Developing Strategists:
Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Interwar Army War College

Thomas Bruscino, PhD
US Army War College

Jessica J. Sheets
Editor
Developing Strategists:
Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Interwar Army War College

Thomas Bruscino
Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations
US Army War College

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Military reform efforts, including reform in professional military education, all too often ignore experiences of the past, seeing them as outdated and irrelevant. At the same time, observers revere historical strategic leaders who grew up in these supposedly outdated systems. The great leaders of the past were rarely, if ever, natural strategic geniuses. They had to learn something along the way, which is why professional militaries have a school system in the first place. In order to gain greater clarity on the preparation of strategic leaders, this paper takes a closer look at the US Army War College in the period between World War I and World War II, with a focus on Dwight D. Eisenhower’s tenure as a student in the 1927-1928 school year.

This study finds that the Army War College had a thorough and rigorous curriculum, organized around war planning and the functions of the War Department General Staff. The first two-thirds of the college program emphasized study, and then stressed detailed practice by having the students produce a complete and workable war plan in the final part of the year. Although the students received lectures from experts inside and out of the school and the military, the majority of the instruction was student-centered in that the faculty broke the students into committees that researched and presented on all manner of topics. By the end, they had studied personnel, military intelligence, operations, logistics, mobilization, and war planning from a wide variety of functional, regional, historical, theoretical, civilian, allied, and joint perspectives.

As a result, the Army War College contributed to the development of Eisenhower and the overwhelming majority of the senior leaders who would guide the United States through World War II. More specifically to Eisenhower, his War College year would yield lessons and experiences that carried on throughout his careers inside and out of the military. To a remarkable degree, Eisenhower would apply his Army War College
education to his roles as a strategic advisor, theater commander, service chief, and even President of the United States.

Making extensive use of the Army War College’s archival records at the US Army Heritage and Education Center, this paper lays out the content, structure, educational methodologies, faculty roles, and student experiences and responsibilities at the interwar War College. In so doing, it offers insights into professional military education at the strategic level, interwar military reform, the professional experiences of most of the senior leaders of World War II, and an important but all-too-forgotten portion of General and President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s life.
INTRODUCTION

In the ongoing effort to improve professional military education, we have a tendency to look for the newest methods and cutting edge technologies. Such an approach has value, but comes at a cost. Some efforts to find new ways of doing things operate on the assumption, sometimes stated explicitly, that past methods were fundamentally flawed. Looking to the future can have the unfortunate side effect of not only forgetting the past, but actually dismissing it altogether.

That effect is not deliberate, but it has happened a lot. Naturally, reforms almost always begin with the alleged flaws of the system being reformed. For example, organizational changes to the Army’s professional education system in 2015 were required in part because of the system’s “Industrial Age legacy.”

The previous professional military education system emerged more than a century ago when requirements for military leaders were very different. Consistent with the mass-production, industrial mindset of the time, the Army developed an assembly-line approach to education that focused on conforming to established procedures based around branch-specific expertise.

Army education has evolved in its approach as it has incorporated new learning techniques appropriate for the challenges of emerging operational complexity. However, it still remains unduly constrained by a structural approach to its curriculum development process and a teaching methodology that is too rigid. It does not effectively cultivate or promote the kind of creative thinking and mental agility necessary to overcome the challenges of the future operational environment.1

This sort of critique of past practices is not a new phenomenon. In 1967, when George Pappas first published his history of the Army War College, then Commandant Major General Eugene Salet wrote the foreword. Salet argued that “rapid and dynamic developments of the post-World War II years,” especially in “advances in science and technology” that had contributed to shrinking the world, had made previous concepts and curriculum “outdated.”

These changes brought realization, also, that the professional soldier no longer could restrict his professional development to the study of arms and armaments, of tactics and techniques. Whereas his grandfather could be content with mastering the use of his individual weapon, learning to ride a horse, and controlling small conventional forces, today’s military professional, while first and always a soldier, must also be a diplomat, an economist, a scientist, a historian,

and a lawyer. The complexity of the military arts and sciences has expanded into many other disciplines and professions.²

At the time of the publication, Salet was in the middle of a program of reform called “Army War College-70,” much of which had to do with broadening the curriculum.³

The trend goes further back. A full forty years earlier, in 1927, such critiques of past performance at the Army War College were already circulating. How else to explain Assistant Commandant Colonel Lytle Brown’s admonition that they give a little bit of respect to their predecessors? “Looking back over the performances of others, in the light of today, let no one assume a critical or superior air, forgetting that it was their cutting as they went that brought us to where we are,” wrote Brown. “It is easy to say that those who conceived and conducted the Army War College before and during the war [World War I] had no foresight, and did not know what they were about, but it would be a thoughtless, superficial, and ignorant person who would make such an assertion. The Army War College today is a result of evolution, and we trust that we may say the same at any day in the future, however distant that day may be. An appreciation, a just estimate of the work of those who have gone before is in our minds now, and we hope that such will be true in those who review today in the future."⁴

Paradoxically, at the same time current military leaders responsible for developing future strategic leaders look toward a novel future and dismiss or diminish the old ways of doing things, they ask again and again how the Army can find and develop the next Dwight D. Eisenhower. Even back in 1967, Salet cited graduates such as “Bliss and Lejeune; Pershing and Bullard; Bradley and Eisenhower; Vandenberg and Halsey” in praising the Army War College’s record.⁵ Therein lies the paradox. If the system was too industrial-age, too methodical and tactically focused, how did it produce these paragons of strategic leadership that we want to emulate now?

Among the current efforts to improve itself, the Army War College is looking to explore how executive level schools inside and out of professional military education go about their instruction and education. This is a commendable effort, done with an open mind toward innovations in education. But, like educational reform efforts in the past, the current approach risks being close-minded when it comes to the War College’s own history. Without dismissing the new, it is worthwhile to take a look at the old. There is chance and luck in everything human, especially war, but the Army did not get people

---

like Dwight Eisenhower entirely by accident. A closer look at the methods and curriculum of the college in the interwar period is in order.\textsuperscript{6}

**ORIGINS OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

The Army War College was founded in 1901, first as a direct adjunct to the new General Staff. While they would carry on that role for a while, within a decade, college leaders made sure the curriculum became more educational. The college picked up where the developing Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth left off. Back then Leavenworth had a two year program—most mid-career officers went to the first year School of the Line, and the best went on to the second year Staff College. In their second year at Leavenworth, students explored in great detail the operations of large units—corps and field armies. The Army War College, drawn at times exclusively from students who graduated from the Staff College, carried on that education, looking at field armies, theater operations, and the national strategic efforts of the War and Navy Departments. The students received lectures, did staff rides, and looked intently at all manner of military problems, most related to the color-coded war plans.

The Army shut down the college for World War I, and then reopened it in 1919 under a different name and new leadership. Within a year or two it became the Army War College again, and along the way the school settled into a teaching and curriculum pattern that held, in its essentials, until World War II. Most people who have looked at the college in the interwar period have come to the conclusion that it was not all that rigorous. One historian called it “a pleasant, contemplative assignment.” Others have called it a “gentlemen’s course.”\textsuperscript{7} The main reason for the perpetuation of this view is a misreading of the sources. Yes, many of the students who went through the Army War College in the interwar years said the course was leisurely or easy, but always in comparison to the ultra-competitive and high-intensity Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth. The War College did not have formal grades and it did not have the competitive class ranking system that made Leavenworth so brutal. But that is not to say the Army War College was easy—far from it. The students stayed plenty busy, none more so than an ambitious officer named Dwight D. Eisenhower.

**EISENHOWER’S ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

Obviously there is plenty of variation among the nearly two thousand Army War College students who went through the school in the interwar period. That said, Eisenhower presents a good case study for the experience of students in that time. He

\textsuperscript{6} Two War College students wrote a study project on the 1940 class that comes to similar conclusions. Trent N. Thomas and Charles F. Moler, “A Historical Perspective of the USAWC Class of 1940,” (Group Study Project, US Army War College, April 1987). So too did the biographer of Lesley McNair. Mark T. Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 99-123.

arrived at the college, then in Washington, D.C., for the 1927-1928 school year. The commandant of the school was Major General Hanson Ely, who was replaced halfway through the year by Major General William Connor—not to be confused, as he often is, with Fox Conner. Historians of the college tend to use the tenures of commandants to illustrate shifts in the school. For this period they have focused on competing perspectives between instruction on high level staff work and teaching about command. These were important considerations, especially to the instructors, but in practice the reforms to the content of the curriculum and the conduct of instruction were relatively minor. Eisenhower attended the school just about in the middle of the interwar period, during a transition between commandants. Despite the potential turmoil of that time, his year ended up being a nice balance between the initial 1920s program set up by the Great War veterans and the approach the college settled into throughout the 1930s.

None of this is to imply that Eisenhower was normal himself or had a normal military career. Without getting into a detailed biography, he graduated from West Point in 1915, served in a variety of roles before going to the Tank Corps and commanding at Camp Colt during World War I. After the war he went on a motorized convoy across the country, and then served as Fox Conner's executive officer in Panama. Conner took a liking to Eisenhower and helped him get into the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1925-1926, from which he graduated first in his class. After a short stint in command and coaching football, Conner brought Eisenhower to the attention of General John Pershing. When Ike was selected for the Army War College, he was serving at Pershing's behest on the American Battlefield Monuments Commission, writing a guidebook to American World War I battlefields in Europe. Ike's supervisor, a man named Xenophon Price, attempted to talk Eisenhower out of going, arguing that Pershing's pet project would be better for the career prospects than more time in the schoolhouse. It says something about the college's reputation, at least with Eisenhower, that Ike disagreed: "The [War] Department has given me a choice. And for once I'm going to say yes to something I'm anxious to do." So off he went in the summer of 1927 to Washington, D.C. His class had ninety full-time students, plus another fifteen or so who came temporarily. The selection of students is beyond the purview of this paper, but the college tried, in fits and starts, to draw from a broad swath of the officer corps, with the main requirement that they usually be graduates of Leavenworth. Ninety-three came from the Regular Army, including seven colonels, twenty-three lieutenant colonels, and sixty-three majors. To

---

8 Cooling makes this mistake throughout.
9 War College historian Harry Ball tends to emphasize differences from period to period, but calls the 1919-1940 altogether the “Second War College,” in Ball, Of Responsible Command, 147-255. On the continuity of themes, see especially Michael R. Matheny, Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 55-68, 74-88.
10 Mark C. Bender, Watershed at Leavenworth: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Command and General Staff School (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1990).
enable “the Navy to keep in touch with the developments and progress of military science and provide a means of liaison in joint operations,” the Navy Department sent officers as instructors and students. A total of nine Navy student officers graduated in Eisenhower’s class: three Navy captains and three commanders, and one Marine colonel and two lieutenant colonels. (For similar reasons, five Army officers went to the Naval War College that year, although the structure of that program was different in many ways, including having a correspondence course.) The Army War College faculty and staff had another forty-seven Army officers. Additionally, fourteen National Guard officers went to the college for all or part of some of the courses, for a total of five weeks.

Some broad characteristics of the social life at the Army War College should be noted. At the time it was located in Washington, D.C., on a little peninsula jutting into the intersection of the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers, just a little west of due south from the Capitol. Back then, the post was called Washington Barracks. In 1935 it would become Fort Humphreys, and since 1948 it has been Fort Lesley J. McNair. Very few of the students lived on the post—instead most rented nearby apartments. The Eisenhowers, Dwight, Mamie, and son John, lived in the Wyoming Apartments, a few blocks north of Dupont Circle, near the Washington Hilton where President Ronald Reagan survived an assassination attempt. The college, while hard work, also made time for a full social calendar, and many of the officers and their families took advantage of being in Washington and among friends and peers to have a good time. They had plenty of gatherings, the men played bridge regularly, and even during Prohibition they had plenty of alcohol.

Very broadly, the school year had two parts. The first part was called the Informative Period (changed the next year to “Preparation for War”), and a War Plans Period (changed to “Conduct of War”). The first focused on knowledge and analysis of current and historical systems; the second focused on application through planning. To organize these parts of the course, they thought about where War College graduates might serve after their year at the school. Since most of the graduates would go into high level staff positions and needed special familiarity with the War Department General Staff, the faculty arranged the curriculum by the staff structure of the General Staff.

During World War I, the leadership of General John Pershing’s American Expeditionary Forces had settled on a particular American general staff structure. That structure was the famous G-1 (personnel), G-2 (intelligence), G-3 (operations), and G-4

(supply and transportation) system. After the war, as Pershing gained more influence, the field staff system was transplanted to the War Department General Staff, where those sections were joined by a War Plans Division and worked alongside the Assistant Secretary of War who oversaw mobilization. Consequently, the college organized the informative period of the curriculum into War Plans Division, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Assistant Secretary of War, and Command courses, all of which would go into application when they wrote war plans in the spring.\footnote{James E. Hewes, From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1983), 52-54; Brown, “The United States Army War College,” 296.}

**INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE**

The school year would run from opening events on September 1, 1927, to graduation on June 30, 1928. The college held the general orientation to the course on September 2, with the opening talk delivered by Army Chief of Staff Charles Summerall and an introduction to the college by Assistant Commandant Colonel Lytle Brown. Brown had noted in an article that summer that the “method of instruction is peculiar to this institution.” The students were unique and had unique requirements. “The War College,” Brown wrote, “is in no sense an academic place. It is rather a place for research, original thought, and the training of the mind to grapple with the most concrete questions that affect the national defense.” With that in mind, Brown’s orientation was a thorough review of the mission and philosophy of the college. It was a selective school for certain individuals to improve themselves and prepare for potential future positions. More specifically, “These positions of high responsibility are the command of large combat forces in time of war, as confidential advisers and assistants to such commanders, and as military advisers and assistants to those high governmental civil officials who are charged by law with the responsibility of preserving the security of this nation.”\footnote{Brown, “The United States Army War College,” 296-297.}

The curriculum would maintain a joint perspective with the Navy and the Naval War College, in particular because at the highest levels of command all strategies were joint, but also because many lower levels would have joint problems too. When it came to the distinction between command and general staff, Brown acknowledged that there had been some dispute over the relative weight of the War College education toward the latter over the former. But to Brown the distinction was overplayed, because “every function of the General Staff is a command function strictly. The general staff officer is a closely confidential assistant to the commander in the execution of the function of command; he considers all questions that affect the action of the commander, and should consider them in exactly the same light that the commander would do.” Brown’s point was that many of the disputes between command and staff education were not really about command versus staff, but rather that the commandant believed they needed to spend more time on “strategy and large tactical operations,” which would cut into some of the War Department General Staff time.
The faculty was broken into divisions that were responsible for each of the courses. Most of the actual student work would be done in committees created by the faculty of each course. The committee structure, make-up, leadership, and subject matter varied by course, meaning that students would get a chance to serve in different roles in committees of various sizes while dealing with all sorts of problems and issues. The role of committee chairman was particularly important, because he was tasked with ensuring that the work was done on time and in the approved manner. Serving as a chairman of a committee or sub-committee was a learning experience in peer leadership, because they had “no power of command but act as staff officers,” and “they must use tact, judgement, patience and forbearance.” The students were of different ranks, ranging from major to colonel, but that would have no bearing on the roles they would play, and all were encouraged to work together regardless of rank.

Certain characteristics and ideas were to be kept in mind as the students went through the curriculum. The faculty wanted as concrete a treatment of every subject as possible, avoiding excessive abstract principles or theories. Unlike the Command and General Staff School, the War College would not use any fictional scenarios—all of the situations and problems for the college were to be either historically accurate or current in the real world. When it came to committee reports, the students would have standard forms to follow, “but it is to be understood that substance and not form is the thing of value,” and they were encouraged to alter the form as necessary to express their points. Brevity was encouraged as a mark of improved judgement as to what was essential in any issue. Students were to avoid “artificial high-sounding words or phrases” and “the coining of new terms” which “leads to confusion of ideas.” Instead they were to convey thoughts in “plain, simple, direct, and ordinary language.” Except in the case of orders, all student writings were to include in-text source references, not just bibliographies. In presenting the work of committees at conferences to the whole student body, the spokesman was not to read an essay nor use notes except as guideposts. They were to practice stressing main points with confidence and clarity. “The speaker must know his subject, believe in his points, and must divorce himself from all nervous manifestations such as walking around, or jerky, meaningless gestures, that are liable to attract more attention from the audience than what he has to say.”

When it came to lectures and committee conferences, the students were never to be passive observers. At the end of lectures, the subject would be opened to a question and answer period, and the students participated in the discussion. All such discussions were confidential, which allowed lecturers to be frank and open with their thoughts, but that happened more often when the audience offered challenging questions. Whether they were in lectures or conferences, “No man will do his full duty if, when he hears views that seem contrary to his own convictions which are based on what seem to him sound reason and mature reflection, he does not give full expression to his own views.” As long as the officers expressed their views in a temperate manner, with no sarcasm, all opinions were fair game. Everything was open to discussion at the War College, and
it was unproductive and unfair to the class to hold on to contrary opinions and express them later in “a small coterie.”

The only truly individual work the students would do during the year would be a writing assignment, called at the time an individual staff memorandum. They had to choose their topic to be approved by the commandant by September 15, 1927, with the final product due by the first Monday of April 1928, freeing them up to focus on the war planning exercise. They had wide latitude in the selection of topics, but they could not be focused on technical or tactical issues. The general guidance called for the topics to “be broad enough to require General Staff action” and “of interest to the Army or Navy, or both, as a whole.” Further, the topic should deal with some issue that would be important to current or future action in “the betterment of national defense.”

The faculty expected the students to be self-motivated. The students would not be fighting for grades, or “boning tenths” as they put it in reference to the grading system at Leavenworth. When it came to assessment, the students and faculty were all in it together, since the only account of the year would be the standard efficiency report for all officers. Instead, the faculty emphasized to the students: “Your reward or your punishment is the opinion your own classmates form of your ability and what you take of that offered you in the course or fail to get. We are simply assembled here for a year to benefit ourselves by hearing and exchanging ideas. You can make the year what you wish, every man for himself, but we of the faculty shall fail in our duty if you find the year other than the most enjoyable and profitable of your peace-time military careers.”

WAR PLANS DIVISION COURSE, PERIOD 1

The meat of the 1927-1928 year began the next day with the War Plans Division Course, which had its first section in September 1927. The orientation for the course acted as a sort of second orientation for the school year. They pointed out that the field of study for a War College that would deal with all of the major parts of the origins, conduct, and consequences of war was so broad that “no one man could cover it by himself in a life time.” They would teach primarily by lecture and discussion, by which they meant invited lectures by “the best authorities we can find,” lectures by faculty at

---


the college on their own research, and also by “having the class itself research various subjects and present the work to the college.”

The War Plans course went first in order to clarify all the work for the rest of the curriculum, especially given some broad confusion about what constituted actual war plans. As Colonel Brown explained, “A very important duty of the War and Navy Departments is the preparation in time of Peace of War Plans.” The problem was that “only a few know all of the features of a war plan though a great many know some of its features.” But a true war plan covered everything from mobilization through the fighting, and as such was “a guide of action of every step of importance taken in the War and Navy Departments during time of peace, including the amount of funds asked from Congress.” The students needed “a comprehensive view of war plans at the outset” in order to give them a view of the full scope and scale of the environment at the highest levels. The Army War College did not make the actual war plans, but acted as if it did, and sometimes college products informed the War Department General Staff. As such, “its work is never wasted; its views are always of value, but its results lie mainly in the minds of those who study there.”

In order to allow these student presentations to cover all the required ground, they divided the students into committees—three in that first period, that would look at three different subjects and present their findings to the class for discussion. One committee looked at how war plans were made and the common language used by the War Department. Another looked at war planning in the past, studying French and German military plans in 1870 and 1914, British and German naval plans in 1914, and American war planning prior to World War I. The third committee, the one to which Eisenhower was assigned, did a strategic survey of the United States, to provide a greater familiarity with the military geography, resource base, and economic power of the country.

Eisenhower’s team was divided into four subcommittees, each looking at a region of the US. Eisenhower was part of the northeastern area, where he looked at the region from an operations perspective. The committee submitted its report on September 17, the last day of the first period. The sixty-eight page report contained short summaries on the topography, climate, population, transportation networks, industry, raw materials, foodstuffs, and maritime features of each area, followed by detailed supplements on the specifics of these issues, including specific port capacities. Unfortunately, Eisenhower’s Operations section of the supplement that he worked on along with Marine Colonel F. L. Bradman was not copied into the report. That said,

---

20 “Orientation Lecture, Outline of the Course and Committee Assignments and Bibliography,” Course at the Army War College, 1927-1928, WPD, First Period, Box: War Plans Course, File No. 346A, 1 to 15, AWC Curricular Archives, 1927-1928, USAMHI.
23 “Orientation Lecture, Outline of the Course and Committee Assignments and Bibliography,” September 12, 1927, Course at the Army War College, 1927-1928, WPD, First Period, Box: War Plans Course, File No. 346A, 1 to 15, AWC Curricular Archives, 1927-1928, USAMHI.
there are some operational conclusions. The report’s overall concern was what shortages the United States might have were it to be attacked by a major power from either the Atlantic or Pacific, with Canada and Mexico also hostile to the US. Based on their studies, they concluded that “trade routes to the east coast of South America or through the Panama Canal to the west coast are essential. Likewise a route to the nickel mines of Canada is necessary.” Internal to the United States, they concluded they had to keep the manufacturing areas of the northeast connected with the raw materials and food of the other sections.24

For this course, they received lectures throughout the year on “Our Natural Strength” (September 3); “Naval Organization” (September 3); “The War Plans Division” (September 6) “A Lesson from Lissa” (about fleets and naval bases) (September 8); “Functions of Naval Types in Fleet Action” (January 20); “A Study of the Battle of Jutland” along with an War College history of the battle (January 21); “The Strategy of the Naval Campaign Preceding Trafalgar” (April 21); “Naval Strategy and Combat” by the president of the Naval War College (April 24). The students also received reports and readings, including the “Military Institutions of Vegetius” and a “Special Tabulation: Census of Manufactures” by type and region of the US.25

G-1 COURSE

After the introductory War Plans course, the students took the G-1 course from September 19 to October 22, 1927. This course continued the informative “Preparation for war” portion of the curriculum and focused on the functions and responsibilities of the G-1 division of the General Staff. It was taught through lectures, committee studies, and conferences, the same as the War Plans course, with the intent of the conferences being to share the specific information gleaned by each individual committee. For the G-1 course in 1927-1928, they divided the students into seventeen committees. Overall, the instruction looked at more than just administration and record keeping, but also have the issues of boosting morale and enabling mobilization. The students received lectures on the Personnel Division, mobilization, Naval personnel, the populations, and Selective Service. The committees looked at a wide range of subjects, including the history of G-1 administrative services, Selective Service, assignment of officers during war, psychological and historical studies of morale, effects of anti-war organizations, mobilization, demobilization, civil affairs in occupied territories, replacements, the operations of the G-1 sections in corps areas and lower units, and the position of the commander in battle. Eisenhower belonged to Committee No. 17, which was tasked with providing a review of the course. They were not to simply rehash or even critique the other reports, but rather look at “the outstanding questions and issues developed either in the reports of committees or in the discussions following such reports.” The

24 “Strategic Survey of the United States,” Extracts from Report of Committee No. 3, Course at the Army War College, 1927-1928, WPD, First Period, Box: War Plans Course, File No. 346A, 1 to 15, AWC Curricular Archives, 1927-1928, USAMHI.
25 Box: War Plans Course, File No. 346A, 1 to 15, AWC Curricular Archives, 1927-1928, USAMHI.
idea was to be more disinterested, as the faculty expected many of the conferences to generate considerable heat.\textsuperscript{26}

Eisenhower’s committee, consisting of six members and chaired by Major C. L. Sampson, had its conference on October 22, the last day of the course. They did a fine job of summarizing the rest of the conferences, drawing out the key points. But more important were the issues themselves, which all students had an opportunity to discuss in the conferences, but which Eisenhower’s committee in particular had to think about because of their assignment to review. Considering Eisenhower would write his major paper for the year on the enlisted reserve, the material in this course naturally appealed to him.\textsuperscript{27} That said, he probably got a little distracted in the middle of the course. Eisenhower’s brother Milton got married on October 12 in Washington, D.C. Ike was the best man, and he hosted the bachelor party at his house, with Mamie and John out for the night. Another brother, Earl, said he got “one of the great hang-overs of the century.” Eisenhower wore his dress uniform for the wedding, and the bride cut the cake with his sword. It was not all business at the War College.\textsuperscript{28}

**G-3 COURSE**

The G-3 course came next—the G-2 course would come later—running from October 24 to November 12, 1927. It followed much the same pattern as the previous two courses, beginning with a series of lectures running from October 24 to November 4. These lectures were delivered by many of the leaders of the Army and covered the development of tanks in the US Army, the role of the G-3 in corps areas, future cavalry organization, the organization and employment of the air corps, anti-aircraft artillery, field army artillery, the principles of war, and the G-3 in a field army. The students then went into committees—nine for this course—which looked at such issues as general staff functions and organization, G-3 functions, the military policy of the US, the organization and equipment of the US Army, training in the army, mobilization and concentration plans, joint army and navy action in air operations, and, like the G-1 course, a review of the course. The students received various reports in this course, including an “Availability File” compiled by the war college’s G-3 Division that showed the strength, status, and location of every unit in the US Army, broken down by headquarters, branch, and echelon. The file was meant “to assist the student body in the preparation of specific War Plans.”\textsuperscript{29}

This time Eisenhower chaired one of the committees, Committee No. 1, which was to “study and report on the origin and development of the War Department General

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{27} “General Review of the G-1 Course as Developed by Committees Nos. 1-16 with a View of a Succinct Presentation of the Course as a Whole,” Report of Committee No. 17, Course at the Army War College, 1927-1928, G-1, Docs. Nos. 1-21, Vol. I, Box: Curriculum, 1926-1927, and 1927-1928, AWC Curricular Archives, USAMHI.
\item\textsuperscript{28} Davis, *Soldier of Democracy*, 225.
\item\textsuperscript{29} “Availability File, United States Army, 1927,” G-3 Course No. 21, Box: War Plans Course, File No. 343A, 1-21, AWC Curricular Archives, 1927-1928, USAMHI.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Staff." They looked at the current system and were to make recommendations, if any, for changes. Finally, they were to study the equivalent staffs of the British, French, and Japanese, and recommend any practices or organizations that might be adopted by the American War Department. Eisenhower sensibly divided the committee into two subcommittees, one to look at the history and current organization of the War Department General Staff, and the other to take the comparative approach with the British, French, and Japanese armies.30

Eisenhower’s committee delivered its findings at a conference at 9:10am on November 8, 1927, and submitted its report three days later. They began with a thorough summary of the development of the actual General Staff, beginning in 1903, going through its growing pains prior to and during the World War, and coming into its current form after the war. Of special note as to why the War Department staff took on the same structure as the field staffs was that “within the War Department General Staff there must be provided the nucleus of a general staff for a G.H.Q.,” i.e.: a deployed theater headquarters, like the American Expeditionary Forces in the First World War. This was the role of the War Plans Division, which itself had a G-1 through G-4 structure. All of that provided useful background to the students on the workings of highest headquarters, but Eisenhower did not stop there.31

Based on a closer look at the workings of the American General Staff and the British, French, and Japanese systems, Eisenhower’s committee concluded its report with a bang, recommending that “the War Plans Division be abolished.” Their reasoning, expressed throughout the report, was that centralizing war planning in a relatively small and discreet section of the staff “tends to encourage other divisions to relegate war planning questions to secondary roles.” As a result, the senior officers of the G-1 through G-4 divisions did not consider those questions and offer their advice to the Chief of Staff in the final decisions on war planning. Basically, since war planning required all of the functions of the rest of the staff (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics) in order to be done well and efficiently, it made no sense that should be done in a division separate from those sections, and usually by a small group of more junior officers. Eisenhower’s report recommended instead that each general staff division have a section dedicated to war planning, that there be a War Plans Board consisting of the heads of each division to lead war planning, and that “war planning, in all its phases, be made the function of the general staff as a whole, in the preparation of which each division shall perform the functions for which it is organized; that the G-3 division, in

addition to its other functions, be specifically charged with the placing of the plan into usable form and with the promulgation of safe keeping of the complete plan.”

**G-4 COURSE**

After finishing the G-3 course, the students went on to the G-4 portion of the year, from November 14 to December 7, 1927. The organization of the course mirrored the others. It began with lectures on G-4 subjects, including the G-4 Division, the regulating station, the War Department budget, port regulations, and a civilian lecture on control of railroad traffic. For this course, the students broke into nine committees. The committees were tasked with making recommendations based on their study of the following topics: the organization of the G-4 from War Department to field army, the budget of the War Department, the First Army G-4 in the Meuse Argonne, control of transportation and regulating stations, G-4 features in specific wars and expeditions, a review of G-4 features in war plans produced by the 1926-1927 War College class, and relations with the Navy in G-4 activities for joint overseas operations.

As with the other courses, the instructors of the G-4 course made clear that supply was not a standalone subject. In the orientation they repeated the mandate and focus of the college, “to afford selected officers the opportunity to prepare themselves for high command, and for service on the General Staff of the War Department, the Corps Areas, and field armies.” The course would emphasize supply, but only as part of the bigger picture of all of the other responsibilities of the commander. The point was that when they got to the later course on command and war planning—and when they got to their future strategic level jobs—“the bearing of supply on the problems presented must be considered in conjunction with all other matters.”

For this course, the instructors assigned Eisenhower to Committee No. 3, which had “Miscellaneous G-4 Matters,” and more specifically: organization of a communications zone (using the American Expeditionary Forces [AEF] in World War I, the Field Service Regulations, and the war plan produced by the previous year’s class); air transportation in supply and evacuation; arrangements for local, allied, and joint supply in a theater of operation; methods for establishing requirements for procurement and distribution; and transportation, supply, and evacuation for a force of 40,000 men. The committee chair divided his group into five subcommittees to look at each of these issues, and Eisenhower went into a four-man team to study the 40,000 man expeditionary force.

---


The committee had its conference on December 2, and given the broad variety of topics, its report was extensive. They were critical of some of the command arrangements in terms of supply in the AEF during the war but thought the Field Service Regulations had rectified the problem. The committee fully embraced the potential of air transportation and evacuation. They called for as much local procurement as possible and close cooperation or unity of command in allied and joint supply in theater operations. The subcommittee on procurement and distribution saw the contemporary system as a great improvement over past practices. Eisenhower’s subcommittee got into very specific detail on its problem, using a committee report from the G-3 course that had looked at organizing and deploying a field army to Mexico that would land at Vera Cruz and attack toward Mexico City. The group studied the terrain, roads, and railroads, estimates of enemy resistance, and the timing and pace of total campaign. Based on their studies, they provided a series of specific recommendations, including the locations of depots and hospitals (and hospital beds), evacuation rates, and the use of air transport and native labor. The subcommittee went further, actually naming the real supply, transportation, evacuation, and medical units (and the conversion of other units to supply roles) that would be a part of the field army, and the specific timing of their movement into the theater.35

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR COURSE**

The class finished the 1927 calendar year with the Assistant Secretary of War course, running from December 8 up to Christmas Eve. After the painful difficulties of procuring material for the World War through a group of basically ad hoc organizations in the War Department, the American government decided to reform the system. The National Defense Act of 1920—an amendment of the 1916 act—created, among other things, an Assistant Secretary of War to “be charged with supervision of procurement of all military supplies . . . and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs.” Army regulations in 1921 went further in defining the Assistant Secretary’s responsibilities and powers, which included “the inspection of facilities, production, purchase or acquisition, and inspection, test, acceptance, and storage of supplies . . . including real estate for the forgoing purposes”; cooperation with the Navy Department and other government departments and agencies in creating a joint program; and supervision of all of the supply branches of the Army. Altogether, it was an enormous responsibility, and the War Department’s role in supply intersected with even larger and more complex civilian systems of production. Recognizing the complexity of the issue, the Army had created a separate Army Industrial College after the war, meant to educate officers specifically for procurement duties.36

---


The Assistant Secretary of War course at the Army War College did not try to replicate the Army Industrial College. Rather, it was meant to familiarize students with the wartime systems and some of the ways that the existing peacetime systems could be used to meet “the material demands of the armed forces during peace and war.” Once again they would be taught through a combination of lectures and committee work leading to conferences. The lectures covered industrial preparedness and control of economic and industrial resources in war (both by Bernard Baruch), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, labor in war, shipping in troop movements, and a series on the unique attributes of industrial planning.37

For this course the college divided the students into seven committees. The first covered industrial mobilization in foreign nations for the World War (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, and Austria) and future emergencies (Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, and Japan). The second looked at mobilizing material and industrial organizations for war time, including the relationship of the Assistant Secretary of War to the Army’s supply branches, the organization and planning of the Navy Department when it came to war materials, the raw materials needed for national defense, and the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The third and fourth committees studied the means of “securing and controlling the economic and industrial support of our national effort in war,” looking at eleven factors: Council of National Defense, Raw Materials and Manufacturing Plant, Fuel and Power, Food, Labor, Shipping, Transportation (rail, inland water, motor), War Trade, Communication (wire, cable, radio), Finance, and Price Fixing. The fifth and sixth committees looked at war plans, with the fifth looking at plans from the perspective of the Joint Board and War Department General Staff and their relationships with the Assistant Secretary of War. The sixth, to which Eisenhower belonged, was to “make a study of the administrative and economic War Powers of the President and recommend a plan to provide for the control of our economic and industrial effort in the prosecution of war.” The seventh committee would review of the rest of the conferences and reports.38

By that time in the academic year, Eisenhower and his classmates had explored a wide variety of issues relating to the making of war from the perspective of the War Department General Staff, theater commands, and field armies. Those topics ranged far beyond purely military affairs, intersecting especially with the civilian economy and the nation’s industrial base for purposes of mobilization. The Assistant Secretary of War was a civilian political appointee, and so the course covering the responsibilities of that position was bound to bring in more political concerns. Nowhere was that more true than in Eisenhower’s committee, which had the mandate of laying out the war powers of the president and providing a presidential level plan for controlling American industry and economy in wartime.


38 “Committee Assignments and Directives,” Course at the Army War College, 1927-1928, ASW, Docs. Nos. 1-17, Vol. V, Box: Curriculum, 1927-1928, AWC Curricular Archives, USAMHI.
The committee jumped into the problem, reviewing the constitutional powers of the president and how they had been interpreted and applied in previous conflicts, especially during the World War. They concluded that in war the president was restricted only in the sense that he could "not trespass on or abrogate the law-making power of Congress," such as suspending agencies or departments explicitly created by law. Otherwise, precedent had shown that the president had nearly dictatorial wartime administrative powers when it came to economic and industrial matters. Modern great power wars required such controls, because in such wars "the moral and physical resources of the nation are largely diverted from their peace-time channels and are directed towards the speedy destruction of the moral and physical resources of the opponent." In other words, they had to use all forms of national power, not just the military. The military would concentrate "their efforts towards breaking down the armed resistance of the enemy, while other agencies of the government are devoted to breaking down the hostile national morale through political and economic pressure, propaganda and education." With "the entire nation at war . . . the national government will be the agency through which the combined efforts of 120,000,000 people will be coordinated and directed," with the president as the coordinator and director.39

The committee’s broad plan for the president exercising such control and direction emphasized the importance of civilian authority for reasons both practical and in terms of morale. The Army and Navy needed to be more focused on the fighting of the war under the direction of the president, and less concerned with trying to procure personnel and materials for the war. Those tasks would be better handled by centralized civilian authorities, in the first place because the “success of a major national effort is dependent upon public opinion.” National morale would not respond well if “the powers exercised by the President in war could be enforced only through punitive laws,” and, like it or not, in “the popular mind, Army or Navy control suggests force.” Further, civilian control would allow for the continuation, as much as practicable, of the forms and functions of existing systems, which already functioned efficiently. Altogether, the plan called for the president to exercise control of procurement of personnel, control of finances, fixing of prices, control of labor, control of food, control of fuel and power, control of internal transportation (rail, roads, and water), control of war materials and manufacturing, war trade, shipping, communication, and public information, including censorship and propaganda. Many of these functions would fall under a proposed Director of War Industries, who worked alongside the Secretaries of War, Navy, Treasury, and Agriculture, and the Directors of Public Information and Selective Service, to aid the president in control and directing the national war effort. It was an ambitious approach, laid out here not for praise or criticism, but to show just how much ground one committee in one course at the Army War College could cover.40


They were by no means done. They had their final conference for the Assistant Secretary of War course on Christmas Eve, then broke for the holiday to reconvene on January 3, 1928. At that time they began the G-2 course, which would run until February 8 and cover issues relating to the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff. The intent of this course was to cover all of the responsibilities of the G-2, but with special emphasis on “information regarding the enemy, and in times of peace information regarding foreign nations and possible theaters of operation on foreign soil.” The faculty had decided to place the G-2 course out of numerical sequence and later in the college year because they wanted the students to have “a view of the essentials of the war-making capacity of our own country,” in order to inform the creation and execution of war plans. With those “essential elements of the ‘Estimate of the Situation’ relating to our own forces,” the course director instructed, “We should now assemble the necessary facts upon which to deduce the actions and intentions of possible enemies.” That said, they had to be careful about not assuming the potential enemies would look at plans the same way as Americans. “It is difficult for us to work ourselves into the mental attitude of a foreigner and to think as he does,” the students were told, “but this we should attempt to do in the G-2 course.”

Given the worldwide scope of the subject material, it should not be surprising that the G-2 course provided to the students a greater number of lectures and transcripts of previous years’ lectures—roughly twice as many lectures as most of the rest of the courses. The lectures went on throughout the year, not just during the course, beginning in September with a talk on Russia, followed by experts from academia, journalism, the State Department, and military intelligence discussing: China, the British Commonwealth, German and French militaries, the general world situation, the War Department Military Intelligence Division, the Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval Intelligence generally, the sources and methods of Department of Commerce information on economic conditions in other countries, press relations, Mexico, neutrality, Japan, the British Empire, China, Latin America, arms limitation, the Near East, and further talks on China and Soviet Russia.

One of the lectures on Russia came on January 30, 1928, from a Catholic priest named Edmund A. Walsh. Father Walsh was a widely published author with a PhD and a professor of international relations at Georgetown University, where he had founded the School of Foreign Service in 1919 for the purpose of educating diplomats and international businessmen. From 1922-1923, he directed the Papal Relief Mission to Russia, working alongside Herbert Hoover's American Relief Administration. There he witnessed firsthand the mass starvation and religious and class persecutions and executions that came in the aftermath of the communist revolution in Russia. His talk at the Army War College was part of a series of thousands of lectures he gave on the

---

subject, and coincided with the 1928 publication of his book, first partially serialized in The Atlantic, called The Fall of the Russian Empire. In a two hour talk, Walsh delivered a clear and brutal condemnation of communism, casting it as a threat to all civilization. He described horrific examples of torture and murder, a terror that far outdid even the worst excesses of the French Revolution. It was all motivated by an all-encompassing Marxist materialistic ideology. It was so all-encompassing that he told them to think of communism as a religion that threatened the rest of civilized society. “The Bolshevik revolution meant . . . revolution in every domain of human thought,” he told them, “revolution in economics, in religion, science, education, politics, everything—every activity of which the human mind is capable—and not only in Russia but also outside of Russia. The program of the Third International is that what has been achieved in Russia shall be extended to the whole world.”

Everyone had to take a break, Eisenhower remembered, but “the class as one man demanded that he return to answer questions and to give us something more of his knowledge that was so interestingly presented.”

As always, the students broke into committees to study specific questions themselves, this time seventeen different groups. The instructors provided two recommendations when it came to the work for the G-2 course. The first was that the study of foreign countries involved so much available detail “that one is very liable to be lost in a maze of research and find little or no time for thought and reflection.” The students had to avoid that trap, because while research was required, “it is of little or no value unless it leads to some original thought or to conclusions pertinent to the problems at issue.” The second recommendation was that the students had limited time to look at their issues, so they should adopt the viewpoint “analogous to that of the man 'higher-up' who makes a broad survey and plans the general route of the railroad…above the realm of the subordinates who make detailed surveys and supervise the construction.”

The committees would look at a wide variety of subjects, including G-2 factors in planning (such as climatology); the principles, policies, organizations, and functions of...

---


military intelligence; studies of potential theaters of operation; key factors in the world economy; significant factors in world political and social conditions (including the status of minorities in Europe); international law and war planning; military estimates on Mexico, the British Empire, and Japan; G-2 historical studies of information and military decision making; censorship and publicity; the importance of South America in world affairs; the Far Eastern situation; the European Situation; arms limitation; G-2 functions and contributions at corps area, field army, and theater general headquarters; and possible alliances against the US. Eisenhower belonged to Committee No. 7, along with eleven other officers, looking at Mexico.45

In the three committees working on updating military estimates, including Eisenhower’s, they did not produce traditional reports. Courses from previous years had already produced the estimates, and almost every year the new committees would update the information and potential conclusions therein. What they produced was a pretty standard estimate, taking into account the geography, political systems, foreign policy, military capabilities, economic power, and psychological aspects of Mexico, along with estimates as to Mexican approaches in a potential war with the US.

Also interesting for the G-2 course was that the students were asked by the faculty to identify readings that they found particularly helpful in their research, and write short thumbnail reviews of those readings. Those reviews were gathered and printed in a 116 page compilation at the end of the course. They do not identify the individual reviewers, but nevertheless the compilation is an interesting snapshot of the reading interests of the officers in Eisenhower’s class at the Army War College. Like the subject matter of the course, the reviews range far and wide, to include foreign language books and articles, covering geography, war theory, politics and political science, economics, psychology, censorship, propaganda, espionage, history, sociology, and international law. The reviews on Mexican subjects, to which Eisenhower presumably contributed, included books and articles on Mexican history, the Mexican revolution, current affairs in Mexico, sociological studies of the country, and even guidebooks on Mexico that were useful for maps that illustrated road networks. A typical review read:

DILLON, E.J.…………..MEXICO ON THE VERGE. (1921) (F 1234 D 57)

A comparison of the “New Era” in Mexico as represented by General Obregon with the regime of Carranza. In discussing the causes of friction between Mexico and the United States severely criticizes our policy and its application in Latin America (particularly in Haiti). Attempts to show that Mexican suspicion of American

intentions is fully justified. All controversial issues presented from the viewpoint most favorable to Mexico.46

COMMAND COURSE, PERIOD 1

The final academic course of the school year before the students went into their war planning exercise was also the longest. The Command course was broken into two periods, the first ran from February 9 to April 4, 1928, and the second from May 31 to June 30. In addition to being longer, the course also had a greater mix of activities. The first period more closely followed the established pattern of the previous courses, with lectures, reports, and committees. They placed the second period in the late spring to take advantage of the better weather, because it consisted of map maneuvers, field exercises, and a reconnaissance of terrain. The overall purpose of the course was, as the instructors noted, “easily stated; we must find out what the higher commander must know, what he has to do and how he does it.” However, like everything else at the War College, even that simple statement required engaging with a wide variety of issues, which the faculty broke into “four general classes”: knowledge of men, knowledge of the unit commanded (field army, theater command, general headquarters), knowledge of war and its principles, and knowledge of how to apply all of these in wartime situations. The course would cover all of these matters.47

Starting in February, the students still received lectures and broke into committees to lead conferences and produce reports. In fact, they would break into two different committees during the course to look at two classes of problems. The first class of problems mostly looked at the subject matter from a more theoretical or general perspective, and the second would study the strategy and campaigns of historical wars and previous War College war plans. In the first group, running throughout most of February, there would be committees on war and its principles, methods and doctrines; system of high command; employment of large units in concentration and attack; employment of large units in pursuit, defense, and movement by railroad and truck; employment of cavalry; employment of air and anti-aircraft forces; employment of artillery, ordnance, tanks, and chemical warfare; employment of signal, engineer, medical and train services; joint landing operations; and First Army in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.48

Eisenhower belonged to the Committee No. 1, working on “War and Its Principles, Methods and Doctrines,” which they delivered on February 27, 1928. Altogether, historians and biographers have paid almost no attention to Eisenhower’s work at the War College, but a few authors, especially Matthew Holland and Grant W.

Jones, have made use of this particular committee report. Jones especially sees in this paper “the theoretical underpinnings of Eisenhower’s strategy in Europe,” and does a commendable job linking the major points of the paper to Eisenhower’s command style and decision-making in 1944 and 1945.\textsuperscript{49} That may be true, but it should be kept in mind that this particular committee was just one part of a broader War College education for Eisenhower and his classmates, all of which contributed to their growth as future strategic leaders.

That said, “War and Its Principles, Methods and Doctrines” is interesting and important in several ways. The committee chair, a cavalryman named Major Roy O. Henry (who would pass away in 1934), organized the group into three subcommittees. The first dealt with the theory and nature of war; the second reviewed prominent theorists, foreign military doctrine, and historical campaigns for principles of war; and the third summarized the first two parts to draw larger conclusions. Eisenhower belonged to both the first and third subcommittees. The first section of their report is essentially a summary of Carl von Clausewitz’s definition of war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” War was always “a deliberate political act, undertaken for a definite purpose,” pitting the mental, moral, physical, and material qualities and resources of nations against other nations. All of these factors and more were interrelated, making war so complex that while “it makes use of the contributions of science,” “we are forced to consider it as one of the arts.” As such, war was not reducible to any rigid set of rules, but rather through the study of successful leaders and campaigns of the past, “certain broad conceptions” appear that could be called “Principles of War.” These in turn could be used in developing doctrines and methods “applicable to the particular conditions . . . existing at the time.”\textsuperscript{50}

From there the committee reviewed historical examples and theories and doctrines from around the world. Included in their review were French field manuals, Ferdinand Foch, Jomini, Napoleon, Culmann, van Overstraaten, Hamley, Bird, Henderson, Hohenlohe, Bernardi, von der Goltz, Moltke, German Field Service Regulations (1921), Creasy, Colin, Reddaway, and British Field Service Regulations (1920). Out of it all they came to their broad conceptions, what they called “principles,” which they boiled down to six: Security, Movement, Objective, Simplicity, Unity of Effort, and Superiority. These six were enabled by a variety of methods and supported by some commonly held doctrines.\textsuperscript{51} Whether they got these right was hardly the point. Indeed they understood quite clearly that there was no right answer. The importance of this report is more in that it reflected the amount of serious time and effort the students


\textsuperscript{51} There are multiple drafts of this paper in the Eisenhower papers, which suggests he might have held it in higher regard than the other committee work, but that is just speculation. “War and Its Principles, Methods and Doctrines,” Report of Committee No. 1, Course at the Army War College, 1927-1928, File: Miscellaneous, Box 20, and File: Army, A – Army, Z (MISC), Box 2, DDE Pre-Presidential Papers, 1916-1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.
put into the complex subject of the nature of war and the limited role of principles in war fighting, which showed a nuanced reading of Clausewitz, among other authors. At no point did they treat war as easy or simple or linear, but rather as complex and requiring serious study and open-minded thought.\(^{52}\)

Starting in early March, the class broke into new committees to begin work on the second class of problems. The committee assignments included studies of both sides of the Napoleonic campaigns (Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, Waterloo); the Franco-Prussian War through Sedan; the Russo-Japanese War (Port Arthur, Liao-Yang, and Mukden); the Civil War (Peninsular, Jackson’s Valley, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Wilderness campaigns); the World War (Western Front 1914, Eastern Front 1914-1915); and the World War (1918, with special reference to the American Expeditionary Force). In all of these historical studies, the students were to consider the situation/environment prior to and during the campaign; the strategic problems of both sides; comparison of the approaches adopted by both sides; the risks taken by commanders; the systems of command used; and the relationship between the operations and national policy.

After the historical committees completed their work, three more committees looked at “Strategy of a Red War,” as more direct preparation for the war planning to follow in the next course. These committees were not to write new war plans, but rather do classified studies of real world situations. The first of these looked at the 1925-1926 Army War College War Plan-RED NO. 1. The second analyzed the 1924-1925 class’s Joint Plan-RED and Army Strategical Plan-RED. The third explored a Red war more generally, to provide ideas about objectives, missions of military, naval, and joint forces, the designation of theaters and “the assignment of missions and allotment of forces thereto.”\(^{53}\)

For this section of the course, they assigned Eisenhower to the committee studying the strategy of the World War, Western Front, 1918, with special emphasis on the use of the American Expeditionary Force. The committee of ten officers broke into three subcommittees, the first to look at the overall situation at the start of 1918, the second studying operations from January to July, and the third from July to the armistice in November. Subcommittee No. 1 was made up of one member, Major Dwight

---

\(^{52}\) Jones and Holland give Eisenhower credit as being the leading author of the paper, but that is also speculation. It should be noted that the committee also included an officer named Oliver Prescott Robinson, who had been an instructor at the Command and General Staff College. Based on that experience, Robinson wrote a book of military theory testing the published principles of war. The book was published in 1928, and in his acknowledgements he thanked at the War College Commandants Hanson Ely and William Connor, Assistant Commandant Lytle Brown, and instructors Wilson Burtt and George Myers. It is likely that Robinson had something to say about the paper, and it was not just Eisenhower’s show. See Oliver Prescott Robinson, The Fundamentals of Military Strategy (Washington, DC: United States Infantry Association, 1928) and Thomas Bruscino, “Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Interwar Years,” Journal of Military History, 77 (October 2013): 1251-1275.

Eisenhower, so it is safe to say that that section of the report came from Eisenhower’s hand. He wrote from a variety of sources in English and French, including Gaston Duffour, *Le Guerre de 1914-1918*; Erich Ludendorff, *My War Memories*; R. van Overstraaten, *Des Principes de la Guerre*; C.R. Howland, *Military History of the World War*; Pershing’s Final Report; a study of “Psychology and Leadership”; and the Literary Digest history of the World War. Not surprisingly, he also made significant use of his mentor Fox Conner’s “Notes of Operations of the AEF” and the guidebook “American Battlefields in Europe,” which he had written in his previous assignment.54

Eisenhower’s portion of the report is a brief but complete summary of the major matters in the war in 1917, including naval and military affairs. The focus was on America’s prolonged entry into the war, the collapse of the 1917 Allied offensives, Russia falling into revolution and dropping from the war, and the Italian disasters of the fall. “Considering all the conditions described above,” Eisenhower concluded, “it was apparent that the first and absolutely essential task of the Allies was to prevent a German victory pending the arrival of American forces sufficiently large to have a real effect upon the war.” The rest of the report is a critical but evenhanded treatment of the German offensives of the first part of 1918 and the Allied counteroffensives that finished the war. In terms of final lessons, they included one of note, “To employ all available forces in convergent and properly coordinated action to accomplish our own decisive efforts and defeat those of the enemy.”55 Historian David Jablonsky has also used this report as evidence of Eisenhower’s long term focus on unity of command, as Eisenhower critiqued the lack of an Allied Supreme Commander on the Western Front for so long in the war.56

The first period of the Command course concluded with a committee reviewing the overall “salient points” developed throughout the course, so it represents something of a common understanding among the students in Eisenhower’s class. A few of those points stand out. For example, they emphasized the power and responsibilities of the president as command-in-chief as a way of making clear that military actions were always subject to civilian control. “Regardless of what power he may see fit to delegate to subordinate commanders in the field,” they wrote, “he can never delegate his responsibility. For that reason we will always find more or less influence exercised over the commanders in the field by the President.” That influence would usually come through the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War, but regardless “it is idle to attempt to set up a rigid scheme or system of HIGH COMMAND if we mean thereby to convey the idea that such command carries with it fixed powers.” Such powers would be an illusion,


because the president could intervene at any time. When it came to the attack, the students made the observation that “continuity of action is a most important consideration; hence the main blow should be so fashioned that it will go through and to make the action complete there should be a force available to take advantage of the success achieved.” Preferably this would not be done with the last reserve, but rather the regular forces and reserves. In other words, attacks that could not guarantee continuity of action until the ultimate object had been achieved were usually too risky to be worth it. Also notable was their recognition that joint landing operations “were likely to fail,” but nevertheless they needed to be studied because “the time may come when it will be impossible to accomplish the mission by means other than forced landing operations.”

For the future Supreme Allied Commander, who would report to President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, command Husky and Overlord, and direct the broad front strategy on the Western front, it seems like some of the content of the Command course might have been of some use in getting him ready for the job.

INDIVIDUAL STAFF MEMORANDUM

Eisenhower also completed his individual staff memorandum during the Command course. The subject was “An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular Army.” It has been reviewed elsewhere in greater detail, but even in its broad outlines it is amazing for the ground it covers. The overall problem Eisenhower identified was that there were not enough Soldiers available in the Regular Army and National Guard to deal with any major contingency in a timely fashion. Therefore, the army needed a reserve that could be called to duty immediately in the case of an emergency. Eisenhower recommended an elegantly simple solution: that future enlistments and reenlistments include active service followed by a three to four year paid reserve time. The logic was that such reserve troops would already be trained from their active time, and that their fitness for service would continue on for a few years after. The reserve pay would not cost the government much, but it would be better than nothing and help as an inducement for enlistment and reenlistment.

This brief review does not do the whole work justice, as it includes extensive statistical analysis of troop numbers, multiple contingency scenarios, and financial requirements. The memorandum drew on a wide variety of sources, including course material, legislation, congressional hearings, official reports, and War College studies, and the final product included multiple tables to illustrate statistics on enlistments and comparisons with British and Marine Corps reserve systems. Eisenhower even drew up language for proposed amendments to the National Defense Act. Maj. Gen. William Connor, the commandant, read Eisenhower’s paper with great interest and commented on it for the student’s benefit. On May 5, he sent the major a note commending him for “work of exceptional merit.” Connor also informed him that the “memorandum, by

---

direction of the Chief of Staff, had been sent to the War Department for circulation among interested agencies.\textsuperscript{58}

**WAR PLANS COURSE, PERIOD 2**

The first period of the Command course came to an end at the beginning in April, and the class finally moved from the informative (preparation for war) into the war plans (conduct of war) portion of the curriculum. For the better part of the next two months, they wrote war plans. Much of the work up until that time was meant as preparation for the writing of the plans. In Eisenhower’s year, they focused on writing War Plan Red, for a war with Great Britain. They had three objects in working on the plan: “While you are past the instruction stage and have come to the producing one, some instruction is gained as a by-product of practice. The second object is to produce something that may be found of value to those who study the subject in the War Department. The third and most important object is to provide a standard for the development of military requirements.” In other words, by doing honest war planning and war gaming, they could know how to defeat an enemy power “as to secure the terms we desire, or, should our test show us unequal to the task, then to determine what additional measures we should take.”\textsuperscript{59}

The planning and gaming exercise was no joke, as the faculty made clear in an underlined statement: “The standard of our security is the sure ability to defeat Red and at least one ally in this hemisphere and drive both out to stay out.” The faculty provided a directive from the president that broadly set the end state and instructions. “The political object is to place on a firm foundation the national security and prosperity of the US as a result of the War.” Further, “Operations will be so conducted as to hold the vital area of the US inviolate and reduce to a minimum any injury necessary to accept elsewhere.” The planning teams were to prepare “a complete war plan, including its mobilization plan, with the annexes and appendices necessary to give full instructions to the next subordinate agencies.” They would be led by students acting as the Army Chief of Staff, Navy Chief of Operations, and the Assistant Secretary of War. The rest of the students were assigned temporary roles in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, War Plans Division, Assistant Secretary of War Office, and the Naval Staff. Eisenhower went to the War Plans Division. Otherwise, the faculty trusted the prior instructions and gave the students wide latitude into the specifics of how they went about and presented their planning. The final standard was clear: “We want a war plan which can be signed on the dotted line and will work.” The students presented their Joint Estimate and Plan, Army Estimate and Plan, and Navy Estimate and Plan over


\textsuperscript{59} “Orientation Lecture and Assignments,” April 5-May 29, 1928, Course at the Army War College, 1927-1928, WPD, Second Period, Box: War Plans Course, File No. 346A, 1 to 15, AWC Curricular Archives, 1927-1928, USAMHI.
four days, May 25-26 and May 28-29. As directed, they completed a full war plan for a conflict with Great Britain, including mobilization, deployment, training, supply, and operations.60

**COMMAND COURSE, PERIOD 2**

Lest it seem that they would glide toward graduation after completion of the War Plans course, they went right back to work in the second part of the Command course, focusing on real world problem solving. The first part of the Command course had included a lot of academic classroom work, so they needed “Practical Application,” because “Academic knowledge of the art of war is valueless unless accompanied by practical knowledge of its application.” That year, the government did not provide the funding to hold a joint exercise with the Navy. Instead, the practical portion of the Command course did map problems from the perspective of a field army commander, a theater headquarters, and a general headquarters; solution of a war game; and field exercise and command reconnaissance. For these practical activities, instead of committees, they usually split into commanders and staffs.61

All of the practical activities for the 1927-1928 class dealt with issues relating to the Red Plan they had been working on for most of the school year. In the war game, they ran through the War Plan they had written in the War Plans course. They did three Map Problems on Red vs. Blue, each from a different level of headquarters. The Field Exercises too were based on the Red scenario, and happened in the latter part of June along with reconnaissance of terrain. They did two such reconnaissance trips, the first from June 10-14 to “appreciate such features of the terrain as affect the operations of a landing in force on the Atlantic Coast in the area contiguous to Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, and operations against such a landing, especially the latter.” Not every student went everywhere. Instead, they broke into four groups, each going by cars to different places in the region. Half of each group looked at the terrain from the Blue (defensive) perspective, and half looked at it from the Allied (invasion) view. All were to watch for possible landings spots, defensive positions around those spots, routes of advance inland, existing defenses, and the road and rail networks in the area. Armed with that guidance, Eisenhower’s group scouted coastal New Jersey, south of Camden.62

---

60 “Orientation Lecture and Assignments,” April 5-May 29, 1928, Course at the Army War College, 1927-1928, WPD, Second Period, Box: War Plans Course, File No. 346A, 1 to 15, AWC Curricular Archives, 1927-1928, USAMHI.
Upon return they got ready for a similar excursion, this time to “appreciate the features of the terrain as affect the operations of large forces in the area generally east and south of the Alleghany Mountains between Washington and New York City.” Once again they broke into four groups, and minus scouting for landing points, they received similar instructions. This time Eisenhower was the assistant to the officer in charge of his group. They rendezvoused at Allentown, Pennsylvania (PA), and explored an area following a line roughly from Washington to Reading, PA, to Easton, PA, to Baltimore, MD. When they completed the reconnaissance, they went into the Field Exercise, for which Eisenhower was on the Blue team.63

The Command course, and the Army War College year, ended on June 29. Commandant William Connor gave the closing address and sent them on their way.64

THE WAR COLLEGE AROUND IKE

Of course Eisenhower would prove to be exceptional, and after he graduated he ended up going back into the unique assignment at the American Battlefield Monuments Commission and writing the improved guide to the battlefields of Europe. From there he would go to the War Department to work on mobilization issues, and then on to service with Douglas MacArthur in the War Department and in the Philippines, among other assignments. He had fallen under the mentorship of Fox Conner, which led him to work for John Pershing and helped him catch the eye of George C. Marshall. All of it would contribute to his meteoric rise in World War II. But for all that, he was not that exceptional when it came to his education the War College.

In fact, it is notable just how normal Eisenhower’s Army War College experiences were among interwar future strategic leaders. Then, as now, the school continually revised the curriculum, but the main themes and educational techniques stayed the same. After William Connor, the commandants would be George Simonds, Malin Craig, John DeWitt, Walter Grant, and Philip Peyton, all of whom had high level staff jobs in World War I. Students continued to study basically the same subjects and be taught in the same ways until the school closed for the war after 1940. There were some small variations, including a minor course on foreign news, with groups of students studying one of five regions in the world. They also brought back Civil War campaign staff rides. War gaming remained an essential part of the curriculum, so much so that the Army decided not to develop a correspondence version of the course in large part because the war gaming could not be replicated through the mail. As time went on, they also


tended to focus more on War Plan Orange for Japan and also war plans against coalitions of enemies.\textsuperscript{65}

In all of this, the War College had access to extensive resources when it came to research. The students and faculty could and did use the Army War College’s military focused library, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, and the records of various other federal agencies around Washington. Since the War Department’s Historical Section was attached to the Army War College, they could also make use of studies and materials put together by that section, which included current intelligence estimates from overseas. Additionally, every class had access to and made use of the committee reports of the previous classes. So even though officers may have been in different year groups, they studied similar issues and looked at each other’s work, which gave them something of a shared understanding of all manner of strategic environments, problems, and approaches.\textsuperscript{66}

A few historians have taken notice of parts of the War College program in the interwar period. Michael Matheny focused on the education for operational art and campaigning, and in that vein credited the college for its advanced instruction in joint operations, logistics, and campaign planning with its strong “sensitivity to national policy.” In his study of “Army Planning for Global War” from 1934-1940, Henry Gole looked closely at the war gaming exercises of the War College in the years leading up to World War II. Gole did a fine job laying out the various war planning efforts, noting how they thought through a wide variety of issues, including working as joint forces and alongside allies, as well as fighting against Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France, Mexico, Brazil, and a number of coalitions that would present ground, air, and maritime challenges at home and abroad, in major wars and smaller interventions. Whether focusing on operational art or giving military officers realistic practice repetitions with wartime problems, Matheny and Gole showed that the Army War College’s instruction had something to do with the building of the strategic leaders of the World War II era. Given that the Army was small and had an extremely tight budget, this work was especially important. As Gole put it, with not too much exaggeration, “A third-rate army educated first-rate strategists.”\textsuperscript{67}

Neither of these works focused on Eisenhower, which makes it very clear that Ike was not unique in benefiting from this education. Indeed the Army War College alumni list from the 1920s and 1930s is a veritable “Who’s Who” of World War II American leadership. Just over half of the roughly 1,800 who graduated in those years became general officers, mostly in the war. In 1945, over 600 of the over 1,000 general officers in the military were graduates of the War College. Eisenhower was joined by Omar


\textsuperscript{66} Pappas, \textit{Prudens Futuri}, 132-133.

\textsuperscript{67} Matheny, \textit{Carrying the War to the Enemy}, passim, quotation on 78; Gole, \textit{The Road to Rainbow}, passim, quotation on 158.
Bradley, George Patton, Brehon Somervell, Leslie McNair, and many others. They all recalled having similar experiences to Eisenhower and almost all gave credit to the content and instruction as expanding their horizons.68

Robert Eichelberger, a future field army commander in the Pacific theater, graduated in 1930. He had been part of Eisenhower’s class at Leavenworth, and like Ike, looked forward to carrying on his education at the War College. “During this year of postgraduate inquiry into military strategy I worked very hard,” Eichelberger recalled. For him, the course material on the command of large formations especially resonated. “Caesar, Napoleon, Wellington, Sherman—a clear understanding of their military tactics has never handicapped a green officer in the field.”69

Patton went through in the 1931-32 school year. He chaired a committee on mechanized units, calling for their close integration with other arms. He also wrote his individual staff memorandum on “The Probable Characteristics of the Next War and the Organization, Tactics, and Equipment Necessary to Meet Them.” Drawing on his own professional development and the college’s vast resources, including questioning of students and instructors, it was a wide-ranging document. He called for more professionalized, highly-trained, small armies that could operate on their own initiative more rapidly and effectively. They needed to do so, according to Patton, writing a line that rivals any current description of complexity, because “battle is an orgy of organized disorder.” The commandant, still William Connor, credited Patton’s paper for “exceptional merit.”70

Another George, George Kenney, a captain from the Air Corps and future four-star general in the Air Force, was in the next class. For many air officers, the Army War College had been thin on developing air power subject matter, but in Kenney’s class they did expand the role and missions of aviation in the end of the year exercises. Also, Kenney wrote his individual staff memorandum on “The Proper Composition of the Air Force,” focusing on the Air Corps’ shortcomings in being able to fulfill its primary mission in defending the US and its territories. Kenney’s biographer credited the college’s student body makeup, committee work, planning, and exercises with developing the ability to communicate between ground, air, and naval perspectives. In fact, Kenney’s “only opportunity to personally discuss ideas about air-sea operations with naval officers would have come from his year at the Army War College.” Air Corps officers were slightly underrepresented as part of the student population at the school,

---

68 McNair was in the 1928-1929 class, which despite undergoing some structural changes under Connor’s direction, went through an experience very much like Eisenhower’s, as detailed in Calhoun, General Lesley J. McNair, 99-123.
69 Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York: Viking, 1950), xv-xvi.
but every class had at least a few, and almost all of them went on to become general officers in the Army and/or the Air Force.\(^7^1\)

The 1933-1934 class would be stacked with famous future leaders, including Bradley, Courtney Hodges, Jonathan Wainwright, Robert Richardson, and future Navy Admiral William “Bull” Halsey. Halsey was particularly interesting, because he had just finished up a year at the Naval War College. “At Newport we had studied the strategy and tactics of naval campaigns, with emphasis on the problems of logistics,” he recalled. “At Washington we studied on a larger scale—wars, not campaigns—and from the viewpoint of the top echelon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”\(^7^2\) Lewis Hershey, the future four-star general and longtime director of Selective Service, was also in the 1933-1934 class, and had the latitude to pursue his interest in “the psychological dimension of leadership.” He scored well in the program, and praised “the scope of his courses and the high level of teaching.” In turn, the commandant and faculty realized, with great accuracy, that Hershey had a special aptitude “for duty with civilian components.”\(^7^3\) Bradley would emerge as critical of his War College year, ironically because of its spirit of open inquiry and lack of pressure from grading. “The War College only faintly resembled a ‘school,’” he wrote years later. “It was more like a graduate seminar or a contemporary think tank.” Even though the “student reports ranged far and wide,” the war planning was not realistic enough for him, and “I often thought I was wasting my time.”\(^7^4\) Bradley’s critique, while notable, stands out as an exception.

The 1936-1937 year had Mark Clark, Matthew Ridgway, and Walter Bedell Smith in it, among others. Their commandant was Brig. Gen. Walter Grant, a close companion of George C. Marshall’s in the World War. Based on Smith’s work, Grant accurately pegged the future four-star general and diplomat as ready for “high command and every staff division from division to War Plans Division.”\(^7^5\) Clark’s biographer noted of the students that despite “their easy congeniality, their affectation of high spirited indolence, they were all serious minded, hard-working, and avid for knowledge, not only because of the mutual pressures they exerted on each other, but also because the prospect of war loomed across both oceans.” In going through the curriculum, Clark served on committees that looked at accelerating promotions during wartime and reorganizing the infantry division into a smaller formation. This latter recommendation went to the War Department, and while not adopted immediately, was part of a larger conversation among these leaders in the Army anticipating the eventual change to the triangular division.\(^7^6\) Ridgway had a similar experience at what he called “the most advanced

---

\(^7^1\) Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., *MacArthur’s Airman: General George Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 30-33. See the graduate charts in Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 170-179.


school in the Army,” serving on a committee that did a wide-ranging report on the war capabilities of Mexico, among other assignments.77

The lists of graduates who served prominently in World War II could go on and on. The heads of the Army Service Forces and Army Ground Forces all went to the Army War College. Graduates would dominate in the War Department general staff, especially the War Plans Division/Operations Division, with all four of the chiefs, including Eisenhower, being graduates.78 Of the roughly fifteen who commanded field armies, army groups, or theater combat-type commands in the war, twelve graduated from the college. These included Marine Gen. Roy Geiger and Eisenhower’s classmate William H. Simpson, who later came back as an instructor.79 Only Douglas MacArthur, Joseph Stilwell, and Lucian Truscott did not. Thirty-four Army generals would command corps in World War II, and twenty-nine of those men had gone to the War College, including future Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, who also instructed at the school.80 In his autobiography, Collins described a curriculum and open environment of inquiry and discussion much like Eisenhower’s year. He added that “there was little distinction between students and faculty,” because the instructors did not know any more about subjects than the students. Instead they “simply posed questions that the War Department or the College thought were worthy of inquiry,” and they participated in the research and discussions that followed. Collins went into more detail than most, but nearly all were general agreement that the Army War College year had been of great value to their future work.81

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND EISENHOWER AS STRATEGIST

If the connections between the interwar Army War College and the careers of the officers who led the armed forces in World War II and beyond seem too generic to be definitive, maybe a return to the specific case of Eisenhower will help illustrate some links. What effect did the War College experience have on the rest of Dwight Eisenhower’s career? In a pre-World War II life and career as diverse and interesting as Eisenhower’s, it would be foolish to treat any single assignment or experience as the decisive one. That said, the historical record does show some interesting ways that the Army War College contributed to Eisenhower’s development, beyond just a general broadening of his mind. Recall that the stated objective of the college in Eisenhower’s year was to better prepare officers for “positions of high responsibility,” such as “the command of large combat forces in time of war, as confidential advisers and assistants to such commanders, and as military advisers and assistants to those high

78 Gole, The Road to Rainbow, 159-65.
governmental civil officials who are charged by law with the responsibility of preserving the security of this nation.\textsuperscript{82}

Immediately after the college, Eisenhower returned to the American Battlefield Monuments Commission to prepare an expanded and updated guidebook that would eventually become \textit{American Armies and Battlefields in Europe}.\textsuperscript{83} When he finished that assignment in late 1929, he went into a War Department position, working for Brig. Gen. George van Horn Moseley, who was an advisor to the Assistant Secretary for War Patrick Hurley. The Assistant Secretary of War had responsibility for procurement of military material, and the War College had an entire course dedicated to the Assistant Secretary’s responsibilities. In that course Eisenhower was on a committee that laid out the president’s war powers and provided a broad plan for mobilization—a plan that included highly centralized civilian authorities over wartime industry and economy, including in terms of price fixing. In 1930, Eisenhower wrote an article for the Assistant Secretary called “Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization.” That year, working closely with Hurley and Moseley, Eisenhower also wrote the first detailed Industrial Mobilization Plan for the nation. The next year, during his dual stint as a lecturer and student at the Army Industrial College, he wrote a widely-circulated paper on the history of procurement and industrial mobilization. All of these products closely mirrored the committee report from the college, and all of this work as a strategic advisor brought Eisenhower great acclaim and to the favorable attention of Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, for whom Ike became an assistant.\textsuperscript{84}

In 1935, with his term as Chief of Staff up, MacArthur became the Military Adviser to the Philippine Government and head of an American military mission in the islands. After decades of American-led government, the Philippines were to have their independence in 1946. MacArthur’s mission was to help them build up a military to defend that independence, and he took Eisenhower with him as his chief of staff. They would be there together for the next four years (and would eventually have a falling out), but in the meantime they had work to do. Eisenhower’s War College experiences peeked through there too. For one thing, when searching for an assistant in writing the national defense plan for the Philippines, he found an old West Point classmate named James Ord at the Army War College. Ord had attended the college in 1932-1933 and then stayed on as an instructor in the G-2 (Military Intelligence) division, specializing on Philippine defense planning. Eisenhower and Ord would meet all kinds of frustrations

\textsuperscript{82} Brown, “The United States Army War College,” 296-297.

\textsuperscript{83} No doubt the multiple War College lectures, committee reports, and studies on the World War assisted Eisenhower in this effort. The importance of this project to the future commander in Europe has never been sufficiently studied, but see Holland, \textit{Eisenhower Between the Wars}, 105-106, 158-160, 178-183; Steven Trout, \textit{On the Battlefield of Memory: The First World War and American Remembrance, 1919-1941} (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010), xv-xxxiii; and Thomas H. Conner, \textit{War and Remembrance: The Story of the American Battle Monuments Commission} (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2018), 75, 79-80.

along the way, and would only be partially successful in building the Philippine forces (Ord died in a plane crash in 1938). But to the degree that they achieved anything in building up a Philippine war department and army, they drew heavily on what they had learned at the War College. Their overall approach aligned closely with the American War Plan Orange (Japan), a perennial college subject, and Eisenhower even got a chance to try something like the reserve system he had recommended in his individual staff memorandum.  

After Pearl Harbor, Eisenhower moved to prominence even faster, and by February 1942 he had become chief of the General Staff’s War Plans Division, working directly for Chief of Staff Gen George C. Marshall. There would be a certain irony to Ike moving into a job heading up a division that he had recommended be abolished when he was a student back in the G-3 Course at the Army War College. However, in March 1942, Marshall effectively did abolish the War Plans Division, replacing it with a bulked up Operations Division. The Operations Division became Marshall’s command post, through which he directed war planning and operations, reducing the rest of the General Staff (G-1 through G-4) in numbers and responsibilities so that they took on more support roles. None of the ideas came directly from Eisenhower, but the new Operations Division looked a lot like his proposed War Plans Board, and he was delighted that they made the switch. Even though the exact names and responsibilities differed slightly, given what Eisenhower had recommended over a decade earlier, Marshall had the perfect officer in place to oversee the transition.

Some of the connections to the War College would be even more direct, such as when Ike moved into command of large combat forces during World War II. Eisenhower’s old commandant William Connor kept up with his former student. In 1932, Connor had gone on to become superintendent at West Point until he retired in 1938, but was called back to active duty for 1941-1942 before switching over to a civilian role on the War Price and Rationing Board. He wrote to Eisenhower from time to time, including once to congratulate Ike on his promotions and taking over leadership of the War Plans Division. They continued to correspond throughout the war, with Connor usually congratulating Eisenhower on his successes and recommending an officer or two for Ike to keep an eye on. Eisenhower clearly held Connor in high regard, writing


“he is one of our best” in a 1932 diary entry about senior leaders he knew. Writing back, Ike accepted Connor’s recommendations at face value and credited his old teacher’s “guidance and inspiration” with playing “a prime role in what little success I and many others have achieved.”

This correspondence could be interpreted as a retired officer grasping at lost relevance and an active duty commander politely tolerating the old man. Connor recognized that, always insisting that the busy Eisenhower not reply, and often regretting that he could not do more to help the war effort. “I must fight this war thru such men as Buckner, Eichelberger, Anderson, Butler and in a small way, you also, who served with me and whom I may have influenced by teaching or example,” he wrote on February 11, 1943. “That is my hope anyway.” Eisenhower did reply to that particular note, and his answer is worth quoting at length:

There is not any doubt about the extent of influence that you are still exerting on operations in this war. Oddly enough, when the decision was made last November 11 to start rushing toward Tunisia in an effort to grab off the last foot that we could in the direction of Tunis before the German could get in, I actually related to some members of my Staff your particular solution to a very “defensive-looking” problem we once had in the War College. When we were still wondering whether the French would fight us or help us, there were many people who counselled me to be more cautious, to develop my bases, perfect my build-up and bring in steadily the troops that we would need to wage a rather ritualistic campaign in that direction. Had we done this, we would probably now be fighting a rather heavy battle somewhere in the vicinity of Constantine, possibly even Tebessa and Souk Ahras, but anyone who has seen the terrain of North African [sic] can well appreciate that a very few troops, holding the coastline and the communications running eastward from Setif, could force upon any attacker the slowest and most costly of advances. Moreover, under those circumstances, we would not have the airfields from which to help our right and there would not exist any possibility of a junction with the Western Desert Forces.

When the Argument was going on, I recalled the particular War College problem that made such an impression on me. We had been working on a problem of resisting an invasion in Connecticut, and all the statistical technicians had worked out in detail the most advanced line that they could defend consistent with getting the logistics properly arranged and the necessary forces in the field. Your criticism of the problem was that it was one that obviously called for instant and continuous attack. I remember you said, “Attack with whatever

---

you’ve got at any point where you can get it up, and attack and keep attacking until this invader realizes that he has got to stop and reorganize, and thus give us a chance to deliver a finishing blow.

We have bitter battling ahead, even in Tunisia. Beyond this is the more serious, long-termed prospect of getting at the guts of the enemy and tearing them out. I hope that every individual in all the United Nations is giving his full effort and his whole heart and soul to this. It is not a task to be accomplished with fain-hearted or half-hearted methods.91

This letter was dated March 22, 1943. At that time Eisenhower was the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in North Africa, deep in the midst of the Tunisian Campaign. The Battle of Kasserine Pass had been only a month earlier. The Battle of El Guettar was the next day. The Allies would spend the better part of the next two months driving the Axis powers from North Africa. Given that context, it is clear that in writing his lengthy and very personal note to Connor, Eisenhower was not just going through the motions. If nothing else, the map maneuvers for War Plan Red at the Army War College had made their mark on General Eisenhower.

Eisenhower became Army Chief of Staff after the war and also briefly served as the unofficial chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In those roles, he was a key player in developing national military strategies for the postwar period and the burgeoning conflict with the Soviet Union. Throughout, his conception of the broad meaning of strategy, planning, and the role of military leaders in American policy-making matched closely the concepts he had worked on at the War College.92 In this era, critics might point to Eisenhower not reopening the Army War College after World War II, and in fact putting the new National War College in the old Army buildings in Washington, D.C. However, that action, along with converting the Army Industrial College into the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and creating the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, all in 1946, was less an indictment of the old Army War College and more a part of Eisenhower’s career-long mission of fostering greater cooperation among the ground, naval, and air services. If anything, the proposed new curricula were an expansion of the “Preparation for War” and “Conduct of War” structure of the Army War College. As it turned out, the services and the country still felt a need for a strategic level school oriented on ground warfare and Army issues, and the Army War College reopened in 1950 and moved to its current location at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 1951. Eisenhower had no strong feelings against the school, and indeed he visited it on several occasions—which is notable only because he never made the trip back to Fort Leavenworth.


On one visit Eisenhower addressed the school. “The War College marks a great change in the thinking, or let us say, the formal education of officers of our armed services,” he told them, reflecting on his own experiences. Whereas before they had to focus on technical and tactical details, they now would broaden their horizons. “The real influence of a nation in the world is measured by the product of its spiritual, its economic, and its military strength.” “And so,” he added, reflecting on his education at the college, “realizing that war involves every single facet of human existence and thinking, every asset that humans have developed, all the resources of nature, here education deserts the formally rather narrow business of winning a tactical victory on the battlefield; it is now concerned with the nation.”

The Army War College continued to have a profound influence on Eisenhower after his military career ended, and he entered the realm of politics and policy-making. The lessons of the college extended beyond content and also into thinking through issues, especially strategic issues. When he was president at Columbia University after World War II, Eisenhower worked with the Graduate School of Business to bring together experts from academic and civilian life, “working on problems and drafting papers, and . . . encouraging a free exchange of ideas.” In Eisenhower’s own words, “My own education at Leavenworth and at the War College had been in the ‘case method’ and I understood its usefulness.”

That usefulness extended into his political career. In recent years, observers have taken a closer look at the “Solarium Project” of 1953 as a good example of developing national policy and military strategy during the Cold War. The idea of Solarium was for task forces of three to five qualified individuals from the civilian and military national security realm each to look at their own alternative for the future of American foreign policy, especially in regard to the ongoing competition with the Soviet Union and international communism. The task forces would prepare their reports over a matter of five or so weeks, and then come together to present their findings for discussion with the National Security Council. Solarium was an important part of developing the national military strategy that would replace the famous NSC-68 in 1953, and be the guiding concept for most of the rest of the Eisenhower presidency. If the Solarium process sounded an awful lot like the committee report and conference system from Eisenhower’s year at the Army War College, that was because it was. As the initial instructions from the president stated, as clear as could be, “The preparation should be as for a War College project.”

---


94 Eisenhower, At Ease, 350.

A few years later, after some wrangling, Eisenhower proposed and Congress passed the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. He had made it an essential part of his 1955 agenda, emphasizing it in the State of the Union address that year and his Annual Budget Message to Congress. The most thorough version of the proposal came on January 13, 1955, in his Special Message to the Congress on National Security Requirements. The emphasis of the message was on manpower requirements, and he called for an extension of Selective Service and the special induction of doctors and dentists. He also recommended what he called a new “National Reserve Plan,” part of which included providing for, in his words, “one group of reservists who can be organized into a force maintained in a high degree of readiness to meet immediate mobilization requirements, and a second non-organized group with prior service who would be called into military service by a selective process, if the need for their services should develop in a general mobilization.” The final legislation vastly expanded the Ready Reserve, including by having those who volunteered for two years of active service serve another four as reserves. In other words, after some twenty-seven years, President Eisenhower signed into law the essentials of the enlisted reserve Major Eisenhower had called for in his Individual Staff Memorandum at the Army War College.96

Throughout all of these post-World War II activities, the international competition with the Soviet Union and the containment of the spread of communism dominated all other considerations. Eisenhower was a dedicated Cold Warrior and dead set against communism. What is less well known, if it is known at all, is that the Army War College played a key part in starting him down that path. In fact and in large part because historians and biographers have largely ignored his college year, most accounts of Eisenhower’s ideological views have been embarrassingly condescending toward his early life and the interwar Army. One study of his anti-communism, for example, said his small-town upbringing, religious faith, and subpar education at West Point kept his thinking limited, and the “the long years . . . spent in the narrow world of the peacetime army” were not “likely to expand his intellectual horizons.”97 Even a more sympathetic accounting of Eisenhower’s ideology has him discovering the potential threat of the Soviets and communism only late in World War II or after the war ended.98

---


The truth, according to Eisenhower himself, was that his strong views on the threat of communism traced their origins back to January 1928, during a long lecture in the G-2 Course (Military Intelligence). That was Father Edmund Walsh’s talk on the Russian Revolution, and it clearly made its mark. It is true that during and immediately after World War II, when the Soviets were allies of the US, Eisenhower went along in public with the national policy line that the two systems could coexist in peace. But in private he consistently expressed doubts that that was true at all—for him the communist system was antithetical to the freedoms of the US and the rest of the western allies. In that his views aligned with Father Walsh, and as the years went on, and on multiple occasions, he explicitly credited the War College lecture with opening his eyes.

When Walsh died in 1956, Eisenhower sent a letter of condolence to the president of Georgetown, calling Walsh “a vigorous and inspiring champion of freedom for mankind and independence for nations.” Then, a week later, the President realized he had left something out, so he sent another letter. “I failed to say that in 1928 I had the rare privilege of listening to a magnificent lecture of his on the growing menace of communism,” Eisenhower wrote. “I think I could recite some parts of it today.” 99 A couple of years later, when Georgetown renamed the Foreign Service School, Eisenhower spoke at the dedication. He spoke fondly of “Father Walsh’s hope for the peace of the world” through education:

In the War College Class of 1928-1929, he came to lecture. . . . The subject of that talk was the threat that an atheistic dictatorship posed to the free world, and the certainty that that threat would grow unless we—all of us—armed ourselves with the spiritual and intellectual capacities . . . so that we could get others to understand and that so that we could oppose that threat practically and effectively.

He made no wild charges. In fact, it was a speech where every statement was annotated—corroborated—by the documents that he himself had procured and brought out, often out of Russia. That series of documents, by the way, was in a suitcase—two suitcases. They were filled, and he knew exactly where to go to pick each one and to read it. So I still remember that occasion if for nothing else than because of the excellence of the presentation.100

Eisenhower’s recollection appears accurate, as the transcript of Walsh’s lecture includes notations of him reading from one source or another.101

As the years went by, the importance of Walsh’s lecture only seemed to grow in Eisenhower’s mind. For a while after his presidency, he toyed with the idea of writing a

---

book on the Cold War. He abandoned the project, but did write down some thoughts for
the opening chapter, called “My Introduction to the Cold War,” talking again about
Walsh’s War College lecture.

He presented to us an exposition on Communist Ideology, together with the story
of its penetration into Russia with the Bolshevik Revolution against Kerensky. He
dwelt upon Communism’s basic goals, intentions and operational methods.

Father Walsh, a gray haired, middle aged, distinguished looking man, was
impressive; he spoke unemotionally, constantly referring to and reading from
official documents that he carefully identified, thus giving his whole performance
an aura of great credibility. With one brief intermission, he spoke for three solid
hours—the only time in my life that I listened to a lecture of this length without
going, along with a number of others, sound asleep.

Before that moment I had, of course, read intermittently about
Communists and their excesses in Russia, and knew the names of some of their
principal leaders; but it had never occurred to me to think of Russian
Communism as an eventual menace to the Free World or, specifically, to my
nation and to me. Ever since 1918 I had thought of Russia as a weak nation,
devoid of any expansionary intentions of the Czars, backward in culture, and
occupying a great area of the earth which, to all intent and purposes, was a
power vacuum.

Indeed, Americans of the middle twenties were interested mainly in the
booming character of the economy, which seemed to burgeon even further with
Mr. Hoover’s inauguration in March, 1929, followed by a disastrous crash in
October of the same year. Foreign relations, when mentioned in conversations of
the time, usually involved Europe’s World War I debts to us, and our impatience
with their unwillingness to pay.

But Dr. Walsh’s conclusion was that Communism, supported by the
potential strength of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, was a perfidious,
treacherous, avowed and aggressive enemy of Freedom and the American way
of life; the normal differences between Western Europe and the United States
concerned him very little. His lecture quickly destroyed my complacency about
the world situation; it brought me back to earth—or to painful reality—with a thud
. . . I began reading on pertinent subjects.¹⁰²

The specific policies of the Eisenhower administration varied over time when it came to
the Soviet Union and communism, but there could be no doubt that President
Eisenhower held strongly to his view that communism had to be opposed. That view
was not kneejerk or jingoist, but rather intellectual and deeply philosophical. By his own

¹⁰² Quoted in Holland, *Eisenhower Between the Wars*, 141-142. The context is in Subseries H:
Miscellaneous DDE Writings Subseries, 1964-1968, Box 58, Kevin McCann Papers, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.
reckoning, his more careful consideration of the matters at stake began during a lecture and discussion at the Army War College.

One final note. Eisenhower famously ended his presidency with a prescient warning about “the unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.” That warning spawned a vast discussion and debate which is far beyond this paper. Suffice it to say that many have made the case, with good reason, that this concern emerged from the travails of his presidency, when he had to deal with emerging military technologies pushed by ambitious scientists, the grim calculus of potential nuclear war, congressional representatives angling for jobs for their constituents, and military services fighting for larger pieces of the pie—all of which added up to an untamable system. Some have even argued that Eisenhower’s concern was a switch from his younger years, including at the War College, when he had called for greater centralization of power in his committee work.103

That is true, but it is only part of the truth. What Eisenhower had starting working on back at the college was the problem of mobilizing for and fighting modern mass industrialized war. The centralization he called for was an emergency wartime measure to provide for unity of effort, never a permanent feature. Outside of the technical details of the centralization—the national strategy for the war—much of what Eisenhower and his peers studied at the Army War College had to do with the unique problem of dealing with a fiercely independent democratic populace. Over and over again they talked about what the people would not and should not accept, mostly because it was identified with the idea of militarization, always a danger to republicanism. For example, the G-1 Course touched on these issues in various committees, and Eisenhower’s own committee in the Assistant Secretary of War Course warned about the population’s healthy disdain for military control of the society and economy. Eisenhower’s recognition of the dangers of the military-industrial complex was not a switch, but rather an extension of the concerns he first had to engage with in a meaningful way as a student at the War College in the interwar period.

FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD TO NOW

It is worth mentioning when, how, and why the Army War College drifted away from this content and method of instruction. The major event was the closing of the school for World War II, and the delay in reopening it until 1950. This closing and opening marked what college historian Harry Ball called the transition from the second to the third War College. The first thing to disappear was the clear distinction in the overall program between Preparation for War and Conduct of War. Gone too were the historical staff rides and terrain rides, not to return for four decades. More and more the curriculum would focus on preparation for war topics, with a greater and greater

emphasis on broad national security matters. That said, the dividing of courses, at least partially, into the G-1 through G-4 divisions remained for a few years, as did the committee approach to learning.

As the years passed and the college moved to and built up its facilities at Carlisle Barracks, a progression of commandants led their own small changes, usually in response to pressures from outside. With Soviet communism making inroads all over the world, there was an attempted greater focus on the world environment and eventually issues of counterinsurgency. That focus, along with technological advancements and a general postwar scientism, led to the incorporation of more specialized experts in scientific and social science fields, especially from outside the military. Their specialties, including international relations theory, systems analysis, and operations research, had to be incorporated into a wide-ranging curriculum, including eventually through electives. Thus began the paradox that more specialties led to greater generalization. The proliferation of topics also took class time, and the subjects covered in the old Command course were gone, and the war games faded and then disappeared altogether by the end of the 1950s.

The demise of War/Army Department General Staff division-focused courses and committees and problem-based instruction took a bit longer, but that also started in the 1950s. Once again, the driver was an attempt to broaden perspectives. In part because the number of Army and Joint positions into which graduates might go grew in the postwar period, Army leadership began to feel like they could not be so specific in stating the mission of the War College. Whereas they used to say they were preparing graduates to go to the War Department General Staff or high commands like theater, army group, or field army headquarters, now they had to be more generic about first “the highest United States Army levels,” then “high level positions within the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies at the national level,” and eventually just “senior,” “national policy,” and “strategic” positions or levels. Along with that change of perspective went the G-1 through G-4 courses, to be replaced by an ever-shifting array of titles such as “National Policy & Security,” “Strategy & War Planning,” “National Power & International Relations,” “Military Power & National Security Policy,” “Management of U.S. Military Power,” and so on, down to the present day. The committee problems became more general too, to get away from the detailed research and perception of mere fact-gathering that had gone with the earlier specific questions. By 1957-1958, the students only had to produce one formal committee report, and that was on the national strategy. Within a few years, most work would be done in seminar discussions, with only informal student presentations.104

As the historian of the Army War College put it, by 1964, “the trend in the program had been away from the operational problems of an army in combat, away from the internal problems of the Department of the Army, away from the problems of war and mobilization planning, and toward the consideration of national security affairs

---

104 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 283-499. See also Terrell, “The Army War College Curriculum,” passim. For a snapshot of the mid-1950s see Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, 319-415.
in the broadest sense of that term.” Even Commandant Eugene Salet, quoted at the beginning of this paper saying in 1967 that “today's military professional, while first and always a soldier, must also be a diplomat, an economist, a scientist, a historian, and a lawyer,” had to admit that the curriculum might have gone too far in the direction of economic, social, and political matters. As the years went by, even more issues would weigh against a return to the practical focus and intensity of the old interwar program, including offering academic degrees, the addition of a non-resident program, greater participation of foreign students, and the attachment to the War College of various schools, fellowships, institutes, publications, and projects.\textsuperscript{105}

**CONCLUSIONS**

What can be learned from this excursion into the increasingly distant history of the Army War College? To begin with, there is no one way to find or build a Dwight D. Eisenhower in either his military or civilian leadership roles. As stated at the outset, and should have been evident throughout, Eisenhower was one of a kind—uniquely gifted as a leader, whether as a student, staff officer, commander, diplomat, or politician. That said, Eisenhower's experiences and education had something to do with helping him reach his potential. As part of those experiences, the War College did not find or build Eisenhower, but it was part, maybe an essential part, of an environment in which an Eisenhower—and Somervell, McNair, Bradley, Ridgway, Collins, Patton, Halsey, etc.—could develop.

Contrary to the common view, that interwar Army War College environment was not characterized by an overly prescribed, narrowly conceived, assembly-line, rote-learning, tactical-focused, mass-production industrial age educational approach. In fact, a quick review of what they learned and how they learned reveals a vast array of subject matter delivered in a manner well-suited for adult military professionals.

When it comes to the variety of content of the War College in the interwar period, it is useful to revisit Eisenhower's year. Even if we were to assume incorrectly that he ignored the lectures and other committees, and only paid attention to the material covered by his own committees and papers, Ike still went into significant detail on:

- A strategic survey of the US, focusing on the northeastern section of the country
- A review of other G-1 (Personnel) reports on Selective Service, officer assignments, the history and psychology of morale, antiwar organizations, mobilization, demobilization, civil affairs in occupied territories, replacements, G-1 organization in theaters, and the location of commanders in battle
- The origins and development of the War Department General Staff, and a comparative study with the British, French, and Japanese equivalents

\textsuperscript{105} Ball, *Of Responsible Command*, 283-499, trend quotation on 361. See also Terrell, “The Army War College Curriculum,” passim. For a snapshot of the mid-1950s see Masland and Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 319-415.
- G-4 (Logistics/Supply) issues relating to the AEF in World War I, the potential of air transport and evacuation, G-4 in a theater, and supplying, transporting, and evacuating a 40,000-man expeditionary force
- The War Powers of the president and a broad national level plan for economic and industrial mobilization of the US
- A military intelligence estimate of Mexico
- War principles, methods, and doctrines using international theory, history, and doctrine, and a review of strategy on the western front of World War I in the latter part of the war
- And the details of a full war plan for defense of the eastern and northern US.

To summarize, if those were the only subjects Eisenhower covered, he would have had a pretty thorough grasp of the historical and current personnel, industrial, military, and naval capabilities of the US; the policies, history, and military capabilities of Mexico; the nature of policy- and strategy-making, to include the powers and responsibilities of the president and the War Department; classic and contemporary theories of war and strategy; and the historical and current operations of theater commands, field armies, and expeditionary forces in various contingencies. We know for a fact that he did pay attention to at least some of the lectures and other committees, which means that he had at least an introduction to the specific policies and military capabilities of countries around the world. What is more, he learned from diplomats about diplomacy, economists about economics, scientists about science, historians about history, and lawyers about military law, in addition to studying or hearing from academics and experts about psychology, sociology, journalism, and international relations, among other topics.

That variety of topics marks the intersection of what they learned with how they learned at the Army War College, beginning with the organization of the program itself. There was something to be said for a course structure built around the divisions of the War Department General Staff and command. If nothing else, it helped arrest the drift towards generalism. The name of the courses were constant reminders that some strategists would someday be personnel, military intelligence, operations/training, supply, or procurement specialists who had to contribute to the larger strategic picture, whether at the national or theater level. They were also constant reminders that all strategists and commanders had to consider those division functions all the time.

Those reminders, that specificity, was lost when the courses were no longer named for the divisions of the General Staff. More generic titles of courses only hint at the purpose of the subject matter under study. Instead of focusing students on thinking strategically about specific jobs, the college transitioned to talking more generally about being strategic leaders, strategic planners, strategic advisors, etc. Naturally, the emphasis shifted to the how-to-think aspect of preparing senior leaders, leaving out or assuming away the follow-on question of how to think about what? Even someone so relatively concrete as Colin Gray answered that question in a slightly more specific version of generalities: students should be taught strategic theory, strategic history, the importance of the enemy, a skeptical mindset, some measure of confidence, something
of the liberal arts, and how to think strategically.\textsuperscript{106} These are all fine suggestions, but they could apply to anyone in a high position anywhere.

The interwar Army War College, armed with that specific course structure to organize the vast subject matter, then turned to the method of delivering the material. A few points stand out in that regard. The faculty said from the beginning that the field of expertise required for high level military leaders was so broad, that it had so many topics, that they could not possibly cover it all in the course of a career, let alone a single school year. That understanding was a major part of the reasoning behind the committee system. By breaking the students down into committees and then having the committees report back to the rest of the student body, they could parcel out the subject matter. That way, some of the students would go into depth on every topic, but all of the students would get at least an introduction to every topic too.

The committee and report system had other benefits as well. By rotating the committees and their leadership, the students got a chance to work with just about everybody in the school, which gave them a chance to build relationships. Moreover, all of the students served as committee and subcommittee chairs, which gave each individual the opportunity to practice peer leadership, edit reports with multiple authors, and do a formal oral presentation of findings in front of a diverse audience. The committee reports also gave the students multiple repetitions in research methods, and since the subject matter varied so much, they practiced reading and researching books, articles, manuals, government reports, journalistic accounts, quantitative studies, legal material, and so on. Finally, because many of the topics either repeated from year to year or built on other committee assignments, the students made a regular habit of reading committee reports and lectures from previous classes at the college. This practice had the effect of creating a greater shared understanding of the major strategic issues and approaches of the era among the entire senior officer corps of the Army and the joint services.

It is important to remember that with the exception of the Commandant and some of the division chiefs—many of whom had high level command or staff experience in the World War—the faculty were by and large peers of the students in rank, education, and experience. They would deliver lectures on their specific area of expertise, and they provided some guidance to the students on working through committee problems, individual projects, and war plans and maneuvers. But they were never the keepers of the school solution because they understood that for high level strategic matters, there were no right answers. For that reason, they were learning right alongside the students from year to year, which created even greater shared understanding and strengthened bonds among the senior officer corps.

Finally, something should be said about the importance of the so-called applicatory method of instruction. That style, borrowed in part from the Germans at the turn of the twentieth century, had long been the standard at the Command and General

Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, which emphasized more practical application "by means of conferences, lectures, tactical rides, map problems, terrain exercises, map maneuvers, and demonstrations."\(^{107}\) The interwar Army War College did a version of the applicatory method, modified for strategic problems that had even fewer clear solutions than the more tactical or operational exercises at Leavenworth. The greatest manifestation of the applicatory method was the major war planning and war gaming exercise in the latter part of the year, along with the associated map maneuvers and terrain rides.

The focus on the war plan had important effects on teaching and learning. While the preparation for war courses covered a wide variety of material that far exceeded the bounds of any specific war plan, all of the material was taught with war planning in mind. That was why they often started the year with an introductory course on the content of war plans. The production and execution of war plans became a sort of anchor for the curriculum. No matter how esoteric the lecture or committee report, the students always had the challenge of figuring out how the material related back to the fundamental question of the planning, overall direction, and execution of honest to goodness military contingencies at the national and theater level. Further, by executing war plans through the war games and map maneuvers, the students got to see the ways that the outbreak, mobilization, deployment, and conduct of even the most thorough plan never turned out exactly as expected, which gave them practice in reconsidering their work and being flexible in their approaches. Students can be told to be adaptable and to reframe their ideas, but in that area especially, there really is no teacher like experience.

Many of the best practices from Eisenhower’s War College have carried on in some form or fashion to the present day. And obviously, not all of what they did could or should be replicated in the current or future environment. Instead, we should consider, in general terms, the strengths of the interwar War College. The college covered a wide variety of subject matter, but instead of being “a mile wide and an inch deep,” they broke out the material in such a way that all of the students went deep in at least six or seven areas. As a school for practitioners, the faculty organized the material around specific and interrelated strategic roles, so the students could see how what they were studying would be applied in real world positions. Through the structure of the curriculum, committees, and faculty-student relationships, they all built stronger corporate knowledge, shared understanding, and interpersonal bonds in the Army and joint officer corps. And they practiced, over and again, in the real world, against various enemies, in various environments, and as part of various alliances, what their contingencies and wars might look like, so that when their real war came, they were ready.

Maybe industrial age education has something to teach us still.

---

\(^{107}\) Peter J. Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 100-122.
US Army Heritage and Education Center
US Army War College
950 Soldiers Drive
Carlisle, PA 17013

http://ahec.armywarcollege.edu