Chapter Six

AQI Dominates the Insurgency

(2006)

January to April

Introduction

(U) The insurgency in Anbar suffered a major blow in late 2005. Operation SAYYAD II created a serious disruption of the AQI network in western Anbar that continued into 2006. This created an opportunity for many of the SAR insurgent and political groups that had emerged in 2005 to seek political engagement with the Coalition under the direction of Nevertheless, AQI would regroup in early 2006, allowing it to shift tactics and target insurgent and tribal leaders favoring political negotiation. This strategy was so successful that AQI was able to completely recover from its losses the previous year to become the dominant insurgent group in Anbar.

(U) The success of AQI offered it a position of unparalleled power, but also threatened to dilute the group’s Salafist focus and to make it difficult for the leadership to preserve the ideological integrity of the organization. AQI’s murder and intimidation campaign also alienated a large number of Anbaris, providing opportunities for both the Coalition and the SAR insurgents. The death of Abu Musab Zarqawi bolstered these opportunities, but also allowed less volatile AQI leaders to rise to the fore within the organization, among them the group’s new leader

Political Progress in Anbar and AQI’s Reaction (January-February 2006)

(S/NF) The results of the December elections showed that Anbaris were willing to defy AQI intimidation to participate in the political process. The Independent Electoral Commission in Iraq (IECI) reported a jump in Sunni voter participation, with Anbar turnout increasing from 55% to 85%.

Anbaris in general seemed quietly concerned but hopeful about the value of the results of the December elections. The few protests that occurred in late December were staged by Anbari political leaders to position themselves for negotiations with Kurdish and Shi’a leaders over a national unity government. Meanwhile, emerging elites in Ramadi, Baghdad, Barwanah, Haqlaniyah, and al-Qaim now actively sought approval from the provincial council for the reestablishment of local governance and security efforts.

(S/NF) The IECI preliminary election results named nine representatives from Anbar, with seven from the Tawafuq Front and two from the Iraqi National Dialogue Front. The Tawafuq Front was a coalition of the IIP, Iraqi People's Gathering, and Iraqi National Dialogue Council (not to be
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confused with the Iraqi National Dialogue Front mentioned in the previous sentence). Later results released in late January gave the four Sunni political parties active in Anbar fifty-nine seats in the parliament, with the Tawafuq Front doing better than expected by taking forty-four seats. As a result, the Shi’a majority UIA was forced to negotiate with the Sunnis and the Kurdish Alliance to form a coalition government and to begin work on revising the constitution. There was a muted response from Anbaris on these developments perhaps because of an underlying fear that Shi’a would now seek to drive Anbar's political agenda.7

(S/NF) Prime Minister Jafari, U.S. Ambassador Khalilizad, and General Casey held a meeting with Governor Mamoun and prominent Ramadi sheikhs in mid-January, giving them a promise of $75,000,000 in reconstruction funding and approval to recruit Sunnis into the 7th Iraqi Army division. Fallujah had already been promised $75,000,000 in funding, so the additional money helped to mitigate rivalries between Fallujah and Ramadi elites and to raise Mamoun's status in Anbar. With this pledge of funding, Governor Mamoun was also able to resolve ongoing pay issues plaguing the Iraqi police throughout Anbar.8 This served as a small milestone for Mamoun as he continued to press Baghdad for further support for his troubled province.

(S/NF) In response to these developments, AQI carried out a series of attacks in Ramadi, Baghdad, Karbala, and Bayji intended to sabotage negotiations between the leaders working to form a national unity government. Al-Sharqiyyah Television in Baghdad inadvertently fanned the flames by carrying news summaries of an "unprecedented security deterioration across Iraq" that influenced popular Iraqi perceptions of security, leading to open disputes between Allawi and Jafari over the failure of the Iraqi government to provide security.9

The Insurgency Reorganizes in Western Anbar

(S/NF) In truth, while Operations SAYYAD II and STEEL CURTAIN killed more than 529 suspected AQI members and led to the detention of 1,584, it had not mortally wounded AQI.10 The signal success of SAYYAD II lay in its destruction of major insurgent logistics networks, removal of experienced leaders, and diminishing of AQI's ability to influence the cities of western Anbar through murder and intimidation. These developments enabled tribal leaders and local Iraqi elites to

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5 Ibid. The elected representatives from these groups were Iraqi National Dialogue Council secretary-general Khalaf Alayan Khalaf, former Sunni Endowment director (b)(6) The Iraqi National Dialogue Front was a splinter group of the Iraqi National Dialogue Council led by (b)(6) who broke away after a conflict with IIP over its support of the constitution referendum. Its two seats went to prominent Fallujah civic leader and former city council president Ass'ad Ibraheem Housen and Moustafa Mohamed Ameen Mohamed Ali.

6 [ Military | 060120 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060120 | (S/NF) | ]

7 [ Military | 060120 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060120 | (S/NF) | ]

8 [ Military | 060115 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060115 | (S/NF) | ]

9 [ Military | 060109 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060109 | (S/NF) | ]

10 [ Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060101 | (S/NF) | ] Among these losses were key commanders including AMZ lieutenant (b)(6)
regain influence over many of their cities and villages in western Anbar, allowing 57,000 citizens to vote in this region during the December 15, 2005 elections.\(^{11}\)

\((S/NF)\) Even so, AQI remained active in the area, developing secondary routes to acquire weapons, funding, and personnel from Mosul and Tal Afar to reduce their reliance on western Anbar as a logistics hub.\(^{12}\) Some AQI fighters from al-Qaim sought refuge in Khaffajiyah to avoid targeting by the Coalition as they fled southwards towards Haditha using unwatched roads.\(^{13}\) Others reinforced the existing AQI presence in New Ubaydi, intimidating locals into allowing them to store weapons and conduct surveillance on Coalition and Iraqi forces in the area.\(^{14}\) These fighters were led by AQI New Steel Curtain, who sought refuge in al-Badr village near al-Qaim following STEEL CURTAIN.\(^{15}\) taught AQI fighters to adapt to the continued Coalition presence in al-Qaim and to reorganize their leadership in order to regain some influence over the local population through murder and intimidation.\(^{16}\)

\((S/NF)\) During this reorganization, AQI and their criminal allies had to change somewhat their methods for crossing the borders. Up to this point, the Baghuz border crossing had been a key facilitation node for the movement of foreign fighters and weapons. Because the Coalition now maintained bases near the border crossing, AQI fighters were forced to transit the area using the Umm Athnatain village, a small settlement 25 kilometers southeast of al-Qaim. This would become a key location for insurgent movement because of its remote location and proximity to al-Qaim and the villages between Ubaydi and Rawah.\(^{17}\)

\((S/NF)\) Other border crossings not secured by Coalition presence were more amenable to insurgent and criminal activity. The Waleed and Trebil crossings, under the control of the Iraqi Interior Ministry, remained subject to corruption despite increases in security.\(^{18}\) New directors and security forces were assigned to both crossings, but neither received adequate supplies or money from the ministry, which refused to support the efforts of the new directors to remove corrupt personnel.\(^{19}\) Without pay from the central government, the incentives for criminal activity far exceeded the consequences of corruption. Trebil customs inspector was making so much money through corruption that he was able to provide funds to AQI leader and helped to smuggle vehicles across the border.\(^{20}\) By mid-January, officials at Waleed were helping foreign fighters to smuggle personnel and equipment between and Iraq, receiving undisclosed amounts of money to let foreign fighters pass through checkpoints without being inspected.\(^{21}\)

\((S/NF)\) Another result of the reorganization was more focus by AQI on towns like Rawah and Anah between al-Qaim and Haditha. served as the AQI amir for the Rawah-Anah
corridor, producing IEDs and VBIEDs that are used by AQI throughout the al-Qaim area. His subordinate oversaw AQI activity in Anah. Under direction, AQI established an extremely effective murder and intimidation campaign that culminated in the February 17 assassination of Sheikh Nuri, the head of the city council. Despite AQI's obvious culpability, the group was able to convince residents that he had actually been poisoned by the Coalition. The assassin was a deputy of who had been mistakenly released from Coalition detention on January 26 and returned to Anah to oversee the planting of IEDs in addition to helping run the city's murder and intimidation campaign.

City Stories: The AQI Reorganization (January-February 2006)

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) While Operations SAYYAD II and STEEL CURTAIN shifted some influence away from AQI and towards the Coalition and the Iraqi government in western Anbar, the local situation varied greatly from town to town. One new phenomenon that held true throughout the province was pressure from residents on insurgent groups to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. Another new fact on the ground was that AQI had lost its previous influence in al-Qaim and, because of active Coalition and Iraqi patrols, was unable to use murder and intimidation to reassert its authority in the town.

Rutbah

(S/REL TO USA, GBR, AUS, CAN, AND NZL) AQI was, however, able to exploit the fractured local government and inadequate security in Rutbah to maintain a sizable presence, augmented by AQI fighters who fled to the city during Operation SAYYAD II. The AQI leadership in the town was headed up by who had served as amir there since the days when AQI had been JTJ. facilitated AQI's regional connections through his ties in which made him the ideal individual to aid the movement of foreign fighters. He also helped to fund the insurgency in Rutbah using smuggling, vehicle theft, carjacking and kidnapping rackets stretching from Rutbah to Ramadi. From Rutbah, AQI operatives were able to deploy suicide bombers and VBIEDs to attack targets as far away as al-Qaim and Ramadi.

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) To rectify the situation in Rutbah, the Coalition carried out raids between January 1-8, detaining sixty-two insurgents including smuggler, drug trafficker, foreign fighter facilitator, and VBIED manufacturer and smuggler and car thief . Key AQI leaders fled or dispersed into the desert, allowing residents to engage with the Coalition for the first time in two months.

21 [Military 060121 GRINTSUM NOFORN 20060121 S/NE ]
22 [Military 060218 GRINTSUM NOFORN 20060218 S/NE ]
23 [Military 01 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060301 S/NE ]
24 [Military 03 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060303 S/NE ]
25 [Military 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM NOFORN 20060101 S/NE ]
26 [Military 060115 GRINTSUM NOFORN 20060115 S/NE ]
27 [Military 060118 GRINTSUM NOFORN 20060118 S/NE ]
28 [Military 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM NOFORN 20060101 S/NE ]

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The presence of Coalition forces in Rutbah prevented insurgents from reentering the town and disrupted their operations within the city. A number of the AQI fighters who fled Rutbah attempted to reach Akashat, but they were turned away by a shootout with Albu Mahal tribesmen. Other AQI fighters, led by (b)(6) hid in bedouin tents near Tabat. AQI Rutbah amir fled all the way to Baghdad, where he was apprehended on February 3.

**Fallujah**

The situation in Fallujah was far better, since the insurgents were relatively weak and isolated due to a strong Coalition presence in Fallujah proper. This prevented large-scale attacks from occurring inside the city, but tensions remained between residents, the Coalition, and the Iraqi government, generally blamed on the slow compensation process for damages suffered during Operation AL FAJR and the high price and limited availability of fuel.

A significant weakening of the ‘ulama did create some security problems in Fallujah. The leading member of the ‘ulama, Sheikh Hamza Abbas (assassinated November 29), had pursued a moderate agenda of reconciliation and progress. City leaders believed that Sheikh Hamza's death, while unfortunate, would mobilize residents against the insurgency, but they badly misread the lasting damage stemming from the loss of the Sheikh. His successor, Sheikh Muhammad Mutlaq al-‘Ubaydi, was forced to flee the country after insurgent intimidation, leaving Sheikh Ahmed al-Janabi to accept the position of mufti. Sheikh Ahmed was unable to ease residents’ fears of the insurgents, which disillusioned imams in Fallujah and led them to disengage from politics. The weakening of the ‘ulama in Fallujah allowed AQI to increase activity in mosques and subvert moderate clerics, further demoralizing the religious establishment.

In addition to AQI (still led in Fallujah by former Umar Hadid lieutenant and Black Flags Group under (b)(6)) several other groups including the ‘Umar Brigade, Ansar al-Sunna, and the Tanzim Sayf al-Qa'ata were now active in the Fallujah area. AQI fighters in Fallujah initiated a major campaign against suspected Coalition informants, posing as Coalition interpreters and telephoning suspected informants to confirm their cooperation. If the suspected Iraqi “collaborator” admitted to cooperating with the Coalition, they were killed.

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29 [ | Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060131 | (S/NE) | ]
30 [ | Military | 060126 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060126 | (S/NE) | ]
31 [ | Military | 060130 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060130 | (S/NE) | ]; see also [ | Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060131 | (S/NE) | ]
32 [ | Military | 060210 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060210 | (S/NE) | ]
33 [ | Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060101 | (S/NE) | ]
34 A mufti is a member of the ‘ulama who is empowered to right fatwas. In this case, it also means the leading member of the ‘ulama in the city.
35 [ | Military | 060113 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060113 | (S/NE) | ]
36 [ | Military | 02 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060102 | (S/NE) | ]; [ | Military | 060115 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060115 | (S/NE) | ]
37 [ | Military | 060114 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060114 | (S/NE) | ]
38 [ | Military | 060114 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060114 | (S/NE) | ]
Zaidon

(S/NF) One of the top AQI facilitators in central Iraq, as well as the de facto head of AQI in Zaidon was (b)(6) The leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Zaidon and a prominent member of the Zoba tribe, (b)(6) had lost several relatives and an arm fighting the Coalition. (b)(6) was able to use his ties to former IIS Chief of Staff Ahmad Ali Waelis to facilitate cooperation between former IIS officers and AMZ. (b)(6) A number of his subordinates had Iraqi government contracts and used their contract money to support the insurgency. The AQI associate groups Jamaat Ali, Jamaat Abu ‘Umar, and Jamaat Ajami that served the primary insurgent groups in Zaidon were controlled by (b)(6) Ahl al-Sunna, an offshoot of Ansar al-Sunna, was also active in Zaidon. (b)(6)

Saqlawiyah

(S/NF) The AQI Saqlawiyah leader was (b)(6) whose force of foreign fighters was large enough to form their own groups and conduct independent operations without the assistance of locals. (b)(6) The AQI associate group al-Hizb al-Salafi, also known to locals as al-Salafi al-Takfiri, (b)(6) was made up of poor farmers who had gotten wealthy by intimidating the residents of near-by Dhiyabat. (b)(6) Despite the presence of these insurgents, Saqlawiyah was relatively quiet, since many fighters and their facilitators lived in the city and did not wish to attract Coalition attention. (b)(6) In early 2006 AQI fighters wearing Iraqi security uniforms began questioning Saqlawiyah residents about assisting the Coalition and killed them if their suspicions were confirmed. Followers of Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi maintained an insurgent network in Albu Shijil west of Saqlawiyah that engaged in kidnapping, murder, and propaganda with the support of the census bureau director and Black Flags leader (b)(6)
Amariyah, Karmah, and Ferris Town

(S/REL TO USA AUS GBR) AQI remained active in Amariyah, Karmah, and Ferris Town despite Coalition presence in the three cities. The situation was the worst in Karmah, where AQI attacks on the police and the Coalition had left most local police too frightened to go to work.48

(S/NF) Some insurgent cells in and around Karmah were motivated solely for profit rather than by ideology or nationalism. Members of these cells served as mercenaries for the head of AQI, [b(6)] who supplied them with money and weapons. Members of these mercenary cells were professionally competent but incapable of sustaining long-term operations. Using the small farms in and around Karmah, AQI was able to support a robust cell network capable of conducting attacks inside both Karmah and Fallujah.49

(S/NF) The AQI associate group Swords of Truth was also based in Karmah but operated in Fallujah, Baghdad, Tikrit, and other Sunni cities in Iraq.50 Primarily focused on kidnapping Westerners and Iraqis loyal to the government, its members included foreign fighters from [1.4b] in addition to Iraqis. Its IED, VBIED, and RPG training was conducted in concert with [b(6)] Death Company, another AQI associate group which operated in Anbar, but was based in Diyala. It was led by an amir named [b(6)] in Anbar and was essentially a criminal organization that had adopted religious rhetoric to add legitimacy to its activities.51

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Coalition forces netted a major victory on January 30 with the capture of Green Battalion leader [b(6)] who had served as a founding member of the group.52

(S/NF) In Amariyah, AQI manufactured IEDs to be used in carrying out attacks elsewhere in order to avoid detection. While the group continued to lack a solid foothold in Fallujah, it was now able operate more freely in the surrounding area.53

Hit

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) The insurgency in Hit was very complex, with many fighters possessing the necessary military training, discipline, and capability to conduct coordinated attacks in the city. Using detailed terrain models and surveillance networks, they were also able to gather information on Coalition bases and activities.54
Saddam-era Hit mayor Abd al-Samad Muhammad served as an AQI financier who facilitated the movement of foreign fighters through Husaybah to Hit using his connections with AQI, and Ansar al-Sunna.\(^\text{55}\)

**Khalidiyah**

The AQI-associate Ghazwan Group was the primary insurgent threat in Khalidiyah, targeting communications centers and cell phone towers.\(^\text{56}\) The Ghazwan Group was a splinter faction of the Islamic Army of Iraq led by \(^\text{57}\) It was made up primarily of Iraqis with a handful of foreign fighters from serving in key leadership positions.\(^\text{58}\) Their destruction of telecommunications networks in 2005 had shut down 17,500 phone lines in Ramadi and 3,000 in Khalidiyah.\(^\text{59}\)

**Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah**

The government structures in these three cities were thoroughly penetrated by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members, who used their positions to support the insurgency and to undermine Coalition attempts to ameliorate the situation in their towns. While the Barwanah city council held several meetings with Coalition to promote a secure environment, many of the council members were AQI or Ansar al-Sunna members, and in some cases key leaders of these groups.\(^\text{60}\) For instance Haqlaniyah mayor Jemal Salah Menazel and Barwanah mayor Fa’iq Ismail Mohammad were active dual members of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, establishing control of their cities through legitimate political channels to influence and promote their extremist agendas.\(^\text{61}\)

The same situation held in Haditha, where newly-elected Mayor Imad Jawad Hamza, a former staff colonel in the Iraqi air force, was now a member of Ansar al-Sunna. Haditha dam manager was a Wahhabi who supported the insurgency and worked to conceal the identity of insurgents and their supporters. Haditha city council members loyal to or intimidated by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna wanted the Coalition to keep its checkpoints in southern Haditha while moving all other checkpoints to the outskirts of the city and pulling its forces out of the K3 pumping station. This would confine the Coalition in those areas they did not regard as critical to the insurgency while keeping up the pretence of cooperation.\(^\text{62}\)

In late January, Coalition forces arrested Haqlaniyah mayor Jamal Salah Manzal for his involvement with AQI. The other AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members holding office in the Haditha

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\(^{55}\) [Military | 060206 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060206 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{56}\) [Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060131 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{57}\) [Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{58}\) [Military | 07 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060407 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{59}\) [Military | 060205 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060205 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{60}\) [Military | 02 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060102 | (S/NE) | ]; Among these city council members was the head of Ansar al-Sunna in Barwanah.

\(^{61}\) [Military | 060110 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060110 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{62}\) [Military | 060107 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060107 | (S/NE) | ]
area declined to retaliate, preferring instead to expand their power base in the political elections scheduled to take place in late spring. They also planned to create an Iraqi police force drawn from its members that could influence local decision-making by providing "peace and stability."

Other AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders in the Haditha area chose to remain in the outlying villages of Albu Hayat, Alus, Bahni Dahir, and Sakran under the command of a former Iraqi brigadier general who served as the amir for all AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha. served as the day-to-day commander of AQI in Haditha, having assumed command following November 27 capture of rapid ascent through the AQI hierarchy from a low-level fighter at the beginning of December to the head of the group in the city by the end of January helps to illustrate the struggles AQI was forced to go through in order to rebuild its organization in Haditha following Operation SAYYAD II.

Ramadi

In early 2006, AQI reorganized itself to avoid being targeted by basing their leadership for the Ramadi area in the Jazira and by changing their patterns of movement. AQI's meanwhile focused on pushing the group to higher forms of warfare. He worked to find steady sources of income—including donations from wealthy Iraqis—so that the insurgency would be internally financed, set up a quasi-military hierarchy; and began paying mercenaries per attack against the Coalition. As a member of the AQI shari'ah committee, answered directly to AMZ and oversaw the activities of all AQI-affiliated groups in Ramadi.

did face at least one challenge. Operation STEEL CURTAIN had convinced several senior and mid-level AQI leaders to leave Ramadi for Baghdad. To compensate for their loss, AQI appointed younger and less experienced members of the group to succeed them. These commanders often lacked training and experience, but their appointment could not be questioned because they had been personally approved by the AQI shura majlis.

Meanwhile the Abu Harun Group (led now by continued to operate in the Albu Ali Jasim and Albu Dhiab tribal areas of Ramadi. The leader of the group until release from prison maintained an active presence in the group, exploiting his status as a former IIS officer with close ties to many former Ba'athists. He regularly met with the former respective heads of the
Iraqi army missile program and the IIS directorate for Anbar. The Abu Harun Group has as their direct head AQI leader who answered to while operational command of the group in Ramadi was divided between who oversaw the Albu Dhiab area and who oversaw the Albu Ali Jasim area. The group's financial network was run by who owned the gas station where the funds received from the group's FRE and the intelligence financiers were dispersed.\(^71\)

While leader of the Group, had created a well-structured organization with excellent operational security. His support network consisted of two groups, each of which would retain the ability to reinforce the other in the event of a major push against his organization. As a result, was able to evade Coalition raids and train his subordinates to assume leadership in his absence.\(^72\) In 2005 frequently traveled to a terrorist training camp in Dayr al-Zawr, but with the successes of Coalition operations in western Anbar in late 2005, he evidently decided to create a new camp for use by his group near Lake Thar Thar.\(^73\)

Other insurgent groups with ties to AQI included Saraya al-Tha'r, led by who worked for second-in-command Ta'if al-Mansura was based south of Lake Thar Thar and led by. Meanwhile, former IIS officer continued to recruit and finance a variety of insurgent groups in Ramadi, acting as the primary conduit between local groups and the insurgent financier Sheikh Abdul Latif Humayem al-Kharbit.\(^77\)

AQI was concerned too about maintaining religious authority for the group. When the 1920 Revolution Brigade kidnapped, AQI's mufti for the Tamim and Qatana districts, was immediately promoted to take his position, providing a continuity of leadership for religious advice and fatwas.\(^78\)

The lives of these two muftis strikingly illustrates how fluid were the boundaries between supposedly secular Ba'athists and the new Islamists who dominated the insurgency in Anbar. had been a former Iraqi military officer before serving as an Islamic Studies teacher at the al-Sadoon School. was a member of the Ba'ath Party who converted to Wahhabism

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\(^71\) [Military | 060126 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060126 | (S/NI) | ]
\(^72\) Ibid.
\(^73\) [Military | 060113 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060113 | (S/NI) | ]; [Military | 060126 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060126 | (S/NI) | ]
\(^74\) [Military | 060117 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060117 | (S/NI) | ]
\(^75\) As in 2005, the area around the southern end of Lake Thar Thar was used to train and facilitate a variety of insurgent groups, housing a large number of safe houses, arms caches, training facilities, and holding areas for hostages. It was considered attractive for insurgent groups because the desert area was laced with poorly mapped and unimproved roads to a series of chicken farms with unobstructed views of all nearby avenues of approach by Coalition forces. [Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060122 | (S/NI) | ]
\(^76\) [Military | 060211 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060211 | (S/NI) | ]
\(^77\) [Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060122 | (S/NI) | ]
\(^78\) [Military | 060112 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060112 | (S/NI) | ]
\(^79\) [Military | 060125 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060125 | (S/NI) | ]
after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and now served as both religious and military leader of AQI members recruited from his Marrawi tribe. Meanwhile, a Ba'athist who had been installed by Saddam as deputy mayor of Hit remained loyal to the Ba'ath Party and cooperated with AQI under orders from (b) who had been operating in the al-Tash refugee camp since December when the Kurdish refugees who had settled in al-Tash were successfully relocated to northern Iraq. 80

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Insurgent booklets captured on January 26 during a cordon-and-knock operation in Ramadi demonstrated AQI’s seamless integration of war and religion. The booklets contained after-action comments, lessons learned, and instructions for successful operations written in the form of moral admonitions. Poor behavior to be avoided included bragging about attacks, cutting off supplies to other insurgents, not properly accounting for weapons and supplies, taking credit for attacks carried out by others, improper mortar training, infighting, arguing about the legitimacy of jihad, and nepotism. Recommended targeting included not only Coalition troops, military bases, staging areas, and contractors, but also criminals, television stations, cinemas, clubs, liquor stores, whorehouses, internet cafes, music stores, adult stores, and Masons. 82

A Q I Absorbs More Insurgent Groups

(S/NF) The close relationship between AQI and other insurgent groups in Ramadi was reflected in the Anbar insurgency as a whole. In late 2005 Ansar al-Sunna and AQI apparently came to an understanding to cooperate in certain areas. In Hit this cooperation was formalized by a December 2005 agreement between the local leaderships of the two groups under which Ansar al-Sunna would seek AQI’s permission before conducting attacks. 83 In Fallujah the Ansar al-Sunna cell was also loyal to AQI. This cell would provide $300,000 in funding from a senior aide to AMZ, to a new group called al-Fursan Brigade (the Knights Brigade), whose leader was headquartered in Bayji. 84 The Haditha-based Ansar al-Sunna, which controlled a stolen car ring, had an agreement with AQI that would allow AS to keep the proceeds of the sales. However, local AQI leaders soon began feuding with their Ansar al-Sunna counterparts over the disbursement of the money. 85

(S/NF) The situation in Karmah further illustrated the complex interaction between AQI and other groups that defined the state of the insurgency in early 2006. Throughout 2005, there had been infighting between pro- and anti-AQI factions of various insurgent groups—particularly the Green Battalion. By the end of 2005, had won out with the help of (a member of the ‘Umar Brigade), persuading a number of senior Green Battalion members to join AQI and the ‘Umar Brigade. 86 One of these members,
although not an AQI member now expanded his operations to Baghdad and Samarra at behest.\(^8\)

(S/NF) The success of was due in part to a crucial decision by the new leader of the Green Battalion, replaced after the latter’s capture in May 2005 and decided to align his group with the Islamic Army of Iraq. This decision created a problem, since IAI was under the command of a member of Parliament and the head of a political party.\(^8\) As part of his political engagement, had decided to turn some of his guns on AQI, forcing Green Battalion members to fight both AQI and the Coalition. Many members were unhappy with this state of affairs, enabling AQI to appeal to them to leave and fight for them.\(^8\)

(S/NF) The tension between AQI and local insurgents in Karmah was affected by Sheikh Khamis Jasim Dewichat al-Halbusi, the imam of the al-Kabir mosque. Although a Wahhabi cleric who supported local Karmah insurgents in 2004, Sheikh Khamis was a critic of AQI who was angered by their killing of Karmah police and who had worked with tribal leaders to mobilize voters in an effort to influence the December 15 elections.\(^9\)

(S/NF) In Ramadi, AQI gained a major victory in early 2006 when it successfully persuaded one of the top IED experts in the 1920 Revolution Brigade, to break with and form the AQI associate group Abdallah bin Malik Brigade, bringing his second-in-command and explosives experts and following his defection from, AQI promoted to the rank amir and granted him authority over the Abu Harun Group.\(^9\)

(S/NF) The defection led to a renewed effort by the 1920 Revolution Brigade to maintain its status and legitimacy as an insurgent organization, with its leaders holding a series of arguments with local AQI leaders at mosques over the morality of attacks that harmed Sunnis. As one of the highest-ranking 1920 defectors, often took part in these debates.\(^9\)

(S/NF) The 1920 Revolution Brigade was not the only insurgent group that suffered defections to AQI. Believing that through defections and infiltration had become nothing more than a section of AQI, former JM members created a new group, Jaysh al-Khalas to carry on their fight.\(^9\)

Internationalizing the Conflict

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\(^8\) Military 060107 GRINTSUM – NOFORN 20060107 (S/NF)  
\(^8\) Military 060129 GRINTSUM – NOFORN 20060129 (S/NF)  
\(^8\) Military 060213 GRINTSUM – NOFORN 20060213 (S/NF)  
\(^9\) Military 04 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - NOFORN 20060104 (S/NF)  
\(^9\) Military 060110 GRINTSUM - NOFORN 20060110 (S/NF)  
\(^9\) Military 060111 GRINTSUM - NOFORN 20060111 (S/NF)  
\(^9\) Military 060113 GRINTSUM – NOFORN 20060113 (S/NF)
(S/NF) Perhaps encouraged by the growth in his organization’s relative strength, AMZ had advanced plans by January 2006 to use his followers, particularly those from Ramadi, to carry out attacks beyond Iraq’s borders, with special emphasis on 94 As we shall see, one reason that AMZ was able to pursue international goals independent of AQSL was that his group was now financially self-sufficient in Anbar.95

(S/NF) AMZ-related plots in  

| 1.4b | To target airports in |

AMZ attempted to recover SAM missiles that he believed had been buried in the Iraqi desert. On January 9, nine AQI fighters were infiltrated into 1.4b to await a suitable opportunity to carry out attacks. This effort may have been related to planning by an AQI associated Salafist group in Ramadi, which hoped to carry out attacks on the U.S., 1.4b embassies in during the Eid al-Adha (January 10-13) using VBIEDs and missiles.

Developments within the Iraqi Security Forces

(U) All of this activity was helped by the uncertain condition of the Iraqi police and army. With the fall of Saddam, police recruiting, training, and oversight had been left at the local level for several years, creating an uneven state of affairs. Some towns, such as Baghadi, managed to create and maintain a relatively effective police force, while others suffered from perennial problems with corruption, insurgent infiltration, and susceptibility to murder and intimidation campaigns.

(S/NF) AQI penetration of the police was quite advanced in places like Rawah and Rutbah. Corrupt Iraqi police officer and former IIS officer 96 served as AMZ’s operations chief in Rawah, using his position to influence the local outcome of the December elections through bribes and threats.97 The Rutbah police also assisted AQI in its activities, providing the group with information that could be used to target pro-Coalition police. Many police even went as far as to kidnap and torture their fellow officers for AQI. As a result, the remaining police were considered complicit in the insurgency by residents.98

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) The situation in Fallujah was slightly different. The city’s police chief was Brigadier General Salah, a professional police officer but an outsider in Fallujah who was aware of his limitations and was forced to cooperate with local leaders to maintain their support and stability. As a result, he allowed himself to be influenced by former Fallujah city council chairman Sheikh Khalid and city council member Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Dafar to release captured insurgents who were of interest to them.99 Sheikh Sattar also screened applicants for the Fallujah police, hiring

94 [ | Military | 060109 GRINTSUM - NOFORM | 20060109 | (S/NF) | ]
95 [ | Military | 060116 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060116 | (S/NF) | ]
96 [ | Military | 060116 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060116 | (S/NF) | ]
97 [ | Military | 060203 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060203 | (S/NF) | ]
98 [ | Military | 060131 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060131 | (S/NF) | ]
99 [ | Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060105 | (S/NF) | ]
Salafists to work for the Ministry of Defense intelligence unit in the city and regularly arriving at the Fallujah police station to personally order the release of detainees.100

\(\text{(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)}\) A massive bombing near the glass factory in Ramadi on January 5, 2006 would persuade some locals, including several imams, to support the recruitment of police and other security efforts.101 Police recruits had lined up outside the factory in hopes of gainful employment when a suicide bomber set off his explosives, killing thirty-one and injuring seventy. In the aftermath of the bombing, the recruits returned to the line and 142 were accepted for training. The attack was denounced by influential elites and ordinary citizens alike, with al-Sharqiyah Television even going so far as to refer to the slain police as "martyrs," a term with profound implications in Islamic theology. Even so, the poor economic situation in the city meant that those Ramadi police who signed up were paid infrequently, leading in January to a threat of mass resignation by the force.102

Tribal Developments and the Anbar People's Committee

\(\text{(S/NE)}\) The situation in the official police forces was connected to a larger struggle between the Coalition and AQI over the loyalty of the tribes in Anbar, and here developments throughout 2006 would provide some of the most encouraging news for the Coalition. Many of the recruits who were killed or wounded during the attack outside the Ramadi glass factory came from the Albu Nimr tribe.103 In response to the bombing, the Albu Nimr declared \(\text{tha'r} \) (blood vengeance) against the perpetrators. The Coalition had been in talks with this tribe since December to take part in Iraqi police recruiting and the bombing led Albu Nimr sheikhs to nominate recruiters for the Desert Protector Force, Iraqi army, and local police forces in western Anbar. Albu Nimr tribesmen also joined the Iraqi security forces and anti-insurgent paramilitaries in and around Hit where they fought both insurgent and criminal activity.104

\(\text{(S/NE)}\) It would be unrealistic, however, to describe the entire Albu Nimr tribe as "pro-Coalition." Of the 20-25,000 Albu Nimr tribesmen, loyalty varied greatly from subtribe to subtribe, with many sheikhs maintaining ties to former Ba'athists. The al-Gaoud subtribe of the Albu Nimr, led by former governor Faisal al-Gaoud, was by far the most supportive of the Coalition.105

\(\text{(S/NE)}\) Meanwhile, many Albu Mahal tribesmen of the now defunct Hamza Battalion also sought employment in the Iraqi police and the Desert Protectors with the support of Sheikh Sabbah and Sheikh Osama Ja'adan al-Karbuli.106 In al-Qaim and Husaybah Albu Mahal Hamza Battalion members made up a majority of the 314 recruits for the police while the larger Karbubi tribe from Karabilah only constituted 1%.107

100 \[ | \text{Military} | 060107 \text{GRINTSUM – NOFORN} | 20060107 | (S/NE) | \]
101 \[ | \text{Military} | 06 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060106 | (S/NE) | \]
102 \[ | \text{Military} | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060105 | (S/NE) | \]
103 \[ | \text{Military} | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060105 | (S/NE) | \]
104 Many Albu Nimr tribesmen understood how to battle an underground force, having been forced to become one themselves after 1995 when Saddam Hussein declared their tribe outcasts, forcing them to survive on smuggling and organized crime. \[ | \text{Military} | 060112 \text{GRINTSUM – NOFORN} | 20060112 | (S/NE) | \]
105 Ibid.
106 \[ | \text{Military} | 03 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060103 | (S/NE) | \]
107 \[ | \text{Military} | 060109 \text{GRINTSUM – NOFORM} | 20060109 | (S/NE) | \]
Other tribes held positions that were more ambiguous. For instance, the Albu ‘Ubayd tribe in Baghdadi was split between pro- and anti-Coalition tribesmen. Those who supported the Coalition were either employed in some fashion at Al Asad Airbase or worked for the unofficial Baghdad police (their existence had not been sanctioned by the interior ministry). Actions by AQI would, however, soon force ‘Ubaydis out of their ambivalent stance and into a more pro-Coalition position.

On January 1, hosted a meeting of tribal sheikhs and Ramadi elites at the home of Sheikh Salah Dari Numan al-‘Ubaydi to discuss the creation of an Anbar People's Committee (the evolutionary descendant of the earlier Ramadi Shura Council) to represent Anbari tribes to the Iraqi government on issues ranging from security to social services. had planned for these organizations to operate parallel to the existing government and to form the nucleus of an all-Sunni Iraqi army and police units under his direction.

More than seventy tribal leaders, technocrats, former military officers, and insurgent leaders attended this meeting. Soon afterwards, hosted Anbari tribal leaders for another meeting of the Committee to elect members to serve on the subcommittee that would work with the provincial government on security issues. Six sheikhs were chosen to represent the Albu ‘Ubayd, the Albu Aetha, the Albu Fahd, the Albu Alwan, the Albu Risha, and the Albu Khalifa tribes. Former Iraqi general Muhammad Sa’ab Manfi al-Rawi hosted a group of sixty former or retired Iraqi army officers in the Hay al-Dhubat district of Ramadi to discuss possible security initiatives, with a group of elected officers then elected to serve as members of the security subcommittee. During a January 8 meeting of Governor Mamoun and the provincial council, security council member introduced and requested his inclusion and that of the Anbar People's Committee's security subcommittee within the provincial security council.

This engagement led to more than 1,000 prospective police recruits arriving at the Ramadi glass factory from January 2-4 to enlist in the Iraqi police. Of the 921 who were screened by the Coalition, 619 were eventually cleared for recruitment.

All Quiet out West?

In early 2006, residents of western Anbar enjoyed a more peaceful environment than they had during 2005, though they continued to trust filial and tribal ties to resolve disputes before turning to the Coalition or the Iraqi government. Because AQI had murdered various prominent
sheikhs, the Albu Nimr, Albu Julib, and Karabilah tribes were now openly anti-AQI. To counter this tribal threat, AQI and its associate groups began formal cooperation with the Ba’ath Party in western Anbar.\footnote{Military | 060212 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060212 | (S/NE) | }

\textit{(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)} While some Iraqi tribal engagement with the Coalition was exaggerated, such as the claim by Sunni tribesmen in Karabilah that they had captured 270 AQI (including 200 foreign fighters from \(1.4b\)), other efforts were more genuine. Thus the self-declared Baghdadi police based, as we have seen, on the ‘Ubaydi tribe, managed to successfully apprehend AQI \(1.4b\).\footnote{Military | 060128 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060128 | (S/NE) | }

\textit{(S/NE)} Coalition operations carried out in early January made it more difficult for AQI to operate in Rutbah and many members were forced to seek refuge in \(1.4b\) or in outlying villages.\footnote{Military | 060202 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060202 | (S/NE) | } AQI leader \(1.4b\) for instance, fled Rutbah for Abu Tiban, a small village southeast of Hit near Muhammadi.\footnote{Military | 060111 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060111 | (S/NE) | }

\textit{(S/NE)} Despite these challenges AQI fighters in the Hit-Baghdadi corridor continued to conduct sporadic attacks on the Coalition and AQI was able to intimidate residents in Jubbah, Baghdadi, Mysriyah, and Muhammadi who supported the Iraqi police and their municipal government.\footnote{Military | 060119 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060119 | (S/NE) | }

\(1.4b\) \textit{vs. AQI}

\textit{(S/NE)} was now able to enlist the help of these new allies to fight alongside his 1920 Revolution Brigade, in order to drive AQI fighters out of Ramadi and to foment sentiment against foreign fighters. This enabled him to carve out a solid power base stretching from Ramadi to the Hit-Haditha corridor and into Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah. His ability to achieve a similar success in Fallujah was, however, weakened by the fact that many 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters in the area had been absorbed into AQI during the insurgent infighting over the summer of 2005.\footnote{Military | 060111 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060111 | (S/NE) | }

\textit{(S/NE)} Intent on dismantling \(1.4b\) political initiative, AMZ had his Shari’ah Committee issue a \textit{fatwa} calling for the death of every Ramadi sheikh participating in the Anbar People’s Committee. AMZ had recently reconfigured the AQI Shura Council to give himself more direct control over the legal decisions issued by the Shari’ah Committee, a move that was controversial, but very useful in situations like this fight with a fellow devout Muslim like \(1.4b\).\footnote{Military | 060119 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060119 | (S/NE) | }

\textit{(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)} AQI and Ansar al-Sunna now stepped up attacks on Iraqi police recruits and prominent Anbaris. Fighters from as far afield as al-Qaim, Fallujah, and Diyala reinforced Ramadi’s outlying Tamim district, already an AQI stronghold, to take part in the fight with \(1.4b\) AQI fighters wearing Coalition uniforms roamed the Albu Faraj, Albu Fahd, Albu Ubayd, and Albu
Maraj tribal areas, targeting sheikhs, imams, technocrats, and Iraqi military personnel for assassination and counteracting positive perceptions of the Coalition.\(^{124}\)

\((S/NF)\) AQI and local fighters were able to carry out two complex attacks against the Ramadi Government Center and Coalition bases using IDF, SAF, RPGs, and VBIEDs on January 20-21. Whereas previous attacks of this scale had created anti-Coalition sentiment in frightened residents seeking to avoid violence, there was little response to these attacks since the violence was widely perceived as a test of wills between the local 1920 Revolution Brigade and the less popular but more powerful AQI.\(^{125}\)

**The Mujahideen Shura Council**

\((S/NF)\) AQSL was well-aware of the declining popularity of AQI and placed pressure on AMZ to put an “Iraqi face” on the insurgency. On January 10 AQI announced the creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council to serve as an umbrella organization for SRE groups under the command of \(b(6)\) A former Ba'athist interior ministry official under Saddam Hussein, \(b(6)\) had reportedly facilitated AMZ's entry into Iraq from the border crossing in 2002.\(^{126}\) According to the announcement, the Mujahideen Shura Council member groups consisted of AQI, Jaish Ta'if al-Mansura, Jaish al-Sunnah, Ansar al-Tawhid, Islamic Jihad Brigades, and the al-Ghuruba Brigade. The creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council, which led to a reduced role for AMZ, was a reaction to complaints from both AMZ lieutenants and AQSL that AMZ had created a cult of personality and that AQI had become too isolated to form a united Islamist front in Iraq.\(^{128}\)

\((S/REL TO USA, MCFI)\) In reaction to the creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council, the Iraqi daily \(Al Sabab\) reported that six Ramadi insurgent groups had decided to pool their efforts against AQI, declaring that they had no relationship with AMZ or his foreign fighters and would fight them in support of local politicians. This declaration was a result of the efforts of the tribal sheikhs and imams in the Anbar People's Committee as part of their pursuit of political engagement rather than violence with the Iraqi government and the Coalition.\(^{129}\) The six groups referenced by \(Al Sabab\) were almost certainly the Islamic Movement of Mujahideen, the Islamic Army of Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the al-Nu'man Brigade, Jaysh Muhammad, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen, the national leadership of which opposed AQI to varying degrees in Ramadi and Fallujah.\(^{130}\)

\((S/NE)\) Outreach efforts and AMZ's brutality even created the potential for fractures within AQI. Throughout January 2006, meetings were held in Baghdad and Fallujah between Jaysh Muhammad and dissident leaders of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna to discuss ways to rid Iraq of AMZ's influence. From the example of Abu Ghraib, they concluded that negotiating directly with the

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\(^{124}\) Ibid.

\(^{125}\) [Military | 060121 GRINTSUM NOFORN | 20060121 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{126}\) [Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060122 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{127}\) [Military | 12 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060412 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{128}\) [Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060122 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{129}\) Ibid.

\(^{130}\) [Military | 060129 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060129 | (S/NE) | ]
Coalition would not be productive, making (b)(6) and the Anbar People's Committee their only option. Jaysh Muhammad convinced the dissidents to hold meetings with members of the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in the al-Dura district of Baghdad, where the groups discussed a way to negotiate a peaceful end to the insurgency with their power base intact.

AQI Attacks the Anbar People’s Committee and Anti-AQI Tribes

(S/NF) In an effort to counter-act political progress in Anbar by (b)(6) and those tribes that were turning against AMZ, AQI mounted a major murder and intimidation campaign against them to prevent serious engagement with the Coalition. Many of their targets were members of (b)(6) Albu Fahd tribe that had been so instrumental in pre- and post-election security in Ramadi and now formed the core of the Anbar People’s Committee. Among the more prominent killings:

- In late December, AQI operative (b)(6) began kidnapping, torturing, and murdering children from the Albu Affan School.
- On December 20, AQI killed AMS member Hamid Ayash al-Alwani, a friend of (b)(6) who served as the spiritual leader and day-to-day commander of the 1920 Revolution Brigade.
- In early January, al-Zobai tribesmen loyal to AQI mortared a number of villages, including al-Ta'us, that were suspected of cooperating with the Coalition.
- On January 1, Sheikh Ibrahim N'aif Mishan of the Albu Aetha was kidnapped by AQI fighters from the Albu Ubayd tribe who did not agree with his support for the elections. Sheikh Ibrahim was a lieutenant of (b)(6) ally Sheikh Nasser Fahdawi, who had been instrumental in the formation of a militia in the Sufia district of Ramadi to support the December elections.
- On January 5, AQI fighters from the Albu Faraj tribe kidnapped Sheikh Khamis al-Fahdawi. In retaliation, the Albu Fahd kidnapped seven Albu Faraj tribesmen including an AQI financier. AQI responded by murdering Sheikh Khamis's brother Walid, leading to tribal warfare between the Albu Fahd and the Albu Faraj tribes.
- Around January 6, (b)(6) deputy, Albu Fahd tribal leader, and Anbar University professor Dr. Hamid al-Faysal was assassinated by AQI fighters from the Albu Faraj tribe. A number of rank-and-file members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade also were killed by AQI as they attempted to join the Iraqi police.

131 [ Military | 060127 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060127 | (S/NF) | ]
132 [ Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060131 | (S/NF) | ]
133 [ Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060105 | (S/NF) | ]
134 [ Military | 060109 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060109 | (S/NF) | ]
135 [ Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060122 | (S/NF) | ]
136 [ Military | 060109 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060109 | (S/NF) | ]
137 [ Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060101 | (S/NF) | ]
138 [ Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060105 | (S/NF) | ]
139 [ Military | 06 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060106 | (S/NF) | ]
On January 8, Iraqi army major Faraj Yas Hammadi was killed by AQI operative for failure to end his support for the Coalition or to resign his position. On January 14, associate and prominent IIP member Sheikh 'Abd al-Ghafar al-Rawi was dragged from the Shafi al-Kabir mosque in the Tamim district of Ramadi and murdered by AQI members wearing stolen American military uniforms. Sheikh 'Abd al-Ghaffar was a member of the clerics' subcommittee of the Anbar People's Committee and his death damaged ability to get backing for his goal of establishing provincial security. On January 16, AQI murdered Sheikh Nasser Abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi, the leader of the Albu Fahd tribe, in the Sufia district of Ramadi. Sheikh Nasser was a prominent tribal leader in Ramadi who was both respected and influential at the highest echelons of Anbari society. He was a key member of Anbar People's Committee who had served as a driving force to improve security in the provincial capital. Because the Albu Fahd tribe is large and divided into many factions and subtribes, AQI used a fighter from the Albu Fahd to eliminate him. Sheikh Nasser's assumed leadership of the tribe upon his death. On January 18, AQI killed al-Nu'man Brigade leader Sheikh Muhammad Sadaq al-Battah Albu Chulayb, the head of the Albu Chulayb tribe, along with his nephew and an Iraqi National Intelligence employee in an apartment in the Bayaa district of southern Baghdad. Sheikh Sadaq was a relative of Iraqi Defense Minister Sadoun al-Dulaymi and was en route to a meeting of the Anbar People's Committee at the time of the murder. Sheikh Sadaq was also a key member of Anbar People's Committee who had served as the chairman of the defense subcommittee of the Anbar People's Committee. I wanted to use the Anbar People's Committee to attack AQI following the killing of Sheikh Nasser and Sheikh Sadaq, but the rest of the Committee was too afraid to do so and the sheikhs insisted on only working on pre-arranged topics and tasks. On February 7, AQI assassinated the well-regarded Fallujah city council chairman Sheikh Kamal Shakir al-Nazal. Following the assassination, several local politicians and technocrats pulled back from dealing with the Coalition. The killing of Sheikh Nasser Abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi was a decisive blow against the Anbar People's Committee. Sheikh Nasser was a major player in Anbar and his death prompted many senior members of the Committee to withdraw from public view for their own safety. Neither 1920 Revolution Brigade nor the personal security measures taken by senior members of the Committee had been enough to stop AQI from murdering its leadership, leaving unable or unwilling to mount an effective counter-attack.
These killings were not random acts of violence but rather part of a deliberate campaign of targeted assassination by AQI. An internal report on the assassination campaign to the AQI shura majlis was recovered on a thumb drive by the Coalition in February 2006. The document described the group's plan to destroy the Anbar People's Committee and its status to date by detailing the killing of several sheikhs including Sheikh Nasser. According to the author of the document, these killings had resulted in several sheikhs rescinding their pledges of cooperation with the Coalition for fear of assassination. The document concluded by submitting a detailed list of recommended additional targets including the leadership of the Albu Nimr and Albu Khalifa tribes, and Lieutenant General Muhammad Sa'ab Manfi al-Rawi.\(^\text{146}\)

**AQI Moves on Ramadi**

AQI's successful targeting of Anbari tribal elites created a threat to both local security and the political process, making residents less open to the Coalition and creating more freedom of movement and action for the group. AQI used this opportunity to build up its forces in Ramadi, putting even more fighters into the Tamim district.\(^\text{147}\) This expansion was financed in part by AQI member who funneled money from a NGO based near the al-Mustafa hospital in Ramadi to support the insurgency. The head of the NGO in Iraq was AQI member Abu 'Umar, who regularly drove to receive regular payments of $5,000.\(^\text{148}\)

At the end of January 2006 AQI spread its fighters from the Tamim district into the 5 Kilo, Sufia, Julaybah, Albu Ubayd, and Albu Bali areas of Ramadi.\(^\text{149}\) To support the influx of fighters, AQI set up levies to recruit military-aged males in Fallujah and Ramadi from allied tribes.\(^\text{150}\) Those recruited in the Fallujah area were sent to Ramadi to fight.

The expansion of AQI in Ramadi set off another round of defections for foremost among them was the Khalidiyah 1920 Revolution Brigade leader Muhammad Ayid Fayath, who joined AQI to exercise greater influence over the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah corridor.\(^\text{151}\) Another important defection was the accounting manager of the Anbar Provincial Government Center, who had supported financially, but in early 2006 switched to giving funds to AQI.\(^\text{152}\)

and his allies in 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Albu Fahd tribe continued however, to fight AQI. Led by Sheikh Nasser's brother some of these allies killed three members of the Albu Ali al-Hamad subtribe of the Albu Fahd on the suspicion that they had assisted in the killing of Sheikh Nasser.\(^\text{153}\) On January 28, the Fahdawis killed...
four AQI members in a drive-by shooting, among them the group's Malaab district amirs Abd al-Fatah and Muzhir. These efforts, ordered by Sheikh Khamis, were overseen by Saddam-era General Thumayl Jarbawi al-Fahdawi, who had garnered support from the Albu Fahd tribe to drive all insurgents (i.e. all those not supporting the Anbar People's Committee) from Ramadi. Meanwhile the residents of the Albu Thiyyab al-Thanya district formed a militia to keep AQI from exerting influence over their area.

(AQI) AQI reacted to this resistance by destroying the home of Sheikh Anwar Abd al-Razzaq al-Kharbit in an effort to intimidate his anti-AQI militia into disbanding. The attack had the intended result and the Sufia militia promptly disbanded after an AQI threat stating that it would kill imams and tribal leaders in the district if the militia refused to comply. With the militia defeated, AQI began attacking its one-time ally Jaysh al-Haqq because of its support for a political solution to the insurgency.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) Another target for AQI was and his family, who had purportedly swindled the group out of $1,600,000 (by his account, it was only $1,160,000). was a member of the which provided the leadership of the Green Battalion, and had been entrusted by AQI to act as a courier to Hajji Hamadi in Karmah in January 2006. This was an attempt at cooperation between the two warring groups, but decided to keep the money for himself, thus severing cooperation between the two groups until his to repay their father's debts.
AQI Triumphant in Ramadi

(S/NE) By the beginning of February, AQI had become the preeminent insurgent group in Ramadi. The 1920 Revolution Brigade had been completely defeated, with its remnants concentrated in the Tamim and Sufia districts of Ramadi. and his second-in-command were both forced to flee Ramadi to escape assassination. Perhaps in recognition of his success in the city—or as a way to secure the religious life of Ramadi—Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) member the overall AQI amir for Anbar, shifted

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) With AQI's victory in Ramadi, there began a gradual shift in the dynamics of many cities in western Anbar away from the optimism following Operation SAYYAD II toward a neutral stance between the insurgency and the Coalition. AQI fighters returned in force to Karabilah, Haditha, southeastern Hit, and Albu Hadith to escape Operation STEEL CURTAIN but had retained ties to the AQI leadership in Ramadi. Unfortunately, the effects of capture were undercut by the release of equally senior AQI amirs like from Abu Ghraib, reforms with the group and used his experience at intimidating locals to bolster AQI morale and recruiting efforts by telling them that they had nothing to fear from Coalition detention.

(S/NE) Under normal circumstances, the capture in early March of (AQI’s amir for the Baghdadi to Husaybah region) would have severely hurt the group. A former IIS major in the Iraqi army, had orchestrated much of AQI's murder and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi security forces in 2005. The fifth highest ranking AQI amir, had relocated to first and then to escape Operation STEEL CURTAIN but had retained ties to the AQI leadership in Ramadi. Unfortunately, the effects of capture were undercut by the release of equally senior AQI amirs like from Abu Ghraib that enabled the group to rebuild existing networks or to create new ones to compensate for loss.

(S/NE) Angered by capture, AQI fighters from Haditha traveled to Baghdad to search for police chief Colonel Sha’ban. Their goal was to carry out threat to destroy Sha’ban’s home if he handed the AQI amir over to the Coalition. When Sha’ban proved elusive, AQI kidnapped and later murdered a Baghdadi police captain whose relatives had been extorting the group for money.

 approved for release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
Renewed Murder and Intimidation

Not surprisingly, the victory of AQI and its allies over and the Anbar People's Committee led to an escalation in the group's murder and intimidation campaign.\(^{167}\)

- In late January the "Anbar Insurgent Command" posted "night letters" in Hit that threatened residents who cooperated with the Coalition, warning that insurgents were watching everyone in the city.
- About the same time AQI fighters in the 5 Kilo, Tamim, and al-Tash areas of Ramadi kidnapped suspected collaborators, bringing them before Mullah Khattan to determine whether they were to be tortured or killed. The Coalition later uncovered an AQI detention facility near Lake Thar Thar that contained a number of torture devices, makeshift cells, and signs of recent use.
- On January 23 AQI murdered two Shi'a in the Shahid market of Ferris Town. The group set up checkpoints in order to monitor or threaten locals who are entering or leaving the complex.\(^{168}\)
- On January 29 four insurgents led by detonated an IED in front of a house in Bani Dhari, firing AK-47's into the house and forcing the family to flee, believing them to have passed information to Coalition patrols.
- On February 1 AQI fighters killed a local hairdresser in front of her children in Karmah for violating shari'ah.\(^{169}\)
- In early February, AQI fighters kidnapped and murdered an Iraqi police officer in Ramadi. He then proceeded to beat women who were not properly covered or those accused of cooperating with the Coalition.
- In early February AQI fighters kidnapped, tortured, and then beheaded an Iraqi police officer in Ramadi.
- In mid-February AQI murdered Jaysh al-Haqq leader Sa'ad Badria, leading to open fighting between AQI and Jaysh al-Haqq for control of the Tamim district of Ramadi. AQI would ultimately prevail over Jaysh al-Haqq, increasing its presence in the district.\(^{169}\)

Domination of Anbar University

The larger fight between and AQI is reflected in miniature in the struggle over influence at Anbar University. The university was the only institution of higher learning in Anbar. The 1920 Revolution Brigade had been the dominant insurgent group, active in the school since 2003, reflecting the orientation of the university as a whole: formerly Ba'athist, but open to religion. This domination enabled to use many student groups as a recruiting pool for his organization. Distinguished faculty professors like legal studies professor were part of \(^{169}\)

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\(^{167}\) Unless indicated, all examples are taken from \(\text{Military} \mid 060207\text{GRINTSUM} \rightarrow \text{NOFORN} \mid 20060207 \mid \text{(S/NE)}\)

\(^{168}\) \(\text{Military} \mid 060206\text{GRINTSUM} \rightarrow \text{NOFORN} \mid 20060206 \mid \text{(S/NE)}\)

\(^{169}\) \(\text{Military} \mid 02\text{Mar} \ 06\text{MNF-W INSTUM} \rightarrow \text{NOFORN} \mid 20060302 \mid \text{(S/NE)}\)
command and control network.\footnote{Military | 060110 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060110 | (S/NE) | |} Campus security director led a cell of the Yarmuk Brigade (an associate group of the 1920 Revolution Brigade) that met regularly on campus, receiving payments of up to $20,000 from university contractor.\footnote{Military | 060227 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060227 | (S/NE) | |} Despite this, much of the faculty was apolitical and tried to distance themselves from their country’s current crisis.\footnote{Military | 060216 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060216 | (S/NE) | |}

\textbf{(S/NE)} By late 2005, loyalty began to shift among some faculty and student groups towards AQI, though the fact that the school was commuter-based kept at bay, at least temporarily, some of the dangers of extremism on campus.\footnote{Military | 060110 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060110 | (S/NE) | |} Two law professors exemplified the shift in the faculty.\footnote{Military | 11 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060511 | (S/NE) | |} became an AQI organizer and planner, preaching jihad and delivering anti-government lectures to the student body.\footnote{Military | 060227 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060227 | (S/NE) | |} Meanwhile, used his position to promote Salafism and recruit students to join AQI.\footnote{Military | 060208 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060208 | (S/NE) | |} frequently traveled to Baghdad on business trips, using them as a cover for meeting with AQI in the city.\footnote{Military | 06 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060306 | (S/NE) | |} AQI relied too on the internet cafe in Anbar University as its key means of communication in Ramadi due to a permissive environment and lack of usage fees.\footnote{Military | 060208 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060208 | (S/NE) | |}

\textbf{(S/NE)} By early March 2006 AQI and Ansar al-Sunna had displaced 1920 Revolution Brigade from its place as the dominant insurgent group at the University.\footnote{Military | 060110 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060110 | (S/NE) | |} Shari'ah was declared on campus, a strict Islamic dress code was enforced, and male and female students were segregated. Some students were unhappy with the dress code, but they were unable to resist AQI. Members of the university faculty and staff who opposed AQI or questioned the group’s interpretation of Islam were removed from their positions and in some cases murdered.\footnote{Military | 11 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060511 | (S/NE) | |} For instance, was personally opposed to AQI but, after he was kidnapped for a month by the group in mid-2005, he stopped protesting the group publicly.\footnote{Military | 28 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 200603128 | (S/NE) | |} Cowed into submission by AQI, provided the group with money acquired from contacts in as well as the funding allocated to him by the Ministry of Education.\footnote{Military | 060208 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060208 | (S/NE) | |}

\textbf{AQI Continues the Fight outside Ramadi}

\textbf{(S/NE)} While AQI leadership had much of its attention focused on the fight with they did not ignore the rest of Anbar. For instance, in an effort to broaden the group’s appeal throughout the province, AQI began offering money to families whose homes were damaged by the Coalition during combat; more than 300 families would accept their offer.\footnote{Military | 28 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 200603128 | (S/NE) | |} AQI was also able to recruit some current and former Abu Ghraib detainees, offering them protection at the prison in return for joining the group. AQI and other Wahhabi groups forced prisoners to adopt Wahhabi practices, a
key indicator that the most extreme religious elements within “the mujahidin” would impose their views not only on ordinary Iraqis, but also on the insurgency as a whole.  

(S/NE) Attention was also paid to the burgeoning relationship with Ansar al-Sunna. In stark contrast to the bitter conflict with cooperation between Ansar al-Sunna and AQI cells (with often interchangeable membership) intensified throughout February and March. Joint AQI and Ansar al-Sunna forces carried out kidnappings, vehicle theft, propaganda and IED attacks in Baghdad, overseen at times by (an AQI leader) and at other times by (an Ansar al-Sunna leader).  

(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Fallujah was not ignored by AQI, but the improved security situation made this city far more difficult for insurgents. In late February AQI and the five lesser groups that made up the Mujahideen Shura Council began a concerted propaganda campaign, focusing on media efforts when the situation on the ground did not favor actual attacks. The credibility of the attack claims made by the Mujahideen Shura Council ranged from measured and accurate to complete fabrications. 

(S/NF) AQI was supported financially in its efforts in Fallujah by Sheikh Barakat al-Sa’adun al-Ifan al-Issawi and his associate Sheikh Khamis, who had been based in since the conclusion of Operation AL FAJR. In addition to funding AQI through his Baghdad-based engineering and construction company, Sheikh Barakat supplied the group with mortars, RPG-7s, and SA-7s that he had stolen after the fall of Saddam Hussein and buried in the desert. 

(S/NF) Sheikh Abdullah Janabi’s top deputy Sheikh Dhafir Sobhe Bukori al-Ubaydi also helped to finance AQI in Fallujah. While Sheikh Dhafir had opposed the presence of and the foreign fighters allied with him in Fallujah, Janabi had supported it and Sheikh Dhafir remained loyal to him as the two men continued to back AQI from the new base of operations in Resistance  

(S/NE) The defeat of the 1920 Revolution Brigade did not, however, mean a complete end to anti-AQI resistance in Ramadi. In the short-term, the center of these efforts simply shifted to the Islamic Army of Iraq. Supported by the remnants of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Fahdawi tribe, Islamic Army of Iraq killed three AQI fighters and attempted to assassinate injuring one of his bodyguards. Driving AQI from the Malaab district of Ramadi, the Islamic Army of Iraq declared the area off-limits to AQI. Despite these efforts, Amman hotel bombing facilitator continued to operate in the Malaab

180 [Military | 060209 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060209 | (S/NE) | ]  
181 [Military | 06 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060306 | | ]  
182 [Military | 060222 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060222 | (S/NE) | ]  
183 [Military | 060223 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060223 | (S/NE) | ]  
184 [Military | 03 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060303 | | ]  
185 [Military | 060203 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060203 | (S/NE) | ]
district.\textsuperscript{186} was also able to remain active in the Malaab district using his ties to the criminal elements centered around the Muhammad Daham Mosque.\textsuperscript{187}

\textbf{(S/NE \textit{b}(6)} took advantage of the Islamic Army of Iraq's resistance of AQI to stage his own comeback, reforming the Anbar People's Committee into the Anbar Revolutionary Group. Realizing that AQI was too powerful to attack directly, \textit{b}(6) new goal was to obtain detailed intelligence on AQI and its allies, and then to use this intelligence to carry out attacks against them using the Iraqi army. \textit{b}(6) accelerated the Anbar Revolutionary Group's infiltration of the Iraqi army in an effort to push for these attacks.\textsuperscript{188}

\textbf{(S/NE \textit{b}(6)} renewed struggle with AQI galvanized other elements of Ramadi society into action. Tribal leaders throughout the provincial capital stated that killing any Iraqi male wearing a ski mask or other "typical" insurgent clothing would not warrant a blood payment. In the Sufia district, locals took up arms against AQI to deny them freedom of movement through their area.\textsuperscript{189} The Albu Dhabi tribe also restricted access to their section of Ramadi, setting up barriers and checkpoints to deter AQI entry.\textsuperscript{190} \textit{b}(6) trusted ally Lieutenant General Muhammad Sa'ab Manfi al-Rawi reorganized old FRE soldiers to begin hunting down and killing AQI.\textsuperscript{191}

\textbf{(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)} The Coalition also achieved its own successes against the insurgency, capturing Ghazwan Group leader \textit{b}(6).\textsuperscript{162}

\textbf{The Failed Ba'athist Regroup}

\textbf{(S/NE)} A similar attempt at resistance was made by Ba'athists of various stripes. A few FRE military officers in Anbar unsuccessfully attempted to form a new insurgent group that would be Ba'athist, Sunni, and anti-AQI and have the goal of retaking control of Iraq. They were supported by the surviving \textit{1.4b} who believed (correctly) that the insurgency had been hijacked by non-Ba'athists and AQI, which left them with nothing to do but facilitate other movements. The attempt failed because FRE's in Anbar had already joined SAR or SRE insurgent groups, with some regularly shifting back and forth between various insurgent groups, political parties, and criminal networks. This dynamic made it all but impossible for the \textit{1.4b} Ba'athists to reconsolidate their followers into a cohesive organization.\textsuperscript{193}

\textbf{(S/NE)} In mid-February 2006, the New Ba'ath Party attempted to demonstrate its control over the insurgency and to force direct negotiations with the new Iraqi government by calling for a cease-fire
across Anbar between February 12-14. Despite this, attack levels remained within statistical norms during the cease-fire.\(^{(194)}\)

\((S/NE)\) In light of this failed attempt to exercise their former authority, the Iraqi Ba’athists were forced to return to their earlier agreement with AQI to coordinate efforts to hasten a Coalition withdrawal from Iraq as their only recourse. Among those Ba’athists who had joined AQI as part of this agreement was Haditha mayor Imad Hamza al-Hayani, who helped to facilitate the infiltration of Ba’athists and AQI into the Haditha police. Faced with his own lack of followers and resources in Anbar and throughout much of Iraq, Ba’athist leader (b)(6) who was attempting to unify the Ba’athists into a coherent force, was reduced to requesting AQI to carry out attacks on targets that he thought were important.\(^{(195)}\)

\((S/NE)\) The ambiguous relationship between AQI and the Ba’athists is most clearly demonstrated by shady dealings in the oil business. Four companies, al-Gadeer, Fajr al-Sham, al-Shira al-‘Abyad and al-Fiou, had authorization from the Iraqi ministry of oil to export petroleum through the Waleed border crossing into Two of these companies (al-Gadeer and Fajr al-Sham) were managed by Ba’athists, and one of them (al-Gadeer) used his profits to fund AQI. The way that this happened was rather circuitous. Al-Gadeer was owned by (b)(6) (the former director of IIS's M4 (Secret Service) Directorate who reportedly served as Saddam Hussein's liaison to AQSL pre-OIF) and Hijazi employed (b)(6) the profits from al-Shira al-‘Abyad went directly to fund AQI.\(^{(197)}\) It is very unlikely that Shi’a Iraqi oil minister Hussein Shahristani and his Shi’a-dominated ministry deliberately awarded export contracts to AQI, but the control of these two companies were one of the major reasons that AQI became fully funded from internal Iraqi sources by early 2006.

**The Golden Mosque Bombing (February-March)**

\((C/REL)\) In the middle of these developments, the face of the war in Iraq would change forever on February 21, 2006. On that evening, four gunmen wearing Iraqi interior ministry uniforms gained entry into the al-‘Askari Golden Mosque in Samarra, overpowering local guards and planting explosives over the next nine hours. They then proceeded to destroy the dome of the mosque, which holds the tombs of the 10\(^{th}\) and 11\(^{th}\) Shi’a imams Ali al-Hadi and Hasan al-Askari and was the site of the occultation of the final imam.\(^{(198)}\)

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\(^{(194)}\) [Military | 060221 GRINTSUM - NOFORN | 20060221 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{(195)}\) [Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{(196)}\) [Military | 17 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060517 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{(197)}\) [Military | 19 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060617 | (S/NE) | ]
The gunmen were associates of AQI leaders who had been recruited into AQI by AMZ lieutenants in late 2004, leading to a personal meeting with AMZ in July 2005. Even so, he retained his autonomy and was able to conduct attacks at will without approval from a higher organization in contrast to regular AQI leaders in Samarra whose operational decisions were supervised by the shari’ah committee.199

Local Iraqi security forces personnel were also likely complicit in the bombing. A Sunni Turkoman commander of the interior ministry’s special commando Lion Brigade in Samarra, met with a guard for the Golden Mosque Facilities Protection Service. Both were scheduled to work the night of February 21 but they did not report for duty.200

Reactions to the Golden Mosque Bombing

Almost immediately after the bombing, Sunni mosques in Baghdad were attacked and a wave of killings swept Baghdad and other religiously mixed areas targeting primarily Sunnis. Because of the religiously homogenous nature of Anbar, there was little danger of immediate sectarian violence in the province, in contrast to the “mixed” provinces such as Baghdad. Indeed, the first reaction to the bombing in Anbar was a peaceful demonstration in the largely Shi’a town of Nasser wa Salaam to protest the destruction of the Golden Mosque.201 Even so, Nasser wa Salaam residents watched the sectarian violence unfolding across Iraq with concern for their own safety.202

In Fallujah, there was some tension between the largely Sunni police and the largely Shi’a Iraqi army soldiers, with the latter expressing anger and frustration over the destruction of one of the holiest Shi’a shrines.203 Nor was this unique to Fallujah, as many Shi’a soldiers and officers were furious over the destruction of the Golden Mosque.204

and his allies were extremely concerned by the outbreak of violence that followed the bombing of the Golden Mosque, fearing that Iraq was on the brink of civil war unless the government intervened to ease sectarian tensions.205 Issued a fatwa against Anbaris joining Yazid—an anti-Shi’a vigilante group named after the man who killed the Shi’a Imam Husayn—that sprang up in Baghdad in reaction to the sectarian violence. While not affiliated with AQI, Yazid sought to kill Shi’a imams and destroy Shi’a mosques for every Sunni imam or mosque harmed by Shi’a militias.206 shared Yazid’s concern about the protection of Sunni mosques against attacks by Shi’a militias, but he was more worried about the prospect of a full-scale civil war, believing that it would play into AMZ’s hands.207

199 Ibid. had served as the AQI amir for Samarra since the death of his brother in April 2005, being promoted to the position of amir for Salahaddin governorate in October 2005 as a Ramadan gift.
200 Ibid.
201 [ | Military | 060222 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060222 | (S/NE) | ]
202 [ | Military | 060226 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060226 | (S/NE) | ]
203 [ | Military | 060224 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060224 | (S/NE) | ]
204 [ | Military | 060226 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060226 | (S/NE) | ]
205 [ | Military | 060225 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060225 | (S/NE) | ]
Reactions among Sunnis in Anbar showed that ordinary citizens might be prone to conspiracy theories, but that they well understood the potential implications of the bombing. In Ramadi, residents were divided as to the identity of the perpetrators of the bombing. Many working class residents believed that the Coalition blew up the mosque to give the Iraqi government a pretext to kill Sunnis, while more educated residents believed it to be the result of a 

1.4b

1.4b
to divide Iraq, possibly as a prelude to invasion.206 In Zangora, the Albu Risha tribesmen set up their own security network to protect the village for possible attack by either Shi’a militias or hostile foreign powers.207

The general population of the Ramadi-Khalidiya corridor did not believe that a sectarian civil war was imminent, though the security situation in Baghdad and other "mixed" religious areas of Iraq was of concern to them. For these Anbaris, the absence of a functioning police and judicial system in western Ramadi was of far more immediate concern than the area’s small and largely unseen Shi’a population.208

In and around the Wahhabi hotbed of Zaidon, reactions to the Golden Mosque bombing were quite different. Shi’a were banned from attending prayers at several of the mosques and volunteers armed with wooden or metal sticks carried out patrols to attack any Shi’a they came across.209

In the aftermath of the Samarra bombing, Ambassador Khalilzad pressured Prime Minister Jafari to convene his advisory council on February 25. Jafari did so, drawing in leaders from the Tawafuq Front into his crisis management team. At the conclusion of the meeting, all attendees denounced sectarian violence and emphasized their determination to avoid civil war and establish a national unity government.210

AQI Exploits the Situation

was quite correct in his fears that AMZ would exploit the sectarian violence in Anbar for his own ends. On February 26, AQI assassinated Anbar Revolution Group leader former Lieutenant General Muhammad Sa’ab Manfi al-Rawi, putting an abrupt end to efforts to create a united anti-AQI force in the province.211 the director of propane distribution in Ramadi who moonlighted as a leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, was also murdered by AQI.212 With Anbaris now increasingly certain that either the Coalition or for the destruction of the Golden Mosque, AQI was able to persuade the Ramadi insurgent groups that Shi’a militias and the interior ministry were implementing collective retaliation against the entire Sunni population. The Ramadi insurgent groups reluctantly agreed with AQI, leading to the creation of the Joint Committee of the Jihad Platoons of Anbar

206 Ibid.
207 [ Military | 060226 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060226 | (S/NE) | ]
208 [ Military | 02 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060302 | (S/NE) | ]
209 [ Military | 05 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060305 | (S/NE) | ]
210 [ Military | 060227 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060227 | (S/NE) | ]
211 Ibid.
212 [ Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | (S/NE) | ]
Province. Supervised the first major sectarian retaliation in Anbar, overseeing the murder of twelve Shi'a merchants in the Tamim district of Ramadi on February 27.

The creation of Jihad Platoons of Anbar Province was a major blow to efforts to unite the SAR insurgents into an anti-AQI force. Even the leadership of his own 1920 Revolution Brigade overruled him, agreeing to join AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Muhammad, Islamic Resistance Movement, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Islamic Army of Iraq as a pan-Sunni reaction force under the leadership of AQI, which had already sent its own fighters to Baghdad in order to exact retribution against the Shi'a. This resulted in AQI and 1920 Revolution Brigade agreeing to temporarily set aside their differences in Ramadi.

As a result of the formation of the Jihad Platoons of Anbar Province and thanks to al-Wayir's unification efforts, the following senior insurgent leaders and their followers were successfully incorporated into the framework of the Mujahideen Shura Council:

- (b) the amir of the Islamic Army of Iraq in Qusaybah
- (b) the new leader of al-Asa'ab al-Alwal
- The anti-Shi'a nationalist Anwar al-Mujahideen group, which was made up of former military personnel from Fallujah, Karmah, and Abu Ghraib

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viewed by many residents as a sign that the outcome of the fighting was in doubt and created concern about the future of Coalition control in the area.\(^{221}\)

**Aqi Exploits Tribal Issues**

\(^{221}\) The resurgence of AQI after the bombing encouraged some members of the group to settle old scores with tribal rivals. For instance, Ramadi-based AQI fighters from the Albu Dhiab tribe led by\(^{(b)(6)}\) began killing Albu Shaban tribesmen who had sided with the Islamic Army of Iraq against AQI.\(^{222}\) In Baghdad, AQI murdered Sheikh Hamid Rashid Mahana al-Alwani, the acting head of the Albu Alwan tribe, in a false flag attack intended to attribute the killing to the Badr Brigades. AQI subsequently sent a letter to Governor Mamoun demanding that he resign and see to his Albu Alwan tribe, or he would also be killed.\(^{223}\)

\(^{(b)(6)}\) AQI was also able to make substantial inroads in Haditha through its spiritual leader\(^{(b)(6)}\) who brokered a series of successful negotiations with the leadership of the Albu Najim subtribe of the Jughayfi tribe. Under the terms of their agreement, the Albu Najim would provide logistical support to AQI and not report their activities to the Coalition in return for AQI agreeing to reimburse the tribesmen whose homes and vehicles had been destroyed during the fighting between the Jughayfis and AQI in the summer of 2005. Additionally, the agreement specified that the Albu Najim would be offered positions of power and influence in the new Islamic State of Iraq. Because the source of the Jughayfi rivalry with AQI lay in AQI stripping the tribe of the power and influence they had wielded in the Haditha area under Saddam Hussein, AQI was able to enlist their support to further infiltrate local government and police forces so that the group could maintain power and control in the Haditha area despite the increased Coalition presence.\(^{224}\)

**Successes Scored by the Coalition**

\(^{(b)(6)}\) Albu Nimr tribal leader Sheikh Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Inad Majil al-Kaud al-Nimrawi by contrast, pledged his continued support to the Coalition and the Iraqi police in the wake of the Golden Mosque bombing. While the Albu Nimr still wanted to deal with AQI on their own in order to satisfy \(\text{tha'r}\) obligations, their tribal leaders were involved in high-level provincial and national negotiations concerning security plans for Anbar as a whole.\(^{225}\)

\(^{(b)(6)}\) The Coalition also scored a major success against AQI in Karmah by capturing\(^{(b)(6)}\) who had successfully coopted or marginalized the Green Battalion, Islamic Army of Iraq, and 1920 Revolution Brigade groups in the city.\(^{226}\) second-in-command\(^{(b)(6)}\) was also captured, leaving\(^{(b)(6)}\) to assume command of

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\(^{221}\) [Military | 12 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060312 | (S/NE) ]
\(^{222}\) [Military | 01 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060301 | (S/NE) ]
\(^{223}\) [Military | 05 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060305 | (S/NE) ]
\(^{224}\) [Military | 02 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060302 | (S/NE) ]
\(^{225}\) [Military | 05 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060305 | (S/NE) ]
\(^{226}\) [Military | 02 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060302 | (S/NE) ]
AQI in the city.\textsuperscript{227} The Coalition made a number of significant captures in Ramadi including the leader of the al-Nu’man Brigade and dual AQI and Ansar al-Sunna commander\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} who had issued fatwas on behalf of both groups but fled to Baghdad during Operation SAYYAD II.\textsuperscript{228}

The Sunni Political Establishment Reacts to the Sectarian Violence

\textsuperscript{(S/NE)} By early March, the initial sectarian violence had shifted from retaliation by individuals to coordinated attacks by militias. The Shi’a Mahdi Army and Badr Corps were the two largest militias and Tawafuq Front leader\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} actively urged senior members of the Tawafuq Front, IIP, and AMS to work together to create an independent Sunni militia capable of defeating the threat posed by these two Shi’a groups. \textsuperscript{(b)(6)} wanted the militia to be under the command of former Iraqi military officers loyal to the Tawafuq Front and IIP and to deploy battalion-sized forces to the various governates where sectarian violence was occurring.\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} believed that rank-and-file members of the militia would be drawn from a cadre of smaller armed groups affiliated with Sunni political and religious elements (i.e. insurgents).\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{(S/NE)} To obtain the blessing of AMS for this plan,\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} had been in negotiations with AMS secretary-general Harith al-Dhari since the destruction of the Golden Mosque. Both\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} agreed that reprisal attacks against Sunni mosques had gone on virtually unchecked since the destruction of Golden Mosque, indicating to them that the UIA was providing tacit approval for the actions of the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps. If the Sunnis could not depend on the government to protect them,\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} argued, then they had to protect themselves.\textsuperscript{230}

City Stories: Post-Askari Bombing

Fallujah

\textsuperscript{(S/NE)} By March, the situation within most cities of Anbar showed the effects of two major developments: the mosque bombing and the increasing dominance by AQI of the insurgency. Fallujah, however, seemed to be one of the exceptions AQI maintained a significant presence in the cities and villages outside Fallujah, though it was unable to reestablish a solid foothold within the city itself. The assassinations of Sheikh Hamza and Sheikh Kamal had slowed but failed to stop political engagement, reconstruction, and the creation of Iraqi security forces, because AQI was unable to dominate the insurgency in Fallujah as they now did in Ramadi. While the assassination of Sheikh Hamza in particular had been a surprising blow to the Fallujah elite, active Coalition and State Department engagement efforts kept the political process alive in the city. After the assassination of Sheikh Kamal, several members of the Fallujah city council fled the country and the local press over-reacted in a panic. But by March 9, the Coalition and the State Department had persuaded the Fallujah city council to resume regular political engagement.\textsuperscript{231}
Karmah

(S/NF) On the other hand, events in Karmah clearly showed the effects of the growing sectarian violence. Many Sunnis displaced from the Shi'a majority provinces of southern Iraq this violence began gathering in tents around Karmah by mid-March. Sheikh Kamis Jasim Dewichat of the al-Kabir Mosque attempted to organize humanitarian efforts for them, but many of the Sunni males had been radicalized against the Shi'a as a result of the violence and as such were perfect fodder for AQI recruiting.232

Ramadi

(S/NF) Through its murder of six key members of the Anbar People's Committee, the provincial security committee, and the provincial council, AQI had neutralized the threat posed by the Anbar People's Committee, sending [b][b] into seclusion and leaving Governor Mamoun and his advisors increasingly isolated.233 Using murder and intimidation tactics,234 AQI became the dominant influence in key Ramadi neighborhoods and surrounding villages. While Ramadi residents were not as cowed by AQI as their Fallujah counterparts had been in 2004, the city's atmospherics had flattened to a neutral steady state as residents became passive in the face of AQI's aggressive intimidation. Many residents and the leadership of local insurgent groups such as the 1920 Revolution Brigade were angry and wanted to retaliate against AQI, but in every case they were outfought by AMZ, leaving them unable to unseat the group on their own.236

(S/NF) These successes enabled AQI to infiltrate the local and provincial government of Ramadi, assume control of black market activity in the city, and establish roots in the outlying tribal areas. Although the dominant AQI presence in Ramadi now represented the most significant threat to success of the Coalition, AQI did not present an obvious or simple target for direct action. The majority of AQI fighters in Ramadi were local Iraqis who easily blended into the general population and had become adept at avoiding targeting by Coalition and Iraqi security forces.237

(S/NF) AQI's infiltration of Anbar's provincial government was also thorough and included members of the command element of the police department. Even Governor Mamoun's secretary was an AQI informant, who regularly provided the group with detailed information about activities at the Government Center. AQI also exerted control over a large number of mosques, hospitals, schools, universities, local contractors, and businesses, often selling material stolen from Coalition and trade ministry convoys in order to finance operations. To counter

232 [ | Military | 16 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060316 | (S/NF) | ]
233 [ | Military | 09 Mar MNF-W INTSUM | 20060319 | (S/NF) | ]
234 [ | Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | (S/NF) | ] See e.g. AQI's murder of twenty Iraqi civilians from Jarayshi village north of Ramadi.
235 Ibid.
236 [ | Military | 09 Mar MNF-W INTSUM | 20060309 | (S/NF) | ]
237 [ | Military | 22 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060322 | (S/NF) | ]
popular resentment against their tactics, AQI and its allies posted flyers or went door-to-door to warn residents of impending attacks.  

(S) The Anbar ministries of finance and treasury attempted to conceal their corruption by avoiding contact with Coalition personnel. When confronted, officials with access to the dispersal of millions of dollars claimed that there were no records of how the money was allocated. No finance director-general or finance deputy director-general existed; the province instead relied on a treasurer, four deputy treasurers, and a provincial accountant. AQI financiers were able to extort funding from the provincial government, threatening department heads with death unless they paid money to AQI.

(S/NF) Efforts to oppose AQI in Ramadi were further complicated by a schism within 1920 Revolution Brigade between and his top lieutenant over the direction of the group in the light of the sectarian violence wanted to protect fellow Sunnis, while (S) saw this as a Zarqawi-generated distraction), as well as mutual accusations that operational funds had been misused. The resumed conflict between and AMZ had taken a severe toll on the group’s resources and many rank-and-file members now questioned policy of political engagement. These divisions led the leader of 1920 Revolution Brigade in the Tamim district in Ramadi, to turn his attention to drug smuggling and the arms trade as the fortunes of his group continued to fade.

(S) To demonstrate its anti-Shi’a credentials, AQI robbed and then murdered nine Shi’a men in the Sufia district of Ramadi. They had planned to kill the women who had been traveling with them as well but were deterred from doing so by members of the influential Albu Ghanam tribe. This incident, combined with AQI’s killing of a Habbaniyah resident who opposed sectarianism, resulted in the flight of Habbaniyah’s small Shi’a community for southern Iraq.

238 Ibid.
239 \[ Military | 24 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060524 | (S/NF) | ]
240 \[ Military | 13 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060313 | (S/NF) | ]
241 \[ Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | (S/NF) | ]
242 \[ Military | 16 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060316 | (S/NF) | ]
243 \[ Military | 19 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060319 | (S/NF) | ]
Haditha

(S/NE) AQI maintained a strong influence on Haditha through the direct presence of 700 fighters (only a handful of them foreign) and alliance with other insurgent groups that had joined the Jihad Platoons. By actively recruiting unemployed or disenfranchised Iraqis, AQI was able to keep its strength at a near-constant level in the city. Unemployed military-aged males in Haditha were seen as particularly attractive targets for AQI recruitment: many of them were disappointed by the results of the political process and fearful of Shi'a attack on their city.

(S/NE) AQI also expanded its operational control of Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha. According to the former Ansar al-Sunna amir of the South Karkh in Baghdad. This was due to the fact that AQI and Ansar al-Sunna had renewed negotiations for a merger between the two groups following the creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council. The example of who was simultaneously the amir of Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha as well as the AQI amir for Bani Dahir, Barwanah, and Haditha shows the extent of the ongoing integration of the two groups.

Bani Dahir and Dulab

(S) These two minor villages in the Hit-Haditha corridor show that the dispersion of AQI and other insurgents to the smallest villages, begun in 2005, continued throughout 2006. In Bani Dahir, AQI regularly replaced traditional imams with those loyal to AQI. A number of mosques in the town actively recruited fighters for AQI, with daily training and propaganda efforts being run out of the al-Sha'bani mosque.

(S/NE) In Dulab, AQI began gathering survivors who had fled Husaybah, Anah, Rawah, and Rutbah during Operation SAYYAD II and Operation WESTERN SHIELD, assembling them in groups of forty (Iraqi and foreign fighters together) in the Tamaniya, Mar'abia, al-Mabghra, Mashkuka, Sa'da, and Zikhikha subdivisions of the city. Many of the mid-level AQI leaders in Dulab had formerly been active in Samarra until they were displaced by Coalition operations, including also relocated from the southern end of Lake Thar Thar to Dulab. Implementing a draconian interpretation of *shari'ah* even by AQI standards, they began murdering any residents who did not support their cause, prompting many locals to flee to nearby Jubbah. More than sixty residents were reportedly kidnapped and murdered as part of a murder and intimidation campaign. As a result, AQI fighters openly walked the streets of Dulab, intimidating the population without retribution as they searched for those residents who were attempting to flee to Jubbah.

244 [Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | (S/NE) | ]
245 [Military | 16 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060316 | (S/NE) | ]
246 [Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | (S/NE) | ]
247 [Military | 20 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060320 | (S/NE) | ]
248 [Military | 19 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060319 | (S/NE) | ]
249 [Military | 30 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060330 | (S/NE) | ]
250 [Military | 26 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060326 | (S/NE) | ]
251 [Military | 7 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060307 | (S/NE) | ]
Baghdadi

(S) In Baghdadi, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members from the al-Ghariri tribe continued to target the Baghdadi police leadership through kidnappings. Victims were released after an initial interrogation and offered $200 per month to inform on the Baghdadi police, $1,000 for specific locations that could be used to target the Baghdadi police, and $100,000 for killing the police chief, his brother, or a high-ranking officer of comparable status. The Baghdadi police chief responded by sending a message to the al-Ghariri tribe threatening to kill any al-Ghariri tribesmen currently in his custody and the kidnappings soon ceased.252

Rutbah

(S) As a result of the subversion of the Jihad Platoons, AQI was able to re-establish itself as the dominant insurgent group in Rutbah. The 1920 Revolution Brigade, Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq were all active in the city, but AQI conducted a majority of attacks in Rutbah, coordinating with other groups and occasionally sharing the spoils gained through illicit activity. Through vehicle theft and other criminal activities, AQI was able to finance its operations in western Anbar from Rutbah and still have enough left to share spoils with other groups to ensure its peace and influence in the city. AQI members regularly traveled from Rutbah to Qusaybah and Hit.253

Snapshot of the Insurgency

(S/NF) By March 2006, AQI had managed to skillfully use the Samarra bombing to spread its influence even further. Even before the attack, AQI played a dominant role in the Anbar insurgency, but the creation of the Jihad Platoons allowed AQI to take control of many local 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Muhammad, Islamic Resistance Movement, Jaysh al-Mujahidin, and the Islamic Army of Iraq groups. Meanwhile the one remaining challenger to AQI dominance, Ansar al-Sunna, was slowly becoming integrated into AQI through joint operations, joint leadership, and negotiations. AQI leaders and rank-and-file members throughout Anbar believed that the organization was winning against the Coalition in the province. Despite the loss of numerous key leaders in December 2005 and January 2006, AQI believed that a steady drumbeat of continued attacks and images of dead American soldiers would serve to sway the American media and public opinion against the war in Iraq, forcing the Coalition to withdraw. As a result of these perceptions, the continued killing of American soldiers was made a top priority within AQI no matter what the cost to its own fighting cadre.254

(S/NF) AQI perceived that American policymakers and the general public cared more about the individual lives of their soldiers than AQI did about its own fighters, resulting in AQI's greater willingness to sacrifice its fighters who had joined the jihad to expel the Coalition from Iraq or die as
martyrs trying. This perception resulted in individual AQI fighters regarding the death of even one Coalition soldier as a personal victory, since every dead soldier was seen as another step towards the Coalition withdrawal from Iraq. In preparation for the Coalition withdrawal, foreign AQI fighters were encouraged to marry the sisters or daughters of their Iraqi counterparts. This was done both to facilitate their assimilation into Iraqi society and to serve protection against possible infiltration, as the foreign fighters’ wives reported back to their Iraqi relatives on their husband’s activities.

(S/NF) The AQI leadership was not concerned by the Ramadi-based insurgent groups now fighting against it, believing that they did so out of fear rather than out of genuine conviction. From the viewpoint of the AQI leadership, their organization had access to better weapons, resources, and fighters whose willingness to die for their cause gave the group an insurmountable advantage in inter-insurgent fighting against and his remaining followers. They were particularly encouraged by the emerging consensus among other insurgent leaders that AQI had become too powerful for anyone to stop.

AQI’s Post-Iraq Planning

(S/NF) Among the group’s leadership, post-withdrawal plans were already being made by late 2005. These plans included the creation of a totalitarian Islamist theocracy similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Once the Coalition left Iraq, the AQI leadership believed that they could easily seize control of most of the major cities and towns in Anbar and use them as a base for AQAM’s long-term war against the United States and its allies. Reflective of this global jihad worldview was the fact that propaganda distributed by the Mujahideen Shura Council began to show fighters in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq in their videos and flyers.

(S/NF) Even so, AQI leadership thought that it might take 7-10 years of fighting to conquer the whole of Iraq. AQI believed that this timeframe would be cut down considerably once the United States withdrew. They were convinced that it was only a matter of time before that event occurred. This was because AQI believed that the faith of its fighters and their reliance on Fourth Generation Warfare was superior to the Coalition reliance on technology. Looking beyond the war in Iraq, AQI argued that its continued attacks were draining Coalition resources, benefiting long-time American opponents such as . It was believed among the AQI leadership that while would benefit in the short-term from this weakening of American power, AQI would ultimately prevail, earning this strategy the nickname of “In compliance with this strategy, AQI cells were instructed to continue targeting American soldiers and to be willing to sacrifice as many fighters as necessary to do so.

International Connections to the Insurgency

255 A perennial fear of AMZ, see Chapter 5’s discussion of foreign fighters.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
259 260
Pages 38 through 39 redacted for the following reasons:
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1.4b
Foreign Fighters

For AQI, internationalizing the insurgency meant, above all else, the involvement of the larger Islamic community in the struggle. This made the group place an emphasis on foreign fighters that far outweighed the actual usefulness of these warriors. As a result of Operation SAYYAD II and Operation STEEL CURTAIN, smuggling foreign fighters into Anbar was now far more difficult with the loss of al-Qaim and the disruption of cross-border networks. Part of the reason for the AQI emphasis on the Hit-Haditha corridor was that AQI hoped to use it as a base from which to reassert influence over the western Euphrates River valley and then to recreate their networks through al-Qaim once again. In the meantime, AQI was forced to use ‘Ubaydi as their primary node for smuggling foreign fighters, a route which left much to be desired in terms of security and ease of transit.\(^{272}\)

AQI’s Renewed Assassination Campaign

Having dealt with the Anbar People's Committee, AQI now began attacking government officials. Among their first targets was Anbar provincial council chairman Qudayr ‘Abd-al-Jabber al-‘Abdali, whom they assassinated outside his home in the Mualimeen district of Ramadi. Within Anbari politics, Qudayr was known as a passive personality, a weak leader, and a poor manager who had been offered the position of deputy governor in 2005 following the assassination of his predecessor but declined to accept it due to personal security concerns. He was always deferential to Governor Mamoun, who had been his predecessor as provincial council chairman in 2004 and early 2005 and had chosen Qudayr to succeed him in order to prevent any significant opposition to his authority.\(^{273}\)

On the other hand, the AQI assassination of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Albu Faraj tribal leader Muhammad Turki Muslah was probably vengeance for his past support to the Anbar People's Committee. The death of Muhammad Turki deprived of one of his last viable lieutenants in the 1920 Revolution Brigade. With the ongoing schism in the 1920 Revolution Brigade, prospects for resurgence were now in doubt.\(^{274}\)
Anbari Security Forces

(U) Efforts towards reestablishing security throughout the province, as we have already seen, were complicated by problems in the Anbari security forces. To deal with the uneven situation in the police forces in particular, the new commander of MNC-I, LtGen Chiarelli, declared 2006 “The Year of the Police,” and began an Iraq-wide effort to establish an effective national police force.

(S/REL TO USA, MCFI) As part of this endeavor, Brigadier General Ghalib called on all Iraqi police to register with the government and return to duty by February 10. The call was heeded by 1,840 police and 700 were processed for future employment. In some cities, such as Khalidiyah, the police functioned well and were trusted by the residents to provide security.

(S/NF) Nevertheless, there were serious obstacles to security throughout Anbar, among them the fact that Iraqi police in the western part of the province had not been paid since November. By mid-March, the Iraqi interior ministry had still not provided salaries for 258 police officers who had been asked to take up their posts along the IRAQ. The issue of pay was a consistent source of friction between the Iraqi bureaucracy and individual units, being particularly troublesome in al-Qaim where there was a steady rise in the number of desertions due to the widespread perception that the Iraqi police and army in Baghdad stole or diverted funds away from Anbar for sectarian reasons. The ongoing AQI murder and intimidation campaign exacerbated the situation, though many units were able to remain cohesive and effective as a result of strong local leadership.

(S) The situation in the provincial police headquarters in Ramadi was far worse, perhaps explaining the poor condition of Anbari police in general. The provincial police chief General Sha'aban Muhammad Samir al-Janabi was unable to find any qualified candidates to assume leadership posts in the police force. As a result, leadership of the police force was overseen entirely by Sha'aban,

(b)(6)

(S/NF) Sha'aban's concerns about the lack of qualified candidates for leadership posts in the police force was justified, as a number of Ramadi police were already actively working with the insurgency.

(b)(6)

supplied the Mahdi Army with detailed information on police, army, and Coalition movements. In


275 | Military | 060208 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060208 | (S/NF) | |
276 | Military | 060209 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060209 | (S/NF) | |
277 | Military | 26 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060326 | (S/NF) | |
278 | Military | 060210 GRINTSUM – NOFORN | 20060210 | (S/NF) | |
279 | Military | 07 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060407 | (S/NF) | |
280 | Military | 17 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060317 | (S/NF) | |
nearby Zangora, the entire Iraqi Highway Patrol had been compromised by the insurgency and was actively working with AQI and the Islamic Army of Iraq.\(^{281}\)

\((S/NE)\) In many ways, the legacy of the tenure of Ramadi’s first post-OIF police chief, Ja’adan helps to explain the extent of the collusion between the Ramadi police department and the insurgency. Under Ja’adan, the Ramadi police had suffered a steady decline as a result of insurgent collaboration and corruption, which led eventually to complete collapse. The Coalition removed Ja’adan from his post and arrested him for involvement with the insurgency, but his legacy remained. During 2004, it was not uncommon for Ramadi police to use their vehicles to conduct pre-attack surveillance of Coalition positions and to plant IEDs. Much of the current Ramadi police force had served under Ja’adan at some point or another and as such a number of the officers continued to retain their insurgent associations.\(^{282}\)

\((S/NE)\) The situation in other cities was just as bad as in Ramadi. In Saqlawiyah, acting police chief Captain Ihab threatened to use his insurgent contacts to attack his own police station if he were removed by Sha’aban.\(^ {283}\) Police captain [identification] of the Jensiyah Office in Saqlawiyah provided Jensiyah (identification) cards to AQI fighters, using his relationship with a major in the internal investigations division of the Fallujah police to prevent his activities from attracting notice.\(^ {284}\)

\((S/NE)\) While much of the reporting during this period gives the impression of a corrupt and thoroughly infiltrated Iraqi police force, at least some of these claims were exaggerated, falsified, or used by their sources against rivals or superiors in an effort by individual police officers to gain personal advantage. There was a moderate degree of corruption and insurgent collusion among the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army, particularly in Fallujah, but the more spectacular claims were the result of continued friction and cultural hostility between the native police and the “foreign” Iraqi army that played out daily in different cities throughout the province.\(^ {285}\)

\((S)\) These suspicions about the army had some basis in fact. In Ramadi, 70% of the Shi’a soldiers either supported or identified with the Mahdi Army. Believing that the Iraqi government was unable to provide security in Baghdad, these soldiers saw the Mahdi Army as the only reason that Sadr City was safe. While they were prepared to defend Iraq against \( 1.4b \) they did not support any action against \( 1.4b \) which they saw as a friend of the Iraqi Shi’a. These sentiments were widely held by many Shi’a soldiers in the Iraqi army after the destruction of the Golden Mosque, though only a few actually advocated sectarian violence and most of the Iraqi soldiers maintained sound relationships in the communities in which they operated. Because many of these units stationed in

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281 [Military 24 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060324 (S/NE)] While Sha'aban seemed to take his role as chief of police in Anbar seriously, his ability to carry out these actions may have been complicated by his personal life. Reportedly, he was a claustrophobe who had been removed from his post in the Iraqi army pre-OIF after trying to force unwanted homosexual advances on a subordinate. Since becoming provincial police chief, he had reportedly maintained an active sex life with all of the male members of his personal security detail. [Military 16 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060516 (S/NE)]

282 [Military 26 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060326 (S/NE)]

283 [Military 20 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060320 (S/NE)]

284 [Military 06 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060406 (S/NE)]

285 See e.g. [Military 19 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060419 (S/NE)]
Anbar had access to satellite television and would be aware of any friction between the Iraqi government, the Mahdi Army, and the Coalition. It remained an open question as to whether these units would remain professional, head east to assist Sadr, or instigate local violence if fighting broke out between the Coalition and the Mahdi Army.\(^{286}\)

**Sectarian Violence Begins to Affect Anbar**

(S) Yet, until mid-March 2006, the sectarian violence now killing thousands of Sunnis and Shi’a across Iraq hardly affected Anbar. This period of relative quiet now ended. One of the first places to see a flare-up of sectarian violence was Fallujah, where comments by American officials that civil war would be an internal Iraqi problem stirred up alarm among residents, who feared the specter of Shi’a militias attacking their city. This led to open fighting between the largely Sunni police and the largely Shi’a army as many Fallujans supported the removal of the Iraqi army from their city.\(^{287}\)

(S/NF) These sectarian tensions were exacerbated by the views of the Fallujah city council members, many of whom were now convinced that controlled both the Baghdad police department and the Iraqi Interior Ministry. From their point of view, political pressure on the United States to hold formal talks with over Iraq were nothing more than a ruse to facilitate In discussions with the Coalition, the Council members charged that the predominantly Shi’a Iraqi army had coerced the Fallujah police into not going to work, with some claiming that the army was seeking to incite civil war.\(^{288}\)

(S) Meanwhile, sectarian violence in Baghdad and other religiously mixed areas of Iraq continued to impact Anbar. Forty Sunni families from southern Iraq sought refuge in Karmah, while thousands of Fallujah residents who had fled to Baghdad during Operation AL FAJR now returned to Fallujah and the surrounding area to escape the violence in the capital. To show Anbari Sunnis that they were not immune to the effects of the violence, Shi’a militants dumped the bodies of six Sunnis killed in Baghdad in Nasser wa Salaam.\(^{289}\)

(S) This act infuriated the Sunni population, and flyers and fatwas were circulated from Zaidon justifying immediate retaliation against every Shi’a in Anbar. Fearing Sunni vengeance, Shi’a living in small hamlets north of Nasser wa Salaam began fleeing to the southern outskirts of Baghdad.\(^{290}\)

(S/NF) The result of the sectarian violence and subsequent internal refugees was that some Ramadi and Fallujah residents began to change their opinions from a prior suspicion of strangers, to a more welcoming attitude toward their co-religionists in a sign of Sunni solidarity. While many Anbaris now regarded the Coalition as a buffer between the Sunni community and the Mahdi Army, they unfortunately viewed AQI as another possible source of protection. For the majority of Anbaris,
and the Iraqi Shi'a were becoming the immediate threats to their safety. AQI exploited these events as an opportunity to present itself as "protector of the Sunni faithful."\(^{291}\)

The Attempt on Sheikh Khamis

\(\text{(S)}\) In the midst of these developments, on March 26, an assassination attempt was mounted against the home of Sheikh Khamis al-Issawi, only to be repelled by Sheikh Khamis's well-armed bodyguards. As noted in Chapter 5b, in addition to being the leader of the Albu Issa tribe Sheikh Khamis was also a supporter of the Coalition who had attempted to prevent the Albu Issa from participating in the insurgency. While the assassination attempt was carried out by AMZ's lieutenant it was planned and approved by a number of senior insurgent figures including AMZ, Harith al-Dhari, and Jaysh Muhammad leaders who blamed Sheikh Khamis for the capture of their leader.\(^{102}\)

\(\text{(S/NF)}\) It was AQI's creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council of Fallujah, by facilitating inter-insurgent cooperation, which made the assassination attempt on Sheikh Khamis possible. A smaller variant of AQI's national Mujahideen Shura Council, the Mujahideen Shura Council of Fallujah was presented by AQI as a successor to the 2004 Fallujah Mujahideen Shura that would help unite the diverse insurgent groups in the city under AQI's auspices. AQI convinced part of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the Khalifa al-Islamiya Group, and the Wa’id al-Haqiq to join its new umbrella organization. However, unlike in Ramadi or Haditha, where AQI had achieved near-complete dominance over local insurgent groups, the environment in Fallujah was still competitive, with many local groups unwilling to surrender influence or control to AQI.\(^{293}\)

Tribal Warfare and the Insurgency

\(\text{(S)}\) There was one other element of Anbar that AQI could not completely control: the tribal situation. In al-Qaim the rise of Quwwat Albu Mahal showed that the Albu-Mahal did not accept their earlier defeat by AQI. At first led by and recruited from Albu Mahal tribesmen, Quwat Albu Mahal was made up of disaffected members of the Hamza Battalion who wanted to reestablish Albu Mahal tribal dominance from Husaybah to Akashat. A former high-ranking member of al-Theeb who had opposed the Coalition since 2003, lost most of his power and influence when AQI drove the Albu Mahal from Husaybah.\(^{294}\)

\(\text{(S/NF)}\) By early April the Quwwat Albu Mahal had once again named itself the Hamza Battalion. Armed with RPGs, PKCs, AK-47s, and pistols that they carried openly when the Coalition was not present, the Hamza Battalion used false identification to gain passage through Iraqi army checkpoints. Their objective was to target the Salmani tribe, whom they regarded as responsible for the influx of AQI into the city the previous year.\(^{295}\)

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291\[Military|16 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM|20060416|(S/NF)|\]
292\[Military|29 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM|20060329|(S/NF)|\]
293\[Military|09 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM|20060409|(S/NF)|\]
294\[Military|12 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM|20060312|(S/NF)|\]
295\[Military|11 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM|20060411|(S/NF)|\]
The Hamza Battalion's actions were not entirely the result of paranoia or misguided vengeance, was directing the transportation of AQI propaganda from his base of operations in and into the Nissan 7 neighborhood of the Salmani area of al-Qaim in the hopes of rebuilding support for AQI in the city. The Hamza Battalion captured and executed anyone caught distributing the AQI propaganda, Badran Turkī's second-in-command among them.296

As we have seen, AQI urgently desired to increase operations in the al-Qaim area. This resulted in a revived targeting of the Albu Mahal tribesmen, beginning with the murder of Sheikh Habib al-Jashami in Ramana by AQI amir Targeting former Hamza Battalion members, Desert Protectors, and Iraqi soldiers, AQI initiated a preparatory operation designed to build their combat power in western Anbar as part of an effort to challenge Coalition presence in the western Euphrates River valley.297 The Albu Mahal and Albu Jughayfī tribes responded in kind, killing twelve Saudi and Yemeni AQI fighters as they attempted to enter Iraq through

who also sought revenge against AQI, decided now to play the tribal card as well. In mid-March he sent representatives of the 1920 Revolution Brigade to the Albu Dhiab tribe to negotiate their support in fighting AQI. Under the agreement, 1920 Revolution Brigade and Albu Dhiab tribesmen would form a militia around the Albu Dhiab tribal lands. Despite these efforts, the Albu Dhiab tribal lands continued to be frequented by AQI members and leaders. The problem was that a number of Albu Dhiab tribal leaders supported AQI, while others were subjected to an intense murder and intimidation campaign. As a result, could only count on the support of the most non-conformist Albu Dhiab tribesmen in his fight against AQI.299

AQI's response to outreach to the Albu Dhiab tribesmen was to have local commander Nassir Ali Awad Shahid and four fighters murder the sheikh of the Albu Dhiab's Shabanai subtribe, Ali Awad Shahid. Shahid had preached against terrorism and urged his tribesmen to register for the Ramadi police and cooperate with the Coalition.300

Meanwhile, AMS and the Tawafuq Front continued to work with the 1920 Revolution Brigade under the direction of AMS Secretary-General Harith al-Dhari to form a Sunni militia capable of protecting mosques in Baghdad and Abu Ghraib as well as to take revenge on Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army for their role in the sectarian violence. In Anbar, this effort was headed up by Harith's relative and 1920 Revolution Brigade leader Sheikh Hussein al-Zobai, who hoped to unite elements of the Zobai tribe in Zaidon, Amariyah, and northern Babil with 1920 Revolution Brigade to form the core of the Sunni militia. These discussions with the Zobai, unlike with the Albu Dhiab, did not include any major action against AQI.301
Progress in Karmah

(S) The tribal and sectarian issues came together in Karmah to create some progress toward a resolution of the violence in that city. On March 8 concerns over the sectarian violence led representatives from the leadership of the Albu Issa, al-Jumayli, and Albu Khalifa tribes to meet to discuss supporting the local police in Karmah in order to achieve better security conditions now that Sunni internal refugees from Baghdad and other parts of the country were resettling there. Prior to this, the tribes had regarded the police as weak and incapable of defending themselves against the insurgency, making them hesitant to support the institution. As the flow of internal refugees increased and the police became more robust, the tribal leaders changed their views and became more willing to discuss supporting the expansion of the police into areas of Karmah not protected by Coalition patrols.302

(S) The tribesmen may also have been encouraged to support the police by the capture of the Albu Hyatt and the disruption of his network. Since these events, the security situation in Karmah had improved dramatically. The Green Battalion, which by this point had either been dismantled or merged into AQI, was forced to relocate to the area north of Fallujah, while the 1920 Revolution Brigade in the city was heavily weakened from insurgent infighting with AQI. Those small groups of foreign and Iraqi AQI fighters that remained were regularly captured or killed by Coalition forces. AQI's weakness in Karmah would lead to a renewed power struggle for control of the insurgency in the city between followers of AMZ and 303 These divisions would continue until 304 was able to reunite the divided Karmah insurgents in an effort to carry out vengeance against the Coalition for capturing 04 AQI Attempts to Re-Establish Influence in Western Anbar

(S/NF) By March, AQI was ready to redress its loss of influence in the al-Qaim-Haditha corridor. From its foothold in the village of Albu Hyatt, AQI infiltrated Barwanah and exploited the absence of permanent Coalition forces to mount an extensive propaganda, murder, and intimidation campaign.305 This campaign, combined with effective propaganda efforts, began to pay off.306 By the end of March, the Barwanah city council dissolved itself and the councils in Haqlaniyah and Haditha followed suit soon afterwards.307 The Hit police force also disbanded at about the same time.308

(S/NF) With the city council disbanded, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna implemented a draconian murder and intimidation campaign in Haditha, carrying out beheadings and cutting off the hands and feet of suspected collaborators. These acts had been prevalent in the city prior to Operation STEEL CURTAIN, and AQI had maintained a network of spies following the Coalition operation to monitor any Iraqi who violated shari’ah or cooperated with the Coalition. The group now sought to

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302 [ | Military | 06 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060406 | (S/NF) | ]
303 Ibid.
304 [ | Military | 11 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060411 | (S/NF) | ]
305 [ | Military | 03 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060403 | (S/NF) | ]
306 [ | Military | 2 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060402 | (S/NF) | ]
307 Ibid; [ | Military | 11 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060411 | (S/NF) | ]
308 [ | Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | (S/NF) | ]

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carry out retribution. While the presence of Coalition units in Haditha prevented the creation of a large AQI presence in the urban area, the city was still subjected to a regular series of attacks and intimidation actions such as the implementation of *hadd* punishments.\(^{309}\)

(S) With the collapse of city government in these cities, AQI now formed the associate group al-Shari’ah al-Diniya in al-Jabib east of Husaybah under the leadership of the\(^{1.4b}\) The group was primarily focused on building VBIEDs for use in attacks in Baghdad and Bayji, its explosives experts having attended\(^{1.4b}\) They were ordered by the AQI leadership to limit their attacks on the Iraqi security forces to no more than once every two weeks in order to create a false sense of security and lessen the likelihood of retaliation.\(^{310}\)

(S) Everything did not go as AQI wished, and in fact the group faced a new problem in western Anbar: fresh tension between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna due to the desertion of AQI leader\(^{1.4b}\) and more than 150 fighters to Ansar al-Sunna. Formerly a senior lieutenant to AQI leader\(^{1.4b}\) a former Iraqi special forces commando who had assumed command of many of AQI amir forces in Haditha following his detention,\(^{1.4b}\) had declined a seat on the Mujahideen Shura Council and his defection was a blow to overall AQI efforts to maintain dominance in western Anbar.\(^{1.4b}\) operatives in Baghdad, Haditha, and Rutbah made up more than half of\(^{1.4b}\) entire force.\(^{311}\) The defection may have been prompted by a disagreement with AMZ’s policies, since\(^{1.4b}\) would later rejoin AQI after AMZ’s death.

**AQI Dominance in Ramadi Continues**

(S) There were no such difficulties in Ramadi. Having brought the other Ramadi insurgent groups to its side, AQI and its allies were able to regularly conduct IED, SAF, and IDF attacks against Coalition and Iraqi patrols and bases. Increasingly, the group was able to orchestrate complex attacks against key targets such as the Government Center and Observation Post Horea. Many of\(^{1.4b}\) AQI fighters lived in safe houses in the Albu Dhiab, Ghazwan, and Julaybah farming communities outside the city, skirting Coalition entry control points by using side roads through the Sufia and 2nd Officer districts.\(^{312}\)

(S/NE) The al-Hajj Mosque in the Qatana district served as AQI’s primary command and control node during its attacks on the Government center. From the al-Hajj Mosque,\(^{1.4b}\) were able to oversee attacks and issue coded orders by playing cassettes containing select portions from the Qu’ran from the mosque loudspeakers.\(^{313}\)

(S) Typical AQI fighters active in Ramadi during this period were armed with AK-47 7.62mm rifles, 57-122mm rockets, and a wide range of IEDs that were regularly used in stand-off attacks, ambushes, and as a cover for retreats. Most of the attacks conducted by AQI targeted the Coalition

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\(^{309}\) [Military | 14 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060414 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{310}\) [Military | 07 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060407 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{311}\) [Military | 23 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060323 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{312}\) [Military | 09 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060408 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{313}\) [Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | (S/NE) | ]
in the center of Ramadi as well as the Tamim and Malaab districts, though Iraqi security forces were also regularly targeted. AQI planning for complex attack and ambushes was often highly detailed, involving the use of sand tables, written operational orders, and precision timing. The overwhelming majority of AQI fighters active in Ramadi were Iraqi nationals who were familiar with the urban terrain and whose sophisticated attacks took full advantage of constricted lines of sight, covered support-by-fire positions, pre-registered IDF, and the occasional use of synchronized SVBIEDs to achieve initial surprise against hardened positions. At any given time, AQI was able to mass up to 150 fighters, drivers, mortarmen, spotters, and scouts, with most major attacks involving up to thirty fighters against 3-4 separate targets.\(^{314}\)

(S/NE) By April 2006, AQI had expanded their organization's involvement in the Ramadi black market to the point where the group was not only supported by organized crime but had in effect become the center of Ramadi organized crime. The group directly controlled a wide range of criminal operations in Ramadi including vehicle theft, extortion, robbery, and black market gas sales.\(^{315}\) This control helped AQI to be financially self-sufficient and to profit from vehicle theft, blackmail, extortion, robbery, and kidnapping, using the proceeds to cover day-to-day operations and provide regular salaries to members. Local criminal gangs loyal to AQI successfully extorted money from contractors to support their illicit ventures. International facilitators provided AQI with recruiting incentive funds as well as the necessary money to buy off or coerce elements of other insurgent groups into joining it. AQI maintained an extremely tight grip on the population of Ramadi, employing sophisticated intimidation tactics while taking into account local sensitivities by reducing attacks on civilians not directly associated with the Coalition.\(^{316}\)

(S) With the Ramadi self-sufficiency model in mind, AQI instituted a three-pronged local funding strategy to limit the need for international support:\(^{317}\)

1. Exploit the Coalition's civil-military reconstruction contracts by gathering information on reconstruction or economic development initiatives to gauge which Iraqi contractors are most likely to win Coalition contracts. The contractors were then targeted for infiltration, extortion, or co-opting to force them to contribute a part of their profits to AQI.
2. Extort money from local government officials or tribal leaders with access to government funding through kidnapping and protection rackets. Kidnapping targets were not limited to the affluent, but the Ramadi elite was a favored target due to their greater access to government funding and their personal wealth.
3. Vehicle theft allowed AQI to turn a 100% profit on the Ramadi black market. This was the least preferred of the three options because vehicle theft was manpower intensive and exposed AQI fighters to Coalition attack.

(S/NE) Each district of the city was put under the command of a different amir. For instance in the Albu Dhiab area, AQI amir \(\text{(b)(6)}\) controlled propane deliveries in the area, only

\(^{314}\) [Military 09 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060409 (S/NE)]
\(^{315}\) [Military 04 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060404 (S/NE)]
\(^{316}\) [Military 09 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060409 (S/NE)]
\(^{317}\) All material is taken from [Military 14 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060414 (S/NE)]

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allowing AQI supporters and their families to receive the fuel. Because most Iraqi families relied on propane to cook their meals, this was effectively a means of starving the opposition into submission. Setting up a network of secret police made up entirely of formerly Ba'athist teenagers, authorized them to engage in violent crime against anyone suspected of betraying AQI.318

(AQI) still used the Ramadi General Hospital in the Warar district as its primary command post, with secondary command nodes set up at the Women and Children's Hospital and a number of electronic shops.319 AQI members regularly extorted several members of Governor Mamoun's staff, forcing them to award preferential contracts to their and his al-Mutaqin construction company that could then be used to support the insurgency.320

of slain AMZ lieutenant Thamir Mubarak Atrouz and failed suicide bomber served as the head of AQI in the 5 Kilo district.320

AQI's expansion in Ramadi attracted international notice in the form of an emissary from AQAM to the Mujahideen Shura Council who also acted as a mufti. Visiting the Albu Jabr area of Ramadi, he was so impressed by AQI's progress in the city that he issued a fatwa in support of their activities. While AQI in Ramadi had already received similar religious sanction for their criminal activity from their local spiritual leaders in fatwas that authorized them to steal money paid to contractors by the Coalition and the Iraqi government, was far more well-known and as such his opinion carried much more weight. While these fatwas did not create significant traction among Ramadi residents, they were used by criminal gangs loyal to AQI to justify their activities.321

AQI's dominance in Ramadi had an unexpected side-effect. Sajil Forces leader and Yarmuk Brigade leader quickly came to the conclusion that if the Coalition didn't kill them, then AQI would. The two fled Ramadi soon afterwards, further depleting pool of potential allies in the city.322

The Coalition scored a success in the propaganda war with the capture of along with Associated Press correspondent and AQI propagandist had been one of AQI's spiritual leaders, issuing fatwas authorizing anti-Coalition and criminal activities. In addition, he was the head of AQI propaganda in Ramadi, producing high-quality media to support AQI. served much the same role and an analysis of his laptop, thumb drive, and over sixty CDs and DVDs revealed extensive footage of anti-Coalition attacks, including videos taken alongside insurgents during attacks.323

Despite their dominance in Ramadi, there was little enthusiasm among Ramadi residents for AQI. The increase in criminality that AQI brought to the town, along with their usual murder and
intimidation campaigns, meant that AQI was feared rather than loved. Many AQI fighters were aware that they had lost the support of Ramadi residents, but did not believe that this was necessary for their domination of the city. They appear to have believed that they would prevail in the city because they were superior to other insurgent groups, and then could win back the support of the citizens.324

AQI Attempts to Regroup in Karmah

(S) With these successes, AQI now decided to regenerate its operations in Karmah. The new drive in Karmah was under the leadership of a Salafist member of Jaysh al-Mujahideen who was one of the group's top commanders. Amassing a significant number of Iraqi and foreign fighters, AQI and Jaysh al-Mujahideen carried out a large, coordinated attack against Coalition positions in Karmah on April 8. The main attack was directed against the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Observation Post #3, with some insurgents forming blocking positions throughout Karmah while others positioned VBIEDs. A third group formed another assault element that burned tires on the road to prevent the Coalition from passing. In another action, AQI leader was able to plan and execute a complex attack with his Jaysh al-Mujahideen allies that included a major attack on the Iraqi army position in western Karmah, an ambush on 20th Street that served as the most likely route of Coalition reinforcements, diversionary IDF and sniper attacks, and a feint operation intended to draw Coalition forces into a complex ambush north of the Karmah police station.325

(S) The successful Coalition defense of Karmah with the assistance of the Iraqi army was a significant tactical victory against AQI and Jaysh al-Mujahideen, which were unable to defeat the 1st Battalion, 4th Brigade of the 1st Iraqi Army Division despite mounting the largest insurgent attack in Karmah since June 2004. Of the roughly 100 AQI and Jaysh al-Mujahideen fighters that took part in the attack, twenty-three were killed, two were wounded, and six were captured, while the Coalition suffered one dead and the Iraqi army suffered five dead and five wounded.326 The Coalition success in Karmah was based on the Coalition's tactical superiority at the small unit level. Air and artillery strikes played no role in the Coalition success although the entire Coalition and Iraqi army forces in Karmah outnumbered the insurgents 280 to 100.

Further Subordination of the Islamic Army of Iraq

(S/NF) Despite this victory, the advance of AQI in the province was not halted. By late April 2006, the Islamic Army of Iraq in Anbar had been almost completely broken by AQI, with its local and regional leaders in the province receiving orders from the Mujahideen Shura Council. While the national leadership of the Islamic Army of Iraq had originally rejected participation in the Mujahideen Shura Council, its provincial leadership in Anbar was far less discriminating. Sheikh Fahd Majid al-Kurdi, the imam of the Mu'adh bin Jabal mosque in the Tamim district of Ramadi

324 [ | Military | 31 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060331 | (S/NF) | ]
325 [ | Military | 21 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060421 | (S/NF) | ]
326 Ibid.
and head of the Islamic Army of Iraq in Anbar, agreed to become a member of the Mujahideen Shura Council.\[327\]

\((S/NF)\) Despite his break with the Islamic Army of Iraq leadership, Sheikh Fahd continued receiving large amounts of money from the group’s primary patron, via of AMS secretary-general Harith al-Dhari, was willing to finance any group that would carry out attacks on the Coalition. While role in the insurgency had taken on a more political role during trips to the Middle East and Europe to rally support for AMS, he continued to serve as an active financier and facilitator for the insurgency.\[328\]

**AQI Perceptions of Western Anbar**

\((S)\) A rare glimpse into the AQI leadership’s decision-making in Anbar can be seen in a message from the shura majlis to a senior commander identified only by the kunya of In it, the shura majlis makes the following points:  

- Sunnis were never to be killed, especially not in a brutal fashion, unless they were known to have collaborated with the Coalition or the Iraqi government.
- Sunni civilians were not to be targeted for killing, only collaborators, soldiers, or police. If they were targeted for killing, it was better if it was carried out discreetly rather than in a public venue.
- Negotiations were to be held with tribal leaders cooperating with the government before they were targeted for assassination. If they agreed to cease cooperating with the government following these negotiations, they were to be left alone.
- Albu Nimr tribe had to be targeted in Hit, preferably discreetly, though the AQI leadership did authorize the use of “missiles” against them.
- AQI activity in Rawah and al-Qaim were currently at unacceptably low levels.

\((S)\) The letter to Abu Usama illustrated the AQI leadership’s shift to a less public murder and intimidation campaign now that it was the dominant insurgent group in Anbar. The leadership’s disapproval of the low level of activity in Rawah and al-Qaim indicated its likely awareness of the popularity enjoyed by anti-AQI mayor Farhan Takan Farhan. While Mayor Farhan was too powerful for AQI to attack directly in al-Qaim, the same was not true for many of his Albu Mahal tribesmen.\[330\]

\((S/NF)\) This shift away from a public murder and intimidation campaign by the AQI leadership may have been due in part to pressure on AMZ from AQSL. On March 30, AMZ reportedly left Iraq and went to The purpose of AMZ’s

\[327\] [ | Military | 19 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060419 | (S/NF) | ]
\[328\] Ibid.
\[329\] [ | Military | 2 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060402 | (S/NF) | ]
\[330\] Ibid.
trip to was to meet with a member of AQI, who demanded that AMZ speak with him face-to-face to learn why he had initiated sectarian warfare in Iraq despite explicit orders to the contrary from Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. A personal emissary of AQI, also met with AMZ, ordering him to stop recruiting new members for AQI online without a proper background check. In AMZ’s absence, AQI was put under the command of the head of the Mujahideen Shura Council, and a man who would soon play a much larger role in AQI.

AQI and Bayji Oil Smuggling

Zarqawi’s continued defiance of al Qaeda leadership was fueled, in part, by the financial self-sufficiency. As we have seen, AQI was benefiting from their relationship with two of the four oil companies licensed to transport oil across the border into By the end of March reports indicated AQI had begun working with Jaysh al-Mujahideen, its associate group al-Fursan Brigade, and criminal elements in Bayji to profit even further from oil smuggling, producing as much as $50,000 a week for the group in revenue. Inadequate law enforcement and high-level corruption throughout the Ministry of Oil and the North Oil Company created conditions that AQI was able to exploit. Smuggling 10-100 tanker trucks each week from Bayji to other regions of Iraq and neighboring states such that AQI was able to sell oil on the black market or to foreign buyers at more than three times the Iraqi government-subsidized price.

By the end of April, AQI was acquiring fuel for resale on the Ramadi black market directly from the state-owned refinery in Bayji using official government requisition forms and manifests. AQI supporters trucked the oil to Ramadi then drove the empty trucks back to Bayji and extorted or bribed officials into refueling them. Their oil trucks then returned to Bayji with the same manifest for safe passage. AQI continued to reuse manifests until the next authorized allotments of fuel was made, at which time it received new manifests as they were issued.

AQI’s operation was made possible by Anbar’s acting director-general for oil distribution who worked for Formerly the manager of the Ramadi distribution terminal, had originally acquired fuel for AQI to resell on the black market in return for a share of the profit. apparently dissatisfied with this relationship, kidnapped son, releasing him ten days later after receiving $50,000 in weapons and vehicles. Under the terms of his his agreed to provide AQI with official requisition forms, giving the group access to a source of funds that enabled it to expand its activity in Anbar.

Later reports indicated estimated AQI’s monopoly on black market fuel sales in Ramadi provided the group with $500,000 a month from the sale of benzene alone. When combined with the full

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331 [Military | 12 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060412 | (S/NF) | ]
332 [Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | (S/NF) | ]
333 [Military | 12 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060412 | (S/NF) | ]
334 [Military | 2 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060402 | (S/NF) | ]
335 [Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | (S/NF) | ]
336 Ibid.
spectrum of AQI's other criminal activity (extortion, kidnapping, and hijacking), the group's total monthly income amounted to several million dollars, more than enough to cover its operating costs several times over. As a result, excess capital was divided up with the rest of AQI or invested in legitimate real estate or small business ventures in Ramadi that enabled AQI to make significant inroads into the provincial economy.337

(S/NF) remaining followers from the Albu Fahd tribe did not accept the situation in Ramadi. The tribe carried out sporadic resistance against AQI in the city and its outskirts, driving them out of Albu Bali village.338 This action set off another round of tribal warfare between AQI and the Albu Fahd, leading to the AQI assassination of IIP activist and Anbar University student Ibrahim Faisal Antar al-Fahdawi. The Albu Fahd responded by killing an AQI fighter named Majid, prompting an aggressive AQI patrol in the Sijaria and Julaybah tribal areas east of Ramadi in an effort to locate the killer. The patrol was led by a AQI fighter who told residents that Shi'a agents had killed Majid in preparation for an attack on Ramadi and that AQI was now their only protection.339

City Stories

Hit

(S/NF) To strengthen their presence in Hit, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna began recruiting from the more than 800 unemployed Iraqi police in Hit that were disbanded in early April, offering to pay their salaries and help support their families. More than one hundred former police accepted their offer and AQI made good on their promise to the unemployed men by paying them in money gained through black market sales to finance their operations.340 Those recruits who accepted AQI’s offer were sent to Wadi al-Maut (“Death Valley”) in the Jabab area east of ‘Ubaydi for training. If they showed promise, they were sent to for more advanced terrorist training.341

Haditha

(S) Throughout the Haditha area, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna continued their brutal murder and intimidation campaign. This campaign was largely successful and attempts to re-form the local police or municipal government were completely stalled. While the national Ansar al-Sunna leadership still refused to join the Mujahideen Shura Council, in Haditha AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders had all but integrated their efforts and organizations.342

(S) was the AQI amir for the Haditha area, having been promoted to replace following Operation SAYYAD II. In this role, oversaw all financing and operational orders that affected AQI in the Haditha area, maintaining

337 | Military | 20 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060420 | (S/NF) |
338 | Military | 21 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060421 | (S/NF) |
339 | Military | 24 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060424 | (S/NF) |
340 | Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | (S/NF) |
341 | Military | 25 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060425 | (S/NF) |
342 | Military | 04 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060504 | (S/NF) |
AQI’s murder and intimidation using a network of spies. Most of AQI’s recruiting was overseen by a group of Wahhabi preachers who received funding from 1.4b 343 

(S) The Haditha police were now based in Ash Sharqat under the command of 1.4b 343 who wanted to return to Haditha and reestablish the police force there with the support of the Coalition and the Iraqi army. The Albu Hyatt-based AQI leadership met with 1.4b and offered to stop attacking his tribe if he agreed to disband the police force, but he refused. 344

Anah

(S/NF) As in Hit and Haditha, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna pooled their efforts in and around Anah, undermining security in the city through a murder and intimidation campaign. The remnants of Saraya al-Jihad were also active in Anah, calling for a boycott of 1.4b goods in the city. 345

Rawah

(S/NF) Former Iraqi colonel, Ba’athist, and Jerusalem Army member succeeded as the leader of AQI in Rawah. Prior to OIF, had commanded the 2nd Regiment of the Ghaza Brigade in Haditha under Saddam Hussein, but he had fled following Saddam’s overthrow only to return as an insurgent in 2004. He had served as a deputy to prior to his capture in early 2005 (see Chapter 5a) and now commanded 50-60 fighters in the city. 346

Dulab and Albu Hyatt

(S/NF) A significant number of Iraqi and foreign AQI fighters flowed in and out of the Dulab area to avoid detection by the Coalition. Much of AQI’s Anbar leadership based itself in the Dulab and Albu Hyatt areas north of Hit and south of Haditha. The Dulab area in particular provided quick access into the major cities along the Euphrates River as well as an easy escape into the desert to avoid Coalition operations. 347

Baghdadi

(S/NF) AQI began to reassert its authority in Baghdad first by sabotaging the water treatment plant on April 10, leaving the town without water, and later by murdering fifteen civilians outside the Baghdad Municipal Building. AQI’s renewed activity in Baghdad was a result of the efforts of its local associate group al-Asa’ab al-Asham led by 1.4b This group had been specifically created by AQI to target the Baghdad police and was supported financially by Brigadier General Sutayir Muhammad Su’ud al-‘Ubaydi, who registered the group’s

343 [ | Military | 20 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060420 | (S/NF) | ]
344 [ | Military | 07 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060507 | (S/NF) | ]
345 [ | Military | 02 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060502 | (S/NF) | ]
346 [ | Military | 08 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060508 | (S/NF) | ]
347 [ | Military | 01 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060501 | (S/NF) | ]
members as personnel in the "Baghdadi Electricity Police." Among al-Asa'ab al-Sham's more infamous activities were posing as police recruiters and convincing a group of fourteen Baghdadi residents to sign up with promises of training and signing bonuses. They then proceeded to interrogate the would-be recruits before executing them outside the Baghdadi Municipal Building.\textsuperscript{348}

**Kubaysah**

(S/NF) In the nearby town of Kubaysah, AQI also attempted to reassert their presence by killing assistant Kubaysah district director \textsuperscript{349} AQI leader \textsuperscript{350} had earlier attempted to assassinate the Kubaysah mayor, but residents fought back, killing four AQI fighters and injuring Aqada. Kubaysah resident \textsuperscript{351} took \textsuperscript{352} to his home and contacted the Baghdadi police to have him arrested, but AQI fighters set up checkpoints around Kubaysah to keep the police from entering the city.\textsuperscript{353}

**Akashat**

(S) A force of sixty Desert Protectors provided security against AQI in Akashat, augmented by thirty police officers from al-Qaim under the command of . The Akashat police would normally have been funded by the Rutbah police district, but since Rutbah had no police force there were no funds available for Akashat.\textsuperscript{354}

**Rutbah**

(S) On March 31, the Rutbah city council held their first meeting since the release of self-declared "city leader of Rutbah" who had been arrested by the Coalition for attempting to solicit a copy of the BOLO ("Be On the Look-Out") list from an Iraqi soldier. During the meeting, offered to help the Coalition apprehend insurgents, a remarkable and disingenuous about-face given that was tied to both the insurgency and to organized crime in Rutbah and used extortion and blackmail to control the city council.\textsuperscript{355}

(S) AMZ believed that there was an increase in Coalition efforts to disrupt the insurgency in Rutbah and dispatched a courier to AQI members in the city to increase their activities. Rutbah resident served as AQI's primary courier in Rutbah, traveling to al-Qaim to receive messages from AMZ from another AQI courier who received messages from another AQI courier from an unknown location.\textsuperscript{356}

**Snapshot of the Insurgency**

348 [Military] 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | (S/NF) |
349 [Military] 21 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060421 | (S/NF) |
350 [Military] 16 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060516 | (S/NF) |
351 [Military] 01 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060501 | (S/NF) |
352 [Military] 31 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060331 | (S/NF) |
353 [Military] 11 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060511 | (S/NF) |
By April, AQI had managed to regain much of the ground it had lost during the operations of the previous year. Networks that had been disrupted were rebuilt, intimidation and murder campaigns were begun anew, and residents of the towns of western Anbar who had worked with the Coalition were targeted as “collaborators” and “traitors.” Only two areas remained outside AQI influence: Fallujah and al-Qa'im, with the resistance of the tribes in the latter city provided a foretaste of the more serious tribal resistance to AQI that would appear in September and October.

Jafari Ousted but Violence Continues (April – May)

National political developments, in contrast to the events in Anbar, moved in a more positive direction. On April 22, Islamic Dawa Party politician Jawad al-Maliki won a 6-1 vote in the UIA leadership council to replace Ibrahim Jafari as the UIA candidate for prime minister. In contrast to Jafari, al-Maliki was regarded by Anbaris as an opponent of the Shi'a militias and was not seen as excessively influenced by AQI. A new Iraqi government was formed soon afterwards with Jalal Talabani as president.

Further AQI Consolidation in Ramadi

On a local level, events in Anbar were dominated by three trends during this period: first, the rising sectarian violence provided ample new recruits for AQI; second, the consolidation of AQI’s victories in Ramadi continued and led to attempts to create a similar environment in Fallujah; and finally, there was a backlash against AQI.

The consolidation in Ramadi showed the directions in which AQI hoped to take the insurgency. In contrast to earlier murder campaigns, the organization now merely intimidated SAR insurgent leaders into pledging bayat to AMZ or into joining the Mujahideen Shura Council. AQI had already won over the majority of Islamic Army of Iraq fighters in Anbar through the defection of Sheikh Fahd, and now targeted the national leader (and Tawafuq Front MP) of the Islamic Army of Iraq. These efforts were supervised by a representative of AQSL and deputy of ‘Usama bin Laden who had spent the previous two years fighting Coalition forces in Afghanistan recently arrived in Ramadi to deliver a large sum of money to support AQI operations there, though it is interesting to note that representatives of AQSL chose to interact with local commanders rather deal with AMZ or his lieutenants.

The efforts were largely successful and within just a few weeks, they convinced the Ramadi, Fallujah, and Zaidon branches of the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Saraya Jaysh al-
Mansoura al-Muslimeen to unite under the AQI banner, adopting AQI rank structure and common goals.\textsuperscript{358}

(S/NF) By this time in late April, AQI's financial network had grown so large in Ramadi that it required its own bureaucracy to adequately manage its finances.\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} oversaw the administration of AQI finances (including the \textit{khams}) from central Ramadi. Their aides were the direct links between AQI cells and their criminal allies, who extorted money from the government contracting process.\textsuperscript{359}

(S/NF) By May 2006, AQI's financial network was sufficiently organized, mature, and robust that the average salary of a starting AQI fighter in Ramadi was $1,000 a month; the next highest paying group was Ansar al-Sunna at $250 a month. There were also regular bonuses of $200 per successful IED attack, $600-700 for attacking and destroying a Humvee, and $7,000 for shooting down a Coalition helicopter. The only exception was in Fallujah, where the less established AQI financial network could only afford to pay salaries of $190-380 a month for starting fighters and $760 a month for cell leaders. To compensate, the group offered all new members a free car regardless of their rank.\textsuperscript{360}

(S) To manage its operations in Ramadi, AQI relied on an elaborate courier network to transmit verbal or written orders to subordinate commanders in order to prepare for complex attacks against the Coalition targets in a timely manner. When the local or regional AQI leadership had determined a target to attack in Ramadi, a time and rally point was relayed through the chain of command using couriers at various mosques.\textsuperscript{361}

(S/NF) Given the sheer number of cells and allied groups that AQI could organize to carry out complex attacks, the use of human couriers reflected a dedication to operational security by\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} and his subordinates. AQI fighters in Ramadi were told that all cellular, landline, and high-powered cordless phones were monitored by the Coalition or its informants.\textsuperscript{362} The AQI leadership in Ramadi also began a systematic destruction of the landline system and cell phones towers throughout eastern Anbar to impose communication discipline on their subordinates by force.\textsuperscript{363}

(S) The result of AQI's efforts in Ramadi was clear: key areas of the city now saw a daily series of running gun battles between AQI and Coalition troops. While over 200 AQI members were killed by the Coalition in Ramadi between March and April 2006, the majority were low-ranking fighters. AQI's robust infrastructure in Ramadi meant that it was able to easily regenerate personnel losses.\textsuperscript{364}

The Results of AQI Influence in Ramadi

\textsuperscript{358} [ | Military | 27 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060427 | (S/NF) | ] and [ | Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{359} [ | Military | 25 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060425 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{360} [ | Military | 04 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060504 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{361} [ | Military | 28 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060428 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{362} [ | Military | 28 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060428 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{363} [ | Military | 28 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060428 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{364} [ | Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | (S/NF) | ]
AQI now used the region surrounding Ramadi as a hub for activity throughout western and central Iraq, employing a system of relatively unregulated roads to transport personnel and materials throughout Anbar and into Baghdad, Karbala, and Diyala. These established transit routes were used despite a constant Coalition presence. By using cells from other regions they hoped to avoid detection of AQI infrastructure in the local area by Coalition or Iraqi forces. AQI leaders met and planned anti-Coalition and anti-government operations in remote areas of the Ramadi-Haditha corridor, transporting assets throughout Iraq using roads through al-Tash. AQI assets traveling specifically to eastern Iraq (including SVBIEDs destined for Baghdad) also used roads through Amariyah and continued towards Mahmudiya or Jurf al-Sakr.365

VBIEDs and suicide bombers intended for use outside Ramadi were kept in the areas surrounding Ramadi to facilitate their infiltration. AQI was not concerned about operational security in the Ramadi area because much of central Ramadi and its surrounding area were considered "safe" by the group. In light of this perception, AQI believed it could consolidate personnel in Ramadi with little chance that its operations would be compromised. AQI used the areas north of Ramadi such as Saddamiyah and Lake Thar Thar to transport personnel and materials into the northern provinces of Iraq to carry out attacks in Mosul and Tikrit.366

Ramadi was thus the new center of AQI efforts in Anbar and possibly throughout Iraq. In the absence of similar success in Baghdad, AQI sought to control Ramadi and the surrounding countryside. If this strategy succeeded, AQI would be in a position to finance, organize, and control a large terrorist organization that would be capable of carrying out mass casualty attacks in Baghdad, at will.367

AQI Moves in Fallujah

In mid-April AQI senior leaders met in Amariyah to discuss shifting their attention to Fallujah now that they had solidified their control over insurgent and criminal networks in Ramadi. AQI's goals in Fallujah were to undermine the deployment of Iraqi security forces, distract the Coalition from carrying out attacks against AQI in Ramadi, demonstrate their solidarity with the Sunni community by attacking Shi'a soldiers, and put Fallujah back in the international media spotlight. After this meeting, AQI persuaded the local 1920 Revolution Brigade, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Ansar al-Sunna groups to pool their resources in order to attack the largely Shi'a Iraqi army forces in the city.368 While this led to AQI resuming its status as the dominant insurgent group in Fallujah, tribal violence often resulted in anti-AQI activity from its would-be allies.369

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(S/NF) remained one of the few challengers to AQI’s dominance of the insurgency in Ramadi. Yet, though he was still active in Habbaniyah—with his surviving 1920 Revolution Brigade followers—would not assume the mantle of former Brigadier General al-Rawi as the public face of anti-AQI efforts in Anbar. He did, however, surreptitiously circulate propaganda that AQI was supported in order to undermine their claims to be “the protectors of the Sunni.” Under his general direction 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters also shot AQI cell leader Muhammad Fahid, whose superior had been involved in kidnapping fighters from the Islamic Army of Iraq. Even so, was unable to prevent AQI from regularly kidnapping and murdering Iraqi army and police force members in Habbaniyah, showing that his influence and power were greatly reduced.

Anbari Perceptions of the Insurgency

(S/NF) By early May, then, AQI had largely reached its goal of dominating the insurgency in Anbar. Yet it had achieved this at a cost: the general population saw it as much as a glorified criminal enterprise as a jihadist organization. Brutality and cutthroat tactics had enabled AQI to seize control of the insurgency and the black market, giving the group a position of unparalleled power, but these tactics had also alienated ordinary Anbaris. Yet AQI was in no danger of being displaced as long as it was able to maintain financial self-sufficiency, intimidate the population, and keep its relative freedom of movement.

(S/NF) The shift in perceptions of AQI in Anbar was based on the reality that despite its rhetoric about jihad, much of its resources (money, weapons, and fighters) was used by low-level amirs for their own financial gain. In addition, the tribal areas that supported AQI were controlled using brutal tactics. Common criminals and thugs who had once operated independently now served AQI, committing violent acts in the name of AQI, but in reality for their personal profit.

(S/NF) Growing Anbari animosity towards AQI was, however, not enough to challenge AQI’s dominance. Popular sentiment toward the group was far outweighed by the destruction of the Anbar People’s Committee, the marginalization of the absence of a functioning police force and AQI’s continued ability to move fighters throughout Anbar.

(S) The weakness of Anbar’s relative to AQI can be seen in the May 2 kidnapping of from the Jazira area near Ramadi. was the brother of Sheikh Sa’ad Na'il Mihisan Hardan Albu Aetha, the head of the Albu Aetha tribe. An ardent Ba'athist and one of the last surviving members of inner circle, Sheikh Sa’ad had agreed to support political engagement at the behest of Sheikh Nasser. After the death of Sheikh Nasser and Lieutenant General al-Rawi, Sheikh Sa’ad's brother had become more active in Ramadi politics, attending provincial-level meetings on a semi-regular basis. This made and by extension Sheikh Sa’ad a target for AQI violence over concern that he would begin cooperating.

370 [ | Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | (S/NF) | ]
371 [ | Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | (S/NF) | ]
372 [ | Military | 03 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060503 | (S/NF) | ]
373 Ibid.
374 Ibid.

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with the Coalition. Yet despite the kidnapping of his brother, Sheikh Sa'ad feared that AQI was too powerful to attack directly and made no plans for retaliation.375

(S/NF) The dangers of shifting Anbari perceptions of AQI were recognized by some within the group, and a few even agreed that the negative views had basis in reality. The leadership of AQI in Karmah, for instance, came to the conclusion that much of their group had drifted away from Salafism and was now synonymous with nothing more than theft, murder, kidnappings, and beheadings. They believed that it was time for their followers to return to the Qu'ran and ordered their followers to stop harming the Iraqi people.376

Tribal Resistance Resumes against AQI

(S/NF) In early May, the tribes renewed resistance. Sheikh Hamayid Hamid Miwal al-`Ubaydi, whose cousin had been burnt alive by AQI, convinced nine ‘Ubaydi subtribal sheikhs (representing 6,000 tribesmen) to issue a leaflet urging the al-Sa’ida, Albu Amar, and Albu Gitashat tribes to hand over any AQI members in their area to the Coalition and the Iraqi police. The three targeted tribes were located primarily in Baghdadi, Dulab, Hit, and Haditha and the leaflet called for violence against the tribesmen even if the tribes themselves were not aligned with AQI.377

(S/NF) In addition to the nine ‘Ubaydi subsheikhs, the Albu Nimr, elements of the Albu Mahal, and several other tribes, also united against AQI. Yet despite this public show of anti-AQI sentiment there were still considerable divisions and weaknesses within the tribes. Thousands of Albu Nimr, Albu Mahal, and Albu ‘Ubayd tribesmen worked for or at least supported AQI and thousands more thought that the sheikhs issuing the anti-AQI statements were not legitimate representatives of their tribes.378

Further Insurgent Infighting

(S/NF) Anti-AQI sentiment was also inflamed in Fallujah. In this case, it was by a video from AMZ, who stated anyone who sought a military or government position was an infidel. The SAR insurgent groups in the city were primarily composed of former soldiers or government officials who had joined the insurgency in order to regain their former positions once a political settlement was reached. Angered by AMZ’s statement, Fallujahns killed four AQI fighters soon after the video's release. [6] exploited the situation, having the 1920 Revolution Brigade draw up a hit list of forty-two AQI leaders to assassinate. The ‘Umar bin Abd al-Aziz Group was formed as a result of this tension with the stated purposes of opposing AQI and protecting the people of Fallujah from the group's extreme view of shari‘ah. Both [6](b) were targeted for assassination as a result of these efforts and AQI responded by assassinating Sheikh Umar of the Usama bin Zayd Mosque near Fallujah.379
AMZ's declaration also appears to have inspired AQI fighters to assassinate Governor Mamoun's secretary Umar Sari al-Alwani, one of AQI and most highly placed informants in the Anbar provincial government. While Umar Sari had been both corrupt and an insurgent informant, he had also been the lynchpin of day-to-day operations at the Government Center. With his death, most of the provincial government officials and bureaucrats simply stopped coming to work in the belief that they could be next.

(S/NF) now attempted to rally members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the al-Nu'man Brigade, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and Harakat İslamiya against AQI in Ramadi, only to find that those fighters who heeded his call were in such disarray that even those commanders who would have supported him did not possess a clear organization or status. In some cases, the groups that hoped would support him had already been absorbed into or subordinated by AQI. This was the case with both the Islamic Army of Iraq and own 1920 Revolution Brigade in Ramadi. As a result, when 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters (who had accompanied him to Habbaniyah) managed to return to the Tamim district of Ramadi in mid-May 2006, they found themselves opposed by many of their former 1920 Revolution Brigade comrades who were now loyal to AMZ.

AQI responded to latest action against their group by murdering Hajji Raja al-Fahdawi and his two sons at their home in the Albu Fahd tribal region. Hajji Raja had been an ally of who had been involved in efforts to legitimize the goals of 1920 Revolution Brigade by having the group join the political process using his high-level contacts in the Iraqi interior ministry.

As a result of the renewed anti-AQI sentiment, 1920 Revolution Brigade senior leader who had previously broken with over the issue of political engagement, now ordered his followers to cease cooperation with AQI and to cooperate with the Iraqi police and the military against AQI by capturing or killing its leaders.

AQI retaliated by kidnapping a senior leader of the remnant Islamic Army of Iraq along with his top aides. This act convinced national leaderships of Islamic Army of Iraq and 1920 Revolution Brigade to reach out to their treacherous subordinates in an effort to persuade them that AQI was a direct threat to the security and stability of Anbar. The leadership of both groups and many Fallujah residents now referred to AQI as "al-Tawlid wal Ijihad," a play on the group's old name of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad that meant "Birth and Abortion" because of the harm that AQI had caused to the people of Fallujah.
Zaidon-based AQI leaders decided to act preemptively against 1920 Revolution Brigade to prevent inter-insurgent violence from spreading to their area, kidnapping 1920 Revolution Brigade leader and his top deputy. Both had been negotiating with the Coalition on behalf of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Jaysh Muhammad in an effort to create a new paramilitary group called Kateebat that would provide security for the Fallujah area. The kidnapping of brought the negotiations to an abrupt end and all of the groups with a stake in the outcome sent a message to AQI superiors in Abu Ghraib, demanding that they order the release or violence would ensue.

In an effort to prevent open conflict, Sheikh Barakat al-Hamam al-Zobai sought to negotiate between AQI and the Kateebat member groups, only to learn that it was too late: the Kateebat member groups had already ordered assassination. The Kateebat member group’s unwillingness to dialogue was due to the long-running feud in Zaidon between 1920 Revolution Brigade and AQI (see Chapter 5b).

This eruption of anti-AQI violence following AMZ’s videotape was due to far more than just AMZ’s statement or disgust over the increasing criminality of AQI. There was also the violence against relatives of SAR insurgents and Anbaris in general; the arrogance of many of the younger AQI amirs who had been promoted by the group’s leadership to replace those captured or killed by the Coalition; friction with the tribes (including the Albu Fahd, Albu Issa, Albu Mahan and Zobai) over whether or not to support AQI; Iraq’s sectarian tension; claims that AQI was supported by fighting between SARs and AQI for control of the Fallujah insurgency; loss of SAR control of the Ramadi black market to AQI; efforts by the Ba’athist financiers who supported the 1920 Revolution Brigade to regain control of the insurgency; and ongoing efforts by AQI to subordinate all the local 1920 Revolution Brigade and Islamic Army of Iraq groups through threats, intimidation, and murder. Yet the SAR groups were still weak and disorganized compared to AQI and its allies, making them incapable of mounting any direct attack. Various SAR cells and groups also lacked leadership and cohesion due to a complex web of cultural, organizational, or operational factors. In the absence of a SAR leader or group of leaders who truly represented the insurgency, Coalition negotiations with or support for individual SAR leaders outside local frameworks was simply impractical.

In mid-May, Islamic Army of Iraq leader sought to change that during a meet with his top commanders for Ramadi and Baghdad respectively. At the conclusion of the meeting, the group changed its name to Jaysh al-Fatihin to distance the group from Islamic Army of Iraq members who now followed AQI. Giving $50,000 each to told them to give $500 to every cell leader and $250 for every fighter to keep them from joining AQI while he sought a way to facilitate the entry of Jaysh al-Fatihin into the Iraqi army or security forces the same way the Hamza Battalion had done in 2005.

387 [ Military | 14 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060514 | (S/NE) | ]
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid.
390 [ Military | 21 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060521 | (S/NE) | ]
(S/NF) It is worth noting that the movement of the Islamic Army of Iraq (now Jaysh al-Fatihin) into the Iraqi military was quite in keeping with original design for the organization. It had first created the Islamic Army of Iraq in 2004 with the goal of carrying out attacks in Ramadi in order to generate the need for a Sunni military force to protect the city. The Islamic Army of Iraq was intended to serve as that military force and would then control the capital of Anbar through his leadership.

The Ambiguous Position of Harith and al-Dhari

(S/NF) Unlike these insurgent leaders, Harith al-Dhari continued to support all sides in the fighting. Harith al-Dhari's son for instance, used pilgrims returning from the Hajj to smuggle money to AQI even while Harith had relaxed his views on political participation in an effort to heal the split between himself and other members of the Sunni leadership (see Chapter 5a). This may have been because he felt that he had been betrayed when Shi'a interior minister Bayan Jabr ordered his arrest in February 2006, forcing him to flee the country. This left Harith with little option in his own mind but to continue supporting AQI through his control of the Jamiyat al-Fatwa NGO that used to fund AQI.

Ba'athists Renew Efforts to Regroup

(S/NF) In the midst of these anti-AQI efforts, Ba'athist leaders attempted to reinvigorate their movement. Because these efforts were halting, limited, and ineffectual, the Ba'athists were forced to content themselves with financing nearly every Anbari insurgent group, operating under the delusion that this gave them influence over the insurgency. According to this school of thought, providing money to AQI allowed the Ba'athists to bide their time, grow stronger, and eventually challenge AQI for control of Iraq. Others, like former IIS officer, returned to Haditha as an AQI financier in the belief that AQI’s shift towards criminality had lessened its original Salafist zeal enough that more secular Ba'athists could now feel comfortable working with it.

(S/NF) Among the Iraqi Ba'athist leaders now trying to rebuild their shattered organization from the Ba'ath Party National Command. Because of his ties to both senior Iraqi and foreign fighters facilitated into Iraq by the Muslim Brotherhood through AMS, he continued to support AQI.

391 Ibid.
392 [Military | 27 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060427 | (S/NF) | ]
393 [Military | 25 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060525 | (S/NF) | ]
was able to serve as an intermediary between the two parties despite the Party’s official stance opposing Saddam Hussein. While the Iraqi wing of the [1.4b] Ba’ath Party had undergone significant leadership changes from 2003-2004 with [b(6)] as the group’s leader in late 2003 only to have his position usurped by [b(6)] it is unclear as to whether or not this resulted in a reduction of [b(6)].

[S/NF] The Ba’athists had originally planned to field more than one hundred candidates in the December 15, 2005 elections, only to have their strategy fail. Since the [1.4b] was one party that was on the ballot, [1.4b] hoped to cooperate with it, only to have their anticipated point of contact, Moshir Ahmad, die unexpectedly. As a result, the officials wanted the Iraqi Ba’athists to identify a senior [1.4b] Ba’athist in their ranks who could help facilitate their infiltration of Iraqi [1.4b] political groups. [b(6)] was particularly prized by in this regard since he had made inroads with numerous AQI leaders, including [1.4b] AQI members.

[S/NF] [1.4b] Ba’athist leader [b(6)] supported other efforts by [b(6)] to convince Albu Mahal tribesmen and AQI leaders to attend Ba’athist-run terrorist training camps in [1.4b]. He believed that they could be persuaded to set up Ba’athist training camps in Anbar upon their return. In an effort to gain broader support for this maneuver, [b(6)] was in intermittent communication with AMZ. Ironically, his chief rival [b(6)] was also involved with AQI, colluding with them in order to keep Iraq destabilized in the hope that it would serve to facilitate the eventual return of Sunni-dominated Ba’athists to power.

[S/NF] [1.4b, 1.4c, (b)(6)] continued to manage the Office of Iraqi Popular Organizations in serving as the primary conduit for expatriate Ba’athists financiers that included Fadil al-Rubai, the spokesman for Sheikh Majid al-Gaoud’s Wahaj al-Iraq (Higher Committee of Forces Opposed to the Occupation).

[S/NF] [1.4b] [b(6)] 10 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060510 | [S/NF] [b(6)]

[S/NF] [1.4b] [b(6)] 12 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060512 | [S/NF] [b(6)]

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also remained in contact with Saddam Hussein through one of his attorneys, explaining the current state of both the insurgency and the Ba'ath Party to the former ruler of Iraq (see Chapter 4). Saddam Hussein had sent out of Iraq in 2003 just before the collapse of his regime, giving him large sums of money and gold to support his operations. had subsequently settled in where he began financing the insurgency through his al-Suqr Company front. By May 2006, he had been expelled from his duties in the Ba'ath Party by and sought Saddam's aid in getting his position reinstated. Acting through his attorney, sent a reply ordering to reconcile with but continued to struggle with over who would serve as the legitimate leader of the Ba'ath Party in Saddam's absence. As a result of this infighting, the entire Karbala branch of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party had broken with the leadership and refused the offers of various pretenders to return.

who served as the primary financier for was also active in trying to recruit former IIS officers in Anbar to travel to to receive terrorist training. was a close associate of Saddam Hussein who worked for . He maintained as well ties to Ramadi-based former Ba'athist Sheikh Sa'ad Naif Mishan Hardan al-Ithawi, who now supported political engagement with the Coalition.

It is clear that and his followers lacked detailed information on the nature of the insurgency in Anbar, in some cases substituting their own wishful thinking for hard data. An example of this can be seen in the military readiness report sent to from a non-existent group calling itself the "Amariyah Forces." Similar to Iraqi military readiness reports created under Saddam Hussein, the Amariyah Forces report detailed a complete line and block chart for a well-organized military unit, including the names for each member of the battalion, company, platoon, and squad. While the report's author stated that the group was seriously involved in the insurgency in Anbar and was prepared to seize control of Baghdad at command, the actual intent of the document was to impress in order to convince him to provide funds for members of the non-existent organization. Determined not to be fooled again, created the Kateebat al-Ayon (Eyes Battalion) to give him an accurate intelligence on the Coalition, police, Iraqi army, and the insurgency in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah, Fallujah, and Abu Ghraib.

To strengthen his influence in Iraq, began negotiations with the Iraqi National Dialogue Front (INDF). Under the terms of the agreement between and INDF representative (formerly IIS officer), the INDF would represent the interests of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in parliament. Contacting Ba'athist military officers who were now living in urged them to return to Iraq and run for office as INDF candidates. To raise support for his alliance with Iraqi Ba'athists inside Iraq, traveled to Tikrit and Mosul to meet with Major General Muhammad Awaid, Major General Subat Matar al-Azawi, General Rashid al-Afghani, and former 14th Infantry Division Commander.

398 Ibid
399 | Military | 14 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060514 | (S/NE) |
400 Ibid.
401 | Military | 19 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060519 | (S/NE) |
(S/NF) took a major step toward consolidating the disorganized and feuding Ba'athists by ousting the former secretary of the treasury under Saddam Hussein and a close associate of enemy whom also removed as the head of the Ba'ath Party's military wing. Demanding that returned to Iraq, charged that he had not adhered to Party rules, that he maintained active ties to countries considered enemies of Iraq (a reference to intelligence officials), that he held meetings without informing the Party leadership, that he publicly disagreed with Party members, and that he failed to follow his assignments. The ouster of coincided with recruitment of General Faris Ali Salih al-Alkawi as part of his concerted efforts to consolidate control of the Ba'ath Party under his rule by staffing its ranks with loyalists. This move was in direct defiance of Saddam Hussein's order to reinstate as a member of the Ba'ath Party.402

(S/NF) selected to serve as replacement in his new Ba'athist hierarchy. A national, was a member of the Ba'ath Party who had worked with the Abu Ras wing of the Ba'athists to recruit volunteers from to fight the Coalition prior to the beginning of OIF. He had later used his connections to the Ba'athist front company People's Corporation for Iraq and Palestine Defense (Corporation for Arab World Defense) to finance the travel of foreign fighter recruits to Iraq. Traveling with his Ba'athists to Baghdad had received training from Iraqi special forces units to fight the Coalition but returned to upon the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. had been grooming to assume this position as soon as it became clear to him that his differences with were irreconcilable.403

By the beginning of June 2006, managed to reunite the entire Iraqi Ba'ath Party under his rule, including the Ba'ath Party Military Command. Ali al-Rih became head of the Party's civilian wing, while was the liaison between and his counterparts. decision to appoint as his liaison to the Ba'athists was surprising, as had gone to great lengths to support The willingness of to appoint an individual who had been associated with his primary rival only weeks earlier—and at a time when he was determined to appoint only loyalists—should help to demonstrate the level of weakness and desperation that now typified the Iraqi Ba'athist leadership.404

Al-Duri’s Negotiation Offer

Faced with increasingly dismal prospects for success, attempted to open up a dialogue with the Coalition through Sheikh Tayyib Muhammad Uthman al-Barzanji, who informed a local religious leader in Sulaymaniyyah that the Ba'athists were prepared to negotiate with the Coalition in return for a cessation of military operations in Ramadi, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala where the Party still had residual influence. According to Sheikh Tayyib, Saddam Hussein continued

402 [ | Military | 26 MNF-W INTSUM | (S/NF) | ]
403 Ibid.
404 [ | Military | 31 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060531 | (S/NF) | ]

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to lead the Ba'athists through messages passed through his lawyer. As evidence of this claim, Sheikh Tayyib noted that Saddam had tried to reconcile with though he neglected to mention that this effort had been disregarded by and was insufficient to prevent him from ousting as the head of the Ba'ath Party military wing. Sheikh Tayyib stated that if the Coalition wanted to get in touch with it could do so through his tribesman General Abd al-Karim al-Duri. Despite apparent ignorance about factual matters concerning the insurgency, Sheikh Tayyib stated that it was kept very well-informed in national Iraqi political developments because Iraqi members of the parliament (MPs) (the latter of whom doubled as the political leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq, now Jaysh al-Fatihin) continued (at least in the minds of the Ba'athists) to serve as active Ba'ath Party members.

While some of Sheikh Tayyib's claims could not be verified, his claim about Saddam Hussein's defense attorney was accurate. In addition to serving as Saddam's lawyer, received coded account information from Saddam Hussein that enabled him to withdraw large sums of money from Ba'athist bank accounts that he then funneled to Ba'athist leaders and other insurgent groups. regularly transferred money from Saddam Hussein into clandestine Ba'athist accounts throughout the Middle East, including those managed by his daughter in When traveling through Anbar, security was overseen by an AQI cell based in Ramadi led by .

The negotiations between and the Coalition would continue throughout the rest of 2006 and into 2007, but led to no agreements between the two sides or reduced violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces.

**AQI Infrastructure and AMZ's Master Plan**

In contrast to this scene of disorganization and weakness, AQI was making plans to take over Iraq. At a May 4 meeting of the AQI shura majlis and senior leadership in the Jazira area southeast of Lake Thar Thar, AMZ outlined his plan to set up a caliphate over Anbar, Salahaddin, and Diyala in the next three months over which he would reign as caliph. The first step of his plan was for AQI to escalate attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces in Ramadi, which AMZ intended to use as his capital until he took Baghdad. AQI leaders were instructed to tell their subordinates that all agents of the Coalition and the Iraqi government were to be killed immediately without prior approval from their superiors. Because the Iraqi police and army were an unacceptable threat to the security of the new caliphate, AMZ decreed that all police and soldiers were to be beheaded to deter Iraqi youth from joining them. The meeting concluded with AMZ making cash payments of $10,000 and $500 to select lieutenants to fund specific operations. The meeting was held at Lake Thar Thar because AMZ considered it a secure location for him to hold meetings with his lieutenants. Its lack of landmarks complicated Coalition and Iraqi efforts to locate him and

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405 [ ] Military | 04 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060604 | (S/NE) | ]
406 Ibid.
facilitated his rapid access to Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Saqlawiyah, Fallujah, and east into Salahaddin province.407

(S/NF) The May 4 meeting included a 41-slide AQI PowerPoint presentation detailing the group's bureaucracy and infrastructure in Anbar and AMZ's plan to better organize its administrative and operational structure. As with AMZ's April 25 video, this presentation was shown in order to reinforce AMZ's control of the group. It could be argued that AMZ was dramatically accelerating his plan to assume direct control of the Sunni Triangle as a result of a groundswell of confidence in AQI's strength as a result of their success in Ramadi, an ever-increasing financial surplus from black market operations, and AQI's successful infiltration of low and mid-level Iraqi bureaucracy throughout Anbar. AMZ believed that the Coalition would withdraw from Iraq as soon as a national unity government was formed, enabling him to overwhelm the Iraqi police and army in Anbar in short order, seize control of Ramadi, and proceed from there to establish his caliphate.408

(S/NF) AMZ's meeting had been preceded by another gathering of the AQI leadership in Baghdad to discuss the focus of AQI and plan further Baghdad attacks. This meeting was chaired by who explained to the attendees that AQI was preparing a major operation that would illustrate the weakness of Iraqi and Coalition forces. described AQI as being at a crossroads and claimed that AMZ's April 25 video had already had its intended effect of demonstrating the group's predominance in the insurgency. According to statements would soon be released by 'Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri that, when combined with decisive battles in AQAM's favor worldwide, would prove the strength of AQAM to the Muslim world and incite more Muslims to join the fight.409

(S/NF) claimed that AQI had already established an army of fighters that would transform their campaign of individual suicide bombings into organized and collective attacks. AQI would use the same well-coordinated intelligence efforts as their Coalition enemies to improve infiltration of the Iraqi security forces in preparation for the coming Coalition withdrawal. At the conclusion of the meeting, relayed general instructions from AMZ to his subordinates to mobilize support for AQI's post-withdrawal plans to their subordinates.410

(S/NF) Iraqi intelligence reporting on AQI reflected knowledge of AMZ's planning and some interesting insights into the dilemmas he faced. They believed that AQI had united several insurgent groups under its banner in preparation for an "Islamic revolution" that would make Ramadi, Samarra, and Baghdad part of a planned caliphate. According to Iraqi intelligence, AQI sought to evolve to more conventional warfare, but lacked the necessary operational momentum or tactical capability to do so. Their current stage of development required the full and direct support of the local population, uncontested safe havens, and a sufficient military force to challenge government forces in select small-scale engagements. While AQI was able to hide, train, and store weapons in the area around Lake Thar Thar, the terrain did not afford the group the ability to hide a sizeable force from aerial observation by the Coalition. The Coalition also maintained an overwhelming

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407 [ | Military | 26 MNF-W INTSUM | (S/NF) ]
408 Ibid.
409 [ | Military | 17 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060517 | (S/NF) ]
410 Ibid.
advantage in firepower, rendering AQI unable to defeat or even stop platoon-sized Coalition
forces.411

(S/NF) Iraqi Intelligence believed as well that AMZ and the rest of the AQI leadership saw that the
group was at a strategic crossroads and feared that their organization was beginning to shift
internally from a Salafist terrorist group to a criminal organization. Their fear was that while this
would still enable them to retain their necessary operational tempo and outlast the Coalition, it
would not allow them to defeat either the Shi'a or resurgent Ba'athists following the Coalition
withdrawal.412

The Humaydi Initiative

(S/NF) While AMZ believed that black market financing and fear were sufficient substitutes for
popular support, other members of his inner circle were far less sanguine. Under the leadership of
a number of senior AQI leaders secretly met in the Amariyah district of Baghdad
to discuss ways to win back this support. Among the attendees were
Guard Brigadier General Hudhari Talal al-Jughayfi (Bin Sheikh Talal), and
former Republican

Guard Brigadier General Hudhari Talal al-Jughayfi (Bin Sheikh Talal), and
These commanders believed that they had suffered a number of unnecessary
setbacks due to lack of support from ordinary Iraqis that had allowed the Coalition to capture or kill
mid-level commanders who held important positions in the organization.413

(S/NF) The meeting resulted in a new direction for AQI: to convince tribes to join AQI and cease
supporting the Coalition. The plan was to negotiate with tribal sheikhs to have 5-10 trusted and well-
connected members of each tribe join the organization's fearsome internal security network. The
goal of these tribesmen would be to learn which tribesmen cooperated with the Coalition or the
Iraqi government and to provide AQI with intelligence on Coalition military operations. The AQI
leaders who attended the Amariyah meeting believed that their group’s objective should be to
strengthen its control of the Euphrates River valley in order to establish Sunni-controlled safe
havens from al-Qaim to Ramadi.414

(S/NF) By May 2006, and his supporters had convinced AQI recruiters in Anbar
to seek out disaffected youth in poor urban areas and outlying communities, looking for young men
playing soccer or loitering in public areas. The recruiter would then invite the young men to his
house or a mosque, offering them cell phones or money. From then on, the recruiter would begin
indoctrinating the youth, encouraging them with money, favors for their families, and other benefits
in return for joining AQI. Once the recruits had agreed to join and been indoctrinated, they were
assigned to plant IEDs, act as couriers, and other low-ranking jobs. If they survived, they were given
additional duties and in this manner worked their way up the chain of command. Other more
specialized AQI recruiters operated at mosques and schools, serving as teachers, professors, and

411 [ | Military | 17 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060517 | (S/NE) | ]
412 Ibid.
413 [ | Military | 16 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060516 | (S/NE) | ]
414 Ibid.
imams. These more specialized recruiters sought to sign up disaffected Iraqi police who were frustrated over their lack of regular pay.\textsuperscript{415}
City Stories

Ramadi

(S/NF) By late May, the efforts of (b)(6) and his supporters in Ramadi were starting to pay off, with AQI providing support to local insurgent groups rather than seeking to absorb them. (b)(6) a former Iraqi general from the Albu Mahal tribe, served as the group’s outreach coordinator to local insurgents who had already been cowed into submission by the group’s terror campaign. As a result, when Coalition operations forced rank-and-file AQI fighters to abandon Ramadi for Muhammadi, Baghdadi, Jubbah, Hasah, Haditha, or even as far west as Husaybah in mid-to-late May, much of AQI’s mid-level talent pool in the city was able to remain active, retaining the group’s operational tempo by acting as special advisors to local insurgent groups who were now the primary fighting force in the city. The group’s mid and senior leadership, for instance, sought refuge among the Albu Soda, Albu Faraj, and Albu Alwan tribes, all of whom now supported AQI.416

(S/NF) This temporary disruption of its Ramadi leadership forced AQI into a diffuse cell structure, in which small groups of fighters operated independently of one another without any higher-level coordination. Operations against the police were especially affected. Before this, each case of murder and intimidation had depended on the officer’s social and tribal standing as well as that of the AQI member carrying out the operation, the situation now became more chaotic. Even so, very few Iraqi police were willing to patrol the streets of Ramadi and when attacked, usually fled as quickly as possible.417

(S/NF) The departure of some of the AQI fighters from Ramadi enabled (b)(6) followers in the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat Islamiya to finally reestablish a presence in the city. Many of the groups’ members sought employment in the local government and awaited the outcome of the political process. While these insurgents still condoned and carried out attacks on Coalition forces, they did not target the Iraqi police or the army and refused to engage in kidnapping or theft. Jaysh Muhammad also returned to Ramadi, reuniting with Jaysh al-Haqq in an effort to compensate for both groups’ weakness in Anbar.418

(S/NF) One of the architects of 1920 Revolution Brigade’s return to Ramadi was former IIS agent (b)(6) who was a senior advisor to (b)(6). While he had attempted to ensure AQI representation in a council of Sunni insurgent groups in Ramadi in late January 2006, this had been because he believed that only collectively could the other insurgent groups defeat AMZ. Impressed with his activities in Ramadi, Jaysh Muhammad was also able to recruit him to help them fight AQI.419

(S/NF) In addition to (b)(6) efforts, members of the Albu Alay, Albu Assaf, and Albu Nimr tribes began forming their own militias to take matters into their own hands and prevent AQI from...
returning to their areas of the city.\[420\] Aware of this threat and worried that the Albu Dhiab tribe would participate, AQI leaders organized the ambush of a group of senior Albu Dhiab tribesmen in Ramadi while they were returning from a funeral, killing prominent subsheikh Abd al-Mihsin Farhan Hayis al-Dhiabi. In the aftermath of the ambush, sixty Albu Dhiab tribesmen began searching through the area with the help of the Albu Ubayd and the Albu Shaban tribes.\[421\]

\(\text{(S/NE)}\) A number of other anti-AQI vigilante groups also appeared in various parts of Ramadi and Fallujah. The most important were the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade (a reference to the cleric murdered by AQI in November 2005, see Chapter 5), the Martyrs of the Iraqi Police, and Sayf al-Haqq.\[422\] Of the three, Sayf al-Haqq was the largest and best organized, its members drawn from former Iraqi army, police, and national guard soldiers or relatives of Anbaris killed by AQI. In contrast to some anti-AQI groups such as 1920 Revolution Brigade, Sayf al-Haqq harbored no anti-Coalition sentiments but instead sought to kidnap, interrogate, and then murder suspected AQI members in the belief that in so doing they were carrying out the will of the average Anbari. Despite the emergence of Sayf al-Haqq, AQI operatives and their allies were still able to move freely through most of Ramadi by intimidating sheikhs, imams, police, and anyone suspected of cooperating with the Coalition.\[423\]

Fallujah

\(\text{(S/NE)}\) The Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade was widely supported by Fallujah imams and residents concerned about the rise of AQI in the city. Made up of roughly one hundred fighters drawn primarily from the ranks of the Fallujah police force, it was supported by the Albu Alwan, Albu Issa, and Mohamdi tribal leaders.\[424\] Saraya al-Jihad, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and even Ansar al-Sunna were also frustrated by the extreme views of the Fallujah AQI leadership, particularly their belief that anyone who cooperated with the Coalition was a traitor to Islam who then had to be killed. Saraya al-Jihad in Fallujah was particularly anti-AQI, blaming the group for the killing of Sheikh Umar Sayid Huran and Iraqi police captain Ali, both of whom had been supporters of Saraya al-Jihad.\[425\]

Karmah

\(\text{(S)}\) In Karmah, Mayor Majid resigned due to his belief that if AQI didn't kill him that the Coalition would, making resignation his only viable option. While Majid had been threatened with detention in 2005 and was related by marriage to insurgent leader through marriage, he had only provided passive support to SAR insurgent groups such as the now-defunct Green Battalion or Jaysh Muhammad.\[426\]
Haditha and Barwanah

(S/NF) The influx of AQI fighters into Haditha from Ramadi made the group's murder and intimidation campaign worse than it had been for the last two months, leading to the killing of twenty residents during the first two weeks of May. Many Haditha residents believed that the Coalition had abandoned them to AQI and that they had no means of protecting themselves now that their weapons had been confiscated by the group.

(S/NF) Ansar al-Sunna fighters led by now had a monopoly on petroleum products in Barwanah, using gas station money to fund the group's activities. Ansar al-Sunna also controlled all of the kerosene shipments into Barwanah, forcing residents to buy it from the group rather than on the black market. Much the same situation existed for AQI in Haqlaniyah, where former mid-level Islamic Army of Iraq commander was responsible for transporting weapons, distributing propaganda, recruiting, and conducting attacks.

Anah

(S/NF) The AQI leadership was frustrated by what it regarded as inactivity by who served as the amir of the Anah-Kubaysah corridor. As a result, AQI operative began working with several other associate groups to destabilize Anah, murdering a number of residents, including the local head of the IIP. This was due in part to an AQI fatwa issued in Haditha stating that IIP leaders would be targeted if the group did not disband. Actions had their desired effect and AQI markedly increased its presence in Anah between the end of May and the middle of June.

Rutbah

(S) Operating from Rutbah with the assistance of local Saraya al-Jihad and Islamic Army of Iraq, AQI was able to stop vehicles, including tractor trailers, from entering or exiting the Waleed and Trebil border crossing in order to extort payments of up to $200. If the driver refused or was unable to pay, AQI fighters looted and then burned the vehicle.

Further AQI Exodus from Ramadi

(S/NF) In the first week of June, concerned by a rumor that the Coalition was about to start an AL FAJR-style operation against Ramadi, AQI mid and high-level leaders left the city en masse for safe

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427 [Military] 22 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060522 | (S/NF) |
428 [Military] 26 MNF-W INTSUM | (S/NF) |
429 [Military] 24 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060524 | (S/NF) |
430 [Military] 02 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060602 | (S/NF) |
431 [Military] 29 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060529 | (S/NF) |
432 [Military] 24 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060724 | (S/NF) |
433 [Military] 11 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060611 | (S/NF) |
434 [Military] 28 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060528 | (S/NF) |
havens in the Jazira area, the southern end of Lake Thar Thar, Haditha, and the Malaab and al-Hawz districts also began making preparations to evacuate for the same reason. A number of AQI fighters remained in the city, however, preparing IED attacks against Coalition forces in the event a major operation was initiated. Having learned from Operation AL FAJR and Operation SAYYAD II, these fighters did not plan to confront the Coalition directly but instead relied on IEDs planted throughout the city to thwart their advance.

The decision to rely on IED attacks in response to a major Coalition operation was determined by AQI leaders during a meeting at the Ibad al-Rahman mosque in Ramadi. They all agreed that AQI should not attempt to engage the Coalition directly and that the AQI leadership should make preparations to leave the city if major operations occurred.

Conclusion

The spring of 2006 thus ended with some good news for the Coalition. The decision by AQI to flee Ramadi seemed to show the essential weakness of the most powerful insurgent group. Meanwhile, many tribes were turning against AQI, the Ba'athists were willing to negotiate an end to their fighting, and there was internecine warfare between the disparate insurgent groups. All these developments pointed to a light at the end of the tunnel.

Yet the underlying conditions in Anbar created by AQI’s lengthy murder and intimidation campaigns, as well as the flexibility and adaptability of the group itself, allowed AQI to adjust to these setbacks. The sectarian violence only increased during the summer of 2006, providing fuel for the insurgency as a whole and large numbers of recruits for AQI in particular. By the fall of 2006, the organization would have a new leadership, new ties with the tribes, and a new willingness to compromise with other insurgent groups that would make it more powerful than ever.

Attack Data (January – April 2006)

The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (January to April 2006). The first two (large – 1/2 page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

The average number of enemy attacks during this period was lower than the extended peak of the previous period, but represented a continuation of the general increasing trend of activity. There was a general balance of activity among the three AOs for IED and Complex Attacks, but
significantly lower occurrence of Direct and Indirect Fire incidents in AO Denver. All types of attacks showed a gradual but distinct increasing trend over the course of the period.
All Incidents

Weekly Incidents by Region (2003 - 2007)

Weekly Incidents by Region (Jan - Apr 2006)
Insurgent Profile: 2006

(S/NF) In 2006, the typical street-level insurgent captured in Anbar was an Iraqi male about 27 years old, was slightly more likely to be married than to be unmarried, and was educated at a high-school level or less. Most captured detainees were associated with tribes and about half had some military experience. These conclusions are based on an analysis of more than 7,000 tactical interrogation reports gathered from intelligence sources.

Figure 1: 2006 Street-Level Insurgent Profile (S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)
(S/NF) Most insurgents captured in 2006 were 30 years old or younger (63.7%), with a significant group (11.5%) under 20 years old. 2006 is the first year in which the mean age (29.4) is less than 30 years old. The middle 50% of the population distribution was between 22 and 34 years old. The fact that the median of 27 years is lower than the mean of 29.4 years confirms that the data is skewed younger and also indicates that the age range among older detainees has a large spread. The most common age among detainees in 2006 was 21 years old.

(S/NF) Almost all of the insurgents captured in 2006 claimed to be Iraqi (99.4%), with only 0.6% claiming to be of foreign origin. Of those foreigners, the most frequent origins named were

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{driver (15.2%)} \\
\text{shepherd or farmer (14.8%)} \\
\text{blue collar workers (29.0%)}
\end{array}
\]

though this represents just a very few individuals.

(S/NF) The majority of detainees were associated with blue collar or other labor occupations. The most common occupations claimed were driver (15.2%) and shepherd or farmer (14.8%), though the largest grouping of occupations was blue collar workers (29.0%), which included jobs like electrician, carpenter, and laborer. Though only 5.4% of detainees claimed to be actively unemployed, it is likely that many more detainees were actually unemployed but provided their previous job or training when asked their occupation. In addition, a noteworthy fraction of detainees (5.8%) were employed in positions of trust such as the Iraqi police or local security forces.

(S/NF) About half of those captured in 2006 claimed to have some military experience (51.4%), while a portion of those that had not served were still students and were too young to participate. This finding indicates that a large segment of the insurgent population had some form of prior military training, had combat experience, and may even have had personal access to weapons.

(S/NF) At least three-quarters of those detained had no education beyond high-school, with nearly half (43.8%) having no more than an elementary education (6th grade or less). More than 18% had some post-secondary education or had completed a degree program.

(S/NF) The tribe with the most captured members in 2006 was the Mohamdi tribe, closely followed by the Fahad, Albu Eissa, and Qubaysah tribes. There was no consistent trend from month to month, as a variety of tribes had the monthly highs. There were many tribes well-represented, as only 69% of the detainees associated themselves with one of the top 20 tribes.

(S/NF) More than 57% of all detainees claimed to be married, engaged, or widowed, though most detainees under 30 (61.8%) were still single. Of those married, only 44.9% claimed to have children, which is much lower than the overall rate of children in the population. However, this data is very unreliable and a significant difference from the results from previous years. If valid, it seems that those who had families were reluctant to participate in the insurgency and less willing to risk their lives, for fear of leaving behind unsupported children.

(S/NF) The most common places of residence among detainees were Ramadi (28.1%) and Fallujah (23.0%), which correspond to the largest cities in Anbar. Ramadi was also the city with the greatest occurrence of insurgent activity. Hadithah (10.8%), Al Qa’im / Husaybah (8.3%), Hit (6.8%), and Rutbah (5.2%) also were major claimed sources of detainees.
May to August

At the beginning of summer 2006, AQI was still the dominant force in Anbar, having defeated, marginalized, or absorbed other insurgent or tribal groups that sought to oppose it. By destroying the Golden Mosque and igniting a sectarian conflict throughout Iraq, AQI had impeded Sunni political engagement and threatened the unity of the country. AQI also achieved another major success through its domination of the Ramadi black market, which when combined with its role in both the licit and the illicit oil trades provided the group with a considerable amount of income.

The brutality that characterized AQI’s rise to power was not without negative consequences. The group had alienated much of the population of Anbar as a result of the same violence that had allowed it to achieve its ends. While some AQI leaders sought to rectify this situation, they were unable to do so before Zarqawi’s death. As a result, the stage was set for a renewed resistance to AQI in Anbar.

The June 7, 2006 killing of Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi and his top spiritual advisor Sheikh Abd al-Rahman in a Coalition airstrike north of Baquba capped a string of good news from Iraq. Iraqi police were the first on the scene following the airstrike, followed by elements of Multi-National Division North. They identified Zarqawi by fingerprints, facial recognition, and known scars. While the death of Zarqawi was both a morale boost and a success for the Coalition, there were a variety of reasons why it had little long-term impact on the insurgency in Anbar. AQI’s continued freedom of movement, ample finances, ruthless murder and intimidation campaign, and network of diffuse, independent cells meant that AQI was able to sustain itself and even grow following the death of Zarqawi. AQI also maintained a sizeable cadre of individuals who could be quickly promoted. Thus, Zarqawi’s death did not affect the long-term capability of AQI to continue operations and exert influence over much of the population of Anbar.

Reactions to Zarqawi’s Death

The Coalition exploited the opportunity provided by Zarqawi’s death by dropping 500,000 leaflets on Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baquba announcing his demise to create fear and distrust among AQI and its supporters.

AQI began its own information campaign to counter the propaganda effect of Zarqawi’s death, with various AQI websites publishing media products glorifying Zarqawi as a martyr. AQI’s ability to produce these products so rapidly illustrated the speed and flexibility of AQI’s media-savvy affiliates. Other supporters of the Iraqi insurgency flooded radical Islamist websites with multimedia depictions of Zarqawi as a martyr. These developments unfolded without the direction of AQI’s central authority (which was likely in chaos as a result of Zarqawi’s death), showing the ability of AQI’s disparate supporters to organize a coherent and unified response using the internet.

Repercussions of Zarqawi’s Death in Anbar

439 [ | Military | 08 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060608 | (S/NE) | ]
440 Ibid.
441 [ | Military | 09 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060609 | (S/NE) | ]
442 Ibid.
Zarqawi's demise left many low and mid-level AQI members in Ramadi confused about what the group was going to do next and who would replace Zarqawi. However, the AQI leadership in Anbar and their allies were still determined to fight, with Abu Khattab deputy declaring that "now we all are Zarqawi" at a meeting of the group's leadership. AQI fighters and recruiters began driving through the Albu 'Ubayd tribal areas, declaring to residents that Zarqawi's death had created "an army of Zarqawis."443

A number of AQI leaders feared that they too would be targeted in the Coalition offensive they believed to be imminent and continued their plans to relocate. In his absence, was appointed to serve as the spiritual leader of AQI in Ramadi despite the fact that he was still completing his religious studies at Anbar University.444 The decision of the AQI leadership to flee Ramadi for other parts of the province proved to be a poor one, resulting in the June 10 capture of AQI Ramadi amir during a Coalition raid northwest of Fallujah.445

In the absence of more senior AQI leadership in Ramadi, AQI amirs decided to oversee the defense of the city to increase their standing within the organization. Traveling to the Malaab district, the three AQI leaders attempted to persuade residents not to flee the city so that they could use them as human shields if the Coalition did attack.446 They even sent a message requesting that his followers in 1920 Revolution Brigade, Harakat Islamiyah, Islamic Army of Iraq, and the al-Nu'man Brigade provide support to AQI if the Coalition did attack Ramadi.447 The request was rebuffed, as had already met with other leaders from 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Harakat Islamiyah in the al-Jam'iyah district of Ramadi as soon as the first rumors of a Coalition attack on Ramadi had occurred. The insurgent leaders who attended the meeting concurred with assessment that they should not attack or oppose Coalition operations in Ramadi in order to avoid further losses to their already-weakened organizations. They also hoped that Coalition operations would rid Ramadi of AQI.448

The capture of convinced AQI leaders that it was safer to return to Ramadi and organize a more consolidated defense of the city. They thus deployed 100-150 fighters between the Malaab and Humayrah districts of the city, dividing the defense of other sections of Ramadi among select amirs, each of whom was given command of sixty fighters. Despite this apparent organization, a Coalition airstrike that killed six AQI fighters while they were planting an IED had a significant psychological impact on the AQI leadership and nearly all of them fled the city again on June 17.449 Only remained behind to fight,
possibly in an effort to increase his stature within AQI now that he had been released from detention.450

The Rise of

(U) The demise of Zarqawi had another significant impact on AQI: senior AQI operative and Zarqawi lieutenant assumed command of the organization. An experienced leader, had been involved in international terrorism since 1982 when he first joined future AQSL as a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Traveling to in 1999, he received explosives training at AQAM training camps and delivered lectures to other AQAM recruits. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to Iraq and by 2004 had assumed the position of Zarqawi’s amir for southern Anbar, using his explosives training to become an expert in the construction of VBIEDs. He operated primarily south of Baghdad, where materials recovered during Coalition raids in April-May 2006 confirmed his ongoing involvement in terrorist attacks in Baghdad.451

(S/NF) After Zarqawi was killed, authored a June 13 AQI statement that threatened retaliation and taunted the Coalition that its only option in Iraq was to flee. He then assumed command of AQI with the approval AQSL, pledging to work hard to improve the strained relationship between AQI and AQSL that had existed under Zarqawi.452 His intimate knowledge of AQI and close ties to Zarqawi helped to ensure continuity of operations for most of AQI, but he also drew up a list of 150-200 members of the group to be purged in a "cleansing process" that would remove both potential traitors and opposition to his ascent.453

The Yusufiyah Meetings

(S/NF) Not all within AQI in Anbar welcomed the rise of to replace Zarqawi. Long-time AQI leader Sheikh Abdullah Janabi held a series of meetings in Yusufiyah with up to fifty lieutenants to discuss the selection of as the new AQI leader.454 Among those who attended the meetings were Fallujah city council member Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Abbas and Because Janabi had lost two sons to the fighting in Fallujah during Operation AL FAJR, he believed that AQSL should have chosen him rather than as the new leader of AQI.

(S/NF) The results of this meeting are unclear, but it shows that there was an undercurrent of wariness amongst the Iraqi leaders of AQI about the new chief and especially about AQSL’s decision to appoint rather than an established native insurgent leader.

450 [ | Military | 19 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060619 | (S/NF) | ]
451 [ | Military | 16 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060616 | (S/NF) | ]
452 Ibid.
453 [ | Military | 21 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060621 | (S/NF) | ]
454 [ | Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | (S/NF) | ]
Insurgent Reconciliation

(S) Following the death of Zarqawi, Prime Minister Maliki unveiled a 24-point national reconciliation plan in a June 25 speech to the Iraqi parliament. Aimed primarily at Iraqi Sunni Arabs, the speech outlined broad security, reconstruction, and reconciliation priorities. However, Maliki provided little detail on contentious issues such as the extent of the amnesty offered to insurgents, de-Ba'athification reform, Coalition withdrawal, and militia integration. Instead, he offered a vaguely worded amnesty "for detainees not involved in terrorist acts, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," a quick release of prisoners not charged with crimes, greater domestic and international oversight of Iraqi prisons, and compensation for Iraqis who had been harmed by terrorism, military operations, and sectarian violence.455

(C) While the Islamic Resistance Movement, Ansar al-Sunna, and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party all rejected Maliki's offer, eleven SAR insurgent groups agreed to join the political process under Maliki's National Reconciliation Plan. According to media reports, these groups laid out several demands as part of their reintegration:456

1. A timetable for Coalition withdrawal.
2. An end to Coalition and Iraqi military operations against SAR insurgent groups.
3. Compensation for Iraqis killed in Coalition military operations and reimbursement for property damage.
4. An end to the ban on army officers from Saddam Hussein's government in the new Iraqi military.
5. An end to the government ban on former Ba'athists.
6. The release of SAR insurgent group members currently being held in detention.
7. Recognition of SAR insurgent groups as legitimate political organizations.

(C) These demands allowed Maliki to find common ground with the SAR insurgent groups, as most of them were similar to points already in his proposed reconciliation plan. However, Maliki risked undermining his own political support by reaching out too far to the Sunni community and being seen as "rewarding terrorists" for their behavior. Many Shi'a did not view the actions of the SAR groups as comparable to their own under Saddam Hussein.457

(S) Several of the insurgent groups seeking political reconciliation with the Iraqi government, including a faction of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, insisted on specific guidelines before agreeing to lay down their arms that the Iraqi government found all but impossible to fulfill. Other insurgent groups, such as the local branches of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Ansar al-Sunna in Fallujah, sought a cease-fire with the Coalition in return for allowing members of the groups to join the Iraqi army while they would in turn provide information that would help the Coalition to target AQI.458

455 [ | Military | 27 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060627 | (S/NF) | ]
456 [ | Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060630 | (S/NF) | ]
457 Ibid.
458 [ | Military | 02 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060702 | (S/NF) | ]
The workable mechanisms for any *quid pro quo* between the Coalition and insurgent groups were very problematic. The Coalition could never verify that any one group was no longer targeting either the Coalition or the Iraqi army since the majority of insurgent attacks were not attributable to a particular group. At the same time, the insurgents could not be adequately assured that their group would not be engaged by the Coalition due to its inability to determine the insurgent affiliations of groups of armed men in civilian attire. The foreign patrons of the insurgency would also be less than pleased to learn that their largesse was bankrolling an idle insurgency. Finally, rapprochement with the Coalition ran counter to the ingrained notions of resistance to occupation, restoration of Sunni dominance in Iraq, restoration of the Sunni to positions of privilege, and shielding the Iraqi Sunnis from Shi’a reprisals that motivated the majority of rank-and-file SAR fighters. To these low-level fighters, the Coalition was an implacable foe with whom no negotiation was possible under any circumstances.459

Another obstacle to reconciliation in Ramadi lay in the fact that residents were increasingly dissatisfied and pessimistic about Maliki’s ability to enact a more effective solution to the security situation and to bring an end to sectarian violence. While the Iraqi security forces had now received better equipment and training, the same could be said for the Shi’a militias. Ramadi residents in particular feared the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi army units, believing that the large number of Sunnis killed in Baghdad was proof of a conspiracy between Shi’a militias and Iraqi government officials. Combined with widespread rumors of Sunnis being kidnapped and tortured by these perceptions made the Sunni population skeptical of any Shi’a moves towards political reconciliation.460

The Anbar Central Council

In response to Maliki’s initiative, the Anbar Central Council was formed at a meeting of SAR Anbari leaders in late July 2006. It consisted of tribal, religious, economic, political, military, professional, social, and youth committees, members of which were elected through a secret ballot. The Central Council rejected Iraqi federalism, called for the withdrawal of Coalition forces from Iraq, supported "national resistance," demanded the dissolution of Shi’a militias and an end to Shi’a-dominated Iraqi army units, accused the Coalition of massacres, called for an end to de-Ba’athification, supported Maliki’s national reconciliation plan, called for an international investigation into the embezzlement of Iraqi funds, rejected modifications to Iraqi provincial borders, called for an end to external and internal refugees, supported AMS, and called for ties between Iraq and the United States following a Coalition withdrawal.461

All in all, the Anbar Central Council helped to provide a platform for uniting the province’s disparate Sunni and SAR leaders. However, its agenda was untenable within Iraqi politics and would remain so until the SAR leadership recognized the reality of their current situation and formed a lasting engagement with the Iraqi government.462 While the Central Council lacked legitimacy within the "official" framework of the Iraqi government, it was able to win over rival political factions.
outside Anbar. Its efforts, however, soon were hindered not by the Shi'a Iraqi government but instead by Sunni political rivals operating both within and outside of its framework. Unable to unify for the purposes of national politics, the Central Council could not assume a real leadership role in Anbar.

Failed Plots and Counterplots

Salih Mutlaq’s Plot

(S/NF) The Central Council was not the only Iraqi group making plans from Amman. With Zarqawi dead, Iraqi National Dialogue Front (INDF) leader Salih Mutlaq held a conference of Iraqi politicians and military leaders in Amman from June 15-20 to discuss his plans to oppose terrorism (i.e. Shi'a militias), sectarianism and any division of Iraq. Salih's goal was to the long-term formation of a government-in-exile, complete with a shadow parliament, that could obtain international support and financial assistance for its own agenda while demonstrating to the international community that the current Iraqi leadership was made up of uneducated individuals incapable of running the government. Even though the shadow parliament was Salih's initiative, his Iraqi National Dialogue Front would remain active in Iraq's real parliament.

(S/NF) One hundred-fifty individuals attended Salih's conference, including ten Tawafuq Front MPs and six INDF MPs (Khalaf Alayan, Dr. Abdul Latif Humaym Kharbit, Dr. Abd al-Wahhab al-Qasab, General Jalil Shauy'a, wealthy expatriate businessmen Sheikh Tariq Khalaf al-Abdallah al-Halbusi and Khamis Khanjar al-Dulaymi). Salih had long sought the political support of Ba'athist and SAR insurgent leaders, but the individuals who attended his conference were among the most dangerous of those still at large. The presence of both Alayan and Humaym Kharbit at Salih's conference illustrates the lengths that he was willing to go in order to undermine Iraq's elected government. Other SAR figures who attended the conference included, all of whom represented hardline SAR groups that continued to sanction violence against the Coalition and Iraqi government.

(S/NF) In early August 2006, the GID Iraqi operations chief responded to Coalition queries about Salih Mutlaq’s activities, stating that it was aware of the rumors that Mutlaq was setting up a "shadow government" or planning a coup but did not regard them as particularly credible. Regarding the alleged involvement of Mutlaq’s plot, stated that while Sharif Fawaz served as representatives in Mutlaq’s plot and

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463 [Military | 07 Aug 06 MNF W - INTSUM | 20060807 | (S/NF) | ]
464 [Military | 23 Jul 06 MNF W - INTSUM | 20060723 | (S/NF) | ]
465 Ibid.
466 Ibid.
Iraq that the GID had no information that he had attended Mutlaq's conference in government as trying to expand his own INDF by trying to enlist the support of AMS, anti-government Shi'a groups, and Iraqi tribes.\footnote{467}

\textit{(S/NE)} On August 28, GID's substantive authority on Iraq, retired Major General Sadi Zatari, described Mutlaq to the Coalition as an individual who was all talk and no action, dismissing the view that he was capable of perpetrating a coup. Zatari believed that there were no truly influential figures in the INDF other than Mutlaq and noting the entire INDF was made up of 8-10 Iraqi MPs, a few former generals, and former Ba'athists. As a result, Mutlaq's claims that he had recruited 3,000 individuals who would help him overthrow Prime Minister Maliki in a military coup should be taken with a grain of salt. Zatari believed that if Mutlaq were able to unite all of the Sunni sectarians, Ba'athists, and army officers then he could become powerful, but noted that he was severely weakened by his feuding with the IIP and the Tawafuq Front.\footnote{468}

\textit{(S/NE)} The continued association between INDF, FREs, and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party made both Iraqi and Coalition engagement with the party problematic, particularly given the Iraqi government's desire to highlight the role of FREs and Ba'athists as the primary threat to Iraqi security. Any Coalition attempts to redirect the INDF towards a more moderate tone of reconciliation were unlikely to produce any improvement in Sunni political unity or Sunni leverage inside the Iraqi government. Nascent Sunni political movements such as the Anbar Central Council, by contrast, generated modest amounts of unity among certain Sunni leaders and had some acceptance from Shi'a political organizations. Other than Mutlaq, however, INDF was primarily supported by Jaysh al-Fatihin leader and members of the powerful family who, upset with their minimal influence over the Anbar Central Council, hoped to further divide the Sunni political leadership for their own personal and economic gain. As a result, Mutlaq's movement remained active only where it operated on the fringes of Iraqi expatriate politics.\footnote{469}

**Kharbit and the Tribes**

\textit{(S/NE)} In early July 2006, Mudhir Abd al-Karim al-Kharbit al-Khalifawi al-Dulaymi, an influential sheikh for the Albu Khalifa clan within the Albu Aitha, who had maintained close ties to Saddam Hussein, held a meeting of expatriate Iraqi sheikhs in to persuade them to return to their traditional tribal areas in Rawah and al-Qaim. In attendance were Sheikh Najah Khalifa al-Karbuli, Sheikh Amar Nijm al-Salmani (Albu Salman), Sheikh Sabah Sattam al-Sharji al-Mahalawi al-Dulaymi (Albu Mahal), and himself.\footnote{470}

\textit{(S/NE)} Prior to arriving in many of the sheikhs in attendance had attempted to travel through only to be refused entry by the because of their ties to AQI. Sheikh Amar, for instance, led the pro-AQI faction of the Albu Salman tribe that supported AQI in its fight

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\footnote{467}{Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | (S/NE) | }
\footnote{468}{Ibid.}
\footnote{469}{Ibid.}
\footnote{470}{Military | 03 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060803 | (S/NE) | }

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Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province, Iraq

\textbf{SECRET/NOFORN}
with the Hamza Battalion in 2005 (see Chapter 5b). Sheikh Abd al-Hadi Amar al-Rawi was one of AQI's top financiers in Rawah who was an associate of AQI leader (b)\(^6\) As a result, they relocated to 14b

\((\text{S/NE})\) attempt to repatriate the pro-AQI sheikhs was motivated by his desire to repopulate the Sunni tribal and political leadership in Anbar with individuals he believed he could manipulate to facilitate his eventual return to the province. (b)\(^6\) remained more or less unchanged in his status from 2003: a megalomaniacal (b)\(^6\) who sought to build a power base in order to become the next dictator of Iraq. Contrary to his views, his influence in Anbar had been marginal since his exile, though he and his Kharbit clan continued to pose a threat to Anbar because of their considerable wealth and willingness to fund any Sunni insurgent group intent on attacking Coalition or Iraqi personnel. His attempt to build an alliance of AQI allies, FREs, and pro-Coalition tribal leaders was likely doomed to failure from the beginning. Sheikh Sabah and Sheikh Najah, for instance, had both been feuding against one another ever since the latter sheikh sided with AQI against the Albu Mahal in 2005, resulting in the destruction of Sheikh Sabah's home.\(^472\) Sheikh Sabah in fact stated that if the pro-AQI sheikhs returned to al-Qaim, he would not guarantee their safety.\(^473\)

**Ali Baban and the IIP Militia**

\((\text{S/NE})\) A different sort of political maneuver, with sweeping military implications, was planned by Iraqi Planning Minister Ali Baban, a leading figure in the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Baban was so concerned by the sectarian violence perpetrated by Shi'a militias that he intended to establish an 800-strong IIP militia that would be able to confront them if the need arose. The militia was formed under the cover of the security company al-Murabit and the communications company Sawa'iq for Communications. The reason for Ali Baban's concern was that the Facilities Protection Service, which numbered 135-150,000 armed men, was being brought under the control of the Shi'a interior ministry, leaving many Sunni leaders concerned over who would protect their public infrastructure and buildings.\(^474\)

\((\text{S/NE})\) Baban's effort to set up an IIP militia followed months of warnings from IIP, Tawafuq Front, and INDF that the Sunnis would set up their own militia if the Iraqi government failed to stop the Shi'a militias and balance out the predominantly Shi'a interior ministry. Prime Minister Maliki sought to integrate the militias into the Iraqi security forces, which many Sunnis feared would bring the security forces further under the control of the Shi'a and 14b While Ali Baban was a competent planning minister, he did not possess the military or religious expertise necessary for this effort and it seems likely that he was working with Sunni leaders within the IIP and its allies who did.\(^475\)

\(^{471}\) [ | Military | 03 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060803 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{472}\) Ibid.
\(^{473}\) [ | Military | 03 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060803 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{474}\) [ | Military | 04 Aug 05 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060804 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{475}\) Ibid.
The IIP also faced another challenge: AQI carried out continuous attacks against the group. Despite IIP efforts to corner the market on Islamist political sentiment in Iraq, its leaders were targeted by AQI in Ramadi and Haditha, necessitating some sort of protection. Furthermore, IIP participation in the Anbar Central Council provoked animosity between the IIP and more traditional provincial power blocs such as the This required the party to establish an armed wing in case the time came to settle old scores.

The feud between AQI and the IIP in Anbar was a long-running one. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, IIP leaders including Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi had hoped to dominate the politics of Ramadi. During the 2003-2004 period, many IIP members supported FRE or SAR insurgents as a way of convincing the Coalition to withdraw from Iraq. With the rise of AQI as the dominant group in the insurgency, however, IIP leaders were actively targeted as traitors to Islam because of their cooperation with the Iraqi government and the Coalition. All AQI amirs in Ramadi were given a list of fifty IIP members to assassinate on sight. Among those IIP members killed were director Dr. Khamis Mutar Aysa of the Women and Children’s Hospital and Ramadi lawyer Thakir Ubayd al-Alwani.

The Haditha Shura Council also mounted a vigorous murder and intimidation campaign against IIP in the city, killing IIP member Layith al-Rawi, a teacher at the Haditha Technical School. The murder of three IIP members by AQI leader provoked a popular reaction against the group, with IIP calling on the general population to rise up against AQI. AQI responded with a propaganda campaign of its own, declaring that IIP members were not true Muslims and that even the party’s name was blasphemy. IIP members in the Anah police force responded by kidnapping and bombing the home of AQI member.

From August 22 onwards, the IIP fight against AQI was supported by elements of the Albu Mahal tribe. The Albu Mahal blamed the Anah AQI for vehicle theft that prevented al-Qaim from receiving fuel and other goods and were unwilling to give the group a foothold for control over lucrative smuggling routes.

\[476\] Ibid.
\[477\] [Military | 28 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060828 | (S/NE) | ]
\[478\] [Military | 02 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060802 | (S/NE) | ]
\[479\] [Military | 29 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060829 | (S/NE) | ]
\[480\] [Military | 01 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060901 | (S/NE) | ]
AQI’s Competitors Reorganize, June-July 2006

Ba’athist Efforts

(S/NF) Meanwhile, exiled Iraqi Ba’athists were making plans of their own. At the behest of the (S/NF) 1.4b formed the Democratic Arab Reform Organization (DARO) to support the Iraqi Ba’athists. (S/NF) 1.4b plan was for DARO to set up offices in various Iraqi provinces in order to recruit former military officers and other elements of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party who would then be sent to (S/NF) 1.4b for training. These offices would also be in contact with other insurgent groups in Iraq. (S/NF) 1.4b intended DARO’s agenda to be the formation of a (S/NF) 1.4b Iraqi government; halting the spread of Salafism in Iraq; serving as a substitute for the Iraqi Ba’ath Party; and lessening pressure on the remaining Iraqi Ba’athists. Saddam Hussein’s (S/NF) 1.4b agreed to provide funding for DARO through the (S/NF) 1.4b

(S/NF) One of DARO’s few successes was (S/NF) 1.4b whose network carried out minor attacks in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Baghdad from his (S/NF) 1.4b sanctuary using Ba’athists drawn from former Iraqi military, intelligence, and security personnel as well as pro-Ba’athist tribesmen. (S/NF) 1.4b attempted to coordinate his operations with AQI but found their ideology too extreme, forcing him to work instead with lesser insurgent groups such as Jaysh al-Fatihin, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and 1920 Revolution Brigade. Like other (S/NF) 1.4b Ba’athists. However, (S/NF) 1.4b only provided limited support for the insurgency that resulted in proportionally limited influence. 482

(S/NF) meanwhile continued efforts to reorganize the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, implementing a number of recommendations made to him by an April 2006 committee of (S/NF) 1.4b Iraqi Ba’athists. 483

1. (S/NF) 1.4b was relieved of all responsibilities in (S/NF) 1.4b and ordered to return to Iraq.
2. (S/NF) 1.4b was ordered to step down from his current position.
3. Former An Najaf governor Ali Abd al-Karim al-Sa’dun (Abu Tahsin) was made the new head of the Iraqi Ba’athists in (S/NF) 1.4b with Lieutenant General Tali al-Duri.
4. (S/NF) 1.4b was made coordinator between the (S/NF) 1.4b Iraqi Ba’athists and their national leadership.
5. (S/NF) 1.4b was made the liaison between (S/NF) 1.4b and the other branches of the Ba’ath Party throughout the Middle East.
6. (S/NF) 1.4b was placed in charge of monitoring the Iraqi emigre community in and coordinating with the (S/NF) 1.4b Ba’athists through (S/NF) 1.4b

481 [ | Military | 14 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060614 | (S/NF) | ]
482 [ | Military | 22 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060622 | (S/NF) | ]
483 [ | Military | 04 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060704 | (S/NF) | ]

6/13/07
Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province, Iraq
SECRET/NOFORN

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
By August 2006, Major General Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad and his deputy, former IIS officer Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad, managed to be reinstated as the leaders of the Ba'ath Party's military wing, though the political leadership remained solidly under the control of Saddam Hussein. This was because Saddam Hussein sent a letter from prison that ordered the Ba'athists to reconcile with the insurgency through any means necessary. While some wanted to continue supporting the insurgency, argued for a cessation of hostilities due to reports of Ba'athists killing other Iraqis in acts of sectarian violence. As a result of consolidation efforts, the Ba'athists had formed small cells at the local level in many Iraqi cities with assistance from the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) supporting the party's activities, helping it to establish a national organization and concentrate its efforts on Iraqi national unity.

Towards this end, the leaders of the Iraqi Ba'athists sought to keep their options open and met with Iraqi parliament speaker Mahmud Mashadani during his trip to Iraq. During the meeting, stressed that his opposition was to the Coalition rather than the Iraqi government and asked Mashadani why the government was not doing more to incorporate the Ba'athists into the new political process.

Other Nationalist Efforts

These Ba'athists were not the only Iraqis abroad seeking to use a nationalist appeal to influence events in Iraq. In July, wealthy businessmen created in the Harakat al-Qiwa al-Wataniyah wa al-Qawmiyah, a political party designed to compete in provincial and national elections. A secular party, HQWQ was based around the ideals of national unity, anti-federalism, and equality between Shi'a and Sunni. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) supported the party's activities, helping it to establish a national organization and concentrate its efforts on Iraqi national unity. Towards that end, the group established contact with six insurgent groups and by late September 2006 had a military wing under the leadership of former Iraqi military officers drawn from the diaspora.

Antagonism Between AQI and Jaysh al-Fatihin

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484 Ibid.
485 [Military | 21 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060821 | (S/NF) | ]
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid.
488 [Military | 09 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070109 | (S/NF) | ]
(S/NF) If DARO, the Ba’athists and other expatriates had trouble effectively responding to AQI, a more serious challenge was presented by Jaysh al-Fatihin. By mid-June, any desire for prior cooperation between AQI and Jaysh al-Fatihin (formerly the national Islamic Army of Iraq, see Chapter 6a) had degenerated into a mutually hostile relationship. Those Jaysh al-Fatihin members who refused to join or ally with AQI were forced to relocate to areas around Fallujah and Baghdad where AQI was less active. The root of the hostility was Jaysh al-Fatihin political leader willingness to explore political participation to the point of considering the incorporation of his group into the Iraqi army and security forces in a manner similar to the Hamza Battalion (see Chapter 6a).

(S/NF) Unlike AQI, Jaysh al-Fatihin enjoyed a degree of popular support in the Sufia district of Ramadi and from the Albu Fahd tribe. Their political message and the all-Iraqi nature of their group resonated with Sufia residents, particularly the fact that the group’s military wing was composed of former Iraqi army officers from the Dulaymi tribal confederation led by .

The Anbar Revolutionaries

(S/NF) Jaysh al-Fatihin was not AQI’s most dangerous opponent, however. The Thuwar al-Anbar (Anbar Revolutionaries) had reformed since its earlier dissolution after the death of Lieutenant General Sa‘ab Manfi al-Rawi. Led by former military intelligence officer in Ramadi, the group assassinated fourteen AQI fighters suspected of killing Iraqi civilians and police officers. Allying itself with other vigilante groups such as Sayf al-Haqq as well as anti-AQI insurgent groups like 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Harakat Islamiyah, the group was determined to carry out its goal of removing AQI from Anbar.

(S) The group rose from a small, obscure organization, perhaps composed of only three brothers and an Iraqi army colonel named into an influential and important part of the anti-AQI resistance. By the summer of 2006, the Anbar Revolutionaries was carrying out attacks against AQI, including the June 9 killing of an entire AQI mortar team and the murder of AQI member Jassim Fadal Abbas, whose body was dumped on 17th Street with a note stating that he had killed Ramadi residents and police.

(S) AQI immediately fought back against the Anbar Revolutionaries, killing six leaders of the group later that month while they were speaking out against AQI. Another leader was injured separately, forcing him to flee to while he recovered.

(S/NF) The efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries were bolstered by the actions of an unknown imam in the Tamim district of Ramadi. Frustrated over AQI’s violence, this imam hired snipers to

489 [Military, 21 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM, 20060621, (S/NF)]
490 [Military, 21 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM, 20060621, (S/NF)]
491 [Military, 27 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM, 20060627, (S/NF)]
492 [Military, 24 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM, 20060824, (S/NF)]
493 Ibid.
assassinate designated AQI leaders, killing two cell leaders. Ordering his followers to leave threatening messages at the homes of AQI members in Ramadi, the imam demanded that they leave the city or be killed.\footnote{494}

Continued Problems in the Iraqi Security Forces

\textit{(S/NE)} Amidst these political maneuvers the security situation in Anbar continued to deteriorate. Some of this was due to a failure to create an effective national Iraqi police force, especially in the two largest cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. AQI’s Ramadi leadership, even when dispersed, managed to carry out an effective murder and intimidation campaign. While their dispersal should have provided an opportunity for the Iraqi police, very few police were willing to patrol the streets of Ramadi and even fewer possessed military experience. Instead, the Iraqi police usually fled immediately after coming under attack.\footnote{495}

\textit{(S/NE)} The situation in the Fallujah police force was even worse. On June 21, Fallujah police chief Brigadier General Salah was summoned to the interior ministry in Baghdad to discuss reports he had submitted about the police in Fallujah as well as to discuss disagreements between Anbar police chief Brigadier General Sha’ban Muhammad Samir and the interior ministry. Salah told the interior ministry that he was forming a committee to investigate what happened to more than $6,000,000 in funding for the Fallujah police force. Sha’ban had been given the government funding for a variety of projects as well as $66,000 to cover expenses and salaries, none of which was accounted for. In light of this information, Undersecretary for Intelligence of the Ministry of the Interior Major General Kamal asked Salah to take Sha’ban into custody for corruption. Salah refused, noting that this was a duty for the interior ministry rather than the Fallujah police.\footnote{496}

\textit{(S/NE)} In actuality, Sha’ban was a former Ba’athist who had refused to kickback 10\% of the Iraqi police payroll to a corrupt official in the interior ministry. His discontent with the interior ministry from this incident led him to steal millions of dollars from the interior ministry and the police. More ominously, he aided AQI efforts against the Coalition while taking money for himself. His personal security detail now included AQI members who took part a variety of violent activities including assassinations.\footnote{497} a member of Sha’ban’s bodyguard, was an AQI cell leader in Fallujah associated with .\footnote{498} Communicating with AQI in Ramadi through Hirzallah, Sha’ban let the group know when his police would depart for their patrols.\footnote{499}

\textit{(S) In mid-July Sha’ban was arrested by the Iraqi interior ministry in Baghdad during a meeting with deputy interior minister for police affairs Dr. Ayden.\footnote{500} Anbar deputy police chief\footnote{501}}
took over his duties as the police chief, but he would resign less than a month later out of fear that he too would be arrested by the interior ministry.\(^{501}\)

AQI leader providing him with police pay rosters and other information on specific officers in order to target them for his murder and intimidation campaign.\(^{502}\)

By mid-August, anti-Iraqi police force had reportedly swelled to as many as 500 members of varying levels of commitment who prevented the Albu Sha'b'an, Albu Muhjabil, and Albu Dhiab tribe from joining the Iraqi police or enlisting in the Iraqi army.\(^{503}\) also repeatedly failed to pay the Iraqi police, some of whom were not paid for over 60 days but were afraid to confront him.\(^{504}\)

25,000,000 Iraqi dinars ($17,000) was given to support AQI activities in Ramadi. As a result, while AQI routinely targeted senior Iraqi police officials for assassination, was able to travel without bodyguards because he was under AQI protection.\(^{505}\)

In retaliation for the loss of Sha'ban as one of its most powerful Iraqi assets, AQI assassinated Fallujah district administrative police officer Major Ayad Khamis Salman along with another senior police officer (Brigadieer General Khoudari).\(^{506}\) The death of Ayad sparked a firestorm among the Fallujah police, as it was the first time that a senior Fallujah police officer had been killed since 2004.\(^{507}\) AQI also kidnapped and beheaded Iraqi highway patrol captain Abbas Khodeir Taleb, the first time that the group killed a member of the highway patrol.\(^{508}\)

The three officers were killed by the Karmah-based AQI leader Sheikh Nazar Sa'di Zahir, who led a "mixed" group of AQI, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and former Islamic Army of Iraq fighters. He was supported by Zaidon-based AQI leader who personally beheaded Abbas. Sheikh Nazar regarded it as a priority to target both the Iraqi army and the police, viewing them as both traitors to Islam and softer targets than the Coalition. Using forged identification cards and his intimidation of several Iraqi police to prevent his operatives from being detected, Sheikh Nazar was able to mount a particularly vicious murder and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi police in Fallujah.\(^{509}\)

Following the arrest of twenty-six AQI members by the Iraqi police on July 27, AQI leader Sheikh Nazar and sent a death threat to Fallujah police chief Brigadier General Salah, ordering him to cease cooperation with the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade or face the consequences.\(^{510}\)

The results of Sheikh Nazar’s efforts are clear. From June 29 to August 2, he and his followers carried out fifty-nine attacks against Iraqi police in Fallujah, up from twenty-one during the same period in 2005. Because of support for the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade, AQI viewed his top lieutenants as a major threat to their freedom of movement inside Fallujah.511

Many Fallujah police became disillusioned over the summer by constant AQI attacks and internal corruption, resulting in some police quitting their jobs. Sheikh Nazar’s near-incessant attacks, a lack of support from the Fallujah judiciary, and corruption in both the police and the judiciary were the most common explanations given for their departure. The increase in attacks on the Fallujah police was due to the fact that all of the disparate AQI factions in the city coordinated their murder and intimidation efforts against the police under the leadership of Sheikh Nazar.512

Unfortunately, Fallujah lost a valuable asset at the end of August when left his position to take up the post of Karkh district police chief in western Baghdad, a job that would give him oversight of more than 10,000 Iraqi police. acceptance of the post was not a surprise given the stress of the previous six months, the assassination of fifteen of his men and friction with Fallujah civic leaders. He was succeeded as city police chief by the native Fallujan.513

Although Ramadi and Fallujah suffered the brunt of AQI’s anti-police campaigns, other cities in Anbar faced similar attacks. Sustained attacks on police stations, recruits and police officers themselves occurred in Hit, Haditha, Kubaysah, Haqlaniyah, and Rawah, while the police forces of other towns, such as Karmah, were thoroughly penetrated by insurgents.

One of the most vicious anti-police campaigns occurred in the Zangora area, where devoted his entire cell to nothing but killing police. He was supported by his superior, Zarqawi protégé who set up checkpoints to target the police, paying members of the cell $500 for every officer killed. On July 3, he carried out numerous attacks against the Iraqi police in Zangora, Abu Tiban, and Zughayr after they returned from their training in . The police were given the option of resigning, agreeing to work with AQI, or death. Nasayf’s efforts ensured that the police, who replaced the ones he murdered or forced to resign, were infiltrated by AQI.515

of the western Ramadi police station supported providing him with an Iraqi police roster.516

Another area that especially suffered during the summer was Jazira. On August 21, AQI leaders ordered a suicide bombing attack on the Iraqi police station in the Jazira area, killing eleven of the thirty Iraqi police assigned there. The Jazira police station was temporary
and had only become operational on July 20, but had already come under AQI attack on several occasions prior to that date.517

(S/NF) Along with its infiltration of local police and government figures, AQI also penetrated Iraqi national intelligence in Anbar, western Iraq for the defense ministry, was in fact an AQI leader who maintained cells in Baghdad, Abu Ghraib, Khalidiyah, and Ramadi. An associate of AQI leader had traveled twice to (the hub for training and support operations for both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna) to acquire money.518

City Stories: Summer 2006

Ramadi

(S/NF) Bolstered by their robust anti-police campaign, AQI pulled Ramadi even further into its hands. Perhaps most importantly, AQI began to re-educate Anbaris by using schools in Ramadi to indoctrinate Iraqi children with Salafist beliefs. Middle-class Salafis loyal to AQI taught several classes per day and falsified their employment records to extort money from the education ministry. While young children were already used by AQI as spotters or IED emplacers, the group had a more long-term vision of its war against the United States and sought to flood the curricula at all levels with classes designed to instill extremist values. Other classes, such as those held at the Ar-Rabat Elementary School instructed children how to build IEDs or suicide bomber vests. While groups such as Harakat Islamiyah and Islamic Army of Iraq also recruited children, they did so primarily by distributing toys and telling children that they should love, respect, and admire the insurgents for fighting the United States.519 AQI, on the other hand, was indoctrinating children for its continuing war with the United States.

(S/NF) At the same time, the flight of many AQI leaders reduced AQI activity in Ramadi, with the result that current or former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq allied with AQI became the primary insurgent force in the city. These Islamic Army of Iraq members maintained their operational relationships with Ansar al-Sunna, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen because of the groups' common goals and views on the insurgency, even while carrying out attacks at AQI's behest.520 They also conducted a typical AQI murder and intimidation campaign to infiltrate members of their group into the police and local government. The one difference between these insurgents and other AQI members was that they generally refrained from targeting civilians.521

(S/NF) The temporary departure of AQI fighters also enabled followers in the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat Islamiya to reestablish a presence in the city with the support of other insurgents in Mosul, Diyala, and Tikrit. Many of the members of these groups now sought employment in the local government as they awaited the outcome of the Iraqi political process. While members of both groups still carried out attacks on Coalition targets, they deliberately avoided

517 [Military] 21 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060821 (S/NF)
518 [Military] 13 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060713 (S/NF)
519 [Military] 12 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060612 (S/NF)
520 [Military] 06 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060606 (S/NF)
521 [Military] 23 June 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060623 (S/NF)
attacking the Iraqi police or army and refused to engage in kidnapping or theft. Jaysh Muhammad also reestablished a presence in Ramadi, reuniting with its splinter group Jaysh al-Haqq in an effort to compensate for the two groups' weakened state in Anbar.  

(S/NE) The architect of 1920 Revolution Brigade's return to Ramadi was former IIS officer (b)(6) a senior advisor to (b)(6) While he had attempted to ensure AQI representation in a council of Sunni insurgent groups in Ramadi in January 2006, this had been because he believed that only a united insurgent front could mitigate the sectarian agenda of Zarqawi. Impressed with his actions in Ramadi, Jaysh Muhammad recruited (b)(6) to assist them with their own conflict against AQI.  

(S) New sources of funding also made the revival of the 1920 Revolution Brigade possible. In late May, managers of several legitimate Baghdad-based businesses, all supporters of the insurgency, gave fifteen to sixteen million dollars to the group. The money was divided up among the companies, which then passed it on to 1920 Revolution Brigade members using wire transfers disguised as vehicle sales or contract deliveries to avoid suspicion. The origin of the fifteen to sixteen million dollars was former Iraqi Air Force chief of staff Lieutenant General Khaldun Khattab ibn al-Tikriti, who had agreed to finance the group at a meeting in (S/NF) 

(S/NE) The 1920 Revolution Brigade had long retained Ba'athists within its ranks and made use of Ba'athist front companies both in Iraq and abroad that had survived the overthrow of Saddam Hussein to support its activities. For instance, the engineer of al-Ashtar Free Trade was former Republican Guard officer and mid-level Ba'athist (b)(6) The Taj al-Arab Free Trade company was named after the former military division of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party made up of Ba'athist officers from the Republican Guard. They intended to counter (S/NF) 

City Stories: June 2005

Fallujah

(S/NE) The insurgency in Fallujah continued to be characterized by a lack of coordination, leadership or defining structure. AQI in particular suffered from too many competing leaders, each of whom claimed the mantle of amir of Fallujah. The result was that the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade now found serious support from Fallujah imams, tribal leaders and residents concerned about a resurgence of AQI in their city. The group was supported especially by sheikhs from the Albu Alwan, Albu Issa, and Mohamdi tribes, was funded by Iraqi expatriate Sheikh Ali Abbas Khalaf al-Hazimawi and wealthy Fallujah merchants, and coordinated with the Lions of Fallujah to

522 [ | Military | 23 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060523 | (S/NE) | ]
523 [ | Military | 29 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060529 | (S/NE) | ]
524 The companies were al-Nubugh Free Trade, Shumukh al-Rafidayn Free Trade, al-Amin Free Trade, al-Ashtar Free Trade, and Taj al-Arab Free Trade. [ | Military | 16 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060716 | (S/NE) | ]
525 Ibid.
526 [ | Military | 01 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060601 | (S/NE) | ]
attack suspected AQI and other “Takfiris” in the city.\(^{527}\) The Brigade was connected to the 1920 Revolution Brigade in Fallujah and followed a very similar agenda except that 1920 Revolution Brigade still carried out attacks against the Coalition.\(^{528}\)

(S/NE) Members of the insurgent groups Saraya al-Jihad, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Ansar al-Sunna in Fallujah likewise refused to oppose the al-Issawi Brigade. The refusal was because these groups disagreed with AQI’s policy that anyone who cooperated with the Coalition was a traitor to Islam and had to be killed.\(^{529}\) Saraya al-Jihad was particularly vehement in its anti-AQI views because AQI had killed Captain Ali, who had been one of the group’s top informants and provided it with detailed information on agreements between the Coalition and the Fallujah city council.\(^{530}\)

(S) Sheikh Abdullah Janabi continued to support the insurgency in Fallujah financially. Prospective insurgent sheikhs traveled to Halab al-Hadir,\(^{1.4b}\) where met with them to discuss funding.\(^{531}\) If approved of the sheikh and the sheikh agreed to operate on terms (which included providing with images and videos of insurgent attacks for use as propaganda), he received a letter to take to the Mutakib al-Islamia for $10,000.\(^{532}\)

(S/NE) After Zarqawi’s death several senior AQI leaders formerly active in Fallujah fled to Their absence made it difficult for AQI to recruit experienced new members, forcing the group to rely instead on 15-20 year-old recruits to help coordinate their attacks. Some AQI mid-level members, such as former lieutenant colonel \(^{1.4b}\) were so demoralized by the recent setbacks that they deserted the group.\(^{533}\)

(S/NE) The AQI associate group Umar Hadid Battalion was also active in Fallujah, receiving funding from the al-Zeharan Company in Baghdad. Al-Zeharan was funded by an individual named through Standard London Bank. Interestingly, al-Zeharan did not exist until its owner \(^{1.4b}\) applied for a $584,000 transfer from the Standard London Bank to the account of the United Arabian Company, which is used by the\(^{1.4b}\) government to procure aircraft.\(^{534}\) Used the United Arabian Company as a front for al-Zeharan’s illicit activities, as a $584,000 deposit would not have been unusual for a business contracted to procure aircraft.\(^{534}\)

Karmah

527 [Military | 15 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060615 | (S/NE) | ]
528 [Military | 25 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060625 | (S/NE) | ]
529 [Military | 01 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060601 | (S/NE) | ]
530 [Military | 06 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060606 | (S/NE) | ]
531 [Military | 25 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060625 | (S/NE) | ]
532 [Military | 28 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060628 | (S/NE) | ]
533 [Military | 01 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060601 | (S/NE) | ]
The insurgency in Karmah had become far less defined with the detention of [redacted] It now had no clear leader or organization. Many fighters belonging to a number of insurgent and criminal organizations banded together from time to time in order to attack the Coalition. In an effort to reinvigorate the insurgency, AQI formed the Jaysh Mujahideen Shura under [redacted] to coordinate IED attacks in the city. [redacted] was an associate of AQI amir [redacted] who was himself an associate of former Green Battalion leader [redacted]

On June 16, the mayor of Karmah, Majid, was shot while en route to a city council meeting. Because Majid had connections to both the Coalition and the insurgency, he immediately suspected one or the other. In reality, the cause of the shooting had been his meetings with Fallujah police chief General Salah in an effort to convince him to fire Karmah police chief Lieutenant Colonel Najm Abdullah Abfus, an unsavory character with ties of his own to the insurgency. The removal of Najm was the culmination of a series of events going back to the December 24, 2005 AQI attack on the Karmah police station as well as the April 8, 2006 attack on Karmah Observation Point-3 during which Najm provided no leadership or assistance to the Coalition in its actions against AQI. Najm was replaced with his predecessor [redacted] who also had significant ties to the insurgency and had been relieved of his duties following the December 24 attack on the police station.

Hit

Information on the insurgency in Hit began to dry up in the summer of 2006, perhaps because AQI and Ansar al-Sunna had so deepened their influence in the city throughout the early part of the year. What is known is that [redacted] was the leader of Ansar al-Sunna in Hit, which was made up primarily of locals who targeted the Coalition and the Baghdadi. Coalition efforts to develop a local police force in Hit failed due to the effectiveness of the Ansar al-Sunna murder and intimidation campaign, leaving the Baghdadi police force as the only effective police operating in the entire Hit-Haditha corridor.

Former Ba'athists facilitated insurgent activity in Hit, providing insurgents with access to large bank accounts and weapons caches. While the Ba’athists did not take part in any attacks themselves, they readily encouraged others to do so.

Kubaysah

Because of their dominant presence in Hit, insurgents were able to spread their influence into neighboring towns. Thus, in response to recruiting drives in Kubaysah that resulted in 184 applicants for Iraqi police training, AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and former Hit launched an increased
intimidation campaign against both police recruits and residents in Kubaysah. This led to the destruction of the Kubaysah police station on August 5, which was fortunately unoccupied at the time except for a small group of internally displaced Sunni refugees.\(^{541}\)

### Haditha

(S/NF) Throughout the summer of 2006 AQI and affiliated groups also deepened their influence in Haditha. So intimidated was the population of the city that AQI fighters no longer bothered to conceal their presence or the identities to those who sought employment in the Iraqi security forces.\(^ {542}\) AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq had united into a single organization and coordinated SAF and IED attacks against the Coalition.\(^ {543}\) The earlier cooperation agreement between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna was formalized at a meeting in the Kassajra area between Hit and Haditha in late June 2006. Unlike Zarqawi, who had often been at odds with the Ansar al-Sunna leadership, members of both groups were hopeful that the rise of \(^{(b)(6)}\) would lead to increased cooperation between their organizations.\(^ {544}\) The Haditha Shura Council served as the formal coordinating body between the various groups that operated in the area.

(S) One of the consequences of the AQI and Ansar al-Sunna unification in Haditha was the Black Banners, a group of fighters from both organizations consisting of financiers, IED facilitators, and an “action arm” that offered $200 for planting IEDs. The Black Banners were financed through the legal and illegal sale of vehicles and helped to coordinate local insurgent groups’ attacks against the Coalition. Motivated by a combination of Salafist ideology and a desire for financial gain, the group was led by \(^{(b)(6)}\) and former Republican Guard captain \(^{(b)(6)}\) the latter of whom organized attacks on Coalition forces.\(^ {546}\)

(S) To help the Haditha insurgency understand Coalition forces, former IIS officer, Ba'ath Party member, and AQI financier \(^{(b)(6)}\) (see Chapter 6a) sought to recruit former military officers who served in the military under Saddam Hussein. The based \(^{(b)(6)}\) was another major financier for the Haditha Shura Council fighters. A former Ba'athist who relocated to \(^{(b)(6)}\) after the fall of Saddam Hussein, \(^{(b)(6)}\) was able to finance the insurgency in Haditha through his brother \(^{(b)(6)}\) using the smuggling networks created under Saddam Hussein. These smuggling networks allowed for a virtually endless supply of funding and material from \(^{(b)(6)}\) to insurgent fighters in the Haditha area.\(^ {547}\)

### Haqlaniyah

541 [ Military | 06 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060806 | (S/NF) ]
542 [ Military | 13 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060613 | (S/NF) ]
543 [ Military | 15 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060615 | (S/NF) ]
544 [ Military | 09 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060709 | (S/NF) ]
545 [ Military | 02 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060802 | (S/NF) ]
546 [ Military | 18 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060618 | (S/NF) ]
547 [ Military | 18 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060818 | (S/NF) ]
AQI’s killing of civilians and its constant attacks on the Haqlaniyah base forced the closure of the local market. This led many residents to become bitter and some to support the insurgency. AQI was thus able to use events it had helped to bring about to recruit some residents and intimidate others.\textsuperscript{548} City council chairman and seven of his colleagues were forced to announce their resignation on June 13, leaving the three remaining city council members to manage the city.\textsuperscript{549} This move was orchestrated by Haqlaniyah deputy mayor Mahir Fadil Odeh, a mid-level AQI leader who was detained by the Coalition on June 26.\textsuperscript{550} Mahir had collected intelligence for Haqlaniyah AQI leader providing him with information on the city council and Coalition personnel to help the group conduct surveillance.\textsuperscript{551}

After July 24 there was a surge in SAF attacks by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna until August 9. Under the guidance of the Haditha Shura Council, the Ansar al-Sunna fighters led by pooled their resources with AQI to carry out attacks in Haqlaniyah and Bani Dahir. AQI now outnumbered Ansar al-Sunna in Haqlaniyah several times over. was the operations chief, oversaw security, and carried out murder and intimidation campaigns for the group in the western part of the city. All of these AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders saw themselves as serving the Haditha Shura Council rather than any one individual group, though the Haditha Shura Council was itself controlled by AQI.\textsuperscript{552}

On August 4, AQI destroyed the long-abandoned Haqlaniyah police station, leaving the Haditha police station as the only remaining police station in the entire area.\textsuperscript{553} AQI was determined to prevent the successful creation of an Iraqi police force in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah at all costs, even using IEDs to target Iraqi security forces as they transited between Anbar and 1.4b.\textsuperscript{554}

\textsuperscript{548}[ Military 09 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060609 | (S/NF | ]
\textsuperscript{549}[ Military 13 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060613 | (S/NF | ]
\textsuperscript{550}[ Military 04 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060704 | (S/NF | ]
\textsuperscript{551}Muthanna Khalif Taha al-Ghariri had earlier been involved in several botched kidnappings, the last of which resulted in his being shot in the head and later dying of his injuries [ Military 27 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060727 | (S/NF | ]
\textsuperscript{552}[ Military 16 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060816 | (S/NF | ]
\textsuperscript{553}[ Military 06 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060806 | (S/NF | ]
\textsuperscript{554}Ibid.
Barwanah

[S] In Barwanah itself, an AQI leader replaced the late Dhiab Khalaf al-Ubaydi (killed on July 9 during an attack on a Coalition outpost in Dulab) as the head of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in the city with the authority of the Haditha Shura Council.\(^{555}\) AQI also controlled the gas stations in Barwanah owned by both of whom sold fuel at exorbitant prices and then used the profits to support the group.\(^{556}\)

[S] The area around Barwanah also experienced tribal conflict. Because of the murder of Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Yusuf, the Albu Nimr had become one of the most pro-Coalition tribes in Hit. As an expression of this support, thirty Albu Nimr tribal recruiters traveled to Barwanah in mid-August to recruit Iraqi police. The result was that Albu Nimr and al-Ghariri tribesmen in West Sakran were threatened with death by AQI al-Jughaifi tribesmen from Barwanah if any of them joined the Iraqi police.\(^{557}\)

Anah

[S/NF] To bolster the weak AQI organization in the Anah-Kubaysah corridor, AQI leadership sent up to thirty foreign fighters who had fled from Ramadi. Under the instruction of former IIS officer the Anah insurgents set up their base at a textile factory in the southeastern part of town.\(^{558}\) AQI also made the new AQI amir for Anah, replacing who had been captured by the Coalition on May 12. Paranoid even by AQI standards, Jabbar had at one point ordered all public internet terminals destroyed in Rawah.\(^{559}\)

[S] Despite the relative disarray in the insurgency, Coalition relations with the Anah civic leadership continued to be fraught with difficulties, with city council members only sporadically attending meetings with the Coalition. The former head of the city council, the head of the government building and quality control, and the head of the famine organization had all been detained as a result of their connection to the insurgency. By the end of August, AQI had successfully marginalized the local government in Anah through a combination of intimidation and recruitment of councilmen. According to former city council member Haqi Farhan Abd Yusif, by the end of August the situation had gotten so bad that the entire city council had gone into hiding.\(^{560}\)

Rawah

[S] A similar situation existed in Rawah, where the local government and police found themselves on the verge of collapse. AQI beheaded Lieutenant Saddam and issued warnings instructing local police to post their names on the walls of the al-Sadiq Mosque, demanding that they denounce the

\(^{555}\) Military | 03 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060803 | (S/NF) |
\(^{556}\) Military | 04 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060804 | (S/NF) |
\(^{557}\) Military | 17 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060817 | (S/NF) |
\(^{558}\) Military | 11 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060611 | (S/NF) |
\(^{559}\) Military | 21 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060621 | (S/NF) |
\(^{560}\) Ibid.
police force or risk being murdered. Twelve of the police agreed to do so, posting their names and quitting the force. As a result of this murder and intimidation campaign, none of the police showed up when an order to assemble at their headquarters was issued on June 8.\(^{561}\)

\textit{(S)} In early August 2006, AQI amir \(\text{(b)(6)}\) was able to set up two checkpoints on the main highway east of the city. Each checkpoint was manned by 20-30 fighters who forced residents and businesses to stay off the highway for fear of being killed, resulting in shortages of food, fuel, and supplies. To avoid attracting attention, Rawah AQI fighters regularly used boats to travel the Euphrates River from al-Jassiyah to the checkpoints.\(^{562}\)

\textit{(S)} By late August, the Rawah city council agreed to relinquish its authority under heavy AQI intimidation. Citizens were appointed to direct their complaints to the Iraqi police and the city stamp was given to the imam of a mosque to authorize approval for government documents. This occurred in part because Rawah city council leader Sheikh Nuri Sa’ud and his \(\text{(m)(6)}\) supported AQI and intimidated locals who opposed the insurgency.\(^{563}\)

**Mintaqat al-Awlah**

\textit{(S)} In preparation for what it saw as a full-scale civil war (or in hopes of provoking one) in Iraq, AQI began recruiting residents from the Haditha area to travel in small groups to the Mintaqat al-Awlah region to meet up with foreign fighters before moving on to Baghdad. At least 50-60 local fighters were sent from Haditha to Baghdad, while Coalition personnel in Albu Hyatt noted that a large number of men between the ages of 15-40 had also traveled to Baghdad.\(^{564}\)

**Rutbah**

\textit{(S)} In Rutbah, AQI’s murder and intimidation campaign took a new turn when leader \(\text{(b)(6)}\) (detained by the Coalition on July 14 and released July 22) ordered the rape of a female member of Rutbah city leader Majid Ayish S’ud’s household after threatening him on two previous occasions. While Majid had ties of his own to the SAR insurgents, since April 2006 he had been attempting to persuade insurgents in Rutbah to cease attacks and let peace prevail in the city. Following the rape, AQI informed Majid that a member of his family would be killed if the group heard any further claims that he was cooperating with the Coalition. As a result, Majid refused to associate himself with the Rutbah city council or the Coalition.\(^{565}\)

\textit{(S)} AQI spiritual leader \(\text{(b)(6)}\) issued orders for the Fayadh and Jughayfi tribesmen to leave Rutbah on August 7 because the families of Iraqi AQI fighters were being moved from Ramadi to Rutbah and needed homes to stay in.\(^{566}\) The Karbuli tribesmen in Rutbah were also forcibly evicted from their homes by AQI fighters from Ramadi, who...
quickly took over the buildings and used them to house their own families. Masked AQI fighters recruited from the dominant Kubaysi tribe in the city patrolled the town market under the direction of [b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b][b] At his order, members of the Rutbah energy department shut down all power in the city at night so that AQI members could move freely under the cover of darkness.  

**Al-Qaim**

(S/NE) In contrast to the situation in other towns of Anbar, the insurgency remained weak in al-Qaim. AQI attempted to reach out to the revived Hamza Battalion in al-Qaim (see Chapter 6a), which now numbered roughly 500 members and operated in al-Qaim, Husaybah, Haditha, and Ramadi. While the old Hamza Battalion had fought against AQI throughout the summer and fall of 2005, the AQI leadership believed that it could negotiate with the new Hamza Battalion following the death of Zarqawi. Representatives of the Hamza Battalion met with AQI leaders but no agreement ensued between the two groups and renewed fighting would break out in late 2006 between them (see Chapter 6c).  

(S) Nothing shows AQI's weakness in al-Qaim better than the decision by the group to recruit female suicide bombers. In both traditional Arab culture as well as within Islam, women are not supposed to participate directly in fighting unless forced to by necessity. While attempts to recruit women to serve as suicide bombers did not endear AQI to residents, the group believed that the use of female suicide bombers would either enable its operatives to get through checkpoints or force the Coalition to change its security stance towards women, angering residents and creating resentment that AQI could then exploit. The first of these female Iraqi suicide bombers was used in a July 11 attack on an Iraqi national in Sa'dah. This suicide bomber was the daughter of AQI member who had been released from prison on July 1 and subsequently recruited his daughter to carry out the attack.  

**Karabilah**

(S) AQI and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq were still closely aligned in Karabilah. With AQI's assistance, al-Asa'ab al-Iraq fighters were able to conduct patrols in Karabilah when the Coalition was not present, implementing a murder and intimidation campaign against residents. Substantial pay for conducting attacks served as a significant enticement for enough Karabilah residents to join the insurgency to bring al-Asa'ab al-Iraq back to a semblance of its former strength. Ironically, AQI's decision to use fuel as a weapon in its insurgency (see below) adversely affected the group's ability to reconstitute in Karabilah because the massive fuel shortages throughout the al-Qaim area prevented them from using any form of transportation.  

**AQI Strengths and Weaknesses: June-July 2006**

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567 [ | Military | 15 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060815 | (S/NE) | ]
568 [ | Military | 23 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 23 Jun 06 | (S/NE) | ]
569 Ibid.
570 [ | Military | 18 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 18 Jul 06 | (S/NE) | ]
571 [ | Military | 31 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 31 Aug 06 | (S/NE) | ]
Ramadi Remains the Center of AQI Activity

(S/NF) As described earlier, AQI was not defeated in Ramadi, but rather voluntarily dispersed from the city. When the group resumed its focus on the city, it did so by escalating its murder and intimidation campaign. Up to five AQI fighters were now sent to every mosque in Ramadi to monitor and report back on the topics discussed during the prayer services. For Ramadi imams and mosque congregations, the voicing of any anti-AQI sentiments meant certain death. A chicken farm near Lake Thar Thar owned by AQI leader was used both to house and to execute hostages. One of the group’s targets was of the Firdaus Mosque, who was forced to flee because AQI believed that his goal of improving security in Ramadi was irreconcilable with their own.572

(S/NF) The Kateebat al-Muwahhidin al-Jihadiyah (The Wahhabi Jihad Battalion) was now the primary arm of AQI in the Tamim and 5 Kilo districts of Ramadi, seeking to unite all of the scattered jihadis and denouncing those who assisted the Coalition.573

(S/NF) AQI influence over Anbar University deepened throughout the summer. Those faculty who supported AQI recruiting on-campus included Most of these professors had been members of the Ba'ath Party under Saddam Hussein. As discussed earlier, the previous university dean had been intimidated into supporting AQI and the new acting university dean maintained AQI ties, as did the deans of the law, medicine, and agricultural schools. Of the 4,000 students who attended the university, roughly 30% were active to some degree or another in the insurgency. AQI next set up an IED factory in the university, using security guards to move bombmaking materials onto the campus. Once the IEDs had been manufactured, the guards moved them off-campus to have them planted by AQI members.574

(S/NF) In early July, AQI reorganized itself in Ramadi once again, shifting its leadership from Humayrah to Zangora. Prior to this, Humayrah had served as a staging area for allowing them to quickly issue orders to the Iraqi and foreign fighters residing in the 2nd Officers' District of Ramadi to the north. The influx of AQI fighters into Zangora coincided with the rise in attacks against Iraqi police in Abu Tiban and Zughayr. Once established in Zangora, the AQI leadership was able to recall the fighters that had dispersed from the Malaab district to Zuwayyah, Abu Tiban, 5 Kilo, Tamim, al-Tash, and Zangora so that they could resume attacks. One of these attacks was the July 8 killing of three Iraqi police and IIP leader Hajji Taha (Taha Mukhlif Suwaydawi), the director-general of highways in Anbar and a close friend of Governor Mamoun.575
(S) (b)(6) was the AQI amir for the Jazira area, overseeing the continuing kidnapping, murder, and intimidation of Ramadi police officers that forced many to resign. He also supervised the manufacture of VBIEDs, the recruitment of suicide bombers, and plots to kidnap sheikhs from the Albu Dhiab tribe. While (b)(6) had fled to Haditha to escape the rumored Coalition military offensive against Ramadi, he soon returned and assumed command of AQI from the Albu Shaban tribal area, an enclave in the Albu Dhiab tribal area four kilometers southwest of the Jarayshi propane factory that served as his primary meeting center and training facility. 577

AQC Leadership Problems in Fallujah

(S) The situation in Fallujah was quite different. Here AQI was run by a committee of seven leaders, each of whom were responsible for a different task: kidnapping, attacking the Coalition, attacking the Iraqi government, weapons smuggling, financing, assassinations, and execution. This committee answered to a larger committee of AQI leaders from Fallujah, Saqlawiyah, Amariyah, Karmah, Habbaniyah, and Yusufiyah. 578

(S) At the same time, (b)(6) was the operational leader of AQI in Fallujah, supervising fifty cells of ten-fifteen fighters (500-750 total fighters). He coordinated and financed large-scale attacks in Fallujah using funding and financial support from Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi al-Halbusi, who oversaw financing and facilitation of AQI fighters in Fallujah. He provided them with ID cards, money, weapons, vehicles, and combat replacements. While (b)(6) was AQI’s operations chief in Fallujah, Sheikh Nazar Sa’di Zahir supervised his activities, coordinated strategy with the group’s leadership, and personally commanded ten cells of fighters (100-150 men) on the eastern side of the city. 579 The reason for the confusion over the rightful amir in Fallujah lay in the fact that the group’s last amir (b)(6) had fled to following the death of Zarqawi in the belief that he would be targeted by the Coalition. 580

The Hunt for a Single Fallujah Amir

(S/NF) This confused leadership situation was not helped by the actions of (b)(6). By July 2006, (b)(6) was AQI’s liaison with intelligence as well as a key logistics amir with the authority to reassign and replace local city amirs. Following the death of Zarqawi, he ordered (b)(6) to replace (b)(6) as the head of AQI in Anah, sending (b)(6) to Fallujah. When (b)(6) proved unsuitable in Anah, (b)(6) ordered the two men to swap positions again, making (b)(6) the AQI amir for Anah and sending (b)(6) to Fallujah. 581

(S) Just at this point AQI leader (b)(6) (released from Bucca prison in April 2006) declared himself the new amir of AQI in Fallujah and the leader of the local AQI associate group Sons of Hadi al-Zabra in July. As the AQI leader responsible for most of the group’s sniper attacks

577 [ | Military | 11 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060711 | (S/NF) | ]
578 [ | Military | 02 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060702 | (S/NF) | ]
579 Ibid.
580 [ | Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | (S/NF) | ]
581 [ | Military | 11 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060711 | (S/NF) | ]
against Coalition and Iraqi forces in Fallujah, Umar had as credible a claim as other prospective amirs. Moreover, he had access to a significant amount of funding through [b(6)] who had withdrawn $250,000 from the Baghdad Exchange to support [b(6)] operations [b(6)] also received a $60,000 ransom from his kidnapping activities on July 7, which enabled him to use $15,000 to bribe his way out of Iraqi police custody that same day.582

(S/NF) Despite [b(6)] efforts, AQI remained fractured and weak in Fallujah. Many AQI members were even unable to obtain weapons, and thus had to resort to killing Iraqi police and stealing their weapons. This made AQI in Fallujah far more decentralized than elsewhere, with none of the feuding power brokers able to wield enough influence to effectively claim the position of amir. It would be a mistake, however, to regard this fracturing of AQI as lessening its tactical capabilities. The group was still able to assassinate senior police officials including Major Ayad (see below) and deputy police chief Brigadier General Khoudari.583

The Hit-Haditha Corridor Falls Further Under AQI Influence

(S) The relatively low numbers of attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces in the Hit-Haditha corridor belied the continued influence AQI and Ansar al-Sunna exerted over the general population. By providing money and moral support to the families of their members, the two groups were able to provide an alternative to the Coalition and the Iraqi government. AQI and Ansar al-Sunna considerable financial resources were among the groups’ most potent tool. The groups were also eagerly recruiting young men between the ages of 16-20 in the belief that the Coalition did not detain anyone younger than 18, making teenagers particularly valuable to recruit.584

(S) [b(6)] was the Ansar al-Sunna leader in Haditha who oversaw the planning and execution of attacks in the area, personally taking part in the destruction of the Haditha telecommunications centers. While he had been detained by the Coalition in late 2005 and sent to Abu Ghraib, he was released in the spring of 2006 and returned to Haditha to reassert his authority over the Ansar al-Sunna cells in the area.585

(S) The other major group in the city was the Black Banners, who were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of more than sixty residents suspected of providing information to the Coalition. The group had kidnapped these people, interrogated them, and recorded their confessions on video to be distributed throughout the Haditha area.586

(S) The Black Banners were organized into three committees: security, shari’ah, and attack. The security committee acted as a secret police, the shari’ah committee enforced Islamic law, and the attack committee carried out operations. The group had some difficulty recruiting after the death of Zarqawi because it had offended many Haditha residents through its murder of local residents in front of their families. The destruction of homes, local government buildings, the

582 [Military | 17 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060717 | (S/NF) | ]
583 [Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | (S/NF) | ]
584 [Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060730 | (S/NF) | ]
585 [Military | 05 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060705 | (S/NF) | ]
586 [Military | 05 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060705 | (S/NF) | ]
telecommunications center, and the courthouse all created tension between residents and AQI, but the group regarded its murder and intimidation campaign as necessary to keep other insurgent groups in the area from negotiating with the Iraqi government.\(^{587}\)

### AQI Setbacks in Anah, Saqlawiyah and Amariyah

\((S)\) Despite these successes in Ramadi, Fallujah and the Hit-Haditha corridor, AQI suffered setbacks in both Anah and Saqlawiyah. In Anah, an AQI member, killed Sheikh Hajji Umar Muhammad Sahtut al-Jughayfi at a gas station in Anah following a public argument. Sheikh Umar had told that neither he nor was welcome at the mosque in Umm al-Waz (a nearby town). The argument had then deteriorated into a shouting match until shot Sheikh Umar. This created a turn against AQI in Umm al-Waz, where Sheikh Umar had been a major supporter of the group, harboring Anwar Araq, and in April 2006.\(^{588}\)

\((S)\) Following the killing of Sheikh Umar, armed residents of Umm al-Waz planned to drive into Anah to attack AQI. They were only deterred after a warning from tribal leaders in Anah that if they did this that they could be mistaken for members of AQI by the Coalition and be captured or killed.\(^{589}\)

\((S/NF)\) The situation in Saqlawiyah was also far from ideal for AQI. The group's former amir fled after operating in the area for more than a year and a half. In his absence, many AQI fighters fled Saqlawiyah for Lake Thar Thar.\(^{590}\) Both and his predecessor were former members of the Black Flags and Jaysh Muhammad. was supported by his brother who worked as a Coalition contractor and used the money he earned to assist AQI.\(^{591}\)

\((S/NF)\) Meanwhile Amariyah had become far less hospitable to AQI. In late June 2006, four AQI fighters attacked the Amariyah police station with hand grenades. The police responded by killing one of the attackers and detaining the other three who confessed under interrogation that they had been hired to kill anti-AQI police. A part of the Albu Issa tribe publicly supported the Amariyah police, issuing a statement that the police were sons of the tribe and that the tribe had a duty to protect them. To demonstrate the force of this claim, this section of the Albu Issa provided the police with 200 armed fighters, mortars, and RPGs intended to help defend Ferris Town. This was due in part to the fact that a majority of the AQI fighters who were active against the Amariyah police were from the al-Owesat subtribe of the Albu Issa.\(^{592}\)

\(^{587}\) Ibid.

\(^{588}\) [Military | 10 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060710 | \((S/NF)\) | ]

\(^{589}\) Ibid.

\(^{590}\) [Military | 16 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060716 | \((S/NF)\) | ]

\(^{591}\) [Military | 10 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060710 | \((S/NF)\) | ]

\(^{592}\) [Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060630 | \((S/NF)\) | ]
(S/NF) There were other tribal problems in the Amariyah area for AQI. In June 6/13/07, AQI attempted to exploit the tension between AQI cells in Zaidon and Amariyah by instigating a conflict between rival fighters from the Zobai and Albu Issa tribes. The plan worked, and by late June the Zobai AQI fighters were attacking the Albu Issa AQI fighters in the belief that the latter were informing on them to the Iraqi police, leaving nine dead.593

(S/NF) Since June 2006, members of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh Muhammad had been searching for senior AQI leader in order to assassinate him and any other AQI figures they encountered in the vicinity of Abu Ghraib. These efforts were supported by local residents in Ridwaniyah and Abu Ghraib who blamed the murder of a number of community leaders. Among those killed during their efforts were cousin Badr and an unknown AQI amir.594

(S/NF) At the core of the conflict between and 1920 Revolution Brigade was a preemptive strike against the group in an effort to prevent insurgent infighting in Zaidon (see Chapter 6a). Throughout the latter half of the spring of 2006, AQI fighters led by had fought and defeated his former allies in 1920 Revolution Brigade in Zaidon. With the possibility of renewed violence, fled the village of al-Naz where he had been hiding for Samarra or Mosul.595

**AQI and the Oil Trade**

(S/NF) Meanwhile, AQI was forced to change how it exploited the oil business. By mid-July 2006, AQI was stealing gasoline trucks traveling from Bayji to Ramadi along the Saddamiyah road between Samarra and Ramadi. AQI did this by setting up checkpoints that were used to steal the gasoline trucks, which AQI members then drove to the Albu ‘Ubayd tribal area. Once there, the trucks were emptied of their contents and the gasoline was taken to Ramadi to be resold at $1 per liter. AQI had been forced to resort to robbing the gasoline trucks because Bayji Oil Distribution Center director who had facilitated much of AQI's fuel acquisition operations, had fled the country. Combined with an increased Coalition presence in Ramadi, the AQI leadership decided that its fighters needed to steal at least half the load of fuel trucks entering Ramadi to compensate for the loss of Ibrahim.596

(S/NF) To lessen the likelihood of Coalition interference, AQI set up makeshift fuel distribution points outside Ramadi. AQI operatives in the Jazira area in particular recruited young men to sell gasoline in five-ten liter containers along al-Jerashi road. Despite the departure of AQI was thus still able to find ways to buy and sell fuel.597

(S/NF) Within Ramadi, oil distribution director also provided oil to AQI, appointing to supervise the distribution of fuel to the

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593 Ibid.
594 [Military | 14 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060814 | (S/NF) | ]
595 Ibid.
596 [Military | 14 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060714 | (S/NF) | ]
597 Ibid.
group. While Turki had fled Ramadi for 1.4b in April 2006, by July he had returned to the city and resumed his relationship with AQI. 598 Turki provided AQI and his representatives with 20-25,000 liters of petroleum every day that were then sold by truck on the black market to gas and large generator stations throughout Ramadi at the price of 1,000 dinars ($0.68) a liter. This enabled AQI to generate $105,000 per week and $450,000 per month in revenue from Ramadi petroleum profits alone. 599

(S/NF) The same sort of situation held true for propane gas. While the legal distributors of propane gas received 35,000 liters, only 5,000 were given to the general public and the rest ended up in the hands of AQI. Director-general of oil was supposed to account for oil, but he had been missing for several months and no ministry of oil personnel were willing to travel to the Government Center. 600

(S/NF) AQI's profits from the sale of black market fuel should not be underestimated. While it is impossible to put an exact figure on the group's profits because of the lack of complete records in Anbar, as of April 2006 AQI received 600,000 liters of benzene and 300,000 liters of crude oil per month. If AQI controlled only 50% of benzene distribution, the group could generate up to $597,000 a month in revenue according to the July black market price of $1.99 a liter or $7.57 a gallon in Ramadi. In addition to benzene and crude oil, AQI also controlled the distribution of propane and diesel, giving them power over the general population by controlling their access to fuel. 601

(S/NF) Significant fuel shortages in Anbar and some parts of Iraq forced oil minister to state on July 9 that Iraq would suffer fuel crises for at least another year. The Iraqi oil ministry's chronic production and distribution failures and inability to secure oil infrastructure from AQI infiltration or attack perpetuated the existence of the black market and promoted shortage-inducing activities like hoarding or price gouging. 602

(S/NF) This situation caused the Iraqi government to implement several measures to regain control over the national oil industry. These measures included the revaluation of Oil Protection Force (OPF) contracts and vetting procedures, the use of Iraqi army units as supplemental forces for the OPF, and physical security improvements at infrastructure sites like the Bayji refinery. However, these did not yield significant improvements in the availability of fuel products in Anbar, where the situation steadily grew worse. 603

(S) In some ways, AQI's new oil policy showed the influence of initiative. Whereas under AQI had only sold oil on the black market for profit, now oil was used to influence Anbaris to back the group. Between forty to sixty masked AQI fighters were sent to the oil distribution center in Ramadi every day to obtain oil for residents who supported the group, with some supporters obtaining fuel for themselves and others receiving free fuel to sell on the black

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598 [ Military | 24 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060724 | (S/NF) ]
599 [ Military | 28 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060828 | (S/NF) ]
600 [ Military | 24 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060724 | (S/NF) ]
601 Ibid.
602 [ Military | 17 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060717 | (S/NF) ]
603 Ibid.
market. Because AQI rather than the Iraqi government or the provincial government now controlled who could purchase oil, this helped to build and maintain support for AQI in Ramadi. Whether residents approved of AQI’s political or religious ideology or not, they were forced to at least feign support in order to receive fuel.604

\[(S)\] On the other hand, those towns, villages or individuals who did not support AQI would have their propane, gasoline or oil cut off. Residents of the city of al-Qaim, for instance, were described as “traitors” and their fuel was nearly completely cut off during the summer of 2006, leading to widespread shortages and, ironically as noted above, also preventing the insurgency from reconstituting in the area.605

\[(S/NE)\] In late August 2006, a number of private fuel transportation companies, including AQI leader \[(b)(6)\] contracted through the Anbar provincial government to form the al-Rawi Group Shipping Company trucking consortium. Both al-Gadeer and White Sails were affiliated with the al-Rawi Group and \[(b)(6)\] used his Ebkitar Investment Company to finance the import of commercial vehicles from \[(1.b)\] to Iraq through Ramadi-based intermediaries. Among those involved with Ebkitar were long-time oil smuggling boss Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bazia Ftykhan and AQI operatives \[(b)(6)\]

\[(b)(6)\] As Anbari residents became more dependent on private transportation companies like White Sails and the al-Rawi Group to deliver the fuel they needed for cooking, electricity, and transportation, AQI was able to insinuate itself further into vital sectors of Anbar’s economy.606

**Disrupting AQI’s Oil Trade and Operation VALDEZ REVENGE (August 17 – 21)**

\[(S)\] In May 2006, the Coalition and the Iraqi army began conducting operations to reduce oil smuggling and corruption at the Bayji oil refinery and the surrounding gas stations, including pressuring the upper management of the refinery to ensure that no one would steal from the refinery. Gas station owners were compelled to ensure that the gas they obtained from the oil refinery was distributed to the Bayji population rather than being sold on the black market. By August 2006, these measures combined with new security procedures by the Iraqi oil ministry had decreased the amount of oil smuggling from Bayji.607

\[(S/NE)\] In an effort to disrupt the AQI monopoly on oil and gas distribution in Ramadi, the Coalition launched Operation VALDEZ REVENGE on August 17, detaining eight fuel trucks.608 Sixty-seven individuals and twenty fuel trucks would eventually be detained as part of VALDEZ REVENGE before its conclusion on August 21.609 While VALDEZ REVENGE caused some immediate, temporary disruption of AQI’s monopoly, its most practical impact was the disruption of...
the previously unhindered AQI routine of stealing, moving, and selling fuel without serious challenge.

**Insurgent Financing**

(S/NF) AQI could weather this operation with impunity because the oil trade was just one source of funding for the group. According to the CIA Office of Transnational Issues, the three main hubs of insurgent financial activity were located in Haditha, Mosul, and Ramadi, which when combined accounted for 44% of all cash seizures made by Coalition forces in Iraq. These hubs were important because they contained numerous extortion and kidnapping targets along the highways to

1.4b The area between Fallujah, Baghdad, and Hillah by contrast accounted for 1/3 of all anti-Coalition attacks but only 1/9 of cash seizures. While the Coalition captured $1,100,000 between January and May of 2006, the insurgency spent between $20-40,000,000 during that same period.610

(S/NF) AQI also made extensive use of hawalas to move funds, which presented a serious problem for the Coalition and Iraqi security forces. Due to security concerns about traditional banking services in Anbar, many Anbaris used local hawalas as "citizen trust funds." Residents deposited their money with hawaladors who then used the funds to cover other transactions. As a result, money seized during hawala raids might belong to an insurgent group, but legitimate citizens could also inadvertently be denied access to their trust fund deposits. Furthermore, the money in these trust funds was dispersed to numerous safe houses to lower the chances of robbery. Coalition raids on AQI associated hawalas in Husaybah indicated that the group deliberately used hawalas in areas devoid of insurgent activity in order to avoid the discovery of their safe houses by Coalition or Iraqi security forces during counter-insurgency operations.611

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610 [ | Military | 18 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060818 | (S/NF) | ]
611 Ibid.
The Sectarian Fighting Helps AQI

(S/NF) Along with their assured sources of funding, AQI also had a continuous stream of potential recruits, many drawn from the continuing sectarian violence. By mid-July, more than 6,000 Sunni families had fled to Fallujah to escape the violence and the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad and Basra. The Fallujah city council estimated that refugees were now entering the city at a rate of 3,000 a month and that support for the refugees provided even more challenges for Fallujah given the city's own infrastructure and economic problems.612

(S) Fallujah was regarded by Sunni refugees as far safer and more secure when compared to living in mixed cities where owning identification cards with typical Sunni names like Omar were enough to get one killed by Shi'a militias. AQI was able to capitalize on the fears of the refugees, gaining their support by claiming to protect them in order to further embed the group into Anbar's legitimate economy.613

(S) AQI was bolstered in Haditha by an influx of Sunni families fleeing Baghdad due to their perceptions of the sectarian violence in the capital. Many of these refugees believed that was orchestrating the violence in Baghdad using the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps, leaving them open to AQI recruiting.614

(S) By late July, 50-60 AQI fighters recruited from the al-Rawi tribe were sent from Haditha to Baghdad to bolster other Sunni groups in the city for what many Iraqis believed was "the beginning of an Iraqi civil war." Acting on this same perception, the Mahdi Army and Badr Corps made similar troop movements from southern Iraq to Baghdad to strengthen Shi'a forces in the capital. The growth of the perception that Iraq was in a state of civil war facilitated AQI recruitment as more and more internal refugees arrived with stories of persecution and atrocities by Shi'a militias.615

Further Coopertation of other Insurgents by AQI

(S/NF) Another source of potential recruits for AQI was other insurgent groups. Following the guidelines previously laid down by AQI had been in talks with a number of SAR and SRE insurgent groups in Ramadi to unite as many of them as possible under the banner of AQI's Mujahideen Shura Council. The main point of friction between AQI and the local groups was the continued targeting of members of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army. Yet every time the topic was raised the AQI representatives were able to make compelling arguments from the Qu'ran and the hadith that were ultimately viewed as persuasive by the other insurgent leaders.616

(S/NF) As a result of AQI's ability to ally with, coopt, or subsume other insurgent groups, the group was able to increase the number of attacks in Ramadi to an average of 139 attacks per week. This coincided with ongoing AQI efforts to recruit insurgent amirs or commanders of SRE and SAR groups not represented in the Mujahideen Shura Council by offering them more money. This
allowed AQI to not only retain its hold over former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq who had allied with the group but to expand that hold to encompass members of Jaysh al-Fatihin as well. Nor were these efforts limited to Ramadi, as can be seen by the establishment of the Haditha Mujahideen Shura and AQI efforts to recruit or subsume local insurgent groups in Hit. 617

(S) The cooptation of 1920 Revolution Brigade by both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna continued as well. A typical result was the July 9 attack on a Coalition outpost in Dulab carried out by former members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade led by (b)(6)

(S/NE) Also typical was the financial and weapons cooperation illustrated in a late July operation. (b)(6) a 1920 Revolution Brigade member, facilitated the transfer of $18 million to (b)(6) (an arms facilitator for the 1920 Revolution Brigade) so that (b)(6) could purchase various weapons, including SAM-7 rockets, Russian sniper rifles, RPGs, PKCs, TNT, 62mm mortars, and 82mm mortars. Once the weaponry was delivered, representatives of (b)(6) the 1920 Revolution Brigade members, and AQI leader (b)(6) intended to begin distributing the weapons. $15,000,000 of the $18,000,000 used to cover the purchase had been provided to 1920 Revolution Brigade by former Iraqi Air Force chief of staff Lieutenant General Khaldun Khattab ibn al-Tikriti. To place this purchase in context, it should be remembered that the weapons budget for the entire Iraqi Interior ministry for 2006 was roughly $250,000,000. 619

(S/NE) AQI was able as well to bring members of Harakat Islamiyah leader (b)(6) under its umbrella as a satellite group to help it target the Iraqi police in Ramadi. In addition to (b)(6) and former members of Islamic Army in Iraq and 1920 Revolution Brigade were under heavy pressure from AQI to target Iraqi police in Ramadi and to gather information on residents who had received military training in 14b Among those police assassinated by AQI were Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Majid al-Nafir and his cousin Muhammad al-Nafir. 620

(S) Another SRE group al-Rashidin Army, which became active in Hit in late August under the leadership of (b)(6) now allied with AQI and Ansar al-Sunna. Setting up checkpoints between Hit and Baghdadi in the Sahilyah, Zakikah, and Kasraq areas, the group targeted residents of Baghdadi and Jubbah for intimidation in the belief that they cooperated with the Coalition. 621

(S/NE) A second way to coopt insurgents was by forming associate groups from former members of other insurgent groups. In mid-August, AQI formed the associate groups Sadr Sunnah-Islamic Army of Iraq (made up of former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq now loyal to AQI), and (b)(6) to operate in the al-Azizia, al-Thaiåla, and al-Sharqiya districts of

617 [ | Military | 23 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060823 | (S/NE) | ]
618 [ | Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | (S/NE) | ]
619 [ | Military | 31 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060731 | (S/NE) | ]
620 [ | Military | 14 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060814 | (S/NE) | ]
621 [ | Military | 28 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060824 | (S/NE) | ]
Ramadi. Of the two, Jaysh Abu Bakr al-Salafi was the most extreme and was led by an associate of Hajji Ibrahim (Abu Kubayd, Sheikh Mansur), who had been killed during an earlier Coalition attempt to kill Zarqawi. Hajji Ibrahim was an AQI imam in Baghdad who had ordered the death of businessmen that he believed had violated shari'ah.

(S) In August, AQI fully reconstituted al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal as its primary associate group in Hit. Subordinate to the AQI leadership in Hit, the revived al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal was made up largely of insurgents who had belonged to AQI associate groups that had been dispersed or destroyed along the western Euphrates River valley during Operation SAYYID II.

(S) The revived al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal was led by whose representative in Hit was He oversaw the planning and execution for all of the group's attack in Hit after receiving permission from his AQI masters. While AQI wanted to reestablish al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal in order to provide the group with a "local face" through which to operate in Hit, the group had trouble finding an adequate successor to al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal's former leader Muhammad Cent (killed in July 2005). were all former associates of Muhammad Cent, while most of the leaders of the new al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal were remnants of the previous group or members of the previous leaders' families.

Coalition Attempts to Disrupt AQI in Ramadi and Haditha

(S/NF) The Coalition recognized the problems with AQI in both Ramadi and the Hit-Haditha corridor and took several actions to disrupt AQI influence in these parts of Iraq. On July 27, AQI leaders Abu Salih al-Saudi, Abu Abdallah al-Saudi, Adnan al-Suwaydawi, and fourteen other AQI fighters were killed by a Coalition airstrike during a meeting of the group's leadership in the Jazira area north of Ramadi. managed to survive the attack by leaving the meeting immediately prior to the airstrike and fled the area soon afterwards. The death of these three senior leaders represented a blow to AQI's capabilities in Ramadi. Abu Salih al-Saudi was a religious leader from the Mujahideen Shura Council who provided religious and operational guidance to AQI and its allies in Ramadi in addition to serving as the amir of 17th Street and an IED leader for the Jazira area. Abu Abdallah al-Saudi was a candidate to succeed Abu Mustafa as the amir of Ramadi who was amir of the Jazira area at the time of his death. was a top deputy to Abu Khattab and the amir of the Malaab district.

(S/NF) Since the capture of all relocated to the Jazira area. While had been his designated second-in-command, he did not take over the group's operations following the capture of his uncle, and in fact AQI had yet to designate a successor from amongst their ranks. This meant

622 [Military] 20 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060820 (S/NF)
623 [Military] 27 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060827 (S/NF)
624 [Military] 24 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060824 (S/NF)
625 Ibid.
626 [Military] 02 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060802 (S/NF)
that the deaths of three AQI leaders disrupted their own networks internally but would do little to the networks of the other AQI leaders in Ramadi.\textsuperscript{627}

\textsuperscript{(S/\text{NF})} At the same time, the Coalition stepped up its operations in Ramadi, beginning a series of battles throughout the city. In response to the loss of many fighters (sixty-five fighters killed and fourteen wounded between July 16-29 alone), many members of the group sought refuge among supporters in the Tamim district of the city. Because increased numbers of Coalition soldiers were restricting the movement of AQI fighters, the group began focusing on mortar and IED attacks against Camp Blue Diamond, the Government Center, the western Ramadi police station, and Camp Ramadi.\textsuperscript{628}

\textsuperscript{(S)} To build support for the Coalition in Ramadi and provide basic services to residents, Civil Affairs personnel distributed seventy-six generators to homes in the al-Hawz and Hay al-Dhobat districts in the southern part of the town. No sooner had the generators been delivered, however, than AQI fighters led by (b)(6) begin intimidating those residents who received generators, telling them that they did not need electricity because the Prophet Muhammad did not use it. They then forced the residents to turn in their generators, selling them on the black market at $800 per generator.\textsuperscript{629}

\textsuperscript{(S)} Meanwhile, in Haditha, the Coalition detained Black Banners leader and AQI amir for Haditha Because the Black Banners were a merged group made up of AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and former 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters, detention was a setback for one of the few AQI associate groups that had been able to succeed at both Zarqawi and long-term goal of uniting different SRE and SAR insurgent groups under a common flag.\textsuperscript{630}

**Foreign Connections to the Insurgency**

\textsuperscript{(S/\text{NF})} Developments during the spring and summer of 2006 would deepen ties between AQI and Iraq’s regional neighbors. The relationship between AQI and \textsuperscript{1.4b} had always been complicated and was made even more complicated by an explosion in the spring of 2006. In late April 2006, an AQI bombmaker and two \textsuperscript{1.4b} officers were killed during an accidental detonation in Abu Kamal. A few days after the explosion, the \textsuperscript{1.4b} claimed that it had been a suicide bombing perpetrated by Jund al-Shams and issued arrest warrants for AQI’s \textsuperscript{1.4b} leader (b)(6) relatives Using his connections with intelligence, (b)(6) secured the release of (b)(6) who was his driver and lieutenant, while (b)(6) was later released and deported to Kuwait.\textsuperscript{631}

\textsuperscript{627} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{628} [ | Military | 04 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 200606804 | (S/\text{NF}) | ]

\textsuperscript{629} [ | Military | 01 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060801 | (S/\text{NF}) | ]

\textsuperscript{630} [ | Military | 10 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060810 | (S/\text{NF}) | ]

\textsuperscript{631} [ | Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060630 | (S/\text{NF}) | ]
The claim that the accidental detonation at Abu Kamal was a Jund al-Shams suicide bombing coincided with the infiltration of Jund al-Shams into Anbar. A loose confederation of Islamists, Jund al-Shams had been tied back to both Zarqawi and the broader AQAM since at least 1999. Although conflicting reporting exists as to the exact relationship between Jund al-Shams and intelligence, the latter was at minimum aware of the former’s activities in Iraq. The increase in Jund al-Shams activity in Husaybah and al-Tanf coincided with intelligence efforts on the locations and dispositions of Coalition bases and Iraqi border posts.

The in al-Qaim were both associated with AQI. In March 2006, they served as the means through which officer Brigadier General Muhsin al-Aqasi (Abu Amar), who is responsible for operations in Abu Kamal, was able to support AQI. Muhsin passed $400,000 to who then deposited the money at the Ali Salih al-Rawi branch office in Abu Kamal under the name of the AQI front Alwan Company. The funds were then transferred to al-Qaim, where they were withdrawn by and then transferred to. Interestingly, the two officers killed in the accidental detonation at Abu Kamal worked for Brigadier General al-Aqasi.

held regular meetings with chief Asif Shawkat, the brother-in-law of president Bashar Asad who was married to. So frequent were the meetings between Asif and that Asif jokingly referred to as AQI's ambassador to. AQI preferred to work with military intelligence rather than the Mukhabarat, which has been led by Major General Ali al-Mamluk since mid-2005. Asif Shawkat, General Muhsin al-Aqasi, and Brigadier General Burhan Burhan all met with representatives of AQI, FRE, and SAR insurgent groups in interactions that were overseen or at least acknowledged by President Asad.

While the idea of support for AQI would appear counter-productive given its own internal problems with domestic jihadist groups bent on dismantling the "heretical" Alawite regime of Bashar Asad, Asad's track record of using propaganda implicating Islamists for actions that were undertaken by is not without precedent. According to the UN investigation into the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Asif Shawkat forced Abu Adass at gunpoint to videotape a message claiming responsibility for Hariri's death under the guise of the Islamist group al-Nasra wal Jihad fi Bilad al-Shams. The UN International Independent Investigation Commission concluded that there is no evidence that such a group ever existed and that agent planned and supported the Hariri assassination alongside General Rustum Ghazali. In the same way, military intelligence used Jund al-Shams as a cover for infiltrating intelligence agents in western Anbar, making earlier assessments of a strictly adversarial nature between military intelligence and AQI over-simplified.

632 [ Military | 02 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060702 | (S/NE) | ]
633 [ Military | 05 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060605 | (S/NE) | ]
634 [ Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060630 | (S/NE) | ]
635 [ Military | 11 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060711 | (S/NE) | ]
636 Ibid.
(S) also stepped up its intelligence collection efforts over the summer of 2006 in order to gather as much information as possible should it choose to facilitate suicide attacks between the summer of 2006 and the end of Ramadan. Collection efforts were focused in particular against Coalition bases, which the government believed would be turned over to the Iraqi army once the Coalition withdrew. In March 2006, Iraqi soldier was kidnapped by while traveling to purchase a car. He was released in early June 2006 after his family paid a $4,000 ransom after four months of being tortured and interrogated by intelligence during which they called him a traitor to the Arab world. As a result of his experience, many Iraqi soldiers and police now feared that they too would be kidnapped and tortured by intelligence.

(S/NF) The fighting between over the summer of 2006 did not affect intelligence operations along the Iraqi border. While the Unarmed PFLP did send fighters to Lebanon to fight Israel, neither Israel nor sought to engage the other in direct military action. For that reason, intelligence was unwilling to divert a significant portion of its intelligence assets from their current duties on the Iraqi border with Anbar. However, the terrorist training in Latakia was run by members of Department 279, many of whose officers and agents were temporarily redeployed from Latakia to in order to provide the leadership with a better understanding of the ethnically and religiously diverse in order to gauge which units were most sympathetic to

(S/NF) By the end of the summer of 2006, there had been a major increase in facilitated insurgent activity in Anbar since March 2006. Intelligence and paramilitary units supported a variety of Iraqi insurgent groups including Jund al-Shams, AQI, the Iraqi Ba'th Party, and a wide variety of SAR and SRE insurgent groups. In the absence of migration control along the Iraqi-border and the scarcity of movement control measures throughout Anbar, insurgents had little difficulty moving around the province to facilitate or participate in insurgent operations.

637 [ | Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | (S/NF) | ]
638 Ibid.
639 [ | Military | 17 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060817 | (S/NF) | ]
640 Ibid.
641 Ibid.
(S/NF) Zawahiri's statement did not modify al Qaeda's stated goal of "a caliphate from Spain to Iraq," but it did modify the operational means used to achieve that goal. Instead of regarding the Shi'a as apostates who were to be converted or killed, Zawahiri called for a united Muslim front to oppose "tyrannical Western civilization and its leader, America" as part of a global war against the West. Zawahiri also attacked the Sunni Arab governments as impotent allies of the West, appealing to the populist anti-Israel sentiments of the Sunni Arab public. This ecumenical appeal indicated a new willingness on the part of Zawahiri to follow the old adage that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Both the supporters of Iranian president Ahmadinejad and AQAM desired that Israel be eliminated and the conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah provided both with an opportunity to rally support to further their own long-term goals. 644

(S) With the fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in mid-summer 2006, AQI leaders returned to the Jaghayfi region of the Jazira area of Ramadi to begin stockpiling weapons in preparation for attacks. 645 All of these leaders were veterans of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, Operation AL FAJR, and Operation SAYYID II who had fled to Lebanon in 2005 to escape capture by the Coalition and were now forced by the war to return to Iraq. 646

642 [ | Military | 28 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060728 | (S/NF) | ]
643 Ibid.
644 Ibid.
645 [ | Military | 25 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060725 | (S/NF) | ]
646 Ibid.

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The Coalescence of Anti-AQI Forces in Anbar Begins

Muwafuq Abd al-Razzaq’s Plan to Oppose AQI

(S) At the meeting, stressed his belief that it was in the best interests of Anbar to support the Coalition against AQI in order to create a security situation suitable for control of Anbar to be turned over to Sunni Iraqi security forces. He argued that only by uniting could Anbar achieve favorable reconciliation with the Iraqi government. recorded a message that was distributed via CD in Anbar's major cities from August 18-25 stating that Anbaris should not fear AQI and that they should support the Iraqi security forces.648

(S/NF) Because was a highly respected Sunni religious leader who had been predominant in Sunni religious circles both before and after the fall of Saddam Hussein, he had the necessary religious and social credentials to challenge Anbaris who felt abandoned by their local leadership and betrayed by the national government. The former imam of the Salahaddin Mosque in Ramadi, had maintained a number of connections to the SAR groups represented in the Ramadi Shura Council.649

(S/NF) While this was a positive development, the SAR groups represented by 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh Muhammad lacked the necessary financial, logistical, and manpower support to effectively oppose AQI in Anbar. Still, as the leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and founder of the Anbar People’s Committee, maintained a certain amount of respect and influence in Anbari religious and political circles prior to going into hiding in early 2006 to avoid assassination at the hands of AQI.650

Tribal Resistance and AQI Realignment

(S) A more serious challenge to AQI would be offered by tribes angered at the brutality of the insurgent group. One important example of this was the relationship of AQI with the Albu Ali Jassim. At the end of August, AQI leaders fled from the Albu Ali Jassim tribal area north of Ramadi to where their families had already been relocated prior to their departure. Prior to their departure, the two AQI leaders demanded that all residents of the

647 [ Military | 16 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060816 | (S/NF) | ]
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid.
650 Ibid.
Albu Ali Jassim tribal area surrender their weapons to AQI, resulting in a round of clashes between local tribes and AQI.

(S/NF) The demand by AQI was occasioned by a feud between the Albu Ali Jassim and AQI, a feud that began with a dispute between the Iraqi AQI fighters in the Albu Ali Jassim tribal area and foreign fighters in the Albu 'Ubayd tribal area. In early 2006, a [1.4b]AQI leader who was a rival of [b](6) had one of his Yemeni lieutenants kidnap an Iraqi police officer and kill him without receiving orders from [b](6) Enraged, [b](6) planned to kill the [1.4b] AQI leader, but the [1.4b] learned of his plans, declared the entire Albu Ali Jassim tribe infidels and ordered his fighters to kill them.

(S/NF) The result of the [1.4b] declaration was that, by late August, the Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Nimr, Albu Alay, and Albu Assaf tribes were providing a large number of enthusiastic police applicants to the Iraqi government. In fact a majority of the 177 applicants for the Ramadi police who reported after a recruiting drive on August 17 came from these tribal lands in the Jazira area.

(S/NF) AQI’s response to the Albu Ali Jassim tribe's resistance was true to type. On August 21, AQI fighters led by [b](6) (released from Bucca Prison on August 20) assassinated Albu Ali Jassim tribal leader Sheikh Khalid Araq Ataymi al-Iliyawi, his son Husam, and his nephew Khalil Ibrahim Araq in Ramadi. A former general in the Iraqi army and local IIP leader, Sheikh Khalid had supported the Ramadi Shura Council in 2004 and had cooperated with AQI leaders Abu Bakr and Abu Uthman back when they had been members of the Abu Harun Group. An unsigned letter to the AQI shura majlis later recovered by Coalition forces had requested permission to assassinate eight IIP leaders, Sheikh Khalid among them. Clashes ensued between AQI fighters from the Albu Ubayd tribe and the Albu Ali Jassim tribe when the latter group attempted to retrieve Sheikh Khalid's body for a proper Muslim burial.

(S/NF) Yet the problems with the Albu Ali Jassim were just the tip of the iceberg for AQI. Throughout the summer of 2006, AQI’s relationship with numerous Iraqi tribes worsened as repeated murder and intimidation campaigns gradually made AQI more hated than the Coalition. The most anti-AQI of the tribes, in addition to the Albu Ali Jassim, were the Albu Dhiab, Albu Assaf, Albu Nimr, Albu Mahal, Albu Sada, Albu Muthanna, Albu Hatam, Albu Alay, Albu Julib, Albu Risha, Albu Fahd and part of the Albu Issa. Albu Dhiab tribesmen supported Coalition operations in their tribal area north of Ramadi, operations which resulted in the capture or death of several AQI figures, including Akram Ibrahim Ali al-Dhiabi and Ansar al-Sunna amir Barakat Ahmad Ali al-Dhiabi. Senior Albu Dhiab, Albu Assaf, and Albu Ali Jassim tribesmen then requested Coalition assistance in permanently cleansing their tribal areas of AQI.

(S) Meanwhile, following the murder of Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Yusif Khutayib of the Albu Nimr tribe in Barwanah by AQI, members of the Albu Nimr tribe began recruiting armed men to kidnap those...
responsible and kill them out in the desert. They received a blessing for this plan from several tribal leaders including Sheikh Abdallah al-Nimrawi, the highest-ranking sheikh of the Albu Nimr tribe in Barwanah. Sheikh Abd al-Sattar had been killed by AQI member [b(6)] as part of a recruiting test without regard for the second order effects of the murder.  

Shiite tribal fighting next broke out among the Fuhaylat and Owesat subtribes of the Albu Issa over the former's support for AQI. The pro-Coalition Owesat leadership had confronted their Fuhaylat counterparts over their support for AQI fighters who had targeted their subtribe, leading to Fuhaylat accusations that the Owesats were puppets of the Iraqi government and the Coalition. Several murders and kidnappings soon followed, leading to Albu Muthanna, Albu Hatim, and Albu Sada subtribes of the Albu Issa siding with the Owesats when the Iraqi security forces did not take action to resolve the situation.

The Owesat decision to target the Fuhaylats for their support of AQI was a momentous choice for the subtribe. AQI maintained a presence of between 200-300 seasoned fighters in Jurf al-Sakr, Yusufiyah, and other cities in nearby northern Babil, who could be called upon to suppress any resistance to the group. In mid-July, these fighters assembled in the center of Fuhaylat life, the village of Qaryat al-Fuhaylat near Amariyah. Concerned over reports of AQI activities in Qaryat al-Fuhaylat, the Coalition conducted Operation SPOTLIGHT from July 22-27 to confirm the AQI presence and leadership in the village.

Residents of Manasir and other villages near Amariyah now took up arms (including AK-47s, PKCs, RPGs, and 120mm mortars recovered from old Iraqi ammo supply points) to support the local Iraqi police against AQI. The leaders of the Owesat organized these tribal fighters into a 200-strong militia that were deputized by the local Iraqi police. The militia provided the Iraqi police with the support to maintain their position throughout the early fall, but despite this early success, the struggle between the Fuhaylats, supported by AQI, and the Owesats, apparently ended with the surrender of the Owesats to AQI.

Senior leaders from the Albu Julib tribe also ordered their tribesmen to capture any AQI fighters found traversing their tribal area south of Ramadi. The Albu Julib tribal leaders had supported the December 2005 Iraqi elections, resulting in a number of their tribal leaders being assassinated by AQI. Together with the Albu Dhiab and the Albu Fahd tribes, the Albu Julib was now one of several Ramadi tribes undertaking anti-AQI measures, though rogue elements within the tribe disagreed with this view. The tension between the Julib tribe and AQI undermined the latter's efforts to persuade Harakat Islamiyah's Ramadi leader [b(6)] to assist the group in carrying out attacks on Coalition forces in Hit.

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656 [Military | 30 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060730 | (S/NE) | ]
657 [Military | 18 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060718 | (S/NE) | ]
658 Ibid.
659 [Military | 01 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060801 | (S/NE) | ]
660 Ibid.
661 [Military | 04 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060704 | (S/NE) | ]
662 [Military | 31 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060731 | (S/NE) | ]

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Fighting also broke out between the Albu Fahd tribe and pro-AQI elements of the Albu ‘Ubayd tribe on August 11 after the latter kidnapped Sheikh Salam Ahmad Khalif Alwan al-Fahdawi, the son of an important Albu Fahd tribal leader. Armed with RPGs, mortars, and machine guns gathered from Iraqi weapons caches, Albu Fahd tribesmen led by Jaysh al-Fatihiin leader attacked the AQI Albu ‘Ubayd tribesmen, killing eight AQI fighters at the cost of five of their own. In an effort to avert further conflict, the AQI leadership promised to release Sheikh Salam the following day, leading to negotiations between AQI leader, Sheikh Salam’s brother Sheikh Mahmud Ahmad Khalif Alwan al-Fahdawi, and Jaysh al-Fatihiin leader at a mosque in an Albu ‘Ubayd village on August 18. During the negotiations, the AQI leader stated that the group kidnapped Sheikh Salam because they believed he had purchased weapons from bandits that had been stolen from AQI for use by Jaysh al-Fatihiin. Moreover, Sheikh Salam had rejected AQI's attacks on Iraqi civilians and informed on AQI fighters to the Coalition.663

The Albu Fahd tribal leaders scarcely needed a reason to fight AQI since they still blamed the group for the killing of Sheikh Nasser (see Chapter 6a). After its tribal militia was forced to disband under pressure from AQI, many of the former Fahdawi militia members had continued to join anti-AQI SAR groups like 1920 Revolution Brigade or Jaysh al-Fatihiin. The former group attempted to seize the opportunity provided by the conflict to renew its war against AQI, declaring that AQI's tactics showed a disregard for innocent life and that the group was responsible for the killing of a number of prominent Fallujans including Sheikh Muhammad Sharqi, Sheikh Umar, Sheikh Ali Hussein, and Sheikh Abd al-Alim. Despite these statements by the 1920 Revolution Brigade leadership, the group was far too weak to do anything other than condemn AQI for its actions.664

This renewed tribal violence against AQI resulted in the death of Diya Shakir Farhan, who was murdered in a dispute over money by his own tribesmen after agreeing to come to a meeting west of Ramadi to settle their differences. With the death of Diya, his brother assumed command of his Saqlawiyah-based network, which stretched into both Fallujah and Ramadi.665

At the end of August, anti-AQI tribes began to reach out beyond their own members to form a more general anti-AQI organization. Representatives of the Albu Dhiab, Albu Assaf, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Julib, and Albu Risha tribes met on August 31 as part of a precursor for a larger tribal conference that would discuss security and stability in Ramadi.666

The Growth of the Anbar Revolutionaries

This meeting would have crucial consequences in September. By late August, many of the anti-AQI vigilante groups in Anbar had begun to organize around the banner of the Anbar Revolutionaries, which was now led in Ramadi by Humid and Hamid Farhan Khais and Iraqi police.
The group had decreased its day-to-day operations in Ramadi in August due to Operation VALDEZ REVENGE, and reverted back to basic security and neighborhood watch duties in order to maintain security for their families during the operation. While the Anbar Revolutionaries remained quite small, and like earlier vigilante groups such as the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade it was only capable of carrying out isolated attacks against AQI fighters, its slow growth represented a reenergized effort to fight AQI on the part of Anbari tribes and SAR insurgent groups.

\(S\) One of the leading minds behind this shift in strategy was who intended to develop a cooperative agreement between the Iraqi security forces, his own 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Harakat Islamiyah against AQI with the help of Sunni religious leaders. \(b(6)\) planned to return to Ramadi to meet with Governor Mamoun and persuade Anbari tribal leaders to publicly disassociate themselves from AQI. \(b(6)\) also intended to request money and weapons for members of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat Islamiyah so that their members could work to drive AQI out of Ramadi. While \(b(6)\) disliked Governor Mamoun, he and his SAR allies believed that the governor was extremely weak and that it was best to deal with him now because of his influence with the Iraqi security forces even as they plotted to remove him later. His intent was for members of both groups to actively participate in the Iraqi police in order to legitimize their presence in Ramadi and help to build public confidence in the Iraqi security forces.

\(S/NE\) To demonstrate his bonafides as a viable figure for political engagement, \(b(6)\) had Harakat Islamiyah fighters in Ramadi assassinate AQI leaders Rafa Abd al-Salam (Abu Salih), Bassim al-Suwaydawi, and Abu Musab al-Saudi, circulating news of their demise throughout the Iraqi expatriate community in Harakat Islamiyah was able to target the AQI leadership in Ramadi so effectively because the group had a greater knowledge of the AQI command structure and many of its fighters saw the group as a threat to their personal safety and the safety of the Sunni community in Ramadi. As the leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat Islamiyah, \(b(6)\) was able to leverage his status as a well-respected political and religious leader in Ramadi to target AQI despite its superior position in the city. \(b(6)\) had told Sheikh Muwafuq Abd al-Razzaq at the August 14 meeting in that he planned to mobilize up to 3,000 loyalists against AQI in Anbar in order to stabilize the province and enable the transfer of local and regional security to Sunni Iraqi forces.

667 Ibid.
668 [ | Military | 01 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060901 | (S/NE) | ]
669 Ibid.
Steps Toward Creating a Shadow Government

(S/NF) Despite these signs of a growing dissatisfaction with the group, AQI continued its attempt to impose its vision of an Islamic state on the people of Anbar. Because it is law and public behavior that are viewed as the most important issues in their Islamic state, AQI – as in the past – expended much time and energy in forcing Iraqis to conform to its notions of correct Islamic behavior. Thus, when AQI took over the Women and Children's Hospital in Ramadi, hospital staff was separated by gender by AQI fighters who claimed that allowing men and women to work together would lead to carnal activities. Patients were beaten for drinking and Shi'a were denied treatment.670

(S) The creation of a shari’ah court in Karmah was a further sign of AQI attempts to create a state within a state. Presided over by Imam Araf Muhammad Ubayd of the Ali ibn Talib mosque in Gnaether north of Karmah, the court had the power of life and death over “collaborators.” If Araf accepted the pleas of the collaborators, they would live, if not they were killed by AQI.671

(S) By the end of August, Shajariyah (a village east of Ramadi and one of AQI's primary headquarters in the area) was referred to by members of the group as "the center of the Islamic Caliphate in Anbar."672 All the effort expended by AQI to create a state in Iraq were about to come to fruition, and the group was merely awaiting orders from AQSL to permit the official declaration of an Islamic state of Iraq.

Attack Data (May – August 2006)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the middle trimester (May to August 2006). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

(S) The average number of enemy attacks during this period was sharply higher than the previous period, particularly within AO Topeka, and continued to increase throughout the period. The first few weeks of the period, through early June, showed attack levels at a stable level, then after a brief lull in mid-June, the attack levels jumped to a higher tier that increased through the end of the period. This pattern was most closely mirrored within the dominant Direct Fire data, but is also evident within the IED and Complex Attack data. The pattern of Indirect Fire attack levels was somewhat independent of the other types, and remained relatively stable throughout the entire period.
All Incidents

Weekly Incidents by Region (2003 - 2007)

Weekly Incidents by Region (May - Aug 2006)

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

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Snapshot of the Insurgency: End of Summer 2006
The insurgency at the end of the summer of 2006 was thus trending in two quite different directions. One the one hand, AQI could not have seemed stronger: intimidating and murdering almost at will, it imposed its vision of shari'ah on any areas over which it had influence in preparation for the declaration of its Emirate. Ramadi had fallen even further into AQI’s hands, Hit and Haditha seemed hopeless, and other areas of Anbar, including Zaidon and most small villages throughout the province, were apparently firmly under their thumb.

Yet, on the other hand, there was one sign that something quite different was happening underneath the surface. There were clear indications that tribal resistance to AQI was not simply fading away and that certain sheikhs were not giving in to AQI’s murder and intimidation. What had started as the actions of one tribe—the Albu Mahal—had grown to include more than a dozen tribes and subtribes, all fighting AQI for reasons of their own initiatives and the new Anbar Revolutionaries promised a chance to organize this resistance if only the right mix of leadership and vision could be found.

September to December

At the end of the summer of 2006, AQI remained the predominant insurgent group in Anbar, but resistance to the group, in the form of Harakat al-Islamiyah and the Anbar Revolutionaries, was growing. One explanation for this was the decision by AQI to soften its basic interaction with Anbaris and to attempt to win “hearts and minds.” While AQI retained its’ influence over the population of Anbar throughout the fall, new direction allowed anti-AQI groups to reemerge in Anbar for the first time since the early spring of 2006.

Unfortunately, attempts to exploit the rise of anti-AQI groups in Anbar were hampered by internal Iraqi factional feuding that continued to be a major impediment to Sunni participation in the Iraqi government. AQI also attempted to Iraqi itself by announcing the creation of an Islamic Emirate of Iraq in the early fall of 2006. The leadership of the Emirate was, with one exception, entirely Iraqi, putting an indigenous face on what was an essentially foreign institution.

AQI’s Status, End of Summer 2006

Throughout August and September, AQI had dramatically stepped up its activity in western Anbar, including an increase in mass casualty attacks in Fallujah while keeping the overall murder and intimidation campaign against Iraqi police and government officials steady throughout the province.

The rise in AQI activity in western Anbar was largely due to additional manpower: local recruits, foreign fighters, and AQI fighters relocated to Anbar from Bayji. In addition, a limited number of AQI fighters moved from Ramadi to the Hit-Haditha corridor, although there was no major influx of AQI fighters from other parts of the province. Meanwhile, a number of AQI cells that had once operated in al-Qaim now became active in the Rawah-Anah area and across western Anbar.

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673 [Military | 02 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061002 | (S/NE) |]
674 Ibid.

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(S) AQI also put renewed focus on the area between Hit and Rawah. Eight members of the Mujahideen Shura Council were tasked by AQI leadership to recruit, finance, and direct attacks to give Hit in particular a higher media profile as part of the broader AQI strategy of reinvigorating its influence throughout the entire western Euphrates River valley. In Haditha, the cooperation facilitated by the Haditha Mujahideen Shura enabled AQI and its allies to triple their attacks after mid-July in order to thwart the creation of an Iraqi police in the area. In Anah, AQI exploited the absence of Coalition forces to suppress their IIP rivals. In Rutbah, the influx of AQI fighters from Ramadi resulted in an increased number of IED attacks in the city, though carrying out any attacks beyond that was problematic due to AQI's limited manpower inside the city. AQI mortar, sniper, ambush, and swarm attacks in this area were modeled after tactics that the group had used to establish itself as the most powerful insurgent group in Ramadi.675

(S) The Fallujah area continued to harbor dangerous if somewhat disorganized (see Chapter 6b) AQI cells that planned to take advantage of the shift of Coalition forces. When the Coalition carried out operations outside Fallujah, AQI fighters returned to the inner city in order to avoid capture while other elements of the group facilitated the movement of foreign fighters throughout the Fallujah area. Infiltrating into Fallujah by using legitimate or counterfeit identification cards, sometimes with assistance from corrupt Iraqi police, AQI was able to continue its murder and intimidation campaign against Fallujah residents. Because Fallujah was an important symbol for AQI, its leadership wanted to maintain pressure on the Fallujah security forces and did not intend to miss any opportunity to wreak havoc inside the town. With its pressure on the Iraqi police in Amariyah supported by the infighting amongst the Albu Issa subtribes, AQI was able to continue to exert considerable influence over the populations of Amariyah, Ferris Town, Karmah, and Saqlawiyah through murder and intimidation.676

(S) In Habbaniyah, Julaybah, and Ghazwan, AQI cells operating between RCT-5 and 1/1 AD were responsible for more than a third of the attacks along the Ramadi-Fallujah corridor, including IDF attacks on Taqaddum Airfield. In addition to being a venue for attack, this area of Anbar served as a center for AQI arms caches as well as a perceived area of safe harbor for some of the most prominent members of the group's leadership.677

(S) In Ramadi itself, AQI had completely disrupted the provincial government, severely inhibited the development of the Iraqi police or rendered it ineffective, and thoroughly intimidated the population. No less than 850 AQI operatives were active in Ramadi. Breaks in their normal level of activity serving resulted either from 1/1 AD's successful counterinsurgency operations or as part of AQI's normal operational tempo.678

A Q I Comes Under Assault, September-October 2006

Tribal Fighting in Ramadi and Amariyah

675 Ibid.
676 Ibid.
677 Ibid.
678 Ibid.

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The one serious challenge to AQI rose from within the tribes, although it would not be obvious until later in September. In the meantime, the tribal fighting between the Albu Ali Jassim and AQI fighters from the Albu Ubayd that began with the death of Sheikh Khalid Araq Ataymi al-Illiyawi, the leader of the Albu Ali Jassim tribe, escalated throughout the fall of 2006. Local religious and political leaders from both tribes attempted to defuse the situation, by negotiating the right for the Albu Ali Jassim to kill the individuals who were directly involved in the murder of Sheikh Khalid. Religious and tribal leaders from the Albu Ali Jassim tribe had, however, already told residents of their tribal area to kill any non-members. The Albu Ali Jassim were supported against the AQI Albu Ubayd members by the Albu Zayn and Albu Fahd tribes, since the latter continued to hold AQI responsible for the murder of Sheikh Nasser (see Chapter 6a) and the kidnapping of Sheikh Salam Ahmad Khalif Alwan al-Fahdawi, the son of the current Albu Fahd sheikh.

This tribal fighting was the subject of a meeting in early September between AQI [b(6)] and his counterparts [b(6)]. A former security officer in the Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein, [b(6)], had served as an AQI financier before becoming AQI amir for the Albu Ubayd tribal area of the Jazira. During the meeting, [b(6)] stated that he had no plans to release Sheikh Salam because he was a traitor and an apostate. Further, he was planning an offensive against a number of Anbari tribes including the Albu Soda, the Jumaylis, the Albu Julib, Albu Jahash, and the Albu Fahd if they continued to oppose AQI.

The strength of AQI in the Jazira area was due to the influx of fighters from Ramadi proper, yet this did not go unchallenged. The presence of so many outsiders generated a backlash, leading to the formation of neighborhood watches and tribal militias from the Albu Dhiab, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Nimr, Albu Risha, and even the Albu Farraj to guard against further AQI incursions. In most cases, AQI fighters were superior to their tribal or nationalist counterparts, but they still felt threatened by Sheikh Khalid and therefore determined to kill him as quickly as possible. Given the opposition that AQI was once again confronting in Ramadi from 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah, the group likely believed that it had to send a message to local tribal leaders to prevent them from supporting their opposition.

The tribal feuding even began to create problems within the expanded AQI. In early September 2006, AQI leader [b(6)] used fighters from the Albu Ubayd tribe to assassinate Ramadi AQI leaders Abu Uthman, [b(6)], and senior AQI leader [b(6)]. All three AQI leaders were former members of the Abu Harun Group that had a long-standing feud with AQI fighters from the Albu Ubayd tribe and their leader [b(6)], dating back to the beginning of 2006 (see Chapter 6b). The death of Abu Uthman in particular eliminated a senior AQI operative who had been involved in multiple operations for the group in the Jazira area, forcing [b(6)] to take up Abu Uthman’s duties in addition to his own.

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679 | Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | (S/NE) | |
680 | Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | (S/NE) | |
681 | Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | (S/NE) | |
682 | Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | (S/NE) | |
By September 7, 2006, [b6] and his followers were also engaged in fighting with the Albu Julib tribe in Jabha that resulted in the capture of AQI operative [b6], who was turned over to Brigadier General Ahmad Sadiq Battah al-Julibawi for release on the grounds that there would be more trouble for the Albu Julib tribe if they refused to release him. The brigadier was the brother of the Julibawi tribal leader Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq Battah al-Julibawi, who was killed by AQI for his involvement with the Anbar People’s Committee. While many tribes in Ramadi and the Jazira area resented AQI’s influence, the Albu Julib decision not to kill a known AQI operative shows the brutal effectiveness of the group’s murder and intimidation campaign.683

The situation in Amariyah mirrored these tribal issues. In early September, AQI resumed fighting with Albu Issa tribal militias in the town after business owners refused to pay tribute to AQI. Yet, with the return of Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi to the Fallujah area, an increasing number of Albu Issa tribal leaders were willing to stand up to AQI members within their own tribe. As a result, the tribe split between pro- and anti-AQI elements within the various subtribes, resulting in the murder of two of Sheikh Khamis’s bodyguards by fellow Albu Issa tribesmen after they voiced disapproval of AQI. The fighting within the Albu Issa tribe was now between a core of loyalists who followed Sheikh Khamis and resisted AQI and members of a not insignificant number of subtribes that supported AQI, effectively subverting the unity of the Albu Issa tribe.684

The Zobai tribe would become involved in the internal Albu Issa split because they had traditionally been allied with the Albu Fuhaylat subtribe. Salafist members of the two tribes, led by AQI[b6] fought the Albu Nasir subtribe because of its support for the Iraqi government, killing three Iraqi police officers and an unknown number of tribesmen. In the aftermath of the initial fighting, tribal leaders unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a cease-fire between the two sides.685

Because of the traditional alliance between the two tribes, the Zobai AQI leadership was able to establish cells among the Albu Fuhaylat and exploit existing tensions within the Albu Issa to create a significant level of influence over Amariyah and Ferris Town.686 They were aided by another phenomenon that created tensions between sections of the Albu Issa and with the Zobai. The subtribes of Amariyah and Ferris Town were relatively wealthy in comparison to the Albu Issa subtribes and agrarian Zobai tribe of Zaidon. Many members of the poorer tribes were persuaded by AQI promises of money and power to support the group against members of the more privileged tribes. As a result, the Fuhaylat and Olyhat subtribes of the Albu Issa as well as the Zobai tribe supported AQI while the Manasir and Albu Hadir subtribes of the Albu Issa supported the Coalition.687

The theoretical head of the Albu Issa, Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi, actively supported the Coalition, but since the attempts on his life in the summer of 2005 (see Chapter 5b) both he and the
ruling Aifan family of the Albu Issa had lost considerable influence and as a result were powerless to mediate or end the conflict. The absence of effective senior tribal leadership ensured that AQI remained the primary beneficiary of the inter-tribal fighting as large concentrations of Salafists from the Zobai tribe and Fuhaylat subtribe were recruited into the group and pledged bayat to as their amir. By perpetuating tribal unrest, AQI was able to dilute the authority of the Iraqi security forces in Amariyah while strengthening its position in the Fallujah peninsula whether or not their Fuhaylat, Olyhat, and Zobai allies were able to actually prevail in Amariyah.688

(S) At least some of the AQI fighters operating in the Albu Issa tribal area apparently had the benefit of training at foreign terrorist camps. For instance, Fuhaylat AQI leader was a Sudanese national who had received at least sixteen months of training at the Sudan National Defense Camp, including forty-five days at the Islamic Jihad Combat Camp where he was taught how to use Hawn-60 rockets, RPGs, RPKs, and 9mm pistols.689

(S) By the end of September, the situation had deteriorated so far that five Amariyah sheikhs requested a stronger Coalition presence in Amariyah to protect the city from AQI. Not only were their tribal fighters unable to fend off their AQI-supported tribal rivals, but the local police were overwhelmed by AQI’s superior firepower and numbers. Adding to the problem, at least nine police officers in Ferris Town had deserted to join AQI but kept all their weapons and documentation.690

(S) Further problems for AQI were caused by who continued his assassination campaign against AQI operatives in the Tamim and Sufia districts of Ramadi through Harakat al-Islamiyah. The group killed AQI leader Abu Khattab as well as Hazim Samarra, Ra'id Madiha, Safa Hamid, and Mullah Khattan's lieutenant Hamid al-Jaburi in the Jarayshi area of Ramadi. Harakat al-Islamiyah gunmen also killed Muhammad Kurdi Rashid al-Muhanna al-Alwani, an Ansar al-Sunna leader operating in the Albu Alwan tribal area. operatives justified their activities through a fatwa issued by Iraqi expatriate religious leader Muwafuq Abd al-Razzaq (see Chapter 6b) that authorized action against AQI to protect the Sunni community. By late August, more than one hundred copies of Muwafuq's fatwa had been distributed on CD to Harakat al-Islamiyah members in Ramadi.691

(S) The Harakat al-Islamiyah group that conducted these assassinations had been founded by at some point after the fall of Saddam Hussein, but the group had disbanded after the December 2005 elections as part of plan to demonstrate his bonafides as an Iraqi politician. Like other groups associated with Harakat al-Islamiyah had been targeted by AQI in 2005 and its leaders Muhammad Turki Muslih al-Faraji and Hajji Shu'ayb had been assassinated. Despite this, following the group's disbandment many of its former members joined AQI in order to continue attacking the

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688 Ibid.
689 | Military | 08 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061008 | (S/NE) |
690 | Military | 26 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | (S/NE) |
691 | Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | (S/NE) |
Coalition. Those members of the group who agreed to join AQI included a number of individuals who also held dual membership in the Abu Harun Group including Ghazi Ahmad Sharmut (Abu Bakr), ‘Abd al-Hadi Ismail al-Dulaymi, Natham Hamid Rashid (Abu Uthman), and Mahmud Husayn Abdullah Fadal (Abu Rasul).692

(S) In the spring of 2006, was able to reform Harakat al-Islamiyah with the help of Sheikh Abdul Sattar under the leadership of the brothers The evolution of these brothers shows one of the significant changes within AQI since the death of Zarqawi. Perhaps influenced by an AQSL desire to exert more control and centralization over its far-flung associate groups, AQI began to demand that members swear bayat to its leadership. The brothers had earlier been associates of AQI leader but when they refused to accept AQI leader offer to swear bayat to AQI began targeting the brothers’ home in the Albu Jdayi tribal area of the Jazira with IEDs. Other Harakat al-Islamiyah leaders such as accepted offer, providing information on the locations of Harakat al-Islamiyah members to AQI. In late May, the brothers were forced to flee to 1.4b after Salah was shot by AQI.693

Divisions Within 1920 Revolution Brigade

(S/NF) reliance on Harakat al-Islamiyah rather than his own 1920 Revolution Brigade to target AQI was due largely to the fact that by August 2006 the group had splintered into four distinct factions. The first split occurred in April 2006 over the issue of whether or not to engage the Iraqi government, with two factions loyal to and his estranged second-in-command supporting political engagement and entering into negotiations with the Iraqi government even while differing with one another over the issue of sectarian violence (see Chapter 6a). They were opposed by two other factions, one made up of members of the group loyal to (who sided with AQI on tactical grounds) and the other of those loyal to AMS members Sheikh Ibrahim Mudaris and (who supported the Iraqi National Dialogue Front or INDF). While the followers of generally stopped attacking the Coalition, their opponents continued to develop and implement attacks.694

(S/NF) By August 2006, some of these divisions had healed even as new ones evolved. Followers of called for continued attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq while those loyal to AMS members Sheikh Ibrahim Mudaris and traveled to 1.4b and joined forces with who they believed shared their outlook for the future of 1920 Revolution Brigade. In the end, those 1920 Revolution Brigade members who opted to join in plotting a coup essentially ceased to be part of their original organization.695

(S/NF) While served as a nexus of Iraqi Sunni political and social movements including factions of both the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP) and the international Muslim Brotherhood, it

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692 [ | Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | (S/NF) | ]
693 Ibid.
694 [ | Military | 04 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060904 | (S/NF) | ]
695 Ibid.

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would be a mistake to regard him as the operational leader of 1920 Revolution Brigade. Because of his diverse connections to the Sunni political, insurgent, economic, religious, and academic elite was seen as one of the few Iraqi Sunnis capable of providing both unity and leadership for the community. However, his influence was beginning to wane in Anbar as the result of his quasi-exile status that limited his ability to exercise any real control over the 1920 Revolution Brigade and similar insurgent factions.696

(S/NF) Simultaneously, former Iraqi intelligence chief led a small group of 1920 Revolution Brigade members who were part of the Muslim Brotherhood including Lieutenant General Hamid Shaban and Major General Adnan al-Hadithi.697 Those members who did not follow remained in Baghdad to carry out attacks on Coalition forces under the leadership of and his subordinates.698

(S/NF) The fractious divisions within the once-powerful 1920 Revolution Brigade reflected the contentious squabbling among Iraqi and Anbari Sunni elites. The divisions demonstrated the increasingly weakened state of those Sunni leaders like that continued to advocate further political participation but had nothing to show for their efforts. Regardless of the goals of nd his SAR allies, they found themselves checked at every turn by an absolute Shi’a majority in parliament and a growing tide of sectarian violence. Similarly, rivals who continued to advocate armed resistance were increasingly confronted with the futility of their efforts as their once-robust nationalist groups were subsumed or marginalized by AQI, their attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces failed to yield any definitive results, and the Shi’a militias continued to grow stronger.699

Attempts to Enlist Support

696 Ibid.
697 [ | Military | 04 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060904 | (S/NF) | ]
698 Ibid.
699 Ibid.
700 [ | Military | 04 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060904 | (S/NF) | ]
Despite the willingness of anti-Coalition Sunni leaders to solicit support to ensure the security of the Sunni population and to facilitate the expulsion of Coalition forces, their desire to work with was not shared by the majority of either the Iraqi Sunni population or the groups that these leaders represented. This explains why they met with the and why none of them would discuss their plans openly. Their fears of the negative fallout from exposure would prove correct when these plans later served as ammunition for attacks on their legitimacy as Sunni leaders by pro-Coalition sheikhs.

At almost precisely the same time as these attempts to enlist support were occurring, representatives from AQI, Jaysh al-Fatihin, Ansar al-Sunna, and 1920 Revolution Brigade attended a meeting where emissaries from the were present. These emissaries reportedly offered financial aid to any Sunni group that agreed to hunt down and eliminate a list of Sunni leaders that the wanted dead. Of the groups that attended the meeting, only AQI agreed to the proposal, creating a rift between AQI and a number of the SAR groups formerly allied with AQI against the Coalition.

In response to tribal and rival insurgent challenges and to their loss of authority in certain Anbari cities, AQI attempted to reassert its influence and to regain the initiative in the province. Thus, in response to the earlier killing of AQI operatives by the Anbar Revolutionaries (see Chapter 6b), a group of AQI fighters led by Abu Bakr attacked a group of SAR insurgents led by Major General Khalid Araf al-Hathimi al-Dulaymi, killing Khalid, his son Husam, and Khalil Ibrahim al-Hathimi al-Dulaymi. In response to these killing, local tribesmen began searching for the purported amir for AQI in Anbar.

Meanwhile, AQI stepped up their attacks in the city of Fallujah, already the special object of AQI murder and intimidation operations. AQI operatives assassinated Jaysh al-Mujahideen leader Abdul

701 Ibid.
702 Ibid.
703 [Military | 09 Nov 06 MNF-W INSTSUM | 20061109 | (S/NE) | ]
704 [Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INSTSUM | 20061024 | (S/NE) | ]
705 was based in the Jazira area, operating in the Albu 'Ubayd, Albu Hazim, and Albu Bali tribal areas through a combination of local support and a vicious murder and intimidation campaign. preferred the Albu 'Ubayd tribal area because AQI had safe houses in the area that were used to hide and interrogate hostages. Saddamiyah in particular was preferred because it was perceived as abandoned by the Coalition and had a network of tunnels that were used by AQI to hide and execute hostages. [Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INSTSUM | 24 Oct 06 | (S/NE) | ]
Salam al-Jumayli in Fallujah because he had spoken out against "Takfiris."705 Also murdered by the group was Brigadier General Ahmed Dera al-Jumayli, the disgruntled chief of traffic police in Fallujah.706 Finally, AQI assassinated Fallujah city council chairman Najm Abdullah Saud al-Issawi and his son Erfan. This last assassination was a blow to the Fallujah leadership, as it had been chairman Najm, vice chairman Abbas, and former Fallujah mayor Sheikh Dhari who had revitalized the Fallujah city council after the murder of Sheikh Kamal in February 2006 (see Chapter 6a).707

(S) As an attempt to provide carrots to match the overwhelming sticks of its campaign against the Iraqi police, AQI posted flyers at gas stations near the village of Sijcher and in the Nazal district of Fallujah offering police officers the opportunity to avoid being targeted. They were instructed to turn over their badges, weapons, and uniforms to AQI operatives who worked at the gas stations. After the police had done so, they were taken into the desert to meet with mid-level AQI leaders and given a white dishdasha to symbolize that they had been cleansed of their sins.708

(S/NF) AQI targeted too the religious leadership of Fallujah, particularly Sheikh Abd al-Minim al-Fayyad al-Kubaysi of the Sheikh Khalid al-Fayyad mosque in the Kubaysayat district of Fallujah. Sheikh Abd al-Minim had preached anti-AQI sermons and told residents not to follow AQI but was now intimidated into silence. AQI also murdered Fallujah imam Marwan Jabbar Husayn for refusing to preach pro-AQI and anti-Coalition sermons. Despite this targeting of Fallujah religious leaders, many of the senior imams that had fled into exile in the 1.4b after the November 2005 murder of Sheikh Hamza now expressed a desire to return with the help of former mayor Sheikh Dhari.709

(S) AQI's murder and intimidation campaign in Fallujah was organized around a list of one hundred prominent figures that were considered priority targets. Each individual listing described the action to be taken against them by AQI operatives (assassination, kidnapping, etc.). Among those targets known to have been killed by AQI in September 2006 was Sami Ubayd Farhud, a member of the Arab Nationalist Movement who served on the Fallujah city council. A highly respected member of both the community and city council, Sami had frequently spoken out against AQI at meetings and criticized local imams he believed supported the group. His death marked the first assassination of a Fallujah city council member since the death of Sheikh Kamal in December 2005 and was significant loss to Fallujah.710

(S/NF) AQI collected intelligence on the Fallujah city council activities and the contracting process through a former contractor.711
One of AQI's most highly-placed intelligence agents in Fallujah was a former 1920 Revolution Brigade member who had since joined AQI. Using his old contacts in the 1920 Revolution Brigade, he provided AQI with intelligence on Fallujah city council meetings and Iraqi government meetings on the national reconciliation plan. More alarming, however, was that he used his long-time friendship with Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zobai to obtain information for AQI on how the Iraqi government planned to de-escalate sectarian tensions and defeat the insurgency. All this information was reported to AQI senior leadership and used by the AQI leadership to adapt their tactics and strategy in order to undermine the Iraqi government in Anbar.712

Fallujah city council vice chairman Qassam Muhammad Abdul Sattar, the head of the town's Democratic and Human Rights Studies Center, also retained ties to AQI, reportedly providing money to AQI financier to be dispersed to the group's various cells in Fallujah.713

AQI also intensified its condemnation of the IIP in Fallujah, with propaganda flyers in the Nazal district of the city claiming that the IIP had taken the path of evil works, betrayed the people of Iraq, and was now an agent of the infidels. While AQI operative had attempted to engage the IIP in negotiations in the Fallujah area, the differences between the two had proved impossible to overcome because the IIP continued to side with the Coalition and the Iraqi security forces rather than with AQI.714

Aqi vs. IIP in Anah and Rawah

The attacks on the IIP in Fallujah were part of a broader campaign against the group carried out throughout Anbar by AQI. The campaign was especially intense in the Anah and Rawah areas, towns that had already experienced significant violence between the two groups. At the beginning of September, the fighting escalated, leading residents to flee the area for safer locations. AQI's brutal tactics and the public nature of IIP, allowed AQI to identify and kill IIP members and to gain the upper hand in the town. At the same time, because Coalition patrols could not distinguish between armed groups, IIP militia fighters (see Chapter 6b) were just as likely to be engaged by the Coalition as their AQI enemies.715

To build up popular support in Anah, AQI fighters gave local business owners advance warning of attacks they planned to carry out close to their homes and businesses in the hopes of lessening the number of civilian casualties.716 For the IIP and their supporters, however, AQI intended no such mercy, killing IIP prominent members such as Sarhan Abed Yusif and leaving their heads in

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712 Ibid.
713 [ | Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | (S/NE) | ]
714 [ | Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | (S/NE) | ]
715 [ | Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | (S/NE) | ]
716 [ | Military | 17 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060917 | (S/NE) | ]
front of mosques in the town. After a failed assassination attempt against Anah IIP leader[(b)(6)] all Anah city council members went into hiding and [(b)(6)] fled the town.\(^{717}\)

\(\text{(S/NE)}\) At the end of September 2006, both Iraqi Vice President Hashemi and Governor Mamoun expressed serious concerns to Coalition officials about the situation in Anah. In particular, they were worried by reports that local SREs, Iraqi AQI fighters displaced from Husaybah, and foreign fighters were transporting weapons to Anah from Rawah and ousting Anah residents. [\(\text{(b)(6)}\) (IIP secretary-general)] and Mamoun (also an IIP member) also argued that they could not just stand idly by while AQI beheaded IIP members in Anah.\(^{718}\)

\(\text{(S)}\) Their concerns were well-founded. On September 22, the IIP disbanded in Anah as a result of AQI pressure, removing the last major obstacle to the group in the town. The uncontested AQI presence in Anah allowed the group to expand into Rawah despite the killing of its cell leader Saddam Shihab. These implications were also not lost on the Rawah police, with only eight of the thirty showed up for work on the day of the Anah IIP’s dissolution. While the closing of the IIP offices in Anah and the dissolution of the party in the town was a blow to its prestige in Anbar, IIP remained the dominant party in the province with over ninety different chapters spread out across Iraq. In the short-term, however, the dissolution of the IIP meant that AQI had the run of Anah.\(^{719}\)

\(\text{(S)}\) Meanwhile as the fighting between AQI and the IIP spread from Anah, residents of Rawah became hesitant to oppose AQI. In an effort to prevent a repeat of the violence that had occurred in Anah, AQI ordered all IIP members in the town to turn in their weapons. Yet AQI again worked diligently to gain the favor of members of the local business community by providing them with advance warning of attacks and attempting to reduce collateral damage by placing IEDs between buildings in order to minimize damage to them.\(^{720}\)

\(\text{(S)}\) AQI's murder and intimidation campaign in Rawah resulted in the city council abandoning their responsibilities, with the defunct council’s members telling residents to direct their concerns to the police instead. This further eroded the confidence of Rawah residents about the ability of the Coalition and Iraqi security forces to bring stability to the city and placed additional stress on the embattled Iraqi police.\(^{721}\)

**AQI Recruitment of Foreign Fighters Evolves**

\(\text{(S)}\) As AQI intensified its murder and intimidation campaigns throughout Anbar, their patterns of foreign fighter recruitment also changed. The primary facilitation hub for foreign fighters was in \(1.4b\) and incorporated a complex network made up of multiple safe houses designed to facilitate the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq. The cell first made contact with potential recruits through e-mail, with prospective recruits contacting the cell via the internet and then receiving a response that included detailed instructions on meeting locations in \(1.4b\) and methods for

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\(^{717}\) [Military | 20 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060920 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{718}\) [Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{719}\) [Military | 27 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060927 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{720}\) [Military | 20 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060920 | (S/NE) | ]

\(^{721}\) [Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | (S/NE) | ]
signaling cell members. After the initial contact, recruits were moved between safe houses for both indoctrination and operational security. After this was completed, the recruits were moved to for an average of one and a half months before being moved to from which they were transported into Iraq.722

(S) Once inside Iraq, the foreign fighters were often smuggled to the Hasiyah and Khawabra areas of Karabilah. A majority of the Albu Khawabra subtribe were Wahhabis who supported AQI and allowed foreign fighters to stay in their home for one or two nights before moving on. Another popular destination for foreign fighters entering Iraq was Ribat, where residents benefited financially from the smuggling of foreign fighters from 723

(S) The GSPC, which had pledged bayat to AQSL in early September 2006, now became heavily involved in the smuggling of trained GSPC fighters and other Islamists into Iraq. After the GSPC swore bayat, took steps to link the two groups' facilitation networks, increasing the number of Algerian foreign fighters coming to Iraq to serve as suicide bombers. The recruits were sent to an AQI facility in that doubled as a hotel and restaurant, from which AQI operative aided their entry into Iraq.724

AQI Financing: Foreign Funding

722 [Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | (S/NF) | ]
723 [Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | (S/NF) | ]
724 [Military | 19 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060919 | (S/NF) | ]
725 Ibid.
726 Ibid.
Although AQI financiers continued to rely on front companies and bank accounts under assumed names, a large number of the transactions occurred person-to-person, with those retrieving the funds abroad physically transporting the money back to Iraq. For instance, NGOs supplied money to AQI through Hajj pilgrims.728

In addition, sources reportedly provided the group with $2-3,000,000 a month. Wealthy donors and other AQI and AQAM supporters in the Middle East and Europe continued to provide financial support to the group, but AQI was increasingly adept at raising money inside Iraq through kidnapping, vehicle theft, extortion, and oil smuggling operations that guaranteed the group’s continued financial survival and vitality even in the event that the Iraqi government was able to curtail or eliminate its external funding.730

**AQI Financing: Oil**

Because of rivalry with other expatriates in kept his connections with the Minarat Biadi Oil Company secret, for fear that his opponents would alert the Coalition to his activities or attempt to extort money from him. He may also have wanted to keep the Iraqi government or the general Iraqi public in the dark about his rather shady business dealings.732

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727 [ | Military | 22 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060922 | (S/NE) | ]
728 Ibid.
729 Ibid.
730 Ibid.
731 [ | Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | (S/NE) | ]
732 Ibid.
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(S/NF) owned the Ahil al-Iraq Security and Protection Company that protected trucks and tankers for the al-Shira al-Abiyad and al-Fawl oil companies that traveled from Bayji to [1.4b]. The al-Shira al-Abiyad Company was, of course, owned by AQI operative [b(6)] and his associates through the Ebkitar Investment Group, a company that was in turn heavily involved in both legal and illicit export activities and maintained a legitimate contract with the Iraqi ministry of oil (see Chapter 6a and 6b).733

(S/NF) As in the past, corruption at the Waleed border crossing was used to facilitate AQI’s siphoning off Iraqi oil from a pipeline in Tikrit. The Waleed border guards were paid off or threatened by AQI to look the other way while they transported the oil across the border in trucks to processing plants in [1.4b] where the oil was resold for $40 a barrel and used to fund AQI operations against the Coalition. The AQI member responsible for this oil smuggling operation was a former Iraqi colonel from Khalidiyah who was now based in [1.4b].734

(S) Meanwhile, the complex smuggling network run by AQI cells in Ramadi took oil from the Bayji oil refinery and distributed it throughout Anbar via the black market (see Chapter 6a-b). The money made from the oil smuggling was then funnelled to AQI and allied cells such as the Abu Alla Group (whose member [b(6)] worked as the manager of the southern Bayji oil refinery) that purchased vehicles to be used in VBIEDs.735

(S) There was an interesting relationship between AQI’s oil smuggling industry and its VBIED manufacturing. AQI recruited [b(6)] the executive officer for the 2nd Strategic Infrastructure Battalion to carry out a VBIED attack against an oil pipeline near Bayji. This attack decreased the supply of oil and increased the demand for black market petroleum, with the increased demand ensuring high black market fuel profits that financed AQI activity throughout Anbar.736

(S/NF) The Iraqi government realized that they were losing control of their oil resources and attempted to find a solution to this serious problem. In late September, the Iraqi oil ministry formed a committee to investigate the September 16 disappearance of 1,500,000 liters of kerosene. Bayji refinery distribution direction [b(6)] (see Chapter 6b) was identified by the committee as one of the employees under investigation for facilitating the theft of the kerosene. While the committee asked the oil ministry operations center [b(6)] to be arrested, he continued to work at the facility (despite having been fired by oil minister Shahristani in August 2006). High-ranking oil ministry officials, including a deputy minister, put pressure on the Iraqi government to close the case for fear of AQI’s wrath and also because they were unwilling to forsake the ill-gotten money that they received from activities.737

(S/NF) Despite [b(6)] protestations of his own innocence to the committee, he had been involved in black market fuel dealings in Bayji since at least July 2005 and had assisted AQI since at

733 Ibid.
734 [Military | 17 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060917 | (S/NF) | ]
735 [Military | 29 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060929 | (S/NF) | ]
736 Ibid.
737 [Military | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | (S/NF) | ]
least the beginning of 2006. The failure of the oil ministry to move against him was due to the fact that the ministry itself was a bastion of corruption and that the deputy minister who supported [(b)(6)] was himself being paid $35,000 a month in return for his cooperation in oil smuggling operations. Prime Minister Maliki's lack of confidence in oil minister Shahristani's abilities, combined with the disdain of oil ministry bureaucrats who resented Shahristani's attempts at reform, made it extremely difficult for the Iraqi government to adequately address the corruption that pervaded the Bayji refinery, the Northern Oil Company, and the oil ministry itself.738

The Oil Man of Ramadi

(S/NE) AQI's attempt to use oil to enrich itself was somewhat complicated by the situation in Ramadi. There the oil distribution director [(b)(6)] had successfully created a situation that made him virtually indispensable for both the provincial government and AQI. Having served as a worker at the Ramadi oil distribution center under Saddam Hussein, [(b)(6)] had been dismissed from his position in early 2003 and then forced to flee the country. He returned from exile after the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty and was allowed to assume the position of oil distribution director under the Iraqi de-Ba'athiication program. By late 2004 and early 2005, [(b)(6)] had exploited his in-depth knowledge of the Anbar fuel distribution network to enrich himself by using Saddam-era distribution system's built-in mechanism for fraud in order to defy accountability and responsibility.739

(S/NE) initial insurgent partner was al-Nu'man Brigade leader [(b)(6)] whose fighters were used by [(b)(6)] to coerce or intimidate his subordinates at the Ramadi oil distribution center into cooperating with his corruption. [(b)(6)]' profits from the corruption enabled him to build several new homes in Ramadi and to buy a wide array of vehicles. After [(b)(6)] was captured by the Coalition in May 2005 (see Chapter 5a), AQI amir [(b)(6)] attempted to install himself as [(b)(6)] new insurgent partner only to be rebuffed. Outraged, [(b)(6)] used a combination of intimidation and assassination attempts on Governor Mamoun to force him to replace [(b)(6)] with [(b)(6)] collaborator [(b)(6)]. When the oil ministry refused to accept [(b)(6)] kidnapped Governor Mamoun’s son. When the governor convinced [(b)(6)] that he was unable to install [(b)(6)] the AQI leader relented and agreed to release his son after a ransom was paid.740

(S/NE) Using [(b)(6)] as an intermediary, [(b)(6)] was now able to convince [(b)(6)] to return to his old job in Ramadi, where he was subjected to AQI intimidation and forced to cooperate in dispersing fuel to [(b)(6)] Ramadi four gas stations, allowing [(b)(6)] to reap a profit of $90,000 every day his gas stations received a tanker load of benzene. For unknown reasons, in 2006 [(b)(6)] and demanded $50,000 in ransom before agreeing to a compromise deal of the same amount in goods, weapons, and automobiles in return for [(b)(6)]. Fearing further AQI attacks, [(b)(6)] fled with his family to 14b only to return to Ramadi over the summer to resume work. After [(b)(6)] was killed by the Anbar

738 Ibid.
739 Ibid.
740 Ibid.
Revolutionaries in September 2006 served as new liaison with AQI to control the distribution of fuel throughout Ramadi.\footnote{Ibid.} 

The Coalition and Iraqis Strike Back

The Capture of and Death of Nasayf Jassim al-Mawali

\footnote{Military \hspace{1em} 08 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM \hspace{1em} 20060908 \hspace{1em} (S/NE) \hspace{1em} \[ ]} On September 7, Coalition forces captured in the Abu Ghraib area while he was traveling to Karmah to meet with AQI network was primarily made up of members of the Abu Harun Group (see Chapters 5a-5b) and was based in the Jazira area north of Ramadi with a strong presence in Ramadi and the surrounding areas. By retaining its old organizational structure from the Abu Harun Group, the group was divided into two sections that oversaw the Albu Ali Jassim and the Albu Dhiab tribal lands of the Jazira area. Following the capture of he was succeeded by his top lieutenant in the Albu Dhiab tribal lands.\footnote{Military \hspace{1em} 10 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM \hspace{1em} 20060910 \hspace{1em} (S/NE) \hspace{1em} \[ ]} 

\footnote{Military \hspace{1em} 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM \hspace{1em} 20060911 \hspace{1em} (S/NE) \hspace{1em} \[ ]} The Coalition notified Sufia district amir that he was to succeed him as the leader of AQI in Ramadi in the event of his death or detention.\footnote{Military \hspace{1em} 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM \hspace{1em} 20061013 \hspace{1em} (S/NE) \hspace{1em} \[ ]} The killing of so many senior AQI leaders had an adverse affect on the group's ability to conduct attacks in Ramadi, resulting in an average of eleven attacks per day from September 5-10; a major reduction from the ninety day average of eighteen attacks per day.\footnote{Military \hspace{1em} 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM \hspace{1em} 20060911 \hspace{1em} (S/NE) \hspace{1em} \[ ]}

On September 25, AQI leader Nasayf Jassim Mawali was killed along with his son Marwan during Coalition operations in the Jazira area near Ramadi. As noted in Chapter 6b, Nasayf was a high-ranking AQI amir who commanded the group's murder and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi police in the Jazira area. The deputy of AQI leader Nasayf was nicknamed "Police Killer" for his merciless attacks against the Iraqi police. A former police officer himself, Nasayf had implemented a ruthless campaign to capture or kill Iraqi police, using his old contacts to obtain intelligence on current officers as well as money from corrupt police officials. In addition to his murder and intimidation campaign, Nasayf also took part in VBIED construction, recruiting suicide bombers, facilitating foreign fighter movement, and criminality. After his death he was succeeded by once again illustrating AQI's ability to replace captured or slain leaders.\footnote{Military \hspace{1em} 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM \hspace{1em} 20061013 \hspace{1em} (S/NE) \hspace{1em} \[ ]}

The Anbar Emergency Council

\footnote{Military \hspace{1em} 08 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM \hspace{1em} 20060908 \hspace{1em} (S/NE) \hspace{1em} \[ ]} A more serious threat to AQI developed with the organization of Anbari tribal leaders into a formal anti-AQI alliance. In early September 2006, sheikhs and tribal leaders from the Rishawi,\footnote{Military \hspace{1em} 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM \hspace{1em} 20061013 \hspace{1em} (S/NE) \hspace{1em} \[ ]}
Hardan, Dhiabi, Ubayd, and Iliyawi tribes throughout the Ramadi area met in the city to announce the formation of an emergency council to fight terrorism and replace corrupt officials in the Anbar provincial government. Displeased with the provincial government's inefficiency at providing security and fighting terrorism and corruption in the province, the sheikhs drew up a letter to the Iraqi interior ministry requesting its permission to replace Governor Mamoun. During the meeting, Sheikh Hamid Fahan Hayis al-Dhiabi was elected head of the Anbar Emergency Council, the political manifestation of the Anbar Awakening movement.746

The Anbar Emergency Council consisted of forty-one sheikhs of various ranks from seventeen Anbari tribes, with the tribes of the greater Ramadi area making up a substantial majority. Nine sheikhs hailed from western Anbar, including the powerful Albu Mahal and Albu Nimr. Only two sheikhs from Khalidiyah were represented and there was no representation from the tribes east of the Thar Thar Canal such as the Zobai or the Albu Issa.747

The idea of this sort of emergency council was not new; a number of sheikhs had entertained the notion at least as far back as November 2005. The formation of other grassroots political groups, such as the Anbar Central Council, led to the creation of several competing organizations made up of tribal leaders determined to secure their personal power in the new provincial political climate. In addition to this problem, Sunni intransigence, sectarian divisions, the dubious constitutionality of the Anbar Emergency Council, and the continued strength of AQI in Anbar were all considerable challenges facing the Council.748

The self-appointment of the Council members also estranged them from the existing government, making it difficult for the Shi'a blocs, who feared Ba'athist resurgence and supported Prime Minister Maliki, to grant it any real legitimacy. As a practical matter, Anbar had no viable provincial governance by September 2006, although the Anbar Central Council tried to provide financial, economic, military, and political advice to Governor Mamoun. It operated, however, from without legitimacy as a political entity.749

While the Anbar Emergency Council had a political agenda very like that of the Anbar Central Council, it was suspicious of the other group's long-term goals. The Emergency Council saw the Central Council as a collection of technocrats intent on marginalizing the traditional Sunni tribal leadership in the Iraqi government. The Anbar Central Council, meanwhile, thought that its rivals in the Albu Mahal family were behind this new initiative and so opposed it, making it difficult for Prime Minister Maliki to support the Anbar Emergency Council. As a national unity leader, Maliki relied on Sunni political parties such as IIP and Tawafuq Front to support his reconciliation initiatives. Recognizing the tribal power of Sunni leaders would undermine both IIP and Tawafuq Front, SCIRI was willing to support a measure that would see the latter party diminished.750

746 [Military 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060911 (S/NE) ]
747 [Military 21 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060921 (S/NE) ]
748 [Military 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20060911 (S/NE) ]
749 Ibid.
750 Ibid.
The constitutionality of the Anbar Emergency Council was rather dubious, but the Council argued that its appointment could be legitimized by the Prime Minister under a particular section of the Iraqi constitution. Essentially, the Anbar Emergency Council wanted Prime Minister Maliki to delegate federal authority to the Council so that they could appoint themselves.\(^{751}\)

The divisions between the two Councils were reflected in separate meetings that occurred within days of each other. On September 12, the official Anbar provincial council held a meeting to appoint Ali Abbud Awad Hatimi as the province's new deputy governor. Two days later, on September 14 near the Jazira police station north of Ramadi, Sheikh Abdul Sattar held his own meeting of the Anbar Emergency Council made up of Anbari tribal sheikhs from the Albu Nimr, Albu Dhiab, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Risha, Albu Julib, and the Albu Faraj tribes disillusioned with the provincial government. At the meeting, the sheikhs planned to establish a new governing body for Anbar with forty-eight members. Sheikh Abdul Sattar was elected the new governor of Anbar, Sheikh Hamid Farhan al-Heis was made the new chairman of the provincial council, and Brigadier General Hamid Hammad Shawka of the Albu Dhiab tribe was made the new provincial police chief. The Anbar Emergency Council then drew up a plan for establishing security in Anbar that was sent on to Prime Minister Maliki and the interior ministry for approval.\(^{752}\)

The creation of the Anbar Emergency Council was largely motivated by the desperation of the tribal leaders to rid Ramadi of AQI. In their view, AQI's ruthless attacks and violence had ripped apart the fabric of Anbari society including the authority and influence of the tribal sheikhs. Moreover, the money that had traditionally gone to the sheikhs was now flowing directly to AQI. They feared that if left unchecked AQI would cripple the traditional tribal system throughout Anbar and therefore directed their anger against Governor Mamoun and the Anbar provincial government, whom they regarded as corrupt and incapable of curtailing AQI in Ramadi. These same sheikhs intended to use the Anbar Emergency Council to install themselves as the new provincial government in order to rehabilitate their prestige, ensure their personal security, rehabilitate government institutions, and most importantly eject AQI from Ramadi.\(^{753}\)

By mid-September 2006, representatives of the Anbar Emergency Council traveled to Baghdad to meet with national security minister of state Shirwan al-Waili, provincial minister Saad al-Hardan, and deputy parliament speaker Khalid Attiya to raise their complaints about Anbar's provincial government. Khalid Attiya assured them that the Iraqi parliament would give him favorable consideration to any measures that the Anbar Emergency Council believed were appropriate. It was through this meeting, as reported by the \textit{New York Times}, that Governor Mamoun first learned of the Anbar Emergency Council.\(^{754}\)

The Origin of Sheikh Abdul Sattar

Among the members of the Anbar Emergency Council was Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bezia Ftykhan Albu Risha, who had been linked in the past to fuel smuggling ventures operated by

\(^{751}\) Ibid.
\(^{752}\) [ | Military | 18 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060918 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{753}\) Ibid.
\(^{754}\) Ibid.
members or allies of the al-Nu'man Brigade (see Chapters 5a-6a) such as [b][6] Sheikh Rafa al-Rawi, and [b][6] This was during the period when these individuals had operated on the basis of FRE or SAR ideologies. Sheikh Abdul Sattar was not ideologically tied to AQI or any of his past business associates, and was instead most interested in a pursuit of profit and willing to turn on his former colleagues if offered a better deal. [755] For instance, he had been actively involved in [b][6] prior to its dissolution.

(S/NF) Certain events were, however, to transform [b][6] from a man interested primarily in profit, to something much larger. Born in 1971, [b][6] had completed high school and served in the Iraqi army in 1991, only to desert in the wake of the Gulf War and serve six months in prison as a consequence. A family man with one wife and four children, he worked as a Coalition contractor in 2003, relying on his friendly ties with the Coalition to beat out the competition when it came to smuggling goods from Iraq to neighboring states. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, [b][6] and his [b][6] stole military hardware from abandoned Iraqi arms depots and began collecting weapons for their own purposes. [757]

(S/NF) It was [b][6] oil smuggling operations that led him to cooperate with members of the al-Nu'man Brigade. Using corrupt Iraqi officials in Ba'aj and at the Walid border crossing, [b][6] was able to turn a handsome profit smuggling Iraqi oil into [14b] but his collaboration with the al-Nu'man Brigade in this venture was motivated purely by money. [758]

(S/NF) served as his chief advisor and confidante. As a result, he participated in many of [b][6] weapons purchasing and smuggling operations at the Walid border crossing at least as far back as August 2004. During this period, he came into contact with a kidnapping and extortion cell at the Walid border crossing run by [b][6] and pulled strings to obtain the release of one of [b][6] men to keep the family business running. [759]

[S] who in July 2004 had been a lieutenant colonel in the Ramadi police force, commanding the fifty-man undercover police unit. Like many of the Ramadi police during this period, [b][6] was a corrupt individual who had conspired with another officer to inflate the number of Iraqi police on the official rosters and then kept the additional salary money for themselves. Nevertheless, he protected the men in his unit, in particular during an attack by then-provincial police chief [b][6] an FRE insurgent supporter. By November 2005, [b][6] had risen to the position of deputy police chief for Anbar province and was considered for the position of director of military intelligence for Anbar and Karbala provinces. [760]

(S/NF) It was at this point that events would conspire to change [b][6] life. His father, Sheikh Bezia Ftyakhan, had been the leader of the Albu Risha tribe since before the beginning of

755 [ Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | (S/NF) | ]
756 [ Military | 18 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060918 | (S/NF) | ]
757 Ibid.
758 Ibid.
759 Ibid.
760 Ibid.
OIF.\textsuperscript{761} Sheikh Bezia Ftaykhan had maintained an amicable relationship with the Coalition, hosting officials at his house for tea in Ramadi. AQI regarded this as evidence of collaboration, and Sheikh Fawzi was killed by the group on November 6, 2004 during the height of Operation AL FAJR. With Sheikh Fawzi dead and his eldest son Abdullah Bezia killed by AQI (then JTJ) in August 2004, Abdullah became the head of the Albu Risha tribe.\textsuperscript{762}

(S/NF) Soon afterward, now-Sheikh Abdul Sattar began paying Anbaris to transport weapons to his home in Ramadi under the pretext that he had been ordered by the Coalition to collect weapons for disposal. While this was false, when he presented the Coalition with the weapons he had accumulated in October 2005 on his own initiative he was told to keep them safe until they could be properly retrieved. His lavish villa outside of Camp Ramadi became a veritable fortress with a wall three meters high and several observation towers guarded by members of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's family or loyal Rishawi tribesmen.

(S/NF) To protect himself, Sheikh Abdul Sattar began traveling with a security detail of no less than fifty armed men. Given that his father had been killed by AQI operatives who dragged him from his car and shot him on the side of the road, he considered these precautions more than warranted. After ascending to the leadership of the Albu Risha, he continued to seek out Coalition contracts and thus was a major target for JTJ. In late May 2004, Sheikh Abdul Sattar received a letter from then-Governor Burjis threatening him and his brothers unless they ceased collaboration with the Coalition. As a result, the brothers spent most of the summer of 2004 to the summer of 2006 under the constant threat of death from AQI, which now regarded the entire Bezia family as Coalition informants.\textsuperscript{763}

(S) As AQI grew stronger in Ramadi throughout the latter half of 2005, Sheikh Abdul Sattar agreed to join and other Ramadi tribal leaders in the formation of the Anbar People's Committee. Most of the Committee's key leaders were assassinated, but Sheikh Abdul Sattar managed to survive due to his personal security detail. Because of their late father's good relationship with the Coalition, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his brothers never became radicalized against the Coalition and by October 2006 were now the most powerful figures in Anbar, having helped to create and lead the most promising pro-Coalition organization in Anbar since the beginning of OIF.\textsuperscript{764}

**Support for the Anbar Emergency Council**

(S) Not surprisingly, given his earlier activities in the Anbar People's Council, 1920 Revolution Brigade leader supported the formation of the Anbar Emergency Council, attending its meetings and informing the assembled tribal leaders that Governor Mamoun and the current provincial government had to be replaced through legal means. He also intended to have members of Harakat al-Islamiyah (which he regarded as being more personally loyal to him as opposed to the now-schismatic 1920 Revolution Brigade) join the Iraqi police and army in order to provide stability for Anbar and stated that he was considering returning to Ramadi in order to promote the Anbar

\textsuperscript{761} His uncle Sheikh Fawzi was also a prominent figure within the tribe.
\textsuperscript{762} [ Military | 19 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070119 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{763} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{764} Ibid.
Emergency Council. The Council members received favorable, believing that he was a powerful man who could help them bring peace back to the province.765

Despite his involvement in the insurgency, was a pragmatic individual who, following his defeat at the hands of AQI in early 2006, was now far more aware of the need to work with the Iraqi government and the Coalition as well as the need for Iraqi Sunnis to coexist peacefully with the nation's Shi'a majority. He had also come to a realistic assessment of the unlikelihood of his SAR fighters defeating AQI without Coalition or Iraqi government assistance given the large disparity in money, manpower and unity between the two groups.766

Gradual shift towards support for the Coalition (or at least opposition to AQI) represented a considerable change from his earlier vehement opposition to the Coalition and Iraqi government. While remained unrepentant for his earlier actions, he recognized that the only way he could ever regain his former prominence in Ramadi was to defeat AQI. Because of the Anbar Emergency Council's ability to attract outside support (and kill AQI fighters using the Anbar Revolutionaries), it was a far more successful vehicle for than the Anbar People's Committee and had a good relationship with Sheikh Abdul Sattar from their shared time on the organization. Through his continued ability to influence 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah, both and Sheikh Abdul Sattar were determined to make certain that the defeat of the Anbar People's Committee was not repeated.767

The Anbar Revolutionaries also accepted support. As a group whose propaganda argued that AQI unjustly killed key Iraqi leaders and shed the blood of the people of Anbar, the Anbar Revolutionaries made a distinction between "the resistance" (insurgent groups that supported the Anbar Revolutionaries) and "the terrorists" (AQI and its allies) that they believed had slain innocent Muslims, cynically used religious rhetoric for their political agenda, and whose actions served the goal of a foreign power.768

As a result, the membership of the Anbar Revolutionaries was now drawn not only from Iraqi police and army officers and local tribesmen, but also from insurgent groups, including the remnants of Jaysh al-Haqq, al-Nu'man Brigade (al-Rahman Brigade), and own 1920 Revolution Brigade. In keeping with their national origins in late 2005 under the leadership of the Baghdad-based, all members of the Anbar Revolutionaries were sworn to secrecy about their identities or their pasts to prevent AQI from obtaining detailed information about their group under torture.769

Anbar Revolutionaries and Harakat al-Islamiyah Against AQI

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765 [ | Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | (S/NE) | ]
766 Ibid.
767 Ibid.
768 [ | Military | 29 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061029 | (S/NE) | ]
769 Ibid. During that period in 2005, the group had been led in Anbar by Iraqi police colonels Akil and Khalid Sharhuth al-Darraj before the two had been assassinated by AQI in February 2006.
The Anbar Revolutionaries continued to target AQI in Ramadi, killing nearly a dozen members of the group, including five AQI fighters at the Tamim mosque as well as deputy Nabil Khalaf Salah while he was finishing prayers at the Abdul Rahman mosque in the Malaab district. Because Malaab was a known center of AQI influence, the Anbar Revolutionaries' ability to penetrate the district and kill an AQI lieutenant showed the group's growing willingness to challenge AQI in areas where it was known to be strong. Not surprisingly, AQI fought back by killing members of the Anbar Revolutionaries and delivering their bodies to the Women and Children's Hospital. The Anbar Revolutionaries responded in kind, killing AQI vehicle theft, IED, and assassination leader Khalid Hardan (Muhanna).

Harakat al-Islamiyah also continued to target AQI, in particular attempting to capture AQI leader in the Malaab district. A former lieutenant to [see Chapter 6b], had risen to the status of amir within AQI and was second-in-command in addition to being responsible for carrying out IED attacks throughout the Malaab district. In an effort to demonstrate the differences between Harakat al-Islamiyah and AQI to Ramadi residents, while Harakat al-Islamiyah kidnapped suspected AQI members, the group did not torture them and promptly released them if they were deemed innocent of AQI ties.

AQI responded by assassinating Harakat al-Islamiyah leader Major General Muhammad Thumayl Jarbawi al-Fahdawi at a checkpoint between al-Nasif and Sajariya. The former head of the security subcommittee of the Anbar People's Committee, Major General Muhammad had reformed Harakat al-Islamiyah into the powerful anti-AQI force it later became. Major General Mohammad had hoped that this force would gain the trust of residents and present a credible alternative to AQI.

Despite AQI's move against the Anbar Revolutionaries, the group continued to grow by absorbing several of the smaller anti-AQI groups (see Chapter 6b for descriptions). The group was organized into militia, intelligence, propaganda, and assassination units and its propaganda campaign encouraged the use of the names Justice Group, Punisher Brigade, Anger Militia, and Right Truth in place of Anbar Revolutionaries when claiming attacks in order to make AQI believe that it had more enemies than it actually did. A majority of its recruits were drawn from the immediate families of victims of AQI attacks, former Iraqi intelligence or interior ministry officials, and SAR insurgents who had become disenchanted with AQI. Members of the Anbar Revolutionaries who served in the Iraqi police force were allowed to continue their professional careers, while unemployed members of the group were encouraged to join the Iraqi police in their own hometowns. The group also received the support of more than thirty tribes in western Iraq and even some individual cooperation from the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, the Anbar Revolutionaries were wary of
government corruption and preferred not to be endorsed by any particular ministry; thus its members always remained anonymous when dealing with Iraqi officials.775

(S) The activities of the Coalition, the Anbar Revolutionaries, and Harakat al-Islamiyah pushed AQI attacks in Ramadi even lower, a trend that began with the capture of and the death of Abu Uthman. The number of daily attacks dropped from forty-five during the first week of September to twenty-three during the last week of the month. The number of IEDs also dropped from thirty-three to twenty-four, although the number of DF attacks increased from forty-nine to eighty-seven. This shift towards DF rather than IED attacks was a temporary measure by AQI until new IED components could be assembled and new funds became available to the group’s new leaders in Ramadi.776

(S/NF) While the actions of the Anbar Revolutionaries and Harakat al-Islamiyah eliminated a number of AQI leaders, the group was still more than capable of reasserting control of the city through intimidation tactics. The AQI leadership did not intend to abandon Ramadi because they believed that any withdrawal from Ramadi would be seen as a sign of defeat in Baghdad and an abandonment of their strategic support position at a time when Baghdad had become their central focus.777 Simply put, AQI was determined to dominate Ramadi no matter the cost.

(S/NF) Recognizing the growth of the Anbar Revolutionaries and the Anbar Emergency Council, Iraqi finance minister Bayan Jabr agreed to release $38,000,000 to Governor Mamoun, or roughly 40% of the money that the Iraqi government had budgeted for reconstruction in Anbar (see Chapter 6a). This money was intended to help reduce tensions between the Anbar Emergency Council and Governor Mamoun, allowing the latter to mollify the former by dispensing reconstruction funding to tribal sheikhs either directly or through contracts. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi also intended to schedule meetings between Governor Mamoun and the Anbar Emergency Council so that the two sides could reach an agreement to improve security prospects for Ramadi.778

Anbar Revolutionaries’ Media Campaign

(S/NF) The efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries would be given a significant boost at the end of September, when the Iraqi satellite television station al-Iraqiya received an exclusive agreement with the Anbar Revolutionaries, a result of the efforts of al-Iraqiya to weaken AQI by providing positive coverage of the Anbar Revolutionaries' actions in Ramadi. Because of their distrust of the Iraqi government, the leadership of the Anbar Emergency Council was initially hesitant to participate, but they eventually consented. This resulted in a deal under which an undercover al-Iraqiya reporter was allowed to embed with the Anbar Revolutionaries and cover their activities. To demonstrate its good intentions to the Anbar Emergency Council, al-Iraqiya also produced coverage of the ongoing meetings between the Anbar Emergency Council sheikhs and the Iraqi government. The station planned to continue covering the
battle that the Anbar Revolutionaries were waging against AQI in other provinces in the hopes of inspiring local Sunni sheikhs and community leaders to organize their own efforts against AQI in neighboring provinces.\textsuperscript{779}

\textit{(S/NE)} The result of the al-Iraqiyya coverage was that the Anbar Revolutionaries' anti-AQI crusade in Ramadi attracted support from a wide range of Anbari Sunnis, Baghdad residents, tribal leaders in other provinces, and Iraqi politicians. This support was highly unusual in its unanimity, but should have been expected, given the almost universal hatred of AQI. Unlike contentious issues such as sectarian death squads or the status of Kirkuk, the story of the Anbar Revolutionaries was universally attractive to the average Iraqi regardless of race, sect or religion because it involved Sunnis attacking Sunni extremists in a Sunni province. This allowed the Kurds and the Shi'a, who had been the primary victims of AQI, to cheer on the Sunnis while at long last giving the Sunnis a reason to express solidarity with their fellow Iraqis.\textsuperscript{780}

\textit{(S/NE)} This was a win-win scenario for the Anbar Emergency Council, bringing them more support from provincial and national Sunni leaders and from the national Shi'a dominated government. The UIA leadership in fact viewed it as even more beneficial because it allowed those Iraqi officials who had made public declarations of support for the Anbar Revolutionaries a chance to look good in the eyes of the Sunni population while doing little more than saying a few kind words. Al-Iraqiyya also benefited from the coverage, helping to make the station a clear favorite and boosting its image among the wider population.\textsuperscript{781}

\textbf{Anbari Sunnis and the National Scene}

\textit{(C/NF)} This ray of hope was needed, because sectarian violence and talk of civil war continued unabated throughout much of Iraq as did the vitriolic political debates over federalism, the status of Kirkuk, oil, and review of the constitution, all of which continued to fuel fears of Iraq's dissolution. The Sunni leadership continued to believe that these issues were not likely to be decided in a way that would give them an acceptable and viable stake in the Iraqi government. Despite Maliki's support of national reconciliation, many Anbaris believed that their province was being marginalized just as it had been under Maliki's predecessor Jaafari. This was because of Maliki's reputation as a hard-core anti-Ba'athist and his role as the head of the de-Ba'athification commission. The sectarian violence that plagued Iraq also was being played out in a larger Arab regional context: it was seen as unlikely to subside, since neither nor Saudi Arabia was willing to give in to the other.\textsuperscript{782}

\textit{(S)} Regardless of what occurred, Iraqi Sunnis believed that they were the losers in the new Iraq because they lacked the ability to unite in order to leverage their collective interests over those of the UIA. In addition, there was little room for the Shi'a or Kurdish blocs to compromise on any of the major issues, so that no concessionary legislation could be implemented to lessen Sunni fears, let alone any legislation that would return even a fraction of their lost status and power. While 76% of
the Shi’as had supported the Iraqi government in September 2005, less than 20% of the Sunnis did and by September 2006 the latter number had dropped to nearly 0.783

(S) All this left Iraqi Sunnis with few options. They could accept their fate under a consolidated Shi’a-led Iraq, but most were unwilling to do so. The other option, open war with the Shi’a in the hopes of regaining control of the country, had little chance of success, given their disunity, minority population, and lack of anything resembling a conventional military force. As a result, much of the Anbari Sunni leadership opted to continue its current strategy of participating in the Iraqi political process, blocking what legislation they could while continuing to directly or indirectly support the insurgency. While this path was unlikely to lead to success, its goal was to prevent the Shi’a from consolidating control of a functioning Iraqi state.784 It is this pessimistic view of Iraq and its future that would be deeply affected by the actions of the Anbar Revolutionaries, by the decision of ordinary Sunnis to turn against AQI and by Iraqiyya television coverage of both of these phenomena.

**Coup Plot: General Command of the Secret Armed Forces**

(S/NF) Another alternative to this bleak picture was offered by While had originally intended his INDF to be a nationalist bloc within the Iraqi parliament that could pressure Prime Minister Maliki to initiate non-sectarian reforms, by September 2006 he had actively organized a "shadow government" (see Chapter 6b). This government would overthrow Maliki by force in coordination with using the INDF's military wing General Command of the Secret Armed Forces led by. Most of the INDF leadership was kept ignorant of the military wing’s existence and that its actions were coordinated by.

(S/NF) intended the INDF to request in the parliament that the current Iraqi government be dissolved. If his effort succeeded, then a new Iraqi government would be formed led by INDF and no coup would be necessary. If it failed, however, would begin planning to launch a military coup in February 2007. While neither possessed the necessary power to actually carry out such a coup, both men intended to use the threat to highlight their political and coercive power.786

(S/NF) By the end of September, had secured support for his coup from leaders of several insurgent groups, including Jaysh al-Fatihin, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Muhammad, and 1920 Revolution Brigade. within these groups all pledged to provide fighters and support to the General Command of the Secret Armed Forces as soon as the actual coup was executed. While the number of fighters that leaders of these groups pledged to were wild exaggerations (in excess of 100,000), the fact that he was able to gain such pledges illustrates that a significant number of SAR groups continued to support a change in the current Iraqi government.787

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783 Ibid.
784 Ibid.
785 [ | Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | (S/NF) | ]
786 Ibid.
787 [ | Military | 08 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061008 | (S/NF) | ]
(S/NF) failure to execute a coup was due in part to an inability to secure similar pledges of support from the United States or Britain. He had erroneously believed both countries would find his junta preferable to the current UIA majority government. Unwilling to risk a coup without support from a major power, put his plans on hold while he attempted to redirect his focus to obtaining support from neighboring Arab states. He instructed his followers to remain on alert for the possibility of an opportunity in Iraq that would allow the overthrow of the current government, such as a significant Coalition withdrawal or a decision by the Coalition to push for early elections. After again being rejected by attempted to set up meetings with politicians from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union to enlist their support for his plans.

(S/NF) Part of the rationale for enlistment of foreign support was the dire state of his domestic fortunes. Iraqi MP and senior INDF political advisor were both in talks to discuss his removal as INDF chairman through a vote of no confidence, believing him to be completely disconnected from the real difficulties facing the INDF in Baghdad. Even those INDF leaders who supported the coup plot believed that was too dictatorial and were against his assumption of the sole executive office. While Ba'athists, AMS, and some disaffected Sunnis supported polarizing popularist rhetoric, the Tawafuq Front coalition resented his attacks on the Sunni political establishment and the Shi'a and Kurds both regarded him with disdain. A classical Arab nationalist, was a racist when it came to the Kurds but was married to a Shi'a woman and was willing to cooperate with secular Shi'a politicians such as former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and members of his Iraqi National List opposition bloc. Despite the fact that his coup plot was checked, continued to develop a shadow government, attract former Ba'athists and other Maliki critics, appeal to neighboring Arab states for funds, and press forward with his plans to change the current Iraqi government through any means necessary.

The Mashtal Massacre

(S) Just at this critical moment, on September 21, about a dozen Anbaris attending a wedding in the religiously mixed Mashtal neighborhood of Baghdad were kidnapped and murdered by members of Mahdi Army and their bodies delivered to the Baghdad Morgue. Iraqi Advisory Task Force leader Sheikh Ali al-Hatim Abdul al-Razzaq Ali Suleiman al-Assafi al-Dulaymi called an emergency meeting of the Anbar Emergency Council to discuss a response to this atrocity. Proposals by the attendees focused on reprisals, ranging from killing every Mahdi Army fighter their tribesmen could find, to demanding one hundred dead Mahdi Army fighters for every Sunni victim of the incident.

(S/NF) As the acting head of the Dulaymi tribal confederation after its two co-leaders fled to Sheikh Ali Hatim was a pivotal figure in tribal and political initiatives. He had been involved in proposals that the Fallujah reconstruction money be paid out to tribal sheikhs, in the compilation of candidates for the Anbar provincial elections before they had been scheduled, and in discussions of placing limitations on Anbari imams in order to stop the rise of Islamist parties. Sheikh Ali was

788 Ibid.
789 Ibid.
790 [ | Military | 22 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060922 | (S/NF) | ]
able to exert a moderating influence on the enraged Anbari tribal leaders, enabling Anbaris to retaliate against the Shi’i under the auspices of AQI. While convincing Anbaris to assist AQI in sectarian attacks in Baghdad may not appear to be much in the way of moderation, it should be understood that were Sunni tribal leaders who wanted instead to carry out tribal attacks under the banner of the Sheikh Ali and the Dulaymi confederation, which would have significantly escalated the level of sectarian violence. The result, then, was sizable but not uncontrolled reprisals against the Shi’a rather than all-out civil war.791

Anbar and Sectarian Violence

(S) This is not to say that there had been no increase in the sectarian violence, much of it in Anbar driven by Sadr’s Mahdi Army and AQI. Since early September, the Babylon Sakhr subgroup of the Mahdi Army had attempted to displace the Sunni population of Hamiyah, telling all the Janabi tribesmen in the city to leave or they and their families would be killed. The actions of Babylon Sakhr were designed to allow the Mahdi Army to expand its influence into religiously mixed areas of Iraq in order establish itself as the dominant influence of the Shi’a residents while expelling the Sunnis.792

(S) The 900,000 member Janabi tribe became the focus of Babylon Sakhr for several reasons. First, it was one of the twenty most influential tribes in Iraq, with its members roughly 60% Sunni and 40% Shi’a. Second, because so many of its Sunni members were loyal to AQI or Ansar al-Sunna, the Janabi tribe was regarded as an AQI tribe and had become entwined in the ongoing Iraqi sectarian conflict being driven by the Mahdi Army on one end and AQI on another. Babylon Sakhr and other Mahdi Army subgroups regarded it as their duty to evict Sunnis from Shi’a areas in order to expand the group’s regional influence and suppress the threat of AQI and its allies from Anbar province. The Mahdi Army's complete disregard for Sunni collateral damage resulted in Sunni families fleeing west into the Haditha area in an internal displacement pattern similar to that which occurred after the February 22 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra (see Chapter 6a).793

(S) Following vicious Mahdi Army attacks on Sunni neighborhoods, AQI targeted Shi’a mosques, which fueled more Mahdi Army activity and created a spiraling cycle of violence.794 This territorial feud between the two sides accentuated existing Sunni-Shi’a divisions, and increased riots and sectarian attacks throughout Baghdad province by pressuring residents to choose sides despite a lack of prior sectarian conflict.795

(S) By late October, Shi’a militias were setting up checkpoints in the al-Thuru and al-Talibi districts of Baghdad as well as along Palestine Street to prevent Sunnis from traveling from Ramadi and other Anbari cities to the capital. Because of the poor quality of medical care in Anbar, many Sunnis

791 Ibid.
792 [Military | 28 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060928 | (S/NE) | ]
793 Ibid.
794 AQI’s reprisal attacks against the Mahdi Army were directed by the Fallujah-based AQI leader who commanded a force of AQI fighters recruited from the Fallujah, Tuwaytha, and Arab Jabour regions against Mahdi Army fighters in Zafaraniya, Baghdad.
795 Ibid.
were compelled to travel into Baghdad for any medical needs. The establishment of Shi'a militia checkpoints led to many Sunnis refusing to undertake the journey for fear of being murdered.\cite{796}

(S) These actions by Shi'a militias were themselves a response to an earlier wave of Sunni attacks as part of a vicious cycle of sectarian violence. On October 13, the MNF-I DCS-INT Extra-Judicial Killings Task Force reported that the total number of victims killed and executed in Baghdad between October 7-13 was 481, a 46% increase in the level of sectarian violence from the previous week. As a result of the sectarian unrest, Baghdad's death rate alone during the course of 2006 was estimated at more than 25,000, a figure that may have been understated because of the number of bodies not found by the Coalition or not reported by the Iraqi security forces.\cite{797}

AQI Responds to the New Resistance

AQI's Continuing Shift Towards Rawah-Anah

(S/NF) With the dissolution of the IIP in Anah and the city council in Rawah, AQI leaders from Haditha, Hit, and Anah met in late September 2006 to discuss ways to alleviate pressure on Haditha from Coalition forces. A decision was made to shift operations away from Haditha towards the Rawah-Anah corridor by placing IEDs along the roads to Haditha. Their goal was to interrupt Coalition supply lines and ultimately bring about a Coalition withdrawal from Haditha.\cite{798}

(S) By consolidating their leadership and resources in the Rawah-Anah corridor, AQI believed that it could direct heavier operations in Haditha while simultaneously minimizing its exposure to Coalition concentrations in the Haditha area. Local AQI fighters in Haditha feared that the RIP between 3/3 and 2/3 was in fact a reinforcement of Coalition forces in the Haditha area.\cite{799}

(S) The architect of this plan was former Brigadier General Sa'id Ali Huwayr al-Hayyani, who had overseen the training of the Saddam Fedayeen prior to OIF and had been recruited by Zarqawi in its aftermath to serve as one of his senior commanders in the Hit-Haditha corridor. A key AQI facilitator, Sa'id had ties to AQI fighters across western Anbar as well as connections with AQI elements in Ramadi and Bayji.\cite{800}

AQI Communications Control

(S) Perhaps in support of these operations, in late September 2006 AQI began destroying internet cafes in Rawah in the belief that residents were using them to view pornography and send information to the Coalition. This was also part of AQI's continued effort to control as much of the communications spectrum as possible in the areas where the group operated. This was somewhat counter-intuitive; however, as AQI supporters were managing the wireless routers at the time of

\cite{796} [ | Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | (S/NF) | ]
\cite{797} Ibid.
\cite{798} [ | Military | 29 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060929 | (S/NF) | ]
\cite{799} Ibid.
\cite{800} Ibid.

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their destruction and thus able to monitor the server traffic of individuals on the internet using commercial software.\textsuperscript{801}

\textbf{(S)} For instance, AQI destroyed the land-line telephone switch in Haditha earlier in 2006 in order to deprive residents of the Coalition-sponsored "tip line." Because of the tip line's success, after the group had destroyed the telephone switch the local AQI intelligence cell began to plant informants at internet cafes to identify Coalition supporters who might e-mail information on AQI and to target them for assassination. The only alternative for Coalition supporters was to visit the Coalition physically, but Coalition bases were monitored by AQI operatives to identify potential informants and execute them.\textsuperscript{802}

**Abu Sarah Group and Islamic Army of Iraq**

\textbf{(S)} The AQI ally Abu Sarah Group continued to be active in western Anbar, by early October 2006 the group had expanded its operational reach all the way from the 14th border to Baghdad, taking part in vehicle theft, robbery, and sectarian attacks. Former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq led by who were now loyal to AQI cooperated with the Abu Sarah Group, both of whom agreed not to attack, kidnap, or steal from any Iraqi Sunni except those who were members of the army or police. Instead, they focused their efforts on targeting Shi'a and truckers who were transporting weapons or commercial goods into Iraq.

\textbf{(S)} The primary objectives of Islamic Army of Iraq members in western Iraq, most of whom were now loyal to AQI under the banner of the Joint Committee of the Jihad Platoons of Anbar Province, was to fight foreign (meaning Shi'a) influence in Iraq by supporting attacks against the Mahdi Army and by targeting Shi'a in Anbar. They were aided by like-minded Islamic Army of Iraq members in Ramadi and Fallujah in targeting Shi'a civilians. In contrast to those members of Islamic Army of Iraq who had remained loyal to their national leadership and become Jaysh al-Fatihin, goal was now to fight Shi'a Islam and rid Iraq of 1.4b by supporting sectarian violence in Anbar and other parts of Iraq.\textsuperscript{804}

**Anti-AQI Forces Continue Their Fight**

**AMS and the Sunni Endowment**

\textbf{(S/NE)} In an effort to reduce the influence of AMS on Saudi and general Sunni Arab perceptions of the situation in Iraq, a 12-man delegation from the Iraqi al-Waqf al-Sunni (Sunni Endowment) led by Sunni Endowment secretary-general Dr. Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i traveled to Saudi Arabia in early October to attend the Saudi-sponsored Iraqi reconciliation conference. Dr. al-Samarra'i hoped that he could persuade the Saudi government to view the Sunni Endowment rather

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\textsuperscript{801} [ | Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{802} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{803} [ | Military | 01 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061001 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{804} Ibid.
than AMS as the official voice of the Iraqi Sunnis because of its responsibilities and more realistic worldview.\(^{805}\)

(S/NF) As the quasi-governmental body responsible for the funding and upkeep of Sunni mosques and imams throughout Iraq, the Sunni Endowment was traditionally the official mouthpiece of the Iraqi Sunni community. Under Saddam Hussein, the Sunni Endowment had been tightly controlled by the Iraqi state and following his overthrow many of its former members reorganized into AMS, which claimed the same responsibilities (though for different mosques) as well as the membership of individuals as diverse as SAR leader [b6] and Zarqawi associate Sheikh Abdullah Janabi.\(^{806}\)

(S/NF) Dr. al-Samarra'i was a former member of AMS secretary-general Harith al-Dhari's inner circle who had broken with him in early 2005 in disillusionment over the failure of the Sunni boycott of the Iraqi elections that ensured the absence of a significant Sunni influence on national Iraqi politics throughout 2005 and had a measureable impact on Anbar as result ever since. Since then, al-Samarra'i and his predecessor Adnan al-Dulaymi (see Chapter 5a) had endorsed Sunni political participation and formed the General Conference of the Iraqi People (GCIP) in 2005. Led by Adnan, GCIP was one of the three major parties in the Tawafuq Front coalition and al-Samarra'i secretly met with Coalition officials.\(^{807}\)

(S/NF) In contrast to AMS, the Sunni Endowment was a far more responsible organization whose imams were far less likely to be harsh in their criticisms of the Coalition or the Iraqi government. While Harith al-Dhari and AMS enjoyed modest support among Sunni hardliners and SAR insurgents as well as wide appeal internationally as the recognized "Iraqi voice" on the Arab street. Within Iraq, Harith was essentially the religious equivalent of secular populist (and coup plotter) whose party received 20% of the Sunni vote in the December 2005 Iraqi elections. Harith's modest support was still enough to influence the outcome of Sunni opinion in Iraq and regardless of whether the individual fortunes of AMS and the Sunni Endowment rose or fell, their rivalry was unlikely to manifest itself through violence in contrast to the Shi'a feud between the [b6] and [b6] families. As a result, it was local Iraqi rather than Saudi support of the Sunni Endowment over AMS that was needed to make a difference in terms of raising Sunni support for political participation.\(^{808}\)

(U) The outcome of the Saudi reconciliation conference was the so-called "Mecca Document" against sectarianism that was endorsed by Sunni and Shi'a Iraqi representatives and embraced by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The only mechanism that could make the agreement hold, however, was for its circulation and acceptance to occur within the broadest circle of religious leaders.\(^{809}\)

(S/NF) While it was heartening that Shi'a-Sunni dialogue was still occurring despite the mounting sectarian violence, neither the reconciliation conference nor the Mecca document led to a cessation

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\(^{805}\) [ | Military | 02 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061002 | (S/NF) | ]

\(^{806}\) Ibid.

\(^{807}\) Ibid.

\(^{808}\) Ibid

\(^{809}\) [ | Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | (S/NF) | ]
of sectarian violence. This was in part because the attendees of the reconciliation conference were altogether influential and because the political figures with the authority to implement the proposed policy fared poorly at implementing it. While the Sunni delegation included Sunni Endowment secretary-general Dr. Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarrai and AMS leader the Shi'a delegation was only made up of low-level clergy. Furthermore, Harith al-Dhari undermined the outcome of the conference by stating that he had no faith in the ability of the other religious leaders who attended the conference.810

(S/NF) Even so, had lost influence over the course of 2006 due to his unchanging opposition to involvement in Iraqi politics despite the shift throughout the entire Sunni political leadership to do just that. And while Grand Ayatollah Sistani attempted to limit Shi'a involvement in retaliatory attacks as a result of his religious authority and the adoration of the masses, since the bombing of the Golden mosque he had been unable exercise his ability to restrain the Shi'as to the same degree that he had. As a result, the Mahdi Army and Muqtada al-Sadr grew in stature through demagoguery and extremism at the expense of Sistani, though the latter was still respected and adored by the masses as the highest religious authority in Iraq. Despite this, remained a fixture of the Iraqi Sunni perspective in the Arab media and all leading Shi'a politicians still visited Sistani to ensure his approval of key issues.811

**Anbar Central Council and Anbar Emergency Council**

(S/NF) With the formation of the Anbar Emergency Council, both Sheikh Abdul Sattar and former Anbar governor Faisal al-Gaoud attempted to reach out to members of the Anbar Central Council (see Chapter 6b), only to be rebuffed due to their belief that the two men were now being supported by SCIRI. Faisal in particular was regarded as being too close to the Anbar Central Council believed that supported the creation of a Sunni militia in order to give SCIRI an excuse to retain its own Badr Corps. The expatriates embodied in the Anbar Central Council were far more likely to support than the Anbar Revolutionaries, though they did offer some grudging support to Governor Mamoun as well.812

(S/NF) After the end of September 2006, the Anbar Central Council's activities were stalled due to a lack of money because those members who had been expected to finance its organization had not done so. Anbar Central Council leader Sheikh Tariq Khalaf al-Halbusi, for instance, was far more preoccupied with his own business holdings rather than with the Council's activities despite the fact that he had been elected to lead the Council largely on the basis of the belief that he would allocate a portion of his substantial personal financial resources to support its activities. Through his spokesman Dr. Ali al-Hadithi, Sheikh Tariq voiced his opinion that the fighting now occurring between tribes represented in the Anbar Emergency Council and AQI was "old news" and that the former did not represent the true opinions of Anbaris in contrast to more "acceptable" voices like 813

810 Ibid.
811 Ibid.
812 [Military | 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061005 | (S/NF) | ]
813 Ibid.

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Further Negotiations with the Insurgency

(S) A number of SAR insurgent groups continued their negotiations with the Coalition. Jaysh al-Fatihin, which by this point had resumed the use of their earlier name of the Islamic Army of Iraq (but will still be referred to as Jaysh al-Fatihin to distinguish between the national group and its members in Anbar loyal to AQI), continued to be interested in rapprochement with the Coalition and the Iraqi security forces. On October 5, a jihadi website posted an audio interview with Jaysh al-Fatihin spokesman Dr. Ibrahim al-Shammari who stated that negotiations between his group and the Coalition were possible but contingent on two key points: withdrawal of Coalition from Iraq and recognition of the "Iraqi resistance" as the sole legitimate representatives of the Iraqi people.814

(S) By October 18, these demands had been modified following dialogue between the Coalition and Jaysh al-Fatihin to encompass a timetable for Coalition withdrawal from Iraq, the trial of all post-Saddam government officials suspected in complicity with death squads or financial and administrative corruption, and the recognition of all insurgent groups save AQI as legitimate representatives of the Iraqi people. Iraqi Vice President Tariq Hashimi attempted to mediate between the Coalition and SAR insurgents on behalf of the Tawafuq Front.815

(S/NF) Despite its name, Jaysh al-Fatihin remained not an SRE but rather a fanatically nationalist SAR insurgent group that had been created in mid-2003 by FREs to defend Sunni interests and to expel Coalition and from Iraq. Despite its continued attacks on Coalition forces, Jaysh al-Fatihin had supported Sunni political participation since late 2005 and opposed attacks on Iraqi civilians. While the group was willing to cooperate tactically with AQI, its national leadership consistently condemned the latter group. As the largest of the remaining SAR insurgent groups, the Coalition believed that persuading Jaysh al-Fatihin to renounce violence and enter the political arena would persuade the national leadership of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh al-Mujahideen to adopt similar moves, though the groups' unrealistic criteria for negotiation and perceived need to retain street credibility against AQI through both rhetoric and continued attacks slowed down the process considerably.816

Effects on AQI’s Relationship with Ansar al-Sunna

(S) As noted, the rise of and the new policies pursued under his leadership were focused in Anbar around building popular support for AQI and reaching out to other insurgent groups. This in turn led to a stronger relationship between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, whose national differences had been primarily focused around animosity between Zarqawi and the Ansar al-Sunna leadership. With Zarqawi dead, it was now far more equitable for Ansar al-Sunna amirs to ally with their AQI counterparts.

(S) By early October 2006, AQI had taken over responsibility for a number of AQI groups in Ramadi and Hit with his having direct control over five

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814 [ | Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | (S/NF) | ]
815 Ibid.
816 Ibid.
AQI cells in Ramadi and two AQI cells in Hit. While this was not an unusual arrangement for AQI, what was particularly interesting about Qasim’s network was that another of his (b)(6) was the leader of Ansar al-Sunna's IED cell in Ramadi. Qasim’s network, which operated in Rutbah, Hit, Ramadi, and Zaidon, was made up of both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members including (b)(6). Nor was Qasim’s network atypical, as AQI and Ansar al-Sunna were now actively working together in Anbar to smuggle money and foreign fighters into Iraq, with their operational cells banding together in order to increase one another's capabilities. Because of their shared allegiance to AQSL and global jihad outlook, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna were able to compliment one another's activities and enhance their shared ability to combat counter-insurgent operations. 817

The Politics of Anbar

(S) By October 2006, there was no Sunni political strategy and their leaders had failed to develop any kind of vision to further Sunni interests in the new Iraq. Widening divisions among Sunni leaders further debilitated them as a political force and eliminated their ability to develop a clear vision of their place in the new Iraq. Only on the national stage was the Sunni parliament vote a catalyst for meaningful compromise as Sunni parties attempted to exploit divisions in the UIA to turn themselves into a more decisive swing vote. Their only coherent agenda item, constitutional reform, was finally introduced in parliament in late September 2006, and then only as a counter-measure against SCIRI's proposal for the formation of federal regions. 818

(S/NE) While the Tawafuq Front coalition remained intact, there were serious strains within its members parties of Tariq Hashemi's IIP, Adnan al-Dulaymi's Iraqi People's Gathering, and Jaysh al-Fatihin leader Iraqi National Dialogue Council. Salih Mutlaq's entirely reactionary INDF was effectively shut out of any ministerial positions and bitterly denounced government activities at every turn. Finally, AMS remained opposed to any cooperation whatsoever with the Iraqi government and supported a variety of insurgent groups including 1920 Revolution Brigade, working beneath the surface of Iraqi politics to exert influence over Sunni political thought. Because Anbar rejected the Iraqi constitution by more than 97%, it was within a climate of rejection that the province's national leaders sought to unite themselves in order to salvage something from the central government. 819

(S) In Anbar itself, the Iraqi political process hardly existed due to a combination of ambition, external actors, and most notably the actions of AQI. The Anbar provincial council had been elected by less than 4,000 voters in January 2005 and the IIP received twenty-nine of forty-one seats with the remainder going to the Independent Iraq (nine seats) or Liberation (three seats) parties. The IIP was unable to pursue its legislative agenda because the provincial government had been rendered virtually non-existent by AQI. Governor Farhan was killed by AQI before he could really assume office and his successor Governor Mamoun was chosen because he was the only eligible candidate available. By October 2006, the AQI murder and intimidation campaign had rendered the provincial council completely ineffective, forcing them to meet in Baghdad rather than in Ramadi. 820

817 [ | Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | (S/NE) | ]
818 [ | Military | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | (S/NE) | ]
819 Ibid.
820 Ibid.
By 2006, all the other insurgent groups in Anbar had suffered devastating losses at the hands of AQI during the first half of 2006 including Jaysh al-Fatihih, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Muhammad, and Harakat al-Islamiyah. Ansar al-Sunna was the only remaining insurgent group of any size, but this was largely due to the willingness of some of the group's leaders to cooperate with AQI. While some SAR groups such as Jaysh al-Fatihih continued to carry out attacks against the Coalition, they generally eschewed attacks on the Sunni Iraqi security forces.\footnote{Ibid.}

As a result of this situation, the Anbari elite had no good options for dealing with the central government. Despite the fact that political non-participation was proven counter-productive to Sunni interests by the events of 2005, the threat of withdrawal from the parliament remained one of the very few Sunni political weapons available because it could discredit Maliki's claims of a national unity government. As a result, Sunni political efforts remained focused around salvaging their influence in Baghdad and slowing the consolidation of Shi'a political power.\footnote{Ibid.}

This created an unprecedented crisis for the Anbari leadership, complicating efforts to build a stable society and played directly into the hands of AQI. All Anbaris, like much of the Sunni Islamic world, was struggling to balance new ideas like representative democracy with their religion and traditions. Although the majority of Anbaris were essentially religious moderates, a few were committed Salafists who supported AQI. Further tension was created among Anbari elites by those who saw tribal leaders as an archaic aristocracy that long ago outlived its usefulness and those who saw sheikhly status as an authentic ancient tradition. Other divisions existed between those who sought a society based around individualism compared with those that favored a "soft authoritarianism" and client-patron relationships. Rivalries also existed between the expatriate elites that fled abroad and those that remained in the country. Because of these factors, Anbar's traditional leaders found themselves unable to unite despite the brutal AQI insurgency.\footnote{Ibid.}

Reactions to the Trial of Saddam Hussein

These rivalries and cleavages were demonstrated in reactions to the ongoing trial of Saddam. Although Anbari Sunnis did not ascend to as a high level of Iraqi government and the Ba'ath Party as their Tikriti counterparts, many of them served in senior military or security service positions and the sheikhs of many of the larger tribes benefited enormously from Saddam Hussein's patronage. While there was not a popular desire to see Saddam Hussein restored to power, a majority of these individuals would likely rush to his side were he released from prison and absolved of involvement in any past atrocities.\footnote{Ibid.}

Many SAR insurgent groups manipulated the likelihood of an unfavorable verdict to aid in their recruiting and fundraising operations. Even so, Jaysh al-Fatihih, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and SRE groups like Ansar al-Sunna were very far from wholehearted supporters of Saddam Hussein. Of these groups, a purported Jaysh al-Fatihih spokesman attempted...
to pledge allegiance to Saddam Hussein and Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, only to later have it denounced by the same organization. While some tribal leaders who had been patronized by Saddam Hussein called for his return, a majority of SAR insurgents regarded Saddam as "incapable of leading Iraq."\footnote{Ibid.}

As for AQI, while the group's ideology was inherently incompatible with the secular socialism of Ba'athism, the group was willing to feign sympathy for Saddam Hussein to exploit Sunni dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government. The Anbar Salvation Front (Sahwa al-Anbar or SAA) that now served as AQI's primary enemy in Anbar, by contrast, was pragmatic enough whatever their opinions of Saddam Hussein to refrain from deviating from their anti-AQI platform and refrained from any actions that the group's leadership believed would endanger Iraqi government, army, or Coalition support.\footnote{Ibid.}

Only in Rawah and Fallujah was there any substantial pro-Saddam sentiment, with some residents believing that Saddam's dictatorship was preferable to the current violence in the country. These residents adopted a conspiratorial view of the insurgency, believing that the Coalition was intentionally drawing insurgents into towns so that they could kill innocent Iraqis. For these residents, was now in control of the Iraqi government and the entire trial was the work of the security services. That some pro-Saddam sentiment would linger in Rawah is not surprising since a large percentage of the town's population was drawn from the Ba'ath Party or retired Iraqi military personnel, while the protests in the Fallujah were part of a neo-Ba'athist propaganda campaign.\footnote{Ibid.}

City Stories (October 2006)

Ramadi

Despite the assassination of high-profile AQI leaders in Ramadi by the city remained extremely unstable and a large number of AQI operatives remained active.\footnote{Ibid.} the AQI amir for the Tamim and 5 Kilo districts of the city, was considered powerful enough by local contractors that no work could take place in the area without his approval, which usually came with the condition that he would receive up to 50% of the profit. Qutayba's situation was the norm and AQI extortion of Iraqi contracts was the standard practice in Ramadi and throughout much of Anbar. Under the new policies set down since the rise of AQI operatives refined their method of extortion to demanding protection money in return for "guaranteeing" that new contracts were allowed to occur free of insurgent attacks.\footnote{Ibid.}

The Jazira Propane Factory continued to be used as meeting site, arms cache, hostage holding area, and IED factory by AQI fighters loyal to AQI amir While multiple Coalition raids on the factory failed to produce any significant findings, this was because the guards
at the factory gave AQI fighters advance notice of Coalition movements in the area, just as the guards had done at Ramadi General Hospital during the summer of 2006.830

(S) Anbar oil distribution director-general \( (b)(6) \) continued to both support and facilitate AQI’s black market fuel activities in Ramadi by supplying AQI with both money and gasoline that was then sold on the black market. AQI leader \( (b)(6) \) continued to serve as primary contact with AQI and together the two men earned $50,000 and $40,000 a day in black market fuel sales. Because \( (b)(6) \) had held his position as director-general for oil distribution in Anbar under Saddam Hussein, he was able to apply his complex knowledge of the situation to help AQI control gasoline distribution in Ramadi. Working with \( (b)(6) \) AQI fighters were placed in control of Ramadi gas stations and paid $300 a day with money provided by the Iraqi government.831

(S) By virtue of his connections with \( (b)(6) \) AQI amir \( (b)(6) \) was able to maintain AQI’s control over Ramadi gas stations and both the price and distribution of gasoline for local generators. Owners of private generators were only able to receive fuel with the verified permission of the local AQI leader in charge of the fuel distribution center. This enabled AQI to finance its operations inside Ramadi while influencing the population through a means that was far less direct but just as effective as the group’s regular murder and intimidation campaign.832

(S) The Anbar Revolutionaries continued their assassination campaign against AQI leaders in Ramadi, killing Hilal Dayih al-Suwaydawi in the Tamim district and Akram al-Assafi in Zangora. Of the two, the death of Hilal was more significant, as he had been a long-time Zarqawi lieutenant, involved in the assassination of Iraqi police captain Layth Farris Abd al-Karim al-Mahalowi in 2004 before relocating to Ramadi from Husaybah in late 2005 to oversee an assassination cell. The death of Hilal sent a minor shockwave through mid-level AQI leaders in the Tamim district, causing a number of them to go into hiding for fear of being targeted by the Anbar Revolutionaries.833

(S/NF) \( (b)(6) \) continued to finance his 1920 Revolution Brigade loyalists from his HQ in \( (b)(6) \) laundering $180,000 through the businesses of A’id, Majid, and Mahid Ibrahim Hammad to his followers in Ramadi. In addition to 1920 Revolution Brigade, \( (b)(6) \) followers were also drawn from \( (b)(6) \) and former members of his old friend \( (b)(6) \) Brigade (al-Rahman Brigade), which had disbanded following the Coalition’s detention of \( (b)(6) \).834

(S) The Coalition also continued operations against AQI’s allies. On September 5, the Coalition captured \( (b)(6) \), the leader of pro-AQI Islamic Army of Iraq faction in the Tamim district of Ramadi. \( (b)(6) \) had been opposed by \( (b)(6) \), the Ramadi leader of Jaysh al-Fatihih.835

830 [ | Military | 12 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060912 | (S/NF) | ]
831 [ | Military | 02 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061002 | (S/NF) | ]
832 Ibid.
833 [ | Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | (S/NF) | ]
834 [ | Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | (S/NF) | ]
835 [ | Military | 05 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060905 | (S/NF) | ]
With the loss of a number of lesser AQI leaders to the Coalition, Harakat al-Islamiyah, and the Anbar Revolutionaries, the leadership and administration of AQI in Ramadi now depended on the leadership of all of whom were among the original seven founding members of JTJ in Ramadi. was the main financier of AQI and was involved in raising money for the group through smuggling, kidnapping, and vehicle theft ventures. was a trained sniper served as AQI’s Ramadi operations chief, coordinating complex attacks, overseeing the day-to-day administration of the group’s infrastructure in Ramadi, and serving as the head of AQI’s ruthless intelligence and internal security cell in the city.  

Other replacement AQI leaders were brought into Ramadi from Rutbah under the cover story that they were “construction workers.” relocated to the 35 Kilo area west of Ramadi to direct vehicle theft, robbery, and assassination west of Ramadi in order to raise funds for AQI operations. formerly the head of AQI in Rutbah charged with facilitating the movement of foreign fighters from now recruited fighters from Rutbah to carry out operations against the Coalition in Ramadi. Akram was formerly the leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq fighters in Rutbah who were loyal to AQI, while had been the leader of al-Asa’ab al-Iraq in Rutbah. Additionally, during a meeting of the AQI leadership at the Salaam Mosque in the Jazira area, a decision was made to appoint  

There are also indications that other branches of AQI assisted the Ramadi leadership in reconstituting their organization. For instance, AQI’s senior Mosul bombmaker who was himself connected to AQI’s Mosul amir used his connections to the Bayji fertilizer plant to ship explosives from Mosul to Ramadi along with cars for use as VBIEDs. AQI also continued to operate in the vicinity of Lake Thar Thar, establishing checkpoints and targeting cargo and tanker trucks contracted by the Iraqi government to transport goods to. AQI murder and intimidation coordinator operated out of the Lake Thar Thar area, overseeing the kidnapping and murder of First Lieutenant Muhammad Abd Hamdan.  

AQI stepped up its campaign against schools in the Tamim and Hay al-Dhubat districts of Ramadi, threatening to kill any student seen attending an education facility and warning that there would be no academic year for anyone in the city unless the Coalition removed its checkpoints. The goal of this intimidation was to force the population into pressuring the Coalition to remove the checkpoints that inhibited AQI’s access to its safe houses, recruiting centers, and weapons caches. It was also a reaction to the Anbar Revolutionaries’ assassination of Ahmad Frayh Ahmad al-Faraji, the AQI amir charged with overseeing Anbar University in order to preserve the institution as an AQI enclave by intimidating the students and faculty.

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836 [Military 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061003 (S/NE) ]  
837 [Military 04 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061004 (S/NE) ]  
838 [Military 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061005 (S/NE) ]  
839 [Military 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061003 (S/NE) ]  
840 [Military 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061005 (S/NE) ]  
841 [Military 09 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061009 (S/NE) ]
Anbar University continued, however, to act as a center for AQI in the city. Faculty members
recruited and propagated for AQI on campus. Of the three, also served as the imam of the al-Husayn Mosque and delivered anti-Coalition sermons in the 5 Kilo district of Ramadi. He was also a member of the Baghdad Salafist organizations Iraqi Sunni Shura Council and Higher Committee for Guidance and Legal Opinion.842

The Qatana district of Ramadi and 17th Street were major centers of AQI activity throughout October 2006 as the group intimidated the local population and conducted regular attacks on Coalition patrols. AQI checkpoints were set up to prevent members of the Albu Risha, Albu Nimr, and Albu Ali Jassim tribes from entering the Qatana district and the group conducted meetings and stored weapons at the al-Zawah and al-Gara schools. The absence of Coalition fixed positions along 17th Street allowed AQI fighters uninhibited freedom of movement through the area.843

Lake Thar Thar

On September 6, 2006, the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion conducted Operation CHOKEHOLD in southern area around Lake Thar Thar near Saddamiyah to confirm or deny the presence of foreign fighters. While the area around the lake was relatively vacant, Coalition forces discovered shooting ranges and an insurgent meeting location, indicating an AQI presence (see Chapter 6b for AQI training around Lake Thar Thar). This area had been used by AQI leaders and Sheikh Nazar Sa'adi Zahir to train fighters, but Operation CHOKEHOLD in early October temporarily disrupted their operations in the area.844

The operation also succeeded in killing Khalid Ibrahim Mahal, a former member of the Abu Harun Group allied with AQI who had carried out IDF, IED, and DF attacks against Coalition forces in the Jazira area and the Tamim district of the Ramadi. An associate of AQI leaders had been the immediate superior to the late Nasayf Jassim, the so-called "police killer" whom Khalid had made his second-in-command as a result of his ruthless attacks on Iraqi security forces. Following the death of Khalid, his relatives and friends held a prayer ceremony for him in the Tamim district where they were targeted by plainclothes Iraqi police (possibly Anbar Revolutionaries) who opened fire at the group, killing six mourners.845

Operation CHOKEHOLD also discovered an AQI torture house with bloodstained walls that contained Iraqi police uniforms, handwritten notes by torture victims and a log book with interrogation notes. The bodies of Iraqi police officers were also recovered in the Thar Thar Canal near Japanese Bridge, further confirming that AQI used the Saddamiyah-Lake Thar Thar area to interrogate and then murder police.846

842 [Military | 10 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061110 | (S/NF) | ]
843 [Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | (S/NF) | ]
844 [Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061003 | (S/NF) | ]
845 [Military | 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061005 | (S/NF) | ]
846 [Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | (S/NF) | ]
Khalidiyah

(A) AQI continued to mount a vigorous assassination campaign against Iraqi security forces, murdering Anbar intelligence director Colonel Ibrahim Hamaad Hilaal near Khalidiyah.\(^{847}\) A number of individuals in the Khalidiyah area were also beheaded by order of an AQI \textit{qadi} (religious judge).\(^{848}\) Killed too by AQI in Khalidiyah were Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Abdullah, Sheikh Abd al-Karim Hamid, and Imam Nihad Muhkil Ali, supporters of the Iraqi government who had participated in the December 2005 elections.\(^{849}\) AQI operatives in Khalidiyah were typically men between the ages of 18-30 who traveled in groups of 2-3 vehicles to plant IEDs. In keeping with efforts to build popular support for AQI in Anbar, cells in the area gave local business owners advance notice when they planned to carry out IED attacks in order to reduce collateral damage. Government officials, Iraqi security forces, and residents who attempted to oppose AQI publicly were tortured or assassinated, making Khalidiyah residents extremely wary of cooperating with either the local government or the Coalition.\(^{850}\)

(A) In the Husaybah-Sharqiya area 10 kilometers northwest of Khalidiyah, AQI fighters led by Durayd Daham (Hanash) forced the 1920 Revolution Brigade and al-Fath al-Mubrin (a local SAR group allied with 1920 Revolution Brigade) groups to disband, giving their members the option of joining AQI, fleecing the area, or remaining in the area but agreeing not to reform their organizations. 1920 Revolution Brigade leader fled the area after AQI kidnapped and beat several of his followers, leaving his successor with little option but to disband and attempt to join AQI. Young men throughout the area were pressured to join AQI, whose fighters killed an imam who preached that beheadings were against the teachings of Islam.\(^{851}\)

(A) Fighting broke out in the Albu Ubayd tribal area north of Khalidiyah between insurgent factions loyal to the Habbaniyah-based Khalid Mukhlif Daham (Abu Walid) and the Jazira-based Ali Siyagha over the issue of whether Iraqi army and police officers should be killed, which Ali supported and Khalid decried. This led to a clash between the two groups that left both men dead.\(^{852}\)

(A) These divisions were due to the fact that Khalid Mukhlif Daham had never sworn bayat to AQI or joined the Mujahideen Shura Council. He was a high-ranking IIS officer who had served as the leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq in Khalidiyah, carrying out attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces as well as suspected collaborators. Like many Islamic Army of Iraq leaders in Anbar, Khalid had allied himself with AQI over the course of early 2006 (see Chapter 6a) but had never truly embraced the group's agenda or ideology. Ali Siyagha, by contrast, had assumed the mantle of AQI's amir in Khalidiyah after his predecessor had been killed in Fallujah during Operation AL FAJR, preaching from Khalidiyah's al-Faruq Mosque and issuing fatwas against Khalid for his perceived reluctance to kill Iraqi Sunnis. As a result, after Khalid disagreed publicly over the killing of Iraqi

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\(^{847}\) [Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{848}\) [Military | 21 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060921 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{849}\) [Military | 30 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061030 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{850}\) [Military | 21 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060921 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{851}\) [Military | 12 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060912 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{852}\) [Military | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | (S/NE) | ]
police, Ali had him assassinated, only to be killed himself in a reprisal attack by former Islamic Army of Iraq fighters.\(^{853}\)

(S) The AQI associate group Ghazwan Group (see Chapter 6a) was active in the Jazira area north of Khalidiyah under the leadership of (b)(6) who had since joined AQI and become the leader of the group in Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah. He was assisted by the Ghazwan Group’s intelligence chief (b)(6) who used a false ID card to gain access to the interior ministry headquarters in Baghdad to collect information on police working in the Jazira area. (b)(6) had originally relied on former Habbaniyah police officer (b)(6) to provide him with intelligence on the Iraqi police, but had been forced to find other means after (b)(6) was detained by the Coalition. The Ghazwan Group was primarily involved in murder and intimidation, vehicle theft, robbery, sectarian violence, and IED attacks.\(^{854}\)

(S/NF) In response, the Anbar Revolutionaries established a chapter in Khalidiyah, posting bounties for AQI leaders (b)(6). The Anbar Revolutionaries' entry into Khalidiyah was facilitated by an October 5 meeting of deputy governor Ali Aboud Awad with prominent members of the Iraqi police and army to discuss ways to restore security in Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah. Anbar Revolutionaries propaganda from this period made much of the fact that AQI had murdered Fahdawi tribesmen and former generals Khalil Muhammad Abed and Muhammad Thumayl, both of whom were leaders within the Anbar Revolutionaries. Before this, they had spent the last few years organizing SAR insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah corridor.\(^{855}\)

**Habbaniyah**

(S) (b)(6) was one of AQI’s facilitators in Fallujah, maintaining weapons caches in Shubaihat village near Habbaniyah while taking part in local kidnapping and robbery ventures. Also operating in Shubaihat village was (b)(6), who now served as the successor for (b)(6).\(^{856}\) Somewhat ironically, the Anbar Revolutionaries relied on the ferry crossing in Habbaniyah and Saqlawiyah to target AQI, exploiting many of the same locations that had previously been used by AQI fighters to coordinate kidnapping operations with the aid of local boatmen who ferried passengers up and down the Euphrates River.\(^{857}\)

**Karmah**

(S/NF) On August 31 and September 1, AQI leaders Sheikh Nazar Sadi Zahir, (b)(6) held an AQI leadership meeting in Karmah to coordinate operational and logistical planning for renewed attacks against Iraqi security forces in Karmah. (b)(6) had overseen the now-concluded training of Iraqi and foreign fighters in the

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853 Ibid.

854 [ | Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | (S/NF) | ]

855 [ | Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | (S/NF) | ]

856 [ | Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | (S/NF) | ]

857 [ | Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | (S/NF) | ]
Saddamiyah area. The meeting was focused on how best to employ his fighters. Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi also attended the Karmah meeting along with his brother As the AQI regional logistics chief for the Fallujah area, Sheikh Abdallah was responsible for ensuring that all AQI cells were adequately equipped with foreign fighters for use as suicide bombers and with weapons.

In contrast to Fallujah, AQI cooperated with Jaysh al-Mujahideen in Karmah, working with the other insurgent group to intimidate residents of the city by warning them of the consequences of working for the Coalition, doing business with Shi'a, smoking, eating vegetables in vinegar, and using ice water. To demonstrate the consequences of violating their edicts, the two groups distributed a video of them beheading Iraqi army soldier Ra'ad Sabah Musa. While most of Karmah's 40,000 residents regarded the insurgents as criminals, those who defied them met with increasingly swift reprisal.

The security situation in Karmah was not helped by the fact that Iraqi police officer and former police officer worked for AQI, convincing other Karmah police to turn over their badges and weapons to AQI members and surrender. Once a member of the police had agreed to do so, AQI took them to a facility near Lake That where they surrendered their badges and were given a formal document informing other AQI members that they had been cleansed of their sins and were now safe from attack along with their entire family.

AQI's policy of allowing Iraqi police to surrender in return for their lives and those of their families was duplicated throughout Fallujah, Amariyah, Saqlawiyah, and Ferris Town. The appeal of this policy for many police is not surprising given that twenty police had been assassinated by AQI in the Fallujah area alone between July and October. Even more alarming was AQI's ability to recruit former police into their ranks; of the nine Iraqi police who had officially resigned in the Fallujah area in June by October all of them were now AQI operatives in Amariyah and Ferris Town.

While fighting continued among the Albu Issa subtribes in the Amariyah area, as we have seen, divisions also emerged among the Minasil and Oaasat subtribes in Karmah that resulted in some of the tribesmen turning against the AQI fighters and their Fuhaylat allies. This was a significant development because the leaders of the Oaasat subtribe were bigoted xenophobes who hated Shi'a and Kurds and so had been receptive to AQI propaganda in the past.
Fallujah

Although the Fallujah AQI cells remained without an amir, [b(6)] served as a high-ranking AQI leader for the group throughout the greater Fallujah area, even surpassing [b(6)]. He had previously been detained by the Coalition at Bucca Prison, but was released on July 8, 2006 and resumed his participation in the insurgency. Organizing multiple VBIED attacks against Coalition targets, [b(6)] sought to unite as many other insurgent groups as possible under AQI's banner with the assistance of [b(6)]. Operating from the Ahmad Garage Complex in Sitcher village, [b(6)] coordinated vehicle theft activity and manufactured VBIEDs.[864]

[b(6)] was one of the primary financiers of AQI in Fallujah. A former lieutenant to Jolan district amir[b(6)] led with his superior to[b(6)] following Operation AL FAJR to evade capture. After[b(6)] was captured by the Coalition in December 2005, [b(6)] assumed charge of his operations, basing himself in a village outside[b(6)] where he received $90,000 payments from tribal and religious figures who worked for Islamic NGOs. One of his[b(6)] primary contacts was[b(6)] who dispersed money to[b(6)] from[b(6)] then had this money returned to various AQI cells in Fallujah to cover the purchase of vehicles and weapons.[865]

Sheik Abdallah Mahdi al-Halbusi was another financier, facilitator, and operational planner for a network of AQI cells in Fallujah, Saqlawiyah, Amariyah, Habbaniyah, and Karmah, using a corrupt Fallujah police officer to facilitate weapons shipments into the Nazal district of the city. Through his ties to members of the Mujahideen Shura Council, Sheikh Abdallah was able to plan and carry out complex attacks against Iraqi police and army officers in the Fallujah area.[866]

To combat AQI a group of one hundred Sunnis agreed to form a non-sectarian militia with the intention of removing AQI and foreign fighters from the city. Many of the members of this group were formerly members or supporters of the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade, which had dissolved soon after the reassignment of Fallujah police chief Brigadier General Salah to Baghdad. Members of the militia requested that the Coalition supply it with weapons, vehicles, and salaries so that they could continue the fight against AQI.[867]

The split in the Albu Issa tribe between pro and anti-AQI factions continued to affect the Fallujah area. In the al-Nasaf area southwest of Fallujah, as many as 500 Albu Issa tribesmen loyal to AQI set up checkpoints throughout the Albu Issa tribal area to search for members of the pro-Coalition Albu Alwan tribe as well as pro-Coalition subtribes of the Albu Issa.[868]

Corruption within the Iraqi army hindered security efforts in the Fallujah area. Commanding General Khalid Juad Khadum of 2nd Brigade of the 1st Iraqi Army Division engaged in fraudulent...
recordkeeping, embezzling, counterfeiting, racketeering, weapons facilitation for Mahdi Army, and theft solely for profit. In addition, General Khadum used his access to Coalition fuel stores to steal fuel from Camp Fallujah and resell it in Abu Ghraib for money.  

(S) Meanwhile Sheikh Abdullah Janabi associate Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Abbas Hudafa agreed to help Brigadier General Salah Khalil Hammadi keep the Fallujah police safe in return for an agreement that he would remain in power and receive a regular shipment of weapons. The two men had maintained a personal and professional relationship during the time that Salah had served on the Fallujah city council. After Salah was transferred to Baghdad in the summer of 2006 (see Chapter 6b) that agreement became irrelevant. Instead, Sheikh Abd al-Sattar forwarded money and weapons to the Albu Issa tribe to assist them in their fight against AQI, though he still regarded Coalition forces as "crusaders" involved in a conspiracy against Islam and sanctioned attacks against them. 

Amariyah

(S) So bad had the situation in Amariyah become by the end of September 2006 that when Fallujah district police chief went to visit the Iraqi police stations in Amariyah and Ferris Town he was met by the sheikhs of five subtribes in the area who threatened to pull their support for the police. The attacks on the Iraqi police and their supporters in Amariyah and Ferris Town were now far more complex than they had ever been before, with 200 AQI fighters arrayed against them from their base in the Fuhaylat village and more than 500 in the Zobai tribal area. These AQI fighters were armed with heavy weapons, anti-aircraft artillery, and PKCs and had successfully augmented their numbers by recruiting from local criminal elements. 

(S) Help was, however, on the way. Although most Anbar Revolutionaries targeted AQI leaders in Ramadi, a number of fighters shifted their focus toward Amariyah using the same well-established lines of communication that AQI had set up along the Euphrates River between Habbaniyah, Fallujah, Amariyah, and Yusufiyah. One such riverside AQI node was located at home in Subayhat village where a cell of 10-15 AQI fighters with charged with watching kidnap victims for AQI cells in Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Karmah for AQI regional amir Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi Salih al-Halbusi. 

(S) Many of the AQI fighters that now operated in Ramadi had been organized in the area between Amariyah and Yusufiyah, where they had been organized in the hundreds by the spring of 2006. The historic ties of AQI fighters to the Amariyah area meant that the group intended for some of its elements to relocate there were they ever pushed out of Ramadi by the Anbar Revolutionaries or the Coalition. 

(S) Sheikh Abdallah’s AQI network stretched from Ramadi to Yusufiyah continued to facilitate kidnapping, weapons storage, smuggling, and attacks on nearby cities. Kidnapping victims from as far afield as Baghdad were held in AQI safe houses between Amariyah and the Euphrates River

869 [Military] | 26 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061126 | (S/NE) |
870 [Military] | 16 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060916 | (S/NE) |
871 [Military] | 27 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060927 | (S/NE) |
872 [Military] | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | (S/NE) |
873 Ibid.
before being transported to additional holding locations north and south of the town. AQI weapons caches north of Amariyah and south Fallujah were also transported using the same network and used to support ongoing AQI activities in Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, and Karmah.\footnote{874}

**Nasser Wa Salaam**

(S) In the Nasser wa Salaam area, \footnote{875} was the mid-level leader for AQI and former members of 1920 Revolution Brigade. \footnote{876} alliance with the former 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters was due to his association \footnote{877} by the primary AQI financier for the area between Nasser wa Salaam and Baghdad. \footnote{878} also received financial support from his contacts in

(S) \footnote{879} maintained too connections with AMS through \footnote{880} and 1920 Revolution Brigade spokesman \footnote{881} While \footnote{882} was the secretary-general of AMS, he was also imam of the Umm al-Qura Mosque in Baghdad and used his position in AMS and as imam of the mosque to provide logistical support to \footnote{883} network as part of the effort by AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups to strengthen their network coordination between cells operating in Anbar, Salahaddin, Baghdad, Nineveh, and al-Tamim provinces.

**Zaidon**

(S) There was very little information from Zaidon in the autumn of 2006, almost certainly because it had fallen so far under AQI influence. AQI leader \footnote{884} conducted mortar and rocket attacks against Coalition and Iraqi military installations in the vicinity of Fallujah, planning and coordinating mortar attacks in Zaidon, Fallujah, Fuhaylat, and Saddamiyah. Abu Hamza's fighters were trained to fire mortars in Zaidon by

**Al-Shubaihat**

(S) In the small village of Al-Shubaihat, AQI leaders \footnote{885} received munitions shipments from \footnote{886} agents that were intended to help prolong the insurgency in Iraq. While cooperation between agents and AQI fighters might seem odd given the latter group's pronounced anti-Shi'a views, the agents had apparently reached an agreement with at least some AQI leaders in Anbar to supply the group with munitions from southern Iraq. Neither side, however, had any illusions that this relationship was going to last and each made it clear to the other that their disagreements over religion remained and would be settled once the Coalition withdrew from Iraq.\footnote{887}

\footnote{874} Ibid.
\footnote{875} [ | Military | 20 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | (S/NF) | ]
\footnote{876} Ibid.
\footnote{877} [ | Military | 23 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | (S/NF) | ]
\footnote{878} [ | Military | 10 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060910 | (S/NF) | ]
Hit

(S) AQI continued to effectively control fuel distribution at Hit gas stations, with fighters keeping customers orderly in line and distributing a portion of the fuel to residents while saving the remainder for sale on the black market. Because fuel was only delivered sporadically to Hit, residents were desperate to obtain fuel, enabling AQI to sell it at up 700% higher than market value. The Kutayshat subtribe opposed AQI and the two fought several battles for control over fuel distribution in southern Hit in late August 2006 that resulted in the death of a locally-feared Algerian AQI fighter.879

(S) Al-Asa’ab al-Ahwal was still active in Hit under the leadership of its founder The nephew of high-ranking Ba’athist and former IIS director had been presumed dead in 2004 but had survived and continued to operate in Hit, Baghdadi, and Nuwayim under the name. A one-time member of Ansar al-Sunna and then AQI. Despite this shift in ideologies, targeted the Coalition exclusively and took part in the August 1, 2005 ambush of a 3/25 Sniper Team in Haditha that killed the entire team.880

Senjick, Albu Hyatt

(S) The Coalition carried out an airstrike against AQI leadership meeting in Senjick, killing AQI leaders Aqaba Nafah Bedawi, Muhammad Jamal Muhammad, and Ahmad al-Sakrari along with six others. As noted previously, Aqaba was a senior AQI leader in the Haditha area while was the leader of an AQI cell in Barwanah. Both prior to and after the death of Aqaba, both Senjick and Albu Hyatt served as a refuge for AQI fighters in the Haditha area. AQI used boats to transport fighters, weapons, and supplies along the Euphrates River. A large number of AQI weapons caches were located in Senjick and Albu Hyatt, with Operation RED BULL and RED BULL II uncovering more than 200 arms caches in the area. Most of these weapons had been recovered as a result of the looting of Dulab after the fall of Saddam Hussein.881

(S) AQI was able to conduct limited training at a milling facility in Wadi Sakran near Albu Hyatt. This area was particularly favored by AQI because of the absence of a sustained Coalition presence. It provided the group with a refuge where its members could rest, train, and refit with minimal risk due to the rural terrain and complicity of local residents. Wadi Sakran was also connected to the village of East Sakran, which was seventeen kilometers from Barwanah and served as part of a network of villages along the western shore of Lake Thar Thar that facilitated AQI activity between Bayji and the Haditha area. Because it was common knowledge that the Coalition patrolled the main roads into the Haditha area, AQI was able to bypass Coalition checkpoints by smuggling weapons to Wadi Sakran and other rural areas on the eastern shore of the Euphrates River so that they could be distributed by boat throughout the Haditha area.882
Haditha

(S) Since mid-July, senior AQI leaders had been concerned about the formation of a local Iraqi police force in Haditha and had sought to counter it through an escalating campaign against the police. This concern was apparently warranted: since their formation in early August 2006, the Haditha police had successfully apprehended sixty-three suspected insurgent fighters. Relocating from Haditha proper to Sakran, mid- and high-level AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders continued to direct attacks against the Iraqi police in addition to mounting an aggressive propaganda campaign aimed at legitimizing the insurgency.883

(S) Ansar al-Sunna in the Haditha area was led by Mohammad Flayyih Hassan al-Ma'zid (Abu Radwan, Abu Nur, Abu Alem, Abu Sayf), who led three cells of roughly one hundred fighters each in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah. Yassir Taha al-Mutna al-Hayan was the leader of the Haditha cell who purchased vehicles to support the group's VBIED attacks, while Abd al-Razzaq al-Jughayfi specialized in IED attacks. Unlike other insurgent groups that relied on criminal or commercial enterprises to fund their activities, Ansar al-Sunna adopted a more rural approach to fundraising in Haditha. The group received some of its finances from local donors via the sheep smuggler, allowing the group a regular shipment of $50-60,000 every 4-5 months.884

(S) The local AQI leadership in Haditha was under pressure from its provincial superiors to increase attacks in the area and take any action necessary to prevent the establishment of an Iraqi police force. To emphasize the need for this measure, AQI threatened to cut funding to all its allied groups in the Haditha area if they failed to comply with this directive. This was a particularly effective threat given that the unemployment rate in western Anbar ranged from 70-75% in the first half of 2006, leaving AQI with a large pool of potential recruits that it could use to expand operations or replace lackluster fighters.885

(S) The anti-American al-Zawra'a satellite network released news stories about fictional engagements between Coalition forces and insurgents in Haditha that were widely believed by many semi-educated residents of the area despite the fact that they did not in fact occur.886

(S) In late September 2006, AQI perpetrated one of the worst atrocities against the Haditha police, beheading ten officers near Bayji while they were on leave including the nineteen year-old brother of Haditha police chief.887 Faruq then recruited volunteers from the Jughayfi, Abu Humayd, and Hayb tribes as well as local bedouin and former SAR insurgent fighters into the Haditha police. His goal was to unite as many of the tribes as possible in order to evict AQI from Haditha by force. The inclusion of the Jughayfi tribesmen was significant because this tribe had a long history of smuggling and other criminal activities in the Haditha area that assisted AQI.888

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883 [Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | (S/NF) | ]
884 [Military | 16 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061116 | (S/NF) | ]
885 [Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | (S/NF) | ]
886 [Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | (S/NF) | ]
887 [Military | 26 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060926 | (S/NF) | ]
888 Ibid.

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Through efforts, about 200 police recruits from Haditha graduated from training in mid-October.\(^{889}\)

(S) Haditha area AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders moved to Bayji to avoid capture by the Coalition. This was not surprising, as Haditha area insurgent leaders often fled to Bayji or the small villages north of Lake Thar Thar when fearing capture by the Coalition. This method of escape was first established during Operation RIVERGATE and enabled insurgent fighters to easily disperse from the Haditha area only to return three-four months later.\(^{890}\)

(S) Bayji and the small desert villages west of Lake Thar Thar also served as the primary sites for weapons caches. Goods stolen from tractor trailer trucks in Bayji were used to support the Haditha Mujahideen Shura and there was a regular flow of goods, weapons, and fighters into the Haditha area from Bayji that served as a contributing factor in the increase in AQI activity. Most of the weapons smuggled into the Haditha area from Bayji or Hit were sent to Barwanah, moved along small trails through the desert to avoid Coalition checkpoints.\(^{891}\)

(S) The coordination of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna activities in Haditha, al-Qaim, and Kirkuk was overseen by who may have been the head of the Haditha Mujahideen Shura (see Chapter 6b). While resided in Kirkuk, he also had residences on Huwayji Island near Haditha and in al-Qaim that he traveled to periodically to visit members of his family and local AQI leaders. Through these trips, was able to issue orders and establish himself as a figure of great prominence within AQI. In addition to having been the mayor of Haditha in 2005, had also served as Zarqawi's "war counsel" prior to his death and advised the late AQI leader on virtually all AQI operations in Anbar. He apparently retained this role under rising to the rank of fourth-in-command for AQI.\(^{892}\)

(S) Much of funding came from collecting payroll checks for services that he no longer performed, such as payments for oil protection services from the T-1 company and the K3 oil refinery. was also able to generate a great deal of internal funding through extortion, theft, and ransom demands made against the people of Haditha and the surrounding cities.\(^{893}\)

(S) AQI documents uncovered in a raid included a report stating that the group had met with Haditha mayor Imad Jawad Hamza as well as city council member Abd al-Muttafib Fahkri and head physician on February 22, 2006. As a result of the meeting, Imad agreed to divert to AQI a portion of the $8,000,000 in reconstruction money that had been awarded to Haditha. A former Iraqi air force pilot and Ba'ath Party member, Imad Jawad Hamza's loyalties originally lay with FRE and FRL insurgent groups, but he was forced to become a virtual puppet of AQI in order to become mayor. While Imad did not subscribe to AQI ideology, a detained senior

889 [ | Military | 01 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061001 | (S/NE) | ]
890 [ | Military | 04 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061004 | (S/NE) | ]
891 Ibid.
892 [ | Military | 09 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061009 | (S/NE) | ]
893 Ibid.

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AQI member stated that he did help to broker an agreement between AQI and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in Haditha in November 2005 under which the two movements would pool their resources to evict the Coalition from Haditha. This agreement, like other AQI-SAR relations, became more tenuous as AQI grew more powerful.894

(S) Imad continued to walk a fine line during his tenure as mayor, allowing AQI access to power and influence in the Haditha area in return for the group's protection and support. In October 2006, however, Imad left Haditha and hid in Bani Dahir, essentially dissolving the local government in Iraq's third largest city. The catalyst for Imad's flight was that the strengthening of the Iraqi police in Haditha had blunted AQI's original plan to infiltrate the police from within. This left Imad in something of a quandary, since he was so closely associated with the Haditha police, even though he had no real control over their campaign against AQI. As a result, AQI murdered several of Imad's assistants and threatened to kill him unless he agreed to rein in the Haditha police.895

Haqlaniyah

(S) In the nearby town of Haqlaniyah, the Coalition detained former city council member (b) who had been involved in facilitating corruption and insurgent activity in Haqlaniyah at least as far back as June 2003. By 2005, he had joined AQI and helped to coordinate the group's propaganda and intelligence activity in Haqlaniyah and Bani Dahir with the support of Haditha mayor Imad.896

Barwanah

(S) The situation in Barwanah was even worse, with residents unwilling to speak with the Coalition unless faced with the prospect of detention due to AQI's murder and intimidation campaign. The poor security situation allowed for criminal gangs to thrive, with some supportive of the insurgency and others simply taking advantage of the security situation. With the city council no longer meeting, there was no municipal government in Barwanah and residents were too afraid to come to the civil affairs building to address their concerns. Some tribal leaders assisted their tribesmen in resolving small inter-tribal disputes, but otherwise they were little more than figureheads.897

(S) The Barwanah gas station continued to be run by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members, who determined who was allowed to purchase gasoline in the city. While the two groups had formerly been involved in a dispute with one another over control of the gas station, by September 2006 they had reached an agreement to divide the profits in half in order to fund their respective activities in Barwanah. By mutually supporting one another, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna were able to make both of their operations more effective in Barwanah. AQI used the gasoline in part to pay local fishermen who helped them to transport fighters and supplies along the Euphrates River.898

894 [ | Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | (S/NE) | ]
895 Ibid.
896 [ | Military | 18 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060918 | (S/NE) | ]
897 [ | Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | (S/NE) | ]
898 [ | Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | (S/NE) | ]
(S) AQI maintained a makeshift training and medical facility capable of housing 15-20 fighters south of Barwanah at the home of (b)(6) Since emergency treatment of AQI fighters for battle injuries at public hospitals was considered risky, members of the group stole medical supplies in addition to foodstuffs and other goods from local commercial routes and used them to treat injured fighters.899

Baghdadi

(S) Having long sought revenge against Baghdadi police chief (b)(6) AQI fighters led by amir (b)(6) kidnapped, tortured, and murdered three of his cousins, including his first cousin Hussein Allawi Za’ee’lee al-Ubaydi. They were killed in Sahiliyah, an area known for AQI checkpoints (b)(6) had already attempted to mount an embargo against Baghdadi for its continued support of the 200-strong police force, informing merchants in Haditha that anyone who sold goods in Baghdadi would be killed. AQI now maintained checkpoints in Sahiliyah, Zakikah, and Kasraq areas between Hit and Baghdadi where fighters led by (b)(6) oversaw the killing of Baghdadi police and the intimidation of residents.900

(S) While the Baghdadi police had been successful at increasing the ability of the Iraqi security forces to control Jubbah, Baghdadi, and Dulab in order to disrupt insurgent capabilities, AQI continued to intimidate and rob Iraqis through its checkpoints between Baghdadi and Hit.901 The AQI fighters who ran these checkpoints stopped all vehicles and cross-referenced the occupants' ID cards with a list of "collaborators" from the 'Ubaydi and Jubbah tribes. If an occupant was determined to be a "collaborator," they were taken prisoner, interrogated, tortured, and eventually murdered.902 The activities conducted at these checkpoints intimidated the population, destabilized the area, and were used by AQI as a means to generate revenue for further operation between the two.903 Food and other basic supplies were unable to reach Baghdadi residents, many of whom had sunk into hopelessness in the belief that the Coalition was unable to secure a 25-30 kilometer stretch of road.904 As a result, there was an ongoing battle between the Baghdadi police and AQI for influence over the populations of Baghdadi and Jubbah.905

(S) On October 3, AQI attacked (b)(6) while he was on patrol, injuring him and killing his second-in-command Lieutenant Colonel Salim. AQI attempted to exploit this incident as a propaganda victory to encourage the Baghdadi police to quit, but the survival of (b)(6) encouraged the police not to abandon their posts and to stand firm against AQI murder and intimidation.906

(S) AQI continued to wage an effective murder and intimidation campaign against Baghdadi residents, maintaining a substantial level of influence over the population despite the earlier success
of the police. Local merchants were so intimidated by AQI that they would not do business with the police while they were in uniform. Baghdadi also continued to be plagued by fuel shortages since the only gas station in the town was not operating. Fuel shipments to Baghdadi were intercepted by AQI or stolen from residents by the group.907

(S) As part of AQI's new emphasis on building popular support, AQI amir [b][b](the AQI amir for Baghdadi, Hit, and Dulab) sent his brother [b][b] to speak with Sheikh Abdullah Hamad Mirhij al-'Ubaydi, who had become the leader of the Albu 'Ubayd tribe in Baghdadi after the death of his father in 2003. [b][b] told the Sheikh that he would be allowed to import vegetables from Hit to the markets in Baghdadi and Jubbah without fear of interdiction or harassment from AQI. AQI's willingness to negotiate with Sheikh Basim was interesting, because he had supported the rise of the unofficial Baghdadi police under the leadership of [b][b] and helped them to grow until they posed a serious threat to AQI (see Chapter 6a). In May 2006, Sheikh Basim himself was the target of an AQI suicide bombing.908

(S) AQI's desire to explore alternative ways to address the group's problem with the largely successful Baghdadi police was due in part to the ability of the group's checkpoints to affect trade in Baghdadi and Jubbah, allowing [b][b] and his followers to exert influence over the population. As a result, [b][b] believed that he was in a strong enough position to try and forge a beneficial relationship with Sheikh Basim that would allow him to provide residents with fresh produce (improving both the quality of life and Sheikh Basim's standing within the Albu 'Ubayd tribe) in return for Sheikh Basim agreeing to renounce the Baghdadi police. By establishing economic ties with a successful community leader, the Baghdadi AQI leadership sought to regain the ground that the group had lost in the area with the establishment of the police.909

907 [ | Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061003 | (S/NE) | ]
908 [ | Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | (S/NE) | ]
909 Ibid.
Rawah

(S) According to documents recovered from a Salafist arms cache near the Euphrates River, AQI displayed an increasing level of sophistication in Rawah, making payments to members of the organization classified as full or part-time fighters, martyrs, and those detained by the Coalition. The primary AQI units in Rawah were 1st through 5th ‘Ubaydi Battalions, with full-time members of the 4th and 5th ‘Ubaydi Battalions being paid regular salaries, with martyrs and those detained by the Coalition being paid more. The salary of individual AQI members was adjusted to compensate for the longevity of service in the organization as well as the number of dependents. All the pay rosters used abbreviated names or aliases to allow members of AQI to conceal their identities.\(^{910}\)

(S) These ‘Ubaydi Battalions apparently formed part of the AQI command and control center known as the Ajjamiyah network. The network, which had its headquarters in Rawah, directed AQI operations in Anah, Bayji, and Ramadi and existed as far back as July 2006. The network cooperated with AQI leader\(^{(b)(6)}\)network to facilitate the smuggling of foreign fighters from the border to the villages of Samsiyah, Husayniyah, Aumriyah, Ajjamiyah, Mahdyah, and Safrah near Rawah.\(^{911}\)

(S) AQI leader\(^{(b)(6)}\) who had formerly been based in Ramadi, was the head of the Ajjamiyah network.\(^{(b)(6)}\) was the group’s operational leader and\(^{(b)(6)}\) was its operations chief. Through these individuals, the network was able to coordinate the actions of AQI cells in Ramadi, Anah, and Bayji through lieutenants active in each city. For security purposes, each cell within the network was unaware of the existence of the others. To preserve the network as well as to adhere to\(^{(b)(6)}\)new philosophy of building popular support, AQI operatives in the Rawah-Anah corridor were instructed to provide local business owners with advance warning of attacks and ensure that attacks were carried out in open areas to mitigate the risk of civilian casualties.\(^{912}\)

Anah

(S) By late August 2006, the security situation had grown so dire in Anah that acting head of the city council Ja’arallah Fihan Musikh was ordered by the provincial government in Ramadi to disband the city council for his own safety. The deterioration of the situation in Anah was due in part to the withdrawal of the 4/14 Cavalry for Baghdad, which left the IIP in Anah vulnerable to attack by AQI. Since the Anah city council was responsible for addressing municipal and political issues in Anah, the absence of the council further stalled economic and government services improvement in the beleaguered town.\(^{913}\)

(S) In early September, some AQI fighters relocated from Ramadi to Anah via Rawah in the belief that the Coalition was preparing a major operation against the city. The milling areas in and around Anah housed many of these insurgents, with the primary AQI command and control nodes

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910 [ | Military | 16 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061016 | (S/NE) | ]

911 [ | Military | 17 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061017 | (S/NE) | ]

912 Ibid.

913 [ | Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | (S/NE) | ]
operating out of the villages of Ajjamiyah and Bubiayah. Within Anah proper, the insurgents were concentrated in the Sishan section of the town, which was used as a base for kidnapping and vehicle theft operations against pro-Coalition residents of al-Qaim.\footnote{Military | 05 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060905 | (S/NE) | }

\(\text{S}\) Hopes that the dissolution of the IIP in Anah would end the violence in the city were short-lived. AQI fighters wearing yashmaghs patrolled the city, intimidating residents and threatening to kill them. Despite the fact that the IIP had met AQI's demands, members of the party were still actively targeted by the group to prevent it from reconstituting. The Shishon district was the center of AQI activity in Anah, and most of the fighters in the district were Iraqi AQI members from further west in Anbar who had been displaced from their homes in towns like Husaybah during the course of 2005.\footnote{Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060910 | (S/NE) | }

**Al-Qaim**

\(\text{S}\) The major driving factor in al-Qaim remained the fight between the Albu Mahal and AQI. AQI leader\footnote{Military | 07 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060907 | (S/NE) | } attempted to open negotiations with Albu Mahal tribal leader Sheikh Sabah\footnote{Ibid.} requesting that Albu Mahal police officers resign in order to allow AQI operatives access to Husaybah as an organization point.\footnote{Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | (S/NE) | } The goal was to form an AQI cell called "the Assault Unit" to conduct operations in Husaybah using VBIEDs, IEDs, and assassinations to break the will of the Iraqi police and Iraqi army in the city. While he negotiated with the Albu Mahal on behalf of AQI,\footnote{Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | (S/NE) | } secretly planned to target the tribe in any event because they had opposed AQI.\footnote{Military | 05 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060905 | (S/NE) | }

\(\text{S}\) The involvement of an AQI leader as high-ranking as in these sorts of negotiations was rather unusual and indicative of the efforts by to build up popular support for AQI. Sheikh Sabah, however, was far from impressed since he stood to benefit from continued Albu Mahal participation in the Iraqi government in Husaybah. To accept offer would be to allow AQI the opportunity to regain power in al-Qaim, resulting in a loss of power by the Albu Mahal.\footnote{Military | 05 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060905 | (S/NE) | }

\(\text{S}\) This attempt at negotiations must be contrasted with the September 9 kidnapping, by AQI fighters, of Sheikh Umran of the Umm Qarah Mosque in Husaybah. Despite his anti-Coalition rhetoric and sermons about the triumph of Islam over Christianity, Sheikh Umran was targeted because he had sent a warning to AQI to stop dumping the bodies and body parts of the group's victims into the Euphrates River because it provided water to the people of Husaybah.\footnote{Military | 05 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060905 | (S/NE) | }

\(\text{S}\) Al-Qaim regional council economic advisor and IIP member\footnote{Military | 05 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060905 | (S/NE) | } served as an asset for intelligence, passing information back to and AQI through Abd al-Ayish al-...
an AQI operative who financed one of the group's cells in Husaybah through smuggling.\footnote{919}

(S) top lieutenant in al-Qaim was his chief representative for all of western Anbar and responsible for transporting weapons and foreign fighters from al-Qaim to the Haditha area.\footnote{920} who had now relocated to Kirkuk, facilitated many of activities in Haditha, Bayji, and Kirkuk.

(S) The communities around al-Qaim were also slowly being penetrated by AQI once again. Karabilah police chief was detained along with five other police for involvement in AQI activities. He had allowed AQI to use his home as a safe haven and encouraged his subordinates to listen to AQI propaganda while on duty. also used his position to protect his son who headed an AQI IED cell in Karabilah. To prevent the Coalition from learning of his activities, largely detained only low-level AQI fighters as well as random civilians.\footnote{921}

(S) served as the AQI leader and primary facilitator for the Husaybah-Sharqiyah area. second eldest son was responsible for coordinating mortar and missile attacks against Camp Habbaniyah, conducting mortar, RPG, SAF, and IED attacks against Coalition patrols, facilitating the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq, and overseeing the AQI murder and intimidation campaign. One of Umar's top financiers was the former head of an IIS unit in Tikrit under Saddam Hussein.\footnote{922}

(S) of the Kothar gas station in Husaybah-Sharqiyah was an associate of who used his gas station to support the AQI, though by October 2006 he had been stripped of AQI membership due to his involvement in the kidnapping of local children. Kothar gas station owner who had formerly served as a corrupt judge in Tarmiah also supported AQI.\footnote{923}

Rutbah

(S) By mid-August 2006, the AQI leadership had appointed as the new amir for Rutbah, believing that he could revive AQI activities in the town because of his track record of successful kidnappings and beheadings of Rutbah residents. Upon assuming his position, accused AQI leaders in Rutbah of delinquency and urged them to increase the level of attacks, kidnappings, and robbery in the town. Cultivating as his deputies, escalated the level of kidnapping and vehicle theft along rest stops and gas stations along the highway.\footnote{924}
(S) The AQI associate organization Abu Sarah Group was active between Rutbah and the Waleed border crossing, mostly engaging in criminal and vehicle theft. Despite being a primarily criminal organization, the Abu Sarah Group murdered any Shi'a its members encountered. The Abu Sarah Group had connections to the al-Hamdani tribe, which itself had multiple connections to AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and the Islamic Army of Iraq. The Abu Sarah network was led by (b)(6) until his capture by the Coalition on October 24.

Signs of Weakness within AQI

Lack of Spiritual Guidance

(S) Despite these clear signs of AQI consolidating its power across Anbar. There were other events and issues that suggested all was not well with the organization. The death of AQI spiritual leader Sheikh Abd al-Rahman on June 7 created a vacuum in AQI's strategic, ideological and religious guidance that proved difficult for (b)(6) to fill. In August 2006, (b)(6) requested the appointment of a religious advisor from AQSL, perhaps as a sign of their support for him as well as of his obeisance to their leadership. As a result, AQSL members (b)(6) (a recognized Islamic scholar) and (b)(6) traveled to Iraq from (b)(6) on September 23 to provide critical religious and strategic guidance to the AQI senior leadership in preparation for a new wave of AQI attacks between September and October 2006.

(S) The absence of spiritual leadership may have hindered AQI's decision-making process. Like Soviet commissars, religious leaders within groups like AQI ensured ideological purity and unity, and their absence could create at least temporary confusion over motivation and ultimate goals. In this particular instance, the result of no religious leadership within AQI was to prevent a reconciliation of AQI's tactics with the global objectives of AQSL. AQSL believed that targeting fellow Muslims was inappropriate regardless of sectarian difference and that this jeopardized their broader strategic plans to unite the Islamic world against the Coalition presence in Iraq. Meanwhile AQI leadership continued to embrace Zarqawi's strategic legacy of conducting attacks against the Shi'a, although the group now attempted to do so in order to increase Sunni support rather than to simply target Shi'a. Moreover, the absence of religious authority made it very difficult for (b)(6) to organize a cohesive response against emerging anti-AQI Sunni groups such as the Anbar Revolutionaries at a time when he was still struggling to reorient AQI following the death of Zarqawi.

AQI Recruitment of Female Fighters

(S) AQI also took the somewhat bizarre step of forming a branch of female fighters for its organization in al-Qaim under the leadership of (b)(6) While the use of women as suicide bombers or participating in AQI facilitation was not uncommon in Anbar, (b)(6) group also

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925 [ Military | 19 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060919 | (S/NE) | ]
926 [ Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | (S/NE) | ]
927 [ Military | 26 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060926 | (S/NE) | ]
928 [ Military | 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061005 | (S/NE) | ]
appears to have been involved in the fighting at a street level, contributing fighters to AQI operations in Anah in early October.\(^929\)

\(^\text{(S)}\) The decision to incorporate females into AQI was made by Zarqawi prior to his death, a decision that supported and sought to exploit in order to use females as fighters, suicide bombers, and smuggling facilitators. AQI's major limitation regarding its use of female operatives, however, lay in its ability to recruit them. While the use of female operatives by AQI remained relatively uncommon for this reason, they continued to be employed by the group as couriers and suicide bombers.\(^930\)

\(^\text{(U)}\) Because there are clear prohibitions in the hadith and Islamic law against women participating in warfare, their appearance in jihads around the world (e.g. Chechnya) is generally a signal of weakness within the insurgency. The use of women in al-Qaim in particular, suggests that AQI was having difficulty recruiting men for their fight in this area.

**AQI’s Use of Child Soldiers**

\(^\text{(S)}\) The use of children in warfare suggests a similar problem for AQI as a whole. Since early 2006, a number of insurgent groups (including Ansar al-Sunna, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Muhammad, and particularly AQI) had been recruiting young teenagers (12-17 years old) to conduct small attacks, such as planting IEDs. By October 2006, AQI recruiters were regularly visiting Anbar high schools to recruit students willing to participate in the insurgency for money. In general, AQI targeted poor teenagers who could be enticed by cheap thrills and even cheaper wages. The money earned from aiding the insurgency provided these poor teenagers with all the motives needed to carry out attacks, particularly when their families lacked sufficient sources of income.\(^931\)

\(^\text{(S)}\) AQI recruiting efforts for these teenagers included paying them a lump sum of $27 per operation with the option of earning a monthly salary of up to $400. This recruitment may have been motivated by the belief that the Coalition would not suspect that teenagers would be assisting AQI, but it may also have been another indication of weakness, since recruiting children for operations is typically a sign of poor recruitment of military aged males within an insurgency. To ensure the compliance of the recruits, AQI operatives intimidated and coerced members of their family if they did not comply with their assigned tasks. For instance, AQI coerced the student body and faculty of a Ramadi high school into leaving the school in order to create a greater pool of teenagers from which to recruit.\(^932\)

\(^\text{(S)}\) Teenagers recruited by AQI were generally used for menial tasks that did not require much skill or sophisticated training, such as the placement of IEDs, surveillance of prospective targets, or early warning operations. In the Haditha area, teenage recruits were used to conduct IDF and small arms fire attacks against Coalition forces. Other teenagers in Fallujah and Rawah were coerced or deceived by AQI into becoming suicide bombers, just as occurred in Mosul and Baghdad. Some Iraqi AQI members were even radicalized enough to recruit their own children to use as suicide...
bombers. While the examples of the latter occurring were rare and extreme cases, they underscored the level of religious extremism that was now dominant within the membership of AQI.\textsuperscript{933}

**Continued Developments Within Anti-AQI Forces (October)**

**The SAA Is Created**

(S/NF) In early October, the Anbar Emergency Council renamed itself the Anbar Salvation Front (the SAA) and continued its efforts to obtain sanction from the Iraqi central government for its activities. Prime Minister Maliki, Vice President Tariq Hashemi, and Governor Mamoun responded with an effort to form another tribal council made up of IIP members. This was not altogether surprising, since Governor Mamoun was a member of the IIP and Vice President Hashemi's was the leader of the party. The result was a series of meetings between Maliki, Mamoun, and Hashemi with IIP members of the Albu Alwan, Albu Fahd, and Albu Issa tribes that Hashemi held up as an IIP tribal council that negated the need for the SAA. The SAA responded with a respectful letter to Prime Minister Maliki stating that they had no intention of "joining hands" with the IIP and particularly with Governor Mamoun and stressed that their goal was to fight AQI, not take part in politics. To illustrate their point, the SAA held rallies to highlight their anti-AQI activities as well as their frustration with Governor Mamoun.\textsuperscript{934}

(S/NF) When Prime Minister Maliki did meet with representatives of the SAA, he stated that Governor Mamoun told him that Ramadi's public services were functional, that security was prevailing throughout Anbar, and that his efforts to expel AQI from the provincial capital were succeeding. Maliki also stated his intention to open dialogue with the Anbar Central Council members in \textsuperscript{14b} who were on good terms with the Iraqi political establishment, rather than with the SAA.\textsuperscript{935}

(S/NF) It appeared that Iraqi politics would once again trump common sense. Both Vice President Hashemi and Governor Mamoun took a personal interest in the IIP conflict with AQI, but they were also committed to mitigating any political challenges to IIP dominance. While AQI certainly posed a larger threat to the Anbari political establishment than the SAA, IIP politicians were pleased over the killing of AQI leaders by the SAA's military wing and now saw the Salvation Front as the greater challenge to their authority. As for the SAA, its leaders' claims that they were above politics was not quite honest, since the group appeared to regard Governor Mamoun and the Anbar provincial government as only slightly less of a menace to Anbari society as that posed by AQI.\textsuperscript{936}

(S/NF) Despite these developments, success against AQI was in the interest of both the SAA and the national government, and the SAA's activities and the positive media coverage they generated were already leading to imitators and offshoots in neighboring provinces such as Babil. Attempts by the IIP to marginalize the SAA from politics only served to alienate the group from the government,

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\textsuperscript{933} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{934} [ Military | 09 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061009 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{935} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{936} Ibid.
while attempts by the SAA to remove Governor Mamoun were not going to be embraced by the national government.\(^{937}\)

(S) In an effort to reconcile the SAA and the provincial government, the Coalition facilitated an October 10 meeting at Camp Ramadi between Governor Mamoun and Sheikh Abdul Sattar. Prior to the meeting, al-Iraqiya Television broadcast footage of an SAA rally that was intended to send a message to Governor Mamoun of the SAA's level of dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government. At the rally, Sheikh Abdul Sattar denounced efforts by Vice President Tariq Hashemi to set up an alternative pro-IIP tribal organization, stating that the IIP did not represent anyone in Anbar but its members, party, and leadership. Given this context, there were many heated words exchanged at the meeting, yet common ground was found in the two men's shared desire to oppose AQI. Governor Mamoun attempted to make it clear to Sheikh Abdul Sattar that he regarded him as a valid partner in establishing security in Anbar and went to great lengths to distance himself from the IIP. The meeting concluded with a mutual agreement for the provincial government and the SAA to cooperate in reconstruction and security efforts.\(^{938}\)

(S/NF) The meeting between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and Governor Mamoun helped to ease the concerns of Iraqi police officials in Anbar, many of whom feared that they might have to choose sides in the event of a power struggle between the two men. Senior police officials correctly believed that SAA would almost certainly prevail in such a struggle since they had the support of the Ramadi police and all their tribal leaders.\(^{939}\)

(S/NF) Governor Mamoun's distancing himself from the IIP at the meeting ingratiated him to the SAA, but it also carried with it the risk that Vice President Hashemi would remove him from office and replace him with a more partisan IIP member. A consummate politician, Governor Mamoun believed that he had an understanding with the Anbar IIP leadership that if the party was to have a future in the province that some compromise with the opposition was required. The result of the meeting between the two sides was a cessation of accusations of ineptitude against Governor Mamoun and of ulterior motives against Sheikh Abdul Sattar.\(^{940}\)

(S) Nevertheless, some tensions between the SAA and Governor Mamoun continued. This was illustrated in the controversy over the potential appointment of Sa'ad Hamad Sharqi al-Alwani as the first mayor of Ramadi. Governor Mamoun insisted that Sa'ad had to join the IIP if he wanted to be involved in the Ramadi municipal government. Sa'ad refused because he did not accept the group's Islamist platform and believed many of its leaders to be corrupt. As a result, no mayor of Ramadi was appointed and Sa'ad became an ally of Sheikh Abdul Sattar, introducing him to other community leaders in Ramadi.\(^{941}\)

(S/NF) Politics aside, the SAA continued its fight against AQI through the Anbar Revolutionaries. On the same day of the meeting, members of the group's militia drawn from the Albu Ali Jassim

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\(^{937}\) Ibid.
\(^{938}\) [Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | (S/NF) | ]
\(^{939}\) Ibid.
\(^{940}\) Ibid.
\(^{941}\) [Military | 15 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061015 | (S/NF) | ]
tribe seized an AQI weapons cache, killing the AQI fighters and turning the weapons over to the Coalition. By the end of October, the Anbar Revolutionaries had killed nearly forty AQI fighters, including the brothers Salam and Ra'ad al-Kubaysi who had coordinated the establishment of checkpoints to capture or kill Iraqi police or Shi'a. On the evening of October 12, the Anbar Revolutionaries attacked a contingent of AQI fighters along the Ramadi highway, leading to the capture of thirteen AQI fighters and recovery of eight stolen trucks.942

(S) The continued success of the Anbar Revolutionaries enabled the group to absorb several smaller anti-AQI vigilante groups through negotiations with its SAA political wing. Among these was the Secret Army, a vigilante group made up of off-duty Iraqi police officers.943 The leadership of also encouraged tribal leaders in the Jazira area to screen prospective police recruits from their tribes for possible AQI infiltrators.944

(S) Indicative of SAA's efforts are statements by Sheikh Abu Farris, Sheikh Abu Yassir, and Sheikh Abu Sattar, tribal leaders from the vicinity of the Waleed border crossing, who informed the Coalition after attending a meeting of the SAA that they were willing to do everything in their power to help and General Saber against AQI. Soon afterwards, a chapter of the Anbar Revolutionaries was established in Rutbah and began threatening local members of AQI.945

(S/NE) was also aware of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's growing fortunes. After the meeting with Governor Mamoun, sent Sheikh Abdul Sattar a warning that he had one month to support AQI in Anbar or he would be killed. Sheikh Abdul Sattar responded that should order his followers to leave Anbar or they would be killed.946 AQI also engaged in black propaganda efforts to disrupt cooperation between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and Governor Mamoun, distributing fliers purported to be from the Anbar Revolutionaries that threatened to kill IIP members unless they renounced their party membership.947

Brigadier General Hamid

(S) The SAA gained a major political victory in early October 2006 when Brigadier General Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa was appointed Anbar police chief for a 90-day trial period. A respected sheikh from the Albu Dhiab tribe, Brigadier General Hamid had been a senior member of the Anbar Revolutionaries since their formation, had attended the initial meetings of the Anbar Emergency Council, and was a senior member of the SAA's military coordination committee that oversaw the planning and execution of the Anbar Revolutionaries' anti-AQI committee. A political moderate, Hamid supported compromise with the IIP and the provincial government to achieve the group's security objectives.

942 [ | Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | (S/NE) | ]
943 [ | Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | (S/NE) | ]
944 [ | Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | (S/NE) | ]
945 [ | Military | 15 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061015 | (S/NE) | ]
946 Ibid.
947 [ | Military | 20 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | (S/NE) | ]

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Hamid had been considered for the position of Anbar police chief in December 2005 and had planned to order the recall of all Anbar police officers and the reopening of their police stations had he been given the position. Any officers that failed to show up for duty would have been fired and their replacements selected on the basis of the recommendations from tribal and city leaders. Hamid had also been involved in the December 2005 Iraqi elections while still a colonel, serving as the chairman of the Independent Iraqi Election Commission for the Albu Dhiab tribal area.  

While it would not be hard for Hamid to be better than his predecessors given their unimpressive if not criminal track records, his affiliation with the SAA and its military wing Anbar Revolutionaries led to friction with Governor Mamoun and the provincial council. The Iraqi interior ministry's decision to grant Sheikh Abdul Sattar permission to "destroy terrorism" in Anbar was regarded by tribal and city leaders outside of Ramadi as an attempt by Sheikh Abdul Sattar to usurp their authority.

SAA Consolidates Support

To solicit the support of the Anbar Central Council for the SAA's effort to fight AQI, Sheikh Abdul Sattar's brother contacted a senior member of the former group. The Anbar Central Council responded that it would support anti-AQI efforts but not what it regarded as the SAA's efforts to usurp the legitimate provincial government of Anbar. In an effort to gain the Anbar Central Council's support, told his contact that he was empowered by the office of the prime minister to help the Council nominate 3,000 individuals for employment in the First and Seventh Divisions of the Iraqi army in Anbar. While the Council was still lukewarm on the SAA, they agreed to meet in early November 2006 to discuss his offer. When combined with the Iraqi interior decision to appoint Brigadier General Hamid as the new provincial police chief, the discussions between Ahmad and the Anbar Central Council were part of the growing indications that the Shi'a-led Iraqi government, the Amman-based Anbar Central Council, and the IIP-dominated provincial government were all increasingly inclined to cooperate with the SAA.

With one of their leaders now in charge of Anbar police, the Anbar Revolutionaries began setting up a mechanism under which AQI members could surrender to authorities by turning themselves in at the Jazira police station, giving up their weapons, and returning to their homes with the understanding that they would not be given a second chance to surrender if they were encountered again on the battlefield. The Jazira police personnel were all drawn from the Albu Assaf, Albu Ali Jassim, and Albu Dhiab tribes, all of which were represented in the SAA.

With the Anbar Revolutionaries now operating openly as the military wing of the SAA, the group threatened to kill anyone caught moving Coalition checkpoints. Ramadi residents were actively encouraged by the group to assist the Coalition in the hope that the Coalition would openly support the Anbar Revolutionaries against AQI. As part of this effort to legitimize itself, the Anbar

948 [ | Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | (S/NE) | ]
949 Ibid.
950 [ | Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | (S/NE) | ]
951 [ | Military | 20 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | (S/NE) | ]
Revolutionaries' leadership went to great pains to apprehend suspected AQI fighters and turn them over to the Coalition instead of having them shot on sight.952

**Operation QATIAT ALMAZ (October 13-19)**

(S) The Coalition was doing its part to disrupt AQI as well. In response to the rise of AQI activity in Anah, the Coalition and Iraqi forces mounted Operation QATIAT ALMAZ with the goal of restoring security to the town. The operation resulted in the capture of AQI leader[____(b)(6)______], though Mujahideen Shura Council member and AQI's Rawah-Anah corridor amir Abu Abdallah al-Hanbali managed to escape to ‘Ubaydi. An associate of[____(b)(6)______] had coordinated attacks against Coalition forces in Husaybah, ‘Ubaydi, Anah, and Rawah.953

(S) The immediate effect of Operation QATIAT ALMAZ was to restore a sense of security in Anah and most residents welcomed the Coalition. The overriding concern among residents, however, was that the Coalition would soon leave and in so doing abandon the population to face AQI's wrath. While former Iraqi police were willing to return to duty and ten to sixteen tribal leaders were active in the city, most of these tribes numbered as few as one hundred members and most the town's notables were waiting to see what happened before they committed themselves. Anah city council member Jarallah Fihan Musikh was very upbeat about the situation in the city, but he cautioned the Coalition that residents still feared they would leave, allowing AQI to return and seek vengeance against them. As a result, while Anah residents were now hopeful for the future of their city, they remained neutral towards openly supporting the Coalition until they were confident that security had been restored.954

(S) With the successful degradation of AQI in Anah due to Operation QATIAT ALMAZ, the IIP reemerged in the town and more than one hundred current and former IIP members began arming themselves to travel to Rawah and fight AQI. While these IIP members were not pro-Coalition, they sought Coalition support in evicting AQI from Rawah in the belief that they could regain their status as the dominant political party in the region.955

**Ansar al-Sunna Relations with AQI**

(S) In the meantime, AQI's closest ally Ansar al-Sunna was rethinking its ties with the larger insurgent group. Following the theft of Ansar al-Sunna weapons, munitions, and money by members of AQI in Haditha, senior leaders of Ansar al-Sunna in the Haditha area agreed to meet with leaders of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party to discuss how AQI's brutal murder and intimidation campaign had tarnished popular support for the insurgency and threatened the groups' international images as popular resistance organizations. The catalyst for the Ansar al-Sunna attendance at this meeting was an earlier September 2006 meeting of the Haditha Mujahideen Shura to discuss a common strategy for defeating the Coalition. The meeting was a failure due to the arrogance of the AQI representatives and created a rift between a number of SAR groups and AQI.

952 Ibid.
953 [ | Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | (S/NE) | ]
954 Ibid.
955 [ | Military | 07 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061107 | (S/NE) | ]
While Ansar al-Sunna did not break with AQI in Haditha, it did reinvigorate its propaganda campaign in Haditha and Haqlaniyah as part of an effort to retain its independence.956

(S) Not all Ansar al-Sunna leaders were so sanguine about cooperation with AQI. By early October 2006, Ansar al-Sunna's military and medical support chief (b) and religious advisor (b) drew up a written document that concluded that AQI was losing its base of support among Iraqi Islamists, and that AQI followed a Takfiri ideology contrary to that of Ansar al-Sunna. He also noted that AQI disagreed with Ansar al-Sunna's view that suicide bombings should only be used in extreme circumstances such as an opportunity to assassinate senior Iraqi officials.957

(S) therefore sought to open a dialogue with the Coalition despite a lack of success at the group’s earlier attempts to use intermediaries in and were now prepared to draw up terms for a full cessation of hostility between the Coalition and Ansar al-Sunna and were even considering entering into negotiations with their long-time enemy President Jalal Talabani. Elements of Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Saraya Jaysh al-Islami all expressed similar interest in joining Ansar al-Sunna's negotiations, believing that was now a greater threat to Iraq than the Coalition. It should be noted that both and had long been critical of Ansar al-Sunna's alliance with AQI, with producing a formal study as far back as 2004 intended to document the evils of working with AQI. Meanwhile (false) claimed that Ansar al-Sunna did not share AQI's philosophy of fighting the United States or participating in global jihad.958

(S) The sentiments of ran counter to the policies of Ansar al-Sunna leader (b) who had been willing to align with AQI despite their differences at least as far back as late February 2006. Exploiting the anger of Ansar al-Sunna leaders in the Haditha area, were able to destroy the relationship between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha.959

AQI's Cross-Provincial Ties and the Creation of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq

AQI Transit Between Anbar and Salahaddin

(S) Despite these clear signals that not everything was going its way, AQI continued to act as if it were still in control of events in Anbar. With the approach of winter, Saqlawiyah-based AQI leader (b) led his group of forty fighters to the Saddamiyyah area around Lake Thar Thar while he prepared to assume a position of greater authority in Salahaddin province. and his followers had been responsible for mortar, IED, and VBIED attacks, assassination, vehicle theft, fuel smuggling, and money laundering.960

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956 | Military | 16 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061016 | (S/NE) |
957 | Military | 25 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061025 | (S/NE) |
958 Ibid.
959 Ibid.
960 | Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | (S/NE) |
There were strong ties between the AQI organizations in Anbar and Salahaddin province. Much of the profit made off of oil smuggled from the Bayji refinery and sold on the Anbar black market was used to finance VBIED attacks in both Anbar and Salahaddin. AQI senior leader network spanned all the way from al-Qaim into Haditha, Bayji, and Kirkuk. The AQI presence in Kirkuk was supported by AQI networks in Anbar that extended into Salahaddin, and al-Tamim. AQI leader also continued to maintain his network of contacts with other cell leaders in Salahaddin.

The AQI network based in Anbar stretched across Salahaddin, al-Tamim, and Nineveh provinces. This network enabled fighters to transit rapidly from one area to another with little difficulty. For instance, in response to Operation RIVERGATE AQI shifted from Hit to Bayji and the small villages north of Lake Thar Thar in order to escape Coalition pressure. AQI leaders were also able to transit rapidly between Rutbah, Ramadi, Haditha and Bayji. After Coalition pressure was reduced, the AQI fighters generally returned to their point of origin. Following the Askariyya bombing, AQI fighters traveled to Baghdad province in an effort to support other AQI and other Sunni elements fighting against Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.

Since the Mahdi Army's offensive against AQI now extended into Salahaddin province, the AQI leadership believed that its network north of Baghdad was under threat and was transferring experienced fighters from Anbar to address it. As a result, the pattern of AQI movement from Anbar and into Salahaddin was both to confront and avoid potential threats. This was because AQI believed that the area between Samarra and Lake Thar Thar had a lower level of Coalition activity that would give the group more freedom to conduct operations while it fought against Mahdi Army efforts to expand its operations into the Sunni Triangle.

Aqi Support in Anbar from Southern Iraq

AQI also relied on smugglers from the Shurayfat and Zagharid tribes to bring weapons into the province from An Najaf and Karbala through Rahalih. From Rahalih, the weapons were smuggled by boat across Lake Razzazah (Bahr al-Milh) to Ramadi. AQI's reliance on smugglers in southern Iraq was due to the fact that the group's traditional smuggling routes in western Anbar were becoming increasingly problematic for its networks in eastern Anbar and western Baghdad, forcing them to rely instead on the northern route through Nineveh province. As a result, AQI cells in Fallujah and Ramadi were forced to supplement their operational support using smuggled supplies and fighters from Najaf and Karbala provinces. Although both provinces were largely controlled by Mahdi Army fighters, as in Baghdad some Shi'a arms dealers decided to turn a profit by selling weapons to both Shi'a and Sunni fighters, though no large-scale arms sales occurred.

The Islamic Amirate of Iraq

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506
The ultimate expression of AQI’s belief in its future dominance of Iraq came in October. One month earlier, AQSL second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri sent a message to [b][6] to create the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. In order to demonstrate that the Islamic Amirate was an Iraqi organization rather than a foreign entity that had been forced upon them, al-Zawahiri instructed [b][6] to appoint an Iraqi leader as the group’s amir. As a result, [b][6] chose native Iraqi Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi to become the amir of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq.965

AQSL envisioned the Islamic Amirate of Iraq as an entity that would be subordinate to AQI the same way that AQI and JTJ had been subordinate to AQSL. The Mujahideen Shura Council and elements of the formerly SAR insurgent groups that were now loyal to AQI (including Jaysh Muhammad, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Taif al-Mansoura, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Islamic Army of Iraq) were all incorporated into the new Amirate. AQSL also ordered the new state to create a Central Tribal Council that would unite Sunni tribes loyal to AQI against both Shi’a tribes and the SAA. In the same way that Saddam Hussein created and financed sheikhs who were loyal to his regime, AQI intended to support those tribal leaders who agreed to swear bayat to Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi as the leader of the new Iraqi state. Many tribal leaders in Anbar and other Sunni areas of Iraq such as Mosul agreed to do so, either out of fear of AQI’s wrath or due to the promise that every tribe that took part in the Islamic Amirate of Iraq would receive the organization’s protection as well as its financial and material support.966

One of the tribes that pledged loyalty to the group was the al-Buaz tribe, whose leader posted an October 6, 2006 public statement swearing bayat to the Mujahideen Shura Council. Other tribal leaders appear to have made similar, though less public, pledges of support. In an October 12, 2006 statement by the Mujahideen Shura Council, the group announced that it had formed a ceremonial alliance (the Mutayyabin) between tribal leaders loyal to AQI and a number of insurgent groups, patterned after an alliance that had occurred during the time of Muhammad.967

In addition to specific tribal leaders, the Central Tribal Council of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq succeeded in winning the outright loyalty of the Albu Ubayd, Albu Farraj, and Albu Fahd tribes, members of which swore bayat to UBL as their amir. AQI’s ability to win the loyalty of the Albu Fahd tribe was especially significant, as this was [b][6] own tribe that had been a key element of his earlier bid for political engagement through the SAA. Ordering these tribesmen to fortify the Sufia and Aziziyah districts of Ramadi, the AQI leadership began drawing up plans to attack the Albu Risha, Albu Assafi, and Albu Mahal tribal areas as part of [b][6] plan to destroy the SAA.968

In general, the western tribes of Ramadi now supported the Coalition while their eastern counterparts supported AQI. The Albu Risha and Albu Assafi tribes were now solidly pro-Coalition, providing a significant portion of Anbar Revolutionaries fighters. The Albu Dhiab, Albu Ali Jassim, and Albu Nimr assisted the Albu Risha and Albu Assafi, providing them with an additional force of one hundred fighters. While the Albu Mahal in Ramadi was a subtribe of the Albu Farraj, on the issue of supporting AQI it broke with its parent tribe.969

965 (S/NE) 1.4c, (b)(6) 50 USC § 3507
966 Ibid.
967 (S/NE) Military 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061019
968 (S/NE) Military 25 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061025
969 Ibid.

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While some members of almost every tribe supported AQI to one degree or another, the Albu Farraj, Albu Fahd, and Albu Ubayd tribal leaders were so intimidated by AQI that their leaders were now forced to support the group for fear of retaliation. That the Albu Fahd was now bowing to AQI pressure was especially worrisome given that its leader Sheikh Nasser had been a key player in the Anbar People's Committee.\textsuperscript{970}

On October 18, to celebrate the creation of the Amirate, AQI fighters and supporters dressed in white held rallies throughout Ramadi, hosting demonstrations at a number of mosques and at Anbar University.\textsuperscript{971} The main demonstration consisted of roughly sixty AQI fighters on the north side of 17th Street brandishing AK-47s, PKC machine guns, RPGs, IGLA rockets, and Dimitrov anti-aircraft guns. The north side of 17th Street was chosen as the site of the demonstration because it was where the Mujahideen Shura Council met and as such was perceived by AQI as an area where the group could move about freely. AQI also organized demonstrations in support of the new Amirate in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Bani Dahir, Rawah, and Rutbah, with additional demonstrations planned for Fallujah and Amariyah. In Rutbah, the AQI demonstration was particularly geared towards responding to a threat from the Anbar Revolutionaries that AQI fighters should leave the town or they would be killed.\textsuperscript{972} At every demonstration a statement from the Mujahideen Shura Council was read, demanding that the Coalition withdraw from Iraq immediately.\textsuperscript{973}

The establishment of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq was a major boost to AQI morale after the losses that the group and its supporters had sustained at the hands of the SAA. The Mujahideen Shura Council's reconciliation initiatives as originally formulated by the SAA were now creating support for an Islamic state among Sunni tribes and insurgent groups. The theme of "AQI as defenders of the Sunni" was persuasive for the various tribes and insurgent groups that decided to support AQI, enhancing its ability to recruit and fueling anti-government sentiment.\textsuperscript{974} Also issued a statement on behalf of the AQI leadership, stating that he would give the sheikhs who had joined the SAA a chance to repent of their actions until the end of Ramadan, at which time they would face AQI's wrath.\textsuperscript{975}

A similar AQI propaganda campaign was mounted throughout the Hit-Haditha corridor by AQI leader.\textsuperscript{976} His primary message was that the insurgents were making a "limited-time offer" for residents and other insurgents to "repent" during Ramadan and to join the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. This propaganda campaign attempted to wrap the mantle of religious authority around AQI, targeting local businessmen that were suspected of working with the Coalition. An AQI propaganda flyer recovered by Iraqi police in Baghdadi summarized much of the group's efforts.\textsuperscript{977}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{970} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{971} [Military] 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061019 \textsuperscript{(S/NE)}
\item \textsuperscript{972} [Military] 23 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061023 \textsuperscript{(S/NE)}
\item \textsuperscript{973} [Military] 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061019 \textsuperscript{(S/NE)}
\item \textsuperscript{974} [Military] 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061022 \textsuperscript{(S/NE)}
\item \textsuperscript{975} [Military] 23 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061023 \textsuperscript{(S/NE)}
\end{itemize}
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(S) “To those who joined the police and sold their religion and faith for petty drachmas, and are content to be bound to serve the Americans, who killed our Muslim brothers. To whoever has become a shield for them against the mujahedin, to the traitors and renegades, to those who joined the Islamic Party, to all who accept contracts against them, we warn you in the precious month (Ramadan) to turn to God and ask forgiveness and penitence, turning to the mujahedin’s amir, Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, for whom we ask victory from God. Your penitence is more interesting to us than killing you.”

(S) Nor were these claims merely rhetorical. Residents perceived the entire Haditha area as being entirely under the control of AQI. Fearful of both Coalition and AQI checkpoints, residents would not travel to other cities and were also intimidated by the fighting between AQI fighters and the Coalition into staying away from the markets in Haqlaniyah and Bani Dahir. Many residents of Haditha had by this point lost all faith in the Coalition, instead believing that their only hope was with Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the SAA in Ramadi. Only in the Hay Albu Assar and Wadi Albu Hyatt neighborhoods were the al-Hayyani and al-Ghariri tribes willing to stand up to AQI fighters.

(S) For Haditha residents, the declaration of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq was announced on local television and radio stations followed by celebratory gunfire. In the days that followed the announcement, AQI fighters armed with AK-47s distributed chocolates and bottles of Pepsi-Cola to residents in Bani Dahir, telling them to celebrate the formation of a Sunni Islamic state.

(S) All the AQI parades and demonstrations in Ramadi, Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Bani Dahir, Rawah, and Rutbah encountered no resistance from the Iraqi police, the Coalition, or the general population. Not only did this further intimidate the general population, but it also increased the confidence of AQI fighters by showing the group’s ability to organize demonstrations even in areas where police or other anti-AQI groups were known to be active.

(S) AQI held additional parades in Ramadi on October 18, 19, 21, and 22, some of which lasted for several hours. These demonstrations were the group’s response to anti-AQI rallies organized by the SAA on October 9 and 15, during which Ramadi sheikhs and police officers openly spoke out against AQI and in support of the Iraqi government. As a result, the series of AQI parades in Ramadi during which its fighters displayed their weapons were intended as a show of force and gave many residents the impression that the group was now in control of the city.

(U) The Mujahideen Shura Council attempted to portray its announcement as a move on behalf of Sunnis and a response to steps toward federalism by the Kurds and the Shi’a. In addition, the group claimed that it was instituting shari’ah throughout Anbar province by popular demand. Not all reaction to the group was positive, however. The SAA immediately denounced the Islamic Amirate of Iraq as “an association of terrorists.” AMS also denounced any talk of partitioning Iraq along sectarian lines as “grand treason,” stating that only AMS spoke for the entire Iraqi Sunni community.

976 [ | Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | (S/NE) | ]
977 [ | Military | 23 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061023 | (S/NE) | ]
978 [ | Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | (S/NE) | ]

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Those groups that resisted the formation of the Amirate soon found themselves on the receiving end of AQI's wrath. As soon as preparations for the creation of the Amirate began, Mujahideen Shura Council member directed AQI cells to organize death squads to attack all groups who refused to swear loyalty to the new organization, specifically members of the various factions of 1920 Revolution Brigade.980

The formation of death squads was part of AQI's attempt to confront anti-AQI sentiment throughout Anbar and in particular the SAA. The death squads targeted members of any SAR insurgent groups, government officials, and community leaders with the goal of coercing acquiescence to AQI presence and operations in the province. Because Anbar was an important center for AQI facilitation and recruiting, the creation of the SAA was seen as a serious threat to the group's influence in the province. AQI's assassination campaign caused an increased violence between the Ramadi area tribes that formed the core of the SAA and forced AQI to dedicate additional resources to secure the area.981

AQI had already moved to set up shari'ah courts in the areas where the group had the most influence. According to documents recovered by G Co 2/3 during a September 25 raid in Haqlaniyah, a regional AQI shari'ah court collected information on a wide variety of topics ranging from criminal activity to political affiliations, residents’ relationships with the Coalition, residents’ relationships with AQI, and alleged violations of shari'ah.982

This shari'ah court was an extension of an earlier body that had existed in the Hit-Haditha corridor and was disrupted as a result of Operation RIVERGATE (see Chapter 5b). All its documents were written in an official and legalistic tone in an effort to establish the court's legitimacy as a sanctioned body within the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. Information gathered by AQI's internal security wing on alleged apostates, police, and others who gained employment with the Coalition were presented to a qadi (religious judge) who then determined the proper hadd punishment. Sentences in the recovered documents range from intimidation to kidnapping to assassination. The shari'ah court was primarily concerned with "traitors," i.e. those working for the Coalition or who were believed to be giving information on AQI activity to the Coalition. Of secondary concern to the court was the issue of apostacy: those who did not conform to the qadis' views of how Muslims should act under shari'ah.983 One result of this concern was that women in Barwanah began to wear the niqab like their counterparts in Haditha and Haqlaniyah.984

Among those who were considered apostates were individuals who acted in the name of jihad either as a cover for criminal activity or without proper authorization from AQI. The courts concerned themselves too with political parties that it believed held objectionable ideologies. Non-Salafist political parties had the potential to rally public opinion and as such had to be monitored by AQI's internal security wing. Not surprisingly, this shari'ah regime resulted in an increase in

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980 Ibid.
981 Ibid.
982 [ Military | 20 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | (S/NE) | ]
983 Ibid.
984 [ Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | (S/NE) | ]
assassinations against the Haditha police force. Twenty-nine officers were killed between September 23 and October 7 even before the declaration of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. All these efforts were intended to set the stage for the creation of a totalitarian Salafist theocracy as soon as the Coalition withdrew from Iraq.

While Iraqis living in the Haditha area were relatively secular and preferred to live under conditions less restrictive than those set up by AQI's shari'ah courts, security remained the most pressing concern for many residents and they were forced to accept, at least passively, any system of government that provided them with some measure of security. At the same time, rather than accept a theocratic police state or face AQI wrath, a number of Haditha area residents left the area for parts of Anbar less affected by AQI's influence.

AQI Endures in Ramadi

It would be a mistake, therefore, to overstate the influence of the Anbar Revolutionaries in Ramadi at this point. While AQI was on the defensive in the city, its fighters were still able to sustain a vicious murder and intimidation campaign as well as checkpoints in the Malaab, Tamim, and Hay al-Dhubat districts. Each checkpoint was manned by twenty AQI fighters armed with AK-47s, RPKs, RPG-7s, pistols, and sniper rifles who regularly targeted Iraqi security forces. Residents from the Tamim district wearing Western-style clothing were increasingly targeted and the more the Anbar Revolutionaries grew, the more AQI beat and kidnap members of the other groups' tribes in the belief that they supported the Coalition.

AQI's amir for the Tamim district was an associate of and former lieutenant colonel who operated in Ramadi under the cover of being a pharmacist. A wealthy man, he helped to finance the construction of the al-Quds Mosque that AQI fighters regularly frequented. In keeping with the collaboration between elements of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, a number of members belonged to both organizations.

On a particular day during Ramadan, which Muslims believe is particularly auspicious, AQI attempted unsuccessfully to carry out major attacks in Ramadi. The sequencing of these attacks illustrated that AQI retained a complex and coordinated command and control infrastructure in the city despite the efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries to assassinate the group's leadership. Every Coalition static position in Ramadi was attacked simultaneously half past each hour between 1330 and 1930.
and 1730. Although firepower defeated the attacks against some positions, AQI fighters continued
the series of attacks until they were killed or ran out of ammunition.991

(S) The AQI fighters were personally commanded by AQI Ramadi ami (b)(6) from
a vehicle with his signature mounted Dimitrov gun. The planning for this attack may have been
organized in the Hay al-Dhubat Thanya district, where safe houses for AQI's foreign fighters, as well
as a VBIED factory, were located on B Street in Al Andalus.992

(S) AQI leader (b)(5) also decided that the time was ripe to move against Sheikh Abdul Sattar.
Despite his public offer for members of the SAA to "repent," by mid-October, (b)(6) had reportedly
made the decision to order the death of Sheikh Abdul Sattar in the belief that this would shatter the
SAA. (b)(5) order to kill Sheikh Abdul Sattar, preferably on Eid al-Fitr (October 26), coincided
with two VBIED attacks south of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's home on October 16 and October 22.993

AQI Recruiting Within Islamic Amirate of Iraq

(S) With the establishment of the Islamic Amirate, AQI intensified its recruiting efforts, including
for the first time background investigations and surveillance of potential members. AQI recruiters
used local markets to scout out young men between the ages of 15-25 who were poor, without
family support, or dissatisfied with their current status in life. Once identified, the recruiters kept an
eye on the potential member to observe their daily habits and routines over a period ranging from
several days to one week. After determining that the potential member was not cooperating with the
Coalition, the AQI recruiter offered them both a salary and the opportunity to become a "true
follower" of Islam.994

(S) Once the recruit agreed to join AQI, the recruiters met with their families, photographed them,
and collected information on their place of employment and the location of any relatives in the city.
This information was used both to locate other potential recruits and to retain control over the
recruits should they be tempted to collaborate with the Coalition. The indoctrination of new recruits
was media-intensive: recruiters provided them with DVDs and newsletters containing footage of
attacks against Coalition forces, alleged abuses carried out by the Coalition or Shi'a, verses from the
Qu'ran, and in some cases Western news articles stating that the Coalition had failed in its mission to
stabilize Iraq.995

Ba'athist Collaboration with AQI

(S) Despite the declaration of the Emirate, which was a clear sign that AQI planned to create a
theocratic state once the Coalition left, collaboration between Ba'athist elements and AQI in Anbar
continued uninterrupted through November. Cooperation was particularly close between AQI and
the Saddam Fedayeen group that operated in Tikrit, Bayji, and Baghdad in addition to Anbar. This

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991 [ | Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | (S/NE) | ]
992 Ibid.
993 [ | Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | (S/NE) | ]
994 [ | Military | 29 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061029 | (S/NE) | ]
995 Ibid.
group of the Saddam Fedayeen was led by (b)(6) who coordinated their activities with other insurgent groups in Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Tikrit, Bayji, Rawah, al-Qaim, and Husaybah.996

(S) were linked to Ba’athist leader Major General Muhammad Jassim Talib al-Zayna (Abu Uthman), a key (b)(6) through former Saddam bodyguard Major General Muhammad had ties to Ba’athist cells in Husaybah, al-Qaim, Rawah, Mosul, and Tal Afar. On August 11, 2006 Major General Muhammad’s (b)(6) attended a meeting with a number of insurgent leaders, sheikhs, and Ba’athists in the village of Owja south of Tikrit to discuss reestablishing Ba’athist cells in Salahaddin province under the leadership of AQI. Because of Saddam Hussein’s ties to Tikrit, there was still some support for Ba’atholicism in Salahaddin, even though formal insurgent structures had collapsed, and Ri jab hoped to recreate these structures through collaboration with AQI.997

(S) As in early 2006, the upper-level coordination between AQI and former Ba’athists led the Saddam Fedayeen in Anbar to align themselves with AQI due to its well-established command structure and large number of followers. This made possible collaboration between former Ba’athists and AQI fighters against the Coalition during the course of Ramadan and into early November 2006 as part of a bid to influence the outcome of the United States congressional elections.998

(S/NF) The remaining Ba’athists were not, however, unified despite efforts to consolidate control over the Party. Since mid-September 2006, a number of the more pragmatic Ba’athists were considering denouncing Saddam Hussein, (b)(6) and continuing resistance to the Coalition. The continuing rivalry between (b)(6) in particular left the Ba’athists considerably weaker and unable to conduct attacks against the Coalition.999

(S) Former regime financiers also continued to assist AQI. Since 2004, Sheikh Abdul Kareem Abdul Razzaq al-Tikriti had financed AQI cells in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad as well as Ba’athist cells in Kirkuk using money obtained from Saddam Hussein’s daughters Rana and Raghad. In addition, Sheikh Razzaq’s financial network acted as a means through which AQI supporters in 1.4b could send money to the organization on a regular basis. While not all this support went to AQI (the 1920 Revolution Brigade in Haditha was also a beneficiary of financiers), the group received more than enough in addition to its already self-sufficient funding to support its operations. Even Saddam Hussein participated in this facilitation process, having his lawyer (b)(6) pass on his orders to surviving senior Ba’athists in Iraq and 1.4b

(S) The collaboration between the Ba’athists and AQI did not result in the latter adopting a better view of the former. On the contrary, AQI documents recovered from a weapons cache in Haqlaniyah by the Coalition listed the Ba’ath Party and Hizb al-Awda in the same category of "Spies

996 [ | Military | 30 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061030 | (S/NE) | ]
997 Ibid.
998 Ibid.
999 Ibid.
1000 [ | Military | 21 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061121 | (S/NE) | ]

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and Traitors" as the Badr Corps and the Da'wa Party. Such cases reflected the fact that foreign and domestic amirs of AQI differed in their view of the usefulness of the Ba'ath Party and Ba'athist groups to the global jihad. Under the new strategy adopted by more local amirs were able to make ideological compromises in order to harness the collective efforts of large numbers of insurgent fighters regardless of their backgrounds, motivations, or ideology. Such a strategy had been recommended to Zarqawi by AQSL Ayman al-Zawahiri as far back as the summer of 2005 (see Chapter 5b).

A.QI Chemical Weapons Efforts

Just at this point, earlier work done by AQI in chemical warfare would begin to bear fruit. On October 21, 2006 AQI incorporated chlorine gas tanks into an SVBIED attack against a police checkpoint in Ramadi, but the chlorine did not cause any casualties. Nine days later, AQI attempted a SVBIED chlorine attack against the Waleed border crossing which also failed. While the failure of the chlorine component of the attack stemmed from the excessive amount of explosives used, improper integration, and the small size of the chlorine cylinder in the VBIED, it represented a new AQI tactic that would later become more common in the beginning of 2007.

The decision to begin using chlorine and other industrial chemicals in AQI bombmaking came about as the result of a letter issued by his subordinates in late September 2006. The letter stated that once AQI members had acquired the necessary industrial chemicals that they were to be sent to Yusufiyah, a town that had long served as a base of operations. Planned to use the industrial chemicals in explosives similar to those used in the 1998 embassy bombings against Kenya and Tanzania.

AQI's quest for chemical weapons was not a new ambition. Former Iraqi chemical weapons engineer was one of the leaders in AQI's chemical weapons efforts. Based in al-Muth Haria, and his associates had long sought to create warheads capable of delivering lethal chemical rounds that would affect the central nervous system, and create skin lesions and burning sensations in the eyes. As with Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh al-Fatihiin, AQI also maintained a crude chemical weapons research and development program. While AQI chemists (like their Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh al-Fatihiin counterparts) successfully created chlorine and mustard gas as well as some nerve agents, their attempts to incorporate these agents into the group's standard munitions all met with failure. The group's chemists simply did not possess the necessary knowledge and technical expertise.

The main technical problem was the ineffectiveness of AQI delivery platforms. The primary methods to deploy chemical agents were direct bulk delivery, such as through crop-dusting aircraft or munitions. While AQAM had earlier planned to use remote-controlled planes to attack American embassies, this method was not duplicated by AQI because of a lack of aircraft and chemicals. Because munitions delivery used only a small quantity of chemical agents and relied on an explosive

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1001 Military | 09 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061109 | (S/NE) | |
1002 Military | 31 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061031 | (S/NE) | |
1003 1.4c, (b)(6) 50 USC § 3507 |
1004 Military | 04 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061204 | (S/NE) | |

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In some cases, AQI used old Iraqi chemical munitions or small quantities of agents procured from corrupt elements in the military for use in IDF and IED attacks. In every case these chemical munitions were so degraded that there were no adverse effects on Coalition forces. AQI also worked to modify existing mortars and rockets to deliver chemical agents, but these improvised munitions were ineffective for a variety of reasons. For instance, the munitions used for delivery were not designed for such purposes and therefore the chemicals used were consumed in the explosion.

The second reason was that AQI had only small quantities of chemical agents with degraded potency. Iraqi chemical munitions produced during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s have been found and sold on the black market since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Most of these rounds recovered by the Coalition contained only trace amounts of the chemicals that they had originally been filled with and even those that remained intact had so degraded that they were a minimal threat even if used properly. In cases where AQI was able to obtain small amounts of chemical agents from corrupt elements of the military, they lacked a reliable platform to employ them effectively.

Finally, the semi-autonomous nature AQI and other insurgent cells left them lacking the necessary expertise to create their own chemical munitions. While AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and Jaysh al-Fatiha all attempted to hire former Iraqi chemical weapons experts, many of these endeavors failed and in some cases the groups appear to have been deliberately scammed. For instance, an individual made his living since 2003 conning insurgent groups into believing that he was an Iraqi chemical weapons scientist only to deliberately fail. As a result of these failings, AQI was unable to produce effective chemical weapons or effective delivery platforms with which to use them.

Many of these problems were overcome in the chlorine bombs used in October. Because chlorine tanks were standard parts of Iraqi water treatment plants with little security, AQI was able to obtain significant quantities of the chemical. The chlorine used in the first SVBIED attack was probably taken from the four chlorine cylinders that AQI operatives stole from the Karkh water treatment plant ten kilometers north of Taji. The mastermind of this theft was a self-employed car salesman who served as the AQI amir of Tarmiyah and had ties to both Baghdad amir Detained in May 2004, was released in June 2006 and resumed his prior position within AQI.

Chlorine gas cylinders could easily be ruptured by explosives, which had the ability to generate a potentially hazardous chemical plume. Despite the lethal nature of chlorine gas, their effectiveness in...
VBIED and SVBIED attacks were highly localized because the potency of the gas depended on its concentration. As a result, anyone close enough to a VBIED or SVBIED to be killed by chlorine gas would probably have already been killed by the initial blast from the explosives payload of the vehicle. In the case of the October bombings, most of the chlorine was consumed by the explosion, severely limiting its effectiveness.  

The Anti-AQI Movement in Late October-November

Iraqi Fatwa Commission

Meanwhile, in an effort to diminish the religious authority of both AQI and AMS, Sunni Endowment director Dr. Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i formed the Iraqi Fatwa Commission (IFC) and solicited the support of thirty Sunni scholars and religious leaders for this effort. These included disaffected members of AMS who were displeased with AMS’s political focus and its constant efforts to criticize the Iraqi government and defend the insurgents. While the IFC was not intended to openly challenge AMS, it was intended to issue fatwas through consensus rather than through the fiat of Harith al-Dhari as often occurred with AMS. At the same time, IFC fulfilled Dr. Ahmad’s long-held desire to form a religious body that would openly counter AQI’s claims to religious authority.

Difficulties in the Anti-AQI Front

Despite the SAA’s efforts to unite and focus insurgent efforts against AQI (as opposed to the Coalition), some subordinate cells of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen disagreed with the very concept of a cease-fire against the Coalition. This independence, as well as the criminal nature of many SAR cells, severely hindered the effectiveness of cease-fire agreements between the Coalition or the Iraqi government and SAR leaders.

attempted to use his control over part of the 1920 Revolution Brigade to convince elements of Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen to agree to a general cessation of attacks against Coalition forces. This cease-fire, known as the Abu Ghraib initiative, did not lead to any measurable decline in attacks. In Saqlawiyah and Ramadi, a few tribal leaders did turn from attacking the Coalition to attack AQI under the name of Jaysh al-Tahrir, posting a hit list of ninety AQI figures it intended to target, but this group seems not to have lasted.

The difficulty in convincing Jaysh al-Fatihin to turn from attacking the Coalition to anti-AQI activity may have been due to the stance of its political leader and Tawafuq Front MP Khalaf Alayan, who was very active within the insurgency. It should be noted that his position on the insurgency was not shared by fellow Tawafuq Front leaders Adnan al-Dulaymi (who supported

1010 Ibid.
1011 [Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | (S/NE) | ]
1012 [Military | 25 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061025 | (S/NE) | ]
1013 [Military | 26 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061026 | (S/NE) | ]
1014 [Military | 30 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061030 | (S/NE) | ]
1015 [Military | 26 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061026 | (S/NE) | ]
political engagement and Prime Minister Maliki's reconciliation plans) or (who was adamantly anti-AQI and supported negotiations between the SARs and the Iraqi government). Of the other Sunni political leaders, Salih al-Mutlaq and Harith al-Dhari also supported Sunni insurgents against the Coalition.1016

(S/NF) To encourage SAR insurgent entry into the political process, Iraqi vice president Tariq Hashimi met with 1920 Revolution Brigade spiritual leader (b(6)) in late October 2006. At the meeting, explained that the 1920 Revolution Brigade had now split between those who accepted his leadership and those who supported Harith al-Dhari and AMS. (6) stated that he wanted to depose Harith al-Dhari as AMS secretary-general with support from IIP or to break with AMS altogether and form a new clerical organization. After this, Harith al-Dhari's followers within 1920 Revolution Brigade accused Tariq Hashimi of betraying the Sunni resistance by meeting with (b(6)). Efforts by and other 1920 Revolution Brigade leaders aside, a significant element of the group now served as the de facto military arm for Harith al-Dhari and his son due to their ability to provide strategic direction to the group.1017

(S) Some tribal leaders who were members of the SAA now began to reconsider their anti-AQI stance. With the establishment of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq and the Central Tribal Council, the AQI leadership in Ramadi began to negotiate a cease-fire with tribes in the SAA, arguing that an AQI victory would pose no threat to the tribal leaders or their authority. By uniting with AQI, the Ramadi tribes could become part of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq once the Coalition had been defeated. This adoption of a more pragmatic view of its opposition by AQI was due to the guidance of AQSL members (b(6)), both of whom relayed orders directly from UBL for the AQI leadership to begin brokering deals with tribal leaders.1018

(S) In an effort to blunt an anti-AQI effort like the SAA from being established in the Haditha area, AQI stepped up its murder and intimidation campaign against residents in general and the Jughayfi tribe in particular. The Haditha area was regarded by the AQI leadership as important to their operations because it served as a key line of communication between the group's networks in Ramadi, Bayji, Mosul, and Kirkuk.1019

Cooperation between the Iraqi government and the SAA

(S/NF) Despite these setbacks, the SAA saw some significant successes in late October and November. Because of smooth cooperation between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the Iraqi national government, the Front was able to legitimize its activities against AQI. Ever since his initial Baghdad meeting with Prime Minister Maliki, Sheikh Abdul Sattar had cultivated ties with Minister of State for National Security Sirwan al-Waili (a Shi'a Da'wa member) and deputy parliament speaker Khalid Attiya (a Shi'a independent). He had made a case that Governor Mamoun had failed to adequately fight AQI in Anbar, and provided evidence of the SAA's popular support to both Khalid Attiya and

1016 [Military] 08 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061108 | (S/NF) |
1017 [Military] 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | (S/NF) |
1018 [Military] 25 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061025 | (S/NF) |
1019 [Military] 26 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061026 | (S/NF) |
Prime Minister Maliki. By late September 2006, interior ministry Major General Rashid Fulayyih told the press that “If the chieftains and the people of al-Anbar ask for the help of the national police, then we are ready to be the first to offer it after an official decision is issued by the prime minister. The national police will be at the disposal of al-Anbar’s people.”1020

(S/NF) In mid-October, Anbar interior ministry representative Major General Ahmad al-Jaburi wrote a letter approved by interior minister Jawad al-Bolani that gave Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the SAA significant control over provincial security, appointing Sheikh Abdul Sattar as counterterrorism director for Anbar and Sheikh Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa as provincial police chief. On October 17, Sheikh Abdul Sattar stated on al-Iraqiya TV that he had received a pledge of 200-300 volunteers to fight AQI from every member tribe in the SAA, volunteers that would be paid by the interior ministry.1021

(S/NF) The Tawafuq Front that was the bulk of Anbar’s Sunni political establishment, by contrast, opposed the SAA at nearly every turn, as did members of the Anbar Central Council. This opposition was headed by Iraqi vice president Tariq Hashimi (the IIP leader who feared the rise of the SAA as a political force) and Khalaf Alayan, who accused Sheikh Abdul Sattar of fomenting sedition.1022

1020 [ | Military | 29 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061029 | (S/NF) | ]
1021 Ibid.
1022 Ibid.
Cooperation between SAA and 1920 Revolution Brigade

[S/NF] also attempted to support the efforts of the SAA, directing his loyalists within 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah to collect intelligence on AQI operatives that could be relayed to the SAA. [b(6)] and Sheikh Abdul Sattar now spoke on the phone several times a week. [b(6)] hoped that his cooperation with the SAA would allow him to gain amnesty for his followers and legitimacy within Coalition and Iraqi government circles. Because of the splintering of 1920 Revolution Brigade due to AQI defections, internal divisions, and most recently a schism between spiritual leaders [b(6)] had little influence over the group’s activities outside of Ramadi. Thus [b(6)] used his influence with 1920 Revolution Brigade members in Fallujah to persuade them to join forces with local tribes and Jaysh al-Fatihi fighters against AQI, but could not deter them from continuing attacks against the Coalition.

[S/NF] While the leadership of the SAR insurgent groups detested AQI, each group had different goals, methodologies, and patrons from the street level to the senior leadership. As a result, funding and weapons from AQI often outweighed the intangible benefits of unity against them, preventing a consensus from emerging among the remaining SAR groups. Even so, many SARs opted to join the SAA as well as the legitimate Iraqi army and police forces. Sheikh Abdul Sattar hoped to use [b(6)] influence to strengthen his position to convince other SAR leaders and more importantly their street level fighters to join the Iraqi security forces.

[S/NF] At the end of October, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the SAA leadership reached an agreement with [b(6)] SAR allies not to detain or attack SAR insurgents as long as they did not carry out any attacks against Iraqi police, Iraqi army soldiers, or Iraqi civilians. This understanding was formalized at a meeting in the Jazira, in which Sheikh Abdul Sattar agreed to help a number of SAR insurgent leaders secure the release of those members of their groups who had in the past targeted Coalition, but not Iraqi forces. Before the release occurred, SAR fighters had to agree to join the "honorable insurgency" of the SAA and help it to defeat the "outsiders" and "Takfiris." This was in keeping with SAA rhetoric, which held that members of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Harakat al-Islamiyah, and Jaysh al-Fatihi could only be forgiven for their past actions by renouncing their former activities and joining the SAA. The actual release was secured by [b(6)] an Iraqi police chief in the Ramadi area loyal to the SAA and Sheikh Abdul Sattar.

The SAA’s Strike Force

[S/NF] Sheikh Abdul Sattar and provincial chief General Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa now began planning a police strike force designed to target AQI. The proposed force would consist of three battalions (a total of 750 police) commanded by [b(6)] (Ramadi proper), [b(6)] (the Shamiyah area between the 5 Kilo district of Ramadi and Hit), and [b(6)] (the Habbaniyah area between Ramadi and Fallujah). The headquarters of the force would be Camp Ramadi and General Hamid planned to conduct anti-AQI operations in
concert with the 7th Brigade of the Iraqi Army that was also located at the camp. Cooperation between the police battalions and the 7th Iraqi Army Division was welcomed by the unit's commander Major General Murthi Mushin Rafa Farhan, who had attended Sheikh Abdul Sattar's first meeting with Governor Mamoun and been cultivated by him as an ally ever since. Through Major General Murthi, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was also able to gain some support from former Anbar governor Faisal al-Gaoud, who was now a member of SAA. \textsuperscript{1027}

\textbf{(S/NE)} Iraqi defense minister Abdul Qadir al-Mufraji strongly supported the establishment of a positive relationship between the Iraqi army and the SAA, ordering the 1st and 7th Iraqi army divisions to provide support to Sheikh Abdul Sattar if he requested it. This led to meetings between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the defense minister in which Sheikh Abdul Sattar agreed to help recruit 2,000 Sunni troops for the Iraqi army.\textsuperscript{1028}

\textbf{(S/NE)} Sheikh Abdul Sattar scheduled a meeting with Prime Minister al-Maliki and interior minister Jawad al-Bolani to obtain approval for his proposed strike force. During a preliminary meeting, interior minister al-Bolani assured Sheikh Abdul Sattar and General Hamid that they had his full support so long as the Iraqi government approved of their activities and gave Sheikh Abdul Sattar a letter of appointment as counterterrorism director for Anbar. As for Sheikh Abdul Sattar, he was determined to work within the auspices of the Iraqi government rather than implementing his ideas on his own authority.\textsuperscript{1029}

\textbf{(S/NE)} On October 30, Prime Minister Maliki met with representatives of the SAA including Sheikh Abdul Sattar to discuss equipping battalions. During the meeting, Sheikh Abdul Sattar stated candidly that he was not receiving support from the Iraqi government due to the destruction of government administration at the local level by AQI, the ineffectiveness of the provincial government, AQI's creation of the Central Tribal Council that enabled the group to infiltrate the Anbari tribal system and further entrenched the group within the province, and Baghdad's current distrust of Anbar. While the leadership of the SAA preferred to receive government support and manage their own anti-AQI campaign, they were also willing to accept the presence of an interior ministry advisory committee mandated by Prime Minister Maliki.\textsuperscript{1030} In late 2006, recognizing the value of these anti-AQI forces, al-Maliki gave the Iraqi army approval to provide weapons directly to the SAA.

\textbf{(S/NE)} Even before this approval, General Hamid had recruited the 750 men for the battalions, as well as 2,000 more volunteers. Hamid's recruits were drawn from the ranks of former Iraqi soldiers who required little training. For instance, \textsuperscript{(b)(6)} had held a similar military post pre-OIF. Pending Iraqi government approval, the battalions were dispersed to various police stations throughout Ramadi, though they were answerable only to their battalion commanders and not local police commanders. While legally the highest-ranking police official in Anbar, as a member...
of the SAA and the leader of the Anbar Revolutionaries, General Hamid was Sheikh Abdul Sattar's de facto top lieutenant.\(^{1031}\)

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\item (S/NE) Despite initial skepticism from some observers, Sheikh Abdul Sattar demonstrated that he was an adept decision-maker who had successfully consolidated his leadership of the SAA. With the support of key allies in the provincial government, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was also able to improve his relationship with Governor Mamoun. Sheikh Abdul Sattar managed, for instance, to persuade Governor Mamoun to name SAA leader Sheikh Wisam Hardan Albu Issa as his special assistant for customs and border affairs. A working relationship between the SAA and the provincial government now replaced their earlier rivalries and as a result the Iraqi government essentially placed Anbar's entire police establishment in Sheikh Abdul Sattar's hands. With the continued targeting of AQI by the Anbar Revolutionaries, this trust began to pay off for both the SAA and the Iraqi government. By respecting the rule of law, the SAA had, with the full support of the Iraqi government, gained political power and increased confidence to challenge AQI.\(^{1032}\)
\item (S/NE) Just as importantly, the sheikhs and tribes that had joined the SAA continued to demonstrate a publicly united front against AQI. While there were huge divisions within the Anbar Central Council, INDF, and the Iraqi government itself, no such divisions existed between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his subordinates in the SAA. This was due in part to the ever-present threat posed by the prospect of AQI retaliation, but was also due to Sheikh Abdul Sattar willingness to share both power and the spotlight with his lieutenants.\(^{1033}\)
\item (S) The power of the growing anti-AQI sentiment in Anbar was demonstrated in early November 2006. AQI leader \(\text{(b)(6)}\) was forced to abandon the Iraqi border area near Ar Rabbit after being threatened by residents who informed him that they would no longer permit him to move foreign fighters through their area. \(\text{(b)(6)}\) was forced to shift his activities north toward the border crossing at Rabiayah northwest of Mosul. \(\text{(b)(6)}\) was also under suspicion within AQI for having embezzled $35,000,000 during his tenure as the group's logistics amir, yet he remained active in al-Qaim, hoping perhaps to regain the confidence of the AQI leadership by restoring its pre-2006 access to the al-Qaim border region.\(^{1034}\)
\item (S) The Coalition in turn struck a major blow against AQI on October 30 with the capture of Mullah Humaydi, the former mayor of Haditha who served as "war counsel" to both Zarqawi and \(\text{(b)(6)}\) advised the AQI shura majlis on all operations that occurred in Anbar, and was considered fourth-in-command for AQI. Mullah Humaydi's network was responsible for much of the foreign fighter and weapons smuggling between al-Qaim, Kirkuk, and Mosul. As the architect of AQI's strategy to
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\item 1031 [ | Military | 28 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061028 | (S/NE) | ]
\item 1032 Ibid.
\item 1033 Ibid.
\item 1034 [ | Military | 14 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061114 | (S/NE) | ]
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win popular support in Anbar, his capture at a time when the group was seeking to regain ground against the SAA was a major success.  

On November 1, the Coalition also killed AQI leader Rafa Abd al-Salam (Abu Salih, Abu Taha) with a Hellfire missile. Rafa was a notorious AQI leader whose network spanned from Ramadi to Khalidiyah. The former second-in-command for AQI Ramadi amir Methat Ibrahim Hussein al-Fahdawi (Abu Mustafa), Rafa had succeeded his uncle after he was captured by the Coalition in June 2006 (see Chapter 6b) and was named amir of Ramadi by the Mujahideen Shura Council. Since then, he had coordinated AQI activities throughout the Ramadi area alongside  

Dissension within AQI Grows  

By October 2006, there was growing dissension among some of AQI’s Iraqi leaders over the large number of senior commanders who had been killed or detained since had assumed command. The dissension was probably driven in part by followers of Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, who believed that he rather than should have been given command of AQI (see Chapter 6b). These Iraqi AQI leaders disliked strict style of discipline and believed that he was out of touch with the needs of their fighters. meanwhile took a dim view of Iraqi nationalist jihadists, regarding them as little better than Ba’athists and sought to indoctrinate recruits with AQI’s global jihadist ideology. This dislike of by some Iraqi leaders was also caused by his close ties with AQSL that resulted in a number of senior leadership posts in AQI belonging to foreign fighters even though Iraqis were given positions of power in the Mujahideen Shura Council and the Islamic Amirate.  

Dissent was also driven in part by the evolving situation on the ground in Anbar and other parts of Iraq. The sectarian violence so desired by Zarqawi had plunged the Sunni inhabitants of Baghdad into an existential struggle for survival against Shi’a militias, making AQI’s agenda for global jihad and restoration of the caliphate irrelevant to many Iraqi Sunnis in comparison with the need for day-to-day security. The relationship between AQI and its former SAR allies remained fluid, with rifts between the two now a common phenomenon in Anbar and other Sunni areas of Iraq. As far as the dissenters within the AQI leadership were concerned, there was now an increasing grassroots Sunni opposition to overcome in addition to their daily combat against the Coalition and Shi’a militias. As a result of the establishment of the SAA, AQI was on the defensive in Ramadi, a situation that some AQI leaders believed would never have occurred under Zarqawi.  

The death or detention of numerous senior AQI leaders by the Coalition, these AQI dissenters believed, meant that even though the group still had more than enough fighters, it lacked clear direction for near-term operations. The removal of mid-level AQI leaders such as also could not be easily offset. They were often replaced with  

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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff  
Declassified on: 201506  
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leaders who were less experienced, did not enjoy the same level of acceptance from other AQI members, and did have the same financial connections as their predecessors.\textsuperscript{1039}

$(S)$ To compensate for these losses, \textsuperscript{(b)(6)} reached out to former Ba'athist leaders and placed them in positions of regional authority within AQI. While this decision seemed a reasonable solution to a leadership problem, it created serious dissent within the group. The Ba'athists had strong ties only to the al-Qaim and Haditha areas of Anbar, and most of their support was concentrated in Tikrit, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Bayji. In an effort to closer ally the Ba'athists with AQI, \textsuperscript{1.4b} held meetings in Haditha to develop a strategic partnership with both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna.\textsuperscript{1040} In response, \textsuperscript{b}(6) shifted some of the group's command and control functions towards Tikrit rather than Ramadi. As part of this shift in AQI command and control, Saqlawiyah-based \textsuperscript{1.4b} was sent to Salahaddin province to assume command of AQI operations.\textsuperscript{1041}

$(S)$ The continued reliance of AQI local cells on brutality to extract the necessary funding for their operations in Anbar, created its own set of problems, by fueling anti-AQI sentiment in the province. This resentment in turn helped the Anbar Revolutionaries to grow from their center of operations in Ramadi to Saqlawiyah and even as far west as Rutbah. Often, AQI reprisal attacks such as the killing of twenty-nine members of the Haditha police force only stiffened the resolve of their targets, in this case, resulting in the capture of \textsuperscript{(b)(6)}

$(S/REL TO USA AUS GBR CAN)$ In an effort to provide a greater degree of strategic direction to his followers, in late November 2006 \textsuperscript{(b)(6)} reportedly delivered a major policy speech to AQI leaders at the al-Risala Mosque in the Albu Fahd tribal area. During the speech, \textsuperscript{b}(6) declared Ramadi a "city of jihad" similar to Kirkuk, Mosul, Samarra, and Baghdad and stated that all Islam would be in jeopardy and the Arab nation weakened if the Coalition and the current Iraqi government defeated AQI. In response, \textsuperscript{b}(6) announced the formation of a ministry of war and a ministry of information for the Islamic Amirate of Iraq to oversee more coherent policies for the new state.\textsuperscript{1042}

$(S/NE)$ \textsuperscript{(b)(6)} also attempted to build popular support, but the loss of \textsuperscript{(b)(6)} meant that the effort was clumsy and often contradictory, and had little chance of winning over large numbers of Anbaris to the cause of global jihad. Even as AQI leaders marked down fuel prices for supporters or forced taxi drivers to give cheap rides to the poor, its fighters pillaged medical supplies, intimidated hospital employees, closed down local schools, and beheaded suspected collaborators in the street. \textsuperscript{b}(6) also had to mount an aggressive military response to the SAA or risk being severely degraded by the Ramadi area tribes. As a result, many Anbaris were not swayed by AQI's new "hearts and minds" campaign, though they were willing to exploit it when it suited them to do so.\textsuperscript{1043}

### Tribal and Governmental Anti-AQI Efforts

\textsuperscript{1039} Military | 10 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061110 | $(S/NE)$ | 
\textsuperscript{1040} Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | $(S/NE)$ | 
\textsuperscript{1041} Military | 10 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061110 | $(S/NE)$ | 
\textsuperscript{1042} $(1.4c, (b)(3))$ 50 USC § 3507 | 20061124 | $(S/NE)$ | 
\textsuperscript{1043} Military | 12 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061112 | $(S/NE)$ |
Albu Issa vs. Albu Alwan, Round 1

(S) A sudden flaring of tribal warfare in November shows the difficulties faced when attempting to win over Anbaris to his cause. Following the murder of Ramadi police captain Jabr Albu Alwan by AQI, the Albu Alwan tribal leadership requested permission to join the SAA to exercise *tha'r*. As a result, factions and subtribes within the Albu Issa loyal to AQI and their Islamic Amirate of Iraq began setting up checkpoints in an effort to kill any Albu Alwan tribesmen who were members of the IIP. The pro-AQI Albu Issa tribesmen also planned to use car bombs to destroy the Usama bin Zayd Mosque that served as the primary mosque for the Albu Alwan tribal area.1044

(S) Fighting now broke out in Ramadi between AQI and the Albu Alwan tribe, which was supported by fifty fighters drawn from the ranks of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Fathin, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen. The center of the fighting was in the Albu Alwan tribal areas and the Tamim district of Ramadi. While the Albu Alwan as a whole remained ambivalent towards the Coalition, the threat against their tribe by AQI and their Albu Issa allies forced them to begin conducting patrols and preventing AQI fighters from entering their territory. Another reason for the Albu Alwan's shift against AQI was Sheikh Abdul Sattar's efforts to have Sa'ad al-Alwani appointed as mayor of Ramadi. As a result, the Albu Alwan tribe, which had resisted the efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries in the past, became openly anti-AQI.1045

(S) The Albu Alwan tribal leader Sheikh Hamid Rashid, who resided in Amman for fear of AQI, was himself a member of the SAA and supported this shift in the tribe's opinion. On November 12, Albu Alwan tribal leaders opened the al-Warrar police station in the Thaylat district of Ramadi with Coalition assistance. Backed by Sheikh Abdul Sattar, the Albu Alwan were now determined to evict AQI fighters from their area.1046

(S) The primary architect of the AQI campaign against the Albu Alwan was Arkan Fayyad Muslih, the leader of an AQI IED cell that operated in the Halabsa tribal area with the support of pro-AQI members of the Albu Issa tribe. These pro-AQI Albu Issa tribesmen told Arkan which areas he was allowed to carry out attacks, acting as an intermediary between the tribe and AQI fighters operating in East al-Nasaf and Amariyah. Arkan's efforts were financed by Shakir Ahmed Mujbal, who stole cars from the Saqlawiyah area and resold them in Baghdad.1047

The Albu Issa Rapprochement

(S) While their involvement in this tribal feud might seem to seal the Albu Issa as firmly pro-AQI, nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact the tribe was still divided between pro- and anti-AQI factions, some of which were still fighting each other. When the Albu Alwan joined the SAA, the pro-AQI Fuhaylat subtribe of the Albu Issa, fearful of coming under attack by the combined

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1044 | [Military] 07 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061107 | (S/NE) |
1045 | [Military] 08 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061108 | (S/NE) |
1046 | [Military] 14 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061114 | (S/NE) |
1047 | [Military] 12 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061112 | (S/NE) |
tribes of the SAA, agreed to pay 280,000,000 Iraqi dinars ($186,000) in blood money to the rest of their tribe as restitution for the killing of sixteen Iraqi police officers in Amariyah and Ferris Town.\textsuperscript{1048}

(S) The rapproachment among the Albu Issa subtribes enhanced the security of the beleaguered Iraqi police in Amariyah and Ferris Town as well as ending the fighting between the pro-AQI Fuhaylat and the anti-AQI Manasir and Albu Hadir in Amariyah. Because the Coalition had such a limited presence in the region, the sheikhs that had stood up to AQI were at a severe risk of succumbing to the group's pressure when the rapproachment occurred. Even so, the involvement of Albu Issa tribesmen in AQI's attack on the Albu Alwan made it very difficult for the tribe to join the anti-AQI alliance.\textsuperscript{1049}

Unified Efforts to Establish Security in Anbar

(S) In early November, the burgeoning cooperation between SAA and the Iraqi government began to pay off. Anbar interior ministry deputy commander General Ahmad Muhammad Khalaf al-Jaburi directed the Iraqi police to enter Ramadi under the command of General Hamid and begin arresting AQI fighters with support from Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the 7th Brigade of the Iraqi army. These efforts to establish security were supported by residents who regarded the Iraqi police as a legitimate institution and were eager to be free of AQI's murder, intimidation, and criminal campaigns.\textsuperscript{1050}

(S/NF) As part of the plan to establish security in Ramadi, the Coalition instituted a new detainee release procedure. In the past detainees from Ramadi had been released and left to find their own ways home. Now detainees were taken from the detention facilities to police stations closest to their tribal areas. At the police stations, they were met by tribal leaders who told them that the situation in Ramadi has now changed and that those who supported AQI were no longer welcome in the province. A handful of the detainees were also brought before Sheikh Abdul Sattar or his brother Sheikh Ahmed to demonstrate their goodwill toward former AQI members who agreed to join the SAA.\textsuperscript{1051}

(S) The Coalition meanwhile captured several major AQI figures. In a raid on the Iraqi Ministry of Health in Ramadi, who was seized while trying to flee the scene of the raid with money and documents, had been the head of the Facilities Protection Service in Anbar and misused his position to funnel money to AQI.\textsuperscript{1052} On November 22, Coalition forces captured AQI amir Sharuk Marfua Abdallah (Muhammad Mahmud) in Rawah. Sharuk, who had worked for AQI at least as far back as November 2004, had been involved in the
group's vehicle theft, murder, IED, and VBIED activities in western Anbar alongside Anwar Araq.1053

While it would be a mistake to state that AQI's position was diminished in Ramadi at this stage, the group's freedom of movement had been reduced. Outside the Qatana district, the establishment of the 17th Street security station prevented fighters from moving freely in that district. Aggressive operations by the Coalition, Iraqi police, and the Anbar Revolutionaries continued to attrite the group's leaders and fighters in the city, while the discovery of the group's weapons caches at Anbar University and the Jazira hindered AQI's ability to reconstitute its operations. The Albu Alwan and Albu Soda were now openly anti-AQI, and both tribes conducted patrols and worked with the Coalition to prevent AQI from entering their territory. On November 16, the Coalition and Iraqi police carried out Operation TINIAN, which removed AQI's command and control node at the Women and Children's Hospital.1054

Sheikh Abdul Sattar's biggest success in expanding the SAA came after a November 2006 meeting in which the leaders of the Albu Anah, Albu Assaf, Albu Julib, Albu Dhiab, Albu Issa, Albu Janab, Albu Jabur, Albu Jughayf, Albu Mahal, Albu Nimm, and Albu Risha signed an agreement to cooperate with the SAA against AQI. At a meeting in Jubbah soon afterwards, they were joined by elements of several other western tribes. These tribes spanned Anbar and the SAA could no longer be dismissed as just a Ramadi organization.1055

Developments within AQI's Rivals

The Crisis within Jaysh al-Fatihin

Efforts to establish security in Ramadi degraded groups other than AQI. By mid-November 2006, increased Iraqi police presence that targeted the group's leaders and fighters forced Jaysh al-Fatihin to cease operations in Zangora. Because Zangora was a stronghold of the Albu Risha tribe and the home of SAA leader Sheikh Abdul Sattar, Jaysh al-Fatihin could not replenish its losses through recruitment for fear of infiltration. Still the largest SAR group in Iraq, Jaysh al-Fatihin maintained a presence in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and many of the population centers along the Tigris-Euphrates rivers. However, because the group's decentralized command structure put heavy emphasis on regional amirs to conduct operations, individual cells were forced to rely on kidnappings, donations, and criminal activity to generate funding. In Anbar, this meant using the group's control of the inactive al-Naf gas station in the Jazira area to regulate the amount of fuel that residents received and charging exorbitant amounts for gas. Armed with sticks rather than guns, Jaysh al-Fatihin fighters beat residents and damaged their vehicles if they refused to comply with their demands.1056

According to preliminary Coalition studies, Jaysh al-Fatihin in Anbar carried out 0.4% of the VBIED attacks, 7% of the IED attacks, 14% of the IDF attacks, and 14% of the sniping attacks.

Footnotes:
1053 [Military | 22 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061122 | (S/NE) | ]
1054 [Military | 21 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061121 | (S/NE) | ]
1055 Ibid.
1056 [Military | 16 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061116 | (S/NE) | ]
placing its role within the Ramadi insurgency in its proper proportions. In general, Jaysh al-Fatihin leaders refused to carry out VBIED attacks to avoid high levels of Iraqi civilian casualties. On a national level, the group was also responsible for producing the infamous "Juba, Sniper of Baghdad" video that inflated the sniper threat and created a fictitious "superhero" for their supporters.\(^{1057}\)

\(\text{S/NF}\) Since at least 2004, Jaysh al-Fatihin (then Islamic Army of Iraq) had been led nationally at the operational level by the Abu Khadijah al-Janabi with Tawafuq Front MP Khalaf Alayan its political leader. While Abu Khadijah was able to solicit some funding for the group from Saudi and donors, he had little control over the daily operations of the group and, like Khalaf Alayan, opposed cooperation with the Coalition.\(^{1058}\)

\(\text{S/NF}\) By contrast, Jaysh al-Fatihin security chief for Anbar favored a ceasefire with the Coalition, having met with Iraqi vice president Tariq Hashimi in Baghdad on several occasions in late October 2006 to discuss a ceasefire arrangement. Though annoyed over Hashimi's disclosure of the plan to the media, broached the idea to Ansar al-Sunna political chief Muhammad Hussein al-Jaburi, giving him a copy of Hashimi's proposed ceasefire plan. Despite willingness to "sell" Hashimi's cease-fire plan to various leaders of Ansar al-Sunna, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Abu Khadijah had the final say on whether such a cease-fire would be implemented.\(^{1059}\)

\(\text{S/NF}\) These efforts by would bring about no change in attacks. While claimed that this was due to AQI perfidy, the truth was that the ceasefire was not honored by senior leaders of Jaysh al-Fatihin including the group's de facto commander-in-chief Baghdad military amir.\(^{1060}\)

\(\text{S/NF}\) Despite the group's animosity towards AQI, was in fact virtually alone among the Jaysh al-Fatihin leadership in supporting collaboration with the Coalition. This is not to say that the group did not cooperate with other insurgents. In September 2006, for instance, Jaysh al-Fatihin supported 1920 Revolution Brigade against AQI following the latter group's assassination of General Khalil Muhammad Abed al-Fahdawi, one of the top Jaysh al-Fatihin leaders in Anbar. Interestingly, propaganda distributed by the Anbar Revolutionaries in Khalidiyah in October extolled General Khalil as a martyr. of Jaysh al-Fatihin political leader Khalaf Alayan and the group's military chief in Anbar, refused, however, to cooperate with the Coalition despite his father's public support for national reconciliation.\(^{1061}\)

\(\text{S}\) The alliance with 1920 Revolution Brigade shows that the decentralized structure of Jaysh al-Fatihin, and the autonomous nature of local leaders, enabled the group to shift rapidly between alliances with other insurgent groups at the local level. While this cooperation was taking place, limited cooperation between Jaysh al-Fatihin and AQI also occurred on a local level in Ramadi due to the personal relationships between the local leaders of both organizations. It is worth recalling

\(^{1057}\) [Military 19 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM 20061119 (S/NF) ]
\(^{1058}\) Ibid.
\(^{1059}\) Ibid.
\(^{1060}\) Ibid.
\(^{1061}\) Ibid.
that many local AQI leaders in Ramadi were themselves former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq that had joined AQI (see Chapter 6a) and thus retained their personal ties to their former comrades. Although the Jaysh al-Fatihin national leadership identified AQI as their primary threat, many local cells in Anbar were unable to resist AQI's influence. Such cells continued to carry out attacks against the Coalition as their raison d'être, often with support from their counterparts in AQI.1062

(S) Meanwhile, Jaysh al-Fatihin found itself cut out of major sources of funding by AQI's dominance of Anbar's black market fuel smuggling and heavy involvement in kidnapping rackets. This forced many Jaysh al-Fatihin cells to become dependent on AQI for funding, which, combined with AQI's recruitment of detained Jaysh al-Fatihin fighters at Coalition facilities, enabled AQI to build up its own operational capabilities at Jaysh al-Fatihin's expense by siphoning away its most experienced operatives. Despite propaganda claims that Jaysh al-Fatihin numbered between 6-46,000 members, as of late 2005 the group's size had in fact numbered closer to 1,050 core members in contrast to Ansar al-Sunna with 2,950 core members and AQI with 5,495 core members. This gave the group a robust capability to conduct IED, SAF, and IDF attacks against Coalition forces, but also meant that it was only one fifth the size of AQI.1063

(S) As a result, Jaysh al-Fatihin cell leaders in Anbar were unable to follow the directives of their central leadership absent a substantial amount of support for fear that their fighters would defect en masse and join AQI. This situation, along with successful targeting by the Coalition and Iraqi security forces, led to the organization's slow decline in Ramadi, making the group unable to operate without substantial support from AQI. Recognizing this situation, the national leadership of Jaysh al-Fatihin began reducing its efforts in Anbar to refocus on Samarra, Tikrit, and Mosul.1064

(S) This shift was due in part to the fact that Jaysh al-Fatihin was the strongest in Baghdad, North Babil, Mosul, Samarra, and Tikrit, with its presence in Anbar mostly focused in Ramadi. While Jaysh al-Fatihin did operate in Abu Ghraib, its presence in Fallujah, Amariyah, and Karmah was minimal and the group's number of actual operatives in eastern Anbar was small. Jaysh al-Fatihin cells also existed in Haditha, al-Qaim, and Rutbah, though many of these were of questionable loyalty since many of the Islamic Army of Iraq cells had agreed to cooperate with AQI under the banner of the Jihad Platoons of Anbar (see Chapter 6a) without actually joining the former organization.1065

1062 | Military | 16 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061116 | (S/NE) |
1063 | Military | 19 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061119 | (S/NE) |
1064 | Military | 16 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061116 | (S/NE) |
1065 | Military | 19 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061119 | (S/NE) |

For instance, AQI associate group leader Akram Mahmud Rashid (Abu Muhammad) of the Abu Sarah Group claimed during interrogation that his loyalties were to Islamic Army of Iraq rather than AQI.
The Crisis within Jaysh Muhammad

(S/NE) Jaysh Muhammad, meanwhile, had reached its operational zenith in 2004 and ever since the conclusion of Operation AL FAJR and the January 2005 Iraqi elections the group had dwindled substantially as many of its leaders were killed or captured and its rank-and-file members defected to join other, more powerful insurgent groups. As a result, by November 2006 the activities of Jaysh Muhammad in Anbar were largely restricted to the Fallujah area, with only sporadic actions in the western cities of the province. While some of the Jaysh Muhammad national leadership remained loyal to the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, mid and low-level leaders did not adhere to Ba'athist ideology and cooperated with a number of groups opposed to Ba'athism, including AQI.1066

(S/NE) The continued survival of Jaysh Muhammad can largely be attributed to the continued patronage of Saddam Hussein’s eldest daughter Raghad, who was a financial facilitator for the surviving Ba'athists due to her access to between $19,000,000 and $17,000,000,000 in former regime funding. Using family lawyers and shuttling between [1.4b] Raghad was able to distribute money to former Ba'athist leaders such as [b(6)] As a result, while Saddam Hussein was still regarded as the titular head of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party by his much-reduced followers, their financial backbone lay with Raghad just as their ideological direction lay with [b(6)] and his clique. Interestingly, Raghad refused to mediate between [b(6)] instead providing support to both in the hope that one or the other would succeed. Support for Ba'athism, however, had already deeply declined across Iraq by early 2006 and even in Tikrit there was no popular desire for a restoration of Ba'athist rule.1067

The Evolution of Jaysh al-Mujahideen

(S) Jaysh al-Mujahideen was undergoing a similar evolution. Originally formed as a consolidation of the smaller Fallujah SRE groups by Sheikh Abdullah Janabi in response to Operation AL FAJR, Jaysh al-Mujahideen’s ranks included both Iraqis and foreign fighters dedicated to the goal of expelling the Coalition from Iraq and establishing a Sunni-dominated state ruled by shari’ah law. Allied with both Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh al-Fatihin, the group had been led [b(6)] until his capture in 2005 (though Sheikh Abdullah Janabi remained the group’s ideological and spiritual leader) at which point he was succeeded by [b(6)] Jaysh al-Mujahideen's former political chief and a member of AMS. The group was divided into regional commands encompassing Baghdad, Mosul, Bayji, and Anbar with Hajji Abu Khalid serving as the group's top leader in Anbar. Despite the strong ties between Jaysh al-Mujahideen's spiritual leader Sheikh Abdullah Janabi and AQI, Abu Sayf believed that AQI’s actions were counter-productive to the insurgency and supported the consolidation of SAR insurgent groups against them.1068

1066 [Military | 23 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061123 | (S/NE) | ]
1067 Ibid.
1068 [Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | (S/NE) | ]
Ba’athist Efforts to Reconstitute

In the meantime, the Iraqi Ba’athists continued their efforts to regroup. By early October 2006, Ba’athist leader had reestablished the General Security Directorate (GSD, one of many Ba’athist security services aimed at rooting out internal dissent) under General Sadun Sabri Jamal, appointing the brother of insurgent financier as their new leader. The goal of the new GSD was to extend its influence throughout Iraq in order to bring about the resurgence of the Ba’ath Party. Towards that end, General Sadun invited a number of former GSD officers to Aleppo to persuade them to join his restored organization.\(^{1069}\)

The location of the revived was due to the former city’s appeal to SREs. Since at least the middle of 2005, Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi had lived in the area and with a large pool of Iraqi expatriates already living in the city, the Ba’athists evidently believed (incorrectly) that they could exploit the expatriates in order to quickly raise manpower or money.\(^{1070}\)

In an effort to regain their momentum, former Iraqi Ba’athist leaders held meetings with SAR insurgent commanders in Amman and at the Dead Sea Resort to merge the shattered SAR insurgent cells into a single organization. These same Ba’athist leaders believed that only by creating a single organization could they successfully negotiate with the Coalition in order to reestablish the Ba’ath Party in Iraq. These meetings may have been organized by Saddam Hussein by proxy in the hopes of reestablishing Ba’athist influence inside Iraq.\(^{1071}\)

Ba’athist discussion of possible cooperation with the Coalition was largely a reaction to the rise of anti-AQI sentiment in Anbar and no realistic effort to enact such cooperation ever occurred. Instead, the Ba’athists believed that they could persuade the Coalition to reestablish Ba’athist rule in Iraq. In any event, the Ba’athists continued to lose their ability to control SAR insurgent organizations and therefore their plan was doomed to failure.\(^{1072}\)

By mid-November 2006, a number of Ba’athist leaders including Ba’ath Party External Political Affairs chief Manah Abd al-Rashid (former IIS director), former IIS officer and Ba’athist leaders were willing to negotiate with the United States in order to facilitate their entry into Iraqi politics. While this represented a change in Ba’athist views, it was based around delusional belief that the declining security situation in Iraq would pave the way for the restoration of Ba’athist rule in Iraq once the Coalition departed. While second-in-command, whether or not this statement was true was irrelevant since his intentions were disingenuous and the Ba’athist leadership continued in its fruitless attempts to carry out independent attacks inside Iraq with the goal of restoring themselves to power. The latest of these plots involved an elaborate plan by...\(^{1073}\)

\(^{1069}\) [Military | 31 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061031 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{1070}\) Ibid.
\(^{1071}\) [Military | 26 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061126 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{1072}\) Ibid.

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to instigate civil strife in Mosul, Tikrit, Baquba, Ramadi, and Karbala in December 2006. Even if offer of negotiation was genuine, his conditions for them were the same as those of September 2006 demands that the Coalition end all counter-insurgency operations, release all detainees, reestablish the Saddam-era security services, recognize the Sunni insurgency as the sole legitimate political authority in Iraq, and withdraw from Iraq completely.\textsuperscript{1073}

\textit{(S/NE)} It should be noted that despite frequent populist anti-government diatribes to the Arab satellite media, most of the Sunni political establishment had little love for the institutional leadership of the Ba’ath Party, since most of them were either exiles or out of favor during the rule of Saddam Hussein. Fallujah-born Tawafuq Front leader lived in exile from 1994-2003, parliament speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani was arrested twice by Saddam Hussein due to his participation in a coup plot, and Vice President Tariq Hashimi was never a member of the Ba’ath Party. Harith al-Dhari spent most of Saddam Hussein’s rule abroad and even the pro-Ba’athist Salih Mutlaq was expelled from the Ba’ath Party in 1978 for a perceived slight against Saddam Hussein. While many Sunnis were far less inclined to oppose the Ba’ath Party than their Shi’a or Kurdish counterparts, this was largely due to their nostalgia for the days of Saddam Hussein when they had a favored status in Iraqi society. In Anbar, neither the IIP nor the SAA had any interest in the return of the Ba’ath Party.\textsuperscript{1074}

\textit{(S)} As a result, Ba’athist influence inside of Iraq was now almost exclusively restricted to finances. Apart from its payments to cadres of clients and ideologues, the Ba’ath Party had nothing resembling its former dominance over Iraqi politics, making its leaders’ dreams of restoring Ba’athist rule of Iraq little more than a collective delusion.\textsuperscript{1075}

\textbf{AQI and Ansar al-Sunna Attempt to Push Back (November 2006)}

\textit{(S)} By late November 2006, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna were determined to annihilate the armed Albu Soda tribe and the Iraqi police stations in the Sufia district of Ramadi. The Albu Soda were singled out for attack because they were seen as the weakest member of the SAA and, if they were defeated, the alliance would collapse just like the Anbar People’s Committee. Towards this end, a force of 200-300 AQI and Ansar al-Sunna fighters was assembled to attack the Albu Soda, with some volunteers coming from as far afield as Samarra in Salahaddin province. Their goal was to overwhelm the tribe in the Sufia district by attacking police stations in waves.\textsuperscript{1076}

\textit{(S)} The Iraqi police and Albu Soda tribesmen became aware of this plan through their own intelligence networks, resulting in the November 25-26 "Battle of Sufia" in which Iraqi police and Albu Soda tribesmen successfully repelled the joint AQI-Ansar al-Sunna effort.\textsuperscript{1077} The AQI-Ansar al-Sunna force crossed the Euphrates River, drove through Julaybah and then proceeded to assault

\textsuperscript{1073} [ | Military | 11 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061211 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{1074} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1075} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1076} [ | Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{1077} [ | Military | 5 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061205 | (S/NE) | ]
the Sufia district and the Albu Soda tribal area in a series of successive waves. At least fifty-five Albu Soda tribesmen were killed in the defense of SAA leader Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Salih's home, which was eventually destroyed by AQI and several of Sheikh Jassim's brothers were killed. While the AQI-Ansar al-Sunna attack was defeated, numerous AQI atrocities occurred during the course of the battle. With their failure to dislodge with Albu Soda from the Sufia district, a number of AQI members under relocated to Julabyah as a staging area from which they could regroup and then carry out future attacks in Ramadi.

**Ansar al-Sunna Expands in Ramadi**

The dependence on Ansar al-Sunna during this battle shows that AQI had been significantly weakened in Ramadi. In response, Ansar al-Sunna began to expand its operations in the city. Sufia district resident and former Arab Lawyers' Association member was the group's amir in Ramadi (supported by former IIS and his lieutenant ) and . With AQI's access to 17th Street somewhat impeded, began organizing many of the attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces along 17th Street with the assistance of the infamous family.

Nevertheless, the Iraqi police and Coalition forces directed every bit as much pressure against Ansar al-Sunna as against AQI. On November 27, they captured the Ansar al-Sunna operations chief for Ramadi who had carried out attacks from 17th Street to the Sufia district. At direction, Ansar al-Sunna cells had carried out IED and sniper attacks against Ramadi General Hospital. In addition, he had led the Ansar al-Sunna contingent of the attack on the Albu Soda tribe.

**Shari'ah Established in Haditha**

Even as Ansar al-Sunna and AQI began to lose control of the situation in Ramadi, Haditha seemed even more securely theirs. Since AQI's declaration of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq, male residents refrained from smoking in public while women adopted increasingly conservative Islamic dress. Civil government had almost completely dissolved as a result of the AQI murder and intimidation campaign, tribal sheikhs were unable to exercise their traditional authority, and beheadings, which were without precedent under both Iraqi judicial and tribal laws, now occurred regularly. In a very real sense, the old Iraqi social order had been abolished by AQI in Haditha and a totalitarian Salafist theocracy had taken its place.

AQI had long planned to establish *shari'ah* in the Haditha area (see Chapter 5b), since the group saw this as the only acceptable legal system. Despite the traditional view of *shari'ah* as derived from

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1078 [ | Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | (S/NE) | ]
1079 [ | Military | 13 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061213 | (S/NE) | ]
1080 [ | Military | 5 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061225 | (S/NE) | ]
1081 [ | Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061226 | (S/NE) | ]
1082 [ | Military | 23 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061123 | (S/NE) | ]
1083 [ | Military | 29 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061129 | (S/NE) | ]
1084 [ | Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | (S/NE) | ]
the Qu’ran, the Haditha, the *ijma* (consensus) of Islamic scholars, and *qiya*ṣ (analogy), AQI’s *shari’ah* courts, particularly those run by former Ba’athists, were set up by individuals who were ignorant of key aspects of the Islamic faith and hence often issued their judgements by the plaintiffs’ degree of agreement and cooperation with AQI rather than on the merits of the case itself.1085

(S) In addition to handing down penalties, *shari’ah* courts were also designed to provide education on Islamic principles to the general populace, forcibly indoctrinating otherwise secular Iraqis with an extreme religious worldview. While AQI was supported by many secular or formerly secular Ba’athists, most members of the group were themselves extreme religious zealots who sought to convert others to their worldview. Even so, AQI did not want to alienate potential Ba’athist or Iraqi army support for their objectives and among the acts undertaken by the *shari’ah* court was the assignment of plots of land to all former Iraqi soldiers in fulfillment of a promise that Saddam Hussein had made to them in 2000.1086

(S) According to captured AQI documents and thumb drives, AQI leaders implemented *shari’ah* and other aspects of their totalitarian theocracy on the basis of directions received from the uppermost echelons of the organization. In keeping with standards that may well have been inherited from the tradecraft of the Ba’athist secret police, AQI maintained extremely meticulous records on the activities of the Haditha areas inhabitants at least as far north as Kubaysah.1087

**AQI Recruiting at Coalition Detention Facilities**

(S) AQI also sought to expand its imposition of *shari’ah* to Coalition detainees. Because AQI and foreign detainees were not separated from their other Iraqi counterparts, they were able to preach their views of Islam to the other prisoners. Dealing with Iraqis who had received little formal religious education under Saddam Hussein, AQI members were so persuasive that one tribal sheikh estimated in October 2006 that as many as 30% of those who entered Coalition detention facilities as secular Sunnis left as adherents of AQI’s version of Islam.1088

(S) At the detention facilities at Camp Cropper, Abu Ghraib, and Camp Bucca, AQI recruited new members and maintained anti-Coalition sentiment. At Camp Cropper, AQI members formed a group called the Sharayeen that taught courses in Islamic law to detainees, claiming that they wanted them to learn more about *shari’ah*, the Qu’ran, and being good Muslims. Those who disagreed with the Sharayeen’s interpretation of Islam were threatened. The Camp Cropper AQI detainees also formed a *shari’ah* committee that encouraged members of the group to conduct daily physical exercises to keep themselves in shape, offered guidance on counter-interrogation techniques, and practiced excellent OPSEC to avoid detection by the Coalition. The *shari’ah* committees at Camp Cropper and other detention facilities indoctrinated prospective AQI members through a five-class curriculum intended to educate detainees into becoming SREs, educating ten detainees at a time. Once a detainee decided to join AQI, they were forced to pledge bayat to UBL and recite a daily pledge of allegiance to AQI and their own willingness to die for UBL and As a result of this

1085 Ibid.
1086 [Military | 10 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061210 | (S/NF) | ]
1087 [Military | 1 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061201 | (S/NF) | ]
1088 [Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | (S/NF) | ]

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recruiting program, AQI was able to successfully recruit from other insurgent groups even while its members were held in Coalition detention facilities.\(^{1089}\)

\((S)\) AQI also made an active effort to provide its fighters with rudimentary counter-interrogation techniques intended to delay or deflect the interrogation process. High-ranking members of the group displayed far more aptitude at counter-interrogation consistent with that found in the Manchester Manual, an AQAM document seized by British police in May 2000 at the home of an AQISL.\(^{1090}\)

\((S)\) The main counter-interrogation instructions of the Manchester Manual are as follows:\(^{1091}\)

- Develop a cover story;
- Refuse to answer repeat questions;
- Answer questions as vaguely as possible;
- Provide names of dead colleagues and name them as leadership figures;
- Never divulge information about your true mission;
- Provide support to and strengthen fellow inmates;
- Recite the Qur'an during questioning;
- Avoid looking into the eyes of the interrogator;
- Deny anything mistakenly divulged during earlier interrogations;
- Claim torture to invalidate information provided;
- If necessary, self-inflict wounds to provide the appearance of torture;
- Never trust the interrogator—never forget he is your enemy;
- Refuse to confirm or deny anything;
- Confronting the interrogator and defeating him is part of your jihad;
- It is better to die a martyr than provide information to the interrogator.

\((S)\) While only a limited number of insurgents had undergone extensive AQAM counter-interrogation training, many of these techniques were passed through word of mouth from higher-ranking members of AQI to mid-level and local leaders or obtained through the internet.\(^{1092}\)

The Assassination Attempt on [b(6)]

\((S/NF)\) On November 4, AQI decided to begin a serious counter-offensive against the SAA and its backers. In Zabadani, a member of one of the group’s Ramadi cells shot five times. [b(6)] was taken to a hospital in Damascus where he barely survived the attack. While [b(6)] had been marked for death by AQI since late 2005, the disbandment of the Anbar People’s Committee in early 2006 and the splintering of the 1920 Revolution Brigade made AQI believe that he was so
weak that an attempt to kill him was unnecessary despite his continued involvement in anti-AQI activities. The rise of SAA may have changed their opinions about influence in Iraq.  

(S/NF) At the same time, since the rise of the reformed Anbar Revolutionaries and other anti-AQI groups in August 2006, AQI had made an intensive effort to identify and track the movements of SAR insurgent leaders who were active in Iraq. Even so, the group was reluctant to target them directly for fear of incurring the wrath of the security services. While elements of the government were willing to a degree to harbor and facilitate AQI attacks in Iraq, major attacks against SAR leaders in would indicate an absence of control over its own territory.  

(S/NF) While the brazen AQI attack on was a blow to the Anbar Revolutionaries, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his lieutenants had already gained legitimate positions of provincial authority, organized a successful anti-AQI campaign, and successfully cultivated a network of support among provincial, national, and media officials that made it far more difficult for AQI to decapitate the group the way it had the Anbar People's Committee. Moreover, while possessed the necessary experience and connections to serve as a senior leader of the Anbar Revolutionaries, the same was also true for the group's founder Brigadier General Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa, and Sheikh Abdul Sattar himself.  

(S) As part of their counter-offensive against SAA, AQI leader began kidnapping and murdering Iraqi police officers near the Abra Bridge in Saqlawiyah while posing as a member of the Anbar Revolutionaries. AQI also began distributing black propaganda, committing atrocities while posing as Anbar Revolutionaries, and attempting to infiltrate the organization and undermine it from within.  

(S) Rutbah-based AQI leaders also planned an assassination attempt against Sheikh Abdul Sattar, possibly using the Abu Sarah Group or former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq who had either allied with AQI or who were angry because Sheikh Abdul Sattar's activities cut down on their smuggling operations. Their plot, which was never carried out, called for the use of 52mm rockets against Sheikh Abdul Sattar's home.  

The Triumph of the SAA  

SAA vs. AMS  

(U) Another attack on SAA came from a completely different direction. On November 10, AMS secretary-general stated on al-Arabiya television that "A group of outlaws does not like the resistance, which opposes its crimes and diminishes its ambitions. Therefore, the government, or certain parties in it, has begun to use this group to counter the resistance."  

1093 [ | Military | 10 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061110 | (S/NF) | ]  
1094 Ibid.  
1095 Ibid.  
1096 [ | Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | (S/NF) | ]  
1097 [ | Military | 21 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061121 | (S/NF) | ]  
1098 [ | Military | 22 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061122 | (S/NF) | ]
Reflecting the stronger relationship between AQI and AMS since the death of Zarqawi, Harith al-Dhari stated that AQI was taking part in "the resistance" and criticized al-Arabiyah for limiting its coverage to Anbar. On November 12, Sheikh Abdul Sattar sent a statement in response to Harith al-Dhari's remark to al-Iraqiyah TV:

(U) "The al-Anbar Tribes Awakening Conference [i.e. the SAA] would like to respond to the claims made by Harith al-Dhari, agent of the Persians and the European Union through the French Ambassador, with whom he held meetings. We say to you that you know bandits better, as you have a long experience in this regard... Who are you to make such statements, which show your defeat on the battlefield? You are visiting countries to beg for donations for the Takfiris and hired killers. Decent resistance washes its hands of you and your actions. The sons of tribes stand up today, wearing the uniform which you can see on television screens, to say to you that you represent only yourself and the hired Takfiris who follow you."

(S/NF) Sheikh Abdul Sattar also mentioned his grandfather, the "hero of the March 1941 Revolution," a reference to the 1941 military coup by pro-German Iraqi army officers against the British-supported Hashemite monarchy that was a source of pride for Iraqi nationalists. By evoking the memory of his own grandfather in Iraqi history, Sheikh Abdul Sattar sought to blunt the ability of Sheikh Harith al-Dhari to use the mantle of his own grandfather, who participated in the 1920 uprising against the British. The animosity between Harith al-Dhari and Sheikh Abdul Sattar was due to the fact that the two men represented different sides of the same Sunni coin, with Sheikh Abdul Sattar attempting to demonstrate to Sunnis that working with the Iraqi government could pay off and Harith al-Dhari fearing that his anti-government message was now being countered. Moreover, Harith al-Dhari was involved in a business relationship with Sheikh Tariq Khulayf, the president of the Anbar Central Council who had refused to cooperate with the SAA.

(S/NF) Despite Harith al-Dhari's influence, won by his vocal opposition to the Coalition and the Shi'a-led Iraqi government, he had engaged in little or no constructive activity on behalf of the Sunni community. Moreover, many of the SAR insurgent groups that he had influence over were splitting between moderate factions that wanted to assist the SAA and hardliners that remained committed to fighting the Iraqi government and the Coalition. By contrast, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was an active tribal leader supported by the people of Ramadi. While Sheikh Abdul Sattar had no religious credentials, he and his fellow tribal leaders had encouraged Anbari tribesmen to join either the Iraqi security forces or the Anbar Revolutionaries to fight AQI in Ramadi, giving heart to Sunni tribal leaders in neighboring province. He also secured a major success by convincing the pro-AQI Fuhaylat subtribe of the Albu Issa to pay restitution to the rest of the Albu Issa.

(S/NF) On November 16 Iraqi interior minister al-Bolani issued an arrest warrant for Harith al-Dhari on the charge of "inciting terrorism and violence among the Iraqi people." This was the second time that al-Dhari had been subject to an arrest warrant - in February 2006, then-interior minister Bayan Jabr issued an order for his arrest on the grounds that he had been involved in the
kidnapping of an Italian journalist, forcing Harith al-Dhari to flee to Jordan. In early March 2006, the interior ministry dropped the warrant because a number of the judges assigned to review it were threatened. Since his initial flight, Harith al-Dhari had resided primarily in Amman, since the authorities were unlikely to extradite him and the Iraqi government was unlikely to ask them to do so. As a result, even if Harith al-Dhari regarded the warrant as genuine he was still confident in his ability to persuade the Iraqi government to withdraw it or the judiciary to reject it just as they had done earlier.1102

(S/NF) Even so, the warrant had the temporary effect of bringing together moderate and hardliner factions within AMS, forcing them to publicly denounce it despite his earlier efforts to depose Harith al-Dhari as the secretary-general of AMS in favor of a leader more receptive to the Iraqi government. Al-Dhari's rival also put his plans to set up a parallel religious authority on hold for the time being and the 1920 Revolution Brigade suspended their negotiations with the Iraqi government (though not the Coalition) in protest.1103

(S/NF) While Harith al-Dhari was a supporter of the Sunni insurgency, his arrest warrant was criticized on the grounds that the Shi'a still had a standing warrant out for the arrest of Muqtada al-Sadr for the 2003 murder of Shi'a religious leader Sayid Abdul Majid al-Khoei. Thus, Sunni leaders believed that Harith al-Dhari was being persecuted because he was a Sunni while Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shi'a, was allowed to remain free. Moreover, even though al-Sadr was seen as the greater threat to the Iraqi government it was seen as acceptable for more than thirty MPs to be affiliated with his office. As a result, the SAA was forced to make tentative statements of opposition to the arrest warrant for Harith al-Dhari even as it retained an amicable relationship with the Shi'a Iraqi army units in Ramadi.1104

(U) On November 18, Sheikh Abdul Sattar pushed the rivalry with AMS back to the forefront, by making a statement to al-Iraqiya TV calling for Harith al-Dhari's removal as secretary-general of AMS in favor of Sheikh Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarrai. In the statement, Abdul Sattar described al-Dhari as a murderer and a kidnapper and stated that he did not represent the people of Anbar. Abdul Sattar further called upon the Zobai tribe to determine its stance towards Harith al-Dhari and his actions or they too would be targeted and requested that Sheikh Abd al-Malik al-Sal'di return to Iraq to better provide spiritual guidance to the people of Anbar.1105

(S/NF) The core dispute between the two men had now escalated to the point of a test of wills as to which vision would prevail in Anbar. Many Anbaris identified with Harith al-Dhari's demands for Coalition withdrawal and harsh criticism of the Shi'a-led Iraqi government. This, however, did not preclude them from supporting the SAA, which made no secret of its desire for aid from the Coalition, Iraqi police, and Iraqi government. As a result, for SAA members, Harith al-Dhari's...
attacks on Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his organization were seen as attacks on the tribes that had joined the Anbar Salvation Front.\textsuperscript{1106}

\textit{(S/NE)} Sheikh Abdul Sattar's suggestion that Sheikh Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i assume the position of AMS secretary-general was supported by Sheikh Ahmad himself, who had met with Coalition officials and sought to limit the influence of AMS as long as Harith al-Dhari was the leader of the organization.\textsuperscript{1107}

\textit{(S/NE)} Sheikh Abdul Sattar's challenge to the Zobai tribe of which Harith al-Dhari was the most recognized national figure was recognition that the tribe had supported the Sunni insurgency from the beginning and that many of its members hated the Iraqi government and the Coalition. This had less to do with Harith al-Dhari, however, and far more to do with the tribe's isolated geography, rampant unemployment, and predisposition to extremist interpretations of Islam. As long as this state of affairs endured, most of the Zobai tribe would support the insurgency despite Sheikh Abdul Sattar's threats.\textsuperscript{1108}

\textit{(S/NE)} Both of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's preferred Anbari spiritual leaders Sheikh Abd al-Malik and\textsuperscript{1106} had supported the insurgency in the past. Sheikh Abd al-Malik was the former imam of the Hadra al-Muhammadiyah Mosque in Fallujah who had supported Zarqawi from January until November 2004 and the conclusion of Operation AL FAJR. Sheikh Abd al-Malik's collusion with Zarqawi, however, was pragmatic rather than ideological and he was far from alone in this collaboration - even the late Fallujah mufti Sheikh Hamza Abbas al-Issawi collaborated with Zarqawi when he controlled the city. While Sheikh Abd al-Malik had certainly been involved in FRE and SAR insurgent activities he, like Sheikh Hamza Abbas al-Issawi, was one of many respected Fallujah religious leaders who had agreed to support Zarqawi prior to Operation AL FAJR when the prospect of AQI victory in Anbar was perceived to be imminent, only to turn against him later.\textsuperscript{1109}

\textit{(S/NE)}\textsuperscript{1110} by contrast, was one of the "founding fathers" of AMS who had lived as exile in the UAE during the rule of Saddam Hussein, only to return to Iraq after his overthrow and be forced to leave once again after delivering an inflammatory sermon at a Baghdad mosque sanctioning attacks on Coalition forces. Back in the UAE, maintained extensive ties to the SAR insurgency by facilitating and financing attacks. However, eventually persuaded of the value of working with the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi government, and even the Coalition. In addition was respected by a majority of the Iraqi Shi'a and could easily be used as a bridge between the two sects.\textsuperscript{1110} moderation was displayed in a September 2006 interview, in which he denied that President Bush, the United States, or Israel had declared war on Islam and stated that those now using the slogan of a "war against Islam" were themselves not true Muslims.\textsuperscript{1110}

\textsuperscript{1106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1110} Ibid.
(S/NF) Even after making these remarks, Sheikh Abdul Sattar claimed that he did not intend to move against AMS, recognizing the importance of maintaining a common front among Anbaris against AQI. By restricting his criticism only to the person of Harith al-Dhari and not to AMS, 1920 Revolution Brigade, or al-Dhari's SAR allies, Sheikh Abdul Sattar kept the door open for AMS moderates and 1920 Revolution Brigade members who wished to break with Harith al-Dhari and join SAA.\footnote{Ibid.}

(S/NF) While the Sunni political establishment did not appreciate Harith al-Dhari's constant criticism of their participation in the Iraqi government, they nevertheless criticized his arrest warrant in an effort to promote Sunni solidarity. The Anbar Central Council also supported Harith al-Dhari, with Sheikh Abdul Sattar's uncle Sheikh Fawzi even going on al-Jazeera television on November 20 to criticize both Harith's arrest warrant and the SAA, stating that Sheikh Abdul Sattar did not represent the Albu Risha tribe. Anbar Central Council president Tariq Khulayf and its business leader Khamis Khanjar also supported Harith, with both men hoping to secure political support from AMS and other Iraqi Sunni tribes in order to counter the rise of SAA.\footnote{Ibid.}

(S/NF) While the Iraqi government was forced to walk a thin line concerning its criticism of Sunni elites, neighboring states, and even Shi'a radicals in order to preserve its national unity government, the fact that Sheikh Abdul Sattar was not Shi'a, Kurdish, or a member of the Sunni political establishment meant he felt free to criticize Harith al-Dhari. Moreover, he now had the support of the Iraqi government, many Anbari tribal leaders, and much of the Anbari public. This ingratiated Sheikh Abdul Sattar with the Iraqi national leaders and helped to embolden more moderate elements within AMS.\footnote{Ibid.}

**SAA Expansion into Hit, Husaybah, Amariyah**

(S) Just a few weeks later, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was able to use his growing popular support to expand the SAA into western Anbar. On November 26, Sheikh Hekmat Jubayir al-Gaoud was selected by the tribal leadership to assume the office of mayor of Hit, reconstituting the city council for the first time since August 2006. Sheikh Hekmat was the cousin of Albu Nimr tribal leader Sheikh Hatem Abdul Razzaq and the son of Sheikh Jubayir Anad who handled the day-to-day running of the tribe's business holdings.\footnote{[ | Military | 26 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061126 | (S/NF) | ]}

(S/NF) The Albu Nimr held a special significance within both SAA and Anbar Revolutionaries, since it was the only one of the original five founding tribes of the former organization that was not based in the Ramadi area. The family to which Sheikh Hekmat belonged was one of the wealthiest families in all of Anbar and was generally pro-Coalition. While the tribal members of the family resided in Iraq, their wealthier counterparts, such as the brothers Hamid and Jalal lived in Amman. Former Anbar governor Faisal was the most prominent member of the family to publicly support Sheikh Abdul Sattar, but he was not welcomed by the rest...
of his family and only maintained minimal influence within the SAA due to his status as the former governor of the province.\footnote{1115}{Ibid.}

\textit{(S)} Ultimately, the fight against AQI was a popular one for the Albu Nimr tribe and both Sheikh Hekmat and Brigadier General Hamid were able to present a united front against the group in Hit.\footnote{1116}{Ibid.}

\textit{(S)} The Anbar Revolutionaries also expanded its anti-AQI activities to encompass Husaybah-Sharqiyyah, Amariyah, and Ferris Town. Forming an alliance with the pro-Coalition subtribes of the Albu Issa, the Anbar Revolutionaries sought to resolve local tribal disputes in order to prevent AQI from gaining a foothold in the area. This led to the November 24 decision by the pro-Coalition Albu Issa subtribes (Albu Harimat, al-Manasir, Albu Dahir, Albu Ghrati, and Albu Jassim) to join the SAA, though anti-Coalition Albu Issa subtribes such as the Fuhaylats continued to support AQI.\footnote{1117}{\textit{\[ | Military \ | 30 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM \ | 20061130 \ | (S/NF) \ | \]}}

\textbf{IIP Support for Security in Amariyah}

\textit{(S)} The entry of SAA into Amariyah was helped by strong anti-AQI sentiment in the town. The pro-Coalition Albu Issa subtribes in the area were supported by a small force of civilian guards who were members of the IIP militia (see Chapter 6b) and supported by local IIP leader Ali Farhan Ramadan. By paying 500,000-750,000 dinars ($330-500) a month to members of the IIP militia, Ali Farhan was able to dissuade them from joining AQI and convince them to carry out joint operations with the local Iraqi police. Using additional money funneled by the IIP to the Albu Issa subtribes, Ali Farhan was able to coordinate with Iraqi police in Amariyah and Ferris Town in order to provide a greater degree of security to the area.\footnote{1118}{\textit{\[ | Military \ | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM \ | 20061203 \ | (S/NF) \ | \]}}

\textit{(S)} While the IIP guards in Amariyah and Ferris Town did not support the Coalition, they clearly considered AQI to be a greater threat. As in Anah, AQI fighters actively targeted IIP members, demanding that they go to mosques run by pro-AQI clerics and publicly renounce their affiliation with the party. AQI also kidnapped at least two IIP members who refused to do so and the Coalition received fragmentary reports of fighting between AQI-Ansar al-Sunna and the IIP militia in the area.\footnote{1119}{Ibid.} These constant attacks on the IIP would eventually push the organization into a closer collaboration with the SAA, allowing Sheikh Abdul Sattar to spread his influence into the Amariyah area.

\textit{(S)} In the meantime, Albu Issa tribal leader Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi had become a member of the SAA and supporter of the Anbar Revolutionaries, which he planned to use to help spread the organization beyond the Ramadi-Saqlawiyah corridor where most of the Anbar Revolutionaries resided. Anbar Revolutionaries leaders told Sheikh Khamis that they would very much like to do so,
but that they were currently tied down fighting AQI in Ramadi and the Jazira area and lacked the necessary funding, resources, and manpower needed to assist Albu Issa tribe.\textsuperscript{1120}

\(\text{(S)}\) To help him in the meanwhile, the Anbar Revolutionaries assisted Sheikh Khamis in setting up two tribal militias in Amariyah and Ferris Town to operate in conjunction with the Iraqi police and the existing IIP militia. Each tribal militia had forty fighters armed with AK-47s, though they had little in the way of ammunition, rank, or hierarchy. These militias were subject to Sheikh Khamis's newly-formed Revolutionary Council, which was intended to develop cohesion among the Albu Issa subtribes so that they could better oppose AQI. Yet was primarily the wealthier subtribes in Amariyah and Ferris Town that supported Sheikh Kamis and the Revolutionary Council; many of poorer rural subtribes such as the Fuhaylats and Owesats remained hotbeds of support for AQI.\textsuperscript{1121}

\textbf{AQI Attempts to Regain the Initiative}

\textbf{Dissension within AQI}

\(\text{(S)}\) One of the consequences of the rise of the SAA was that a number of FREs who had joined AQI as much out of a desire to regain their lost power and status as out of ideology were now considering switching sides in return for advisory posts in the Iraqi army. Foremost among these were Major General Khaddam Muhammed Farris al-Fahdawi and \textsuperscript{[\text{b}(6)]} both of whom had served in Saddam Hussein's army as well as the Iraqi National Guard before joining AQI.\textsuperscript{1122}

\(\text{(S)}\) \textsuperscript{[\text{b}(6)]} had been General Khaddam's executive officer during their time in the ING and like many in the unit joined him in defecting to AQI. Since joining AQI he had operated out of Ramadi, administering the AQI's smuggling, IDF, and mortar activities in the city.\textsuperscript{1123}

\(\text{(S)}\) Despite the involvement of General Khaddam, \textsuperscript{[\text{b}(6)]} and other members of the 60th Brigade who had joined AQI in the insurgency, they now recognized that security situation in Anbar was now quite different from what it had been in late 2004. For them, the successes of the SAA were the writing on the wall and they now believed that they could reap broader benefits from working with them to defeat AQI, creating dissension within the organization in Anbar at a time when it was seeking to redouble its efforts against Sheikh Abdul Sattar.\textsuperscript{1124}

\textbf{Refocuses AQI Priorities}

\(\text{(S)}\) On November 14 \textsuperscript{[\text{b}(6)]} traveled to the Albu Ubayd tribal village in the Jazira area of Ramadi to meet with Mujahideen Shura Council members Abu al-Harith (the amir of Salahaddin) and Thamir Hamad Nahir al-Rishawi al-Dulaymi (the Ramadi amir). During the meeting, \textsuperscript{[\text{b}(6)]} appointed \textsuperscript{[\text{b}(6)]} to assist Thamir with managing AQI operations in Ramadi.

\textsuperscript{1120} [ \text{Military} | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{1121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1122} [ \text{Military} | 27 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061127 | (S/NE) | ]
\textsuperscript{1123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1124} Ibid.

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made the destruction of the SAA and any other organization that opposed AQI as the group’s top priority in Anbar, ordering to send fighters and suicide bombers from Salahaddin to Anbar and to increase the number of attacks against the Coalition in Salahaddin to draw their attention away from Anbar.\textsuperscript{1125}

In particular, wanted AQI in Ramadi to increase IDF attacks against the Coalition while they prepared for a major attack against one of their bases similar to that which had occurred against the Abu Ghraib prison in 2005 (see Chapter 5a), in the hopes that it would shatter Coalition resolve in Anbar. At the conclusion of the meeting, departed for Bayji to meet with other regional AQI leaders while developing the next phase of his plan for Salahaddin province.\textsuperscript{1126}

**AQI Reorganizes**

As a direct response to this meeting, AQI began preparing for its move against the SAA in Ramadi, the head of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Ramadi, sent signed messages to senior members of the Albu Soda tribe in the Sufia district of Ramadi demanding that the tribe abandon their security checkpoints or he would use chemical or biological weapons against the Albu Soda tribe and assassinate their leaders. Because there seemed little likelihood of AQI using chemical or biological weapons against the Albu Soda, this threat only served to further inspire Albu Soda resistance against the group.\textsuperscript{1127}

Spearheading the new AQI campaign in Ramadi was, who had been a member of AQI (then JTJ) since at least 2004. The owner of the Ramadi Transport Company, carried out sniper and IED attacks while facilitating weapons smuggling from Baghdad to Ramadi. Although was not a high-ranking member of AQI in Ramadi, the cumulative effect of the loss of left the group scrambling to find experienced Ramadi leadership, resulting in the promotion of individual cell leaders to fill leadership positions.\textsuperscript{1128}

AQI was also seeking to redouble its efforts in Fallujah, where leaders held a meeting of all AQI leaders in the city at the heavily-guarded La’min Laboratory in the Sina’a district of Fallujah to discuss how to make the group’s efforts in the insurgency more effective. was unhappy with the state of attacks against the Coalition, prompting to argue that attacks were becoming more effective. While both were based in the Zobai tribal area, they entered Fallujah through the Nu’aymiyah area.\textsuperscript{1129}

The meeting in Fallujah occurred around the same time as other AQI leadership meetings in Haditha and Rawah, in which members of the group’s provincial and national leadership stressed the need to increase the precision and effectiveness of attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces because of the rise of anti-AQI sentiments in Ramadi. By stressing that AQI fighters should focus

\textsuperscript{1125} [ ] Military | 18 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061218 | (S/NE) | ]

\textsuperscript{1126} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1127} [ ] Military | 15 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061115 | (S/NE) | ]

\textsuperscript{1128} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1129} Ibid.
on killing Coalition and Iraqi government personnel rather than civilians, the group's leadership hoped to combat this sentiment.\footnote{1130}

\textit{(S./NF)} A major element of AQI reorganization was the internal rotating of amirs. For instance, in early November 2006, Sheikh Abu Dawud, who had finally emerged as the amir of the Fallujah-Khalidiyah-Saddamiyah corridor (see Chapter 6b for a discussion of the internal struggle for the position of Fallujah amir) was rotated to Habbaniyah and replaced by [b(6)] due to the fact that he had become too well-known in Fallujah. As the leader of the force of up to 300 fighters, Sheikh Abu Dawud's position was highly sought after within AQI.\footnote{1131}

 AQI Recruiting

\textit{(S)} As part of the reorganization process, AQI sought to thoroughly train all new recruits. This must be contrasted with its earlier method of allowing natural selection to take its course before any training was provided. The group also developed a uniform standard for training recruits to carry out IED and sniper attacks. As before, AQI recruiters targeted men between the ages of 25-40, though older recruits were preferred to be groomed as leaders because they were seen as more likely to keep the group's secrets. Despite its religious rhetoric, AQI recruiters were aware of the economic situation in Ramadi and were quite capable of recruiting young men by appealing to their desire for money, power, a new car, and cheap fuel. In addition to these professional recruiters, individual AQI members were encouraged to recruit friends to join the group. Under [b(6)] new standards, however, AQI members were told to avoid using force or threat of force to persuade potential recruits to join in order to prevent them from later becoming disloyal to the organization.\footnote{1132}

\textit{(S)} After prospective recruits had pledged to join AQI and sworn bayat, they were invited to their recruiter's home, shown video propaganda, and told that they would be given $1,000 for every successful videotaped attack. The recruiter stressed the financial incentives for working for AQI (see Chapter 6a). After that, the recruit was take to a safe house or training camp and tutored in the construction of IEDs starting with most basic (command-detonated artillery rounds) and working up to the most complex (base station IEDs). Accompanying the IED training was an intense ideological indoctrination that the Iraqi police were the greatest threat to AQI because they were able to identify the insurgency in a way that the Coalition could not. During this tutoring process, recruits were screened for intelligence and loyalty to the organization, with the top 4-5 recruits taken into the desert to be trained as snipers.\footnote{1133}

 AQI in Zaidon, Saqlawiyah and Against the Albu Alwan

\textit{(S./NF)} Although the majority of AQI efforts were now aimed at Ramadi, AQI also attempted to regain the initiative in other parts of Anbar. Following the murder of at least nineteen AQI fighters at the hands of armed groups in Fallujah (likely Anbar Revolutionaries or 1920 Revolution Brigade)
and the declaration circulated by city residents that AQI fighters must renounce their affiliation to the group or be killed, a majority of the foreign fighters that had operated in Fallujah relocated to the Zaidon area under the leadership of (b)(6) While this was in part because the foreign AQI fighters were more identifiable than their Iraqi counterparts, it was also because (b)(6) had overseen AQI’s campaign against 1920 Revolution Brigade in Fallujah and other AQI leaders in the city may have believed that his temporary relocation could ease tensions with residents.1134

(S) In an effort to gather new recruits from tribes that refused to join SAA, AQI fighters in the Zaidon tribal area began distributing propaganda and recruiting from their base of operations in the village of al-Anaz. This effort was overseen by (b)(6) high-ranking AQI leader operating in the area between Abu Ghraib and Zaidon and had sought to implement shari'ah there following the declaration of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. Residents who smoked cigarettes had their fingers cut off, while those that wore improper clothing or beards were killed. (b)(6) regarded these penalties as too harsh and feared that they would lead to popular resentment, prompting him on November 11 to remove (b)(6) from a position of leadership and to have him focus on recruiting instead.1135

(S) Ta’alia village also served as an AQI node, deliberately cordoned off by more than 150 fighters so that it could serve as a broadcast site for al-Zawraa satellite television (see below). Al-Anaz village, by contrast, served as the headquarters of (b)(6) and was referred to as (b)(6) by residents, in reference to the large numbers of foreign fighters in the area. Because the Coalition was absent from the Zaidon area, AQI and its allies had a protected zone from which to conduct attacks against Coalition forces in Fallujah and then fall back to regroup.1136

(S) In Saqlawiyah, local AQI leaders (b)(6) began actively pooling their efforts to coordinate attacks in Saqlawiyah in general, and along the Japanese Bridge northeast of Habbaniyah in particular. As the primary means of AQI access in and out of the Albu Shijil tribal area, the Japanese Bridge was a center of AQI activity, as its fighters killed Iraqi police officers and threw their bodies from the Bridge into the Thar Thar Canal.1137

(S) In late November and early December, AQI also attempted to again take on the Albu Alwan, this time by threatening Iraqi police at the al-Warar station. The station had been established on November 12 by Coalition forces, Iraqi police, and local Albu Alwan tribesmen backed by Sheikh Abdul Sattar.1138 Police from al-Warar station supported the Coalition during Operation TINIAN, and AQI leaders in Ramadi decided to attack the station both to punish them for this support and to prevent the Albu Alwan from becoming even more closely aligned with Sheikh Abdul Sattar’s anti-AQI activities, particularly the SAA’s “insurgent rehabilitation” program aimed at preventing recidivism.1139

1134 [Military] 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | (S/NE) | ]
1135 [Military] 30 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061130 | (S/NE) | ]
1136 Ibid.
1137 [Military] 1 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061201 | (S/NE) | ]
1138 [Military] 4 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061204 | (S/NE) | ]
1139 [Military] 5 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061205 | (S/NE) | ]
Ansar al-Sunna joined AQI in their attacks on the Albu Alwan. The group's Ramadi membership was drawn heavily from Albu Alwan tribesmen who lived in the al-Hawz, Sufia, and Sharqiyah districts of the city in contrast to the bulk of their tribesmen that lived in the Hay al-Dhubat district. Furious over the support for the SAA by the Albu Alwan tribal leaders, Ansar al-Sunna used former Albu Alwan tribal leader Sheikh Adnan Khamis Jamal Alwani as their courier to the Albu Alwan leadership, threatening to kill them if the al-Warar police station was not closed. When the Albu Alwan refused, Ansar al-Sunna first attempted to make good on their threats by attacking the homes of the tribal leaders in the Hay al-Dhubat. After those attacks were repelled by the Iraqi police, Ansar al-Sunna began using IDF attacks to injure the tribal leaders' family members.\footnotemark

The reason for Albu Alwan resistance to both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna was due in part to the strong leadership of Sheikh Abdul Sattar in contrast to his predecessor Sheikh Adnan Khamis Jamal, who was a weak leader and easily intimidated by AQI. As long as he was perceived as powerful, the Albu Alwan police officers would continue manning the al-Warar police station and the tribe itself would remain steadfast against all AQI or Ansar al-Sunna attempts at threats and intimidation.\footnotemark

Ansar al-Sunna Reorganizes

Like AQI, Ansar al-Sunna decided that events in Anbar were forcing it to reorganize. In early December 2006, the Ansar al-Sunna leadership began planning to restructure and decentralize their organization following the capture of key leaders in November and December 2006. This effort was pioneered by senior leaders who held meetings with the Ansar al-Sunna shura majlis in Baghdad together with Baghdad amir.\footnotemark At the meetings,\footnotemark decided to divide Ansar al-Sunna's fighters into several autonomous brigades that could operate with greater freedom under the leadership of an amir.\footnotemark

To ensure that these brigades remained under Ansar al-Sunna control, the group opted to appoint a commander-in-chief or “amir of the brigades” who would be responsible for the fighters and answerable only to the group's supreme leader.\footnotemark was considered for the position of amir of the brigades, but the Ansar al-Sunna leadership preferred to appoint someone with bonafide international jihadist credentials, preferably someone who had conducted a significant attack in which large numbers of Coalition forces were killed.\footnotemark

The reason for this move lay in the fact that Coalition forces had made a number of impressive captures of senior Ansar al-Sunna leaders in the sixty days prior to the meeting. Among the group's losses were Afghan-trained inter-cell coordinator, financier, and secretary.\footnotemark

\footnotemark[140] Military | 17 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061217 | (S/NE) | 
\footnotemark[141] Ibid. 
\footnotemark[142] Military | 10 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061210 | (S/NE) | 
\footnotemark[143] Ibid. 

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While these captures did not dissolve Ansar al-Sunna's operational cells, the absence of their leadership severely limited coordination between separate cells and the Ansar al-Sunna leadership, forcing the group to reestablish its disrupted command structure in order to continue attacking the Coalition. Prior to this meeting, Ansar al-Sunna had been a multi-tiered pyramidal organization with each element of the group answerable directly to the senior leadership.

(S) The restructuring and decentralization of Ansar al-Sunna was a clear indication that Coalition operations had disrupted the surviving leadership, leaving the remaining leaders with the heavy burden of initiating a wholesale restructuring of their own organization in the middle of an insurgency. While the national leadership continued to command a large and deadly organization, the loss of senior leaders coupled with the group's reorganization adversely affected its operational capabilities in the Ramadi-Haditha corridor as loyalties shifted and operational starvation occurred.

(S) In Anbar, many Ansar al-Sunna cells regularly shared resources such as weapons caches and VBIED factories with their AQI counterparts, particularly in Ramadi, Haditha, and Hit areas. While this cooperation benefited both organizations, it now represented a vulnerability for Ansar al-Sunna as multiple cells operating absent a strong leadership found themselves open to AQI recruiting, leading to an expansion of AQI's influence in cities and towns where the Coalition had degraded Ansar al-Sunna. Moreover, since the Ansar al-Sunna cell leaders often maintained financial and facilitation connections, individual cells had difficulty maintaining cohesion following the loss of their local leader.

(S) Ansar al-Sunna was also at something a crossroads due to the fact that its members were increasingly divided into pro- and anti-AQI as well as Arab and Kurdish factions, leading to a rift between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in Salahaddin. In Anbar by contrast, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna coordinated their activities, relied on the same weapons smugglers and foreign fighter facilitators, and shared the same enemies in the form of the SAA. As a result, the internal restructuring of Ansar al-Sunna at the national level did little to diminish the group's threat to the Coalition in Anbar.

Al-Zawraa

(S) The efforts by both insurgent groups to regain the initiative in Anbar were assisted by the al-Zawraa Arabic satellite channel. This station was created in October 2005 by Sunni MP Mishan al-Jaburi using misappropriated government funds (Mishan was reputed to have skimmed $600,000 a month off the salaries of the strategic infrastructure battalions during his time as security coordinator between the defense and oil ministries), though it did not begin broadcasting until September 2006. Because of its vehemently anti-Shi'a, pro-insurgent message it was ordered shut.

1144 Ibid.
1145 Ibid.
1146 Ibid.
1147 Ibid.
down by the Iraqi government, only to resume broadcasting from an unknown location on November 18.\textsuperscript{1148}

\textbf{S} Al-Zawraa founder\textsuperscript{[b(6)]} was a Sunni MP who founded the three-seat Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc (RLB) in the Iraqi parliament. RLB's platform called for the integration of former Ba'athists into the government and the expulsion of the Coalition from Iraq. As a result of his activities, on October 8, 2006 the Iraqi parliament stripped \textsuperscript{[b(6)]} of his immunity, forcing him to flee to in order to escape arrest. Despite his exile, \textsuperscript{[b(6)]} continued to lead his parliament bloc in absentia.\textsuperscript{1149}

\textbf{S/NF} An opportunistic and unrepentant Ba'athist, \textsuperscript{[b(6)]} had attempted as far back as July 2003 to falsely claim to Mosul's political establishment that he had the support of the Coalition and therefore should be respected and feared. In February 2004, he became the editor of the anti-Coalition newspaper al-Itijah al-Akhar and worked with \textsuperscript{4b} intelligence to use his publication as a vehicle to refute Coalition allegations of \textsuperscript{4b} support for the insurgency. Between November 2004 and April 2005, he had attempted to convince members of the Dulayni tribal confederation in Anbar that he would reestablish the old Iraqi military if they agreed to vote for him in the December 2005 elections.\textsuperscript{1150}

\textbf{S/NF} Despite his track record, \textsuperscript{[b(6)]} was able to use al-Zawraa as a very effective propaganda tool for the insurgency, constantly reporting massive Coalition defeats that resulted in no insurgent losses. The station was popular among Iraqi police in Ferris Town as well as some residents of Fallujah who perceived it to be credible as an "Iraqi" news station that was not government-controlled. AQI appears to have actively supported the station, with the group's strongholds in the Zobai tribal area serving as broadcast sites for al-Zawraa. While \textsuperscript{[b(6)]} lacked the personal appeal of \textsuperscript{[b(6)]} his station was a major success due to its ability to paint the Coalition as enemies of the Sunnis. Lincoln Group surveys between August and September 2006 indicated that a majority of Anbaris continued to support attacks on Coalition forces. While this figure declined somewhat with the rise of the SAA, the continued reception of al-Zawraa indicated that anti-Coalition sentiment remained prevalent in the province.\textsuperscript{1151}

The Coalition Maintains the Initiative

**Operation MAJID**

\textbf{S} Despite these attempts by AQI to reorganize and regain the initiative, the Coalition and anti-AQI forces in Anbar managed to continue to take the fight to the insurgents. In late November, Coalition forces began Operation MAJID to clear the Haditha region of AQI and affiliated insurgents. With the movement of the Coalition into Barwanah, Haqlaniyah, and Haditha, high-ranking AQI leaders fled the larger cities for Khaffajiyah, Albu Hyatt, and Anah to hide until it would be possible to regroup and return to the Haditha area once Coalition forces had departed.

\textsuperscript{1148} [ | Military | 7 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061207 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{1149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1151} Ibid.
Low and mid-level AQI fighters, by contrast, remained in the area using false identification cards, operating clandestinely and carrying out periodic kidnappings and murders of suspected collaborators.\textsuperscript{1152}

(S) Coalition forces then proceeded into Wadi Sakran, discovering a major AQI arms cache and training facility. As noted before, Wadi Sakran and Albu Hyatt were major centers of AQI activity as a result of their seclusion from Coalition forces and Iraqi police. Aggressive operations were also conducted in Bani Dahir, which had been subjected to a heavy AQI presence as well as the murder and intimidation campaign that went with it.\textsuperscript{1153}

(S) The immediate consequence of Operation MAJID for the insurgency in the Haditha area, apart from dispersal, was that a power struggle erupted between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, with Ansar al-Sunna burning cars belonging to AQI.\textsuperscript{1154} As had occurred during previous Coalition operations such as Operation RIVER GATE in 2005 (see Chapter 5a), a large number of insurgent fighters dispersed from the Haditha area at the onset of Operation MAJID, dispersing to Hit, the Rawah-Anah corridor, Bayji, and Ubaydi. This was intended as a temporary shift, however, and AQI fighters planned to filter back into the Haditha area once they perceived that the threat posed by Coalition forces had returned to an acceptable level.\textsuperscript{1155}

(S) With AQI dispersed from Haditha, the Coalition established checkpoints, conducted patrols inside the city, and created a secure area on the outskirts of the city in an effort to prevent AQI fighters from returning.\textsuperscript{1156} A similar situation occurred in Haqlaniyah, where AQI activity was virtually non-existent after the majority of the group’s operatives in the town fled at the beginning of Operation MAJID. Coalition, police, or Iraqi army personnel searched every structure in Haqlaniyah, with residents being very receptive to their presence.\textsuperscript{1157}

(S) This positive shift in atmospherics were not seen in Barwanah, where residents remained distrustful of the Coalition due to fear of the Shi’a militias, paranoia over \textsuperscript{1.4b}, a belief that the Coalition was not committed to their security, and intimidation by the insurgency. The severely weakened Albu Nimr tribal leadership in Barwanah continued to oppose both participation in the Iraqi army or police, while many residents believed that the Coalition would soon leave the town and the insurgency would return unless competent Iraqi security forces were established.\textsuperscript{1158} In an effort to achieve this, Haditha police chief\textsuperscript{(b)(6)} conducted an IO campaign in support of Operation MAJID aimed to persuading residents to accept Coalition-imposed security measures. With the arrival of more than one hundred newly-trained Iraqi police in the Haditha area by mid-November 2006 and another 126 scheduled to arrive at the end of December 2006, the presence of the Iraqi police in Haditha continued to grow.\textsuperscript{1159}
The Death of Abu Abdallah

(S) On December 1 a Coalition airstrike resulted in the death of Abu Abdallah, the head of AQI's Ajjamiyah network. This network operated across the western Euphrates River valley from Rawah to al-Qaim, providing logistical support and foreign fighter facilitation to AQI cells throughout western Anbar. Made up of experienced and dedicated fighters, the Ajjamiyah network was responsible for a significant portion of the AQI attacks between Rawah and al-Qaim. An example of the network's access to weapons can be seen in the October 8, 2006 discovery of one of the network's arms caches that contained heavy machine guns and ammunition, ordinance and IED manufacturing components, and SA-7 MANPADS.1160

(S) Even before the death of Abu Abdallah, the Ajjamiyah network had suffered a number of major setbacks as a result of renewed fighting between AQI and the revived Hamza Battalion in al-Qaim. Iraqi police operations in the western Euphrates River valley had also resulted in the capture of Abu Abdallah's top lieutenant (b)(6) and Coalition operations in the Rawah-Anah corridor killed many Ajjamiyah network operatives and forced others to minimize or abandon their activity in the area. With Abu Abdallah's demise, the group's ability to recover from its setbacks in the Rawah-Anah corridor or al-Qaim was greatly reduced.1161

1160 [ | Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | (S/NE) | ]
1161 Ibid.
Other Insurgent Organizations Open Negotiations (December 2006)

Jaysh al-Fatihiin Negotiations with Vice President Hashimi

(S/NF) At the end of November 2006, national leaders of Jaysh al-Fatihiin expressed a willingness to enter at least some form of negotiation with the Iraqi government. Mid-level Jaysh al-Fatihiin leader [b]traveled to Baghdad to meet with Sunni planning minister and IIP politburo member [b]in the hopes of arranging talks between Jaysh al-Fatihiin and Vice President Hashimi in an effort to mend ties between the two (Jaysh al-Fatihiin spokesman [b]had criticized Hashimi on November 4) and strengthen the relationship between Jaysh al-Fatihiin and the IIP in the hopes of forming some kind of political coalition.  

(S/NF) The relationship between Jaysh al-Fatihiin and the IIP was an interesting one. During the December 2005 elections, Jaysh al-Fatihiin (then Islamic Army of Iraq) members had supported the Tawafuq Front coalition of which both their political leader [b]and then-IIP secretary-general Tariq Hashimi were members. Members of the Islamic Army of Iraq apparently believed that Hashimi would give them jobs in the Iraqi government after he became vice president, but Hashimi apparently reneged on any agreement that existed between the two. By October 29, 2006 Vice President Hashimi told Ambassador Khalilzad that he was on a Jaysh al-Fatihiin "hit list," but this was an exaggeration and Jaysh al-Fatihiin had no intention of killing Iraq's ranking Sunni politician.  

In Anbar, some Jaysh al-Fatihiin and former Islamic Army of Iraq moderates began integrating themselves into SAA security units, although the Jaysh al-Fatihiin organization itself was not yet willing to align itself with the SAA. As a result, Sheikh Abdul Sattar entered into negotiations with the Jaysh al-Fatihiin provincial leadership to persuade them to adopt a ceasefire and incorporate their fighters into existing anti-AQI units as well as legitimate security forces. This initiative occurred separately from that which Jaysh al-Fatihiin was pursuing with Vice President Hashimi due to the latter's continued IIP partisan attempts to undermine the influence of SAA.  

1920 Revolution Brigade Negotiations

(S/NF) The 1920 Revolution Brigade now doubled its efforts to integrate with the Iraqi political process. In late December 2006, 1920 Revolution Brigade emissary [b]met with the leaders of the SAA to see if they would sponsor the integration of members of 1920 Revolution Brigade into the Iraqi police and army in Anbar so that they could support anti-AQI operations. This was supported by the SAA platform, which called for former SAR insurgents to renounce their past actions and join the SAA to fight AQI. This had the intended side effect of undercutting the likelihood of recidivism.  

1162 Ibid.  
1163 Ibid.  
1164 Ibid.  
1165 [ | Military | 26 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061226 | (S/NF) | ]
While 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah members loyal to were already supporting the Anbar Revolutionaries in their efforts against AQI, efforts signified that followers were willing to continue their efforts to join the political process despite the near-death of their leader. By late December 2006, views had been adopted at the national level by 1920 Revolution Brigade politburo chief who wanted to negotiate a settlement with the Coalition as soon as possible in order to better defend the Sunni community. While the group had previously attempted to negotiate with Vice President Hashimi, all its emissaries had been arrested and its members had been discouraged from further dialogue with the Iraqi national government.\(^\text{1166}\)

Unfortunately, the criteria set by the SAA for former insurgents to join their group involved pledging allegiance to the Iraqi national government, making a public denunciation of AQI, and agreeing not to carry out any attacks against the Coalition. While this arrangement was possible for followers among 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah, it was far from clear as to whether this would be adopted by other factions of the 1920 Revolution Brigade - certainly it was not adopted by the pro-ceasefire elements within Ansar al-Sunna or Jaysh al-Fatihi.\(^\text{1167}\)

The Anbar Salvation Front and the Anbar Revolutionaries Organization

By the beginning of December 2006, the SAA had expanded from its original core of five tribes centered in the Ramadi area to more than twenty spread throughout Anbar. While Sheikh Abdul Sattar was the organization's undisputed leader and tribal leaders from the original five tribes dominated the group's leadership positions, all major decisions were determined by consensus. The group's agencies included political, military, and media committees, and by December 2006 it had created an 11-point platform addressing everything from the question of local governance to de-Ba'athification to terrorism to economic recovery. While the SAA lacked the resources to attend to this diverse range of issues, they helped to organize the group at the grassroots level and garnered the interest of national politicians.\(^\text{1168}\)

The Anbar Revolutionaries, by contrast, were a loose confederation of off-duty police, tribal fighters, and former SAR insurgents that by December 2006 had established chapters in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah, Rutbah, Saqlawiyah, Karmah, Amariyah, and Ferris Town. These chapters did not coordinate their actions but instead served as something of a common banner for residents willing to expel AQI from their area. In many cases, local chapters of the Anbar Revolutionaries were made up of friends and relatives of AQI's victims wearing black masks, armed with AK-47s, and driving privately owned vehicles at night in search of their quarry. Despite the Anbar Revolutionaries' expansion however, the group's widespread cells had no defined regional leadership and were only as effective as their own local logistical capabilities and resources allowed them to be.\(^\text{1169}\)

\(^\text{1166}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{1167}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{1168}\) [Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^\text{1169}\) Ibid.
Meanwhile, by December 4, and Brigadier General Hamid Hamad al-Showqa had successfully recruited all the necessary 2,250 personnel for their three Emergency Response Battalions (ERBs) but they still needed weapons, vehicles, and training for their men, who had not been paid since signing on.\(^{1170}\) AQI took advantage of this delay to infiltrate the ERBs in Ramadi. Due to the group’s ample experience at infiltrating the Iraqi police and the sheer size of the ERBs, it was next to impossible for the SAA to screen out all AQI agents given their limited resources.\(^{1171}\) As in the SAA’s original proposal, the ERBs were commanded by in Habbaniyah.\(^{1172}\)

City Stories (December 2006)

Ramadi

The Hay al-Dhubat Thanya district (2nd Officers’ District) of Ramadi was the nerve center of AQI in Ramadi as well as the stronghold of AQI Ramadi amir Thamir Hamad Nahar.\(^{1173}\) Despite the proliferation of COPs and extensive Coalition patrols, AQI retained a significant presence in the district. The group set up safe houses, arms caches, propaganda centers, and command and control nodes at Muhayim High School, Muhayim Elementary School, and the Abd al-Qadir Mosque.\(^{1174}\) The Qatana district was also a center of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna activity in Ramadi, though much of this activity was concentrated in the eastern part of the district due to the establishment of the al-Warar police station.\(^ {1175}\) In an effort to drive AQI out of the Qatana district, Coalition forces conducted Operation HUE CITY aimed at establishing command operating positions and Iraqi police stations in the northeastern Qatana district and along 17th Street.\(^ {1176}\)

On December 15, AQI mounted the largest attack against Coalition forces throughout Ramadi since October 21, 2006. As with that the earlier attack, the intent was largely propagandistic: to demonstrate to residents that AQI was still powerful in Ramadi despite the efforts of the SAA. The complex attack, which consisted of highly visible explosions, prolonged gunfire, and indirect effects on the city such as the closing of the entry control points, was the culmination of lengthy preparation, including massing fighters near Hit and east of the Sufia district of the city. Although the level of coordination and complexity involved in the attack was impressive, it forced AQI to sustain high casualties at no cost to Coalition forces.\(^ {1177}\)

\(^{1170}\) Ibid.
\(^{1171}\) [Military | 10 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061210 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{1172}\) [Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{1173}\) [Military | 4 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061204 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{1174}\) [Military | 8 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061208 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{1175}\) [Military | 20 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061220 | (S/NE) | ]
\(^{1176}\) [Military | 17 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061217 | (S/NE) | ]
Khalidiyah

(S) Education ministry employee (b)(6) was the AQI propagandist and facilitator in Khalidiyah, providing AQI fighters with jobs in the education ministry that enabled them to draw a steady salary in addition to their pay for insurgent participation. These AQI fighters resided near the al-Majid school, which served as their primary meeting place.\(^\text{1178}\)

(S) The strong presence of the Anbar Revolutionaries in Khalidiyah and their good working relationship with the local Iraqi police had a positive effect on security in the city. Waging an extremely effective propaganda campaign against AQI in the city, the Anbar Revolutionaries began posting the names of purported AQI members in public forums such as at the Khalid ibn al-Walid Mosque. This campaign caused many AQI cell leaders to regard Khalidiyah as untenable for their operations, relocating to Fallujah with their families for fear of attack by the Anbar Revolutionaries.\(^\text{1179}\)

(S) Despite the heavy presence of the Anbar Revolutionaries, a number of senior AQI leaders continued to operate in the town including Abdullah Ramaya, Abu Marayid, and Kamil Fadhil Latif (Kamil Alladima). While these leaders carried out a variety of activities for the organization ranging from coordinating between cells to facilitating meetings and travel arrangements for senior AQI leaders, with exception of IED manufacturing these leaders had little direct operational impact on security in the city.\(^\text{1180}\)

Julaybah

(S) AQI maintained an extremely strong influence in the Albu Bali and Albu Hizam tribal areas of Julaybah, with many residents too frightened by AQI to even speak with Coalition officials. This influence was due to the fact that both tribes' leading sheikhs were weak individuals who were unable to check AQI influence. Sheikh Sarhan Fadhil Marayi and Sheikh Sattar Muhammad Abd al-Fadhil of the Albu Bali tribe both fled for fear of AQI, while Sheikh Ayad Muhammad Diwan of the Albu Hazim tribe fled with his family to the Jazira area north of the Euphrates River. In the absence of their leadership, AQI was able to maintain a strong presence in both tribal areas, holding parades in support of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq between the Albu Bali tribal area and Sijaria.\(^\text{1181}\)

(S) Whenever AQI fighters entered Julaybah, they continually questioned residents concerning the Coalition presence before conducting any activities. AQI also maintained a successful propaganda campaign, convincing residents that the Coalition killed indiscriminately and deliberately planted snipers to murder Iraqi civilians. As a result, while a majority of the Albu Bali tribesmen supported the efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries, they had no secure way of contacting the group to request its aid or contact its leaders to express their support.\(^\text{1182}\)

\(^{1178}\) [Military | 4 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061204 | (S/NF) | ]
\(^{1179}\) [Military | 5 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061205 | (S/NF) | ]
\(^{1180}\) [Military | 27 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061227 | (S/NF) | ]
\(^{1181}\) [Military | 26 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061226 | (S/NF) | ]
\(^{1182}\) Ibid.
Karmah

(S) In Karmah, residents living in the vicinity of OP Muhammad were forcibly evicted by AQI so that the group could gain a tactical position from which to launch attacks against OPs Muhammad and Omar.\textsuperscript{1183} Tribal leader (b) was under heavy pressure from AQI to use his influence to provide recruits for the group, but he was in fact an agent of the Anbar Revolutionaries in Khalidiyah.\textsuperscript{1184}

(S) served as the primary leaders of AQI in Karmah, carrying out IED and VBIED attacks in the area. As the imam of the Muhammad ibn Sareen Mosque, was able to use his position to hold AQI meetings and plan further attack on the Coalition. was detained by Coalition forces on December 10 after sensitive reporting indicated that he possessed information concerning the body of the F-16 pilot who was killed on November 27 when his aircraft crashed northwest of Karmah.\textsuperscript{1185}

Saqlawiyah

(S) Saqlawiyah was deep in the grip of AQI's murder and intimidation campaign, with armed fighters patrolling the market to prevent residents from speaking with Coalition forces. By threatening workers who attempted to fix the city streets, AQI made it much easier for its operatives to plant IEDs inside the town. While AQI was able to continue recruiting young or unemployed men, as in other Iraqi towns the group's brutality had effectively alienated it from the rest of the general population.\textsuperscript{1186}

Amariyah

(S) As a result of the alliance between the Albu Issa subtribes, the SAA, and the IIP a majority of the residents of Amariyah and Ferris Town were now openly opposed to AQI. As more Albu Issa subtribal leaders agreed to join the anti-AQI effort, they were able to provide legitimacy to the Iraqi police and protect themselves from AQI retaliation.

Hit

(S/NF) As in other Anbari cities, many of Hit's politicians and prominent local figures were forced to support AQI for fear of retaliation. The city's senior cleric Sheikh Muflin Yasin publicly supported the Coalition but was forced by younger imams loyal to AQI to extol the insurgency in his sermons. Former Hit city council chairman Khalil Jundi Mahmud served as the top AQI financial facilitator for the Hit area. While the Hit city council had not functioned since roughly August 2005, by late November 2006 mayor Sheikh Hikmat had gained the support of the Albu

\textsuperscript{1183} [ | Military | 1 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061201 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{1184} [ | Military | 8 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061208 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{1185} [ | Military | 15 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061215 | (S/NF) | ]
\textsuperscript{1186} [ | Military | 25 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061225 | (S/NF) | ]
Nimr, Muhammadi, Furat, and Hay al-Bakr tribes, as well as the ‘Ubaydi tribe in Baghdadi through his alliance with SAA.\(^{1187}\)

\(\text{(S)}\) AQI also maintained an interrogation, detention, and IED manufacturing facility south of the Hit gas station that the group used as part of the murder and intimidation campaign in the city. Among those held at the facility were twenty members of the Albu Nimr tribe that AQI had kidnapped in an effort to secure the release of AQI member \(\text{(b)(6)}\) from Coalition custody.\(^{1188}\)

\(\text{(S)}\) With the loss of both Ramadi General Hospital and the Women and Children’s Hospital as AQI strongholds, the group's cells in Ramadi were forced to either rely on smaller, local clinics or to take their injured to other hospitals outside the Ramadi area. In addition to Kirkuk and Fallujah, Hit was a particularly attractive destination for injured AQI fighters because the same smuggling networks that the group used to transport fighters, weapons, and equipment from Ramadi to the Sijariya and Jazira areas could be used to transport injured fighters to Hit.\(^{1189}\)

Anah

\(\text{(S)}\) Anah, where atmospherics had been positive since the completion of Operation QATIAT ALMAZ, experienced a major surge in IED and SAF attacks concentrated in the southern part of the town, particularly in the Shishon district. The population of southern Anah also adopted increasingly anti-Coalition views as a result of an aggressive AQI propaganda campaign spearheaded from the Qatada Mosque, though these views were not accepted in the northern part of town. This increase in Anah attack levels was due in part to the flight of AQI fighters from the Haditha area as a result of Operation MAJID.\(^{1190}\)

\(\text{(S)}\) Among those AQI fighters who fled to Anah in the wake of Operation MAJID were Ahmad Abd al-Rahman and his followers. Ahmad was killed on December 5 while attempting to plant an IED, which was ironic given that his primary purpose in relocating to Anah was to teach local AQI cells proper IED construction techniques.\(^{1191}\)

Al-Qaim

\(\text{(S)}\) On December 20, fighting resumed between AQI and the revived Hamza Battalion in the Al-Qaim area following the Hamza Battalion’s wounding of AQI amir Anwar Araq Ali al-Jughayfi and the killing of his cousin Thari Ruli Musa al-Jughayfi in Uklah village. In retaliation, AQI attacked the Uklah tribesmen, murdering at least five and kidnapping two others as well as killing and kidnapping several members of the Albu Mahal tribe. The Hamza Battalion responded by kidnapping twenty-five members of the Jumayli tribe and holding them for ransom in the hopes of securing the

1187 [ | Military | 15 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061215 | \(\text{(S/NE)}\) | ]
1188 [ | Military | 25 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061225 | \(\text{(S/NE)}\) | ]
1189 [ | Military | 16 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061216 | \(\text{(S/NE)}\) | ]
1190 [ | Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | \(\text{(S/NE)}\) | ]
1191 [ | Military | 15 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061215 | \(\text{(S/NE)}\) | ]
peaceful release of their tribesmen. AQI in turn sent the decapitated head of one of the hostages to the village of Samsiyah, indicating that there would be no negotiations.\textsuperscript{1192}

**Anbari Reactions to Saddam Hussein’s Execution**

(S) It is just at this moment that Saddam Hussein was executed by the Iraqi government. Reactions to the execution varied considerably in Anbar. In Karmah, residents were largely pleased by Saddam's execution since his government had been very cruel to the people of the town. However, they were afraid to show their relief since Saddam's execution had become an Arab nationalist cause and local insurgents regarded the death of Saddam Hussein as an act of war against the entire Sunni Arab world by the United States, believing that anyone who took pleasure in his death was a Coalition supporter and should be killed.\textsuperscript{1193}

(S) In Haditha and Rawah by contrast, former Ba'athists and retired Iraqi army personnel held demonstrations in support of the dead Iraqi dictator, holding up his portraits and denouncing Muqtada al-Sadr's influence in Iraq. Similar demonstrations had been held in Rawah following Saddam Hussein's initial sentencing on November 6, 2006.\textsuperscript{1194}

**Attack Data (September – December 2006)**

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (September to December 2006). The first two (large – 1/2 page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

(S) The average number of enemy attacks during this period was the highest sustained level of the entire insurgency, and remained relatively stable throughout the period. While the number of Direct Fire and IED incident counts remained mostly stable, the number of Indirect Fire incidents decreased slightly during the period from a peak in late September. The level of Complex Attacks was significantly lower (less than 5 per week) during October and early November than in the months before and after.

\textsuperscript{1192} [ Military | 26 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061226 | (S/NE) ]
\textsuperscript{1193} [ Military | 02 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070102 | (S/NE) ]
\textsuperscript{1194} Ibid.
Conclusion: Snapshot of the Insurgency

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(S/NF) The creation of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq should have been the culmination of AQI’s work throughout the past four years. Al Qaeda senior leadership held the establishment of an Islamic state as one of its central objectives and had already set up an Emirate in northern Pakistan. The announcement of the Emirate in Anbar and other provinces throughout Iraq was accompanied by actions that indicated AQI was developing long-term plans for the country and intended to expand its influence once the Coalition left Iraq. These actions included the declaration and enforcement of shari'ah law in Haditha and elsewhere; the setting up of new institutions and a well-articulated bureaucracy in areas that AQI believed it controlled; strengthened connections between AQI cells in the various provinces; and the levying of taxes and military recruits for the new Emirate.

(S/NF) Meanwhile, AQI so dominated the insurgency, that most of the remaining independent groups were either forced or coopted into cooperation with the group. To any outside observer, it must have seemed likely that AQI would be able to enforce its vision of Anbar’s future—as an Islamic state tied to other states being created by AQSI—once the Coalition departed.

(S/NF) Yet there were other forces at work in Anbar that suggested quite a different conclusion could be drawn about the state of the insurgency. The tribal problems that AQI had suffered since at least 2005 had led to the creation of a serious indigenous rival to the group, a rival that had a charismatic and adept leader who was willing to work with the Coalition in order to challenge AQI. SAA’s work, combined with a decision by the Coalition to move toward a more counterinsurgency approach to the violence, had already led to early successes in Ramadi, one of the centers of the insurgency. It would, however, remain to be seen if these early signs could be transformed into a province-wide program for rolling back and ultimately defeating AQI throughout Anbar.