Chapter Five

Anbar: Insurgency Grows, Strengthens, Elections

(2005)

January to May

Introduction

(U) The various Sunni insurgent groups suffered a major blow in the second battle of Fallujah*Error! Bookmark not defined.* (Operation AL FAJR) in November 2004. Thousands of fighters were captured or killed. The insurgent leadership spent several months reorganizing in its aftermath, retreating to their remaining strongholds in western Anbar. This left the insurgents unable to derail the upcoming (January 2005) Iraqi elections.

(U) Even so, popular Sunni antipathy towards the Coalition led them to boycott the January elections. Coalition diplomatic efforts for the remainder of the year focused on convincing Sunni leaders to engage in the political process. These efforts, combined with the sense of hopelessness among insurgents stemming from Operation AL FAJR, would eventually bear some fruit. There was Sunni participation in the summer’s constitutional referendum and the December elections. This also helped create divisions between more nationalist insurgents led by Dr. Mohammed Mahmund Latif and Islamists led by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (Zarqawi).

(U) From April onwards, the Sunni insurgent groups stepped up their efforts to target the general population of Baghdad*Error! Bookmark not defined.*, leading to Coalition military action against their strongholds in Anbar. By the end of the year, the Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR) was increasing its involvement and influence in the political process and the ethno-nationalist motivations for the insurgency were declining. This led to major infighting within the insurgency and paved the way for the emergence of AQI*Error! Bookmark not defined.* as the dominant group in the province by 2006.

(S/REL TO USA, MC) The second battle of Fallujah*Error! Bookmark not defined.* (Operation AL FAJR) was generally perceived as an unqualified rout of the various insurgent groups in Anbar. Roughly 4,000 insurgent fighters were captured or killed, including Umar Hadid, who had served as the de facto commander-in-chief for the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura. The insurgent plan to defend Fallujah (see Chapter 4) by sending half of its fighters from Fallujah to Ramadi*Error! Bookmark not defined.*, Baghdad*Error! Bookmark not defined.*, and northern Babil in the hopes of opening up a second front was a failure. Insurgents who survived the fighting dispersed to the al-Qa‘im-Haditha*Error! Bookmark not defined.* area, Baghdad, northern Babil, or the Fallujah-Ramadi corridor. The loss of Fallujah had pushed the insurgency back, forcing those that remained to go underground and operate differently in the province than they had in the past. Because of this, insurgent efforts in early 2005 focused on reestablishing their organizations and infrastructure in Anbar.
The January Elections and Their Aftermath (January – March 2005)

AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. Regroups in the HitError! Bookmark not defined. Corridor

(S/REL TO USA, MCF) With the fall of Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined., one of AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. ’s top priorities was to find a safe area where they could reorganize and continue to operate. The Hit Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor was particularly attractive, as the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign launched in the summer of 2004 had largely suppressed local support for the Coalition.\(^1\) The intimidation campaign had especially affected the Iraqi police (IP) in Haditha. What little law enforcement presence remained was considered ineffective.\(^2\) Prior to Operation AL FAJR, many Haditha residents had welcomed this development, regarding the IP as thuggish and unnecessary, but they now found themselves virtually defenseless in the face of a large insurgent presence in their city.\(^3\) With only an intermittent presence of Coalition troops in the Hit-Haditha corridor, the insurgents saw it as a safe to regroup.

(S/NF) Zarqawi himself went to Mosul Error! Bookmark not defined. following his escape from Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined.. He concentrated on destabilizing that area. A large number of his followers in Anbar either fled to the Hit Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor, further to the west in Anbar (even as far as Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined. on the Syrian border), or sought shelter among Sunni extremists in Zaidon (about 30 km southwest of Fallajah near the Euphrates River) and Nasser Wa Salaam near Abu Ghraib.\(^4\) The influx of Salafist fighters fleeing Fallujah served as a radicalizing force on the local insurgents—who previously had a more criminal mindset. At least one ad-hoc AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. terrorist training camp was set up in Haditha to train replacements for those killed in Fallujah.\(^5\)

(S/NF) In a positive development, the religious radicalization of the core jihadist insurgents in Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. spurred many residents to provide intelligence to the Coalition despite increased intimidation. A possible explanation is the Haditha residents were willing

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2 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050109 | 20050109 | (S/NF) | ]
3 Ibid.
4 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050109 | 20050109 | (S/NF) | ]
5 [Military | I MEF: AO MSR/ASR ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 14-20, 2005 | presumed 20050120 | (S/NF) | ]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
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to tolerate the presence of the local SARand criminal insurgent forces but not the increasing number of Salafists and foreigners into the city.  

(S/NF) Under the leadership of Abu Abd al-Qadir, a small number of mid-level AQIError! Bookmark not defined. members remained active in the towns of Karmah and Saqlawiyah (about 10 km northwest of FallujahError! Bookmark not defined. on the Euphrates River), possibly searching for survivors from Operation AL FAJR. A wealthy man, al-Qadir also maintained ties to the local criminal element and was connected to a legitimate construction business that he hoped would win a $2,400,000 contract from the Iraqi Ministry of Health to build a dispensary.

(S/NF) While Zarqawi focused his operations on MosulError! Bookmark not defined. and BaghdadError! Bookmark not defined., he recognized the urgent need to rebuild his organization in Anbar. Towards that end, he traveled to Abu Ghraib disguised as a woman with a handful of trusted bodyguards to meet with SARleader and former IISError! Bookmark not defined. officer Sabah Khalaf Farhan al-Zobai (Sabah Khalaf) to assess the situation.

(S/REL TO USA, MCF) Following his meeting in early January 2005 with Sabah Khalaf, Zarqawi held a meeting of the AQIError! Bookmark not defined. Ansar al-Sunna (AS), and Jaysh Mohammed leadership at Abu Ghraib to assess the insurgency's prospects post-Operation AL FAJR and to begin working on a new strategy to prevent the creation of a stable Iraqi government.

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Khalaf

(S/NF) SABAH KHALAF. A former IISError! Bookmark not defined. officer, Sabah had been responsible for overseeing the IIS Assassination Committee. A close associate of both fugitive IIS Director Tahir Jalil Habbush and detained M-14 Director Mohammad Khudair Sabah, Sabah had a sincere interest in Salafism during Saddam Hussein’s rule. He allied himself first with SRE groups and then with AQIError! Bookmark not defined. Sabah’s close ties to the M-14 leadership gave him access to a cadre of experienced M-14 operatives and explosives experts across Anbar, particularly those active in the Karmah-based Green Battalion.

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, AND NZL) At least part of Zarqawi’s plan for sabotaging the Iraqi elections called for suicide bombers. Umar Hadid associate Abu Abd al-Rahman ordered foreign fighter facilitator Abu Husayn to increase the number of "grooms" (suicide bombers) for use in targeting polling booths during the Iraqi elections.

6 [ ] Military | MNF-W: STATE OF THE INSURGENCY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2005 | 20050905 (S/NF) | ]
7 [ ] Military | 2D RADIO BATTALION: ABU ABD AL QADIR, MARCH 13, 2005 | 20050313 | (S/NF) | ]
8 [ ] Military | DIR IMEF HET08 0174, DOI 7 JAN 05 | 20050113 | (S/NF) | ]
9 [ ] Military | DIR IMEF HET08 0199 05: DOI 23 JAN 05 | 20050125 | (S/REL USA AND MCF) | ]
10 [ ] Military | 2D RADIO BATTALION: ABU HUSAYN, JANUARY 2, 2005 | 20050102 | (S/NF) | ]
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(S/NF) A major asset for AQI's rebuilding efforts in Anbar lay in its retention of an external financial network. For instance, Ramadi financier Abu Khattab al-Ansari, who served as a member of an 82mm mortarmen team during Operation AL FAJR, maintained contact with Abu Durr (Abu al-Hour), a Saudi-based AQAM financier. Abu Durr was the primary conduit of funding to Zarqawi from Saudi Arabia and Europe via the UAE Error! Bookmark not defined. Other Zarqawi lieutenants such as Baghdad Error! Bookmark not defined. amir Abu Abd al-Aziz continued to easily access funds from Saudi-based clerics and NGOs. These funds added to fund from Iraq provided them with the finances to rebuild AQI.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) An event held at the end of January 2005 was a testimony to AQI's recovery. AQI leadership felt secure enough to hold a memorial service for Umar Hadid in Amariyah on January 27. It was even attended by the leadership of JS, Jaysh Mohammed, and some smaller Iraqi Salafist groups. Sabah Khalaf delivered the eulogy, stating that the death of Hadid would impact the insurgency's operational tempo if openly known and for that reason must be kept secret from both the Coalition and rank-and-file insurgents. Even the insurgent leaders were not told the true circumstances of Hadid's death, with Sabah telling them that he had been killed in Rutbah Error! Bookmark not defined. while shooting down a Coalition helicopter.

The Emergence of the Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR)

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Divisions within the Insurgency: While Zarqawi was looking for means to reinvigorate the insurgency, other insurgents were looking for a way out. The loss of Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined. had defeated the SAR insurgency. Many senior leaders of groups operating under the Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. Shura Council began looking for a way to engage politically to gain a stake in the new government. This led to divisions between SREs and members of the newly emerging Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR). While not crystal clear, these divisions appeared to divide the insurgency from 2005 onwards.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) SUNNI ARAB RESISTANCE (SAR). From 2005 onwards, Coalition forces used the term SAR to refer to those FRe's, tribal leaders, and emerging elites active within the insurgency who were open to political engagement and reconciliation with the Iraqi government despite their anti-Coalition activities. SARs rely on the Ba'ath Military Bureau, the former Iraqi security services, AmError! Bookmark not defined., AMSE Error! Bookmark not defined., and tribal networks for organization, with most SAR groups maintaining a Syria Error! Bookmark not defined. based political leadership to determine strategy and financing in addition to an Iraq-based military leadership.

11 AQAM (Al Qa'ida and Associated Movements) refers to the global effort by Al Qa'ida.
12 [ | Military | 2D RADIO BATTALION; ABU KHATTAB AL ANSARI, MARCH 2, 2005 | 20050302 | (S/NF)- ]
13 [ | Military | ...]
14 [ | Military | IMEF HET08 0205 05 | 20050128 | (S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)+ ]
15 [ | Military | STATE OF THE INSURGENCY MNF-W, SEPTEMBER 5, 2005 | presumed 20050905 | (S/NF)- ]

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The de facto leader of the SARs in Anbar Province was Muhammad Mahmud Latif (MML), the head of Ramadi.

In early 2005, Latif left Ramadi for Hit to convince other insurgent leaders to press for a political solution after their defeat in Operation AL FAJR. Contacting senior leaders of the Duluiyami tribal confederation, MML asked them to serve as intermediaries between the insurgency, the Coalition, and the Iraq Interim Government (IIG). This decision may have been prompted as much by his own perceived weakness as by a desire to negotiate with the Coalition. Like many SARs, MML feared the rise of AQI and Zarqawi's extremist interpretation of Islam.

The leader of the Ramadi network stretching from Hit to Fallujah. The former imam of the Abdullah Makrund Mosque in Ramadi, MML had been calling for jihad against the Coalition since 2003 and had impeccable SAR insurgent credentials. He was regarded as a leading religious figure by AMN.

MML's decision to push for a political solution to the insurgency was controversial within the Ramadi. MML led a schism within Jaysh Mohammed. While MML was a powerful insurgent leader in Anbar and too strong to be challenged by any one group, former Anbar Ba'lath Party Secretary Hani Nasser Raja al-Ubaydi refused to accept the leadership of MML's loyalists in Jaysh Mohammed. He formed his own Jaysh al-Haqq (JAH) splinter organization with the help of the brothers General Thunar Henefish al-Mahalawi and General Munir Thunar Henefish al-Mahalawi. Gaining the financial support of the Amman-based Abd al-Latif Humayin al-Kharbit (see Chapter 4), JAH remained active within Ramadi Shura Council but adamantly refused to listen to MML, instead working with AQI.

The emergence of SARs, and MML's decision to join the political process, illustrate one of the defining characteristics of the Iraqi insurgency: a remarkable fluidity of alliances, motivations and ideologies. Nevertheless, of the 10,000 Sunni insurgents estimated to be active by the Coalition at this time, 30% are believed to have been SREs, 45% SARs, and 25%

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16 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050517 | 20050117 | (S/NF) ]

17 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | (S/NF) ]

18 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050125 | 20050125 | (S/NF) ]
criminaled. It is important to note that the attitude of individual groups varied a great deal depending on the local environment. SRE/SAR differences did not rule out mutual collaboration. In many cases, membership within insurgent groups was fluid, with street-level insurgents moving easily between different groups.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) In addition, most of the non-SRE insurgent figures within the Karboli, Ubaydi, Rawi, Mahalowi, Salmani, Fahd, Khalifawi, Diab, Faraj, Alwan, Zobai, Halbusi, Jumayli, Mohamdi, Janabi, and Dulaymi tribes would likely be classified as SARs.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) While SAR insurgents were open to reconciliation with the IIG in theory, MML urged boycotting or sabotaging the January elections to demonstrate Sunni influence in Iraq. His view was seen by many as extremely radical at the time, but, came to be accepted by other insurgents later in 2005.

(S/REL) The SRE/SAR differences were also reflected among the Ba'athist leaders and former Iraqi political actors residing abroad. While some Ba'athsists still regarded themselves as loyal to the ideals of Pan-Arab socialism and had delusions about rescuing Saddam Hussein and restoring him to the presidency, most recognized—and exploited—the appeal of extremist rhetoric for soliciting international aid for the insurgency. However, the Ba'athist leaders exercised a limited role in inter-insurgent disputes in Anbar. Their primary role in the province's insurgency lay more in issuing periodic communiqués and providing insurgent groups access to funding through intermediary financiers. They simply did not exercise day-to-day operational control.

(S/REL) Despite the emergence of SREs and SARs as the predominant centers of the insurgency in Anbar, the vast majority of the rank and file insurgents in the province was made up of individuals who had served as military and security personnel under Saddam Hussein. However, many of these individuals had adopted Salafist beliefs since the fall of Saddam Hussein and hence were SREs regardless of their former backgrounds.

Anbar Prior to the 2005 Elections

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The situation in Anbar at the opening of 2005, while much improved from the previous year, remained volatile. After Operation AL FAJR, Anbar's provincial
government in Ramadi started to move again, but was severely compromised by the insurgents murder and intimidation campaigns. Anbar Governor Fasal Gaoud remained a weak authority figure. During his first week in office in November 2004, he had been forced to meet with representatives of Ramadi. Shura Council who gave him one month to remove Coalition forces from Ramadi or face the consequences. Regarded by many Anbaris as incapable of governing the province, he had already lost several key officials to kidnapping or resignation and made little effort to replace them.

The most improved area of Anbar was Fallujah. The city’s residents were grateful to the Coalition for launching Operation AL FAJR and blamed the insurgency for their current state of affairs. Having seen a glimpse of what Iraq would be like under Salafists, many Fallujah residents reduced their support to the insurgency despite their dislike of the Coalition presence and antipathy towards the IIG. Aversion to the insurgency rose to the point that a majority of Fallujahns expressed a desire for a permanent Coalition military force stationed in the city.

The Coalition and the IIG also sought to engage Sunnis in the political process by encouraging participation in the elections. This was no easy feat, as the elections were opposed not only by insurgents and Anbaris angry over Operation AL FAJR, but also by local Sunni leaders and incumbent officials at nearly every level. There were two main reasons for this opposition from local leaders: 1) fear they would lose their current standing and influence, and 2) concerns about insurgent violence. As a result, the individuals who should have supported the political process (the incumbents) were instead trying to depress turnout in the belief that it would protect their jobs.

Individual cities had additional issues that would keep participation in the elections low. Many Fallujah residents were completely ignorant of which parties and candidates were running for office, believing that their only option was to pray that the right people were elected. In Khalidiyah as in much of Anbar, residents regarded basic necessities like electricity and water as more important to them than abstract concepts like elections. There was

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23 [Military | 1ST MARINE DIVISION: IO WEEKLY OPERATIONS SUMMARY, January 8, 2005 | 20050108 | (S/NE) | ]
24 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050115 | 20050115 | (S/NE) | ]
25 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050110 | 20050110 | (S/NE) | ]
26 [Military | 1ST MARINE DIVISION: IO WEEKLY OPERATIONS SUMMARY, JANUARY 8, 2005 | 20050108 | (S/NE) | ]
27 [Military | 1ST MARINE DIVISION: IO WEEKLY OPERATIONS SUMMARY, JANUARY 29, 2005 | 20050129 | (S/NE) | ]
28 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050115 | 20050115 | (S/NE) | ]
29 Ibid.
serious concern that if they voted under their real names, the insurgents would get the voting
registers and target them for supporting the elections. A further concern was that the Shi'a would
impose their “distorted” views of Islam on the country. 30

(S/REL TO USA, MCF) While Iraqi election workers publicly claimed that up to 750,000 votes
were expected in Anbar, in private they conceded that only a few thousand residents were likely
to vote. In an effort to keep expectations low, Iraq's Sunni president Ghazi al-Yawar stated that many
Iraqis were unlikely to vote out of fears of bloodshed. He attempted to reassure the Sunni
community that those who didn't vote would still participate in talks for the new
constitution. 31

(S/REL TO USA, MCF) With Anbar incumbents failing to support the elections, the Coalition
turned to motivating other leaders in the province. In early January 2005 three meetings were
organized between the IIG and local tribal leaders. The first meeting, held in Fallujah. Error!
Bookmark not defined. included eight respected Anbari sheikhs from the Jumayli, Albu Issa,
Mohamadi, Zobai, Aluwani, Rawi, and Anni tribes. This meeting actively played to the Sunni fear of
Shi'a power in Iraq, with Fallujah's Shi'a police commander noting that Sunnis should vote if they
were so fearful of Shi'a power in Iraq. Somewhat surprisingly, the sheikhs were all supportive of
incumbent Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, regarding him as a "strong leader" and an acceptable Shi'a
candidate because of his secular nature. 32

(S/NE) The second meeting, attended by fifteen sheikhs, took place in mid-January 2005 at the
office of Interior Minister Falah Hassan al-Naqib. Al-Naqib was direct but non-confrontational,
noting that the only way for Sunnis to regain any political power was to participate in the elections.
All of the leaders that attended, however, were from areas with a heavy insurgent presence.
Intimidation was a more pressing concern than tribal allegiance. 33 Moreover, the senior members of
the Dulaymi confederation that attended had already lost considerable credibility among their own
tribesmen. They were perceived as corrupt and neglectful of their people and too close to the
Coalition. 34 A number of the Dulaymi sheikhs feared assassination if they returned to Anbar.

(S/NE) A third and final meeting occurred as a result of the efforts of United Iraqi Alliance
candidate and future Iraqi National Security Advisor Dr. Muhsin al-Ruba'i Khalil Ibrahim al-
Jabara. He wanted to enlist Sunni tribal leaders to support the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) despite
its overwhelming Shi'a majority. Even so, al Ruba'i's meeting was not without some positive results
as many of those Anbaris that did vote relied on their tribal leaders to tell them which parties
and candidates to support. 35

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30 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050129 | 20050129 | (S/NE) | ]
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050130 | 20050130 | (S/NE) | ]
34 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | (S/NE) | ]
35 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050130 | 20050130 | (S/NE) | ]

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(S/NF) National Iraqi political maneuvering also had consequences for the situation in Anbar. A considerable Shia bloc formed under the banner of the United Iraqi Alliance. Within the UIA, both the Da’wa Party and the Islamic Da’wa Party (IDP) began vying with the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)Error! Bookmark not defined.) to serve as the public face of the Iraqi Shia Leaders from both Da’wa parties had already endorsed Ibrahim Jaffari as prime minister, with SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz Hakim serving as his top rival. A major obstacle for the UIA in the early negotiations to select a prime minister lay in the fact that the alliance had poor internal discipline. The UIA was more an amalgamation of Iraqi Shia politics than it was a united parliamentary bloc. Because a 2/3 majority was required in parliament to form a government, the UIA’s need to form a coalition with Kurdish and Sunni politicians removed more divisive candidates like finance minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi or Hussain Shahristani. Incumbent president Ghazi al-Yawr and Adnan Pachachi also sought to obtain the presidency. For many Anbaris, the absence of any major Sunni candidates appeared to confirm insurgent claims that the elections were an American plot to install a Shia dictatorship in Iraq, further contributing to the boycott.

The January 2005 Elections

(U) While insurgent preparations to attack the elections had been underway for some time, the first public declaration to that effect was a January 23 audiotape by Zarqawi. In it, he denounced the elections, referring to the candidates as “demi-idols” and declaring those who voted as kuffar (unbelievers)—a clear threat to the security of those who took part in the election. In keeping with insurgent propaganda themes, Zarqawi stated that the Coalition was holding the elections in order to bring the Shia to power in Iraq. As a demonstration of his power, Zarqawi released a video of Salem Jaafar al-Kanani, Prime Minister Allawi’s political director, who was forced to read a statement urging Iraqis not to cooperate with the Coalition before being killed.

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(TAKFIR. The act of declaring a Muslim to be an unbeliever (kafir, pl. kuffar or kafirun) is called takfir. Those people who engage in this act are called “takifiris.” Takfir involves far more than a religious declaration, however. Traditionally, once a Muslim is declared an unbeliever or an apostate, he loses all right to property (including the right to inherit or pass on through inheritance any property), he is automatically divorced from his wife, and his blood becomes licit (i.e., he can be killed without any penalty). In the past, only the state could declare a Muslim to be an apostate or unbeliever, and takfir was a rare event. Today, most jihadists believe that they have the right to declare takfir and then to kill the apostates and take their property.

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36 [ | 14c, 6(0)(c) of 50 USC § 350 | 200500125 | (S/NF) | ]
37 [ | Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS/ ROBERT H. REID: OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES ELECTION WOES | 200500123 | (U) | ]
38 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINSTUM 050127 | 200500127 | (S/NF) | ]

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Voter Intimidation

(S/NE) Zarqawi’s attack on the elections coincided with a major information campaign spearheaded by his UAE-based propaganda chief Abu Maysarah al-Iraqi. Operating primarily through the internet, Abu Maysarah posted hundreds of online messages denouncing the elections. To maximize his appeal internationally, he quoted from the writings of the late J’TJ spiritual leader Sheikh Abu Anas al-Shami and posted rare photos of 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta.39

(S/NE) Zarqawi’s threat to kill those who took part in the Iraqi elections, as well as his continued massacres of ordinary Shi’a, led to a trend that would have tragic consequences for the people of Iraq. Frustrated with what they saw as inaction on the part of the Iraqi government towards Zarqawi and his attacks on Shi’a, in mid-January 2005 members of the Da’wa Party and SCRIError! Bookmark not defined.'s Badr Brigade paramilitary wing formed the al-Mukhtar Battalion, a death squad designed to hunt down and kill suspected Salafists, Wahhabis, and Ba’athists.40

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The insurgent push to counter the elections in Anbar began on January 27 with a major spike in attacks throughout the eastern part of the province, such as the Abu Harun Group’s attacks on polling sites in Ramadi.41 That same day, the IIG implemented a national curfew until February 1, attempting to empower local Iraqi leaders and the security forces to provide security for elections.42

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The national curfew appears to have blunted a number of planned insurgent attacks in Anbar. In Ramadi, Mohammed Daham's followers in the Ramadi Shura Council and the Abu Harun Group had planned to send fighters from Ramadi to Baghdad to carry out attacks on polling stations but were prevented from doing so by the traffic ban.43 Their objectives were to:

- Attack U.S. forces to create chaos and mayhem and divert security from polling places
- Attack polling places and Shi’a to prevent them from voting
- Not harm Sunnis, but intimidate them so that they will not vote

(S/NE) Plans to carry out attacks within Ramadi itself were organized by Colonel Ayad (Abu Omar), a former member of Qusay Hussein’s Security Service and deputy to Umar Hadid. He oversaw the murder and intimidation campaign in the city during the run-up to the election. Colonel Ayad, however, was unprepared for the IIG’s use of multiple polling

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39 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050129 | 20050129 | (S/NE) | ]
40 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | (S/NE) | ]
41 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050127 | 20050127 | (S/NE) | ]
42 Ibid.
43 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | (S/NE) | ]

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stations, believing that only Government Centers or local high schools would be used. The insurgent plan also failed to take into account the large number of Coalition and Iraqi National Guard forces active on the streets during the elections.\(^{44}\)

\(^{44}\) [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050129 | 20050129 | (S/NE) | ]

(S/NF) Other groups conspiring to disrupt or prevent the elections included:

- AQI\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\)
- Nationalistic groups such as Jaysh al-Haqq
- Smaller AQI\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\) associate groups such as the Umar Hadid Battalion

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Plans to attack voters in Fallujah\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\) by local SAR leaders Karim Karkaz and Zaydan Khalaf were similarly called off when it became clear that they would be unable to get VBIEDs within range of the polling sites.\(^{45}\)

\(^{45}\) [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | (S/NE) | ]

(S/NF) Despite its failure to carry out attacks in Anbar during the election, AQI\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\) did successfully attack voters and polling sites in both Mosul\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\) and Baghdad\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\). Even with the insurgent failure to carry out major attacks against polling sites in Anbar, however, the combination of the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign, a lack of Anbari political support, and Sunni popular antipathy towards the IIG created an effective boycott in Anbar. Total voter turnout for the province was 16,588, with only 2,300 voting in Ramadi\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\). The largest single turnout was nearly 5,000 in the majority Shi’a city of Nasser Wa Salaam and lowest was in Karmah where there was no voting at all due to widespread fear of retaliation.\(^ {46}\)

\(^{46}\) [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050130 | 20050130 | (S/NE) | ]

Political Results from the Elections

(U) Unofficial national election results for all of Iraq had the Shi’a UIA winning 47.6% of vote, with the Kurdish Alliance coming in second at 25.4%. Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraq List, which would have been the most acceptable of the three to Anbaris, only received 13.6%.

(S/NF) In provincial elections, the IIP\(^{\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}}\) won thirty-four of forty-one seats in Anbar running on a platform of freeing Iraq from the Coalition, resisting foreign influence, building national unity, empathizing with the Iraqi people, and creating a good life for every Iraqi, based on Islamic principles.\(^ {48}\) Regarding Governor Gaoud’s personality as the source of many of the problems in Anbar, the IIP pressed for former deputy provincial council chairman Mamoun Sami...
Rasheed to be the new governor of Anbar. A consummate politician, Mamoun had a good relationship with the Coalition but appears to have committed electoral “improprieties” in order to ensure the IIP’s political dominance in Anbar.  

(S/REL) Despite the widespread Sunni boycott in Anbar, many Anbari political parties adopted a "wait and see" approach toward the new national government. Moderating their earlier rhetoric and minimizing challenges to the election’s legitimacy, many Sunni political leaders announced that they were willing to accept secular Shi’a control of the government as long as it did not result in an Iranian-style theocracy. While this was not likely since none of the prominent Iraqi Shi’a political parties advocated a Khomeinist system of governance, it was a major concern in Anbar and other parts of Iraq. Hence the statements by Sunni political leaders helped to encourage some Sunnis to work with the new government.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Sunni politicians Adnan Pachachi and Muhsin Abd al-Hamid expressed despondency about the Sunni marginalization resulting from the boycott. Many Iraqi Sunnis who had previously supported the boycott of the national elections now realized that the party would have little influence in the new government. The IIP's threat to boycott had been intended to postpone the elections or lead to a reform in the electoral process. Now, however, IIP leaders recognized that they had to work together with other Sunni parties to preserve their influence over the constitutional ratification process and over the establishment of a permanent Iraqi government. The table below shows the evolution of governance of Iraq from 2003 to 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(U) Governance Organization</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Religion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Jay Garner</td>
<td>4/21/03-5/16/03</td>
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<td>CPA / Iraqi Governance Council</td>
<td>L. Paul Bremer</td>
<td>5/03-6/04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Interim Government</td>
<td>Ayad Alawi - Prime Minister</td>
<td>6/04-4/05</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Iraq (Sovereign)</td>
<td>Ibrahim Jaafari - Prime Minister</td>
<td>4/7/05-4/22/06</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Iraq (Sovereign)</td>
<td>Nouri Maliki - Prime Minister</td>
<td>4/22/06 - present</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
</tr>
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49 Ibid.
50 [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050215 20050215 (S/REL MCFI)
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.

6/13/07
Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028
Figure 1. Governance in Iraq, 2003 to 2006

One reason for the temporary accommodation by the new Sunni elites lay in their realization that, far from being a monolith, the Shi'a were just as internally divided as the Sunni. Secular Shi'a leader Ahmed Chalabi initially sought backing from UIA supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, only to be deserted when Ali Sumasem, his main contact in the Sadr camp, lost favor with Muqtada al-Sadr. With Chalabi defeated, the Islamic Da'wa Party (IDP) candidate Ibrahim al-Jaafari was able to win the support of SCIRI Bookmark not defined. from former finance minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi, ensuring his nomination as the UIA's candidate for prime minister.

The Sunni calculations about their new political situation were thus complicated by a number of factors. On the one hand, the Sunnis leadership thought the new Iraqi National Assembly unlikely to settle important issues, instead drafting a broad and diluted constitution in order to secure minority support and defer a potential veto. Thus most of the major concerns that sparked the Sunni boycott would be deferred until a new government was elected and installed in 2006, giving Sunni political figures another year to maneuver.

On the other hand, when SCIRI Bookmark not defined. began holding meetings in Baghdad Bookmark not defined. in February to advocate the creation of a federalist system that promised the southern Shi'a regions of Iraq some degree of local autonomy, fears of the new government were rekindled in Anbar. While SCIRI did not command a majority within the UIA, its success in elections allowed it to wield a disproportionate amount of influence.

Efforts to achieve Sunni political participation in Anbar in early 2005 were also deeply affected by the machinations of AMS Bookmark not defined. leaders Harith al-Dhari and Mohammed Hardan Hashim. Harith al-Dhari in particular continued to demand Coalition withdrawal, painting the Iraqi elections as fraudulent and inflaming tensions by claiming that al-Najaf was rebuilt after the Coalition fought al-Sadr while Fallujah Bookmark not defined. continued to stagnate.

To win Anbari support for the new government, the Coalition and IIG began a "hearts and minds" campaign. Governor Gaoud met with Albu Dhiyab, Albu Nimr, and Albu Issa tribal leaders to discuss the special release of the prominent Albu Dhiyab tribal leader

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53 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050215 | 20050215 | (S/NF) |
54 | Ibid. |
55 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050206 | 20050206 | (S/NF) |
56 | Ibid. |
57 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050205 | 20050205 | (S/NF) |
58 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050208 | 20050208 | (S/NF) |
59 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050203 | 20050203 | (S/NF) |
60 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050215 | 20050215 | (S/NF) |

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028
Sheikh Hamid Turki Zurbin, who had been detained by the Coalition. The release of Sheikh Hamid generated a considerable amount of goodwill among Anbari tribal leaders, particularly when it became known that Sheikh Hamid had now adopted a pro-Coalition outlook and issued public statements stating that the Coalition was in Iraq to help the Iraqi people, that they treated the local population with respect, and that cooperation with the Coalition was necessary to make Iraq peaceful again. Yet the Abu Ghraib scandal continued to persuade many Anbaris that they would be treated inhumanely if they were detained by the Coalition.

Post-Election Realizations (February 2005)

The result of these pressures was that Sunni political parties in Anbar were hesitant to support the new Iraqi government. While apprehensive about likely Shi'a control of the government, many Sunni political leaders were willing to accept Shi'a political dominance as long as it did not install an Iranian-style system of government. In an effort to counter secular Anbari Sunnis formed the Sunni Movement to Protect Iraq.

Interestingly, the insurgency as a whole also adopted a "wait and see" approach, some because of logistical difficulties and others due to a desire to participate in the political process. Those who wished to continue the fight had the necessary manpower and munitions to surge attacks but now lacked the necessary planners and expertise because of losses suffered during Operation AL FAJR. The result was a halt in fighting across Anbar, suggesting that insurgent capabilities had temporarily peaked during the period of attacks in the run-up to the elections.

City Stories – Early 2005

General Observations

Much of western Anbar served as insurgent bases after the defeat in Fallujah. MML maintained his base in the Hit. Ramadi maintained his base in the Hit region, while other major centers of insurgent activity were along the Haditha. Bayji and Husaybah. Rawah, and Mosul corridors, with the insurgent leaders based in Rawah overseeing much of the insurgency in western Anbar. In addition to MML, the major insurgent leader in the region was Ghassan.
Amean, who was the overall AQI leader for far western Anbar.\textsuperscript{68} Ghassan Amean had ties to a Saudi AQAM leader who was alleged to be the nephew of ‘Usama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{69}

**Haditha and Vicinity**

Haditha’s poor security conditions and the prevalence of Islamist ideology helped the city to largely replace Fallujah and Ramadi as a final waypoint for foreign fighters bound for Baghdad.\textsuperscript{69} Near Haditha, AQI leader Aqaba Nafah al-Hayani controlled many of the mosques in Haqlaniyah and Barwanah, conducting armed patrols in the city whenever Coalition forces were not present.\textsuperscript{72} Prior to Operation RIVER BLITZ (February-March 2005), Aqaba Nafah al-Hayani, Hamed Dawoud Azawi, and Abu Taha were the major insurgent leaders in Haditha.\textsuperscript{73}

**Al-Qa’im and Husaybah**

Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, a successor group to the earlier Al Theeb, served as the major insurgent group in Husaybah.\textsuperscript{74} Motivated as much by anger and criminality as by religion, the group was led by Bassim Mohammad Fayad and Ra'ad Salah Mutar. Mutar in particular was an infamous figure in Husaybah. He was reputed to have kidnapped as many as 50 Iraqis for working for the police, the national guard, or the Coalition during the previous year. The group was supported by wealthy Iraqis living in Syria and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{74} With the aid of Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, Husaybah insurgents facilitated the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq, with Husaybah serving as a last stop for foreign fighters bound for Mosul, Bayji, Ramadi and Baghdad.\textsuperscript{73}

**Hit**

\textsuperscript{68} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | (S/NI) | ]
\textsuperscript{69} [Military | IMPACTS ON THE LOCAL INSURGENCY FOLLOWING THE DETAINMENT OF GHASSAN AMEAN — AO DENVER SIGNIFICANT REPORTING | (S/NI) | ]
\textsuperscript{70} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050218 | 20050218 | (S/REL MCFI) | ]
\textsuperscript{71} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | (S/NI) | ]
\textsuperscript{72} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050201 | 20050201 | (S/NI) | ]
\textsuperscript{73} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | (S/NI) | ]
\textsuperscript{74} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050204 | 20050204 | (S/NI) | ]
\textsuperscript{75} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050218 | 20050218 | (S/REL MCFI) | ]
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(S/REL TO USA, MCP) Some of the insurgents in HitError! Bookmark not defined. had relocated from FallujahError! Bookmark not defined. and RamadiError! Bookmark not defined. with some led by MML. They successfully exploited the city’s tribal dynamics and long tradition of opposition to outside authority. Local leaders of the insurgency in Hit were Waseib Hamoud Albu Aber and Khalid Abdul Rahman.

(S/NF) The situation in HitError! Bookmark not defined. was complicated by the presence of a major ally of Ba’athist leader Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri (see Chapter 3). Now an ally of AQIError! Bookmark not defined., al-Douri continued to support the insurgency from SyriaError! Bookmark not defined., using arms received from his contacts in 14b, 14c and sending them into Iraq through an elaborate network of professional arms smugglers headed up by Aleppo-based former JISError! Bookmark not defined. officer Mahdi' Inad Latif al-Dulaymi. Coordinating with his remaining loyalists in BaghdadError! Bookmark not defined. and MosulError! Bookmark not defined. under the banner of the New Ba’ath Party and supported by money smuggled to Syria after the fall of the former regime, al-Douri promised his Ba’athist followers that they would be reinstated to high-level government positions when the Ba’athist came back to power. Among al-Douri’s followers was Hit-based Green Battalion leader Nu’man Janabi (Abu Abdal al-Rahman), who had been protected by al-Douri after the fall of the regime and fled to the Ghazalayh district of Baghdad during Operation AL FAJR. Indicative of the tactical cooperation between al-Douri and AQI was the fact Nu’man’s top deputy was Essa Hani Abood Albu Issa (Major Haydi, Essa al-Alghani), an al Qa’ida-trained Iraqi who had been among Zarqawi’s first recruits into JTError! Bookmark not defined. when he arrived in FallujahError! Bookmark not defined. in 2002-2003.

RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.

(S/NF) Insurgent Infighting: In early February 2005, infighting broke out in RamadiError! Bookmark not defined. between members of Jaysh Mohammed loyal to MML and AQIError! Bookmark not defined. fighters led by Haikal Khalid loyal to Zarqawi. This conflict may have been caused by MML’s efforts to establish order within the insurgency. In early February 2005, MML ordered Jaysh Mohammed leader Turki Athawri, a member of the Albu Issa tribe, to cease targeting Coalition forces and instead kill the "criminals" who had dishonored the insurgency by killing Iraqis when they were supposedly attacking the Coalition. Echoing MML’s sentiments, religious and tribal leaders in the FallujahError! Bookmark not defined.-Ramadi corridor began condemning violence perpetrated by the “criminal” mujahideen.

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76 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050218 | 20050218 | (S-REL-MCP) ]
77 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | (S/NF) ]
78 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | (S/NF) ]
79 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050327 | 20050327 | (S/NF) ]
80 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | (S/NF) ]
81 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050208 | 20050208 | (S-REL-MCP) ]
82 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050213 | 20050213 | (S/NF) ]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

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The fighting soon spread to other cities such as Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah, and Karmah and encompassed other groups like the Green Battalion. Jaysh al-Haq and the Ba'ath Party in Ramadi assisted Jaysh Mohammed in its efforts to push AQI out of the city, forming a new organization known by the acronym MHB and vowing to destroy any insurgent group that engaged in takfir. In response, AQI assassinated associates of Mohammed Daham (the de facto leader of Ramadi Shura Council while MML was away from the Ramadi), while refraining from attacks on Daham himself, to force him to end the fighting. Saraya al-Jihad leader Mutiyad Shami (Abu Hawra) became so frustrated with inter-insurgent fighting in Ramadi (as well as being targeted by the Coalition) that he relocated to Diwaniyah with his associates. At the same time, Daham was being attacked by the Coalition because he continued to attack their forces even while supposedly engaged in a war with AQI.

Daham used the notoriety he had received from being targeted by the Coalition to leverage a truce between Jaysh Mohammed and AQI. The fighting between Daham and AQI came to an end about the time Operation RIVER BLITZ began.

The Ramadi Hospital was one of his key strongholds and his main command and control HQ, exploiting Coalition restrictions on searching hospitals and mosques. Additionally, the emergency room doctors were unwilling to cooperate with the Coalition due to intimidation. The bodies of dead insurgent fighters were dropped off at the morgue after the Ramadi Shura Council had informed their families of their death.
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Fallujah

Foreign fighter movement in the Fallujah area was controlled by Abu Muhammad in the Qaryat al-Fuhaylat area. A deputy to AQI leader Abu Sayf, Abu Muhammad answered to Syrian Zarqawi lieutenant Abu Jafar and had ties to the Abu Rashid network in Amariyah.  

Additional financial support was provided to the insurgency by the resident Sheikh Ghazi Sami Abbas, an international businessman and one of the five richest men in Iraq. Sheikh Ghazi had close ties to Saddam, Uday, Qusay, and Baqon al-Rashid and helped to protect Saddam’s wife and daughters after the fall of Baghdad. The primary recipients of Sheikh Ghazi’s largesse in Anbar were Sahad al-Fahad and Umar Hadid associate Abu Sayf.

Rutbah

Iraqi border police chief Hareth Tariq Sirheed stole money from the Iraqi government and used it to fund the insurgency in Baghdad. At the direction of his father, FRE General Tariq Sirheed Hareth used his position to facilitate smuggling operations in Rutbah and Akashat, coordinating smuggling networks from Syria all the way to Baghdad. His activities were exposed and he was forced to flee Rutbah for the Iraqi capital. No official police chief existed in Rutbah but a man named Mr. Hussein ran the department. The Iraqi National Guard stationed in the city noticed that their paychecks were shrinking, further increasing their inclination towards criminality.

Zaidon, Amariyah and Karmah

During February 2005, groups of Salafists and SARs began regrouping in Khalidiyah, Amariyah, Karmah, and Zaidon, using the villages as areas from which to mount attacks in Fallujah and Ramadi. Exploiting local shortages of fuel and electricity, insurgents used the slow progress and poor services in Anbar as reasons for residents of these towns to join them. Other insurgent fighters gathered on the southern end of Lake Thar Thar as well as the Jazira area and the Sulia district of Ramadi.
Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province, Iraq
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(S/REL TO USA, MCFT) Local conditions allowed the insurgency to operate in the small towns. In Khalidiyah, Muhammad Salah Hamadi, the commander of the 502nd Iraqi National Guard Battalion, was forced to provide Iraqi military funding to the insurgents in order to prevent his unit from being targeted. In Karmah only thirty of 117 Iraqi police officers showed up for work due to insurgent intimidation, though all of Karmah police continued to receive pay. Of those still working in the city to guard the bank and city, most were passive supporters of the insurgency. Majid Hamid Modhe Halbusi, the head of the Karmah city council, was reduced to meeting with the Green Battalion to improve his stature in the city.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFT) Zaidon, a small town of about 7,000 populated by farmers, fishermen and day laborers from the Zoba tribe, became extremely important for AQIM. Since the 1980s, the Zoba had been at the center of Wahhabi missionary activity in the region, activity sanctioned by Saddam and supported by local resident. Zarqawi associate, Sabah Khalaf. Zoba tribal leaders Nafia Aswad Khashif, General Mohammed Aswad Khashif, General Zbar Hadi Yousif Jrsan, and Ahmed Madhul Fiza Shatari all supported the insurgents, allowing money and weapons to be brought into the area using smuggling networks.

(S/REL TO USA AND MCFT) Zarqawi believed Zaidon secure enough to hold a meeting with AQAM leaders from Sudan and Saudi Arabia at Sabah Khalaf's home. The details of what was discussed is unknown, but since mid-January 2005 Usama bin Laden had been requesting Zarqawi undertake preparations to attack the continental U.S. This was likely the subject of the meeting. In response to bin Laden's request, Zarqawi sent a number of non-Arab operatives to an unknown location to prepare to carry out the attacks. While Zarqawi had some ideas concerning targets in the U.S., he was preoccupied with the insurgency in Iraq and left the operation in the hands of senior AQAM leaders.

(S/REL TO MCFT) In Amariyah, Salafist insurgent leader Fasil Hussein Jabar (called "Sheikh Fasil" by residents because of his power and influence despite not actually being a sheikh) was chairman of the city council, and used the Muslim Brotherhood as a cover for his activities. Lieutenant Colonel Nuri, the commander of the Iraqi National Guard in Ferris Town (a housing area in Amariyah), was a follower of Jabar and until his February 28 arrest abused his authority to support the insurgency. He ordered his troops to display their weapons without wearing their uniforms so the people could not distinguish the insurgents from National Guard Forces out of uniform. Together, Jabar and Nuri were able to subvert the Iraqi National Guard and police in Amariyah and Ferris Town,

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95 [ | Military | ]
96 [ | Military | ]
97 [ | Military | ]
99 [ | Military | ]
99 [ | Military | ]
100 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050224 | 20050224 | ]
101 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | ]

6/13/07
Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028
making them work with local insurgent leaders to counter any attacks by the Coalition.\footnote{102}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | (S/NF) | ]

The chief bomb maker in the city was Emad Diechi, an Iraqi national who had trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan\footnote{103}[Ibid. The reporting does not specify the nature of bin Laden’s order.]. but had been ordered by bin Laden to return to Iraq to join the insurgency at some point after May 2003.\footnote{104}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050220 | 20050220 | (S/NF) | ]

Operations RIVER BLITZ (February 2005) and RIVER BRIDGE (March 2005)

(S/REL TO MCFI) To mask the relief-in-place of I MEF by II MEF, the Coalition launched two consecutive operations, RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE. Preceded by raids in Rawah\footnote{105}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050317 | 20050317 | (S/REL MCFI) | ] but had been ordered by bin Laden to return to Iraq to join the insurgency at some point after May 2003.\footnote{106}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050223 | 20050223 | (S/REL MCFI) | ]

RIVER BLITZ was designed to disrupt insurgent groups during the changeover.\footnote{107}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050221 | 20050221 | (S/NF) | ]

Coalition forces launched twelve raids in the first eight days of the operation, capturing 117 detainees including mid-level AQI\footnote{108}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050221 | 20050221 | (S/NF) | ] leaders Hamed Dawoud Azawi (AKA Saud Mohammed Jassim), Raad Daham Noseyef, Abu Othman, and Abu Harun Group leader Mohammed Nassir Ali al-Faraj.\footnote{109}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050221 | 20050221 | (S/NF) | ]

RIVER BLITZ forced fighters into flight throughout the region and disrupted insurgent networks. Thus, Ramadi\footnote{110}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050221 | 20050221 | (S/NF) | ] Shura Council members were forced to flee towards Akashat and the southern end of Lake Thar Thar,\footnote{111}[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050222 | 20050222 | (S/NF) | ] (where they were joined by insurgents from Hit\footnote{Ibid. The reporting does not specify the nature of bin Laden’s order.}.\footnote{Military} TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050223 | 20050223 | (S/REL MCFI) | ] MML and Daham both fled to Syria\footnote{Military} TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050222 | 20050222 | (S/NF) | ] along with many other fighters from Ramadi.\footnote{Military} TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050222 | 20050222 | (S/NF) | ]

(S/REL TO MCFI) Immediately after RIVER BLITZ the Coalition launched RIVER BRIDGE to specifically target key leaders and facilitators. The operation established an aggressive military presence from Iskandariyah in the south to Haditha\footnote{Military} TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050220 | 20050220 | (S/NF) | ] in the north. Insurgent facilitators Abu Husayn, Abu Umar, and Abu Mohammed were all captured, as were al-Asa’ab al-Iraq leadership in Husaybah\footnote{Military} TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050220 | 20050220 | (S/NF) | ] (including founder Abdel Mehlif Abdel Hadi) and the AQI\footnote{Military} TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050220 | 20050220 | (S/REL MCFI) | ] leadership in Haditha, causing

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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 20150606
widespread disruption to insurgent networks and forcing them to revise or cancel planned attacks. Local insurgents in Hit \[ \textit{Bookmark not defined.} \] and Haditha were told to remain underground or flee west towards Husaybah and al-Qa‘im. Those fighters who had taken refuge around Lake Thar Thar were forced to flee southeast.\footnote{To escape being targeted by RIVER BRIDGE, insurgent leaders who had previously been hiding in the remote areas of Anbar fled to Diyala \[ \textit{Bookmark not defined.} \], Salahaddin, and Nineveh to seek refuge with allied tribes. Among them was Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, who appointed Sheikh Kassim al-Abaidy as his temporary successor while he left the province. While many insurgent leaders were divided as to whether or not to regroup in Ramana (near Al Qa‘im), none intended to give up the fight against the Coalition.\footnote{The most notable improvement was in Hit \[ \textit{Bookmark not defined.} \] and Haditha \[ \textit{Bookmark not defined.} \], where residents became far more pro-Iraqi government and pro-MNF after the operations. This may have been because the situation in the two cities had deteriorated so severely due to intermittent troop presence before RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE. Insurgents had enforced on both cities all the trappings of an Islamist totalitarian theocracy: secret police, \textit{shari'a} courts, \textit{hadd} punishments, intense propaganda, concentrations of foreign fighters, and an oppressive murder and intimidation campaign to deter local resistance.}}

Consequences of RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE

Positive Achievements of the Operations

\[ \textit{REL TO MCFI} \] The purpose of the two operations was never to hold territory, only to keep insurgent groups occupied until II MEF was firmly in place. The actual results of the operations were ambiguous. On the one hand certain areas were cleared of fighters and their leadership, local supporters of the Iraqi government were reassured, and attacks were disrupted, improving the security environment. In towns as remote as Rutbah \[ \textit{Bookmark not defined.} \], for instance, 200 police agreed to return to work, keeping the city safe and responding to resident reports about insurgent activity as long as they continued to receive Coalition support.\footnote{Coalition and local governments took other steps to create greater stability and security throughout the province. The Shi‘a Public Order Brigade in Fallujah \[ \textit{Bookmark not defined.} \], accused by the largely Sunni population of heavy-handed tactics and disrespect for local
women, purged several members in an effort to address these concerns. In an attempt to improve the regular police, Governor Gaoud fired Deputy Provincial Police Chief (Acting Provincial Police Chief) Jassim Mohammed Bad'a. However, he was forced by the Interior Ministry to rehire him for lack of a suitable replacement.

(U) PUBLIC ORDER BRIGADES: 2005: In January 2005, after the election, the new government led by Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, the Ministry of Interior (the Ministry responsible for national-level police forces) came under the control of SCIRI. Using a purge of officers, SCIRI increased its control. In early May 2005, three brigades of counter-insurgency commandos (the Wolf and Volcano Brigades - paramilitary commandos) and the Scorpion Brigades operated in a number of areas. Allegations exist that as a Shia dominated and Muqtada al-Sadr controlled force these commandos operated as death squads. Most of the commandos were trained in.

(S/NF) To counter the burgeoning AQI campaign, the Iraqi Interior Ministry began two new television series, “Confessions,” and the “Terrorists in the Grip of Justice,” designed to expose the reality behind insurgent propaganda. Both shows featured videos of insurgent confessions and were aired on national stations. The confessions demonstrated that the insurgents were responsible for death and destruction across Iraq, pointed out that many insurgents were motivated by money rather than nationalism or religion, and showed that at least some fighters used drugs to embolden themselves for attacks. Because of intimidation and threats, the Coalition at first had trouble finding Anbar stations willing to broadcast the two series. Once they succeeded, both programs had some impact in discouraging attacks and in encouraging Anbaris to see the insurgents as responsible for problems with security in their communities.

(S/NF) Zarqa recognized the problems his operations faced and held a meeting with surviving leaders of the former Fallujah. Following the meeting, AQI implemented new OPSEC measures across Anbar, issuing three different “warrior” kanji (nicknames or aliases) to each member. An effort was made to put the aliases as well as the birth names of every member on forged or valid Iraqi identification cards. AQI members were instructed only to use their “warrior” name with other members of their immediate cell and to discard it after completing a major attack. Street-level

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117 [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050326 | 20050326 | (S/NF) [ ]
118 [Military] TACREP/OCAC2-0314-05 | 20050310 | (S/REL USA, CAN, AUS) [ ]
120 Ibid., p. 3, 7.
121 [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050311 | 20050311 | (S/NF) [ ]
[Military] TACREP/OCAC2-0421-05 | 20050421 | (S/NF) [ ]
[Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050401 | 20050401 | (S/NF) [ ]
122 [Military] 14c 20050224 | (SECRET//REL GBR, CAN, AUS) [ ]

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members were not to be told the identity of mid-level leaders and mid-level leaders were routinely rotated from positions ranging from cell leader to commander to planner to supervisor to facilitator to ensure operational security.\footnote{\textit{KUNYA} (pl. \textit{KUNIYAT}). It is sunna (accepted Islamic practice) for Muslims to have a nickname or \textit{kunya}. Generally, \textit{kunyats} are in the form “Abu” (father) or “Umm” (mother) plus the name of the bearer’s child. It is also permissible to have a \textit{kunya} that honors a pious predecessor, shows tribal or national affiliation, or that indicates something significant about the bearer (i.e. height, courage, devotion to God). Anyone trained in al-Qa’ida camps have \textit{kunyats} that are used \textit{as noms de guerre} (warrior names), as do most of the mujahideen in places like Iraq.}

Unintended Consequences of the Operations

The Insurgency Re-establishes Itself

\textit{(S/NF)} Because neither \textit{RIVER BLITZ} nor \textit{RIVER BRIDGE} was designed to permanently clear, hold, or build Anbar Province, they had three unintended consequences. First, some insurgents simply kept quiet or fled only until Coalition forces left. They then resumed their murder and intimidation campaigns. Second, the displacement of insurgents into previously untouched territory gave them the opportunity to build new terrorist networks. And third, the disruption of financial networks led to a considerable rise in criminality throughout the region, as insurgents scrambled to find alternative funding for their activities.

\textit{(S/REL TO MCFT)} The examples of Hit,\footnote{Hit: Error! Bookmark not defined., Haditha,\footnote{Haditha: Error! Bookmark not defined.} and Ramadi,\footnote{Ramadi: Error! Bookmark not defined.} demonstrate what happened when insurgents went undercover until the operations ended. In Haditha, local insurgents remained in the city even though their leaders took flight west or north to avoid being targeted. In Hit, the insurgents fled the city briefly, but then returned when Coalition forces left, vowing retaliation against those who cooperated with the Coalition. Among them was a particularly infamous group of Syrian foreign fighters who, after the operations ended, beat and threatened to kill residents who had allowed the Coalition to use their homes and shops.\footnote{There was a “carrot” side to the Syrian “stick,” however: they offered $5,000 to anyone who agreed to join the insurgency with a regular salary of $500 a month. In short, the insurgent’s salaries were twice what a government soldier or police officer received.}} They offered $5,000 to anyone who agreed to join the insurgency with a regular salary of $500 a month. In short, the insurgent’s salaries were twice what a government soldier or police officer received.

\textit{(S/NF)} In Ramadi,\footnote{Ramadi: Error! Bookmark not defined.} many insurgents, like MML, leaders from AS, and other prominent members of the Ramadi Shura Council temporarily fled the city while others laid low until Coalition operations subsided.\footnote{In the absence of its leaders, the Ramadi Shura Council came under the control of Abu Hanin, Abu Hawra, and AQI,\footnote{AQI: Error! Bookmark not defined.}} In the absence of its leaders, the Ramadi Shura Council came under the control of Abu Hanin, Abu Hawra, and AQI.
defined. leader Sheikh Rafa al-Rawi, who were able to reconstitute the insurgent networks in the Ma'laab, Sufia, and Jazira districts before the operation was concluded. AQI, under the leadership of Haikal Khalid, even strengthened its presence in the Sufia district, although it was now forced to create kidnapping rings to generate badly-needed funding. AQI and others used the Al Haq mosque and the Ramadi General Hospital in Sufia as their primary staging areas. The Ramadi Women and Children's Hospital was also used to treat wounded fighters and to conduct surveillance of Coalition forces. Several doctors at the hospital treated insurgents in rooms not used by regular patients, registering them under false names to keep them from being tracked by the Coalition.

The Insurgency is Displaced (March 2005)

(S/NF) The displacement of insurgents westward created new opportunities for the insurgency. The increasing concentration of insurgents in western Anbar led AQI to coordinate with Quwwat Allah al-Tharib to regain influence in Haditha and then expand their operations to a larger area. In addition to Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, AQI also enlisted al-As'aab al-Iraq and Salafis Takfiris to assist in these efforts, leading to increased coordination between insurgents in Husaybah and Haditha, and Rawah. As many as 1,000 AQI fighters were reportedly active in Husaybah, armed with mortars, RPGs, and AK-47s. This led to fighting between AQI and local insurgents who were tired of fighting the Coalition and resented the presence of the displaced foreign fighters. As a result, AQI began targeting civilians inside the city and pressuring sheikhs to stop using the mosque loudspeakers for preaching unless they were willing to preach jihad.

(S/NF) Despite the predominance of AQI in western Anbar, MML would also develop considerable influence among insurgents in the area, using his connections with Sheikh Abdullah Janabi to control a new network of insurgent cells between Hit and Saqlawiyyah. The tensions between AQI and MML, created by MML's decision to consider political engagement, was further exacerbated when the AMS issued a fatwa forbidding the targeting of Iraqi National Guard members. In response, AQI increased dramatically their kidnapping and murders of ING soldiers. The Special Police

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128 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050304 | 20050304 | (S/NF) | ]
129 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050307 | 20050307 | (S/NF) | ]
130 Ibid.
131 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050321 | 20050321 | (S/NF) | ]
132 Ibid.
133 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050330 | 20050330 | (S/NF) | ]
134 Ibid.
135 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050315 | 20050315 | (S/NF) | ]
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Commandos in particular were targeted with car bombs and all but one company deserted the unit.\footnote{\textsuperscript{137}}

\textbf{(S/REL)} One insurgent who benefited from the displacement of larger, more established groups was Atheer Nassif Tuiki. Tuiki’s FRE organization Right Party, a pro-Ba’athist group that had once been very influential, was able—with the dispersal of other organizations from HitError! Bookmark not defined. and HadithaError! Bookmark not defined.—to reemerge as a major source of IEDs in the Hit-Haditha corridor.\footnote{\textsuperscript{138}} Backed by Syrian FRE Mohammed Yusuf al-Ahmed, the Right Party was made up of former military, Saddam Fedayeen, and Ba’ath Party members from al-Saboga, Abu Wherda, Hysekani, and Jubbah who wanted to reestablish the Ba’ath Party without Saddam.\footnote{\textsuperscript{139}} Tuiki’s capture in June -- and the subsequent disbanding of his group -- would spell the end to much of the formal FRE insurgent organizations in Iraq.

\textbf{The Insurgency becomes more Criminal (March 2005)}

\textbf{(S/NF)} The most significant shift in the insurgency was a general turn toward criminal activity to finance attacks on the Coalition. From the very beginning, the two activities had been linked. Smugglers, for instance, facilitated the entry of foreign fighters and weapons as well as more traditional goods that could be sold to finance insurgent groups. \textbf{RIVER BLITZ} and \textbf{RIVER BRIDGE}, by disrupting established financial networks throughout the province, pushed insurgents to find other means for funding their movements, generally through kidnapping, extortion and robbery.

\textbf{(S/REL TO MCFI)} A small group of active in the HitError! Bookmark not defined.-HadithaError! Bookmark not defined. corridor were already engaged in kidnapping to replenish finances even before the operations.\footnote{\textsuperscript{140}} In Amaryyah Jaysh Mohammed leader Ahmed Tohman (a former Ba’athist granted the rank of captain by Saddam Hussein)\footnote{\textsuperscript{141}} began robbing residents to raise money.\footnote{\textsuperscript{142}} Meanwhile SARs infiltrated the Tiebl customs checkpoint in far western Anbar, extorting bribes from travelers to support their groups.\footnote{\textsuperscript{143}}

\textbf{(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)} Ordinary corruption—as at the Syrian border crossings—benefited the insurgency elsewhere. In HabbaniyahError! Bookmark not defined., insurgent leader Sheikh Abdul Hamid was able to bribe the police in order to lure the Coalition into a false sense of security, ordering Iraqi National Guard commanders to use "more force" in clearing out the streets to

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\textsuperscript{138} Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050410 | 20050410 | (S/NF) |
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050304 | 20050304 | (S/NF) |
\textsuperscript{141} Military DIIR MNFW HET08 0294 05 | 20050309 | (S/REL MCFI) |
\textsuperscript{142} Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | (S/NF) |
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
prevent the Coalition from returning to the area.\footnote{144} And, when insurgents attempted to ambush Iraqi National Guard troops that were transporting their monthly payroll from Baghda\footnote{Error! Bookmark not defined.}d, the lieutenant in charge reported the money stolen and then kept it for himself.\footnote{145} Mohammed Daham's brother Issa found one of the more ingenious quasi-criminal methods for raising funds. His Ramadi\footnote{Error! Bookmark not defined.} gas stations inflated gas prices and used the proceeds to fund his groups' activities. Some Ramadi residents were willing to pay for the higher prices at insurgent gas stations rather than waiting in longer lines for the cheaper government fuel, either out of sincere support for the insurgency or in order to escape intimidation. This led to conflict between 1920 Revolution Brigade and a small group of Syrian, Egyptian, and Sudanese AQI\footnote{Error! Bookmark not defined.} fighters over which group would control the gas station money.\footnote{146}

New Criminality and Displacement Provoke Tribal Conflict

\footnote{(S/REL TO USA, MCIF)} This conflict was not the only one provoked by the new criminality. It also led to an outbreak of tribal infighting in the Ramadi\footnote{Error! Bookmark not defined.} area in March 2005. The Albu Diab tribe sought revenge against the Albu Aetha and Albu Faraj for kidnapping and killing its tribesmen.\footnote{147}

MCIA Insert Map of Iraqi Tribes Here

\footnote{(S/NF)} The flashpoint that sparked the fighting lay in the Albu Diab's desire to hunt down members of the Albu Faraj who had kidnapped Ghemy Ahmed Zebin al-Shokha because he built shops in the Jazira area that the Albu Faraj believed were being used by the Coalition. However, this was merely the culmination of a series of kidnappings of Albu Diab tribesmen by the Albu Faraj in an effort to solicit money from the families of the kidnapped to support the insurgency. In response, the Albu Diab began actively thwarting efforts by the Albu Faraj to plant IEDs and threatened to inform on them to the Coalition if they refused to return al-Shokha.\footnote{148}

\footnote{(S/NF)} The displacement and increased criminality of the insurgency led to further tribal fighting. There had always been tension between the Albu Mahal and the Albu Salman. The Mahal\footnote{Wis} presented the fact that the Salmanis were the “princely” section of the Dula\footnote{mi} confederation and therefore given a cut from the proceeds of all illegal tribal smuggling. The leader of the Mahal\footnote{Wis} (and an SAR insurgent), Sheikh Sabah Sattam, with the help of his brother-in-law Raja Farhan, the mayor of al-Qa'im, hired displaced insurgents into the al-Qa'im police and used it as his personal

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\footnote{147} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050308 | 20050308 | (S/NF) | ]
\footnote{148} [ | Military | DIIR IMEF HET12 0275 05 | 20050303 | (SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCIF) | ]

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security force. He placed Mahalwis in the local Iraqi National Guard. He also attempted to take over the Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined. police force, but found himself blocked by the rival Salmanis, who resented this intrusion into their area of influence.\textsuperscript{149} The result was an outbreak of low-level fighting between the two tribes that would intensify throughout the spring and result, in the summer of 2005, in a full-blown tribal war.

Other effects of RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE

Insurgent Financing

Insurgent Information Operations

\textsuperscript{(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)} During 2005, various elements of the insurgency, particularly AQI Error! Bookmark not defined., continued to refine their information operations capabilities. AQI and AS information campaigns were comprised of:

\begin{itemize}
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  \item [150] Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050410 | 20050410 | (S/NI)
  \item [151] 14c, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3570 | 20050420 | (S/NI)
  \item [152] Military DIIR IMEF HET02 0245 05 | 20050303 | (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI)
  \item [153] Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050326 | 20050326 | (S/NI)
\end{itemize}

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recruitment efforts
“winning hearts and minds”
anti-Coalition propaganda
published speeches and statements by insurgent leaders like Zarqawi
claims of responsibility for attacks to include releasing videos of the attacks
explanations of the goals and strategies of the groups

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) During RIVER BRIDGE and RIVER BLITZ, some media capabilities were disrupted. For instance, insurgents were unable to mount an effective propaganda response to the operations because they lacked the money to hire reporters.154

(S/REL TO MCFI) Recruitment was a top priority of both SARs and SREs, since both had lost hundreds of fighters during the operations. The focus of these efforts varied, however. SAR groups worked to persuade poor, uneducated Iraqis to join their supposed fight for Sunni survival, while SREs argued that the failure of the insurgency would mean the destruction of Islam in Iraq.155 With roughly 50% unemployed and about 20% of them young men, there were roughly 200,000 potential recruits in Anbar Province. This gave the insurgents a large pool from which insurgents could replenish their depleted ranks.

(S/REL TO MCFI) An important source of frustration for Anbaris were power outages, which provided another issue that insurgents both exacerbated and exploited.156 The rehabilitation of the Iraqi electrical sector proceeded at a slow pace due to fuel, financing, maintenance and, especially, security issues. Common sense solutions, such as making better use of available fuel resources or making it a priority to repair pipelines that fed power stations, were not implemented because of a lack of coordination between the ministries of Electricity and Oil and Iraqi security forces.157 Insurgents realized the importance that Anbaris placed on this issue and made targeting power lines and pipelines a priority.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The other focus of insurgent IO was inciting anti-Coalition sentiment. A debate at the time within both provincial and national governing bodies over whether the weekend should consist of Thursday-Friday (as it had under the former regime) or Friday-Saturday (as in most of the Middle East) provided a perfect opportunity for insurgent media exploitation.158 For SREs the final decision to make Saturday (the Jewish Sabbath) part of the weekend was “proof” that the

154 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | (S/NF) |
155 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | (S/NF) |
156 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050404 | 20050404 | (S/NF) |
157 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050405 | 20050405 | (S/NF) |
158 [ Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050311 | 20050311 | (S/NF) |
central government wanted to “Judaize” Islam in Iraq. After the decision was made, insurgents used intimidation to prevent Anbaris from attending work or school on Thursdays.\(^{159}\)

**Smaller City Stories (March 2005)**

(S/NF) The dispersion of insurgents meant that a number of small towns and villages throughout Anbar became more significant for the maturation of the insurgency. Once by-passed by insurgents as well as Coalition forces, these villages became hot-beds of insurgent influence, activity and growth.

**Ramana**

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Husaybah\(^{160}\) ** Bookmark not defined.** and other towns around al-Qa’im had always been the transit points for foreign fighters intending to move further north or eastward.\(^{161}\) The displacement of large numbers of insurgents westward gave the area an added significance. Because Husaybah was under the control of local insurgents/criminal groups (such as al-Theeb), Zarqawi decided to make Ramana his primary transit point for fighters going to Tall Afar and Mosul\(^{162}\) ** Bookmark not defined.,** reportedly housing large numbers of fighters in the cities and meeting with Ghassan Amean at al-Qa’im and Ramana to coordinate his operations in the area.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The result was an upsurge in violence in this once placid village. To intimidate locals into compliance, on March 11 AQI\(^{163}\) ** Bookmark not defined.** leaders Hussein Shehab Hammed and Ra’ad Salah Mutar murdered nineteen individuals in Ramana suspected of being Coalition supporters or part of the Iraqi National Guard.

**Dulab and Albu Hayat**

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Following their flight from the Hit\(^{164}\) ** Bookmark not defined.-**Haditha\(^{165}\) ** Bookmark not defined.** corridor during RIVER BLITZ, insurgents regrouped in more isolated towns like Dulab or Albu Hayat. They stole weapons and ammunitions from former regime weapons caches and used the area as a staging area for attacks on Al Asad Airbase in an effort to regain influence in the region.\(^{166}\) Rural towns like Dulab were vulnerable to insurgents efforts to influence and recruit as well as murder and intimidate the population. AQI\(^{167}\) ** Bookmark not defined.** fighters in Haditha relocated to the Albu Hayat area, taking vehicles from there and sending them to Rawah\(^{168}\) ** Bookmark not defined.** or Bayji to be transformed into

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\(^{159}\) [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050313 | 20050313 | (S/NF) | ]

\(^{160}\) [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050310 | 20050310 | (S/NF) | ]

\(^{161}\) Ibid. The number of fighters in the city was reportedly in excess of 1,200-1,500.

\(^{162}\) [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050311 | 20050311 | (S/NF) | ]

\(^{163}\) [ | Military | DIIR IMEF 2DMAW 0004 05 | 20050307 | (SECRET//REL USA AND MCFI) | ]
car bombs.\textsuperscript{164} Their ability to operate in Albu Hayat was facilitated by the fact that Coalition operations in the area had caused the death of a young girl in March 2004, a fact that was bitterly remembered by locals.\textsuperscript{165}

Amariyah, Karmah, and Saqlawiyah

\textbf{(S//N)} These small towns attained significance beyond their size during and after AL FAJIR, when important insurgents, including mid-level JM leaders Karim Karkaz and Nori Zbar, as well as foreign fighter facilitator Abud Jadoah, fled to the area.\textsuperscript{166} RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE would only add to their importance. Mohammed Daham, for instance, moved from Syria\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} to Amariyah.\textsuperscript{167} His reluctance to return to Ramadi\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} was due not to fear of the Coalition but rather because of a handwritten note purportedly from Zarqawi declared him an infidel and stated that he should be put to death for allowing infighting to take place in the city.\textsuperscript{168} Mohammad Abdul Aziz, imam of the Abu Thar Mosque, also led a group of 50-60 insurgents into the area and was involved in distributing their propaganda throughout the region.\textsuperscript{169}

\textbf{(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)} Daham and Abdul Aziz joined a large and growing number of insurgent groups in the three towns. Jaysh Mohammad leaders like Karim Karkaz and Ahmed Tohman used Ferris Town to meet, plan attacks, buy and sell weapons, screen recruits for Coalition informants, confiscate Iraqi ID cards, and obtain fraudulent documents to enter controlled areas such as Fallujah\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} Jaysh al-Sunna, a subsidiary of JM, was also active under the leadership of Ibrahim Flaya Hassan Issawi.\textsuperscript{170}

\textbf{(S//REL TO USA, MCI)} The ease with which JM was able to operate in Ferris Town lay in the fact that it was in large part controlled by their former Ba'athist allies.\textsuperscript{171} These Ba'athists were all former Ba'athists who collaborated with the insurgency, facilitating attacks or allowing them to take place.\textsuperscript{172} Even so, the arrest of \textit{b} 6 \textit{J4} served to limit the freedom of movement for \textit{b} 6 and Sheikh Fasil.\textsuperscript{173}

Akashat

\textsuperscript{164} [ Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050326 | 20050326 | (S//NF) ]
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{166} [ Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050313 | 20050313 | (S//NF) ]
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} [ Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050313 | 20050313 | (S//NF) ]
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} [ Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050315 | 20050315 | (S//NF) ]
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
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S/REL TO USA, MOA
The small mining and smuggling town of Akashat, located in a desolate area between al-Qa'im and Rutbah, became an important staging ground for several insurgent groups. Members of the Ramadi Shura Council fled there after RIVER BLITZ while AQI set up VBIED production in the town (as well as in Karabilah and Rawah). Because of its anti-Coalition environment and remoteness, Akashat served as the meeting place for insurgents from al-Qa'im. Local leaders tried to prevent the Coalition from entering the city and Iraqi security forces representative Commander Nuri actively collaborated with the insurgency there. After MATADOR in May 2005, Akashat would briefly attract even more fighters and become a major center of insurgent activity until the insurgents were driven out by anti-AQI members of the Albu Mahal tribe.

Al-Tash Kurdish Refugee Camp

S/REL TO MCO
Another area where insurgents gathered in eastern Anbar was the al-Tash Kurdish refugee camp, where Zarqawi's military chief Ibrahim Ahmed Mustafa and former AI leader Hayder Qa'Qa-Bira 'Abd al-Qadir were based following RIVER BLITZ. They were reportedly also active in the camp, using its mixed ethnic make-up to avoid detection while they collected intelligence on SARs in Anbar and tried to undermine Coalition relations with the civilian population of the camp.

Political Developments and Sunni Engagement (March – May 2005)

S/NFI While the insurgency was being reshaped by this series of operations, the first meeting of the Anbar Provincial Council was delayed until March 17, 2005. Only twenty-seven of the forty-one elected members were present, including six women. The Council elected Mamoun Sami Rasheed as president, Khudair Abd al-Jabbar as vice president, and Sheikh Hussein Zubair Muhkif as secretary. While the seating of the Council served as a positive step, it prompted tension between Mamoun and incumbent Governor Gaoud. Gaoud attempted to retain his power by establishing his own security forces, marginalizing Mamoun, and claiming legitimacy for his position because of his ties to the government in Baghdad.

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178 [Military DIIR MNFW HET02 0310 05 | 20050310 | S/NF]
179 [Military DIIR MNFW HET02 0239 05 | 20050310 | S/REL TO USA AND MCO]
180 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050319 | 20050319 | S/NF]
(S/NF) On the national political level the Shi’a UIA pursued a policy of rejecting former Ba’athists like Mish’an al-Jaburi and Adnan al-Janabi in favor of Sunnis like Industry Minister Hajim al-Hassani, an ally of Ayad Allawi. The Iraqi National Assembly overwhelmingly elected al-Hassani to serve as its new speaker. UIA leader Husayn Shahristani and Kurdish lawyer Arif Taylor were elected to serve as deputy speakers with 157 and 96 votes respectively. With al-Hassani as speaker, the UIA was forced to moderate its plan to de-Ba’athify the National Assembly but instead implemented its policies at a ministerial level, preventing Sunni inclusion into the leadership of the Defense and Interior ministries.

(S/NF) At the same time, the election of Jalal Talabani as president, Ghazi al-Yawar as vice president, and Hajim al-Hassani as speaker demonstrated to some Sunnis that the Shia and Kurds wanted to give the Sunnis a voice in the new Iraqi government. The later decision to give Sunnis control of six ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, served to ease some Sunni fears of marginalization.

The long delay in the formation of Iraq’s new government, and in the creation of a drafting committee to write the new constitution, left only four months to create this seminal document. This time constraint severely hampered the Transitional National Assembly’s ability to forge a constitution acceptable to all of Iraq’s major political groups. Contentious issues that had to be addressed included the role of Islam as “a” source rather than “the” source of legislation; a delineation of Iraqi federalism; the role of women in Iraqi society and their rights; the limits of de-Ba’athification; the status of Kirkuk; minority group rights; the allocation of income from hydrocarbons; and the status of Coalition forces.

“Negotiations” with the Insurgency (March – April 2005)

The creation of a federal government, however delayed, was a hopeful sign for the future of Iraq. Another positive development was the decision by some parts of the insurgency to seek a political settlement. As noted, the loss of Fallujah as an insurgent sanctuary in Operation AL FAJR along with the Shi’a electoral victories in the Iraqi elections and the combined operations of RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE, left many insurgent groups with constrained resources, decreased political leverage, and less relevant propaganda. This left many Sunnis in search of means of political expression. In Anbar, the two most influential Sunni organizations were the HIP and AMS, with HIP favoring political engagement and AMS opposing it. However, fear of political
marginalization and pressure from Sunni followers pushed AMS to begin discussing the development of a new post-regime Sunni political identity.\(^{188}\)

\((S/NFI)\) Towards this end, near the end of March 2005, Harith al-Dhari, MML, and Mohammed Daham formed the Sunni Shura Council, a committee designed to represent Sunni concerns in Anbar while maintaining and advancing AMS\(^{189}\) Bookmark not defined. interests in the province. The Council enlisted the support of prominent former Ba'athists and Sunni tribal leaders and initiated a series of talks that signaled their willingness for political engagement.

MCIA Insert Picture Here

\((S/NFI)\) The first official contact between the Sunni Shura Council and the Iraqi government took place between Harith al-Dhari, MML, Mohammed Daham, and Anbar police chief Brigadier General Shakir Mohammed Salih in the Amariyah district of Baghdad\(^{189}\) Bookmark not defined. in late March. During the meeting, MML requested the dismissal of 1,000 Iraqi police that he claimed were not properly trained or regularly attending work, the integration of the police with security efforts to address public concerns, and the reinstatement of the majority of Iraqi police officers from the former regime that he claimed had been unfairly dismissed from their positions. To demonstrate his bonafides, MML provided the names of thirty-two gang leaders and 300 police officers with false identification or credentials.\(^{190}\)

\((S/NFI)\) Soon afterward the Sunni Shura Council entered into preliminary talks for negotiations with the Iraqi government and the Coalition.\(^{191}\) They were shortly joined by the followers of SAR Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Alwan al-Khalid of the Ramadi\(^{189}\) Bookmark not defined. Shura Council, AQL\(^{189}\) Bookmark not defined. leader Abdul Qadir Thakir al-Damook (Qaduri Abu Salch, who was later detained at Baghdad\(^{189}\) Bookmark not defined.) International while attempting to flee the country after AQI learned of his initiative and targeted him for assassination, and the Mosul\(^{189}\) Bookmark not defined. based Khalid Hasan Ahmad Shirabi. Al-Khalidia had already negotiated an agreement with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi to support his Iraq List in future Iraqi politics. Some\(^{14b}\) backed this initiative, believing that Sunnis should push for political engagement, an end to insurgent attacks, and integration into the new government so that they could once again subjugate the Shi'a following the Coalition withdrawal. Even some followers of Sheikh Abdullah Janabi were open to negotiations and a cessation of hostilities so that the Coalition could finish rebuilding Fallujah\(^{189}\) Bookmark not defined.\(^{192}\)

\(^{188}\) [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER | GRINTSUM 050325 | 20050325 | (S/NF)]
\(^{189}\) [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER | GRINTSUM 050331 | 20050331 | (S/NF)]
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(S/REL) The common goal of many of these insurgents was the creation of Sunni Iraqi security forces in Anbar that would not only provide security and stability but also act as a bulwark against the rise of Shi'a power in the province. Members of the Sunni Shura Council thus continued to meet with senior Anbari police officials, suggesting that Anbaris be hired by the Iraqi government to fill the gaps in the police and security forces.  

(S/NF) To support this position, AMS Error! Bookmark not defined. leader Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour as-Samarrai issued a fatwa signed by six-fours cleric and scholars including 14b Error! Bookmark not defined.
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Non-insurgent Sunnis were also expanding their political engagement. In March 2005, 'Abd Mutlaq al-Jabouri formed the National Power Alliance for Iraqi Unity (NPA) to mount a strong Sunni opposition to the Shi'a ULA in the December elections. Vice President al-Yawer was in direct contact with the NPA during its formation and requested that it nominate a list of choices for defense minister, only to have the party nominate BRE Major General 'Abd Mutlaq Hamud al-Jabouri. In an effort to keep from being targeted by the insurgency, the NPA insisted that all meetings take place in Jordan. Error! Bookmark not defined. and reached out to neighboring Sunni Arab governments for political, moral, and financial support. After (b)(6) refused to join the NPA, Al-Itawi agreed to sign on with the party in an effort to establish a broad-based political organization to participate in drafting the constitution and the upcoming national elections.201

In the face of this shift in the agenda of Sunni leaders, including many former insurgents, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. became even more extreme, expanding its targeting to encompass its former allies in the Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. Shura Council.202

Snapshot of the Insurgency (April 2005)

The Coalition saw a clear downward trend in the number of attacks for three weeks following Operation RIVER BLITZ, leading some analysts to conclude that insurgent capabilities had been seriously degraded.203 There were, in fact, significant improvements in the

198 [ ] Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050413 | 20050413 | (S/NE) |
199 Ibid.
200 [ ] 1.4c (S/NE) | |
201 [ ] (S/NE) | |
202 [ ] Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050403 | 20050403 | (S/NE) |
203 [ ] Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050401 | 20050401 | (S/NE) |
security situation brought about by the three major operations in combination with the January elections. Towns such as Hit, Haditha, and Rutbah, all major centers of insurgent activity, became much quieter and more secure while the operations were on-going. The political engagement of Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders, prompted by fears of Shi’a domination and by the example of Fallujah, also held promise for a better future.

Attack Data (January – April 2005)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (January to April 2005). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. Note that the Complex Attacks data was not available until the last few weeks of this period, and the graphs are truncated accordingly.

(S) Early 2005 was highlighted by a dramatic spike in attacks during the week of 27 January – 2 February, across all three AOs but focused on Indirect Fire and IED attacks. This spike was concurrent with the national elections and consisted of many attacks on polling places. On average, however, the attack levels in early 2005 were lower than previous two periods and did not show any obvious trends. Activity was relatively balanced between the three AOs, as no single AO dominated for any of the attack types or overall, though AO Denver was slightly less active.
All Incidents
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Complex Attacks

(S/NE) Yet the insurgency had only been transformed by the series of operations, not destroyed. Insurgent groups were now dispersed throughout Anbar, including many areas—like Ramana and Aamilyah—which had once been relatively quiet. The line between criminals and insurgents became far more blurred since insurgents became more involved in criminal activity to fund their struggles while criminals were just as involved in insurgent activity. Then there was the tension between various insurgent/criminal groups that was leading to tribal conflict, an issue that would come to a head during the summer of 2005.

(S/NE) Two other trends had begun long before 2005, but would strengthen throughout the early part of the year: a more religious orientation to the insurgency and less distinction between SARS and SREs. Religious rhetoric was used by all groups, but more significantly AQI. had successfully recruited a large number of mid- to upper-level former military, security, and IISE. officers to join the organization. SARs that remained independent increasingly put their expertise indiscriminately at the service of any insurgent group. The example of Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad Mya, the de facto head of the New Ba’ath Party, shows the convergence of the once distinct groups of insurgents quite clearly. Al-Ahmad remained in Syria after fleeing to Damascus, and could not establish an insurgent group of his own. He thus set up several ad-hoc training facilities in the Jazira Desert that were staffed by Salafists and Wahhabis as well as former IIS members, and funded by

The Insurgency Strikes Back (April – May 2005)

Recovery from AL-FAJR, RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE (April 2005)

(S/NE) By April 2005, the insurgency as a whole was recovering from the damage caused by Coalition operations. The resilience of the SRE insurgency lay in its continued ability to exert ideological and financial influence in Anbar, with the survival of larger groups dependent upon the

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205 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050402 | 20050402 | (S/NE) ]
206 [ | Military | 1.4c | (S/NE) ]
ability of their leadership to issue broad operating guidelines to far-flung autonomous cells, enabling them to conduct attacks over an extended time period. Because of security concerns, insurgent leaders relied more on couriers and personal meetings to communicate with lieutenants, generally only relying on limited electronic communications as a last resort.\textsuperscript{207}

\textbf{(S/NF)} The ability of \textit{AQI} to regenerate and recreate itself was especially remarkable. Immediately after the operations, a new AQI training facility was set up at al-Bitar village south of Amariyah by the Umar Hadid Battalion and used to train the insurgents that would later attack Abu Ghraib.\textsuperscript{208} Ghassan Ameen also survived RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE and began to rebuild his organization’s capacity for attacks. He used his cells to hijack cars traveling to Jordan\textsuperscript{209} and then employed the cars in suicide bombings in Baghdad, Mosul, Samarra, and Bayji.\textsuperscript{209} Ameen also stole munitions from a Coalition supply point in Dulab, and intensified attacks throughout the Hit-Haditha corridor.\textsuperscript{210} One of his main responsibilities—facilitating the entry and housing of foreign fighters in western Iraq—was helped by his creation of a supply depot between Rawah and Husaybah, \textsuperscript{211} and the use of the area north of the two cities to house foreign fighters.\textsuperscript{211}

\textbf{(S/NF)} The regeneration of \textit{AQI} was announced most starkly by a surge in suicide bombings at the end of March continuing through April. Most suicide bombers during this period were Saudi or Kuwaiti nationals chosen by Zarqawi on a first come, first serve basis. There were no more than four-five suicide bombers per safe house and they were kept in an isolated environment reading the Qur’an and other religious texts all day long.\textsuperscript{212} This isolation from outside sources allowed \textit{AQI} to reinforce their resolve as well as provide an opportunity to tape each person’s suicide “statement” as added insurance the individual would go through with the attack.

\textbf{(S/NF)} Local groups like al-Asaib al-Iraq in western Iraq were drawn more and more into \textit{AQI}'s orbit, attracted by the notoriety of Zarqawi and access to external financial support as well as local concerns - in this case a desire to limit infrastructure damage to their area.\textsuperscript{213} Al-Asaib al-Iraq served as an \textit{AQI} support organization, facilitating the smuggling of foreign fighters and helping \textit{AQI} to operate in Ramaha, Rawah, ...
defined., and Husaybah

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definition, thanks to its SAR members from the al-Rawi tribe as well as local tribesmen and criminals with close ties to many local communities.214

(S/REL) Another local group now affiliated with AQI, the Abu Harun Group in Ramadi, emerged as the primary threat to the Coalition in the city after RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE. IEDs and VBIED attacks by Sheikh Abu Abdullah Abdul Nasser’s cell of the Group spiked during RIVER BLITZ in response to the Coalition disrupting their activities and they then began employing suicide bombers during RIVER BRIDGE.215 The radicalization of the Abu Harun Group was due in part to the influence of their close ally AQI leader Sheikh Rafa’ al-Rawi.216

(S/REL) Insurgents who had once terrorized Fallujah, also attempted to reconstitute themselves once the operations had ended. Several insurgent leaders loyal to Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, including Fadel Mensi al-Aswai, a mid-level leader of Thawra al-Ishreen, were able to infiltrate back into the city. Al-Aswai brought with him fighters equipped with night vision goggles and sniper rifles, positioning them to shoot at Coalition forces from the minaret at the al-Kufah Mosque and planting IEDs in the city’s drainage system. They were joined by SAR military and IIS officers loyal to former Fallujah Brigade commander General Ahmed Obaid Jassim, his brother Maymoon, and his son Moyhamam.217

(S/NF) Ansar al-Sunna, which had moved its headquarters from Ramadi, during Operation RIVER BLITZ, also began to rebuild its strength. By mid-April, AS controlled a majority of insurgents in the latter city under Haj Abu Ayad. Abu Ayad was concerned by the polarization in Hit between "local" and "foreign" (non-Hit) insurgents following RIVER BRIDGE and increased attacks on Camp Hit out of fear of losing control of the Hit-Haditha Bridge corridor.219

The Abu Ghraib Attack (April 2005)

(S/NF) On April 2, the Abu Ghraib prison was attacked at multiple points in a sophisticated operation. One hundred fifty fighters led by Sheikh Abbas Khalifa Thumil al-Essawi combined indirect fire, small arms fire, IEDs, and VBIEDs in a complex attack. The purported goal of the attack was to execute one’s (blood vengeance) against the Coalition for killing several of Sheikh Abbas’s family members and to liberate those of his followers who were being held at the prison.
Zarqawi is believed to have been personally involved in planning the attack from Amariyah and those who took part in it fled towards Zaidon in its aftermath.²²⁰

MCIA Insert Picture here

(U) AQIError! Bookmark not defined. posted four propaganda statements claiming responsibility for the attack on the Al Eklas jihad website.²²¹ The first message stated that the group carried out the attack in order to avenge the death of Zarqawi’s spiritual advisor Sheikh Abu Anas al-Shami. The second message described the reconnaissance, planning, and execution of the attack, while the third vowed that AQI would continue the fight and the fourth claimed a credit for the car bomb attacks on the prison. AQI also released a video of rockets being fired at the prison to demonstrate its role in the attack.

(S/REL) Following reports of the Abu Ghraib attack, insurgent propaganda led to an increase in donations, morale and momentum for Anbari insurgent groups, particularly for those that cited minimal insurgent casualties and numerous Coalition soldiers killed. The target audience for this propaganda was Iraqis already disposed towards the insurgency in order to embolden them to conduct similar attacks. Even though the attack was repulsed, insurgents were killed and detained, and their objective not achieved, the Arab satellite media portrayed it as a brave attempt to free abused prisoners, which only added to the propaganda value of the attack.²²²

(S/REL) A similar—although much smaller—attack was mounted on April 11 against Camp Gannon by AQIErrror! Bookmark not defined. supported by al-Asa’ab al-Iraq and Quwwat Allah al-Tharib.²²³ Three VBIEDs built at a Karabilah garage used by Jaysh Mohammed and the Abu Harun Group were used in the attack, indicating the degree of cross-coordination that was now taking place within the insurgency.²²⁴

Zarqawi’s Blitz (April 2005)

(S/NF) Following the Abu Ghraib attack, AQIErrror! Bookmark not defined. and its allies mounted a series of mass casualty terrorist attacks throughout Iraq in an effort to sabotage SAR efforts to negotiate a political solution to the insurgency and to prove to Anbaris that the insurgency was still alive and well despite the Coalition operations.²²⁵

(S/NF) AQIErrror! Bookmark not defined.’s ability to sustain a prolonged offensive against the Coalition following AL FAJR, RIVER BLITZ, and RIVER BRIDGE served as a major boost to the
group in its bid to eclipse the Ramadi\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} Shura Council in the insurgent leadership. The more nationalistic SARs continued to have recruiting and retention problems, now exacerbated by a widespread perception, shared by foreign fighters, that the decision to negotiate with the Coalition indicated SAR groups were losing the battle and no longer possessed the necessary money, power, and resolve to continue the fight. Popular Iraqi shows like \textit{Confessions} and \textit{Terrorists} only served to further undermine their efforts, since they seemed to demonstrate that these insurgents were mostly inspired by money or other base motives.\textsuperscript{226}

\textit{(S/NE) AQI Error! Bookmark not defined.}, by contrast, had ample external financing, good logistics and an ability to attract foreign fighters and appeared willing to take greater risks and expend its resources to conduct larger and larger attacks.\textsuperscript{227} To help AQI regain the initiative, AQAM had also directed additional resources (primarily money and foreign fighters) to Iraq, enabling the group to defy previous estimates of its operational cycle and surge capability. In addition, for AQI and its SRE allies, April 2005 was viewed as a "now or never" moment to prevent Sunni political participation and the creation of Sunni Iraqi security forces. In such an environment, many rank-and-file SAR insurgents deserted to more radical groups like AQI or AS, even while the leadership of groups like the Ramadi\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} Shura Council continued to believe that they could seize power in Anbar through a combination of intimidation, infiltration, negotiation, and political participation.\textsuperscript{228}

\textit{(S/REL USA, CAN, GBR, AUS AND NZL) As part of this offensive, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. sent a large number of fighters into Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. to mount a stepped-up intimidation and coercion campaign that culminated in the assassination of Haditha police chief, Colonel Hassan.\textsuperscript{229} Interior Ministry employee Captain Ziyad was also assassinated and all radio and television broadcasts were censored.\textsuperscript{230} Nineteen fishermen were subsequently killed north of the Haditha Dam as suspected collaborators.\textsuperscript{231} AQI also targeted the workers necessary for moving critical reconstruction supplies, threatened government workers, and kidnapped, then murdered, several Iraqis working at Al Asad. This strategy was not without consequences, however, as at least one tribe in Haditha expressed a desire to take up arms and exact \textit{thar}' against AQI.\textsuperscript{232}

\textit{(S/NE) AQI Error! Bookmark not defined.} logistician Jamal Khairi (Abu Umar), who oversaw the group’s operations in the Hit\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}-Annah corridor for Zarqawi, was able to reestablish AQI presence in Hit with the assistance of Ansar al-Sunna.\textsuperscript{233} Abu Umar was aided by

\textsuperscript{226} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050421 | 20050421 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{228} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050415 | 20050415 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{229} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050417 | 20050417 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{230} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050419 | 20050419 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{231} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050421 | 20050421 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{232} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050502 | 20050502 | (S/REL MCFI) | ]
\textsuperscript{233} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050502 | 20050502 | (S/REL MCFI) | ]

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the departure, without explanation, of Brigadier General Fahad Abd al-Aziz of the 503\textsuperscript{rd} Iraqi National Guard Battalion from his post.\textsuperscript{234} Fahad had improved security in the Hit-Hasith\textsuperscript{a} corridor but was accused of corruption and embezzlement by his own men and had been attempting to leave on a high note.\textsuperscript{235} Before leaving, he made arrangements with Ramadi\textsuperscript{a} Shura Council representative Mohammed Ibrahim al-Dhai to pass on earlier agreements for his own safety and financial gain to his successor Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Rasheed, but AQI foreign fighters were able to intimidate Rasheed into colluding with them for his personal security.\textsuperscript{236}

\textbf{(S/NE)} After Fahad left Hit, AQI set up their own amirs as rulers of the city and created \textit{sharia} courts while retaliating against residents suspected of cooperating with Coalition forces. This assertion of control enabled AQI to take control of key government offices and two gas stations, even confiscating the ID cards of some city employees.\textsuperscript{237}

\textbf{(S/NE)} Zarqawi took other actions to create greater cooperation between AQI and remaining FRE/SAR groups in Anbar. On April 14, 2005, he met in Zaidon with the 1920 Revolution Brigade's leader Abu Allah to plan and coordinate their future attacks. They planned to use Zobai tribesmen loyal to them to operate in Baghdad and Abu Ghuai. Among these was the Abu Sitah Group, a small group of 10-20 Wahhabis who worked for Abu Allah as couriers.\textsuperscript{238} AQI also began to work more directly with the Green Battalion, funding their "amir of amirs" Hajji Tragi Ibrahim Alawi Fayadh al-Halbusi and giving instructions about the fate of Coalition sympathizers kidnapped by the Battalion through Abu Sarmat, the AQI leader in Karram.\textsuperscript{239} Meanwhile, SARs Karim Karkaz and Nori Zuhair were paid by AQI to carry out attacks in Fallujah. The two insurgents were able to use their earlier ties to Khamis Sinjan's organization to rally surviving members of that group in an attempt to re-establish their position in the city.\textsuperscript{240}

\textbf{(S/NE)} Zarqawi reintroduced his own insurgent cells into Fallujah, as well, exploiting the conflict between the native Fallujahns and the Public Order Brigade to win

\textsuperscript{234} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 0500319 | 20050319 | (S/NE) [ ]
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\textsuperscript{236} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 0500319 | 20050319 | (S/NE) [ ]
\textsuperscript{237} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 0500519 | 20050519 | (S/NE) [ ]
\textsuperscript{238} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 0500519 | 20050519 | (S/NE) [ ]
\textsuperscript{239} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 0500506 | 20050506 | (S/NE) [ ]
\textsuperscript{240} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 0500428 | 20050428 | (S/NE) [ ]
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support. He also hoped to prove that the Coalition had not been able to force him out of the city through their offensives. The historic Furqan Mosque served as the main AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. planning and recruitment center in Fallujah. As usual, however, the primary bases for assaults into Fallujah were in fact outside the city in Saqlawiyah and Amariyeh. There, AQI leader Haytem Mohammed Anfous coordinated more than 200 insurgents to carry out attacks, kidnappings, and smuggling operations.

(S/REL) As part of Zarqawi's new strategy, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. began to refrain from conducting attacks that would cause death or injury to Sunni civilians (or damage to their property). The inverse, however, held true concerning the Shi'a and any members of the Iraqi security forces that refused to collaborate. When combined with mass casualty terrorist attacks targeting the central government in Baghdad Error! Bookmark not defined., this helped the insurgency regain its lost momentum.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) These efforts were not limited to Ramadi and Rabit. Residents in Barwanah were heavily intimidated by insurgents who had safe houses in Haqlaniyah. Regardless of the locals' desire to help the Coalition, their desire was overshadowed by the high degree of insurgent intimidation.

(S/NF) In western Anbar, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. and Ansar al-Sunna showed a level of cooperation not seen elsewhere in Iraq extending down to street level joint operations in the Hit Error! Bookmark not defined. - Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor. Together, the two groups provided one another with enhanced early warning against Coalition raids, assisted in the movement of fighters and material, and contributed to the other's ability to mass. Elements of the al-Alwah Group based in Hit (see Chapter 5) also played a role in assisting AQI. Led by Sinan Metib following Operation AL FAJR, the al-Alwah Group split between those favoring MML's strategy of negotiation and hardliners led by Mohammed Sent that sided with AQI. Together with Ansar al-Sunna and al-Jama' a al-Salafia in addition to its historic western Anbari allies Quwwat Allah al-Tharib and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, AQI was able to incite all of these groups against the Coalition in Baghdad Error! Bookmark not defined.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. and the Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. Shura Council remained at odds over the former's relentless targeting of Iraqi security forces and resulting civilian casualties. The Abu Hamid Group attempted to side with AQI but was
still suffering from setbacks in material and was attempting to reunify its decentralized command structure before any decision could be made.247

Anbari Reactions to Zarqawi’s Blitz (April 2005)

(S/REL) Anbari perceptions of security varied dramatically throughout the province during the course of Zarqawi's offensive. The intermittent Coalition presence in towns like Hit and Haditha led to some communities being trapped in a vicious cycle of insurgent domination through murder and intimidation, the Coalition asserting presence, and insurgents reentering the community to reassert influence following Coalition departure. In extreme cases, insurgent domination meant the seizure of government buildings, the creation of shari'a courts, and the implementation of harsh punishments. Parties sympathetic to the Coalition were put at risk, purges were conducted by the insurgency, and fewer residents were willing to cooperate with the Coalition during its next operation in the area. As a result, Coalition departure bred resentment and the mood in many communities worsened with each cycle.248

(S/NF) The Ramadi Shura Council tried to help the security situation by declaring a cease-fire from April 15 to April 17, but this move failed to produce any significant lessening in the number of attacks between Habbaniyah and Ramadi. This was due to a number of factors, including pressure from AQI, but more importantly because the groups represented in the Ramadi Shura Council had always been a volatile coalition, as can be seen from its earlier feuding in February 2005. In some cases, the only thing that united member groups was their shared opposition to the Coalition. As a result, when MML and Daham attempted to develop political options as part of the emerging Sunni elite they found themselves becoming targets of their former allies.249

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) In Ramadi’s Tamim district, one of the centers of violence in the city, the failure of the ceasefire led to a worsening perception of security, which dissuaded the population from supporting the Coalition. This allowed insurgents loyal to Nazir Abu Musab and the 1920 Revolution Brigades, based in the Haji Dahar Mosque, to gain influence.250 Even so, Ramadi residents were just as unhappy with the insurgents, leading to an incident in which residents took up arms against insurgents who had been planning an ambush against Coalition forces.

MCIA Insert map of these points

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248 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050421 | 20050421 | (S/NF) | ]
249 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050417 | 20050417 | (S/NF) | ]
250 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050502 | 20050502 | (S/REL MCFI) | ]
(S/NF) The behavior of local police and interior ministry forces did not help the security situation. In Fallujah, local support for the Public Order Brigade continued to decline because of mistreatment of detainees and religious differences. Two members of the Brigade were even killed after a woman claimed that she was sexually harassed by the unit.251 As described earlier in this Chapter, the Public Order Brigades were mostly Shi'a. However, various Shi'a and Sunni Iraqi security forces units were plagued by problems similar to those of the Public Order Brigade. These units beat and tortured detainees during interrogation and used excessive force against civilians, exacerbating sectarian tensions. Both Coalition and Iraqi commanders were frustrated over Baghdad's inability to control its own security forces, complaining that some Iraqi security forces routinely defied the central government and conducted independent operations.252

Al-Qa'im, AQI's "Capital" of Iraq (April 2005)

(S/NF) With AQI's offensive underway in Anbar, Zarqawi set up his non-military base of operations in al-Qa'im under Thabit Khalifa Jalut, declaring it the new capital of Iraq.253 Jalut had served as Zarqawi's top lieutenant in al-Qa'im since December 2004, setting up AQI's internal security wing in the city following the reduction of Coalition forces in the area and establishing safe houses for foreign fighters from Afghanistan. AQI believed its situation in al-Qa'im to be sufficiently secure to use the city to plan operations, train new recruits, and lay the groundwork for mass casualty terrorist attacks aimed at Kuwait.254

(S/NF) The form of governance that Zarqawi instituted in al-Qa'im is important, because it served as a template for later "shadow governments" set up by AQI.255 Throughout Iraq. Zarqawi set up shari'a courts in town, began implementing Islamic law and the badd punishments, took over all the mosques, and killed anyone suspected of collaborating with the Coalition or central Iraqi government. AQI operatives drove around the city and its environs in trucks making certain that young men were cutting their hair and growing beards. They set up green Islamic flags on the government buildings that they controlled, publicly whipped a woman who was accused of prostitution, and created a system of volunteers to monitor violations of shari'a.256

Anbar Fights Back

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252 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050424 | 20050424 | S/NF]
253 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050425 | 20050425 | S/NF]
(S/NF) Zarqawi's strategy for reinvigorating the insurgency in Iraq was at least partially successful. His successes were reflected in a May 2 report by the Iraqi Working Group which suggested that progress towards stability in Iraq had slowed by mid-April due to the security situation, concerns over de-Ba'athification, and rising sectarian tensions. Anbar was listed as one of two provinces that served as centers of instability for the country. Even Fallujah was starting to backslide with increased insurgent activity, a deteriorating security situation, and Sunni marginalization within the security services. While Zarqawi's role in creating these conditions should not be overstated (as noted, AQI was operating in tandem with a number of insurgent groups during its April offensive and many of the internal Iraqi political problems such as de-Ba'athification would likely have existed regardless), AQI was able to exploit the situation for its own purposes. In so doing, however, Zarqawi would provoke a backlash from tribes in western Anbar.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) In many cases, the reasons for this backlash were local. When insurgents withdrew their weapons and propaganda from a school in the Jazira district of Ramadi, teachers pointed to earlier collateral damage from attacks and began actively discouraging students from joining or supporting the insurgency. This forced insurgents to impose a curfew and begin warning residents prior to carrying out attacks.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The major trigger for fighting between AQI and local tribes in Anbar, however, was the killing of a Coalition contractor belonging to the Mahalawi tribe by a member of AQI's ally al-Jamadi al-Salafi in al-Qa'im. While AQI likely considered this just another killing of a Coalition collaborator, the Mahalawi tribe was furious and mounted a reprisal, culminating in a major clash in al-Qa'im between AQI and the thousand member Hamza Battalion. This unit, under the leadership of Sheikh Saba, consisted primarily of Mahalawi tribesmen, joined by parts of the Salimani and Ubaydi tribes.

(S/NF) The roots of the conflict between AQI and the Hamza Battalion dated back far earlier. In October 2004 sheikhs from the Karbuli and Ramana tribes had considered the idea of a vigilante force that would oppose the rise of foreign fighters (FF). Junah Hamid Khalef (Abu Umar) founded the group in October 2004 from Albu Mahal tribesmen in al-Qa'im, Anahe, Haditha, Rutbah, Sadah, Ubaydi, and Karabah to drive out FF in order to more effectively fight the Coalition. The Albu Nimr also tried in November 2004 to form a paramilitary group that would fight the insurgents without sanction from the Coalition. The argument was that FF such as Zarqawi, by indiscriminately targeting non-combatants, were discrediting the indigenous insurgency. Native fighters were also upset that FF were damaging Sunni

257 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050506 20050506 (S/NF) ]
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid.

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infrastructure, drawing the attention of the Coalition, competing for important smuggling routes, and spreading Salafist ideology.\footnote{260}

(S/NE) Neither of these efforts, however, met with much success until March 2005 when MML met with a group of AMS\footnote{260}Error! Bookmark not defined. and tribal leaders to draft a fatwa calling on the tribes in western Al Anbar to fight AQI\footnote{260}Error! Bookmark not defined.'s foreign fighters. Thanks to MML's support, by May 2005 the Hamza Battalion included fighters from 1920 Revolution Brigades, Umar al-Mukhtar, and the Nu'man Brigade\footnote{261} in addition to Albu Mahal and Albu Nimr tribesmen and former Iraqi police and National Guard soldiers.\footnote{262}

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Unlike Zarqawi's previous enemies in Anbar, Sheikh Sabab was a force to be reckoned with. The brother-in-law of the newly-elected Anbar governor and former al-Qa'im mayor Raja Nawaf Farhan, Sheikh Sabab was the head of the Mahalawi tribe and a former member of the Fallujah\footnote{263}Error! Bookmark not defined. Mujahideen Shura (see Chapter 4).\footnote{264} As such, he had ties of his own to both the insurgency and local tribes that he was able to use as a force amplifier in his fight against AQI\footnote{265}Error! Bookmark not defined.. Exploiting these connections, he was able to convince al-Asa'ab al-Iraq to turn against AQI in Husaybah\footnote{266}Error! Bookmark not defined. and begin capturing their fighters traveling between Husaybah and Barwanah.\footnote{267} Exploiting tensions between AQI and the Jughayfah tribe in Haditha\footnote{268}Error! Bookmark not defined., Sheikh Sabab persuaded the Jughayfah tribe to begin training 200 tribemen to fight AQI in Albu Hayat and Dulab (the Jughayfah tribe later declined to carry out any attacks due to a lack of leadership) and enlisted the Albu Alwan tribe to begin attacking the group in Ramadi\footnote{269}Error! Bookmark not defined..\footnote{270} Taking advantage of the differences between AQI and the Ramadi Shura Council leadership, Sheikh Sabab requested that they send fighters to al-Qa'im to reinforce his tribesmen.\footnote{271}

Operation MATADOR (May 2005)

(U) In response to the rise of AQI\footnote{260}Error! Bookmark not defined. activity in western Anbar, on May 7, 2005 forces from the 2nd RCT, 2nd Marine Division launched Operation MATADOR in the Jazira desert north of the Euphrates River to eliminate insurgents and foreign fighters, believing that the region had replaced the Ramadi\footnote{261}Error! Bookmark not defined.-Hit\footnote{262}Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor as the center of insurgent activity since the fall of Fallujah\footnote{263}Error! Bookmark not defined. in 2004. MATADOR involved over 1,000 Coalition troops in addition to tanks and other armored vehicles and both manned and unmanned aircraft including F-15Es, Predators, and Marine Corps F/A-18s. The operation was primarily focused in the vicinity of al-Qa'im.
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(U) At the beginning of MATADOR, troops from the Army’s 814th Multi-Role Bridge Company constructed a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates River where 14c indicated the insurgents were located. Marines crossed the southern banks of the Euphrates at Ubaydi and headed into the Jazira desert, establishing a blocking position at Ramana and flushing out a large group of insurgents after a decisive battle using combined arms and close air support. Insurgents attempted to launch a counter-attack against a Marine convoy at Camp Gannon using small arms fire, RPGs, IEDs, and two suicide car bombers. One car bomb damaged an armored HUMVEE, while the other was destroyed by a Marine M1A1 Abrams.267

(U) In both the Jazira desert and the Camp Gannon fighting, insurgents encountered by the Coalition were wearing paramilitary fatigues and in some cases wearing protective vests while demonstrating TTPs that exceeded those demonstrated by their counterparts in other parts of Iraq.268 The organization, training, and discipline of these fighters, as well as the depth of insurgent penetration in this part of Iraq, came as a surprise to the Coalition and demonstrated the need to carry out major operations in order to deprive the insurgency of this staging ground.

(S/NF) AQIErrror! Bookmark not defined. leader Ghassan Amasha was captured by the Coalition during MATADOR, causing the group to become demoralized in al-Qa’im and to lose popular support. While the group remained active in Haditha! Bookmark not defined., its fighters in the al-Qa’im area dispersed to Rutbah! Bookmark not defined., Mosul! Bookmark not defined., and Syria! Bookmark not defined., and Syria! Bookmark not defined., to escape both MATADOR and attacks by Sheikh Sabah’s followers. Some would flee back into the Hit! Bookmark not defined. - Haditha corridor, regarding the area as a safe haven.269

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) As part of MATADOR the Coalition carried out a diversionary operation in Zaidon. Once again, the depth of insurgent penetration in this small town came as a surprise to the Coalition, pointing out once again the need to do something to disrupt insurgent operations in the area.270

City Stories

General Situation

(S/REL) Many Anbaris continued to struggle in their daily lives and lacked basic services, publicly comparing life to how it had been under Saddam Hussein. The absence of utilities, economic growth, and security were all major aspects of public life whose absence or destruction was blamed

267 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050514 | 20050514 | (S/NF) | ]
268 Ibid.
269 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050508 | 20050508 | (S/NF) | ]
270 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050523 | 20050523 | (S/NF) | ]
on the Coalition. Several water and electricity-related problems arose in the Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor, where residents needed an adequate water supply for crops in order to make money and survive. The general population was most supportive of the Coalition in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined. and least supportive in Hit Error! Bookmark not defined. and Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined.. Several peaceful protests occurred regarding allegations that the United States desecrated the Qur'an at Guantanamo Bay and calls for local government officials to take a stronger stand against former Ba'athists. While insurgent intimidation, kidnapping, and assassination were high, the relatively small Iraqi security forces continued to hold up.  

Al-Qa'im, Akashat and Ga'aara

(S/NF) With many fighters dispersed from al-Qa'im by the Coalition and fighting with Sheikh Sabah, the insurgents began shifting their primary rallying area to Akashat, using the village of Ga'aara as their new headquarters. A small group of houses outside of Akashat disguised as a Bedouin village, Ga'aara served as a planning center for the insurgents after they had been pushed out of al-Wa'im in Operation MATADOR. The insurgency had already possessed a logistics and smuggling network in the Rutbah Error! Bookmark not defined. Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor at least as far back as January 2005 and the villages of Maqir al-Thib, al-Baqihuz, and al-Karish were insurgent hubs to smuggle foreign fighters and supplies into Iraq due to their rural arrangement and the nomadic character of the inhabitants.  

(S/NF) Unfortunately, the security situation in al-Qa'im remained grave at the conclusion of Operation MATADOR, with large numbers of Iraqi fighters who had fled to Syria Error! Bookmark not defined. now returning to al-Qa'im to resume their intimidation of the population. Some were Error! Bookmark not defined. loyal to Zarqawi.  

Hit Error! Bookmark not defined. and Haditha

(S/NF) Al-Asabab al-Ahwal fighters drawn from AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. and Ansar al-Sunna served the dominant group in the Hit Error! Bookmark not defined. -Haditha Error!  

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271 [ ] Militar | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050522 | 20050522 | (S/REL MCF) |
272 [ ] 1.4c | 20050308 | (S/NF) |
273 [ ] Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050519 | 20050519 | (S/NF) |
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**Bookmark not defined.** corridor due to its large supply of munitions and the frequent movement of its supply caches.  

(S/REL) In general, insurgents in western Anbar were able to endure MATADOR by either withdrawing to urban areas while the Coalition was conducting operations in outlying villages or by assimilating into the rural population. Either way, they quickly reestablished influence once Coalition forces are no longer active in the area. Membership in individual insurgent groups remained fluid, with local groups operating under the umbrella of AQI! **Bookmark not defined.** or Ansar al-Sunna being the most common. Friction continued in Haditha! **Bookmark not defined.** between residents and SREs, while Hit! **Bookmark not defined.** was subjected to an intense murder and intimidation campaign by Ansar al-Sunna. Rawah! **Bookmark not defined.** and Annah served as secondary staging areas for AQI while the group relocated to Akashat and Rutbah! **Bookmark not defined.** following Operation MATADOR.  

Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah! **Bookmark not defined.**  

(S/REL) Unfortunately, the end of Operation MATADOR coincided with another period of insurgent reconstitution in eastern Anbar. There were a number of factors behind this insurgent resurgence. These factors included the Abu Diab tribe beginning to relax its opposition to the insurgency in the Jazira area near Ramadi! **Bookmark not defined.** , the continued lack of employment, and irrigation problems that led to a low-yield harvest among the tribesmen. Thanks to this ease in pressure, the Abu Harun Group and the followers of Nuhad Abu Abdullah were able to organize 250-300 insurgents to carry out attacks in Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah! **Bookmark not defined.** AQI! **Bookmark not defined.** fighters were able to move through the area, bribing Iraqi security forces into allowing them to move uninhibited through the area, attacking Coalition and Iraqi convoys in coordination with the Islamic Army of Iraq.  

Ramadi! **Bookmark not defined.** and Fallujah! **Bookmark not defined.**  

(S/REL) The insurgent leadership in Ramadi! **Bookmark not defined.** continued to be divided between the Ramadi Shura Council, AQI! **Bookmark not defined.** , and Ansar al-Sunna despite efforts to form a united front. Insurgents near Fallujah! **Bookmark not defined.** , by contrast, were far better organized and willing to coordinate attacks towards Baghdad! **Bookmark not defined.** and Abu Ghraiw while supporting infiltration back into
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Fallujah. Insurgents north of Fallujah were largely drawn from Jaysh Mohammed and the Islamic
Army of Iraq, while those to the south are AQI or Ansar al-Sunna.29

Iraqi Politics and the Constitution

(S/NF) Following the May 10 announcement of the Transitional National Assembly Constitution
Drafting Committee, several prominent Sunni leaders expressed deep disappointment over what
they saw as inadequate Sunni representation. While UIA MPs publicly acknowledged the need for
greater Sunni inclusion, in practice they rejected all Sunni proposals. Even so, representatives from
the prime minister, SCIRIError! Bookmark not defined., and UIA independents assured the U.S.
embassy in mid-May that they were in close contact with Sunni groups and leaders in order to work
out a compromise.26

(C) Of the fifty-five members of the committee drafting the constitution, twenty-one were from the
UIA, fifteen were from the Kurdish Alliance, eight were secular Shi'a from Alawi's Iraq list, and two
were Sunni Arabs. IIPError! Bookmark not defined. leaders Tareq Hashemi and Naseer al-Ani
told the Coalition that efforts to include Sunnis in the Iraqi government were superficial and that
this treatment of the Sunnis was counter-productive to IIP efforts to put pressure on extremists. Dr.
Adnan Pachachi rejected as well the idea that Sunnis should only have “consultative options” when
it came to drafting the constitution. In an effort to address these criticisms, Awqaf Director al-
Ithawi told the Arab press that he was drawing up a list of Sunni candidates for inclusion on the
Committee.281

The Kidnapping and Death of Governor Farhan (May-June 2005)

(S/NF) While the negotiations over the constitution continued, two significant developments in
Anbar would profoundly affect the insurgency in mid-2005: the kidnapping and murder of the
provincial governor and the capture of Mohammed Daham. The growing strength and effective
action of the Hamza Battalion was the main impetus for AQIError! Bookmark not defined.'s
decision to kidnap Governor Farhan. After a brief lull following Operation MATADOR, the Hamza
Battalion resumed its attacks on AQI, seeking to prove itself to the new Iraqi government in order
to be incorporated into the police and Iraqi National Guard in the al-Qa'im area.282 Among those
they attacked were AQI foreign fighters in Karabilah under Hussein Shehab and Ra'ad Saleh Mutar,
who had been planning another attack on Camp Gannon.283

(S/NF) In an effort to reduce attacks by the Hamza Battalion, AQIError! Bookmark not defined.
had Ansar al-Sunna kidnap Sheikh Sabah's brother-in-law Governor Farhan and his son while they

279 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050520 | 20050520 | (S/NF) | ]
280 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050520 | 20050520 | (S/NF) | ]
281 Ibid.
282 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050524 | 20050524 | (S/NF) | ]
283 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050524 | 20050524 | (S/NF) | ]
were traveling from Ramadi to al-Qa'im. This forced the Hamza Battalion, which had rejected two earlier ceasefires, to halt its attacks against AQI in order to negotiate for the governor's release. Sheikh Sabah of the Malahawi and Sheikh Hatim Abd al-Razzak of the Albu Nimr oversaw the negotiations with the AQI leadership in Rawah. The first demand from AQI was that the Malahawi tribe leave the group alone and that Sheikh Sabah and 10-12 of his top subordinates leave the area. On May 16, AQI agreed to release the governor's son in return for weapons and vehicles. The negotiations would continue until May 29, when AQI killed the governor during a Coalition raid northwest of Rawah that also resulted in the death of four foreign fighters and the capture of four more.

(S/NF) Local reactions to the death of Governor Fathman were decidedly mixed. AQI mounted an aggressive propaganda campaign to convince locals and members of the Hamza Battalion that the Coalition had deliberately killed Fathman. While Fathman's son and nephew blamed AQI for the governor's death, many in the Malahawi tribe believed that threats by the Nawa' family served to exacerbate the situation. Many of the Malahawi tribesmen who made up the bulk of the Hamza Battalion were demoralized and tired of fighting, not wishing to return to Husaybah. (S/NF) In late May and early June, AQI mounted a propaganda campaign to convince locals and members of the Hamza Battalion that the Coalition had deliberately killed Fathman. While Fathman's son and nephew blamed AQI for the governor's death, many in the Malahawi tribe believed that threats by the Nawa' family served to exacerbate the situation. Many of the Malahawi tribesmen who made up the bulk of the Hamza Battalion were demoralized and tired of fighting, not wishing to return to Husaybah.

The Capture of Mohammed Daham

(S/NF) Coalition forces also managed to capture Mohammed Daham in Ramadi. When he made the mistake of attempting to turn a peaceful protest into a riot. At the time of his capture, Daham controlled multiple cells of the Nu'man Brigade and had recently reorganized his fighters to carry out multiple attacks. MML ordered Sheikh Mohammed Sadaq, one of six representatives that he had named to negotiate with the government on behalf of the insurgency, to get Daham out of prison. Sadaq organized a demonstration in Ramadi to petition for Daham's release, but this protest failed to generate large numbers since many Ramadi residents regarded Daham as a thug and were unconcerned by his detention.

284 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRIKTUM 050601 | 20050601 | (S/NF) |
285 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRIKTUM 050524 | 20050524 | (S/NF) |
286 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRIKTUM 050601 | 20050601 | (S/NF) |
287 | Ibid. | 14c |
288 | Military | IMEF HET02 0214 04 | 20040815 | (SECRET/REL TO USA AND MCFI) |
289 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRIKTUM 050529 | 20050529 | (S/NF) |
290 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRIKTUM 050530 | 20050530 | (S/NF) |
291 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRIKTUM 050530 | 20050530 | (S/NF) |
The detention of Daham led to a splintering of the Ramadi Shura Council, with additional leaders fleeing to Baghdad. Leadership and membership in insurgent cells became fluid, with low-level cells holding no clear allegiance except being willing to fight for whoever was willing to pay. Even so, Daham’s followers continued to conduct retaliatory attacks in Ramadi.

AMS sought to head off the potential for chaos among the Ramadi fighters by uniting all the insurgent groups in the city into a single organization. This particular project was the provenance of Harith al-Dhari, who was under pressure within AMS because of his failure to secure Sunni power in the last election. Towards that end, AQI agreed to share funds and weapons with the Nu’man Brigade and other member groups of the Ramadi Shura Council.

Snapshot of the Insurgency

By the end of May 2005, the insurgency had recovered from earlier Coalition operations and was now firmly embedded in certain areas of Anbar. Al-Qa’im was the new capital of AQI, and parts of the Jazira as well as a section of territory around Zaidon were hotbeds of insurgent activity. The example of al-Qa’im and nearby villages showed the sort of society that AQI hoped to create in Iraq: ruled by a strict version of shari’a and enforced by groups of “volunteers” who meted out medieval punishments for the least violation of these codes.

The dispersion of insurgents after AL-FAJR and later Coalition operations had pushed AQI, AS and other groups into smaller towns and villages of the province. Localities like Akashat, Ga’ara, Ramana, Saqlawiyah and Amariyah now became important staging grounds for attacks. Insurgent groups—FRE, SRE, and SAR—also turned to criminal activities, since their regular financial networks were disrupted. At the same time, AQI and other groups had quickly reconstituted and were capable of sophisticated and complex attacks, like the one mounted against Abu Ghraib.

There were, at the same time, several positive changes brought about by AL FAJR and the January elections. The serious split between SARs and SREs—and between MML and AQI in particular—was creating a space for insurgents to find a peaceful way out of the fighting. This political engagement was at an early stage in May 2005, but held great promise. A related problem for AQI was the decision by MML to encourage attacks on foreign fighters by native Iraqi tribesmen. Sheikh Sabah’s tribal force created a serious threat to Zarqawi, one that he felt compelled to answer with more violence.
(U) Finally, the example of Fallujah after AL FAJR showed that, once free of overwhelming insurgent influence, ordinary Anbaris were relatively resistant to the appeal of the insurgency, and willing to find ways to work within the system to improve their lives.

(U) Summary:

(S/NF) Early 2005 was a key period for AQI's efforts to reorganize its Anbar networks following Operation AL FAJR, setting the group up to become the preeminent insurgent force in Anbar the following year. Despite aggressive Coalition operations intended to defeat or degrade the insurgency, the decline of FRE insurgent groups inadvertently served to fuel the rise of AQI as many FREs continued to join or ally with AMZ in order to continue their fight against the Coalition. Coalition operations in major cities forced local insurgent cells to operate in a more clandestine manner, leading to a rise in criminality, murder, and intimidation as insurgents sought to raise money and retain influence over the general population.

June to August

Introduction

(U) If the first half of 2005 was dominated by the aftermath of AL FAJR and the January elections, the second half of the year was defined by two entirely different processes. The Coalition carried out a series of operations designed to accomplish two tasks. First, it disrupted insurgent activities to provide the stability necessary for the political development of Iraq. Second, it secured the western borders by clearing territory occupied by AQI and affiliated groups. Meanwhile, the summer of 2005 saw the continuation and deepening of tribal warfare, much of it aimed at AQI. This development culminated in a blood feud between AQI and members of the Albu Mabal tribe's Hamza Battalion. The battalion was decimated by AQI.

(U) 2005 ended on an uncertain note. On the one hand, there was significant progress in the political development of Iraq, including the October constitutional referendum and the December national elections. Yet the insurgency remained strong and was evolving into a more professional and integrated movement, dominated as never before by AQI and its affiliated groups.

Operation NEW MARKET (SUK JADID) (May 25-29, 2005)

(U) To end insurgent intimidation in Haditha and maintain pressure on fighters dispersed by MATADOR, the Coalition carried out Operation NEW MARKET (Arabic: Suk Jadid). A total of 1,000 personnel from RCT-2 and the Iraqi security forces took part in the operation. They first established checkpoints around the city to interdict insurgents fleeing the area. Then, Marines and Iraqi security forces searched targeted areas, buildings, and businesses in an effort to locate insurgents, weapons, and ammunition caches. They detained dozens of suspected insurgents while seizing numerous weapons caches.
(S/NE) The insurgent reaction to NEW MARKET showed both the resilience of AQI and their growing problem with tribal warfare. Sheikh Rafa al-Rawi, who had taken command of AQI in western Anbar after Ghassan Ameen’s capture, attempted to coordinate an insurgent response to the Coalition offensive.\(^{295}\) At the same time members of Jaysh Mohammed in Hit, \(^{296}\) supported by the Albu Nimr, turned their guns on AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and AQI ally al-Asa‘ab al-Ahwal to avenge the killing of a Jaysh Mohammed fighter by AQI.\(^{297}\) This fighting soon spread north to Husayniyah, where AQI attacked a suspected Jaysh Mohammed facility north of the town with car bombs.\(^{297}\) The Mahalawi, seizing the opportunity, attacked an AQI-occupied police station in Ramana, ending the informal truce that had existed between the two since the death of Governor Farhan. This action led to a series of kidnappings by both sides.\(^{298}\) More than thirty-two bodies of AQI and Hamza Battalion fighters from Akashat, Rawah, Hit, Ubaydi, and al-Qaim were discovered by Coalition forces in the al-Thalaja Desert.\(^{299}\) There are some indications that these developments alarmed the al Qaida senior leadership (AQSL). Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (Nashwan Abdul Razzaq) instructed the Ansar al-Sunna insurgent group facilitator Haji Said in Iran’s Kermanshah province, to make arrangements for him to enter Iraq.\(^{300}\)

Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi

(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN AND GBR) The story of Abd al-Hadi’s entry into Iraq illustrates several important lessons about AQI and the insurgency in general. Abd al-Hadi requested transfer to Iraq twice. Zarqawi had denied both requests on security grounds. AQSL pushed Abd al-Hadi to get into the country despite Zarqawi’s objections because they felt Zarqawi’s strategy and supporting tactics were hurting AQI. However, to even get into Iraq, Abd al-Hadi had to overcome the bureaucratic infighting between Ansar al-Sunna and AQI. Each group believed it should be in charge of all elements of AQ operating in Iraq. Due to infighting between the groups, it took almost seven months for al-Hadi to actually arrive in Iraq. This infighting prevented coordinated actions against the Coalition by Ansar al-Sunna and AQI.

After-effects of Operation NEW MARKET (May-June 2005)

(S) If the renewed fighting in late 2004-early 2005 between AQI and both JM and the Hamza Battalion was the reason for Abd al-Hadi’s entry into Iraq, AQSL was right to be concerned. The feud between the AQI and the Hamza Battalion had led to the de facto partition of Husaybah between the two groups, with AQI holding Karabilah and the area east of the Husaybah hospital and the Hamza Battalion holding everything to

\(^{295}\) Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050602 | 20050602 | (S/NE) |
\(^{296}\) Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050605 | 20050605 | (S/NE) |
\(^{297}\) Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050606 | 20050606 | (S/NE) |
\(^{298}\) Ibid.
\(^{299}\) Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050610 | 20050610 | (S/NE) |
\(^{300}\) Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050603 | 20050603 | (S/NE) |
the west.\textsuperscript{301} A number of fighters from the Hamza Battalion were arrayed near Camp Gannon, deterring AQI from mounting further attacks on the Coalition base.\textsuperscript{302}

MCIA Insert Map Here

\textit{(S/NF)} Elsewhere in the region, fighters loyal to AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq retook control of the territory near the Ramana Bridge from the Hamza Battalion. AQI convinced al-Asa'ab al-Iraq that the Coalition was planning to attack its bases north of the Euphrates River and therefore it was necessary to secure their rear from the Hamza Battalion before this offensive began.\textsuperscript{303}

\textit{(S/REL)} AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. was also fighting with Jaysh Mohammed in Hit Error! Bookmark not defined.. AQI used its control of the Ahmad al-Rafi, Abdel Rahim, and al-Haj Hussein Ali Sultan mosques in neighboring Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. (and the support of leading clerics Sheikh Abu Doua'a, Sheikh Tahseen Zaman and Sheikh Hamood al-Muaddidi) to carry out attacks against the Coalition, local police, Iraqi National Guard, and rival insurgent groups like JM in Hit and Haditha.\textsuperscript{304} Sheikh Abu Bahn of the Aziz Mosque in the Haditha Dam village even allowed AQI to use his mosque to launch mortars against the Coalition on June 11.\textsuperscript{305} Although some religious and tribal leaders wanted to move against foreign fighters, they were unable to create an organized resistance movement. Quite simply, they lacked a leader like Sheikh Sabah, who could focus their resolve against SRE groups like AQI.

\textit{(S)} Despite the strength of AQI Error! Bookmark not defined., Jaysh Mohammed was able to exploit the temporary disruption of the AQI foreign fighter network in western Anbar to divert foreign fighters into their own rou. Sheikh Khamis al-Rashad of the group's Albu Hatim cell thus used his religious and Error! Bookmark not defined., to facilitate the entry of foreign fighters into Jaysh Mohammed.\textsuperscript{306} Among his followers were former IIS Error! Bookmark not defined. agents Mohammed Khodier Sabah and Jassim Hammadi Hathel, both of whom served as key leaders with JM.\textsuperscript{307}

\textit{(S/REL TO USA GBR AND AUS)} Other insurgents, not wanting to take part in the infighting and fearful of Coalition efforts in western Anbar, fled south to regroup at Rutbah Error! Bookmark not defined. While the insurgent presence in Rutbah had traditionally been roughly 100-150 fighters,
it now expanded rapidly. Rutbah was an ideal sanctuary for these insurgents because the mayor and other key officials in the city were still the same former Ba’athists. They supported the insurgency by providing it with money given to them by the U.S. Civil Affairs Group. The insurgents exercised strong control over residents, with anti-Coalition propaganda preached openly from the mosques while videos and CDs of insurgent attacks actively sold in markets. No respected local authority existed to prevent ordinary criminal activity, let alone the insurgency, and checkpoints outside the city were not effective unless manned by Coalition troops.

AQI

(AQI) The need to relocate AQI personnel and infrastructure away from the Syrian border to escape Coalition operations may have coincided with the creation twenty miles east of from the Iraqi-Jordanian border of an AQI terrorist training camp capable of housing 200-250 recruits. Run by former Fallujah fighters, the camp had personnel in al-Kasra, al-Nukhayb, and Ain al-Tamur that included an intelligence collection cell, an assassination cell that targeted Shia leaders, and a suicide bombing cell. The command node for these cells was located in a sand factory in Zigherat. This is the same factory where Zarqawi reportedly received medical attention following Operation AL FAJR. When Karbala police successfully infiltrated the camp during the summer of 2005, they discovered a group of fifty Saudis, Sudanese, Syrians, and Iraqis being indoctrinated to serve as suicide bombers. Three additional training camps, each capable of housing 50-75 fighters, were located at Zweia, Khabat al-Habbariya, and al-Habbariya south of Ramadi, focusing on preparing fighters to conduct suicide bombings, complex attacks, IEDs, and VBIED attacks. These camps were reportedly under the supervision of a former

The Capture of the Military Housing Complex in Baghdad (May 2005)

Despite being weakened in western Anbar during MATADOR and NEW MARKET, AQI and its allies remained active in other parts of the province. As before, the key to AQI’s survival lay in the absorption of individuals from other groups to help sustain and regenerate its networks. In Baghdad, for instance, AQI took in fighters from the Islamic Army of Iraq. Led by Abd al-Rahman al-Afghani, the group carried out a successful operation that captured the Military Housing Complex of the 503rd Iraqi National Guard

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Battalion in early May 2005. The unit’s commander, was so intimidated by the insurgency that he fired any of his men who worked with the Coalition. By May 30, the situation had grown so dire that the 503rd completely abandoned their base. The insurgents destroyed the gate the following day. This led to a June 2 Coalition raid on the Military Housing Complex that resulted in the capture of Atheer Nassif Turki, the last remaining significant FREL insurgent leader in Iraq. The capture of Turki in fact signaled the ending of an era in the history of the Iraq insurgency. From this time on, there existed no serious FREL or FRL challengers to the SAR and SRE dominated insurgency.

Operation SPEAR (Operation RUMAH) (June 17, 2005)

(U) Operation SPEAR was launched on June 17 by 1,000 Marines from RCT-2, 2nd Marine Division and Iraqi forces from the 1st Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade against AQI fighters active in Karabilah. The operation lasted until June 22 and involved direct attacks against locations in Karabilah affiliated with AQI. These included a training compound that contained weapons, propaganda, and documentation for foreign fighters and a detention facility that housed Iraqi and foreign hostages. During the operation forty-seven Saudi and Sudanese AQI fighters were killed and one was detained.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) It is difficult to say what effect Operation SPEAR had on the overall security situation in western Anbar. For instance, a new murder and intimidation campaign targeted base workers and Coalition interpreters in the Hit corridor. Scarcely yet, because AQI fighters were focused on reorganizing and on carrying out attacks on JiM and the Hamza Battalion, there ensued a period of relatively few attacks on the Coalition in the area.

(S/NE) There are some indications that Zarqawi was directly involved in AQI’s reorganization in western Anbar, as he was sighted in Anah, Ma’add, and Haditha. During this period along with the amir of al-Qaim Husayn Shihab al-Kabul, they were able to move about the area freely using established local support networks that provided knowledge of the terrain and early warning of Coalition operations.

City Stories (Mid-2005)

315 This occurred after the group had spent a lengthy period stealing vehicles and weapons from site. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid.
Fallujah

The evolution of the insurgency in Fallujah demonstrates the complex relationship between AQI and local insurgents who began join AQI as affiliated groups. AQI cells in Fallujah now somewhat united under the leadership of Sheikh Abd al-Munam Shakir Hamdan Faith al-Kubaisi of the Furqan Mosque, who hoped to facilitate Sheikh Abdullah Janabi’s return to power in the city. Janabi had sworn allegiance (bay’at) to Zarqawi in 2004. Yet his local fighters in Fallujah had sworn allegiance to Janabi, not to AQI itself. However, there was only a surface distinction between the two groups without ideological, motivational, or operational significance. The double bay’at meant that the individual insurgent were bound to obey Janabi who was bound to obey Zarqawi, making them AQI affiliates through their leader. This was apparently a common phenomenon affecting the insurgency throughout 2005 and would culminate in early 2006 with the nearly complete al-Qaedaization of the Sunni anti-Coalition Iraq insurgency.

Sheikh Abd al-Munam received funding from Janabi’s backers in He used it to provide some 500,000 dinars to select locals in order to win their trust and to call them to a revived jihad in Fallujah. His position at the al-Furqan mosque made it very convenient to deliver anti-Coalition and pro-jihad sermons while passing out money to perspective mujahadin.

During the summer of 2005, a group of Syrian, Yemeni, and Moroccan AQI fighters led by Hamid Khamis Saleh used Sheikh Abd al-Munam’s influence to target Aifan, a popular city council member and Albu Issa tribal leader who openly supported the Coalition. An SVBIED attack on June 23 convinced Aifan to flee the country for where he was soon joined by other members of his family. Prominent pro-Coalition members of the Albu Issa, including Sheikh Hamed Togon and Sheikh Abd Allawi Salih were also assassinated, leaving Khamis Hasnawi as the leader of the Albu Issa.

Jaysh Muhammad in Fallujah greatly reduced by defections to AQI and Coalition efforts, was led by Sheikh Hassan Jassim al-Zuwad and his son Hassan Tohman. They were supported by Sheikh Ismahal Saram Hussein

321 [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050603 | 20050603 [S/NF] [ ]
322 [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: TFC INTREP #05-008 [S/NF] [ ]
323 [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050603 | 20050603 [S/NF] [ ]
324 To complicate matters further, Aifan had also received a $10,000 bribe from Jaysh Mohammed leader Ahmed Tohman to keep the Coalition from targeting him.
325 [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050628 | 20050628 [S/MCFD] [ ]
326 [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050618 | 20050618 [S/NF] [ ]

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Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources

Declassification on: 2028
Muslim al-Jumayli, the spiritual leader of the Fallujah insurgents, who fled to Syria during Operation AL FAJR.327

(S/REL TO USA AUS AND GBR) Fatwas Calling for Support for the Coalition: Not all Sunni clerics supported the insurgents. The `Awqaf issued fatwas calling for increased cooperation between locals and the Coalition, an end to violence, and increased Sunni participation in the Iraqi security forces and the political process.328 These calls were taken up in Fallujah by Sadun al-Halbusi of the al-Khulafa Rashid Mosque and Fawzi Namiq Mustafa of the Hamud al-Mahmud Mosque.329 Fallujah residents generally agreed with these sentiments, influenced in part by local anti-insurgent broadcasts that blamed the insurgency for an IED attack that resulted in the death of a young girl.330 Many former mujahidin had given up the fight and were returning to the city to take up normal jobs despite efforts by AQI and others to incite them to return to jihad.331 Even so, government activities and improved civil administration in the city went largely unrecognized by many residents.332 In fact, the mostly Shi’a Public Order Brigade justified the residents continued distrust. After a June 17 VBIED attack on a local marketplace, members of the Brigade looted merchandise, leading to a substantial decline in public support for the police.333

Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined.

(S/NF) The insurgent dynamics in Ramadi changed significantly following the capture of Daham in May 2005. MML sought to rekindle his earlier alliance with Zarqawi in order to exact retribution against the Coalition for the capture of his lieutenant.334 To do this, he opened a dialogue with AQI at the behest of Harith al-Dhari, to discuss the unification of AQI forces with those of his own Ramadi Shura Council.335 This led to a temporary alliance between the two, and Latif facilitated the entry of as many as 183 foreign fighters under Ismael Hamad into Ramadi, using the ratlines around the inactive railroad south of the city to smuggle in fighters, weapons and explosives.336 In addition, river routes were also reestablished to get around Coalition entry points into the city.337

327 Ibid.
328 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050614 | 20050614 | (S/NE) | ]
329 Ibid.
330 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050605 | 20050605 | (S/NE) | ]
331 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050618 | 20050618 | (S/NE) | ]
332 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050605 | 20050605 | (S/NE) | ]
333 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050622 | 20050622 | (S/NE) | ]
334 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050623 | 20050623 | (S/NE) | ]
335 Ibid.
336 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050630 | 20050630 | (S/NE) | ]
337 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050623 | 20050623 | (S/NE) | ]
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(S/NF) The Islamic Army of Iraq meanwhile established a presence in Ramadi as part of a broader campaign by Iraqi SREs to establish a greater presence in the provincial capital in order to counter the rise of Governor Mamboun.

(S/REL TO USA, MCF) The influx of AQI and other SRE insurgents led to an increased harassment campaign against residents, leading some to leave the city. Alcohol salesmen in particular were targeted for intimidation and kidnapping, showing the religious motivation for many of these actions.

(S/REL TO USA, AUS CAN GBR AND NZL) Insurgents increased attacks on "soft" civilian convoys outside the city, stealing their merchandise both for profit and to intimidate locals. During one such convoy ambush on June 7, a number of Iraqi civilians were taken hostage by Ansar al-Sunna, who separated them into different groups and took them to the Amaniyah area.

Al-Qaim

(S/NF) Despite renewed fighting in the city, AQI maintained their influence in Al-Qaim. Not only was it their new capital, but because they relied heavily on foreign support they needed access to Ramana and Karabilah to facilitate smuggling personnel and material throughout Iraq.

Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah

(S/REL TO USA, AUS CAN, GBR AND NZL) In Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah, the insurgents stepped up their intimidation campaign to limit local cooperation with the Coalition and Iraqi security forces. Sentiment in both cities had been neutral, neither favoring the Coalition nor the insurgency, but this began to change as the insurgents assassinated or intimidated residents suspected of being associated with the Coalition. These operations were financed by Amir Mubarak Atrouz, the brother of Zarqawi lieutenant Thamir Mubarak Atrouz (see Chapter 3). In part, the intimidation and murder campaign was made possible through the work of Iraqi police captain Khalid Chaed Hayaf, who was the leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades in this...
city.\textsuperscript{345} Through his lieutenant Abu Ayu, Hayaf was able to monitor residents entering and leaving Coalition bases.\textsuperscript{346} This intimidation gradually created a favorable environment towards the insurgency in the town, enabling insurgents to step up attacks on civilian convoys in the area, and delaying the deployment of the 1st Iraqi Division.\textsuperscript{347}

\textbf{Rawah} Error! Bookmark not defined. and \textbf{Anah} Error! Bookmark not defined.

(S/NF) A number of Zarqawi associates including Qasim Ali al-Mahmud fled to \textbf{Anah} Error! Bookmark not defined. and \textbf{Rawah} Error! Bookmark not defined. during Operations MATADOR and SPEAR, seeking refuge with Umar Ramadan Error! Bookmark not defined. al-Hadu, a local insurgent leader. Umar Ramadan claimed to have personally beheaded forty Albu Mahal and Salmani tribesmen in al-Qaim at AQI Error! Bookmark not defined.'s behest. The Rawah-Anah corridor was heavily influenced by AQI and had previously been used as a base to supply training camps in the Jazira desert. Because both Rawah and Anah were Ba'athist retirement communities under the former regime, the predominantly Sunni planned communities were home to large numbers of insurgent supporters. The Euphrates River that surrounded 50% of Rawah provided a natural barrier against ground forces entering the city and both bridges were under constant AQI surveillance to provide early warning of any Coalition movement south.\textsuperscript{348} The influx of AQI fighters into the city led to the June 30 evacuation of residents, who feared that a Coalition attack on the town was imminent.\textsuperscript{349}

\textbf{Karmah}

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) After a short lull, the insurgency returned to previous levels in Karmah. Insurgent leaders were, however, frustrated by the effectiveness of the Coalition in the area and their inability to mount attacks. As a result, local insurgent leaders Salam Dena Abdallah Thamer, FRED General Falah al-Awadi, and Salah Nihal held a series of meetings in which they argued over the reasons for the ineffectiveness of their attacks against the Coalition to date.\textsuperscript{350}

(S/NF) Among the issues facing the Karmah insurgents was a dispute between AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. leader Sheikh Nawar Ali Musarbat and Turgi Ibrahim Allowi Fayad al-Halbusi (the head of the Green Battalion) over resorting to criminality. Turgi supported it but Nawar decreed it.\textsuperscript{351} Turgi was later detained by the Coalition at the end of June.\textsuperscript{352} He was replaced
as leader of the Green Battalion by Ahmed Migbas (Haji Waleed), who had his own ties to IIS. 

(S/REL) The story behind the capture of Turgi points up the continuing intertwining between tribal issues and the insurgency. Turgi was kidnapped by local Jumayli tribesmen, who had hoped to use him as leverage to secure the release of one of their own tribesmen who was being held by the Green Battalion. The Jumaylis subsequently turned Turgi, who was also a member of a rival tribe (the Halbusi), over to the Coalition. In retaliation for their role in Turgi's capture, Halbusis in the Green Battalion kidnapped the Jumayli tribal leader's son Arkan Mushhan Abbas al-Jumayli. They would subsequently kill Arkan and then his uncle (Talib Abbas al-Jumayli) forcing the head of the Jumaylis (Mehsin Abbas al-Jumayli) into exile in Syria.

Zaidon

(S/NF) In Zaidon, AQI fighters were under the command of Zarqawi's cousin and AQI Baghdad amir Abu Harith. He had masterminded the February 28, 2005 bombing in Hillah that had killed 166 Iraqi police recruits and injured 146. Together with Zaidon-based Essa Handi Abood, Abu Harith met with AQI leaders in Ramadi and distributed funds and instructions to cells in the region. He also supervised the kidnapping of Jeffery Ake, who was held captive by Essa in Zaidon.

Ubaydi

(S/REL TO USA, AUS AND GBR) Recognizing the threat posed by local smugglers and Salafists tied to AQI in Zaidon, the Coalition carried out Operation VITAL GROUND, causing some insurgents to flee towards Baghdad and Abu Ghraib to regroup. Others remained in the town, holed up in areas such as mosques, which they believed would not be targeted by the Coalition.

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353 | Military | TACTICAL DIIR MNFW HET07 0481 05 | 20050620 | (S/REL USA AND MCFI) |
354 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050708 | 20050708 | (S/NF) |
355 | Ibid. |
356 | Ibid. |
357 | Ibid. |
358 | Ibid. |
359 | Ibid. |
360 | Ibid. |
AQA’s intimidation of the population in ‘Ubaydi enabled the group some freedom of movement across the Euphrates River. \cite{361} The major insurgent facilitator in the city was local pharmacist Salah Barakat Asideon, who joined AQI after his son was shot and killed by Coalition forces on May 16. He used his pharmacy as a front for the insurgency. Adnan Abdul Kareem, the imam of the Mustafa Mosque, led a group of local Salafists allied with AQI in the city. \cite{362}

Snapshot of the insurgency

\textit{(S/NF)} The series of operations carried out in early summer 2005 only briefly disrupted insurgent activities, forcing fighters and their leadership to hide or disperse once again to smaller towns and villages throughout Anbar. Certain towns were, however, relatively untouched by Coalition operations and these cities (including the al-Qaim area, the Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. - Hit Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor, and Rutbah Error! Bookmark not defined.) would later permit the evolution of the insurgency into a more formalized structure with some of the characteristics of a state.

\textit{(S/NF)} AQI Error! Bookmark not defined., meanwhile, continued to attract fighters from other insurgent groups, but also faced serious resistance from certain tribes. These problems, in particular with the Albu Issa and the Albu Mahal tribes, would soon come to a head as open conflict with the Mahalawi and a murder and intimidation campaign against the Albu Issa.

Attack Data (May – August 2005)

\textit{(U)} The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the middle trimester (May to August 2005). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks Error! Bookmark not defined.) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

\textit{(S)} The average number of enemy attacks during this period was slightly higher than the previous period, and generally increased slightly during the four months. In particular, the number of Direct Fire and IED incidents showed a definite increase during the four months. The majority of activity in the period was concentrated in AO Topeka. The Indirect Fire and Complex Attacks data showed no strong trends. There were no particular weeks during the period that varied significantly from the overall trends and averages.

\cite{361} \cite{362}
All Incidents
Political Developments: The Rise of Governor Mamoun

(S/NF) With the death of Farhan, former provincial council chairman, Mamoun Sami Rashid was chosen as the new governor of Anbar by a vote of 27-0 on June 1, 2005.363 His success as the provincial council chairman had demonstrated his ability to work well with the other council members, leading to their confidence in him to serve as governor.364 His political aptitude, however, made him a frequent target for insurgent groups seeking to prevent political progress in Anbar. Deputy Governor Taleb Ibrahim Sameer, who had temporarily served as governor in Farhan's absence, returned to his former position with Mamoun's ascension.365 Sheikh Nasser Abdul Karim, an individual with a history of corruption and former regime ties that brought him considerable influence and "tribal legitimacy," was favored as Mamoun's replacement as provincial council chairman.366 However, Sheikh Nasser was out maneuvered by deputy provincial chairman Khedier Abd al-Jabar Abbas, a teacher and school administrator.367
Infiltration of the Iraqi Security Forces by Insurgents

(S/NF) This positive development in the political sphere was undercut by infiltration of insurgents into the ISF. This infiltration caused many Anbaris to hesitate to approach the Coalition for fear of being identified by insurgents who held senior positions in the new Iraqi security forces. One of the most successful examples of insurgent infiltration was [b](b)(6) who worked both for MML to spy on top-level Iraqi military meetings as a bodyguard for a commanding officer in the Iraqi armed forces in Anbar. [b](b)(6) Other more common examples of insurgent infiltration took place in Karmah, where insurgents routinely sabotaged the weaponry of the local Iraqi security forces.

(b)(6) MML was able to successfully coerce Anbar police chief Brigadier General Shakir Salih to support him, meeting regularly to receive intelligence on how to infiltrate the local police forces with fighters loyal to the Ramadi Council. Meanwhile Deputy Assistant Minister for Security Coordination of Police Affairs Ali Ghanib Khudair was intimidated into providing intelligence to MML in return for his own security. [b](b)(6) [b](b)(6) also worked for MML, attempting to reduce the Coalition presence in Ramadi in order to allow the Ramadi Shura Council to operate more freely in the city.

(S/REL TO USA, GBR, AND AUS) In addition to intelligence, MML used his agents within the security forces to provide himself with a steady income. Foremost among his agents was Assistant to the Interior Ministry General Al Ghalib, who worked with General Shakir to "tax" 7,000 dinars

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368 ibid.
369 ibid.
370 ibid.
371 [Open Source | SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE/AAMER MADHANI: U.S. TROOPS FIND BODY OF ANBAR GOVERNOR | 20050601 | (U)]
372 [Military | ibid.
373 ibid.
374 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050606 | 20050606 | (S/NF)]
375 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050727 | 20050727 | (S/NF)]
376 ibid.
377 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050727 | 20050727 | (S/NF)]
from officers and 5,000 dinars from enlisted men to support MML in Ramadi. Access to funding, coupled with the inability of many Anbaris to support their families, was a major factor in the success of insurgent infiltration. The starting salary of an Iraqi police officer, facilities protection worker, or soldier was $150 a month, whereas insurgents were paid $100-200 per small arms, IEDs, mortar, or RPG attack. Civilians were paid $10 a day to spy on Coalition bases and checkpoints. Much of the day-to-day funding for these payments was collected or extorted from local Iraqis, though some chose to donate funding to support the insurgency at mosques, relying on anonymity to let them provide money without fear of detention.

**Operation SWORD (Operation SAIF) (June-July 2006)**

(S/REL) Operation SWORD was the strategic successor to Operation SPEAR. It was launched to pursue fleeing AQI fighters in the Hit corridor using 1,000 Marines from RCT-2 along with a hundred Iraqi infantry. The influx of Coalition and Iraqi security patrols forced more AQI fighters to flee towards Ramadi, which led in turn to a major insurgent intimidation and coercion campaign against residents in Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah. In Hit, Operation SWORD encountered surprisingly light resistance because corrupt members of the Hit city council warned insurgents of the impending attack. Most insurgents escaped to Baghdad or Jubbah while others simply went underground.

(S/NF) AQI Fighters: Possibly prompted by Coalition operations, fighting broke out in Haditha between AQI fighters under Husayn Shihab and members of the Jaghayli tribe during May 2005. There had earlier been tensions and some outright violence between the two, but the proximate cause of the renewed fighting was AQI's decision to burn down houses in the Ahmed neighborhood and beat the inhabitants. Sixty AQI fighters under Mohammed Cent (likely members of the Hit-based Asa'ab al-Alwaq) managed to remain above the fray, hiding out in the Haditha water treatment plant. Dissatisfied by what he regarded as insufficient zeal on the part of Iraqi SREs, Zarqawi appointed Yemeni AQI leader Abu Ayman as his new amir for Haditha to free up Shihab to operate in other parts of western Anbar.
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(S/NE) With AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. now actively fighting local tribes in Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined., HitError! Bookmark not defined., and Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. in addition to the Coalition and the Iraqi government, AQI leader Husayn Shihab was forced to keep moving between Karabilah, Um Tina, and Haditha to evade capture. Even so, Shihab continued to exert considerable influence in Karabilah, Sadah, and New 'Ubaydi despite the continued efforts of the Hamza Battalion, which was now holding foreign AQI fighters prisoner in Husaybah rather than killing them outright.

(S/REL) The Coalition also moved into Zaidon, preventing insurgent groups in the city from recruiting openly for six weeks and forcing insurgents led by Mohammed Suleiman Fizza, Ahmed Ali Waelis, Sheikh Abdel Salaam Jameel, and Essa Abood al-Handi (largely Iraqi AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. fighters with ties to the Jaysh al-Haqq and 1920 Revolution Brigades insurgent groups) to limit their recruiting efforts to offering money and support for the families of insurgent fighters.

(S/NE) AHMAD ALI WAELIS. Chief of Staff of the IIIE Error! Bookmark not defined. for twenty-two years under Saddam, Waelis speaks Spanish and English fluently. In 2003 and 2004 he was a Jaysh Mohammed facilitator. In early 2005, Waelis was one of the Jaysh Mohammed members who split with the main body of JM to form Jaysh al-Haqq in opposition to MML's attempt at political engagement. Jaysh al-Haqq would then become a satellite group of AQI Error! Bookmark not defined.

A Fight for Influence within the Insurgency?

(S/NE) The New Ba'ath Party: With AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. under attack from the Coalition and local tribes, the 14b Error! Bookmark not defined. 14b leadership thought that this would be an opportune time to reestablish their influence in Anbar. Spearheading this effort was New Ba'ath Party leader Mohammad Yunis al-Ahmad, who had reformed and reorganized his FRL followers into eleven "battalions" under the leadership of the New Ba'ath Party Military Command. He planned for them to operate in and around the Sunni Triangle. Al-Ahmad directed many of the high-ranking Ba'athists based in Syria to return to Iraq to lead this new Ba'athist insurgent group. None of his plans were implemented to any serious degree. The FRL portion of the insurgency in Iraq remained unable to influence events on the ground in Iraq.

(S/REL) Zarqawi's Influence Challenged: Zarqawi's influence was threatened internationally when his own mentor Sheikh Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi denounced the killing of innocent Iraqis. Despite al-Maqdisi's later assertions that his words were taken out of context by the Arab media, he

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386 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050707 | 20050707 | (S/NE) |
387 | Ibid. |
388 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050705 | 20050705 | (S/NE) |
389 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050707 | 20050707 | (S/NE) |

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was not the only prominent Sunni cleric to take exception to Zarqawi's tactics; the prominent Egyptian cleric Tantawi and the Saudi cleric al-Awji also denounced him.  

(Z/REL) Zarqawi’s Competing Objectives: It would be a mistake, however, to see AQI as deeply damaged by the on-going Coalition operations, tribal infighting or international challenges. Yet Zarqawi may have felt that his reputation as a mujahidin had been damaged because he began to shift his publicized operations from western Anbar to Ramadi to reassert his presence in the provincial capital. Combined with increased threats and attacks against the province’s Sunni leadership (particularly the Fallujah mukhtars and the Karmah city council), Zarqawi sought to prevent Sunni leaders from distancing themselves from his jihad and to keep them from any further political participation.  

Political Negotiations Resume  

(Z/NF) In one important way Zarqawi was correct: his perceived weaknesses were pushing tribal and religious leaders loyal to MML to discuss security and political issues in the city with the Coalition and the Iraqi government. MML also seems to have realized that his anger over the arrest of Daham was counterproductive and that it was in his best interest to negotiate. These negotiations led to the creation of the Independent Popular Front for Anbar, an apolitical Sunni group designed to educate locals about the political process and prepare them for the upcoming elections. Unfortunately, a June 16 planned meeting for political and religious leaders from throughout the province at the Saddam Mosque was prevented by a group of SREs. These same SREs had previously stopped Iraqi security forces from recruiting at the same mosque.  

(Z/NF) MML’s Strategy to Enter the Elections: MML’s strategy was to negotiate a ceasefire in Ramadi that would allow him to run in the December 2005 elections. MML’s renewed drive to transform himself from Sunni insurgent leader to aspiring politician led a number of his former followers in the Ramadi Shura Council to break ranks with him. In their search for an alternate leader for the insurgency, many rank and file fighters from the Islamic Army of Iraq, the al-Nu’man Brigade, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and Jaysh al-Haqq joined AQI.  

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390 Ibid.  
391 Ibid.  
392 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050708 | 2005-7-8 | (S/NF)+ ]  
393 Ibid.  
394 Ibid.  
395 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050718 | 20050718 | (S/NF)+ ]  
396 Ibid.; [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050714 | 20050714 | (S/NF)+ ]
Together with their allies in Ansar al-Sunna, AQI reacted to MML’s change of mind, by asking their new fighters from the Ramadi Shura Council member groups to carry out attacks in Ramadi. The Al-Nu’man Brigades had already been partially assimilated into AQI. The Brigades’ leader Issa Daham, although he supported MML, had also been taking funding and direction from AQI leader Abu ‘Ubayda al-Kubaysi ever since the capture of his brother. Mid-level Ramadi Shura Council leaders were paid $300 by AQI to organize and conduct attacks, while low-level leaders were paid $100. These attacks undermined MML’s position in the negotiations by making him unable to control his own subordinates. They also kept the Coalition focused on the member groups of the Ramadi Shura Council while AQI was reestablishing its own network in the city.

Fault Lines: AQI’s actions in Ramadi created a public fault-line in the city. On the one side were the leaders of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, al-Nu’man Brigade, Jaysh al-Haqq, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Islamic Movement of Iraqi Mujahideen (men such as Mukhlif al-Fahdawi, Ali Zaydon al-Milawi and even Issa Daham) who followed MML in pushing for negotiations with the Coalition. On the other side were many rank-and-file members of these groups who joined AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and Saraya al-Jihad in following AQI leader Muhammad Khalaf Ulyan al-Khaffafi (Abu Riam) in his push for continued attacks. There were also certain leaders of the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the al-Nu’man Brigade who broke publicly with MML’s view on negotiations and joined AQI and Ansar al-Sunna fighters under Ghassan Kazim Husayn al-Azzawi. Betrayed by his own subordinates and targeted for death by AQI, MML abandoned his negotiations with the Coalition by the end of July.

AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and the Islamic Army of Iraq quickly became the most active insurgent groups in Ramadi. (though Islamic Army of Iraq soon began suffering mass defections to AQI). As before, they based their operations in the Jazira and Sufia districts of the city. These districts afforded them a measure of safety from Coalition and Iraqi security forces as they conducted limited training, and intimidated the local population. While fighters rapidly shifted back and forth between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, both groups in Ramadi answered to Fallujah native Abu Salam (a representative of Zarqawi’s Anbar amir Abu Yahya) following the capture of Ansar al-Sunna’s

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397 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050714 | 20050714 | (S/NE) ]
398 Ibid.
399 Ibid.
400 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050717 | 20050707 | (S/NE) ]
401 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050718 | 20050718 | (S/NE) ]
402 Ibid.
403 [Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050721 | 20050721 | (S/NE) ]
Ramadi leader Mussab Jasim.\textsuperscript{404} Abu ‘Ubayda al-Kubaysi, meanwhile, took over the al-Nu'man Brigade rejectionists who opposed MML’s negotiations.\textsuperscript{405}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Zarqawi’s anti-Shi’a ‘Umar Brigade}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{(S/REL)} In an effort to inflame civil war across Iraq, Zarqawi announced the creation of the exclusively anti-Shi’a ‘Umar Brigade on July 5, named after Caliph ‘Umar. The fact that Umar conquered Persia and spread the Islamic empire to South Asia\textsuperscript{406} was a constant reminder anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian nature of the force. Soon after its creation, AQ\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} began publicizing the Umar Brigades attacks against the Shi’a “Ghadr Corps” (a sectarian pejorative used by Zarqawi to refer to SCIRI\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}’s Badr Corps), including the assassination of Badr commanders Kharyy al-Ameri and Adel Koshk Khabar.\textsuperscript{407} Many Anbaris quietly supported the creation of the ‘Umar Brigade as a means to protect Iraq from Shi’a domination, enabling Zarqawi to further develop his image as “Defender of the Sunnis” inside Anbar without putting his supporters there at any immediate risk, since most of the ‘Umar Brigade's actions took place in Baghdad\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} or southern Iraq.\textsuperscript{408}

\textsuperscript{(S/NF)} In Anbar, the ‘Umar Brigade was made up of Iraqi, Saudi, and Syrian AQ\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} fighters and required strict Salafist and Wahhabi beliefs as a criterion for membership.\textsuperscript{409} It primarily focused on targeting the Shi’a in Haditha\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} in order to gain local Sunni support and foment instability in the population.\textsuperscript{410}

\textsuperscript{(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)} The creation of the ‘Umar Brigade coincided with a major effort by the AQ\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} media committee headed up by Abu Maysarah al-Iraqi and Khattab al-Iraqi to create an AQI propaganda campaign specifically tailored to Anbar. Working with Muhammad al-Anbari, they established a media committee for every major city in Anbar, providing the necessary funding to hire media-savvy staff.\textsuperscript{411}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Targeting the Albu Issa Tribe (July 2005)}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{(S/NF)} The Shi’a were not the only targets of AQ\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}’s renewed murder and intimidation campaign. Among the top targets on their list was Fallujah\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} city council member and Albu Issa tribal leader Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi. A one-time supporter of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, Sheikh Khamis had shifted his views...
following Operation AL FAJR because he blamed the insurgents for the destruction in the city.\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 | 20050720 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.}

AQI attempted to kidnap him in January, but the plot failed and his tribe retaliated by killing two insurgents.\footnote{Ibid.}

\textbf{(S/NE) Tribal Vendettas:} Sheikh Khamis was a target for AQI\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 | 20050720 | (S/NE) | } attempt\footnote{Ibid.}ed. assassination from then on, both because his presence on the Fallujah\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 | 20050720 | (S/NE) | } community council kept the Albu Issa tribal members from participating in large-scale insurgent activity and because the Zobai tribesmen who now made up many of the AQI in the Fallujah area saw his assassination as a way to settle a tribal vendetta against the Albu Issa.\footnote{Ibid.} Faced with continued threats to his life by AQI leader Essa Handi al-Essawi (a fellow Albu Issa tribesman), Sheikh Khamis fled to Jordan\footnote{Military | CIOC REPORT: EXPLOITING CONTINUED DISCORD BETWEEN ANSAR AL-SUNNA AND AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ | 200511 | (S/NE) | } with several prominent members of the Albu Issa tribe, paving the way for wholesale participation by the Albu Issa in AQI.\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050715 | 20050715 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.}

\textbf{AQI\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 | 20050720 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.}’s attempted merger with Ansar al-Sunna (Mid-2005)}

\textbf{(S/NE) A Love-Hate Relationship:} At the same time, AQI\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 | 20050720 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.} was making a robust effort to merge its organization with that of Ansar al-Sunna. While they shared the Salafist global jihad ideology and allegiance to ‘Usama bin Laden, they were divided by local and personality-driven tensions throughout Anbar, Nineveh, and Baghdad\footnote{Military | CIOC REPORT: EXPLOITING CONTINUED DISCORD BETWEEN ANSAR AL-SUNNA AND AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ | 200511 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.} provinces.\footnote{Ibid.} As we have already seen, some of the dispute between the two groups originated in claims over who truly represented al-Qaeda in Iraq. There were, however, other reasons for the tension, including Ansar al-Sunna’s belief that Zarqawi was responsible for the destruction of their parent organization’s base in northern Iraq, the Ansar al-Sunna belief that AQI did not respect it, resentment towards AQI for claiming AS attacks as their own, AQI recruitment of AS fighters, and Zarqawi’s carefree attitude towards killing large numbers of Iraqis regardless of whether they were Shi’a or Sunni.\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050715 | 20050715 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.} The attempted negotiations between Zarqawi and AS leader Abu Talha (see Chapter 3) were terminated by the latter’s capture. Still, the negotiations fostered a closer degree of cooperation between the two groups as Abu Talha’s lieutenants Abu Barra and Abu Saad sought to maintain a high operational tempo focused around Zarqawi’s then-staging point of Tal Afar in an effort to assert leadership over AS across Iraq.\footnote{Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050715 | 20050715 | (S/NE) | }\footnote{Ibid.}
Other roots for the dispute between AQI and AS were the personal grudges between the leaders of the two groups. As far back as 2002, Zarqawi had told future AS leader Abu Abdullah al-Shafii that his organization was weak, poorly organized, and in need of experience. His view was reinforced over the years by the steady stream of mid and senior-level Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna defectors who had joined first JTJ and then moved on to join AQI. While their lieutenants had discussed the need for operational coordination between the two groups prior to Operation AL FAJR, there was little love lost between the leadership of the two groups.

These same views had already been expressed to Ansar al-Sunna commander in Kirkuk, Yahya al-Kurdi. He had been ordered (through a courier) by Ansar al-Sunna leader Abu Abdullah al-Shafii not to support AQI during Operation AL FAJR. Abu Abdullah felt Zarqawi was inexperienced and his plan to defend the city against the Coalition was doomed to failure.

Intrigue within AQI: After JTJ became AQI in October 2004, the Arab Gulf-based leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting (LIB) asked the following concerns be relayed to AQSL.

- The Ansar al-Sunna leadership was concerned that AQSL had abandoned it after the defeat of its predecessor organization Ansar al-Islam in Beyara during the initial stages of OIF.
- AQI had both committed and publicized the "brutal and barbaric" act of beheading hostages, which the Ansar al-Sunna leadership opposed.
- AQI had a poor to non-existent political strategy for their movement.
- AQI had no established avenue of negotiation or communication with the Iraqi government or the Coalition.
- AQI had no established public relations effort apart from intimidation and fear.
- Because Zarqawi was a Jordanian, he lent no legitimacy to the Iraqi resistance, which should be led by an Iraqi.
Al-Libi relayed these concerns to his superior Abu Munther, who intended to relay it by courier to ‘Usama bin Laden. When these concerns were not addressed by mid-February 2005, Ansar al-Sunna leader Abu Layth made arrangements for a representative of the group to make its concerns known to AQAM global operations chief Abu Faraj al-Libi and to ‘Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in person if time and security allowed. Among the concerns expressed by Ansar al-Sunna leaders (including those of chemical weapons expert Abbas bin Farnas bin Qafqas) was that Zarqawi forcibly conscripted fighters into his organization and that there was the potential for dangerous situations to develop due to Zarqawi’s mismanagement and lack of leadership. Abbas also provided a written critique of Zarqawi’s performance during the defense of Fallujah, noting that he failed to establish even basic defensive measures such as barbed wire, trenches, berms, and mine fields despite having months of advance notice that the Coalition was going to attack the city.

Other Ansar al-Sunna leaders in Anbar and throughout Iraq were equally disparaging of Zarqawi to the AQSL during the spring and summer of 2005, claiming that discord between AQI and other Iraqi Salafist groups had reached the point where armed conflict could erupt. Moreover, they claimed that Ramadi Salafists were so weary of killing innocent civilians that they now planned to aid the returning police and civil defense forces. Ansar al-Sunna leaders in northern Iraq had similar criticisms, with the Tulul al-Baqq-based Abu Sufiyan reporting that formerly sympathetic tribal leaders were now supporting the Iraqi military and police forces due to Zarqawi’s violent tactics.

The Letter to Zarqawi from Ayman al-Zawahiri

Much of the Ansar al-Sunna criticism of Zarqawi would later surface in a July 9, 2005 letter to Zarqawi from AQSL second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. The letter, while written in a patronizing tone, nevertheless contained a comprehensive critique of Zarqawi’s strategy to date, including his practice of televising beheadings, engaging in sectarian warfare against the Shi’a, and alienating other insurgent groups. In particular, al-Zawahiri emphasized the importance of popular support in jihad and urged Zarqawi to begin uniting as many other insurgent groups as possible behind him in preparation for the Coalition withdrawal. Zarqawi’s focus, according to al-Zawahiri, should be on the creation of an Islamist amirate following the Coalition withdrawal that could spread jihad to other parts of the Middle East before more moderate or secular factions within the Iraqi Sunni community could emerge.
(U) Al-Zawahiri's letter reveals just how closely AQSL was following both Zarqawi's campaign in Iraq and global jihad in general. In particular, in his closing statements al-Zawahiri says "By God, if by chance you're going to Fallujah, send greetings to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." This phrase, which initially made some Western analysts suspicious of the letter, is in fact a paraphrase from a jihadist poem that was widely circulated online following Operation AL FAJR:

(U) **You who rule countries by his infidels**
**You who can kill flies with chemicals**
**You who are riding the fast thing**
**By God, where are you going to?**
**If you are going to Fallujah, send my regards to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi**
**And all the jihadis in his group ...**

(U) **Friction:** For reasons that are unclear, Zarqawi did not act upon al-Zawahiri's recommendations, and in fact declared publicly that the letter was a fraud. This led to further friction between Zarqawi and AQSL that would cause Attiyah al-Jaziri, another member of AQSL, in November 2005 to issue his own far more direct letter to Zarqawi informing him of their displeasure.

**Summary of First Half of 2005**

During the first six months of 2005, the Coalition conducted a series of offensive operations to clear the insurgents from cities throughout the province. Unfortunately, as soon as the operation was completed, the Coalition forces moved on and the insurgents returned. While the operations caused some damage, the insurgents were hurt just as badly by infighting between Ansar al-Sunni, Jaysh Mohammed and AQI. Despite the offensives and the infighting, by mid-year the insurgents were recovering from AL FAJR and gaining strength in large parts of the province.

**City Stories (Mid-2005)**

**Fallujah**

(S/REL) By mid-July most of the insurgents in Fallujah were members of AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Mohammed, and the Green Battalion, with unemployment the most common motivator to join the insurgency. However, because the main focus of the Fallujah branches of Jaysh Mohammed and Green Battalion (made up primarily of FREs and IIS officers led by

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427 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050717 | 20050717 | (S/NF) | ]
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Waleed Khalid Obied Khodier and Mohammed Suleyman Fizza Shenather) was criminal activity rather than fighting. AQI and Ansar al-Sunna dominated the insurgency.\textsuperscript{438}

(S/REL) Munam Abu Sheba served as AQI Error! Bookmark not defined.‘s primary organizer for SVBIED attacks in Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined.. Formerly the second-in-command under Umar Hadid, Abu Sheba had fought alongside him during both VIGILANT RESOLVE and AL FAJR, overseeing the execution of Iraqi National Guard soldiers and suspected Coalition collaborators during the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura’s reign of Fallujah.\textsuperscript{430} Despite being captured during AL FAJR, he was later released, at which time he resumed his former position within the insurgency.\textsuperscript{431}

(S/NE) Fallujahs Urged to Vote this Time: There were also signs of progress in Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined., with many mukhtars (neighborhood chiefs) stating their intention to convince residents to participate in the upcoming elections during weekly meetings with the Coalition and Iraqi officials.\textsuperscript{432} A number of Fallujah officials regretted not voting in the previous year and now saw an opportunity to regain Sunni political power by participating in the elections.\textsuperscript{433} This was reflected in a fatwa issued on July 15 by 15 leading Fallujah clerics, including prominent imam Sheikh Kamal Shakir Mahmut, that urged residents to participate in both the constitutional referendum and the December elections.\textsuperscript{434}

Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined.

(S/NE) The ongoing negotiations between MML and the Iraqi government dominated the situation in Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined, during the summer of 2005. Attack levels remained high throughout the city, intimidating residents but generally proving ineffective against Coalition forces. The continued subsuming of FREs into AQI Error! Bookmark not defined, was illustrated by men like former Republican Guard lieutenant Nazim Hamid Rashid Abu Othman (al-Amir), who now took command of AQI fighters in the Zangora district of the city.\textsuperscript{435}

Amariyah

(S/NE) SREs continued to grow in strength in eastern Anbar as the Jaysh Mohammed in the Habbaniyah Error! Bookmark not defined, and Amariyah corridor led by Ahmed Tohman began

\textsuperscript{438} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{439} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050716 | 20050716 | S-NE | ]
\textsuperscript{440} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{441} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{442} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050731 | 20050731 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{443} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{444} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050807 | 20050807 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{445} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050712 | 20050712 | (S/NE) | ]

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defecting to join AQI. In Amariyah itself, the well-organized Black Flags was an SRE group that specialized in contract kidnapping for AQI and Ansar al-Sunnah. Among their most infamous achievements was the kidnapping of the Algerian ambassador, whom they delivered to Ferris Town before moving him to the village of al-Libya (al-Bias). Led by an individual known as "Diya," ("Blood Money") the group was based in Saddamiyah because of the region's relative isolation and low population.

Rawah

(S/NF) Rawah continued to serve as the primary AQI logistics node and staging area for foreign fighters from Syria, with foreign fighters waiting in the city to receive further instructions from cells in Baghdad or Mosul. Fearing a Coalition attack because of the foreign fighters, many Rawah residents began fleeing the city on July 17, and there was widespread looting of property in the western part of the city as a result. The one hundred insurgents who remained in the city under the leadership of AQI amir Abu Abdullah, Wadi Wahab Jassim, and Hoqar Jumal used the water treatment plant as a headquarters.

Haqlaniyah

(S/NF) AQI also seized the Haditha Project for Power Generation south of Haqlaniyah, forcing workers and contractors to abandon the site and turning it into a bomb factory and a safe house for foreign fighters.

Hit

(S/NF) AQI as a logistics node despite Coalition and Iraqi forces in the city. One of the major AQI leaders in Hit was Husayn 'Abd al-Ghafir al-Hilawi, who used it as a base from which to disperse suicide bombers to safe houses from which they could be transported to other parts of Iraq. Tribal infighting, possibly related to AQI's problems with MML in Ramadi, led to fighting between the group and the Albu Fahad tribe. It started with AQI's attempted kidnapping
of an Albu Fahad tribesman that local amir Mohammed Ibrahim Jadiyah believed to be working for the Coalition. The intended victim escaped, but the Albu Fahad killed the amir in retaliation.\textsuperscript{444}

Fighting Resumes with the Hamza Battalion (June-July 2005)

(S/NF) The trouble between the Albu Fahad and AQI\textsuperscript{445} Error! Bookmark not defined. was symptomatic of a brewing tribal conflict in western Anbar. By late June 2005, local tribes in that area regarded AQI as a greater threat than the Coalition to their short and long-term objectives. In al-Qaim in particular, the situation had deteriorated to the point where members of the Albu Mahal tribe found it difficult to move about freely without coming under attack by AQI.\textsuperscript{445} As a first step towards reestablishing their traditional influence over their respective cities, these tribal leaders banded together as residents to expel all foreign fighters. On June 22 local residents succeeded in doing just that in Husaybah\textsuperscript{445} Error! Bookmark not defined., and then turned the city over to the Hamza Battalion.\textsuperscript{446}

(S/NF) It would be a mistake to assume that every tribal member followed the decisions of his sheikh. In fact, many members of the Karbali, Rawi, 'Ubaydi, Salmaan, and even the Albu Mahal tribe remained indecisive about whether to support AQI\textsuperscript{447} Error! Bookmark not defined. or the Hamza Battalion.\textsuperscript{447} AQI was able to ensure the neutrality of many Albu Mahal tribesmen in Husaybah\textsuperscript{445} Error! Bookmark not defined. and Rawah\textsuperscript{445} Error! Bookmark not defined. by paying them off.\textsuperscript{448} Though Zarqawi was now distrustful of many Iraqi tribes, he did rely on the Jasha'ama tribe to move foreign fighters in Ramana, Baghuz, and Qarnah.\textsuperscript{449}

(S/NF) Local insurgent groups, since they were composed of tribesmen from the area, also split over whether to support AQI\textsuperscript{445} Error! Bookmark not defined. or the Hamza Battalion. Ra'ad Saleh Muttar, the unofficial leader of the Quwayt Allah al-Tharib, al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, and Jaysh Mohammed insurgent groups decided to stay neutral and the groups loyal to him were thus divided over on whether to support AQI or the Battalion.\textsuperscript{448} Some members of al-Asa'ab al-Iraq were willing to hire out their services to whoever would pay the most.\textsuperscript{449} In order to distinguish themselves from the rest of al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, those members of the group that chose to fight alongside AQI adopted the name al-Asa'ab al-Qaim.\textsuperscript{450} The mercenary attitude adopted by al-Asa'ab al-Iraq was due in part to its

\textsuperscript{444} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{445} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050711 20050711 [S/NF]
\textsuperscript{446} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050716 20050716 [S/NF]
\textsuperscript{447} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 20050720 [S/NF]
\textsuperscript{448} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050717 20050717 [S/NF]
\textsuperscript{449} [Military] TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050724 20050724 [S/NF]
new leader Sa'ad Ghrabi al-Rawi, who had taken over the group following the capture of Abd al-Hadi and the disappearance of his successor Mohammed 'Ubaydi Jassim. 43

(S/NF) By mid-July the Hamza Battalion controlled not only Husaybah! Bookmark not defined. (preventing AQI! Bookmark not defined. from carrying out any attacks on Camp Gannon), but also Sadah and Old 'Ubaydi. AQI controlled Kaabilah, New 'Ubaydi, and the Jazira areas of Ar-Rabit and Ramaha. 44 Aware that missing their forces risked Coalition attack, many AQI fighters in Kaabilah and Ar-Rabit redeployed further north towards Tal Afar and Bayji. 45

(S/NF) While many of AQI! Bookmark not defined. 's foreign fighters had fled western Anbar in response to Coalition offensives, those that remained active were a force to be reckoned with, especially in contrast to the Hamza Battalion. Despite having more than 900 active fighters spread out across Husaybah! Bookmark not defined., Akashat, Rutbah! Bookmark not defined., and Muhamadi! Bookmark not defined., weapons and material shortages continually plagued the Battalion. 46 Additionally, the Battalion was also unable to penetrate AQI's internal structure and was reluctant to attack their rivals in the absence of specific intelligence for fear that the Coalition would end up targeting the Battalion during a firefight. 47

(S/NF) AQI! Bookmark not defined. now shifted their attacks to Akashat, which lay on the Hamza Battalion's Error! Bookmark not defined. and Rutbah! Bookmark not defined.. In order to maintain its dominance of these necessary and lucrative smuggling routes, the Battalion was forced to dispatch 130 fighters from Husaybah! Bookmark not defined. to Akashat under the command of former members of the Iraqi National Guard. The Battalion leadership apparently believed that the Coalition presence in Husaybah would keep AQI at bay. 48 In retrospect this would prove to be a fatal mistake, since the reduction in fighters, combined with shortages in weapons and ammunition, allowed AQI to overpower the Battalion in Husaybah. By the beginning of August, AQI had largely defeated the Battalion in the city, setting up their banners over public buildings and moving freely about the city without fear of attack from residents. 49

Consequences of the Hamza Battalion's Defeat

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Before the defeat of the Hamza Battalion, AQI! Bookmark not defined. had been willing to make a distinction between the Battalion and the Albu Mahal. After taking Husaybah! Bookmark not defined., however, this distinction disappeared, and AQI

43 Ibid.
44
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46
47
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began actively targeting the tribesmen in nearby villages like Barghuz, where many wealthy and influential Mahalawi lived.\textsuperscript{460} The defeat of the Battalion also allowed AQI, in tandem with Ansar al-Sunna, to reposition many of its fighters (apart from those now active in Ramadi\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}) to Haditha\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}, Haidaniyah, Bani Dahir, and Barwanah, with Barwanah serving as the primary staging area.\textsuperscript{461}

Snapshot of the Insurgency

(S/NE) Throughout the summer of 2005 AQI\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} faced and apparently overcame a series of challenges. These included decisive solutions for the conflicts with the Hamza Battalion and the Albu Issa as well as the creation of the ‘Umar Brigade to appeal to the Sunni by openly targeting Shi’a militias. The ineffectual efforts by\textsuperscript{14b} \textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} to re-enter the battlefield showed that AQI continued to play a dominant role in the fighting on the ground.

(S/NE) Yet the summer revealed four serious problems for AQI\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} to overcome. First, the growing movement for political engagement supported by many SAR groups was a direct threat to the existence of the insurgency as a whole. Second, the continued disagreement with Ansar al-Sunna prevented the unification of the two largest SRE organizations. Third, the stiff letter from al-Zawali showed that AOSL was growing weary of Zarqawi’s reckless attacks that killed far more Muslims than it did Coalition troops. Finally, the defeat of the Hamza Battalion did not solve the tribal issue, but simply postponed a confrontation until 2006. The four issues meant AQI had to fight several enemies besides the Coalition.

The Foreign Connection (July-September 2005)

Foreign Fighters

(U) During the summer of 2005 the Coalition became more concerned about the infiltration of foreign fighters into the Iraqi battlefield. A key element of Zarqawi’s strategy for rebuilding his AQI\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} after Operation AL FAJR was the increased use of foreign fighters as suicide bombers and special advisors for his group. Although foreign fighters were never a large element of the Iraqi insurgency or AQI, their experience and leadership made them a key element of the group.

(U) According to an overview of foreign fighter recruiting\textsuperscript{14b} by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, many recruits were motivated by revulsion at the idea of an Arab land being occupied by non-Arab troops, a view that was intensified by their reliance on

\textsuperscript{460} [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050803 | 20050803 | (S/NE) ]

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid.

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extremely anti-American and anti-war TV and internet sources. The recruits were particularly prized by AQI because each recruit often brought $10-15,000 in personal funding.

(S/NF) An investigation by the Tunisian DGNS provided insight into AQI’s ability to recruit North African fighters for Iraq. Tunisian recruits were angry over the situation in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Like-minded individuals discussed these concerns in online discussion boards. Some became radicalized and were then contacted by AQI recruiters. Once recruited, they stopped attending mosque and adopted a low profile, wearing modern dress, shaving their beards, and finally traveling to in preparation to fight in Iraq.

(S/NF) An investigation by the Algerian DDSE into the connection between AQI and its North African ally Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad bil-Maghrib (JTJM, see Chapter 4) uncovered the existence of an international support network run by followers of Zarqawi's mentor Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The purpose of the network was to convey AQI propaganda and recruit foreign fighters to serve as suicide bombers in Iraq. It was divided into six regional nodes: (there are six nodes shown below)

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463 Ibid., p. 10
464 Ibid., p. 10-11
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6. 1.4b

(S/NF) The flow of foreign fighters into Iraq depended on the needs of AQIError! Bookmark not defined. and Zarqawi's preferences and paranoia. For instance AQI sent out a call for more foreign fighters in January 2005 to target polling sites for the Iraqi elections, yet during a meeting of AQI facilitators in al-Salt, JordanError! Bookmark not defined. in October 2005 recruiter Bilal Mansur al-Hiyari (Abu 'Asim) told the other attendees that there were already enough foreign fighters in Iraq and that Zarqawi's primary concern was now money. That September, were informed that Zarqawi was increasingly paranoid that the U.S. or Israel was trying to infiltrate his foreign fighters and had recently beheaded a Tajik national he believed to be a spy. As a result, were instructed only to recruit Arabs to join AQI because he believed them to be trustworthy.472

Training Camps

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR) There were few discernible patterns in the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq.473 Most foreign fighters traveled to Error! Bookmark not defined. by plane and contacted facilitators there who were able to move them to Iraq through discreet inquiries at local mosques.474 From there, they were taken first to Aleppo and then to the northern route through al-Qamishli or a southern route through al-Qaim.475 The amount of time spent at safe houses in Aleppo depended on the facilitator's access, the security situation along the border, and whether or not the skills of the foreign fighters matched those that were currently needed by AQIError! Bookmark not defined.476 Experienced fighters were sent into Iraq immediately while "green" foreign recruits were sent to training in Error! Bookmark not defined. or ad-hoc training facilities on the other side of the border.477

MCIA Insert Map of FF Infiltration Routes

470
471
472 Ibid.
473 [ | Military | CIOC SPECIAL ANALYSIS PAPER, MAY 4, 2005 | 20050504 | (S/NF) | ]
474 Ibid.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
477 Ibid.
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(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Two training camps that appear most prominently in the intelligence reporting were the Arab Council for Victory in Iraq camp at Hasakeh run by FRELN and another at al-Qamishli run by AQI. The existence of AQI training facilities should not be surprising, as an AQAM training facility was reported as active at an abandoned penitentiary in Tadmur as early as June 2004.

(S/REL) In addition to providing terrorist and guerrilla training to prospective insurgents, these training facilities assisted foreign fighters with assimilating into the local population by providing them with instruction on Iraqi customs and dialects, though much of this training was unsuccessful. Foreign fighters' ID cards and other distinguishing items were also altered to make them less conspicuous upon their entry into Iraq.

(S/FGI NF) These camps did more than simply provide training for the Iraqi insurgency. Tayarah al Qaeda member Jamal Sayf Abdallah Salih al-Maqrami (Dr. Abu Ubayda, Abu Amr) was trained in the use of remote controlled explosives by Abu Hasan al-Suri and then sent back to Yemen to carry out a terrorist attack against the Sheraton Hotel.

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR AND NZL) Those foreign fighters entering Iraq through the northern route would enter the country at the Tal Kishik border crossing or via the smuggling routes southeast of al-Qamishli using the back roads near al-Hasakah area or Ash-Shaddadah. Once inside Iraq, they were taken to the border towns of Marhub al-Tayr, Bab al-Khair, Sunni, and Wardiyah. "Green" recruits were taken to the ad-hoc terrorist training facility at Biaj, while trained fighters were taken to Sinjar for transport to Tal Afar or Mosul. Another southern infiltration route into Iraq was to cross at Abu Kamal, Ar-Tafi, or Rabi'ah and be transported to Ramadi. and other parts of Anbar or sent on to Baghdad.

Syrian Support for the Insurgency

1.4b

478 Ibid.
479 Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050530 20050530 (S/NF)
480 Ibid.
481 Ibid.
482 Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050530 20050530 (S/NF)
483 Military CIIOC SPECIAL ANALYSIS PAPER, MAY 4, 2005 [20050504 (S/NF)]
484 Ibid.
485 Ibid.
486 Ibid.

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Operation SAYYAD (HUNTER) Phase I (July 2005)

(S/NF) During this period, the Coalition focused on reducing the violence in Baghdad. As an economy of force effort, the Coalition forces in Anbar were limited to two options to allow widespread participation in the upcoming elections: clear and hold the Euphrates valley or secure the border with Syria. Two considerations—the need for Iraq to have control of its own borders and the need to prevent the smuggling of foreign fighters into Anbar—gave precedence to securing the border. Thus, MNF-W began preparations for a phased operation, named Operation SAYYAD.

(S/NF) The first phase of SAYYAD was a shaping operation, designed to prepare the battlefield for the major kinetic phase later that fall. The Coalition began developing the required intelligence to establish an enduring Iraqi security force in western Anbar. In particular the 2nd Brigade, 7th Division of the Iraqi army was focused around Anah and Rawah. Mid-level insurgent leaders Mohammed Cent, Wahayb al-Abir, Khalid Abdul Rahman, and Sabah Nuj were killed. These losses severely damaged al-Asa'ab al-Alwal, forcing it into a prolonged period of inactivity as the group attempted to restructure in order to compensate for its losses.

(S/NF) Operation SAYYAD I forced AQI and Ansar al-Sunna to shift their operations from al-Qaim and Hit to the Haditha Haqlaniyah corridor. Barwanah, which had previously been heavily influenced by Ansar al-Sunna's Haditha amir Abu Ayman, was abandoned by most of the group at the onset of SAYYAD I. With the influx of insurgents into Haditha, sentiments toward the...
Coalition changed from neutral to negative due to the intimidation campaigns carried out by the new insurgents. Residents stayed in their homes or fled the area rather than assist the Coalition.\textsuperscript{506} Zarqawi was also active in Haditha during this period, meeting in Haditha with Rawah.

\textbf{Bookmark not defined.} amir Hamid 'Alwi, al-Qaim deputy amir, Halid Ali Dawud, and an unknown Saudi cleric.\textsuperscript{507} While there, he also visited 'Ukab Hamad al-Karbili, all of whose sons served as AQI amirs.\textsuperscript{508}

\section*{Aftermath of Operation SAYYAD I (July 2005)}

(S/NE) Well established in the Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. and Ansar al-Sunna divided the region. Each group controlled "turf" by assigning cells to specific areas to carry out surveillance and small-arms, IED Error! Bookmark not defined., or mortar attacks.\textsuperscript{509} Ansar al-Sunna was most active in Haditha, dividing the city into sectors, while AQI was centered on the palm tree forest in Haqlaniyah. Both groups maintained a small presence in Barwanah where they competed for control.\textsuperscript{510} All major roads were under continuous surveillance and all hospitals were controlled by the insurgency, which used them both as medical centers and as safe havens.\textsuperscript{511}

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Zarqawi maintained a base at the al-Thawid Mosque in Haqlaniyah during this period, threatening to punish the Jaghayfi tribe for attacking AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. in Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined.\textsuperscript{512} The root of the latest fighting between AQI and the Jaghayfis began when AQI kidnapped the driver of the director for oil pipes in Haditha, who was a member of their tribe.\textsuperscript{513} The Jaghayfis retaliated in an effort to free the hostage, killing two AQI fighters and capturing three. This prompted senior AQI leaders negotiate for their release.\textsuperscript{514} During the night following the negotiations, AQI attacked the Jaghayfi and burnt down their houses in Haditha.\textsuperscript{515}

(S/NF) As Zarqawi grew stronger, large numbers of FREs in Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined., many of whom were unemployed, were persuaded either by money or by ideological appeal to join AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. or Ansar al-Sunna.\textsuperscript{516} This is reflected by the AQI leadership in Haditha. Its top leaders were former Republican Guard Chief of Staff Lieutenant

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General Saif al-Din Falahi al-Rawi and his nephew Usam Malik al-Rawi. The other leaders were kidnapping chief Abd al-Razzaq al-Rawi, and spiritual leader Abu al-Hadi Ammar al-Rawi who doubled as the head of AQI's only secret police in the city and acted as judge and jury when dealing with suspected "collaborators." In recognition of his role in defeating the Hamza Battalion in Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined., Zarqawi promoted Husain Shihab al-Karbubi (Abu Ali) to the position of one of his top lieutenants in Iraq, with authority from al-Qaim to Haditha. Error! Bookmark not defined.

(S/REL TO USA AUS AND GBR) In Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined., the permanent Coalition presence since Operation SWORD had finally begun to turn the tide against AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. and Ansar al-Sunna. The sustained Coalition presence had forced insurgents to leave the urban areas and regroup along the outskirts of the city, enabling residents to partially overcome their intimidation campaign.

AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. rebuilds in Western Anbar (July-August 2007)

(S/REL) Despite losses suffered during Operation SAYYAD, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. was down rather than out in western Anbar. In Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined., for instance, AQI operatives only withdrew briefly from most of the city, finding shelter in outlying areas until the operation ended. By the beginning of August, AQI had successfully reconstituted its fighters in Karabilah to pre-SPEAR levels, using it as a staging point and operational hub to smuggle Error! Bookmark not defined. all the way to Baghdad Error! Bookmark not defined. AQI also solidified its position in New ‘Ubaydi using weapons brought from Rawah Error! Bookmark not defined.. They prepared for renewed attacks against the Hamza Battalion. Through July and August AQI leaders in Anbar continued to focus more on fighting the Battalion than on attacking the Coalition.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) To regain their momentum against the Hamza Battalion, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. began offering $300-400 monthly salaries for rank-and-file members and $1,000 monthly salaries for all cell leaders, with bonuses of $15,000 for every major attack on the Hamza Battalion. Faced with AQI's superior financial resources and ideological appeal, the Battalion was unable to keep AQI from luring away those who might have otherwise supported its efforts for tribal or ideological reasons.

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\[\text{\cite{ibid.}}\]
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\[\text{\cite{Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050812 | 20050812 | (S/NF) |}}\]
(S/NE) **AQI** Error! Bookmark not defined. **Renews Attacks on the Hamza Battalion:** Using the weapons shipped from Rawah Error! Bookmark not defined. to New ‘Ubaydi, AQI initiated a major operation against the Battalion in early August. AQI evicted the Battalion from New ‘Ubaydi and expanded its influence into Jurayjib and Sa’dah. 527 AQI's fighters set up curfews and checkpoints along the main road in New ‘Ubaydi and, using computer-generated lists and photographs, searched house-to-house for Albu Mahal tribesmen in order to kill them. 528

(S/NE) Despite this victory, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. remained otherwise quiet in the al-Qaim region for fear of provoking another Coalition offensive, focusing instead on rebuilding the support of the local population. 529 To counter Coalition accusations that AQI fighters fought only for money, AQI began capturing and executing suspected thieves in Rutbah Error! Bookmark not defined.. This demonstrated that they were fighting for the implementation of shari'a, not venal gain, and they were better able to protect Iraqis than the Coalition. 530

(S/NE) **MML and Government try to Counter AQI** Error! Bookmark not defined.: The Iraqi government, however, had little doubt as to AQI's intentions. Minister of Defense Sadun al-Dulaymi met with MML and representatives from the Albu Nimr and Albu Mahal tribes to discuss the creation of a majority Sunni Iraqi army division to fight AQI in Anbar. The Albu Nimr representatives offered the Defense Minister 500 recruits, stating that they could provide more if needed, but Sadun al-Dulaymi warned them that neither Prime Minister Jafari nor SCIRI Error! Bookmark not defined. leader Hakim wanted a Sunni army division created even as they feigned support for Sunni political inclusion. 531

(S/NE) This revelation led MML to meet with tribal sheikhs in Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. to discuss the formation of a special Ramadi-based military unit to eliminate AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. in the city. 532 MML requested that the sheikhs identify members of their tribes who had served as soldiers or officers under the former regime but had not retained strong ties to the Ba'ath Party. 533 Knowing that Prime Minister Jafari would never agree to the formation of an all-Sunni military unit, MML informed the sheikhs that the unit would have to contain Shi'a and Kurds but that Sunnis would be the majority. 534 To appeal to his former allies in the Ramadi Shura Council, MML claimed that he had spoken with Mohammed Daham and had received his approval. 535 This claim might have been true, as Daham had been using his contacts in the medical

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527 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050810 | 20050810 | (S/NE) | ]
528 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050902 | 20050902 | (S/NE) | ]
529 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050811 | 20050811 | (S/NE) | ]
530 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINRSUM 050808 | 20050808 | (S/NE) | ]
531 Ibid.
532 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050818 | 20050818 | (S/NE) | ]
533 Ibid.
534 Ibid.
535 Ibid.
staff at Abu Ghraib prison to send messages to MML, among them a request to increase surveillance
on Coalition convoys in the hope of kidnapping a sufficiently high-level Coalition or Iraqi official
who could be used to barter for his release.\footnote{535}

(S/NF) The Defense Minister's message was eagerly adopted by Hamza Battalion recruiters, who
told prospective members that their group would form the basis for the new Iraqi National Guard
and police in al-Qaim as soon as AQI\footnote{535} was defeated.\footnote{537} There was,
however, no practical way for Hamza Battalion to match AQI's international financial or logistical
advantages, nor could they replace their losses in personnel and equipment.\footnote{538} The Battalion
was only able to keep up the fight because Coalition operations, primarily MATADOR and SPEAR, had
degraded AQI's position in the al-Qaim area.\footnote{539} In fact the Battalion was incapable of conducting
operations involving more than 15-30 fighters, lacked proper training and equipment, and many of
its potential recruits could not afford to leave their homes unguarded in order to receive proper
training or conduct long-term operations.\footnote{540}

(S/NF) Another AQI\footnote{541} Offensive against the Hamza Battalion: In
late August 2005, AQI mounted a major offensive against the Hamza Battalion, possibly under
the personal direction of Zarqawi.\footnote{542} This offensive, which involved the use of 1,000 fighters against the
Hamza Battalion's 300, led to significant AQI gains in Husaybah\footnote{543} and isolated the Hamza Battalion to the northeast corner of the city. Coalition air strikes on
August 26 prevented the Hamza Battalion from being driven out of Husaybah completely, but by the
end of the offensive, AQI fighters under the command of Abu Islam controlled 75% of the
city.\footnote{544} AQI then began increasing their attacks on Camp Gannon as Battalion members fled
southeast towards the al-Teneh area.\footnote{545} In their section of the city, AQI fighters reportedly began
going house to house, separating out adults and adolescents from the Albu Mahal tribe and
executing them in order to send a message to other Iraqi tribes about the price of fighting AQI.\footnote{546}

(S/NF) Exploiting the Albu Mahal's long-standing rivalry with the Karabilah and Salmani tribes, AQI\footnote{547} began conscripting fighters from the latter two tribes to
further its influence in the al-Qaim region.\footnote{548} Karabilah, Husaybah\footnote{549} and Sa'dah, and Ramana were now under the influence of Iraqi AQI augmented by foreign fighters.\footnote{546}
From al-Qaim, AQI was able to control western Anbar's lucrative smuggling routes to facilitate AQAM operations throughout the Middle East and Europe.\textsuperscript{547}

\textbf{(S/NE) AQI\textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined.} prepared to attack the 100-150 Hamza Battalion fighters who had been active in Akashat.\textsuperscript{548}} Perhaps distracted by their need to consolidate gains in the al-Qaim area, as well as by the next phase of Operation SAYYAD, AQI never attacked. Given a reprieve, the remaining Battalion members began working with the Iraqi MOD to create the Desert Protectors Battalion designed to fight AQI and protect the borders of Iraq.\textsuperscript{549}

\textbf{Return of the Abu Harun in Ramadi\textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined.} (August 2005)}

\textbf{(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)} With AQI\textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined. consolidating its victory in western Anbar, the inadvertent release of Abu Harun Group leader Basim Muhammed Hazim Ahmed al-Fahdawi (Abu Khattab) by the Coalition caused the situation in Ramadi\textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined. to take a turn for the worse.\textsuperscript{550}} Unlike the AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members who had only recently arrived in the city, Abu Khattab had been active there as leader of the Abu Harun Group since 2004. He possessed a great deal of local knowledge and was able to use it against the Coalition. Among Abu Khattab's top subordinates were his secret police chief Suhain Khalid Fadil Abu Ali Jasim (later killed in a car accident), former Republican Guard Colonel Naithem Hammed Rashid (Abu Othman), and former IIS\textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined. analyst Satar Jubayr Rashid.\textsuperscript{551}}

\textbf{(S/NE) Under the direction of Abu Khattab, the Abu Harun Group (also known as the Abu Bakr Group), AQI\textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined. and the Islamic Army of Iraq began distributing propaganda demanding that all police resign, that all Shi'a in the city depart, and that MML resign.\textsuperscript{552}} Zarqawi also threatened to kill any Sunni imams who supported the constitutional referendum.\textsuperscript{553} Abu Khattab's followers forced Ramadi\textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined.}'s Christian community to adhere to \textit{shari'a} law if they refused to convert to Islam.\textsuperscript{554} MML retaliated by using his influence with several Dulaymi confederation tribes to protect a Shi'a neighborhood from attack by AQI, which he claimed wanted to turn Ramadi into another Fallujah\textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined.}.\textsuperscript{555}
(S/NE) Abu Khattab's prominence among the Ramadi insurgents was due in part to his relationship with Anbar Ministry of Oil and Gas Deputy Director Yusif Abid Farhan al-Fahdawi. Every week, Abu Khattab or one of his lieutenants would receive a kickback from Yusif, who had turned control of his building over to the Abu Harun Group.

(S/REL) This set the stage for open fighting between MML and Zarqawi over MML's support for the Iraqi political process. While many political and religious elites in Anbar shared Zarqawi's goal of ending the Coalition presence in Iraq, they also agreed with MML's criticism of his methodology. Zarqawi flatly rejected MML's efforts at negotiation, regarding it as “abandoning the law of Allah” and “deserting the Qur'an.”

(S/NE) With many Ramadi insurgent groups now working at least tacit alliance with AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, a curious phenomenon emerged in which specific functions within the Ramadi insurgency were handled on a tribal rather than on a group or cell basis. For instance, the Albu Faraj housed foreign fighters and engaged in surveillance; the Albu Alwan acted as coordinators between the groups in the Tamim and Jazira districts and conducted small arms, IED, and kidnapping attacks; and the Albu Ghanem engaged in counterfeiting and document forgery.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The Jazira area encompassed the tribal lands of the Albu Diab, and the Albu Aetha tribes in addition to the Albu Faraj, and served as a well-known refuge for insurgents from Ramadi. This was probably because of the presence of the al-Quds mosque, which acted as a gathering and meeting place for insurgents in general. Among those members of the Abu Harun Group who fled to the Jazira area in addition to Abu Bakr was

556 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050902 | 20050902 | (S/NE) | ]
557 Ibid.
558 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050815 | 20050815 | (S/NE) | ]
559 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050802 | 20050802 | (S/NE) | ]
560 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050816 | 20050816 | (S/NE) | ]
561 Ibid.
562 Ibid.
563 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050817 | 20050817 | (S/NE) | ]
Abu Othman, who had used his IISError! Bookmark not defined. connections to help manage the logistics and reorganization of the Abu Harun Group following the initial capture of Abu Khattab.564

**MCIA Insert Map Here**

### The Assassination Attempt on Governor Mamoun

(S/NF) To maintain pressure on Anbaris to prevent them from participating in the political process, AQIError! Bookmark not defined. attempted to assassinate Governor Mamoun during a meeting with fifty RamadiError! Bookmark not defined. imams at the Saddam Mosque. This particular meeting was held to discuss MML's proposal to set up a Sunni military force to fight AQI in the city.565 The attack failed, but AQI injured provincial Awqaf officials Sheikh Dhafr 'Ubaydi and Sheikh Abdullah Jallal in the subsequent scuffle.566 The attack was organized by Abu Khattab in conjunction with local AQI leader Haji Walid and his fighters.567

(S/NF) The failed assassination attempt on Governor Mamoon led to serious repercussions for AQIError! Bookmark not defined. in RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.. Foremost among these was a meeting between MML's allies in the al-Nu'man Brigade and the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades chaired by Ghanam al-Khalisawi to discuss retaliation for AQI targeting members of the Awqaf.568 Ghanam, who urged his fellow insurgents to respond to any AQI attacks or threats against them with a show of force, had already captured two AQI members who took part in the attack and tortured them into giving him the name of the AQI leader who ordered it.569 He would later capture this (un-named) AQI leader, planning to execute him publicly in order to demonstrate to Zarqawi that not everyone in Ramadi was afraid of him.570

### Operation QUICK STRIKE (August 2005)

(S/REL) After the Marines lost four more sniper teams, the Coalition carried out Operation QUICK STRIKE in and around HadithaError! Bookmark not defined. with over 1,000 Marines. The operation forced more than 100-150 AQIError! Bookmark not defined. and Ansar al-Sunna fighters under Yahya Ayish and Sheikh Hamid Rashi Salib to flee Haditha for KubaysahError! Bookmark not defined..571

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564 Ibid.
565 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050818 | 20050818 | (S/NF) | ]
566 Ibid.
567 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050823 | 20050823 | (S/NF) | ]
568 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050822 | 20050822 | (S/NF) | ]
569 Ibid.
570 Ibid.
571 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050816 | 20050816 | (S/NF) | ]
Intelligence gathered during the course of Operation QUICK STRIKE confirmed the continued presence of Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha and AQI in Haqlaniyah and Barwanah, with both groups exerting considerable influence over the general population through an extensive propaganda, murder, and intimidation campaign. The insurgents had been able to use Haditha as a base to manufacture IEDs and VBIEDs for use in cities along the Euphrates all the way to Baghdad. While QUICK STRIKE forced some insurgents to flee to Bayji or Kusaybah, many Haditha insurgents were in fact based in outlying towns such as Dulab, Jubbah, and Baghdadi along the Euphrates, which meant the Coalition operations missed them entirely. Insurgents in Haqlaniyah and Barwanah on the other hand did flee first south and then north to escape Coalition cordon and search operations, before returning to Haditha and re-exerting influence over the population.

Pattern of Coalition Operations: As we have seen, this was the usual pattern for Coalition operations. Another recurring pattern, typical for insurgencies as a whole, was that local residents would assist the Coalition as long as Coalition forces were present but would also tolerate (or even support) the insurgency in their absence. At times, even the presence of Coalition forces was not enough to ensure cooperation, since recent experience had shown that they would leave and the insurgents return to exact their vengeance.

Ansar al-Sunna, for instance, openly stated their intention to reenter Haditha as soon as Coalition forces departed. Despite QUICK STRIKE, Husayn Shihab managed to remain active in the Haditha-Haqlaniyah corridor with as many as 2,000 fighters, and would oversee the resumption of the intimidation campaign in the area. The AQI propaganda campaign also resumed in earnest, circulating flyers depicting a "secret memo" from a high-ranking UIA official to rig the constitutional referendum in favor of the Shi’ā.

The shari’a court established by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in the Albu Hayan area of Haditha played a major role in the renewed intimidation campaign. For instance, a woman accused of prostitution was whipped 200 times and died from her injuries. Two men who had publicly complained about the insurgency were kidnapped within hours and decapitated, their heads displayed on spikes along the Barwanah.
Bridge. Anyone who sought to participate in the elections was threatened with decapitation and a curfew was set up throughout Haditha for all residents.\(^\text{578}\)

(S/NE) Among the positive effects of Operation QUICK STRIKE were the creation of Coalition bases in Hit\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) and the heavy attrition among al-As‘ab al-Ahwal leadership.\(^\text{579}\) The surviving members of the group were forced to flee the city for Ramadi\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) or Baghdad\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\).\(^\text{580}\) The Albu Nimr tribe exploited the group's weakness, attacking its members in Hit and the Albu Tiban area.\(^\text{581}\) His organization fractured and in decline, al-As‘ab al-Ahwal leader Sinan Metib was forced to seek shelter in the anonymity provided by Baghdad.\(^\text{582}\) Those al-As‘ab al-Ahwal members who fled to Ramadi gathered in the Tamim district or the Hai al-Sakani Military Housing Complex.\(^\text{583}\)

AQI\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) Defeats the Albu Mahal

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) By early September, AQI\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) had established itself across much of western Anbar. Having defeated the Hamza Battalion, AQI now dominated al-Qaim, Karabilah, Sadah, Ramanah, Husaybah\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\), and ‘Ubaydi to the point of conducting armed patrols and setting up checkpoints whenever Coalition forces were not immediately present.\(^\text{584}\) The defeat of the Albu Mahal opened the door for AQI and its allies to consolidate their influence over a wide swath of western Anbar from the Hit\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\)-Haditha\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) corridor all the way to Rutbah\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\). They created a virtual "shadow government" based in Hqalaniyah and Barwanah complete with shari‘a courts and a secret police force.\(^\text{585}\) Anticipating Coalition military action against Husaybah, AQI began contracting large numbers of Salmani and Karbuli tribesmen to serve as additional fighters in the event of a Coalition attack on the city.\(^\text{586}\)

(S/REL) The goal of AQI\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) and its co-belligerents such as Ansar al-Sunna was to openly assume control of the upper Euphrates River region just as they had Fallujah\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) in 2004 and use it as a base for further attacks east towards Ramadi\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\) and Baghdad\(^\text{Error! Bookmark not defined.}\).\(^\text{587}\) Hadd punishments had been implemented by AQI throughout September against suspected collaborators,

\(^{577}\) Ibid.  
\(^{578}\) Ibid.  
\(^{579}\) [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050822 | 20050822 | (S/NE) | ]  
\(^{580}\) Ibid.  
\(^{581}\) Ibid.  
\(^{582}\) Ibid.  
\(^{583}\) [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050825 | 20050825 | (S/NE) | ]  
\(^{584}\) [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051002 | 20051002 | (S/NE) | ]  
\(^{585}\) Ibid.  
\(^{586}\) Ibid.  
\(^{587}\) Ibid.
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Iraqi police, and any Shi'a found in the area. The frequency of these killings increased dramatically the closer the Coalition came to mounting military operations against the area.

The Anbar General Conference and the Anbar People's Committee

(S/NF) AQIError! Bookmark not defined.'s gains were balanced with Sunni efforts to join the political process. In late September 2005, the Anbar General Conference was formed in Amman, JordanError! Bookmark not defined.. An outgrowth of the earlier Sunni Shura Council (see Chapter 5a), it supported the creation of a unified political front to represent the Sunni community (including many SAR insurgent groups) to the Coalition and the Iraqi government. The group also supported the constitutional referendum process to prevent further Shi'a influence in Iraq. In addition to AMSError! Bookmark not defined. secretary-general Harith al-Dhaif and MML, a number of prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians agreed to join the Anbar General Conference including Sheikh Abdullah Janabi's top deputy Sheikh Dhaif al-'Ubaydi.

City Stories (October 2005)

RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.

(S/NF) By the end of October, an estimated 1,200 insurgents were active in RamadiError! Bookmark not defined., divided between MML's Ramadi Shura Council (which was funded by Mudhir and Abd al-Latif Humayin al-Khatib) and AQIError! Bookmark not defined. and affiliated groups. The Shura Council was probably responsible for at least some of the attacks on Coalition forces and IEDs, particularly those using secondary devices. AQI, meanwhile, targeted the Coalition as well as government figures and buildings. It was responsible for two assassination attempts against Governor Mamoun in September and October as well as the kidnapping of the Governor's son. AQI also assassinated Deputy Governor Taleb Ibrahim Hidawi and repeatedly attacked the Government Center. In addition to political leaders, AQI (and perhaps the Shura Council as well) targeted the Iraqi security forces to create instability in the city. This intimidation campaign enabled the insurgents to move in platoon-sized groups whenever Coalition forces were not present.

588 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRIINTSUM 051003 | 20051003 | (S/NF) | ]
589 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: MINF-W OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT BRIEF OCTOBER 24, 2005 | 20051024 | (S/NF) | ]
590 Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

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(S/NF) Insurgent motivations in RamadiError! Bookmark not defined. continued to vary considerably. All the insurgents wanted the Coalition to leave Iraq and feared Shi'a influence. But MML and his declining number of SAR followers remained open to political engagement, while AQIError! Bookmark not defined. and other SREs wanted to disrupt the political process and targeted moderate Sunnis in order to do so.  

Khalidiyah-HabbaniyahError! Bookmark not defined.

(S/NF) These two towns under District Manager Thaer Huhu Hamdala served as important safe havens and way stations for an estimated 900 insurgents traveling between FallujahError! Bookmark not defined. and RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.. The Jazira area of Khalidiyah was home to a large number of retired FRE military and security officials. Insurgents were able to move freely through the area but were unable to mass in large numbers for fear of being targeted by the Coalition. As a result, they focused on contesting control of the Khalidiyah Bridge. IIEError! Bookmark not defined. attacks were common, and while residents did not support the insurgency they were intimidated by the rise of AQIError! Bookmark not defined. and feared the group would turn its attention to them rather than Fallujah or Ramadi if they actively opposed them. The key insurgent leaders in the area were Abed Dawud Sulayman and explosives expert Captain Salam Dawud Sulayman al-Fahdawi.  

FallujahError! Bookmark not defined.

(S/NF) FallujahError! Bookmark not defined. served as a political example for all of Anbar with a standing city council under Mayor Sheikh Dari Abed Yousef and a strong Coalition presence that generally prevented insurgents from returning to the city. The roughly eight hundred fighters in the greater Fallujah area made up of the defeated Fallujah Mujahideen Shura forces, while nominally under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi and Sheikh Khamis al-Rasheed, were in reality controlled by AQIError! Bookmark not defined.. Janabi made a half-hearted effort to retake the city on the anniversary of AL FAJR, but most of the actual insurgent activity in Fallujah was linked to criminality, with insurgents entering or leaving the city with the help of local smugglers.  

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI AQIError! Bookmark not defined. associate Munam Kamel Ahmed Abu Sheba, who had previously served as a deputy to Umar Hadid, worked from Lutayliya with Janabi's lieutenant Ismail Szaya Jumayli as the operational leader of the insurgents in FallujahError! Bookmark not defined..  

Karmah

\[593\text{ ibid.}\]
\[594\text{ ibid.}\]
\[595\text{ ibid.}\]
\[596\text{ ibid.}\]
Majid Hamed Mothan al-Halbusi used his position as mayor of the city of Karmah to facilitate smuggling insurgents to and from Baghdad. An abundance of safe houses and arms caches existed in the area under the control of the dominant insurgent force in the city, the 300-member FRE Green Battalion now led by Thamir Khalid Ubeid al-Khudhair and Jassim Ubeid al-Khudhair. Jaysh Mohammed explosives expert Salaam Dera Abdullah Thamir served as the Green Battalion’s primary contact with other elements of the insurgency.

**Amariyah**

During the late summer and fall of 2005 there was a relative absence of insurgent activity in Amariyah area, although significant numbers of insurgents remained in the city, concentrated in the northern Ankur district. Two possible explanations for the dip in attacks were a prolonged Coalition presence in the area and a desire by insurgents to use Amariyah as a safe-haven. The destruction of a nearby police station in Feris Town and resulting lack of Iraqi security forces inside the city tends to support the latter explanation. Major insurgent figures in the city were Zarqawi associate Essa Handi Ahood al-Essawi, foreign fighter facilitator Abu Mukhlas, and Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Fizza.

**Hit**

Though nominally under the control of Mayor Ali Hamdi Nasser al-Awee and the "People's Sheikh" Yassin Muflin Ham Hadi, AQI's murder, intimidation, and IO campaigns had successfully converted or cowed the local population by October. With assistance from local FREs, Hit served as the last stop for insurgent and foreign fighters traveling to Ramadi or Fallujah and its hospital was co-opted by the insurgency to treat their own wounded fighters. AQI was the dominant group in the city, but Ansar al-Sunnah, Jaysh Mohammed, and (until their defeat) al-Asa'ab al-Awhal also maintained a presence.

**Rawah**

Once the insurgents felt relatively secure in al-Qaim and Husaybah, Quwwat Allah al-Tharib attempted to re-establish the Bayt al-Masada training camp north of Rawah. A number of Quwwat Allah al-Tharib leaders were Iraqi or foreign fighters who had been trained by AQAM instructors at this camp before its establishment.
destruction in 2003 (see Chapter 3) and escaped to ‘Ubaydi, al-Qaim, and Husaybah to join the nascent insurgency.\textsuperscript{601}

\textbf{Al-Qaim, Husaybah\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined., and Karabilah}

\textbf{(S/NE)} Throughout this entire area, shari’a courts were set up and the hadd\textsuperscript{602} punishments were implemented by AQI\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined. clerics. Using boats and back roads, AQI was able to move rank-and-file insurgents as well as foreign fighters in and out of the area on a regular basis. The AQI senior leadership left for Syria\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined., as Operation SAYYAD II began, but 300 fighters under the command of mid-level leaders remained in both Husaybah\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined. and Karabilah to set up fortifications, plant IEDs, and establish C2 nodes in preparation for a Coalition attack.\textsuperscript{602}

\textbf{(S/NE)} After their defeat of the Hamza Battalion, AQI\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined. forcibly evicted Battalion members from the area in mid-September and most of the cities’ populations fled south and east in anticipation of the Coalition attack.\textsuperscript{603}

\textbf{Rutbah\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined.}

\textbf{(S/NE)} As Coalition pressure on Anbar’s northern border sanctuaries increased, Rutbah\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined. became a key location for fighters crossing into Iraq at Trebil and Waleed. The insurgency used the city as a meeting ground for arranging attacks, and had successfully persuaded locals that any problems in the city were caused by the Coalition. Cars purchased in Rutbah were taken to Akashat, Husaybah\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined., and Rawah\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined. to be turned into VBIEDs. While the number of insurgents in Rutbah was estimated at only seventy-five men, all under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammed Abdul Khudayr and Mohammed al-Aswad, they exerted more influence over residents than did Acting Mayor Raheem Sabah Awadi.\textsuperscript{604}

\textbf{The Example of Haditha\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined., Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah: AQI\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined.’s ideas in action}

\textbf{(S/NE)} By October 2005 AQI\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined. had thoroughly penetrated the Haditha\textsuperscript{601} Error! Bookmark not defined. area and, perhaps aided by the presence of the many FREs

\textsuperscript{601} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{602} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: MNF-W Operational Assessment Brief, October 24, 2005 |
\textsuperscript{2051024 | (S/NE) | ]}

\textsuperscript{603} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{604} Ibid.
in the area (including former intelligence officers and former Republican Guard Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Saif al-Din Falayh al-Rawi), created a sophisticated organization in this region. A study of captured documents suggests that AQI had in fact created an infant “state within a state” in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah. The incipient state had centralized command structures, intelligence and security cells, shari’a courts, a Shura Council, and a highly developed financial infrastructure. This bureaucracy, while not fully mature, generated reports, kept meticulous records, and had set rules for conducting business.605

(S/NF) The documents show several other interesting facts about AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. in this part of Anbar. First, the development of guerrilla tactics and therefore the evolution of the insurgency did not occupy much of the attention of the leadership. Second, religio-ideological justifications for their actions dominated the internal documents, suggesting that these justifications were more than simply talk, but rather speak to the deeper motivations of many AQAM members. Finally, while much time was devoted to local concerns and figures, almost no thought was focused on understanding the Coalition—its motivations, potential strategies and tactics.606 These documents indicate the insurgents understood the fact that insurgency is a political rather than military struggle and that all politics are based on local issues.

(S/NF) A closer look at the situation in the Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. region reveals some details about the larger state that AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. hoped to create in Anbar. AQI organized their insurgent cells by city block and street and enforced their version of shari’a throughout the area with their police force, security forces and court system.607 Reports on “immoral” residents (such as prostitutes or homosexuals) were collected and stored, as was a “black list” of people wanted by AQI for various infractions. The management of disputes and the mediation of local grievances were of special concern for AQI, which took the time, for instance, to arbitrate a dispute over land use near Haditha.

Snapshot of the Insurgency (September 2005)

(S/NF) Despite the series of operations designed to disrupt the insurgency in Anbar, secure the borders, and prepare the region for the elections, the bloodshed and intimidation in Anbar continued. AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. and other insurgent groups seemed more entrenched than ever in certain parts of the province, able to create in places like Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined. a “state within a state” that enforced their ideas of governance on the unwilling populace.

605 [Military | MCIA-2420-IRQ-010-07 | (S/NF) | ]
606 Ibid.
607 [Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051003 | 20051003 | (S/NF) | ]
608 [Military | MCIA-2420-IRQ-010-07 | (S/NF) | ]
Yet all was not well within either AQI or the insurgency as a whole. AQI's continued inability to defeat Coalition forces caused the organization to lose credibility in parts of Anbar, while the divide between SRE and SAR insurgents was more pronounced than ever. Genuine differences of opinion had formed over whether or not to participate in the upcoming referendum. From late September onward, tensions over this issue created a split between AQI and MML's followers in the Islamic Movement of Iraq Mujahideen, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Jaysh Mohammed. JM even warned merchants in insurgent strongholds not to distribute AQI leaflets, posted flyers listing known AQI members, and preached anti-AQI sermons at mosques.609

Meanwhile local concerns and personality-driven disputes continued to cause problems between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna. There were, in addition, continued AQI efforts to recruit Ansar al-Sunna fighters, the sectarian attitudes of the AQI leadership, and AQI's carefree attitude towards the killing of Iraqi Sunnis.610 While Ansar al-Sunna continued to cooperate both strategically and tactically with AQI, Zarqawi's all-out declaration of war against the Shi'a over the summer had been the last straw for the Ansar al-Sunna leadership, and prospects for a merger between the two groups faded.611

The Referendum (October 15, 2005)

As the referendum neared, AQI attempted to disrupt the political process by distributing a fatwa written by prominent al-Qaeda imam Abu Qatadah al-Taei. The fatwa declared that voting was punishable by death under shari'a and that Sunnis should fight rather than vote. AMS, MML, and insurgent financier Abd al-Latif Humayin al-Kharbit all countered this charge by claiming that participation in the referendum (in order to vote against the constitution) was a duty equivalent to participating in jihad.612

The influence of these competing declarations, as well as the effects of the Coalition's shaping operations, was reflected in the turn-out for the referendum. Voting in Fallujah, Nasser Wa Salaam, Saqlawiyah, and Zaidon, where the insurgency had been more thoroughly suppressed and where the AMS and Anbar People's General Conference had advocated participation in the political process (in order to keep the Shi'a from imposing their ideas), was quite high, with 106,200 out of 153,477 eligible voters (69%) participating. The atmosphere in the area was so open to the referendum that additional ballots were requested for delivery to Fallujah.613
The picture was quite different in western Anbar. The only town that had good turnout was Barwanah, where the atmosphere was described as “festive.” Voting in Akashat, Rutbah, Sadah, Haditha, Baghdad, and Hit, on the other hand, was extremely low: only 7,510 citizens out of 158,682 eligible voters participated (4.7%). The reason for this low turnout varied from place to place: Haditha residents were too intimidated by insurgents to participate in the referendum. Hit residents were told not to vote in mosque sermons. Residents in al-Qaim, Husaybah, and Haditha were unable to vote because there were no polling stations due to a lack of security. In al-Qaim AQI reportedly set up cameras to identify and record individuals attempting to vote, so that they could be targeted.\footnote{Ibid.}

Voting in Ramadi, Tammim, and Zangora was also low, with only 4,297 out of 217,940 eligible voters participating, barely 2%. The main reason given for the lack of voting was that the lack of visible Coalition forces at the polling stations made citizens feel unsafe.\footnote{Ibid.}

Turnout across Anbar was estimated at 22% or 118,000 of the 530,000 eligible voters in the province.\footnote{Ibid.} Most attacks that took place the day of the referendum were both ineffective and directed against Coalition forces. It was intimidation, conflicting religious and political guidance, and widespread perceptions of insecurity rather than actual violence that were primarily responsible for the low turnout.\footnote{Ibid.}

Despite this estimated turnout, the official statistics for Anbar reported 217,471 votes cast, of which 97% were against the constitution. The discrepancy between estimated and official turnout would lead to an official investigation of the referendum after its conclusion.\footnote{[ | Military | Referendum Investigations, October 24, 2005 | 20051024 | (S/NE) | ]} When the results across Iraq were tallied, Anbar, Salahaddin, and Nineveh had all voted against the constitution but Nineveh had failed to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority necessary to defeat it. The investigation into the elections in Anbar was therefore closed and the constitution was approved.\footnote{[ | Military | Final Referendum Statistics, October 25, 2005 | 20051025 | (S/NE) | ]}

Some Anbari elites claimed that they were being disenfranchised by the Shi'a majority, but most begrudgingly accepted the results and began selecting candidates for the December elections.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Operation SAYYAD II (October-November 2005)**

With the successful conclusion of the referendum, the Coalition began the last phase of SAYYAD, designed to secure the borders and create enough security for the vital December
elections to occur. Phase II of SAYYAD would establish a Coalition military presence in al-Qaim, Rawah
Error! Bookmark not defined., Haditha
Error! Bookmark not defined., Hit
Error! Bookmark not defined., Baghdadi, and Rutbah
Error! Bookmark not defined., in some cases displacing AQI
Error! Bookmark not defined. for many months from these important cities.

(S/NF) Before SAYYAD II began, AQI
Error! Bookmark not defined. ’s ability to mass, communicate, and coordinate in western Anbar was shown in two ways. First, the organization established active communication with satellite cells in

Second, AQI was able to plan and coordinate attacks, mounting an increased intimidation and coercion campaign against the local population.\textsuperscript{621} AQI relied on the Husaybah
Error! Bookmark not defined.-Haditha
Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor for logistical support, using murder and intimidation to force locals to comply with their demands and setting up “shadow governments” based on sharia law to maintain their influence and control within major cities.\textsuperscript{622} SAYYAD II helped to rectify that state of affairs, with a series of supporting operations (GREEN LIGHT, LIGHTNING STRIKE, and IRON FIST), which specifically targeted AQI cells in Sadah, Rawah
Error! Bookmark not defined., Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Baqubah, and Baghdad.\textsuperscript{623}

(S/NF) By the end of Operation SAYYAD II, 529 AQI
Error! Bookmark not defined. fighters had been killed and 1,584 detained.\textsuperscript{624} Among the dead were Husayn Shihab (the regional amir of AQI), Abu Ubayda al-Kubaysi (head of the Nu‘man Brigade and AQI member), Abu Asil (Shihab’s successor as regional amir), and Asad Allah (senior AQI commander for the Anah
Error! Bookmark not defined.-Rawah
Error! Bookmark not defined. corridor), while the captured included senior amir Muhammad Hamud Kanish, Haditha
Error! Bookmark not defined. amir Khalid Hamid Zeballa, Rawah amir Hoqar Jamal Razzaaq, and senior AQI facilitator Sadiq Ayad Findi.\textsuperscript{625}

(S/NF) Despite these losses, as had occurred in previous Coalition operations, many of AQI
Error! Bookmark not defined. ’s mid- and senior leaders in the region were able to flee the area while the majority of the rank-and-file members simply went underground. The ability of AQI to ”melt away” during the course of battle enabled the group to preserve its forces when confronted with superior firepower at the expense of holding terrain.

Operation STEEL CURTAIN (October 2005)

(S/REL TO USA, MCH) In support of the upcoming elections, and to increase security along the Iraq-Syria
Error! Bookmark not defined. border, the Coalition launched a separate phase of

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\textsuperscript{621} [[Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060104 | 20060104 | (S/NF)]

\textsuperscript{622} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{623} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{624} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{625} [[Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060104 | 20060104 | (S/NF)]]
SAYYAD II named Operation STEEL CURTAIN (AL-HAJIZ AL-FULADHI) with 2,500 Marines from RCT-2 and 1,000 Iraqi troops.\textsuperscript{626}

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Operation STEEL CURTAIN specifically targeted the insurgent networks headquartered in Husaybah\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} AQI\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} had a virtual free run of this part of al-Qaim since driving the Hamza Battalion out of Husaybah in August. During September and October, the AQI leadership in the city was able to plan a major attack on Camp Gannon with the goal of seizing or destroying the base. Executed in late October, the attack, though unsuccessful at seizing Camp Gannon, was sophisticated and complex. The Coalition clearly needed to disrupt the insurgency in Husaybah.

(U) Beginning on November 5, combined Coalition and Iraqi forces pushed into Husaybah\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}, encountering small arms fire and IEDs from insurgents. Nine Coalition air strikes were called against suspected insurgent strongholds on the first day of the operation and preparations began to begin a methodical search of every house in the city.

(U) By November 9, the Coalition had completed its sweep of Husaybah\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}. Coalition forces worked with Iraqi troops to set up a permanent presence in the city. Raids continued against Karabilah, however, and on November 14 the Coalition mounted another operation to secure ‘Ubaydi, which had served as a safe haven for many insurgents who had escaped from Husaybah. By the time ‘Ubaydi had been cleared on November 17, 256 suspected insurgents were captured and 139 killed.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Some insurgents fought in RPG or machine-gun teams, and leadership in New ‘Ubaydi coordinated IED\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} and VBIED attacks. Some residential buildings were rigged with IEDs to explode when Coalition forces breached and cleared rooms. All main roads and avenues of approach had been rigged with IEDs, and large VBIEDs were found and destroyed in Husaybah\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.}, Karabilah, and New ‘Ubaydi. Pre-planned defensive positions were used and some insurgents fought wearing flak jackets, kevlar helmets, and other forms of body armor. Later assessments stated that the degree of tactical discipline displayed by the insurgents showed that many had received military or terrorist training.

Revelations about AQI\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} from SAYYAD II

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Operation SAYYAD II revealed a great deal about AQI\textsuperscript{Error! Bookmark not defined.} operations and sophistication.\textsuperscript{627} For instance, an AQI voucher discovered in a weapons cache near Albu Hyatt contained a day-to-day record of expenditures during the course of SAYYAD II for sixty-five fighters. The record was extremely detailed at the beginning, but

\textsuperscript{626} This entire section is taken from [ | MILITARY | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060104 | 20060104 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{627} [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060205 | 20060205 | (S/NF) | ]
became less meticulous as time went on. The AQI cell that compiled the record regarded a visit by the group’s Ramadi [Error! Bookmark not defined.] amir Methat Ibrahim Fahdawi (Abu Mustafa) as a great honor, spending roughly $1,000 to throw a party for him. The cell also spent more money on transportation and maintenance than on weapons, although “vehicle maintenance” was also the preferred euphemism for modifying cars to serve as VBIEDs.\(^628\)

After SAYYAD II, the Coalition realized the extent of AQI [Error! Bookmark not defined.] influence over Iraqi society and the sophistication of its bureaucratic infrastructure throughout the western Anbar region. For instance a November 20, 2005 document found in Albu Hyatt detailed an AQI leadership meeting focused on how to take control of a city. The document discussed Haditha [Error! Bookmark not defined.] and Barwanah in particular and included the names of individuals approved to take over the land in the city and what type of land they were to receive. Many of the individuals listed were still involved in local government in early 2006. A second document, found at a weapons cache in Barwanah, was a transcript of an official insurgent meeting in which specific cases that had been brought against various residents of the town (for being Coalition informants or attempting to join the Iraqi police) were discussed. The documents also listed individuals who had been declared “thieves” and what they stole.\(^629\)

SPOILS OF WAR (ANFAL). Al-Qaeda, like many jihadist groups, believes that the spoils of war are a legitimate source of income provided by God for the mujahidin. They therefore take very seriously the division of any goods or land taken through fighting. The parceling out of territory in the Haditha [Error! Bookmark not defined.] area should be seen as part of the larger attempt to impose \(\text{shari’}a\) on the populace and to win over Muslims through legitimate \(\text{shari’}a\) means to the side of the insurgency.

City Stories Post-SAYYAD II (December 2005)

Al-Qaim

As the Coalition and Iraqi army retook control of al-Qaim, AQI [Error! Bookmark not defined.]’s ability to carry out operations in the city was severely degraded and the group was forced underground. AQI lost its ability to coordinate attacks in the city, to support insurgent activity further east, and to use the area as the capital for their notional state.\(^630\)

Hit [Error! Bookmark not defined.] The presence of Coalition forces provided both stability and security for Hit [Error! Bookmark not defined.] residents. The Coalition forced the bulk of the insurgents from AQI [Error! Bookmark not defined.] and al-Asa’ab al-Ahwal to the outskirts of the city where they were reduced to conducting harassment attacks against Coalition bases and patrols. Al-Asa’ab al-

\(^628\) Ibid.

\(^629\) [ Military | DIIR MNFW HET03 0329 06 | 20050000 | (S/NF) ]

\(^630\) [ This entire section is taken from City Assessment, October 2005 (S/NF) ]
Ahwal continued to fragment under Coalition pressure, while AQI fighters were limited in their ability to move, forcing them into a reactionary stance of conducting attacks around the Coalition operation schedule.

Rawah

The Coalition and Iraqi army presence in Rawah since late July had disrupted AQI's intimidation campaign against the general population, though the group continued to have IED cells in the city. While weapons transfers and smuggling operations still took place within the city, it was severely curtailed by the Coalition presence that continued to deny AQI freedom of movement, disrupted command and control, and forced their fighters to remain underground.

Haditha

Aggressive company-sized Coalition patrols and checkpoints forced both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna back underground, reducing their ability to organize, mass their fighters, or intimidate the population. While the two groups continued to contest the Coalition presence in Haditha, both were forced to keep a low profile to avoid being targeted by the Coalition. In doing so, they preserved their organizations to re-emerge later.

Baghdadi

Because of the absence of a permanent Coalition presence in Baghdadi, the town served as a haven for AQI fighters fleeing other parts of western Anbar including senior leaders such as Sadiq Ayada Fandi al-Mahalawi. These AQI fighters were able to successfully intimidate residents, keeping the general sentiment anti-Coalition.

Rutbah

While Coalition operations in Rutbah were able to seize a number of weapons caches, safehouses, and suspected insurgents, the town remained an isolated, provincial transit point for foreign fighter movement, vehicle smuggling, and weapons trafficking. Smuggling continued to be a mainstay for local tribesmen and criminals, but residents were displeased at the presence of AQI in the city and the growing number of Saudi nationals becoming involved in traditionally Iraqi criminal activities in the area.

Snapshot of the Insurgency

Operation SAYYAD II and STEEL CURTAIN allowed Coalition troops to create a presence in the previous insurgent strongholds of al-Qaim, Hit, and
Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined., though AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. forces under Kunther Selma retained some influence in al-Qaim and Baghdad.631

(S/NF) Meanwhile the Anbar General Committee evolved into the Anbar People's Conference following a national reconciliation conference sponsored by the Arab League that recognized the right of “legitimate armed resistance” against occupation.632 This recognition increased SAR and SRE divisions within the insurgency, with 1920 Revolution Brigade leader MML organizing a group of more than 70-100 politicians, technocrats, sheikhs, and insurgent leaders in order to organize municipal security committees in Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined.. made up of members of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Mohammed, and Islamic Army of Iraq to assist in the December 15 elections.633

The Amman Bombings

(S/NF) Zarqawi’s broader regional concerns were highlighted when, after numerous failed attempts, he finally succeeded in carrying out a terrorist attack in his native Jordan Error! Bookmark not defined. on November 9. Using non-Jordanian suicide bombers facilitated by Uthman Ismael Fahad al-Khalifawi (including a relative of top Zarqawi lieutenant Thamir Mubarak Atrouch), AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. carried out attacks against the Radisson, Hyatt, and Days Inn hotels in Amman, Jordan, killing 57 and injuring 60. The attack on the Radisson Hotel in particular was a major source of pride for Zarqawi, who had targeted it since 1999.634

(U) Zarqawi did not anticipate the wave of popular revulsion that the Amman bombings caused in Jordan Error! Bookmark not defined.. More Jordanians were killed than foreigners and one of the attacks targeted a wedding party largely made up of Palestinian Jordanians. The attacks sparked a popular outcry against AQI Error! Bookmark not defined.. In an effort to defend his actions, Zarqawi posted two online defenses justifying his choice of targets. He claimed that the wedding party was made up of “Israeli Arabs” rather than Palestinian Jordanians and that it was well-established that the hotels were “the backyard of the enemies of the faith.” He also claimed he had sent a warning in AQI’s attempted attack against U.S. warships in Aqaba in August 2005. He offered an alternate explanation in a subsequent audiotape, claiming that AQI had attacked the hotel because Israeli intelligence officials were meeting there and that the roof had fallen on the wedding hall as a result of the explosion.635

Atiyah al-Jaziri

631 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051007 | 20051007 | (S/NF) | ]
632 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: Prominent Assassinations 20310307 | 20060116 | (S/NF) | ]
633 Ibid.
634 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060116 | 20060116 | (S/NF) | ]
(U) AQSL appears to have been just as furious with Zarqawi over Amman as the Jordanians were. In an uncharacteristically blunt letter, AQSL Atiyah al-Jaziri scolded Zarqawi for his actions, informing him that all operations had to be subordinate to AQAM's long-term goals and rebuking him for undermining AQI. According to al-Jaziri, Zarqawi's widening scope of operations was alienating the Sunni community and reducing support for AQAM. Zarqawi was therefore ordered to cease killing popular Iraqi Sunni leaders, to forge strategic relationships with moderate Sunni tribal and religious leaders, and to follow all previous orders from ‘Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri concerning war with the Shi’a (i.e. to cease agitating for sectarian violence) and operations outside of Iraq. Al-Jaziri then proceeded to criticize Zarqawi's advisors in Iraq for their inadequate political and religious expertise, warned Zarqawi against arrogance, and implied that there might be someone more qualified than Zarqawi to command AQI. He closed with an order for Zarqawi to send couriers with regular reports on his activity to AQSL in Waziristan or use jihadi discussion forums to speak with AQSL directly.636

(U) Atiyah al-Jaziri’s letter, which amounted to a formal rebuke of Zarqawi’s activities and strategy in Iraq from the highest echelons of AQSL, was a major factor in the January 2006 formation of the Mujahideen Shura Council.637

The December Elections (November – December 2005)

The Rise of Anbari Political Parties

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) When the insurgency failed to disrupt the constitutional referendum, many Anbari elites, including the members of the Anbar People's Conference with ties to the insurgency, began preparing for the December elections. The shift from insurgency to political actions is in keeping with a long-established insurgent pattern of setting up formal and informal political wings in order to engage the government. By October 27, the Sunni political groups Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC), and the Conference of the People of Iraq (CPI) joined together to form the Iraqi al-Tawafuq Front (ITF) coalition in preparation for the December elections.638 The IIP and INDC had originally intended to ally with Iyad Allawi, but his support for Operation AL FAJR made him a political liability in Anbar.639 Operating on a platform calling for insurgent disarmament and Coalition withdrawal, the ITF planned to field as many as 230 candidates.640

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The ITF was not the only Anbari political faction to form during this period. Former INDC leader Saleh Mutlaq tried to create another political coalition that would

636 [Military | CTC Westpoint: Letter Exposes New Leader in al-Qa’ida High Command | 20060925 |(U)|]
637 Ibid.
638 [Military | Special Assessment: Sunni Political Parties | 20051030 |(S/REL)|]
639 Ibid.
640 Ibid.
include more extreme Sunni religious groups. At the same time, Fallujah technocrat Engineer Farouk founded the Majlis Siyasi Watani Leel Iraq (National Political Council for Iraq, NPCI).  

(S/NF) The Sunnis realized they could gain more seats in the National Assembly by pooling resources and running together rather than as independent candidates. While the specific candidates were not announced in Anbar until immediately prior to the elections due to security concerns, Governor Mamoun believed the ITF in particular was a strong, balanced coalition that could represent Anbari interests in Baghdad. He felt any insurgent group that attacked it would draw the wrath of the provincial elites. A key part of Mamoun's security plan was to engage the local imams and tribal leaders who opposed the referendum in order to overcome the intimidation against voting.

City Stories (November 2005)

Ramadi

(S/NF) The insurgency remained extremely active in Ramadi, with IEDs serving as the major threat to Coalition troops. Because they were focused on western Anbar, Coalition forces maintained a minimal presence in Ramadi. Still, Coalition patrols, bases, and operating positions were the primary targets for insurgent attacks. Iraqi security forces were still targeted with kidnapping and execution in the hope of convincing them to quit their posts. A major factor in the insurgency’s ability to operate in the city lay in the fact that Police Chief Shakr Mohammed Saleh had been collaborating with the insurgents until his detention. Even so, the SRE-SAR divide was apparent in Ramadi, with SARs loyal to MML hoping to join the political process and SREs loyal to Zarqawi hoping to disrupt it.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) In a positive development for the Coalition, residents of the Sufia district formed a militia to fight AQI in their area. While a positive development, this decision also reflected a lack of trust in the government’s ability to provide security.

Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah

641 Ibid.
642 Ibid.
643 Ibid.
644 Ibid.
645 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: CITY ASSESSMENT | 200511 | (S/NF) | ]
646 Ibid.
647 Ibid.
648 Ibid.
649 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051210 | 20051210 | (S/MCFI) | ]
The situation in this area reflected the difficulties that the Coalition faced in Anbar, as well as illustrating an important standard al-Qaeda technique. On the one hand, residents of Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah remained unsupportive of the insurgency, but there was, at the same time, a great deal of anger and civil unrest directed against the Coalition. With the arrival of the 9th Brigade of the Iraqi Armed Forces, the area was actively patrolled by professional Iraqi soldiers. The response of AQI was to use the two towns as their safe-havens for attacks on Ramadi while refraining from carrying out attacks within Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah themselves. This was standard practice for al-Qaeda around the world, reflecting both a religious as well as practical reading of the demands of an insurgency.

**SAFE HAVENS.** As with other insurgent groups, AQI needs safe havens to rest, resupply and train. The insurgency in Anbar has safe havens in neighboring countries as well as within the province itself. Because of a particular reading of Muhammad's life, AQI believes in using one city or town as a safe haven that will be spared attacks, while carrying out attacks in neighboring cities. A town or area of a city where attacks do not occur is often the sign that this is the center of an AQI safe haven.

**Fallujah**

The city remained a prime target for the insurgency. Insurgents found ways to enter the city using forged documents or by traveling the Euphrates River from Saqlawiyah or Amariyah to carry out grenade attacks, drive-by shootings, IEDs, and other "low risk" attacks. One major exception was AQI's November 29 assassination of Sheikh Hamza, the widely beloved and influential religious leader who had supported both the elections and reconstruction.

**Karmah**

Karmah continued to serve as the primary planning and networking center for the Green Battalion. It conducted explosives training outside the city and then entered it to plant IEDs. The Green Battalion exerted a strong influence on residents through family and tribal ties, causing the city's atmospherics to change on a weekly basis depending on the strength of the group. As a result, tribal leaders suffered a loss of influence and the city council was rendered completely ineffective. While residents did not support either the Coalition or the insurgency, many tolerated the insurgents for fear of being attacked. No Iraqi security forces were active inside the city and those local officials that worked with the Coalition were targeted for intimidation and assassination.
Amariyah

(S/NF) Having successfully won over or intimidated police chief Captain Saldoon Hansal Subhee Husayn, the insurgent’s received aid and support from many police. Learning from their earlier lesson of massing in Fallujah, insurgents in Amariyah did not stay in one area for very long and exercised good operational security.654

Haditha

(S/NF) Infiltrating back into Haditha from Rawah, Bayji, and Ramadi after STEEL CURTAIN ended, insurgents were able to organize a limited number of attacks, but could not carry out more sophisticated operations.655

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The government agricultural building in Haditha was used as a headquarters and a field hospital by Ansar al-Sunna.656 Staffed by trained doctors and nurses, wounded Ansar al-Sunna fighters from across Anbar were brought to the area for treatment.657

Hit

(S/NF) Coalition operations in Hit, which forced most leaders to flee to the outskirts, suppressed the insurgents’ ability to operate in the city and limited activity to harassment attacks directed against targets of opportunity. A lack of safe houses also disrupted networks in the city and the ability to prepare more sophisticated attacks. As a result, insurgent intimidation and coercion campaigns against the general population ended.658

Rawah

(S/NF) Department of State

654 Ibid.
655 Ibid.
656 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051103 | 20051103 | (S/MCFI) | ]
657 Ibid.
658 Ibid.
Coalition presence in Rawah limited AQI's ability to conduct operations in the city, though night attacks using IEDs were on the rise in and around the nearby town of Anah. 659

Al-Qaim

Although still forced to operate covertly, AQI continued to carry out IEDs and small arms attacks in a desperate attempt to contest Coalition control of the city. 660 AQI also attempted to infiltrate the new Iraqi security forces and intimidate residents into submission. 661

Meanwhile, the weakening of AQI in the al-Qaim area led to an escalation in tribal tensions, as the Albu Mahal tribe sought to consolidate its power in the region over its rival Salmanis. 662

Rutbah

AQI believed that the Coalition could not or would not conduct major offensives in Rutbah and as a result chose the area as their safe haven after being driven from Husaybah. 663 Small villages in the al-Jafalah region were used as ad-hoc terrorist training facilities and the local criminal element was co-opted to support AQI personnel and operations after being told by AQI that the Badr Corps was planning to suppress the Sunni vote in Ramadi. 664

The Insurgency Divided (Late 2005)

Coalition operations in western Iraq had decisively shifted the balance of power in the area away from AQI and back towards the Iraqi government. 665 This is an interesting conclusion given the city by city analysis above. Across the province, insurgent groups of all ideologies were under pressure to avoid Sunni civilian casualties, while constant Coalition and Iraqi patrols prevented AQI from gaining the necessary momentum to re-impose its influence on the general population. 666 From the perspective of the AQI leadership, the situation in their former stronghold of western Anbar was increasingly grim and the group needed to mount new operations to maintain momentum.

659 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: CITY ASSESSMENT | 200511 | (S/NF) |
660 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: CITY ASSESSMENT | 200511 | (S/NF) |
661 Ibid.
662 | Military | GRINTSUM 051210 | 20051210 | (S/MCFI) |
663 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051221 | 20051221 | (S/NF) |
664 Ibid.
665 | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051230 | 20051230 | (S/MCFI) |
666 Ibid.
AQI's leadership in Ramadi (particularly the Albu Ubayd tribal region), Fallujah, and throughout western Anbar had been seriously attrited by Coalition military operations. Many key leaders and facilitators fled the province or went completely underground. Among them was Khalid Hamad Zibalah al-Hayyani (Abu Harith), the AQI amir of Haditha, who had fled to Baghdad during Operation STEEL CURTAIN and instructed other leading and mid-level insurgents to disperse to outlying river towns and villages near Haditha. In an effort to regain momentum, Zarqawi began appointing a handful of temporary commanders to oversee the province until new leaders could be approved. To avoid being targeted by the Coalition, the bulk of AQI's scattered fighters fled to the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah corridor or to the Albu Faraj and Albu Dhiyab tribal areas of Jazira to regroup.

Fearful that other insurgent groups would seek to fill the power vacuum left by AQI, local commanders began targeting the leadership of Ansar al-Sunna and the 1920 Revolution Brigade in Ramadi. From Syria, Sheikh Abdullah Janabi directed the Umar Brigade to begin moving some 225 Iraqi and foreign fighters who had been dispersed across western Iraq to Ramadi, Husaybah, Rutbah, and al-Qaim in the hope that they would reinforce the existing AQI cells in those cities.

Ironically for a group for whom hatred of the Shi'a was a key ideological component, AQI sought to use its ties to Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army to help reconstitute its infrastructure. Ties between AQI and the Mahdi Army had first formed in April 2004, when al-Sadr had provided support to the Fallujah insurgents under Umar Hadid (see Chapter 4). This support had been reciprocated by JTJ, which sent heavy arms, ammunition, and fighters to assist al-Sadr against the Coalition in An Najaf in 2004. Mahdi Army fighters had fought alongside AQI during Operation AL FAJR, but ties between the two organizations had become more strained after al-Sadr joined the political process and it is unclear whether or not their efforts to enlist al-Sadr's assistance were successful.

667 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | (S/NF) | ]
668 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051126 | 20051126 | (SMCRI) | ]
669 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | (S/NF) | ]
670 Ibid.; [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051222 | 20051222 | (S/NF) | ]
671 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | (S/NF) | ]
672 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | (S/NF) | ]
673 [ | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051103 | 20051103 | (S/MCFI) | ]
674 Ibid.
(S/NF) Potential cooperation with al-Sadr was not the only means through which AQIError! Bookmark not defined. planned to re-invigorate itself. Zarqawi told a senior AQI leader, who was later captured by Coalition forces, that following the group’s losses in 2005, only starting a full-fledged civil war in Iraq would convince the other insurgent groups to support his strategy for jihad in Iraq.\textsuperscript{675} Among those insurgents that the senior AQI leader recounted as having objected to this sectarian strategy were 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Mualhadeen, Jaysh Islami, and Ansar al-Sunna. The latter was of particular concern because it was attempting to make these objections known to the al Qaeda senior leadership.\textsuperscript{676} It was the implementation of Zarqawi’s strategy that would lead to the bombing of the Golden Mosque in SamarraError! Bookmark not defined. in February 2006.

(S/NF) The other insurgent groups in Anbar were divided over the prospect of joining the political process. The Rahman Brigade (the new name for the al-Nu’man Brigade), 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Haq, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Islamic Movement of Iraq Mujahideen all sought to engage the political process in order to increase their wealth, influence, and power in Anbar by covertly sponsoring candidates or political parties.\textsuperscript{677} The leaderships of these groups were already negotiating with both the Coalition and Iraqi government in order to resolve the insurgency in Anbar so that the Coalition troops could begin to withdraw.\textsuperscript{678} Other groups based in western Iraq, including Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Mohammed, Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, and al-Asa‘ab al-Iraq, were divided over whether to join the political process or to continue to support AQIError! Bookmark not defined..\textsuperscript{679}

(S/NF) Despite these considerable gains against the insurgency, the underlying conditions in Anbar were unchanged. Corruption remained widespread among local officials and elites in RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.. Young men had only a limited number of ways to achieve status and financial independence. During the former regime, they could join the Iraqi army, but in Ramadi government employees were often paid late or simply not paid for months on end. The entire November payroll was stolen by the insurgency. Insurgent groups, by contrast, paid $400 to plant an IEDError! Bookmark not defined. and $750 to detonate one, the equivalent of a month’s insurgent salary and significantly more than a government employee. The families of suicide bombers were paid up to $10,000 and insurgent groups supported the families of their detained fighters. False documents and counterfeiting shops were a huge business in places like Ramadi, enabling easy access for insurgent groups. As it sought to regroup in Anbar from 2005 onwards, AQIError! Bookmark not defined. would exploit these financial hardships to serve its ideological goals and begin recruiting new fighters.\textsuperscript{680}

\textsuperscript{675} | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051221 20051221 (S/NF) |
\textsuperscript{676} | Ibid. |
\textsuperscript{677} | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 20051127 (S/NF) |
\textsuperscript{678} | Ibid. |
\textsuperscript{679} | Ibid. |
\textsuperscript{680} | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051226 20051226 (S/NF) |
Parliamentary Elections (December 2005)

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) During the run-up to the elections, major Anbari political parties began actively campaigning, though the manner and degree to which this occurred varied from city to city depending on the security situation. In the most secure areas like Fallujah, this took the form of political rallies, speeches at mosques, and television advertisement blitzes, while in less secure areas like those in western Anbar the only sources of election news other than national television were the mosques and meetings of tribal leaders. All of the other major parties in Anbar instead stressed Sunni identity politics, opposition to federalism, condemnation of Shi'a militia activity, support for the reconstitution of the Iraqi army, and a timeline for Coalition withdrawal.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Anbari support for the elections convinced AQI and its allies they had to change their tactics. Rather than threatening to kill anyone who participated in the voting, they decided to concentrate on attacks against the Coalition. Complex attacks in Hit and suicide bombings in al-Qaim demonstrated that AQI was still able to carry out mass casualty attacks. AQI believed that it had to continue to challenge the Coalition presence in order to regain its former standing in western Iraq. With AQI's intimidation campaign weakened, however, many residents began discouraging insurgent groups from operating in their area except in Rutbah, where the insurgency continued to wield significant influence over the general population.

(S/NF) MML played a major role in the December 15 elections, using the 1920 Revolution Brigades to drive AQI from several Ramadi neighborhoods in order to ensure security at the polls. He was assisted in this effort by his lieutenant Sheikh Nasser Fahdawi, who raised a militia in the Sufia district to protect the population against AQI. MML used agreements with Sunni leaders in Fallujah, similar to those he had with Sheikh Nasser to reduce violence in the city during the elections. This move was also self-serving, as it helped to extend MML's authority from his center of power in Ramadi into the Hit-Haditha and the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah corridors. Even so,
MML's 1920 Revolution Brigades had been seriously weakened in the Fallujah area, with many members absorbed into AQI or forced out of Zaidon and into Ramadi during inter-insurgent violence.\(^{691}\)

(S/NF) In Karmah, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. did not take the support by other insurgents for the December elections lying down. Accusing the local Islamic Army of Iraq of collaborating with the Coalition, AQI leader Hajji Hamadi al-Janabi attacked them. The attack failed, leading to the death of at least four AQI fighters.\(^{692}\)

(S/REL TO USA, MCF) Popular reaction to the elections in Anbar was delayed for several weeks into early 2006 while ballots were tallied and allegations of intimidation and voter fraud were addressed. Non-AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. insurgents led by MML expressed their continued willingness to engage the Iraqi government and the Coalition, even to the point of providing security at polling sites, but regarded that willingness as contingent upon the results of the election and the share that Sunnis received in the new government.\(^{693}\)

(S/REL TO USA, MCF) As with the referendum, the Fallujah Error! Bookmark not defined. area took the lead with upwards of 200,000 votes.\(^{694}\) This high turnout was the result of pressure on the general population from local mosques and imams to participate. Local elites had made agreements with all non-AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. groups to refrain from attacks on election day and “wait and see” whether or not the political process would provide real benefits for Anbaris.\(^{695}\) Even so, some insurgents continued to carry out attacks on Coalition forces in order to obtain political concessions.\(^{696}\)

(S/NF) Despite the absence of violence during the elections, the situation in Anbar was by no means stable. Tensions in Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. were particularly high as local elites engaged in grandstanding against the anticipated election results, claiming that they had been “fooled” into participating by the Coalition. Many of them were, however, simply positioning themselves to negotiate concessions from the Iraqi government in return for their continued political participation.\(^{697}\) Nationally, some Sunni parties and Allawi denounced what they argued had been elections rigged to favor the United Iraqi Alliance, while the Badr Corps and Mahdi Army were told to be ready to move if the election results did not correspond to what they believed the “correct” results of the voting should be.\(^{698}\)
(U) The October Constitutional referendum and the December national elections were a significant step for Iraq, and for Anbar Province. Still, insurgents roamed the province creating havoc and attempting to establish themselves in urban and rural areas.

Conclusion

(U) The year 2005 thus ended on an uncertain note. There had been many positive developments throughout the year: the participation of a significant percentage of the Sunni population in the elections, the division of the insurgency over political participation, the active support of the Anqaf on the side of the Coalition, the decision by at least some of the tribes that their interests coincided with those of the Coalition, and the serious disruption of AQI and affiliated insurgent networks in western Anbar. These events gave hope for the year to come.

(U) However, AQI had not been destroyed, its leadership and organization were still intact, and Zarqawi would now determine that AQI’s very survival depended on taking desperate action to provoke the sectarian violence that could be its only salvation. Still, Zarqawi’s stature with the AQSL was waning as they became increasingly concerned with his tactics and large-scale slaughter of other Sunnis.

Attack Data (September – December 2005)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the middle trimester (May to August 2005). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

(S) The attack levels during this period demonstrated a sustained peak from late September through early November, maintaining levels much higher than immediately before and after, and only surpassed previously by the incident rate during Fallujah II. This peak is coincident with SAYYAD II and Operation STEEL CURTAIN. The drop-off may be related to increased security efforts surrounding the December 2005 parliamentary elections. Though all attack types showed a similar pattern, there were particularly significant drop-offs of Indirect Fire and Complex Attacks after the peak period, and there were almost no Complex Attacks at all by the end of the year. The majority of attacks were taking place in AO Topeka during late 2005.
All Incidents
Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province, Iraq

6/13/07

Weekly Incidents by Region (2003 - 2007)

Weekly Incidents by Region (Sep - Dec 2005)

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028
Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province, Iraq
6/13/07

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

SECRET/NOFORN

Weekly DF Incidents by Region (2003 - 2007)

Weekly DF Incidents by Region (Sep - Dec 2005)

Weekly ED Incidents by Region (2003 - 2007)

Weekly ED Incidents by Region (Sep - Dec 2005)
Insurgent Profile: 2005

(S/NF) In 2005, the typical street-level insurgent captured in Anbar was an Iraqi male about 28 years old, much more likely to be married than to be unmarried, and educated at a high-school level or less. Most captured detainees were associated with tribes and had some military experience. These conclusions are based on an analysis of more than 5,500 tactical interrogation reports gathered from intelligence sources.

(S/NF) Most insurgents captured in 2005 were 30 years old or younger (59.5%), with a significant group (9.9%) under 20 years old. The middle 50% of the population was between 23 and 36 years old. The fact that the median of 28 years is lower than the mean of 30.4 years confirms that the data is skewed younger and also indicates that the age range among older detainees has a large spread. The most common age among detainees was 23 years old.

(S/NF) Almost all of the insurgents captured in 2005 claimed to be Iraqi (98.3%), with only 1.7% claiming to be of foreign origin. Of those foreigners, the most frequent origins named were Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

(S/NF) The majority of detainees were associated with blue collar or other labor occupations. The most common occupation claimed was shepherd or farmer (21.6%), though the largest grouping of occupations was blue collar workers (23.9%), which included jobs like electrician, carpenter, and laborer. Though only 59% of detainees claimed to be actively unemployed, it is likely that many more detainees were actually unemployed but provided their previous job or training when asked their occupation. In addition, a noteworthy fraction of detainees (8.0%) were employed in positions of trust such as the Iraqi police or local security forces.
More than half of those captured in 2005 claimed to have some military experience (58.1%), while a portion of those that had not served were still students and were too young to have served in the military. This finding indicates that a large segment of the insurgent population had some form of prior military training, combat experience, and perhaps access to weapons.
At least three-quarters of those detained had no education beyond high-school, with nearly half (47.8%) having no more than an elementary education (6th grade or less). More than 14% had some post-secondary education or had completed a degree program.

The tribe with the most captured members in 2005 was the Albu Eissa tribe. From January through July, Albu Eissa consistently had the most captured members, averaging almost 45 per month, though by the end of the year, the rate of capture decreased dramatically, averaging only 17 captured per month. During this latter part of the year, other tribes such as Jumayli and Albu Mahal were captured more frequently than Albu Eissa. Though these were the most frequent tribes claimed, there were many tribes well-represented, as only 60% of the detainees associated themselves with one of the top 20 tribes.

By far, the most frequently claimed residence among detainees in 2005 was the Fallujah area, with more than 43% of detainees, compared to only 10% from Ramadi. This major spike likely was a result of the chaotic situation in Fallujah after the 2004 operations, allowing many people to claim Fallujah residence because of the difficulty in confirming that information. In particular, the Fallujah-area towns of Karmah (8.8%) and Amiriyah (5.6%) contained a large concentration of detainees. Other detainees came from Hadithah (9.1%), Al Qa‘im / Husaybah (7.4%), Hit (5.9%) or from outside Anbar in Baghdad (4.4%), though this was somewhat limited.

More than 60% of all detainees in 2005 claimed to be married, engaged, or widowed, though most detainees under 30 (68.4%) were still single. Almost all married detainees (91.5%) claimed to have children, but this data is unreliable. The need to support a family likely was a factor that led those with children to participate in the insurgency to receive larger financial gain than their regular jobs or while unemployed.