in AO Raleigh but significantly increased levels in AO Topeka as well. The Direct Fire and Indirect Fire attack counts closely mirror the overall counts, while the IED attack counts show a

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207 [ Military | TFC: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | S/REL | ]

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more muted correlation. There is also a smaller spike in activity during the week of 9-15 September, with almost all of the increase coming from activity in AO Topeka.
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Weekly Incidents by Region (2003 - 2007)

Weekly Incidents by Region (Sep - Dec 2004)

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Direct Fire Incidents

Indirect Fire Incidents

IED Incidents

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Figure 1: 2004 Street-Level Insurgent Profile (S/REL TO USA, MCFI)

(S/NF) In 2004, the typical street-level insurgent captured in Anbar was an Iraqi male about 28 years old, was more likely to be married than to be unmarried, and was educated at a high-school level or less. Most captured detainees were associated with tribes and also had some military experience. These conclusions are based on an analysis of more than 4,300 tactical interrogation reports gathered from intelligence sources.
Most insurgents captured in 2004 were 30 years old or younger (61.7%), with a significant group (12.2%) under 20 years old. The middle 50% of the population was between 22 and 35 years old. The fact that the median of 28 years is lower than the mean of 30.0 years confirms that the data is skewed younger and also indicates that the age range among older detainees has a large spread. The most common age among detainees was 25 years old.

Of all detainees captured in 2004, 92.9% claimed to be Iraqi. However, it is likely that many of the remaining detainees, more than half who described themselves only as Muslim, Sunni, or Shiite, were Iraqis but identified themselves first by their religion. Of the 3.0% claiming to be of foreign origin, the most frequent origins named were Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran.

Just over 50% of the detainees were associated with blue collar or other labor occupations. The most common occupation claimed was shepherd or farmer (18.4%), though the largest grouping of occupations was blue collar workers (20.8%), which included jobs like electrician, carpenter, and laborer. Though only 7.2% of detainees claimed to be actively unemployed, it is likely that many more detainees were actually unemployed but provided their previous job or training when asked their occupation. In addition, a noteworthy fraction of detainees (11.8%) were employed in positions of trust such as the Iraqi police or local security forces.

More than half of those captured in 2004 claimed to have some military experience (57.6%), while a portion of those that had not served were still students and were too young to participate. This finding indicates that a large segment of the insurgent population had some form of prior military training, had combat experience, and may even have had personal access to weapons.

At least three-quarters of those detained had no education beyond high-school, with nearly half (46.1%) having no more than an elementary education (6th grade or less). More than 15% had some post-secondary education or had completed a degree program.

The tribe with the most captured members in 2004 was the Fahad tribe. The most captures of Fahad happened in April, coincident with Fallujah I, and in the latter part of the year. In November 2004, coincident with Fallujah II, the Albu Alwan and Albu Khalifah tribes were most captured, while there was a significant dip in Fahad captures from 75 in October to 9 in November. Though these were the most frequent tribes claimed, there were many tribes well-represented, as only 52% of the detainees associated themselves with one of the top 20 tribes.

The most frequently claimed residence among detainees in 2004 was the Ramadi area, with nearly a third (33.1%) of detainees, followed by Fallujah with 24.6% of detainees. In particular, the Fallujah-area town of Karmah (7.0%) contained a large concentration of detainees. Habbaniyah and the neighborhood of Khaldiyyah was also a source of many detainees, with 12.2% of all detainees. Other detainees came from Al Qa’im/Husaybah (6.5%) or from outside Anbar in Baghdad (5.7%), though this was somewhat limited.

Nearly 60% of all detainees (58.3%) in 2004 claimed to be married, engaged, or widowed, though most detainees under 30 (75.8%) were still single. Almost all married detainees (91.5%)
claimed to have children, but this data is unreliable. The need to support a family likely was a factor that led those with children to participate in the insurgency to receive larger financial gain than their regular jobs or while unemployed.